

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ARMY TRANSFORMATION – BEYOND
THE TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATED
PLANNING SPELLS SUCCESS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army transformation process has centered on the introduction of new technologies to meet the needs of the war fighter. As such the Army logistics community has incorporated a Revolution in Military Logistics (RML) which is the introduction of new technologies to improve logistical sustainment to the war fighter. Although the advancement of technology is needed, it is not the only answer to ensure logistical support is attained throughout a campaign. Army transformation and the RML must include the ability to integrate operational and logistical planning in order to synchronize the capabilities of new the technologies in logistics. Additionally, it is the integration of these planning efforts that will ensure the right size force is available to accomplish the mission. Therefore, a fully viable Army transformation must include the introduction of new processes and concepts that will integrate the efforts of both the operational and the logistical planner. Only then will Army transformation and a RML allow for more than the introduction of new technologies and thereby make a strategic difference for operations and logistics on the battlefield.

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ARMY TRANSFORMATION – BEYOND THE TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATED PLANNING SPELLS SUCCESS

The success the U.S. Army achieved during the major combat phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is in part due to the recent advancements and fielding of new equipment and technologies. This is in conjunction with a massive transformation effort by the U.S. Army that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Since then, there has been recognition for the need to transform to a smaller, lighter, more lethal and more deployable force that exploits new technologies. The deployment of the best soldiers with the best technology and equipment has paid dividends with the successes the Army achieved in the aforementioned operations.

It seems that the focus of the U.S. Army transformation efforts is primarily on achieving the widest and most expedient insertion of these new technologies. I think this kind of thinking is risky as it could lead to an over reliance on technology and the failure to emphasize the requirement for integration, coordination and planning processes at the operational and strategic levels. The idea that technology alone, without the proper coordination of its use and improvements to processes to address all aspects of deployment, combat, sustainment and redeployment is not borne out by the experiences of the Army in recent conflicts. It is the integrated planning efforts of the operational and logistics planners that will prevent potential problems and ensure proper use and optimal results of the new technologies.¹ Therefore, the transformation efforts of the Army must also include a cultural change that would include the integration of planning staffs and not solely the insertion of new technologies and fielding of new equipment onto the battlefield.

For example, as part of a Revolution in Military Logistics (RML), the Army logistics community is pushing forward technologies that will interconnect all logisticians and logistics systems in order to better react to the needs of the war fighter. This concept proposed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) of the Army includes having quicker communications in the logistics chain; the ability to view and monitor supplies across the entire logistics system; and deliver supplies and equipment quickly and as far forward as possible.² The risk of this proposal is that it is a process designed to be reactive rather than proactive. I think this is a response to the negative consequences a lack of proper planning to determine the full requirements for logistical support being conducted prior to operations. If operations are to be successful, units cannot wait until they are engaged to identify a logistics requirement and then expect quick logistical support response to occur if it was not previously coordinated between the operational and logistical planners. Whether it is supplies, equipment,

maintenance, logistical units or distribution assets, prior detailed integration and coordination between operations and logistics planning is needed.

A clear case for the need to improve integrating operations and logistical planning can be found in the process used to determine the right force size needed to accomplish and sustain a mission. It is only through close integration and coordination of the planning efforts that the risky and unscheduled operational pauses caused by lack of logistics support and distribution assets can be prevented. The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) identifies the right logistical structure for combat operations as being a critical force structure and sequencing consideration for deployment and sustainment planning. The concept, called focused logistics, is intended to ensure “the right personnel, equipment and supplies in the right quantities” are deployed and operational “at the right place and time”.³ In my opinion, this statement alone should cause the most senior Army leadership to demand that the operational and logistical planners integrate and synchronize their planning to provide a level of detail that will ensure mission success. Our recent history provides ample examples of how the lack of this integration and synchronization in planning has caused operational delays and often with the potential for disastrous outcomes.

What is needed is an expansion in Army Transformation, RML and NMS to include a change in the planning processes. From the Chairman’s own forward in the NMS on transformation he writes of the need to transform the Armed Forces “in stride” – fielding new capabilities and adopting new operational concepts ... a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments –adjustments reward innovation and creativity.⁴ From my assessment, it would seem that the real emphasis in Army Transformation, RML and the NMS has more to do with incorporating technology than how to fully achieve benefit from that technology in the planning process.

Historical proof for the need for integration of operational and logistics planning was posed by a former Army DCSLOG, LTG (Ret) Joseph M. Heiser who has written extensively on the subject. To fully appreciate the need to conduct proper integrated planning he states:

Logistics is a command responsibility at all levels of command, and commanders cannot delegate their logistics responsibilities to logistics specialists. Personal contact between the combat commander and the logistic commander provides the best basis for cooperation and coordination and results in mutual understanding and confidence.⁵

His proclamation that the logistics is a responsibility a commander takes on for an operation is the crucial element in planning. Simply put, this mutual integration is a necessary action

between the operational and the logistic planners. LTG (Ret) Heiser, by his own account, learned this concept during his almost 40 years of service. Obviously, this notion has existed for a long time, so it begs the question of how can transformation not also address the need to ensure the integration of operational planning with the logistical planning from the very onset.

There is little doubt within the Army that we no longer need a force that is excessively large and heavy. It is accepted that what we need is one that is lighter, more lethal and more mobile to respond in relatively short notice anywhere in the world. For many this means enhancing the Army with advancements of a technological nature that will allow commanders the flexibility and responsiveness to achieve these capabilities. Looking at the Stryker vehicle for instance, it is clear the Army views the incorporation of the vehicles in a brigade combat formation that is of medium weight, rapidly deployable yet lethal enough to combat a heavy force. As mentioned, for its part the Army logistics community is also looking toward advancements in technology to support a smaller, lighter, more lethal and more deployable force.⁶ I think here again we find evidence of a flawed idea that technology alone can enhance the war fighting capability of the Army, but failing to understand technology alone will not solve the Army's logistical requirements for this future force.

To justify this statement let's look at the logistics community's initiatives for transformation more closely. The DCSLOG of the Army recently published the *Army Logistics White Paper* to outline the road ahead for the RML. Of the four focus areas he discusses, all but one center on the need to leverage technology to support the war fighter. The first, second and fourth focus areas underscore advancements in technology that will allow logisticians world wide to become more effective in supporting the war fighter.⁷ The exception is the third focus area which involves a solution for better reception, staging and onward movement (RSO) by developing a permanent theater entrance capability/unit and not solely on technology. In support of the argument for integrated planning, the *Army Logistics White Paper* does discuss the need for logisticians to better understand war fighting in order to better anticipate and support the fight. Through the lessons learned from OIF, logisticians understand the necessity to plan logistics operations as part of combat operation and not just a support mission.

If we accept that Army logisticians' fully appreciate the importance of their planning to the success of combat operations it is then time for logisticians to insert themselves more into the overall operational planning process. U.S. Army logisticians need only to look to their most senior leader, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) of the Army for reinforcement. The CSA has

outlined his vision for transformation in five basic concepts. The first is to adopt the new operational concept of each "Soldier is a warrior first" and not just a specialist in his field; second, the introduction of new technologies that will allow for a smaller, lighter, more lethal and more deployable force; third, a complete reorganization of the Army; fourth, as all this is occurring evolve doctrine to complement the changes; and finally addressing logistics and the need to reshape the way the Army thinks and does logistics.⁸

At the center of this concept are an operations and logistics planning assumption that must be changed. For years the Army has planned logistically in the terms of a developed theater of operation with an extensive host-nation infrastructure to support the force. This is a logistics paradigm Army planners must move away from as these concepts do not support expeditionary operations.

Simultaneity and complexity compound the eternal constraints of decreased time, vast distances, and limited resources, creating a pressing demand for a logistics system that capitalizes on service interdependencies. We must operationally link logistics support to maneuver in order to produce desired operational outcomes. ... We require a distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations; one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements.⁹

Again we can see justification for changing coordination and integration to improve the relationship between the operational and logistical planners. Again, it would seem that there should be a push from the most senior leaders of the Army for the need to integrate and synchronize operations with logistics as a part of transformation.

An additional aspect of transformation that supports the need for integrated planning is the new Brigade Combat Team (BCT) organization. Knowing it is not possible to transform everything at the same time, the Army chose the maneuver/direct war fighter as the first focus in its transformation with the reorganization of brigades into BCTs. The basic concept of the BCT is to have a task organized fighting element that is a permanent unit verses how in the past units task organized prior to being deployed. The whole premise of the BCT is the ability to prepare/equip and train while in garrison before moving to the combat zone. Technological advancements are peppered throughout the BCT, but they are not the key element of the transformation. The BCT is an organization that lives and trains together, deploys in total to support the combatant commander. Theoretically, there is no longer a need to have a train-up period to become a team, prepared to execute the mission.¹⁰ It is my view that the true

challenge for the BCT is to make a change in the mind-set of the commander and staff, and the need to change the way the maneuver and support elements plan for operations.

As stated the transformation of maneuver units really has more to do with how the whole BCT trains and fights together. In dissecting the methodology used to reorganize the BCTs, the Army ensured each BCT was organized as a self-sustaining entity and with its own support battalion. With this design the BCT is capable of operating under a high tempo for three days, and in a moderate environment up to seven days.¹¹ Therefore, the assumption is that by reconfiguring the BCT into a self-contained entity that trains and fights together efficiencies are brought to bare in its employment in operations. There is still a significant challenge for the BCT to deploy, sustain and redeploy if the higher level support structures are not in place.

To meet this requirement, the Army is developing a higher level support structure in the concept of a Support Unit of Action (SUA), which has a theater opening capability and can provide the higher echelon sustainment to the BCT.¹² Unfortunately even this new concept has yet to mature and would seem to rely more on technology as the main solution for logistics. This approach also increases the need to ensure the integration of operations and logistics planning to achieve success.

To see the dangers over reliance on technology may hold for the logistics community we can turn to the Government Accounting Office (GAO) December 2003 audit report to Congress on the results of their audit of OIF logistics effectiveness.¹³ Their findings revealed faults in the logistics processes. Unfortunately this report is being cited to help drive the train on technology improvements for logistics processes instead of identifying the real root cause of the problem. I assert that the logistics process was just one of many issues that could have been averted had better integrated planning occurred. One of the main findings in the report was the many problems in the reception and distribution of supplies for OIF. What is most disturbing is that the problems in OIF were a repeat of the problems of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It is very difficult to understand how it is possible to have the exact same problems 12 years later. There were After Action Reports (AAR) submitted following Operation Desert Storm concerning these problems and methods to correct them were recommended. Apparently the required corrections weren't implemented in time to alleviate the same reception and distribution issues. Operations and logistics planners did not learn from this point and therefore did not integrate their planning in advance to preclude the same problems. Had it not been for the resourcefulness of the immediate ground commander during OIF, supporting forward with supplies would not have occurred.¹⁴

Had integrated planning occurred, the accumulation of supplies and equipment at the ports of debarkation and the huge quagmire that ensued would have been prevented. Each combatant commander has an operations plan that also has a deployment plan that is meticulously scrutinized, reviewed and updated. This phase of the planning process is commonly known as the TPFDD (Timed Phased Force Deployment Data).¹⁵ Unfortunately, in OIF the TPFDD was not executed but instead was replaced with individual deployment orders for specific units, otherwise known as Request for Forces (RFF).¹⁶ Obviously this is not the preferred method for deployment due to the uncertainty for the units of who would get called and when they would deploy. An operational plan with TPFDD most certainly clears up most uncertainty whereas the RFF does not. The latter deployment methodology is not an integrated plan like a TPFDD and will likely cause logistics support to be insufficient and overly reactive. This in effect will cause the logistics support plan to be adversely altered by changes in the deployment. Now it is evident that second and third order effects occurred due to not having the ability to flex to support as far forward as planned, especially in the case of rapid successes. Instead of having sufficient logistics units with the right capabilities for all phases of the operation, risk was assumed and critical logistics units were not deployed to provide combat strength.¹⁷ Again, the most troubling aspect of this was that the exact same problems occurred during Operation Desert Storm. It should have been a lesson learned that a well thought out logistics and deployment plan would have to be more proactive instead of reactive.

Then the obvious question is why were the right logistics units not deployed in sufficient quantities to meet OIF requirements? Throughout the planning process operational planners normally review plans to ensure the right size force is available to conduct the operations. This is not to imply that the Army fights on the cheap, rather the operational planner had to find combat power and combat multipliers that would allow for the minimal amount of forces to be deployed to accomplish the mission. This includes minimizing both troop support and civilian numbers as much as possible. The most common approach is reducing the amount of support forces, accepting risk and relying more on host nation and contracting. It was this acceptance of risk in the trade-off of logistics forces for host nation and contracting that was a limiting factor on the ability to provide forward support during OIF.¹⁸ Unfortunately there is always a limit to how far the logistics system within the force can be reduced before there is catastrophic degradation of support to the mission. Getting the right combination of forces also has the added challenge of synchronizing and scheduling their arrival through sea and air lift to ensure success.¹⁹ This must all be part of the integrated planning process, making sure to fully

understand the requirements when considering the design of the force package to include the right size logistical force necessary to ensure success.

In the case of OIF, the force cap did not include adequate logistical capacities to sustain the force throughout the entire operation.²⁰ In essence, the plan was written to minimize the amount of forces on the ground necessary to accomplish the mission successfully. This included assuming risk in order to achieve maximum ground combat power quickly to deter, and if required, sufficient strength to go on the offensive. As mentioned, the plan was successful in that sufficient combat forces were deployed to conduct combat operations, but adequate logistics capacity to fully support the force was not deployed. Part of the risk and a detriment in supporting the force was an assumption that the logistics structure in Kuwait was sufficient to support the force through battle until follow-on-forces could arrive. Due to the success and speed of the operation and the lack of sufficient logistics capacity coupled with the vast distances involved there was simply a lack in capability to deliver the needed supplies far forward in order to keep the momentum going. As a result, the ground forces took an unplanned “tactical pause” of a minimum of 36 hours in order for supplies to catch up to refit and rearm the combat elements.

In General (Ret) Tommy Franks' biography “American Soldier” (former Commander of Central Command at the onset of OIF), his account of the planning process for OIF leads the reader to believe that operational planning was conducted first and then given to the logisticians to determine the best method to support the plan. He describes the intense pressure on him to develop a plan that would emphasize a smaller and more lethal combat force that would quickly defeat the enemy and then quickly end hostilities. This meant decreasing the force from the original operation plan developed; a plan that was already vetted by all staff components. By changing the plan without additional vetting, the required force to actually conduct the entire operation from deployment through transition to civil government control was not employed. This could have been partially due to the rapid developments at the time and the fact that planning at the Combatant Commander level required a high level of security, but I believe this solidly justifies the need to involve the logistics planners up front. Once the plan was approved at the highest levels, it was then given to the other staff components to determine how to support the plan. Unfortunately, in order for the staff components to determine the best methods to support the approved operational plan they had to accept levels of risk in each phase of the operation. For the logistician this meant working within the constraints given, finding places where there was acceptable risk, but still ensuring success in the operation.²¹

There are some senior leaders in the Army that already recognize the need to better integrate planning staffs to ensure optimal planning occurs. A current action in this regard is the restructuring of the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) headquarters staff (which is designated as the new model for the Unit of Employment headquarters (UEX or UEy) a higher level command and control structure for maneuver elements) into functional headquarters staffs.²² The concept of this restructuring is to align the staff into functional areas instead of the current "G-Staff" structure. Instead of having a G1 (Personnel) staff and a G4 (Logistics) staff, they will now be aligned into an ADMINLOG staff, bringing the functions of combat service support into one functional staff. The other functional staffs include an Intelligence staff, Operations staff, and Fires staff and so on; again business as usual by keeping the separation of staffs. Unfortunately, this methodology of realigning staffs does not go far enough to integrate planning, therefore, it is still done separately and the staff functions are still brought together after the operations plan is developed in order to determine supportability.

Fortunately since the initial planning efforts of OIF, individual commanders have pushed for integrated planning efforts among the staff sections so as to involve all functional areas to ensure lessons learned are incorporated and corrective actions taken. For instance all missions that are currently conducted in Iraq are executed after mission planning is coordinated between the CFLCC C3 (Operations) and C4 (Logistics).²³ This came about from lessons learned from of the initial planning effort for OIF that were centered mainly on operational planning. The plan was then given to the logistics planners to determine how to support the plan, thereby producing an uncoordinated plan. Now that OIF has transitioned into the Stability and Support Operations (SASO) phase, commanders and planners seem to be more embracing of what Joint Pub 1 underscores; that "Logistics sets the campaign's operational limits."²⁴

To further emphasize this last point, another planning consideration is what actions may be needed in order to be able to exploit success, or how to develop a branch plan for an unexpected event. These are planning considerations that should have been considered during both Operation Desert Shield/Storm and OIF. It is not clear if there was a plan to keep the flow of supplies and equipment moving over great distances in the event of quick success. During a model planning process branch plans are used for changing the mission, orientation or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions based on enemy actions and reactions.²⁵ The failure to fully plan and synchronize for branches created a crisis involving the flow of critical supplies during both Operation Desert Shield/Storm and OIF. As mentioned previously the frustrations that occurred

throughout the logistics process due to the lack of an integrated planning effort only exasperated the problem when there were no branch plans. In OIF, as in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, a disastrous outcome would have occurred if not for the initiative of commanders to develop quick branch plans.²⁶ Both of these operations in Iraq exemplify the difficulties a plan that does not have a branch can put on a successful operation. Without an integrated planning effort for all phases, all the initiatives possible are not likely to achieve the desired operational results.²⁷

It is evident that there was a lack of an integrated staff processes to synchronize the planning efforts of the combatant commander's staff for the initial phases of OIF. If only the planners would have looked to the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm they would have seen that the lack of integration was a key factor in the insufficient logistic support to the ground force. The plans were simply not prepared in coordination with the primary staff planners so as to take advantage of their expertise on all aspects of an operation. Perhaps there were security concerns or a need for rapid development of the plan, but as a result, excessive risks and preparations for unexpected events appear not to have been fully vetted during the planning process.

I believe there is a tendency by combatant commander staff planners to jump head first into planning an operation using whatever information is readily available, such as the mission statement, the commander's intent, and the intelligence assessment. Lacking in this process is the logistics planner that has knowledge of the unique requirements for supporting those three items. Still the combatant commander's operational planner will go back and forth with the logisticians over what is required and what is feasible instead of integrating their factors into the process.²⁸ The benefit of integrating the other staff elements into the operational planning process would assist the operational planner by something as simple as identifying potential limitations that will occur. By creating this integrated staff to conduct planning, there is a good chance that a better product will be produced.

Certainly some of the fault for the lack of integrating operations and logistics planning could lie in the professional development of leaders by the Army education system. It is easy to see the operational aspect of combat is where the emphasis is placed during the core classes of almost every professional development institution. By comparison little time and emphasis is committed to instructing on the need to integrate logistics into the planning process to ensure operational success. For instance, the overall curriculum of the US Army War College is designed to educate future strategic leaders of the Army, but within the core curriculum the lack of integrated logistics planning is glaring. The fourth core curriculum course of instruction

(Implementing National Military Strategy) deals with the development of the Campaign Plan, and more than half the periods of instruction address how to derive a mission statement and commander's intent for an operation. In comparison, instruction on the integration of logistics into the Campaign Plan comprises just one period of instruction three hours long.²⁹ Of course my intent in this paper is not to discuss the need to restructure the program of instruction for Army education system in order to incorporate all aspects of planning, but this shows that the integration of planning has not yet been widely accepted as strategically important.

It is my belief that the recommended course of action for the transformation of the Army is to de-emphasize technology and turn more to the coordination of staff functions, into a combined staff process in order to execute a fully integrated plan. The idea is to have a combined staff that will focus on current and future operations with all staff functions working together in an integrated process. Most planning staffs that I have been associated with are broken down internally to these two basic elements already, one to focus on current situational awareness and the other to focus on future events/planning. Therefore, a combined and integrated staff that focuses on future operational planning could be proactive and able to identify requirements in order to develop a synchronized plan with acceptable risk. It is this combined staff and integrated planning process that would determine the best force mix to ensure for each phase of the operation.

If the logistician is to fully support the commander's intent, then it is imperative he is involved from the inception in order to determine logistics feasibility and recommend where to accept risk. This means logistics planners working jointly and on equal parity with the operations planner and not waiting to determine how to support a plan. Being able to support the operation with the smallest logistical footprint possible is extremely hard, and this determination must also be made with the commander being advised on what risks he will be taking. The commander must understand that at some point deployment of too small a logistical footprint is simply out of the question, no matter what the technological innovations.³⁰ Therefore, the critical parts of planning for an operation are the constraints and considerations for incorporating logistic units and logistical support in each phase of the operation. It is incumbent upon the integrated planning team to determine for the commanders, the size and capability of the logistics force required.

I believe the logistics community has the challenge and responsibility to go beyond transforming logistics merely with technology and to also integrate staffs and planning processes. The *Army Logistics White Paper* is a beginning and currently the framework of how the Army will better provide logistical support to the war fighter, yet there is a shortfall because

of the lack of integrating the operations and the logistics planners. The current Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, (DCSLOG) on his visit to the Army war College in September 2004, discussed RML in detail and provided more insights into logistics transformation. During the question and answer period he was asked for his thoughts on placing logisticians with operational planners during the planning process. He answered that it is a criticality that logisticians have a place in the development of an operation order and not just trying to support it once completed. He continued by discussing how he has placed some of his logistics planners in the G3 (operations) planning cell to ensure that the logistical support is part of the plan and not an after thought.³¹

Therefore, if this change is so critical that the DCSLOG is actually doing something about integrating logisticians with the operations planners then it would seem prudent that in addition to the *Army Logistics White Paper*, the Army modify its planning process and staff structures. The Army should integrate logisticians and operations planners at all staff headquarters, from the Army Staff down to the BCT Staff. It is these staffs that will truly control policy and operations, and it is here that operations and logistics planners in particular must work in concert to fully develop a better coordinated operations and logistics plan. An enhancement to the *Army Logistics White Paper* would be the start of an answer to the planning integration issue. Otherwise the future of RML will be the Army continuing down its current path without making the needed corrections.

The Army now has an opportunity to truly enhance its capabilities while it goes through one of the greatest transformations in its history. The Cold War is over, new threats are emerging, as are new advancements in technology, but more importantly the recent lessons from OIF demand that the Army incorporate all other aspects to transformation and not just technology. One can see the paradigm shift that is taking place in Army logistics, starting with a RML focusing on technology for a campaign ready Army. The concepts are to move logistics away from the layered, supply-based combat service support system of the past and current force, to a more modular and distribution-based force system.³² Still, this should not be the singular focus scheme of transformation, because as discussed these new technological systems need to be accompanied by the integration of operations and logistics planning to ensure their proper use. After all, it is only integrated planning that will ensure the right size force with the right sustainment capacity is available to achieve mission accomplishment.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Peter J Schoomaker, GEN, Chief of Staff, Army, *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army 2003). This is the CSA vision for a transformation in the Army that includes the integration of all elements of power not just the kinetic ones.

² Department of the Army, *Army Logistics White Paper* (Washington D.C. U.S. Department of the Army, December 2003, 2-3

³ Richard B Meyers, Gen, Chairman of the Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), 15-16

⁴ *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* , 2004, iii

⁵ Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., LTG (Ret), A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 1991, 260

⁶ Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Logistics Plan*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army 2003), 8

⁷ Ibid, 2-3

⁸ Peter J Schoomaker, GEN, Chief of Staff, Army, 20

⁹ Ibid, 10. My emphasis by underscoring what I believe is the critical point of incorporating logistics into the operational plan.

¹⁰ Benjamin S. Griffin, LTG, Direct of Programs, G8, *2004 Army Modernization Plan, Relevant and Ready Land Power for the Joint Force*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army 2004), 35-37

¹¹ Ibid, 40

¹² Department of the Army, *Sustainment Brigade Concept(Coordinating Draft)*, (Ft Lee, VA, US CASCOM, 30 August 2004)

¹³ General Accounting Office, *Defense Logistics: Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 18 December 2003), 3-4. This is a government agency watchdog group that when directed by congress conducts audits on operations conducted by the U.S. military.

¹⁴ *Defense Logistics: Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives*, 3

¹⁵ Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* , Joint Publication 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, III-15

¹⁶ David D. McKiernan; LTG, Deputy Commanding General FORSCOM, "Joint Force Land Operations", briefing slides with commentary, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 17 December 2004

¹⁷ *Defense Logistics: Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives*, 3

¹⁸ Christopher Cooper, "Iraq Reconstruction Works Picks up Pace Again," *Wall Street Journal*, (16 April 2004), A-2 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 1 October 2004

¹⁹ Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Logistics Plan*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Department of the Army 2003), 13

²⁰ Frank Gibney, "Defense; The General Who Got it Right," *Los Angeles Times*, (26 December 2004), M-3 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 6 January 2005. This is just an example of the many articles that were written on the subject of whether or not the troop density was right for OIF.

²¹ Tommy Franks; GEN (Ret), *American Soldier* (Harper Collins Publisher, Inc, New York, NY, 2004). Discussion starting on page 328 from GEN (Ret) Franks as the USCENTCOM Commander on his intent and plans with the J3 Operations Officer for OIF.

²² McKiernan; LTG, Deputy Commanding General FORSCOM

²³ William Mortensen, MG, Director for Logistics, J4, Central Command, "Theater Logistics", briefing slides with commentary, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 January 2005. Comments during the question and answer period with Service Logisticians, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 19 January 2005

²⁴ Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, Joint Publication , 15 July 1997, 7. Overview of JP1 on planning consideration for campaign planning.

²⁵ Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Words*, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 30 November 2004), 72

²⁶ Yves J. Fontaine, "Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces", *Parameters*, Winter 1997-98, 47

²⁷ General Accounting Office, *Military Prepositioning: Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives* (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 24 March 2004), 8-9, access <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04562t.pdf>, accessed 7 January 2005. Efforts by USCENTCOM to build a prepositioned stockage level that would sustain forces through initial phases of another Desert Storm never developed.

²⁸ Samantha L. Quigley, "Logistics Moves Military Toward Warfighting Superiority," *Defense Link*, (12 December 2004), 1-2, [database on-line]; available though http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2004/n12042004_2004120402.html, accessed 12 December 2004. This was a comment LTG McNabb, the Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff, made at the Defense Logistics 2004 Conference in Washington DC. At most lower level staffs, interface between the staff primary's is a routine event as they see each other most everyday, the issue arises at higher levels when the planners do plan separately where dire circumstances occur due to this distance.

²⁹ U.S. Army War College, Directive, Core Curriculum, Course 4, *Implementing National Military Strategy* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 18 November 2004 – 27 January 2005), 110

³⁰ Mortensen, MG, Director for Logistics, J4, Central Command. As well as a briefing from Gen Handy USTRANSCOM commander 20 January 2005 on what USTRANSCOM's mission is and their support to ongoing operations worldwide. Both of these officers commented on the size of the support requirements and the amount of work that goes into supporting a force the size needed for OIF. A comment by Gen Handy that water weighs 8.34 pounds no matter how you package it meaning the scope of the distribution requirements that are involved.

³¹ Claude V. Christianson, LTG, DCSLOG, "Logistics Transformation", briefing slides with commentary, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, September 2004

³² John F Wharton, "Redesigning the Supply Pipeline: The Army's Plan to Overhaul Logistical Support," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2004, 29

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