

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

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ABSTRACT

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On 12 September 2001, the day after the horrible attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers, the United States Government (USG) and the American military officially began the global war on terrorism (GWOT). In a response to the overwhelming flow of compassion from the International, Arab and Muslim Communities, President Bush quickly reached out to America and the rest of the world to make the USG's case to respond quickly to the terrorist activity around the world. Proposing a global war on terrorism (GWOT), he would deliver an eloquent, but stern message, successfully framing why America and the freedom-loving citizens around the world needed to unit to fight the war on terrorism. Almost two years later, as America faced a second war with the brutal government of Iraq, the USG again engaged the international community to state its case for war. This time engaging too slowly, America's positive support gained through public diplomacy and public affairs would quickly dissipate. Thus, making it very difficult to convince the world and the Arab and Muslim Communities that America and the coalition were doing the right thing by in going to war with Iraq for a second time. [p1]

This SRP will examine the importance of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. It will review the current USG policy on public diplomacy, and the military's role of public affairs. Further, the paper will discuss world opinion of USG policy, assess whether the U.S. military should carry the burden of public diplomacy to "win the hearts and minds," and provide a recommendation for improving the USG Pubic Diplomacy posture in our current global war on terrorism.

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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

I've made some very difficult decisions that made public diplomacy in the Muslim world difficult. One was obviously attacking Iraq ... we're behind when it comes to selling our own story and telling people the truth about America....¹

- George W. Bush,
Sierra Times, January 18, 2005

On 12 September 2001, the day after the horrible attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Towers, the United States Government (USG) and the American military officially began the global war on terrorism (GWOT). In a response to the overwhelming flow of compassion from the International, Arab and Muslim communities, President Bush quickly reached out to America and the rest of the world to make the U.S. government's case for a quick response to terrorist activity around the world. Proposing a war to rid the world of terrorism, he would deliver an eloquent but stern message, successfully framing why America and the freedom-loving people of the world needed to unite in an effort to stop terrorism. Almost two years later, as America faced a second war with the brutal government of Iraq, the USG again engaged the international community to state its case for war. This time engaging more slowly, America saw its positive support gained through public diplomacy and public affairs quickly dissipated. The USG then found it difficult to convince the world, specifically the Arab and Muslim communities that America and coalition partners were doing the right thing in going to war with Iraq again.

This SRP will examine the importance of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. It will review the current U.S. policy on public diplomacy and the role of public affairs. Further, the paper will examine world opinion of the USG, assess efforts to "win hearts and minds," and provide a recommendation for improving Public Diplomacy in the war on terrorism.

BACKGROUND

There is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the motivating force for freedom and democracy in the world. And there is no country in the world that does not touch us. We are a country of countries with a citizen in our ranks from every land.

- Colin L. Powell,
Former Secretary of State²

Controversy regarding American military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and USG Middle Eastern policy has raised concerns about the effectiveness of American public diplomacy around the world. The State Department, the U.S. Military, and the Administration's

public affairs staff all have significant responsibility for U.S. public diplomacy around the world. Their activities and messages should be closely coordinated through an inter-agency process that ensures the military, even by default, will not find itself as the agency for American diplomacy around the world.³ According to Dr. R.S. Zaharna, American University, the U.S. military is burdened with a distinct disadvantage because the media reports regularly about American "military occupation" and a "civil administration in Iraq."⁴ In the Arab and Muslim world, an American military occupation conjures negative images of Israeli military occupation of Palestine and of European colonization of the Middle East. These negative images create fertile grounds for rumors, stereotypes and fears that shape public perceptions of an American military occupation of Iraq – an association that is negative, no matter how positive American intentions may be.⁵

Cultural awareness and sensitivity are instrumental in helping the American military put its best face forward to avoid tensions, thereby increasing the safety of both American military personnel and the people they encounter. Dr. Zaharna adds:

If American troops have not been trained in important cultural differences in behavior, such as eye contact, they need training so that they do misinterpret a harmless stare as an aggressive challenge. If there are not sufficient female soldiers to interact with the local female population, there will likely be no interaction with women, thus an opportunity to build relationships will be lost. If religious practices such as covering one's hair is looked down on or reverence to holy sites or religious rituals are not upheld, American military will lose another opportunity to demonstrate tolerance and respect for religious beliefs of the local people.⁶

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public opinion is everything. With it, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed.⁷

—Abraham Lincoln

Public Affairs encompasses a wide range of functions and capacities that affect the different relationships within the military, civilian and media realm. It is a vital enabler to the U.S. government as an instrument of power. Because public affairs is positioned at the core of these relationships, the function is central to positive communication among the military, the various publics and the media. Perceptions of the military by the general public can suffer unless everyone involved in this circle of communication understands the role, function, and job of the military public affairs professionals. PA personnel have one of the most challenging and unique missions in the Armed Services today. Not only are they expected to develop and implement

information campaigns, they are also responsible for developing the PA mission to educate the military and advance the publics' understanding of the military's role in peacetime and in war. Equally important is a clear description of the role the military plays in supporting national security goals and strategy for homeland security and defense.⁸ The departments of State and Defense use public affairs to initiate communications that enable the U.S. government to inform and influence U.S. media and the people of America.

The White House, the National Security Council, other departments and agencies, and military commands all include public affairs staffs. They focus on domestic audiences, but also reach out to acquaintances, allies, and adversaries around the world. Public affairs and public diplomacy practitioners make use of similar tools and methods to reach audiences that are global as well as local.⁹

RESPONSIBILITIES

Distinctions between public affairs and public diplomacy continue to shape U.S. doctrine, resource allocations, and organizational make-up. Public Affairs officers seek to sustain the public's confidence in America's military, in its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict, and war. Since America's earliest days, the Army has communicated information to the people through the media. Fundamentally, public affairs officers enable competent leaders to carry out their missions successfully. Public Affairs officers help commanders achieve information dominance and conduct coordinated information campaigns that contribute to the preservation of public support for America's Armed Forces. Through the use of print and electronic media Public Affairs personnel promote understanding of the nation's military – assuring the nation that their military is dedicated, disciplined, and has the will to win.¹⁰

TRUTH IS PARAMOUNT

No matter how much spinning you do...without trust, you won't be able to influence those you seek to target.¹¹

- COL Dave Smith, IO Program Coordinator, USAWC

A recent article, "Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in A Broad Arena," in the 12 December 2004 New York Times discusses the use of public affairs programs to deceive or "psyop" an adversary during war. These efforts, if approved, would blur the lines of truth and deception and render the traditional public affairs practitioner a useless tool to the public and the media.¹²

Trust and confidence in America's military force and its conduct of operations result when external and internal audiences understand the Army and the reasons for its actions, decisions and policies. Every U.S. service member, active and reserve component, civilian and family member can be a spokesperson if credibility is retained. Once lost, credibility cannot be easily regained. The quickest way to destroy credibility is to misrepresent the truth: communication becomes ineffective and it is impossible to achieve information objectives. Communicating different messages to like audiences is also a sure way to destroy credibility of the source.¹³

In a letter written to General Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Democratic Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri said, "As you know, the mission of public affairs is to reliably present official military information to the American and international audiences. In so doing, it protects the honor, integrity and credibility of our military, which in turn protects the honor, integrity and credibility of the country."¹⁴

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy promotes the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public diplomacy helped win the Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror. The term was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, a career foreign service diplomat and subsequently dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, in connection with establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School. At that time, the Murrow Center's institutional brochure stated:

Public diplomacy seeks to influence public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy, sometimes by shaping public opinion in other countries as a means of obtaining their governments' support of U.S. policy.¹⁵

The Department of State defines public diplomacy as "government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries."¹⁶ Public diplomacy thus seeks to build lasting relationships with targeted countries and to increase receptivity to U.S. culture, values, and policies. It also seeks to influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support U.S. policies and interests. Public diplomacy extends beyond traditional diplomatic interactions between governments.¹⁷ Traditional diplomacy involves active engagement between two or more governments, whereas public diplomacy represents views of private citizens and other organizations, in addition to official U.S. views.¹⁸

In traditional diplomacy, U.S. Embassy officials represent the U.S. Government in a host country by maintaining relations and conducting official business for the United States Government (USG) with the officials of the host government whereas public diplomacy primarily engages many diverse non-government elements of a society.¹⁹ Several of the most influential international leaders of our time, such as Anwar Sadat, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, Raul Alfonsin, and Margaret Thatcher, recognized early in their careers, after spending much time in the United States under the educational exchange programs of the United States government that U.S. public diplomacy was important and at work.²⁰

Public Diplomacy is increasingly taking over classical diplomacy as the most modern working form of diplomacy. This may be the case, but there are convincing examples that support behind-the-scenes negotiations, e.g., the Oslo process. Diplomats can no longer conduct secret business completely free from public scrutiny. Public diplomacy allows diplomats to work directly with the media and the public, turning diplomats into a new generation of public communicators. Functioning as new communicators will require a new communications-related skill set that will enhance skills and ability to react quickly to an ever-changing environment. Essentially, diplomats learn how to utilize the media to convey important foreign policy initiatives and messages.²¹

Traditional Diplomacy, unlike public diplomacy, is that form of diplomacy associated with closed-door executive interaction, with restrictions on the details revealed to the media. It permits important diplomatic discourse and negotiations taking place on a bilateral or multilateral level. Diplomats often try to justify the spirit of secrecy as crucial for the success of talks. Secrecy has been an integral part of classical diplomacy.²²

TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS, THE WHITE HOUSE MUST BE INVOLVED

In order to conduct effective public diplomacy abroad, the US must have an effective [foreign policy] strategy.²³

- Jennifer G. Hickey

Many have expressed the challenge ahead as one of “winning the hearts and minds” – and that speaks directly to the public diplomacy challenge the nation faces.

For the first time since the Cold War, the United States finds itself in an intense struggle for the hearts and minds. This time, the U.S. government is competing against radical fundamentalists for the support of the Arab and Muslim world. This is a struggle against those who seek to destroy the United States and its allies and its core values. The battle is not a short term campaign, but one that will be protracted without a clear end. To win this battle, the nation must formulate an integrated strategy of public diplomacy and political actions. This

campaign must be fought against extremist organizations and governments that support political violence. The focus should be on the information and media battlefield (Information Operations), which are as important as the kinetic/conventional military aspects of war. In cooperation with moderate Muslims, the United States can encourage the strengthening of Islam as a tolerant faith and counter the militant ideology that destroys lives and hinders economic development. Military force alone will not achieve this goal, for the challenge is philosophical, cultural and political."²⁴

At one time, the United States had one of the most reliable public diplomacy programs in the world. During World War II and throughout the Cold War, the Office of War Information and the U.S. Information Agency were developed to inform, persuade, and win the hearts and minds as well, in any nation on the planet.²⁵ The bottom line is this: "The President is the most important voice for influencing attitudes toward the United States abroad. Public diplomacy must have his stamp of approval and enthusiastic support for the duration of the commitment. In fact, he must be considered the ultimate director of public diplomacy."²⁶

HOW DO WE GO ABOUT "WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS?"

To win the confidence of a people, the first challenge lies in defining what we are winning them to. Liberal democracy or democratic shams, Western or Islamic economic system, constitutional or Shariah-based legal order -- any combination of these are possibilities. Lack of clarity in specifying U.S. goals could prove catastrophic in the end. Yet to achieve any successes, Iraq and other societies targeted for reconstruction and reengineering must participate in the definition of success if there's to be legitimacy. This balancing act is necessary in determining the degree of external involvement required to reconstruct a nation's social institutions. The more detailed the level of involvement, the finer the balance necessary for success in winning hearts and minds. These are complex issues that require the nuanced decision-making that the administration must be willing to highlight. So when all is said and done, the standard by which it will be measured is this: a safe and stable government operating under a statute of good governance; an abundance of goods and a system of free enterprise; the freedom to vote (for men and women); the freedom of worship (your chosen religion); the freedom of speech; and the respect for all humanity. It is then when the hearts and minds have been won.²⁷

According to LTG Keith B. Alexander, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "We have to win the hearts and minds of the people ... that's the key to solving problems in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East."²⁸

STRUGGLE OF IDEOLOGY

Winning the hearts and minds requires not only participation, but winning the ideological struggle both overseas and at home. Larry Elder, nationally syndicated columnist, once wrote about an elementary school teacher in Afghanistan who taught political science and history. He said the teacher held up a pie chart that depicted America controlling most of the pie, leaving a tiny sliver for the Afghans. According to Elder, the teacher's point was to show the Afghan students that their suffering and conditions of poverty were directly related to America's disproportionate wealth around the world. Elder concluded that U.S. public diplomacy was failing.²⁹

Another anecdote from Elder described an American public school teacher in a small school in Milwaukee. The teacher wanted to show his students how to understand the mind of a terrorist. The teacher didn't "blame America" for the Middle Eastern problems, but he wanted to demonstrate to his students that over-population and poverty are breeding grounds for easy recruitment of terrorists. He asked his fifth-grade students to stand. Then he arranged them by population, on top of a huge floor map of the world, and handed out cookies according to the countries' gross national product. For example, students in Asia received one cookie to share among 16. Three students in Africa split a half cookie among themselves. In North America, one kid received eight cookies.³⁰ Elder called this the Exploitation Theory: that America enriches herself at the expense of other countries, much as her European counterparts had previously done in the Middle East. His lesson was that America's wealth causes poverty in other countries. Elder presented this anecdote as evidence that U.S. public diplomacy is a domestic failure, as well.³¹

According to John A. Matel (Office Director, International Information Programs [IIP], Europe and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State), the USG understands the complex environment in which we seek to communicate. Many people oppose the United States and its policies for good, practical, and true reasons. If you are a fundamentalist Muslim and you believe that women have fewer rights than men, that only God's (Sharia) law should rule, that lending money at interest is a crime and a myriad of similar beliefs, you will hate the United States. And the more you learn about this country, the more you hate it. If you are French and you believe in the glory of France, America stands in your way. If you are a leftist who believes in socialism internationally, America stands in your way. If you are an anti-globalist, America stands in your way. This is not a matter of public relations. We have some predictable enemies.³²

STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The State Department's role in public diplomacy is to promulgate America's messages, but the United States must improve the way policies are explained, the way American values are presented, and the way the U.S. listens to what others are saying not only in Arab and Muslim States, but throughout the world. "The American transformation will require a new clarity and strategy for public diplomacy, guided from the White House; new processes for developing strategic messages and disseminating the messages, making use of the best information technology; new programs to implement the strategy, continually testing the effectiveness and making adjustments; a top to bottom review of current programs, eliminating or revising programs that do not meet the needs of the Administration in order to produce favorable attitudes toward the United States and a more accurate understanding of American interests; a new management structure that provides accountability, speed, and coordination across the full spectrum of government interagency; adequate resources drawn through reallocation from existing programs and through new personnel and finances; and a firm commitment and directive from the President of the United States to all relevant governmental agencies that emphasize the importance of public diplomacy in advancing American interests."³³

OFFICE OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS

President Bush, understanding the importance of conveying America's message to the world, issued executive order 13283 establishing the Office of Global Communications (OGC), on 21 January 2003. The Office of Global Communications (OGC) was formed to coordinate strategic communications overseas that integrate the President's themes and truthfully depict America and Administration policies. Since better coordination of our international communications helps convey the truth about America and the goals we share with people everywhere, the President authorized OGC, by executive order, to communicate American policies and values with greater clarity and through dialogue with emerging voices around the globe. This office, under the leadership of the Deputy Assistant to the President for Global Communications, was established to advise the President and members of his Executive Office, heads of executive departments, and agencies on the best method for communicating USG positions effectively to a global audience.³⁴

Many functions of the OGC mission overlap those of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. OGC has worked in close coordination with the Pentagon and all relevant agencies in an effort to reveal the disinformation and propaganda directed at the United States. The OGC has yet to fully reach its potential as the integrator of executive level to

mid-range themes that support Presidential Initiatives, as assigned by its original charter. Its role has focused primarily on support for the president and his Executive Officers.³⁵

ADMINISTRATION POLICY

There are efforts to increase the efficiency of the Administration's policy on public affairs and public diplomacy. This policy is driven by values and interests, and it promotes the free flow of information and ideas to spark aspirations of freedom in societies ruled by the sponsors of terrorism.³⁶ At the same time, the Administration needs to listen carefully to international publics to maintain dialogue those who look at the United States for direction, and to be mindful of regional and cultural traditions. In this manner, it is possible to create a realistic, positive picture of the United States, one that helps audiences make informed judgments about American policies and society.

The United States needs to ensure that sufficient funding is available to promote American diplomacy effectively.³⁷ It's essential to bring funding in line with the role of public diplomacy as a vital component of foreign policy and national security. The marginalization of public diplomacy has created a legacy of under-funded and uncoordinated efforts. For example, the approximately \$1 billion spent annually on the Department of State's information and exchange programs and on U.S. international broadcasting is only four percent of the nation's international affairs budget.³⁸

From 1993 to 2001, leading up to 11 September 2001, the overall funding for the State Department's educational and cultural exchange programs decreased by more than 33 percent, from \$349 million to \$232 million. Over the past decade, exchanges programs with significant Muslim populations declined -- even as populations in those countries were increasing. State Department exchanges with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand decreased 28 percent; those with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen fell 21 percent; and those with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India declined to a paltry 34 percent.³⁹

As populations increased in most Muslim countries (by an estimated 16 percent since 1992), per capita spending by the State Department decreased by more than 33 percent. Similar decreases in funding can be seen in the budget for international broadcasting, and today the Voice of America audience ratings in the Middle East average only about two percent of the population. Drastic decreases in funding have been made in many U.S. information libraries and "America House" as well.⁴⁰

Investing one percent of the nation's proposed \$379 billion military budget on public diplomacy will result in a budget increase to \$3 billion to \$4 billion -- a figure that pales in

comparison to the \$222 billion American companies invest annually on overseas advertising. U.S. public diplomacy must be funded at significantly higher levels -- with moneys phased in over several years, tied to specific objectives, and monitored closely for effectiveness, including the possible use of test campaigns.⁴¹

Spreading positive information about the United States to receptive audiences will heighten their awareness of what America is all about. It is essential to identify foreign audiences to gauge whether or not U.S. diplomacy is in line with concerns of those with an interest in America. As Richard Holbrooke points out, these initiatives will help "define what this war is really about" in the minds of a billion Muslims and work as a good platform to understand the next strategy the nation must take to help others understand America."⁴² Towards this end, the current policy promotes international education exchanges and professional exchanges that bring emerging foreign leaders and youth together from around the Arab and Muslim world, especially Afghanistan and Iraq. This long-term public diplomacy is likely to have the greatest impact on future generations, mutually benefiting US, Arab and Muslim citizens.⁴³ The ideal goal is to plan and fund efforts, using advanced technology, to integrate themes across boundaries of enemies, friends and coalition partners.

Immediately after the attacks on 11 September 2001, President Bush recognized that America needed to do a better job of telling the nation's story.⁴⁴ In less than a month after 9/11, Charlotte Beers, a former advertising executive with more than forty years of experience, was appointed to serve as the Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy. Her primary task was to refurbish America's image abroad.⁴⁵ Beers achieved early successes convincing Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to take America's message directly to the Arab and Muslim world via Al Jazeera and like-minded media throughout the Middle East. The regional media enabled America's top diplomats to share American values with Arabs and Muslims. Also, information compiled to produce a booklet called "The Network of Terror" links al Qaeda and the 11 September attacks; it's now a widely disseminated brochure in the Muslim community. Beers also produced a State Department website that airs a series of mini-documentaries on positive contributions of Arab and Muslim Americans.⁴⁶

But the United States enjoyed only limited success in reaching large audiences within the Arab and Muslim world. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 February 2003, Beers admitted the gap between how America sees itself and how others see America as "frighteningly wide." She acknowledged images so negative that they assure "a new generation of terrorists is being created."⁴⁷ Her comments were confirmed by the PEW

Research Center's survey of thousands in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan. The survey suggests that many Arab and Muslims believe the United States is a more serious threat to the world than Iraq.⁴⁸

To further explain declining U.S. support in the Arab and Muslim world, it is necessary to consider credibility and culture. As far as credibility is concerned, many in the Arab and Muslim world openly condemn Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network for the September 11 attacks, especially for perpetrating this act in the name of Islam. However, throughout the Middle East, Arab political sentiment is shaped by the region's history with past colonial rulers (France and Britain). The treatment of Palestinians suggests U.S. bias, and direct projection of American power into the region contributed to the perceptions that America's presence is a sacrilege against the sacred purity of Islam's holy places and therefore harmful to the welfare of the Arab people.⁴⁹[p3]

President Bush did the right thing in visiting the Islamic Center in Washington and meeting with leading Arab and Muslim Americans immediately after 11 September. However, since that time, communications have stalled. Islamic experts believe the U.S. information campaign to reach out to Arab and Muslims is now a confused mess, and all hope is lost.⁵⁰

Despite the U.S. government's overwhelming supremacy in modern communications technology, America communicates with the Muslim world primarily through less-than adequate means that are not up to the task and are simply the vestiges of the old U.S. Information Agency, a Cold War agency that was folded into the State Department in 1998-1999. Its personnel have limited background or experience regarding the issues they must now address. As for the Voice of America, it still uses primarily short wave or regular radio and very limited special channel television. Broadcasts are barely audible. They have an audience of less than two percent, and almost no reach to the most critical group, those Muslims under 25.⁵¹

Another outlet is Radio Sawa, a 24-hour, seven day a week Arabic-language network that began broadcasting on 23 March 2002. Its broadcast originates from studios in Washington, D.C., and Dubai, U.A.E., as well as news bureaus throughout the Middle East. The network is a service of U.S. International Broadcasting and is publicly funded by the U.S. Congress. Radio Sawa is dedicated to broadcasting accurate, timely and relevant news about the Middle East, the world, and the United States. It is committed to the highest standards of journalism, free marketplace of ideas, as well as respect for the intelligence and culture of its audience. Its upbeat style is modern and forward-looking, so it and has a positive impact on the youthful generation in the Middle East. The United States has made significant use of the internet in Iraq,

but finds the Internet of little value throughout the remainder of the Middle-East where Internet access is less than one percent in key countries.⁵²

WORLD OPINION

Today America's image problem is global. Leaders of America's traditional allies have found it convenient and prudent, for political survival, to work against the efforts of the United States. The problem is prevalent across the Middle East and among predominantly Arab and Muslim populations. Recent polls highlight the depth and breadth of the discontent with America. In December 2001 and January 2002, Gallup conducted a poll of nearly 10,000 residents in nine Muslim countries. By an average of more than 2:1, respondents reported an unfavorable view of the United States. The prevailing negative view in Iran is not surprising because there is a tumultuous relationship between the two nations that has existed for more than 20 years. More troubling for the United States is that only 16 percent of respondents in Saudi Arabia, supposedly one of America's long-standing allies in the region, held a favorable view of the United States and what it represented in the Middle East.⁵³

ABU GHRAIB...FROM LIBERATORS TO TYRANTS

Complicating America's strategy to appeal to the Arab and Muslim community were the devastating discoveries at Abu Ghraib. So did evidence of abuse of prisoner damage America's reputation as the leading nation around the world. Images of the great "liberators" who pulled down statues of the tyrant Saddam Hussein, have transitioned to grainy photographs of bad American prison guards, allegedly torturing Iraqi detainees at Saddam's prized chambers of horror.⁵⁴ "Just as the picture of the naked and burned girl fleeing a napalm attack achieved iconic status during the Vietnam War, so have the grainy pictures of the hooded prisoner standing on a box with wires attached to his limbs achieved a similar status during the Iraqi War."⁵⁵ Whether the act(s) at Abu Ghraib were limited to a small group of individuals, or rampant throughout the prison, the images will forever linger in the minds of Americans and citizens of the Middle East.⁵⁶ Those images have fueled the perception that the U.S. is a brutal oppressor versus a benign liberator.

SHOULD THE MILITARY CARRY THE BURDEN FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM?

According to Charles Hucker, Executive Communications Services of America, public affairs officers in today's military should ask of themselves the following question: Should military public affairs carry the bulk of responsibility for public diplomacy during the global war

on terrorism?⁵⁷ It has in many cases, by default. From the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, military spokespersons were at the forefront in communicating with the people of America. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military continued to take the lead in communicating to the American people. Because U.S. political leadership has not communicated effectively to the people in the Middle East and other areas around the world, the responsibility fell by default upon the military. However, according to Hucker, “the reality is that it depends on who you are talking about – senior civilian leadership or senior military leadership in the Department of Defense (DOD).” Referring to civilian leadership, Hucker notes that, besides the President of the United States, the primary military leadership responsible for public diplomacy is the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.⁵⁸

Regardless of responsibility by statute, the role of the military is to support the lawful orders of civilian leadership. However, the military should not be responsible for leading public diplomacy; the military’s job is to “fight and win the nation’s wars” and not to market foreign policy.⁵⁹ Realistically, there is no way around the military playing a role, whether major or minor, in “public diplomacy” in the global war on terrorism. First, the military is one of the most trusted institutions in America. Secondly, for better or worst, the media keeps the face(s) of the American military fresh in the eyes and minds of the global community.⁶⁰

DOD MEDIA BOOT CAMP AND EMBED PROGRAM

“Flexibility is as important in facilitating media coverage of wars as it is in fighting them. We must continue to look for opportunities to assure media access to combat forces and, when necessary, create smaller, regional media pools.”⁶¹ As difficult as it may be to admit, the military has not always provided ample opportunity for the media to cover operations and missions in past conflicts. The friction between the Army and media, although not new, has contributed to a painfully distrustful relationship that extends over generations of conflicts fought by American military.⁶² To ensure media is given a fair opportunity to get to know soldiers, to understand the operations and experience how they lived under less than favorable conditions, the DOD established a Media Boot Camp as a complement to the Embedded Media Program.⁶³

The DOD media boot camp was established to help embedded journalists develop a relationship with the military services and prepare them for the rigors of combat, including possible exposure to biological or chemical weapons. DOD made it a requirement for all journalists who wanted to be embedded with troops to attend the boot camp.⁶⁴

Media Boot Camps, held at various military installations, were conducted in an environment as realistic as possible, since fewer of today's reporters have combat experience. Each reporter was allowed to experiment with improved communications gear and satellite uplinks. The Army assigned highly competent soldiers to manage the embedded media program to alleviate repeated criticisms it received in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm because of how it managed public affairs operations. By contrast, media comments have been overwhelmingly positive in the aftermath of major hostilities in Iraq. According to John Hendren of the LA Times, who stayed with the 3d Infantry Division in Kuwait before the war, "When you're living in tents with these guys, and eating what they eat and cleaning the dirt off your glasses, it's a whole different experience. You definitely have a concern about knowing people so well that you sympathize with them."⁶⁵

TELLING THE STORY IS GOOD FOR THE MILITARY

Given the successful use of embedded reporters, the military has often wondered why it appears the United States is losing the campaign in the media. Numerous successes have been shared with the public via the military media embed program for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and to some degree, successes in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The military has worked tirelessly to provide accurate and timely information to the media about the force and its operations and mission accomplishment. Historically, there has been a lack of trust between the media and the military because the media believes the military would like to keep them uninformed about what the military is trying to accomplish. The media believes there should be "NO" secrecy when dealing with the military. When that is the case, the military usually looks bad in the long run.⁶⁶

MILITARY VS MEDIA CULTURE

The culture of the military differs greatly from the media culture and from civilian culture in general. Reporters have little use for structure and hierarchy; the military does. These contrasting views of authority lead the media and sometimes the public to become very frustrated with the military.⁶⁷

Second, the expectations of the military culture and the media culture are entirely different. The media wants to know everything right now and consider the military a pachyderm – moving very slowly unless forced to move faster. Media demands and expectations can put the military in a position the institution is most uncomfortable with. Again, the result is media frustration with the military.⁶⁸

Third, whether it likes it or not, the military operates in a political environment and is subject to partisan-inspired commentary in Congress and from the media.⁶⁹ Several historians have noted that numerous general officers, as early as the American Civil War, chronically complained about having to look over their shoulders at the politicians in Congress.

Today, many media critics say that since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the press has shown a certain reluctance to question the national authority, Congress and even some high-level military officers with tough questions about the state of the country and its military. Such questions are now considered (by many Americans) to be “unpatriotic.” Of course, there is the other half that believes it is “unpatriotic” not to question what the US government and military is doing.⁷⁰

CNN’s Lou Dobbs said he is very concerned. He believes it is “critically important” for the media to question “the geopolitical discussion, its relationship to the military and our national goals, and the result on the military.” He also surmises that the media is operating in a country that has never before been so politically polarized and fragmented.⁷¹

WHEN DIPLOMACY IS MOST EFFECTIVE

Public diplomacy is most effective when resources are allocated to establish conditions for success specified in the administration’s conflict resolution and conflict termination objectives. To achieve this aim there should be a cabinet level position for the Presidential Office of Information (POI). The director of the POI should be a public diplomacy expert and resourced with a viable staff to perform functional responsibilities. A critical goal of the POI is to develop strategic direction and interagency coordination of domestic and international public diplomacy. The director should have the ability to influence public policy with respect to information operations, planning and funding. The office would be supported by the State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, all focusing on shaping U.S. responses to global issues. A public policy goal for the POI is to establish a consortium of senior public relations and other senior executives in order to have effective dialogue and agreement on what constitutes an appropriate media saturation campaign without undermining State Department public diplomacy goals, while countering, negating and neutralizing propaganda and discrediting radical fundamentalism.⁷²

THIRD PARTY CREDIBILITY

The United States should seek legitimacy and credibility that can be achieved through the use of third-party validators. Making use of these outside sources may provide alternative means to communicate U.S. foreign policy with international audiences and bolster efforts to

engage American officials. Such sources are rarely incorporated into public diplomacy efforts since most U.S. embassies lack the means to contact American expatriates and sympathetic prominent citizens of other nations.⁷³ All of these could profoundly impact local populations; influential citizens can supplement embassy efforts and serve as unofficial spokespersons.⁷⁴ The use of prominent international citizens and diplomats has often worked to develop bonds between the United States and other countries. In today's 24-hour media environment, it is necessary to expand the number of such contacts and provide them with communication tools such as messages and talking points.⁷⁵

WINNING THE WAR OF IDEAS

Engaging Arab-Americans and U.S. Muslims to communicate the U.S. message can profoundly impact the perception gap between the United States and Arab and Muslim communities around the world. Muslims and Arab Americans have unique credibility in their countries of origin; they communicate from a vantage point the importance of U.S. policy. Senior administration officials should meet with a broad cross-section of this community on a regular basis to explain the rationale for government policies. Individual Arab American and Muslim leaders could also be invited to play a formal role in overseeing public diplomacy efforts.⁷⁶

BETTER UTILIZE THE MEDIA IN THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLDS.

Osama bin Laden scored a propaganda coup when Al Jazeera, an uncensored satellite network based in Qatar, broadcast his videotaped remarks on 7 October 2001. Instead of flooding Al Jazeera with comments from U.S. officials and U.S. voices to counter bin Laden's hate speech, administration officials initially sought to prevent both Al Jazeera and U.S. networks from broadcasting messages from bin Laden or the Taliban leadership. Secretary of State Colin Powell granted Al Jazeera an interview six days after the 11 September attacks. Condoleezza Rice, then the Administration's National Security Adviser, followed with an interview as well. To date, President Bush has yet to conduct an interview with Al Jazeera. According to a DOD spokesperson, Al Jazeera's Washington bureau chief has said that his network is "desperate to find any [U.S.] officials who will speak to them. The White House must develop a program that reaches out to media in the Arab and Muslim world, starting with Al Jazeera, and other pan-Arab networks, Middle East Broadcasting Center, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International, and "moderate" newspapers such as al-Hayat. Also the administration must bolster the Voice of America and create new outlets and media. Eighty percent of Afghan men listen to VOA broadcasts; 72 percent say they trust VOA and agree that

it provides facts that let them make up their own minds. Unfortunately, VOA's listenership in the Arab world is a mere two percent.⁷⁷

RECOMMENDATION

The Administration should establish a Presidential Office of Information (POI). The concept of POI is not without precedent. Nearly 60 years ago, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt confronted the challenges of public diplomacy by creating the Office of War Information and the Advertising Council. He hired the most creative minds of the generation to help create messages to communicate with American and world audiences. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower created the United States Information Agency to combat the ideology and spread of communism. This once effective agency was led by Edward R. Murrow, George Stevens Jr. and John Chancellor. More recently, President Clinton realized that normal public information programs were not affecting the enormous support among Serbs for Slobodan Milosevic during the Kosovo Crisis. The Clinton Administration then created an office specifically to counter the robust disinformation campaign emanating from Serbia. The efforts were both overt; they covert and played a significant role in bringing Milosevic to justice.⁷⁸

The POI must develop an environment that facilitates the sharing of essential information across the full-spectrum of the inter-agency process. "The office should create a system that builds upon systems that provide the right information that focuses on the right people at all times. Information will be shared "horizontally" across the spectrum of the interagency and selected governments and "vertically" among the federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and citizens when appropriate. With the proper use of people, processes and technology, the POI will receive the information needed to anticipate threats and respond rapidly and effectively. Equally as important, the Presidential Office of Information will leverage America's leading-edge information technology to develop an information architecture that will effectively support American Public Diplomacy."⁷⁹

By creating a Presidential Office of Information, the Administration will be able to pursue its public diplomacy aims and remain engaged with targeted audiences throughout the world. The active involvement of America's public diplomacy will be crucial to achieving the final outcome of galvanizing support from other states that oppose Muslim radicalism -- but remain open to diplomacy and good governance throughout the Arab and Muslim world."⁸⁰

President George Walker Bush, having acknowledged that the U.S. needs to do a much better job in public diplomacy, announced his nomination of Karen Hughes as the new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. If confirmed, Hughes will conduct a

broad review and restructuring of U.S. public diplomacy efforts to meet the challenges in the war on terrorism and the 21st century.⁸¹

CONCLUSION

Critics have argued that it could be impossible to sell world opinion on policies that may be flawed. Winning the hearts and minds continues to be a difficult goal to achieve in the war on terrorism, but it's not impossible. U.S. public diplomacy needs great improvement, and if there is to be a change in its direction, it will need to come from the U.S. President. If the nation's leader is involved, change will occur. Whether it is for the best will be determined later. America's military is regarded as a superb military machine, and is unmatched around the world. It is effectively engaged in informational activities that require the national direction essential to guide military application of informational power; to help share the public diplomacy load with which the military is disproportionately burdened; and finally, to complement military efforts to create a receptive environment in which U.S. service members operate.

Overall, the military doesn't do well in handling public diplomacy and shouldn't need to because, at best, public diplomacy is largely political ... and not military.⁸²

WORD COUNT= 7347

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