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**PSYOP IN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
OPERATIONS: PREPARING FOR KOREAN
REUNIFICATION**

by

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March 2005

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PREPARING FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION**

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ABSTRACT

Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces should undertake significant doctrinal, training, and operational reforms to ensure the viability of support provided to U.S. led stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Such operations involve increased civil-military interactions and necessitate effective cross-cultural communications with not only the indigenous populace, but a host of transnational actors as well. Today's PSYOP training is reflective of a persisting "Cold War mentality" that fails to adequately prepare soldiers for effective post-conflict situations such as the reunification of the Korean peninsula, whether brought about either through a renewal of combat operations or the result of diplomatic means. Meanwhile, North Korea's formidable and adept propaganda machine has persisted in isolating its populace from external influences for more than a half-century. Post-Korean War generation North Koreans have been successfully indoctrinated since birth to despise the United States. Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment has been on the rise in South Korea for a number of years. Under the current training model, contemporary psychological operations forces are ill-prepared to conduct effective operations in an environment involving two-way, face-to-face communications such as those required while stabilizing and reconstructing a nation. The case of Korean reunification serves as an extreme scenario that nevertheless depicts the drastic need for improvements in the capabilities of modern PSYOP forces.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: A TIME FOR CHANGE.....	1
	1. The “Transformation Age” of the U.S. Army	1
	2. The Case of a Korean Reunification	1
	3. Psychological Warfare: Prevalent Throughout History	2
	4. Psychological Operations Defined	3
B.	PSYWAR IN KOREA: 1950-1953	4
	1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome” and the Cold War	4
	2. The Need for Trained Personnel	5
C.	THE DPRK: A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE	5
D.	CONTEMPORARY PSYOP: A COLD WAR RELIC?	7
	1. The Post-Cold War Period: Increased Civil-Military Interaction	7
	2. Escaping the “PSYWAR Syndrome?”	8
	3. The “Cold War Mentality” in the Information Age	9
	4. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations	10
	5. Increased Requirement for Face-to-Face Interactions.....	11
	6. The Pitfalls of “Cookie Cutter” PSYOP	12
	7. The Importance of Networks	13
	8. A Training Disconnect?	14
	a. <i>PSYOP Enlisted Soldiers (37F)</i>	14
	b. <i>PSYOP Officers</i>	16
	9. The Difficulty of Korea.....	18
	10. PSYOP Transformation Prescriptions	19
E.	ASSUMPTIONS AND THESIS METHODOLOGY	21
	1. Critical Assumptions	21
	2. Thesis Methodology	21
II.	PSYWAR IN KOREA: 1950-1953	23
A.	“REINVENTING THE WHEEL”	23
	1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome:” Degenerative Post-War Tendencies	23
	2. A Need for PSYWAR.....	24
	3. Execution of Wartime Psychological Warfare Operations.....	25
	4. PSYWAR Lessons from Korea.....	25
	5. Chapter Methodology	26
B.	PSYWAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR.....	26
	1. Radio Broadcast Operations.....	28
	2. Leaflet Operations	29
	3. Tactical (Micro) PSYWAR	30
C.	IMPROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: 1951-1953	31
	1. First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1 st L&L)	31

2.	First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1 st RB&L)	32
3.	PSYWAR Themes and Restrictions	32
a.	Themes and Objectives.....	32
b.	Policy Restrictions.....	33
4.	Measuring PSYWAR Effectiveness.....	34
a.	Correlating Direct Effects.....	34
b.	Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Interviews.....	34
c.	Environmental Conditions.....	37
D.	PSYWAR LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR.....	38
1.	Indiscriminate Leafletting	39
2.	Too Many Themes.....	40
3.	Poor Target Audience Analysis	40
4.	Poor Intelligence and Evaluation	41
5.	Poor Training	42
E.	IMPLICATIONS	45
III.	THE DPRK: A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE	47
A.	DPRK INFORMATION CONTROL AND REGIME SECURITY	47
1.	Methodology versus Mysticism.....	47
2.	Manufacturing Truth	48
3.	Anti-Americanism: A Central Theme.....	50
4.	Chapter Methodology	51
B.	PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM IL-SUNG.....	52
1.	North Korean Psychological Warfare: 1950-1953	52
2.	Post-Korean War Propaganda	55
a.	Countering Operation Jill.....	55
b.	Writing is Believing.....	57
c.	The Propaganda and Agitation Department.....	57
3.	The Monolithism of Juche.....	58
4.	Reunification of the Fatherland.....	59
5.	Kim Il-sung: The “Great Leader”	61
6.	Indoctrination of the Masses.....	62
C.	PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM JONG-IL.....	64
1.	Early Reign of the “Dear Leader”	64
2.	Propaganda Themes	67
a.	The Rise of Anti-Americanism	68
b.	Thematic Shifts and Recent Developments.....	70
3.	North Korean Media.....	73
a.	Newspapers.....	74
b.	Radio and Television Broadcasts	76
D.	IMPLICATIONS	78
IV.	CONTEMPORARY PSYOP: A NEED FOR CHANGE	81
A.	POST-COLD WAR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	81
1.	Breaking the “PSYWAR Syndrome”	81
2.	Post-Cold War Military Paradigm Shifts.....	82
a.	Increased Civil-Military Interaction	83

	b.	<i>Post 9/11 Paradigms of Nation-building</i>	84
	3.	Korean Reunification.....	84
	4.	Chapter Methodology.....	85
B.		STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS	85
	1.	Increasing Emphasis on Stabilization and Reconstruction.....	85
	2.	The “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction”	87
	a.	<i>Security</i>	88
	b.	<i>Social and Economic Well-Being</i>	89
	c.	<i>Governance and Participation</i>	90
	d.	<i>Justice and Reconciliation</i>	91
	3.	Increased Face-to-Face Interactions	92
	4.	Social Capital, Networks, and Trust	93
	5.	The Role of PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations	95
	a.	<i>Supporting the “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction”</i>	95
	b.	<i>Building Social Capital</i>	95
	c.	<i>Providing Critical HUMINT</i>	96
C.		THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA	96
	1.	Lessons Learned, But Not Heeded	96
	2.	Mutual Unintelligibility	97
	3.	South Korean Anti-Americanism.....	98
D.		TRAINING SHORTFALLS	99
	1.	Perpetuation of a “Cold War Mentality”	99
	2.	PSYOP Enlisted Soldier (37F) Training.....	101
	a.	<i>No Regional Training</i>	101
	b.	<i>No Language Capability</i>	102
	c.	<i>No MOSQ Requirement</i>	103
	3.	PSYOP Officer (39B) Training.....	104
	a.	<i>No Language Capability</i>	104
	b.	<i>Irrelevant Postgraduate Degrees</i>	104
	c.	<i>No Professional Discourse</i>	105
E.		TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PSYOP SUCCESS	105
	1.	PSYOP Training	106
	a.	<i>Language Training</i>	106
	b.	<i>Language Maintenance</i>	106
	c.	<i>Officer Recruitment</i>	107
	d.	<i>Regional Studies for Enlisted PSYOP Specialists</i>	107
	e.	<i>Officer Advanced Degrees</i>	108
	f.	<i>Professional PSYOP Journal: “Military Influence”</i>	109
	2.	PSYOP Doctrine.....	109
	a.	<i>Supporting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations</i> ...109	
	b.	<i>Establishing Psychological Operations Networks (PONs)</i> ..109	
	3.	PSYOP in the Republic of Korea	110
	a.	<i>Deployment of Trained PSYOP Personnel to South Korea</i> 110	

<i>b. Active Combined Psychological Operations</i>	<i>110</i>
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION.....	113
LIST OF REFERENCES	117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	129

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I. INTRODUCTION

The network is emerging as the signature form of organization in the Information Age, just as bureaucracy stamped the Industrial Age, hierarchy controlled the Agricultural Era, and the small group roamed in the Nomadic Era.¹

A. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: A TIME FOR CHANGE

1. The “Transformation Age” of the U.S. Army

Since the coordinated terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in 2001, the United States Army has both quickened and broadened its transformation process with regard to doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and technology. Combat operations against asymmetric threats and the highly visible military difficulties in stabilizing Iraq have only increased the requirement for transformation. The burgeoning use of the U.S. military in stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as those ongoing in both Afghanistan and Iraq, further demand rapid, modular, agile, and adaptive military forces. In the midst of this “transformation age” in the U.S. Army, the current psychological operations (PSYOP) leadership should take dramatic steps to ensure the viability of support they provide in a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

2. The Case of a Korean Reunification

The transformation of psychological operations training and execution must take place in the context of ongoing PSYOP in the Middle East. At the same time, other threats outside of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) must not be overlooked. The continuously looming menace of the Stalinist regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a case in point. The DPRK continues to threaten U.S. interests, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other allies within Asia more than fifty years after the partition of the Korean peninsula. North and South Koreans continue talks that suggest a mutual goal of reunification. Such reunification, whether achieved through diplomatic means or as the result of a renewal

¹ J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, *The Age of the Network: Organizing Principles for the 21st Century* (New York: Oliver Wight Publications, Inc., 1994), 3.

and subsequently victorious conclusion of combat operations, may find PSYOP forces unprepared and incapable of providing support unless effective systemic changes to training and operations are implemented.

Therefore, United States Army psychological operations must undergo an immediate and dramatic improvement in training and doctrinal development to provide effective support to regional combat operations and to prove useful in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Such issues are especially relevant in light of the difficulties that PSYOP forces would face in operations following reunification of the Korean peninsula. Despite a long history of U.S. PSYOP efforts during the Korean War, and the more than fifty subsequent years of combined² ROK-U.S. military operations, today's PSYOP forces appear ill-prepared to conduct effective operations on the Korean peninsula.

3. Psychological Warfare: Prevalent Throughout History

Almost every work on psychological warfare (PSYWAR), or more contemporarily psychological operations (PSYOP), that one encounters tends to reference ancient battles, or even the Bible, to illustrate how deception can influence the result of a campaign. To begin this thesis I have avoided such clichés because it is true that deception is at the heart of warfare. The psychological dimensions of battles, tactics, and warfare in general are inextricably linked. The utility of strategies to attack and exploit the “psychological” vulnerabilities of armies and their leaders is an important component of victory. However, historically specified units have not been solely assigned deception or psychological operations roles. Traditionally PSYOP sought to incite fear in one's enemy or to deceive and misdirect the enemy's operations. Thus, the inception of separate *psychological operations* units to perform these tasks is a twentieth century phenomenon within the United States military. The majority of PSYOP assets belong to the U.S. Army.

² U.S. and ROK Forces in Korea fall under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquartered in Seoul. Operations and training events are conducted in a “combined” fashion that incorporates the interactions and planning of ROK and U.S. military counterparts to foster seamless mission execution.

4. Psychological Operations Defined

Clearly every action in warfare has a psychological dimension, whether intended or unintended. However, modern U.S. PSYOP units focus solely on influencing “emotions, motives, objective reasoning, decision making, or behavior of foreign target audiences.”³ Historically, psychological operations conducted by the U.S. Army differed notably from the adversarial propaganda techniques practiced by World War II Axis powers or Stalinist regimes (the former Soviet Union or North Korea for example). The overarching emphasis of U.S. messages is the utilization of *truth* to construct an umbrella of credibility with their target audiences. This is a far cry from the information-control and persuasion techniques of Nazi Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who utilized the principle later dubbed the “big lie.”⁴ Goebbels’ technique was “to persuade the masses...to develop and repeat falsehoods – for example, ‘The German people are a master race; Europe is menaced by the Jewish conspiracy.’”⁵

However, for many people *psychological operations* connotes deceitful propaganda used by information-controlling authoritarian regimes.⁶ Therefore, even the term *psychological operations* carries with it a certain stigma that may cause distrust of U.S. forces on the part of an indigenous people. The doctrinal term *psychological warfare* was renamed *psychological operations* in January 1962 to recognize that messages directed toward unarmed civilian populaces did not truly constitute “warfare.”⁷ Therefore, in maintaining continuity within this thesis, I will continue to refer to such operations prior to the Vietnam War as psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and those

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (5 September 2003), I-2.

⁴ Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2001), 108, 319.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁶ Such a negative connotation is illustrated in South America, where the term Military Information Support Team (MIST) is utilized as a more socially and politically acceptable categorization. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, VI-5.

⁷ Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: *A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 261.

operations occurring during and after the Vietnam War as psychological operations (PSYOP). However, the two terms are widely considered to be synonymous.

B. PSYWAR IN KOREA: 1950-1953

1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome” and the Cold War

Psychological effect oriented units within the United States Army became permanent with the outbreak of the Korean War.⁸ Despite significant success during World War II, PSYWAR units were disbanded in the *post-bellum* years. This disbanding of units and neglect of the importance of psychological warfare, the “PSYWAR syndrome,” would be repeated following subsequent U.S. conflicts. These PSYWAR units were reinvented as the United States military entered the Cold War. The escalation of tensions and outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 required the rapid re-creation and deployment of PSYWAR units. These units were fielded in a hasty, *ad hoc* manner that resulted in the deployment of untrained and inexperienced personnel to the Far East Command (FEC). These units gradually improved in both furthering the study of the scientific principles underpinning the development of persuasive messages, and in the technological aspects of PSYWAR product generation and dissemination. Many lessons regarding the conduct of psychological warfare learned during World War II were forgotten and re-learned during the Korean War, but were later used to improve training, technical, and tactical deficiencies in the embryonic organization.

Following the armistice in 1953, these newly reinvented units were neglected and fell into disrepair.⁹ The “PSYWAR syndrome” was again in effect, but it gradually subsided as units were called upon, and even expanded, during the Vietnam War. However, this renewed interest in psychological operations waned once again following the end of the Vietnam War. For the ensuing decade, PSYOP forces diminished and atrophied.¹⁰

⁸ The Korean War erupted on 25 June 1950 as the North Koreans attacked southward across the 38th parallel. William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 10.

⁹ The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 in Panmunjom. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 325.

¹⁰ Sandler, “*Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!*”: *A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 318.

2. The Need for Trained Personnel

In general, the basic PSYWAR principles and means of dissemination saw little alteration throughout the post-Cold War period and (with the sole likely exception of the internet) have changed relatively little over the last fifty years. It is clear, however, that radio (and now television) waves propagated from host nation radio towers and mobile broadcasting facilities, leaflets dropped from fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft or balloons, and tactical loudspeaker and face-to-face communications, all still serve as primary means through which PSYOP messages are conveyed to respective target audiences. Therefore, one may conclude that, based upon these trends, the only likely future PSYOP advances will be predicated upon the incorporation of emerging technological innovations in the realms of media production, distribution, and dissemination, or perhaps improved military information sharing and data links. However, the emphasis on technology ignores the fundamental question of whether the message is effective. The main hindrance to effective psychological operations currently, as it was during the Korean War more than fifty years ago, continues to be the lack of fully trained personnel who are capable of conveying credible messages to target audiences within the confines of the respective nation's culture and language. These principle areas of expertise will only become more vital as the U.S. involvement in global stabilization and reconstruction operations continues and expands in the Information Age, and more ominously, in the event of a renewal of combat operations on the Korean peninsula.

C. THE DPRK: A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE

North Korea has remained highly dependent upon a propaganda-centric approach to governance that promotes its communist ideologies and legitimizes both the Kim regime and the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). This DPRK reliance on propaganda to control the masses began during the reign of Kim Il-sung, which lasted from the Korean War until his death in 1994, and continues under his son and successor, Kim Jong-il. During the Korean War, psychological warfare campaigns were waged by both sides. While U.S. PSYWAR units were rapidly fielded and gradually improved their PSYWAR capabilities throughout the war, so, too, did the North Koreans. During this process, the

North Koreans became quite adept at conducting propaganda operations, especially those targeted at their own soldiers and populace. North Korean soldiers were routinely indoctrinated prior to battles and these processes eventually became a routine method for coalescing support for the Kim regime.

The KWP now has more than a half-century of controlling the dissemination of regime manufactured “truth” through the Propaganda and Agitation Department.¹¹ Anti-Americanism is a central theme of North Korean propaganda. The DPRK encouragement of a fear of the United States empowers the Kim regime. This allows North Korea to promote a “military first” policy that diverts approximately 25 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) toward defense spending, despite its still meager overall economy.¹² This ranks the DPRK as the number one nation in the world for percent of its GDP utilized for defense expenditures.¹³

The DPRK continues to be an anachronism, an information-controlling state in the Information Age. However, this does not mean that the North Koreans are merely on the defensive in the international information arena. Both sides agreed to cease the overt propaganda activities along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in June 2004.¹⁴ However, an estimated forty thousand North Korean agents are assumed to be operating in the south.¹⁵ Control of domestic access to the internet maintains the KWP monopoly on information north of the border, as are the continued, stringent regulations concerning radio/television broadcast receivers. Meanwhile, as individuals are restricted to their diets of KWP censored information, they also receive political indoctrination tailored to their social class and age, beginning with children as young as three months old.¹⁶ The creation of

¹¹ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea* (Fort Bragg, NC: 4th Psychological Operations Group, June 1980), i.

¹² Charles E. Morrison, ed., “Regional Overview,” in *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 12.

¹³ Vietnam is ranked a distant second at 7.1 percent. Ibid.

¹⁴ Norimitsu Onishi, “In a DMZ that Bristles Less, the Villagers are at Home,” *New York Times*, 3 August 2004, A4.

¹⁵ Anthony Faiola, “South Korea Weighs Allowing Once-Taboo Support for the North; Debate Reflects Division Over Détente,” *Washington Post*, 22 November 2004, A16.

¹⁶ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, IV-6.

historical “evidence” to demonstrate the credibility of North Korean propaganda themes is also inherent to their strategy.¹⁷ Guided by such principles, the KWP can promote anti-Americanism in its younger generations by interjecting such themes into children’s daily school lessons and by providing “proof” through state created “evidence” of U.S. designs on Korea.

Today, the North Korean propaganda machine continues to enjoy the same perpetual domestic domination of information that it perfected during the Cold War. This offers a formidable challenge in the campaign of persuasion and influence. Even without a renewal of full-scale combat operations on the Korean peninsula, the pervasion of unbridled anti-Americanism throughout North Korean society casts doubts on the abilities of U.S. PSYOP to build trust and communicate effectively with North Korean target audiences in support of U.S. objectives for stabilization and reconstruction operations following a reunification

D. CONTEMPORARY PSYOP: A COLD WAR RELIC?

1. The Post-Cold War Period: Increased Civil-Military Interaction

The abrupt and unexpected conclusion of the Cold War has prompted a shift toward the *postmodern* paradigm in military organizations.¹⁸ “Although antecedents predate the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provided the major thrust to move the military toward the postmodern model.”¹⁹ Postmodern militaries are characterized by trends toward structural and cultural “interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres,” reduced differentiation between the branches of the armed forces, increased participation in non-traditional military missions, and increased internationally mandated missions.²⁰

¹⁷ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Military Capabilities Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Appendix C: Psychological Operations” (Fort Bragg, NC: 4th Psychological Operations Group, November 1998).

¹⁸ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

However, the main focus under the postmodern paradigm for the psychological operations planner is the increasing inevitability of interactions between U.S. military forces and a multitude of transnational actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).²¹ Yet these individuals will likely be skeptical of PSYOP messages received via blatantly overt, traditional media such as leaflets, posters, loudspeakers, or radio/television broadcasts. However, NGOs may be more persuaded by a strategy of interpersonal relationships and trust – especially when the persuader is well-versed in the customs and language of the indigenous populace and the values and missions of the varying transnational actors.

2. Escaping the “PSYWAR Syndrome?”

The media-intense 1991 Persian Gulf War brought a large degree of PSYOP success into the international spotlight. This media attention was largely attributable to the results of PSYOP efforts against the Iraqi military:

Of the targeted audience – 300,000-plus Iraqi troops-approximately 98 percent of them read or were otherwise exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in the theater.* Many EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] were found clutching leaflets in their hands or hiding them somewhere on their uniforms as they raised their arms to surrender.** An estimated 88 percent of the Iraqi forces were influenced by the leaflet drops as intended, and 77 percent were persuaded to quit the fight through the combination of combat-leaflet operations and credible tactical military threats and actions.***²²

In the wake of the Cold War and the subsequent overwhelming victory in Operation Desert Storm, the United States began a drawdown of its military forces. This critical event, coupled with increased deployments under the ensuing unipolar world order, placed pressures on the U.S. military to continue to “do more with less.”

²¹ Moskos, Williams, and Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” 2. Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 26.

²² Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “PSYOP in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 353. The author’s original footnotes are denoted as *, **, and *** representing 16, 17, and 18 respectively. These notes refer to an interview conducted with the Commander of the 4th Psychological Operations Group in 1991.

Uncharacteristically, PSYOP forces did not relapse into the pitfall of the “PSYWAR syndrome” as in the past. On the contrary, there is a high commitment to PSYOP troops in the Global War on Terror, while progress has been made toward increasing the current active duty PSYOP force structure.

3. The “Cold War Mentality” in the Information Age

Psychological operations today still tend to emphasize long distance communications through leafleting, aerial or ground loudspeaker operations, and radio broadcasts rather than face-to-face communications requiring interpersonal, cultural, and language capability. This is reflective of the tactical concepts and missions prevalent throughout the Industrial Age and the Cold War. Such tactics relied heavily upon long-range message dissemination operations that mirrored the conventional military mindset of the day.

Despite intrinsic difficulties that surround measuring the effectiveness of PSYOP, their battlefield effects were “incontestable” following the Persian Gulf War.²³ Because of these seemingly positive results, psychological operations forces changed little during subsequent operations in the 1990s. Similarly, despite the clamoring for proactive transformation apparent in the post-9/11 military, PSYOP training and doctrine today largely reflects a “Cold War mentality.” Its most dramatic changes occurred in the 1980s under President Reagan, following his declaration of the “informational element of national power.”²⁴

If contemporary PSYOP forces have finally escaped their recurring tendency to lapse into post-conflict neglect, then PSYOP finally has the precise moment in time to galvanize meaningful and effective systemic force transformation. To do so, however, means shedding the “Cold War mentality” in favor of developing the relevant principles of training and operations necessary for supporting increased roles in stabilization and reconstruction operations consistent with the theories of the Information Age.

²³ Sandler, *“Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 361.

²⁴ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 30, 45.

4. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

The Bush administration, having recognized the increasing importance of post-conflict security-building operations, established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Department of State in the summer of 2004.²⁵ United States led operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan constitute stabilization and reconstruction operations, as could operations that might take place on a reunified Korean peninsula. Such activities are gaining increasing importance and may be undertaken as a logical post-combat phase to a military operation or as a separate strategy to prevent nations from befalling state failure or from becoming havens for terrorist network cells.

These operations are underpinned by four “pillars” for post-conflict reconstruction which have been defined and articulated by a joint project between the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).²⁶ These four pillars are security, economic and social well-being, governance and participation, and justice and reconciliation.²⁷ While current U.S. Army doctrine includes such post-Cold War definitions as “stability operations”²⁸ or “military operations other than war,”²⁹ the underlying elements that are embodied in the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction are not comprehensively addressed. This doctrinal exclusion is mirrored by current U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine as well.³⁰ However, it is entirely possible that due to the level of interest and involvement

²⁵ United States Department of State, “Establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),” *United States Department of State Press Release*, 28 September 2004, available from URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36558.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

²⁶ Robert C. Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 11.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations and Support Operations*, February 2003.

²⁹ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, June 1995.

³⁰ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, September 2003. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, November 2003. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.301: Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, December 2003. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.302: Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, June 2004.

undertaken by AUSA in the joint post-conflict reconstruction project, that incorporation of such concepts into Army doctrine is rapidly approaching.³¹

5. Increased Requirement for Face-to-Face Interactions

The emphasis on military participation in stabilization and reconstruction operations as a method of pursuing the Global War on Terror has further implications for U.S. PSYOP. Clearly, U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that the future of U.S. military involvement in destroying terrorist cells abroad will continue to presuppose unidentifiable enemy “insurgents” operating interspersed within the civilian community and in close proximity to military forces. Just as the physical distances between PSYOP communicators and their target audiences have been reduced to individual interactions, ironically the dawning of the Information Age has broadly expanded global communications capabilities and access to audiences while concomitantly reducing cost. This allows for not only larger U.S. outreach to target audiences, but consequently provides cheaper and more accessible outlets for insurgent propaganda on an international level as well. Therefore, it is becoming more important than ever that increased focus be placed upon direct interactions with foreign indigenous populaces and transnational actors to build trust, credibility, security, and ultimately – stability, while also seeking to undermine the global communications capabilities of the enemy forces. However, the significance of face-to-face communications has not been overlooked by the PSYOP community and has been doctrinally characterized as “the most common and potentially effective mission conducted by TPTs [tactical PSYOP teams].”³² Typically, these face-to-face missions take on the role of one-way communications via loudspeaker. What has not been articulated to any great extent is the importance of two-way communications during these face-to-face interactions as a means for both PSYOP influence and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

³¹ The foreword in the CSIS/AUSA publication *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* was co-authored by General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff and current president of AUSA.

³² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.302: Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, June 2004, 7-13.

6. The Pitfalls of “Cookie Cutter” PSYOP

The twentieth century’s Cold War military mentality also led U.S. PSYOP into a self-styled “cookie-cutter” approach to communications in which certain themes or PSYOP products, perceived as effective in the past, were in essence recycled in subsequent wars. Hence, the B-29 leaflets disseminated during World War II were modified and reissued as the B-52 leaflets of the Vietnam and later Persian Gulf Wars.³³ While there are certain cases where such themes or products may be effectively recycled in later conflicts under similar conditions, the mindset in training psychological operations specialists has historically been characterized by an emphasis on generic psychological operations concepts as opposed to creating soldiers who are expertly trained in specific regional, cultural, or language fields. This is a dangerous trend to continue because not only may such practices contribute to the dissemination of messages that are inappropriate for given target audiences but may also result in reduced abilities of PSYOP personnel to intelligibly communicate with target audiences in a stabilization and reconstruction environment.

Poorly crafted PSYOP products disseminated at a tactical level are able to be elevated to a highly visible strategic setting in rather short order given the access available to contemporary media. At best such gaffs are shrugged off by the target audience while the central meaning is understood, at worst the message’s meaning can de-legitimize the source of the message, undermine U.S. credibility, or spark undesirable or even mission-threatening actions on the part of the message recipients. Such mistakes may often be the result of non-systemic oversights on the part of the message crafters; however, more systemically they may be indicative of a heavy reliance upon generic psychological operations principles, “cookie-cutter” solutions, and too little emphasis on regional, language, cultural, or persuasion theory training. I argue that these are precisely the skills that need to be cultivated within our contemporary PSYOP forces for success

³³ These leaflets typically depict the aircraft releasing its bombs while warning individuals that a bombing will take place at a specified date and time. The bombing then occurs as promised and the result is that the credibility of the PSYOP messages is validated and subsequent messages are taken more seriously by target audiences. The World War II B-29 leaflet and the Vietnam War/Persian Gulf War B-52 leaflets can be found in: Sandler, *“Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 192-193, 283-284, 341-342.

under the *postmodern* military paradigm and the vehicle for viable influence operations must emphasize the use of the *network* – the cornerstone of operations in the Information Age.

7. The Importance of Networks

In an age when participation in stabilization and reconstruction operations are on the rise, it is important to highlight the importance of “hearts and minds” campaigns that strive to improve U.S. credibility and legitimacy while simultaneously attempting to deprive insurgent networks of future operatives. While PSYOP forces are not the sole bearers of responsibility in a hearts and minds campaign, they do play a significant role. Clearly U.S. policy decisions are key influencers in shaping world opinion and therefore military PSYOP is but one small element to an overarching persuasion strategy.

Crucial to these hearts and minds strategies is the building of trust between U.S. forces, the local population, and transnational actors, along with the methodical targeting of the post-conflict reconstruction pillars. Both PSYOP and civil affairs units operate in a face-to-face manner with citizens in order to facilitate increased credibility, foster stability, and build trust. Paramount to the concept of networks, however, is that trust-building leads to the amassing of *social capital*.³⁴

Trust is the basis of a new source of wealth in the Information Age, one based on connections. As trust accumulates, people build up ‘social capital...’³⁵

Through this accumulation of social capital, predicated upon the building of trust, networks are constructed.³⁶ The importance of recognizing these principles of networks is elevated with the understanding that terrorist networks are advanced and highly adept at both obtaining economic and logistical support for their operations and recruiting additional personnel.

For PSYOP and civil affairs forces to capitalize on the building of networks requires the ability to communicate effectively with the indigenous population. Regional

³⁴ Lipnack and Stamps, *The Age of the Network: Organizing Principles for the 21st Century*, 177.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 197.

and language expertise are essential tools to facilitate trust-building, social capital accumulation, and consequently – network construction. However, the predominant form of face-to-face PSYOP communications involves playing a recording, via loudspeaker, tailored to a specific language, passing out handbills, or doling out humanitarian aid. While these soldiers may have language “familiarity,” they are widely incapable of maintaining simple conversations with the indigenous populace. Furthermore, translators or interpreters have frequently been in short supply. This leaves the PSYOP personnel relatively oblivious to the true underlying dynamics of a particular village or region despite “face-to-face” interactions.

8. A Training Disconnect?

With the increased usage of PSYOP forces in environments that stress one-on-one interactions with indigenous populations and transnational actors, it is necessary that the PSYOP training programs provide the skills necessary for communicating and persuading in such environs. Such skills should entail sufficient study of the language and culture necessary to produce soldiers who can communicate with efficacy while also understanding key principles of persuasion. Unfortunately, the current PSYOP training programs, for both officers and enlisted soldiers, are predicated upon theoretical disconnects that do not provide the tools necessary for coherent, well-planned psychological operations activities via Cold War styled delivery systems; let alone for operations that rely upon two-way, face-to-face communications. The importance of rectifying these training disconnects is underscored by the fact that civil affairs officers undergo the same training as PSYOP officers and are therefore similarly constrained in operational performance by the inadequacies of the training program.

a. PSYOP Enlisted Soldiers (37F)

Today’s PSYOP enlisted soldiers, assigned to military occupational specialty (MOS) 37F (Psychological Operations Specialist), attend the twelve week 37F Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.³⁷ This

³⁷ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.

program is primarily for soldiers who have recently completed Basic Training and are now being trained in their job specialty. The 37F AIT course consists of both basic soldier and PSYOP specialist elements, however, these soldiers are provided with no regional training whatsoever.³⁸ Meanwhile, these soldiers serve as the primary crafters of PSYOP messages, analyzers of varying target audiences, and developers of PSYOP products. These soldiers typically attend a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC), also located at Fort Bragg, which provides language familiarity but little substantive language capability. The current BMLC language proficiency goals for its graduates increased in 2004.³⁹ Therefore, where soldiers were previously required to achieve a level in listening skills in which they comprehend “with reasonable accuracy only when this [listening] involves short memorized utterances or formulae;”⁴⁰ they are currently required to achieve a slightly higher level in which they can understand “very simple face-to-face conversations in a standard dialect.”⁴¹ Similarly, pre-2004 standards called for a level of reading capability in which the graduates are “unable to read connected prose,”⁴² versus the current standard that requires one to be capable of reading “very simple connected written material.”⁴³ Previous graduation evaluation criteria, and indeed Department of the Army language tracking, only focused on these aforementioned listening and reading skills. However, these parameters have recently been expanded to include an emphasis on speaking skills as well.⁴⁴ Therefore, current graduates of BMLC are now required to reach a level in speaking capability in which the speaker is “unable to

³⁸ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.

³⁹ “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” *Special Warfare* 17, no. 1 (September 2004): 63.

⁴⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management* (Washington DC: February 1996), 37.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” 63.

produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed material.”⁴⁵ Active duty civil affairs enlisted soldiers are primarily drawn from the special forces branch and typically receive the same language training (BMLC) as the PSYOP enlisted soldiers.

Other enlisted soldiers who are more proficient in language capabilities are organic to PSYOP units. These soldiers are identified as MOS 97E (Human Intelligence Collector) and are organized under the Army’s military intelligence branch. Language training for these soldiers is conducted at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, where they are trained for greater lengths and subsequently to higher standards than graduates of BMLC.⁴⁶ Additionally, the soldiers assigned the MOS of 97E are classified as having “language-dependent” specialties and must retain the same DLI minimum levels in language proficiency or risk losing their military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ).⁴⁷ This would require such individuals to be reclassified into another, and sometimes much less appealing, MOS. Psychological operations specialists (37F) are classified by current Army regulations as a “non-language-dependent MOS,” and therefore do not have the same language requirement as part of their MOSQ. Therefore, languages obtained are not required to be retained by the soldier.⁴⁸ This is a drain on both budgets and resources.

b. PSYOP Officers

Psychological operations officers receive training at a four week Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), a seventeen week Regional Studies Course (RSC), and BMLC.⁴⁹ Therefore, PSYOP officers, who do not share the enlisted soldiers’ focus on message crafting, audience selection, or appropriateness, receive

⁴⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 36.

⁴⁶ Basic language courses taught at the Defense Language Institute are designed to train individuals to level defined as “limited working proficiency.” When applied to speaking skills, this level of proficiency enables one to “satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements.” Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 4, 36.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ The only difference between this training program and the one prescribed for civil affairs officers is the inclusion of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC) in lieu of the PSYOP Officer Course. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington DC: October 1998), 166-172.

formal regional training to increase their knowledge of a particular area of the world. Some officers are further offered the opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) to study under master's degree programs. Typically these officers are sent to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program (as are the civil affairs officers).⁵⁰ While this program has applicability due to psychological operations constituting one arm of the Army's special operations, "PSYOP support to special operations" is but one out of many activities undertaken by PSYOP forces across the range of military operations.⁵¹ As Colonel (retired) Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. stated, "In general, the current subordination of PSYOP elements to special operations detracts from recognition of the overall applicability of psychological operations in times of peace, crisis, and war."⁵² Relevant degrees in regional studies, marketing, and persuasion and social influence, the underpinnings of PSYOP, are not pursued. Furthermore, the PSYOP community does little to provide a professional outlet for information and operational and academic discourse. While the quarterly periodical *Special Warfare* is one publication that currently receives PSYOP oriented articles, it is predominantly an outlet for special forces discourse and is frequently little more than a newsletter for the special forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP branch and Special Warfare School administrative notes along with some feedback from recent military exercises.⁵³ Identical to the PSYOP enlisted soldier language requirements, PSYOP officers are not required to maintain their language capabilities.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ This program yields a Master of Science (MS) Degree in Defense Analysis with a specialization in Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. United States Naval Postgraduate School, "Department of Defense Analysis Special Operations Curriculum," available from URL: <http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

⁵¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, VI-2, VI-8.

⁵² Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "Military Psychological Operations," in *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach*, eds. Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 58.

⁵³ *Special Warfare* is published quarterly by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

⁵⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, 167.

9. The Difficulty of Korea

Not only are the challenges of influencing the population of North Korea formidable, but the prospects of effectively persuading South Koreans through PSYOP are increasingly appearing less plausible with the rise of anti-American sentiments among the post-Korean War generations.⁵⁵ Little is being done by U.S. PSYOP to combat this anti-Americanism. There are no U.S. PSYOP forces stationed on the Korean peninsula to provide active PSYOP support to the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Predominantly U.S. PSYOP forces deploy to the ROK for military exercises and then redeploy to the continental United States (CONUS) where they are based. Such deployments occur multiple times throughout the year and are characterized by a great degree of impermanence in the relationships between the U.S. and ROK PSYOP personnel. These difficulties are compounded by the inability of most U.S. PSYOP personnel to read or speak Korean to the degree necessary to communicate. Likewise, this phenomenon is mirrored by the ROK personnel's inability to communicate in English. Communications within the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) rely heavily upon a minimal amount of personnel who can communicate in these two languages. Such an obvious constraint begs the question of whether U.S. PSYOP personnel who cannot communicate with their ROK counterparts can effectively craft messages to persuade target audiences within the ROK, let alone in the communist north. Such difficulties in communication are only exacerbated when the setting for the message dissemination is changed from a Cold War styled leaflet drop to a close-quarters interaction such as those required in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Furthermore, more than a half-century of partition has exacerbated the initial bifurcation of the once homogenous Korean culture. Thus, not only must PSYOP soldiers understand "ROK Korean" language and culture, but they must also be able to distinguish and operate utilizing "DPRK Korean" language and culture, as well as the regional dialects within each category.

⁵⁵ Seung-Hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002-2003): 113.

10. PSYOP Transformation Prescriptions

The transformational recommendations proposed as prescriptive measures to improve PSYOP contributions in the event of reunification of the Korean peninsula are generally systemic in nature. In this regard they largely have implications for improved execution of psychological operations throughout all AORs and especially when operating under the umbrella of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. While these recommendations are not a panacea for improving PSYOP influence capabilities, they do constitute a basis for improving the expertise of PSYOP personnel in several critical areas while focusing on the evolving missions of the U.S. Army.

No matter the medium that is utilized to deliver a PSYOP message to its intended target audience, the most critical part of a PSYOP product development system is the proper training of the personnel. In an age of increased civil-military interactions during operational deployments, the “product” takes on the form of effective communications articulated through human interactions. This is also critical to obtaining vital HUMINT that can then subsequently be input back into the overall PSYOP campaign planning and execution process. However, such activities are predicated first upon the linguistic and cultural capabilities of the soldiers employed under such scenarios. Such interactions are impossible to the same degree with an individual’s broadcast of a PSYOP message via compact disc and an overt loudspeaker. Such actions serve more as the *modus operandi* of “warrior deejays” than of “warrior diplomats.” Therefore, PSYOP training must get “back to the basics:”

- Language training must be conducted to the DLI level of proficiency to provide greater capabilities to all PSYOP soldiers (officer and enlisted).
- Maintenance of language capabilities to DLI standards must be made a requirement for MOSQ of all officer and enlisted soldiers.
- Officers from across the Army possessing skills vital to PSYOP, especially in critical languages, should be actively recruited by PSYOP utilizing bonuses and other incentives.
- PSYOP enlisted soldiers must receive regional and cultural training.
- PSYOP officers should pursue master’s degrees in those disciplines that form the underpinnings of PSYOP such as regional studies, persuasion and social influence, and marketing.

- The 4th Psychological Operations Group should publish its own professional journal of military PSYOP, encourage discourse, and invite both the reserve component groups and other services to contribute.

Furthermore, the trends of the postmodern military provide the impetus for additional changes to escape the “Cold War mentality:”

- Corresponding to current trends in military operations, the principles that underpin stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably the “four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction,” should be closely scrutinized for doctrinal advancements in PSYOP support.⁵⁶
- Trained PSYOP personnel should be utilized to establish Psychological Operations Networks (PONs) as a means of persuading target audiences at a grass-roots level. Such networks utilize the building of social capital via interpersonal interactions utilizing two-way, face-to-face communications in the target language while allowing the mapping of the varied nodes in the network. Messages that are delivered are adaptive and persuasive in pursuing PSYOP objectives. This enables PSYOP to improve its persuasiveness in supporting U.S. objectives while gathering critical HUMINT, identifying insurgents or potential insurgents, facilitating the facets of stabilization and reconstruction operations, and ultimately winning more “hearts and minds” than previously possible.

Finally, the conduct of psychological operations in North Korea, South Korea, or possibly in a newly reunified Korean state poses formidable challenges that must be anticipated and mitigated before an emergency arises:

- It is imperative that the training and deployment of a PSYOP detachment to the Korean peninsula be expedited. This unit should be fully trained in the Korean language and culture, with special care given to determining the divergent points along these lines with regard to the two distinctly separate nations.
- The conduct of active combined psychological operations, focused on both ROK and DPRK target audiences, must be instituted immediately. These units should focus on counterpropaganda operations with designs to dilute anti-American sentiment and promote the ROK-U.S. alliance.

⁵⁶ This should be done through interaction with the newly established Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Information on this center can be found at URL: <http://www.security-building.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/welcome>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

E. ASSUMPTIONS AND THESIS METHODOLOGY

1. Critical Assumptions

This thesis is predicated on three primary assumptions.⁵⁷ First, any agreements bringing about a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula would not proscribe U.S. Army PSYOP force involvement, even if only for humanitarian assistance operations. Second, a renewal of combat operations on the Korean peninsula would likewise entail U.S. Army PSYOP force participation. Finally, the current U.S. Army PSYOP leadership understands the need for increases in PSYOP force structure and is actively pursuing this issue. Currently, increases to active duty PSYOP forces are to take place over the next few years.⁵⁸

2. Thesis Methodology

Chapter II of this thesis will analyze the U.S. psychological warfare efforts during the Korean War to present the initial baptism by fire that PSYWAR forces underwent after their hasty reorganization and to provide the predominant lessons learned during this conflict as a backdrop for highlighting contemporary PSYOP transformation requirements. Chapter III of this thesis will discuss the formidability posed by DPRK propaganda with an emphasis on its domestic usage. This will further accentuate the difficulties that psychological operations would face in persuading North Korean target audiences, who have historically been heavily indoctrinated with anti-Americanism. Chapter IV will discuss contemporary psychological operations training and execution to stress deficiencies in the current methodologies and the impetus for change. I will further present transformative PSYOP prescriptions that seek to prepare PSYOP forces for future

⁵⁷ In the event that any or all of these assumptions may possibly prove untenable, the conclusions of this thesis will not be invalidated due to their further reaching applicability. For example, while a unified Korean state could emerge that is unreceptive toward U.S. support; such a scenario does not warrant the abandonment of military psychological operations preparedness in Korea or in other regions of the world.

⁵⁸ Congress, House, Armed Forces Subcommittee on Unconventional Threats, *Testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Unconventional Threats by Mr. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low-Intensity Conflict*, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 1 April 2003, 12.

stabilization and reconstruction operations, especially on the Korean peninsula. Finally, Chapter V will conclude this thesis by suggesting further areas of research based upon the aforementioned prescriptions.

II. PSYWAR IN KOREA: 1950-1953

*On 25 June 1950, there were no readiness measures in terms of operating personnel or equipment for psywar on hand in the Far East Theatre; there were only plans.*⁵⁹

A. “REINVENTING THE WHEEL”

1. The “PSYWAR Syndrome:” Degenerative Post-War Tendencies

Despite the prevalence of psychological warfare in both World War I and World War II, such units no longer existed in the U.S. Army inventory at the outbreak of the Korean War.⁶⁰ The importance of psychological warfare largely fell by the wayside and by the time the Korean War ignited in the summer of 1950, the U.S. Army was forced hastily to re-create and deploy PSYWAR units to fulfill the burgeoning needs in the Far East. Thus, the *post-bellum* dismantling of the U.S. PSYWAR apparatuses and de-emphasis on PSYWAR principles in general, the “PSYWAR syndrome,” largely resulted in the delayed employment of untrained soldiers during the Korean War. These forces were mostly innocent of previously ascertained PSYWAR principles due to the depletion of critical institutional knowledge during the interim years of peace that occupied the late 1940s. Soldiers who possessed PSYWAR experience from World War II were not a part of the newly reinstituted units and the rapidity with which these forces were fielded did not allow for adequate training to occur prior to their deployment to East Asia. This greatly impeded PSYWAR progress in attaining a level in capability that was even commensurate with the PSYWAR units of World War II.⁶¹

Due to the aforementioned elimination of PSYWAR forces from the Army, many psychological warfare lessons of World War II were forgotten and inevitably re-learned during the Korean War. Similarly, this devolution into the “PSYWAR syndrome”

⁵⁹ George S. Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁶¹ One statement indicates that it took two full years for PSYWAR operations in the Korean War to attain such a level. Carl Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets* (Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1959), xi.

occurred again following the Korean War and hindered initial psychological operations efforts during the Vietnam War.⁶² However, because Korean War era units were not disbanded, in stark contrast to the World War II PSYWAR units, many of the psychological warfare lessons that emanated from the Korean War were beneficial to honing psychological warfare doctrine, execution, and improved equipment. Nevertheless, the main underlying factor that hindered psychological warfare during the Korean War -- comprehensive training -- was inadequately addressed before the end of the war.

2. A Need for PSYWAR

Among the myriad of difficulties faced in reviving PSYWAR units were how to devise the techniques to employ viable psychological warfare operations against the North Koreans. The communist North Koreans (later accompanied by communist Chinese in November 1950)⁶³ stressed the widespread use of both propaganda and agitation.⁶⁴ The North Koreans relentlessly directed their propaganda activities at both their indigenous population and military forces, and to a lesser degree against their enemies.⁶⁵ Furthermore, due partially to the PSYWAR ability to affect the strategic level of operations in particular, a Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was constituted under the auspices of the Truman administration to provide national policy for psychological warfare.⁶⁶ Thus, the U.S. military had a large stake in providing forces capable of combating enemy propaganda operations while simultaneously supporting U.S. national objectives. However, providing capable forces proved extremely problematical because PSYWAR units had to be wholly reconstructed.

⁶² Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., "No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition," in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 28.

⁶³ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 14.

⁶⁴ Agitation utilizes "individuals, including party members, for active work as promoters, organizers, talkers, in a grass-roots approach to the popular audience." Ibid., 4.

⁶⁵ See Chapter III for more about North Korean utilization of propaganda during and after the Korean War.

⁶⁶ Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 16.

3. Execution of Wartime Psychological Warfare Operations

While war plans that included psychological warfare particulars existed, and some missions were executed only days after the outbreak of the Korean War, PSYWAR forces continually lagged in their contributions to the overall war effort.⁶⁷ Units were slowly fielded and deployed to the Far East, and even after they had arrived still did not possess all of the requisite personnel or equipment to execute missions. Despite these initial setbacks, various personnel were scrounged within the theater, especially those possessing language capabilities, for bolstering PSYWAR operations. However, even as the PSYWAR units grew in personnel strength, operations were far from fluid. This was due to largely inadequately trained and inexperienced personnel. Despite great strides that were made during the Korean War to further PSYWAR capabilities, the training of PSYWAR personnel was constantly denoted as a critical issue for soldiers operating at both strategic and tactical levels.⁶⁸

4. PSYWAR Lessons from Korea

By the time the Korean War erupted, most of the methods utilized for disseminating PSYWAR messages were established during the two World Wars. Leaflets were disseminated through both leaflet bombs and leaflet artillery rounds (LARs).⁶⁹ The use of loudspeakers and radio broadcasts had been widely used during World War II.⁷⁰ Thus, the major psychological warfare advances resulting from the Korean War were the compilation of a variety of PSYWAR “lessons learned.”⁷¹ Recommendations by newly experienced officers and staffs, and those facts gathered through interrogations of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) also greatly contributed to the enhancement of psychological

⁶⁷ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 15.

⁶⁸ Most references to PSYWAR at this point in history tend to categorize operations into the strategic or tactical level while largely ignoring the operational level of warfare.

⁶⁹ Even the leaflet artillery round utilized in World War I was forgotten until 1943. Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, xi.

⁷⁰ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 5.

⁷¹ Many significant contributions were made by studies conducted by the Operations Research Office (ORO) under contract to the U.S. Army through Johns Hopkins University. However, this contract was not maintained because the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare staff believed the studies to be “too general.” Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 118.

warfare capabilities. While some of these lessons were technological in nature, many of them highlight the difficulties of crafting appropriate messages without the essential training in PSYWAR, foreign language, or regional studies.

5. Chapter Methodology

This study will begin by discussing the situational reality of PSYWAR during the Korean War by dividing it into two time periods. The first covers the outbreak of war in June 1950 and encompasses approximately the next six months. This will highlight the levels of initial PSYWAR planning, preparedness, and operational difficulties that characterized the initial months of combat until shortly after the Chinese intervention. Next, it will discuss the execution of U.S. PSYWAR activities during the remainder of the Korean War as operations became more focused, its effectiveness against enemy troops, and its difficulties in persuading targeted audiences. This will demonstrate how the conduct of PSYWAR had evolved during the subsequent years of combat. I will then draw from these two time periods to provide the major overarching systemic lessons learned from psychological warfare during the Korean War and to discuss the absolute criticality of focusing on the principles that underpin the conduct of psychological warfare.

B. PSYWAR AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR

The importance of PSYWAR that had been apparent during the latter stages of World War II was lost during the brief interwar period. By the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, the Tactical Information Detachment of Aggressor Force at Fort Riley, Kansas was the only PSYWAR unit that remained in the entire United States Army that dealt with PSYWAR.⁷² Comprised of approximately twenty personnel, it focused mainly on simulating loudspeaker and leaflet operations against U.S. troops during training exercises.⁷³ Worse, in 1950, there was only one PSYWAR trained soldier

⁷² Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 29.

⁷³ Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: *A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 20.

within the entire Far East Theater.⁷⁴ Despite the absence of PSYWAR units, however, PSYWAR plans were still incorporated into the theater-level war plans.⁷⁵ These plans were created by a seven-member planning cell that was established under the auspices of the Special Projects Branch of Civil Intelligence, G-2, General Headquarters (GHQ), and had been in existence since 1949.⁷⁶ As further proof of the decline of emphasis on PSYWAR, instruction in psychological warfare studies at the Army's professional military schools had also completely ceased to exist.⁷⁷

Despite these seemingly insurmountable challenges, remarkably the first leaflets disseminated by U.S. forces during the Korean War came less than twenty-four hours after President Truman authorized military intervention against the north, and the first broadcasts from Radio Japan began less than twenty-four hours after that.⁷⁸ Both of these efforts, however, were conducted by the small staff in the Far East Theater and were in no way indicative of an actual capability to sustain a PSYWAR campaign.⁷⁹ The establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board in 1950 at the U.S. national level soon led the U.S. Army to establish its own central PSYWAR coordinating authority on 15 January 1951, which was named the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW).⁸⁰ However, only in April 1952, almost two years into the war, did the Army finally establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁸¹

The war created a large demand for expeditiously filling newly established PSYWAR units with personnel ready to deploy and execute combat operations. These units "were hastily manned by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism,

⁷⁴ This was a former military police lieutenant colonel. Herbert Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign—A Study* (AFPE PSYWAR, 10 August 1953), 56.

⁷⁵ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 5, 13.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷⁷ Sandler, "Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": *A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 205.

⁷⁸ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 15.

⁷⁹ The radio broadcast was only thirty minutes in duration and was broadcast twice on 29 June 1950. Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 27.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁸¹ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 140.

newspaper printing, novel and script writing, art, and radio technology.”⁸² In spite of all of the markedly applicable aspects of these civilian occupations, these soldiers lacked adequate training in the core fundamentals for psychological warfare operations in Korea: general PSYWAR principles and Korean/Chinese culture, language, and customs. Also noticeably lacking was leadership experienced in the conduct of PSYWAR during World War II. Because there was no time properly to train these units, these soldiers deployed without the necessary expertise to execute their missions effectively. As the number of personnel in the Far East PSYWAR planning cell grew, it experienced tremendous difficulties. The military was scoured to acquire the critical personnel, such as translators. However, reliance on these *ad hoc* procedures was vital to accomplishing missions.

1. Radio Broadcast Operations

The VUNC (Voice of the United Nations Command) began broadcasting from Tokyo on 29 June 1950.⁸³ Translators to conduct these strategic operations were gathered from various locales including the Korean Embassy, the Bank of Korea (Tokyo Branch), and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.⁸⁴ This unit was capable of broadcasting only three hours of material each day at this stage of the war.⁸⁵ The preparation of ninety minutes of programming took approximately forty-eight man-hours to prepare in Korean or Chinese.⁸⁶ This was extremely manpower intensive and was a direct result of the lack of personnel possessing PSYWAR, language, or cultural knowledge.

By January 1951, George Pettee, an analyst with the Operations Research Office (ORO), had noted that, “The radio effort of the US psywar program up to the present has been very small compared to the enemy-controlled radio propaganda effort addressed to

⁸² Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 24.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

the Far East.”⁸⁷ The communists were clearly determined to control the airwaves. The purpose of their broadcasts was not simply to influence the enemy, but more importantly, to continue the propagation of its indoctrinating principles upon their own military forces and civilians.⁸⁸ Much was done to utilize existing radio stations in broadcasts to the North Korean populace and communist militaries. For example, when the UN forces held Pyongyang early in the war, PSYWAR forces sent a contingent of personnel there to reestablish Radio Pyongyang.⁸⁹ By the middle of the next month, the station was under UN operation and was transmitting programming up to six hours a day.⁹⁰ Obviously, this control was relinquished during later combat as Pyongyang passed between United States and communist control.⁹¹

2. Leaflet Operations

Also by that time, the United States forces had disseminated over 160 million leaflets which targeted only four different target audiences.⁹² During the first five months, the thematic emphasis was on distributing safe conduct passes and surrender appeals.⁹³ In December 1950, themes began to shift toward undermining enemy morale. Feedback on disseminated PSYWAR products and their battlefield effects was complicated by the fact that there was not, as of yet, agreement among the multiple producers of leaflets on how to classify them.⁹⁴ Also, by January 1951, the United States began to analyze the results from over six months of EPW interrogations to determine systemic evidence of the effects of PSYWAR products on the enemy. However, they still

⁸⁷ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 5.

⁸⁸ See Chapter III for about North Korean utilization of propaganda during and after the Korean War.

⁸⁹ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 28.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ This occurred in December 1950 in the wake of the Chinese intervention. William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 128.

⁹² These audiences were enemy soldiers/civilians and ROK soldiers/civilians. Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 16.

⁹³ Ibid., 17.

⁹⁴ Therefore, depending on the analyst, one leaflet could feasibly be categorized as a surrender theme or instead as a good conduct theme. According to Pettee, “Some leaflets are always on the borderline between any categories that are set up.” Ibid.

had not conducted key research on enemy target audiences and demographics.⁹⁵ Thus, their inability to isolate specific target audiences forced message themes to be broad in nature in order to ensure as much applicability as possible.

3. Tactical (Micro) PSYWAR

In the conduct of tactical PSYWAR (or micro-PSYWAR as the ORO referred to it at the time), the United States was underdeveloped. During the first several months of the war, tactical level loudspeaker operations were only being conducted on an experimental basis.⁹⁶ It was noted that, “Although widely and effectively used by many forces on both sides in World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, and what has been available has been used with little effect, because of failure to provide adequate personnel for its operation and adequate organizational arrangements for its proper use.”⁹⁷ Only two vehicle-mounted loudspeakers and two aerial-mounted loudspeakers were conducting operations by January 1951.⁹⁸ The two aerial mounted loudspeakers were operated on C-47 planes and had only been made available in the October-November 1950 timeframe.⁹⁹ Not until early 1951 did the Army conduct appropriate aerial loudspeaker tests to determine exactly how audible such broadcasts were from different altitudes. The results indicated that at altitudes of over fifteen-hundred feet the messages were unintelligible.¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, however, these loudspeaker equipped aircraft had already been operating for months at high altitudes.¹⁰¹ Loudspeaker operations overall were hampered by the theater-wide lack of equipment, training, properly structured PSYWAR forces, and language qualified personnel.¹⁰²

As the war progressed, PSYWAR personnel gradually gained experience. Despite their progress, the need for adequate training was still evident in their comments.

⁹⁵ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 6.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 112.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 23.

They acknowledged that they still lacked the cultural and language skills necessary to produce effective PSYWAR products. Therefore, they were forced to rely blindly on translators to compensate for these shortcomings. Such trends would continue for the duration of the war.

George Pettee summarized the PSYWAR problems of the first six months of the war in stating:

...improvisation for psywar in Korea has been compulsory. The method of procurement of personnel has been improvised, the development of tactical psywar in the combat zone has been provisional and the devices used for getting the message to the audience also have been provisional.¹⁰³

C. IMPROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: 1951-1953

1. First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L)

The Tactical Information Detachment from Kansas finally arrived in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in November 1950, and provided the core for the formation of the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) which focused on tactical (or micro) PSYWAR.¹⁰⁴ By January 1951, it was still not in operation.¹⁰⁵ It was comprised of headquarters, propaganda, publications, and loudspeaker platoons and was under the operational control of the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK).¹⁰⁶

The 1st L&L had difficulties in beginning its operations. Pettee noted that “The FLLC [1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company] is the only organization that can be mentioned in the history of psywar in Korea that might have provided, had it been fully active, a good volume of psywar activity directed at specific targets in combat.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 15.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 29. Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 2nd ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1954), 303.

¹⁰⁵ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 30.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 29. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 20. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 303.

¹⁰⁷ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 29.

Following its arrival in Korea, the 1st L&L still had no provision for language or PSYWAR qualified personnel to assist in message development and some of their equipment had remained in Japan.¹⁰⁸

On 30 November it was learned that much of the equipment was still in Yokohama. Two speakers had arrived in Korea, one of which was operable. One press had arrived, but parts were lacking.¹⁰⁹

2. First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L)

In April 1951, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L) was constituted at Fort Riley and its focus was primarily on the strategic level of operations.¹¹⁰ It was comprised of a headquarters, reproduction, and mobile radio companies.¹¹¹ Immediately upon arrival in theater in August 1951¹¹² it took over the conduct of strategic broadcasts from Japan through the Voice of the UN Command (VUNC).¹¹³ Therefore, after months of broadcasts, the VUNC was technically under new and inexperienced supervision. They also disseminated programming through the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) via substations in Seoul, Taegu, Pusan, and Tokyo (Japan Broadcasting System).¹¹⁴

3. PSYWAR Themes and Restrictions

a. Themes and Objectives

These newly established units were tasked with three primary U.S. psychological warfare objectives to fulfill during the war. The first was to weaken the enemy's will to fight. The second PSYWAR objective was to ideologically defuse communism by undermining the enemy's propaganda with the introduction of truth into

¹⁰⁸ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 29.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Typically "strategic" denoted radio broadcast and leaflet operations. Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 302.

¹¹¹ Ibid. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 22.

¹¹² Sandler, *"Cease Resistance: It's Good For You!": A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 217.

¹¹³ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 24.

¹¹⁴ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 306.

all of its messages. The final objective was to reinforce ROK morale.¹¹⁵ Objectives for PSYWAR, unlike those of other military units, are necessarily broader. It is impossible to achieve desired effects in every individual. In its disseminated messages to the communist target audiences, whether through loudspeaker, leaflet, or radio broadcast, themes that were stressed included: surrender to receive better treatment; surrender and live to see the end of the war; the superiority of UN firepower; and inevitability of defeat of the communist forces.¹¹⁶ Themes for civilians in newly occupied UN territories focused on undermining the communist ideologies and the disenfranchisement of the communist civilian populace.¹¹⁷ They also sought to promote the ideals of an overall Korean brotherhood on the peninsula and stress the overwhelming support of the nations of the world for the Republic of Korea.¹¹⁸

b. Policy Restrictions

Due in part to the large strategic, and more importantly, international impacts of PSYWAR, one of the major hindrances encountered by attempting to develop these PSYWAR product themes was the centralized restriction of the use of certain themes or topics that were deemed unmentionable by the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) through its issue of a series of Policy Guidance directives. One example of these major restrictions in proposed themes that was still in effect as late as 8 November 1950 was the “standing prohibition of reference to Chinese participation in the Korean conflict (Policy Guidance Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8) ... until specific notice to the contrary.”¹¹⁹ There was significant lag between operational reality and the authorizing consent to produce products that acknowledged such events. An example of this was noted in Policy Guidance directive #10, dated 3 October 1950, that specifically forbade the mention of the crossing of the 38th parallel by UN forces until “official announcement of such

¹¹⁵ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 18.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 31.

crossing.”¹²⁰ These types of difficulties were to be expected due to the inexperience of the units and the difficulties associated with establishing prescribed parameters of responsibility.

4. Measuring PSYWAR Effectiveness

a. Correlating Direct Effects

There was a large movement within the PSYWAR community to identify the direct affects of their products on the enemy. This could be deemed a study into why PSYWAR should even exist. The PSYWAR leadership needed to justify their efforts in order to continue to maintain relevance in the Army as a whole. The difficult part of such a study was the determination of appropriate measures of effectiveness backed by appropriate data. In 1951, the PSYWAR leadership had taken note of the importance of EPW interrogation and the methods that needed to be utilized to do so effectively. George Pettee at the Operations Research Office led efforts to determine the effectiveness of “strategic” PSYWAR efforts while the ORO also concluded that the same kind of measures of effectiveness could be developed for tactical PSYWAR as well (mainly loudspeaker usage).¹²¹

b. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Interviews

The methods of pre-testing and post-testing psychological warfare products on enemy prisoners of war evolved during the Korean War.¹²² Also of growing importance was the emphasis on utilizing properly trained interrogators methodically to obtain information for PSYWAR products and themes from enemy prisoners of war. Interrogations of EPWs yielded several key pieces of information that were used to perfect and hone the PSYWAR messages. As George Pettee surmised in his report in January 1951, “Such interrogation, unless conducted with great technical skill, produces

¹²⁰ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 31.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹²² Richard C. Sheldon and Henry Senft, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-6: Preliminary Evaluation of PSYWAR Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations*, (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, February 1951), 52.

only dubious and approximate indications of the effects gained.”¹²³ In other words, one could not always trust the statements given by EPWs with regard to PSYWAR message effectiveness unless the right kinds of questions were asked. Enemy prisoners of war may perceive that the best way to ensure their own personal safety is to respond with what they anticipate the interrogator wants to hear. These interrogation operations proved of such remarkable importance to the production of effective PSYWAR products that today the 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee) exists for these purposes.

In 1951, the Operations Research Office issued a report by International Public Opinion Research, Inc. (IPOR) derived from interviews conducted with 238 Chinese EPWs in Korea over a three month period.¹²⁴ The purpose of the study was to determine the effect of U.S. leaflets on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The results verified the lack of analysis of potential target audiences by U.S. PSYWAR forces. The report stated that there was “no evidence that leaflets had been concentrated on troops who were particularly prone to surrender.”¹²⁵ Although 63 percent of the interviewees stated that they had been influenced to surrender by leaflets, this was just one of many aspects that precipitated their decision.¹²⁶ Loudspeakers and radio broadcasts only accounted for decisions of 10 percent of the interviewees to surrender.¹²⁷ This might have been due, in large part, to the dearth of loudspeaker units and equipment being operated by U.S. forces, as well as the lack of radio access available to the CCF forces. The report highlighted that, not only were the CCF forces more likely be directly affected by the leaflets than were North Korean soldiers, but also that ex-CNA (Chinese Nationalist Army) veterans were the group of the communist forces most susceptible to

¹²³ Sheldon and Senft, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-6: Preliminary Evaluation of PSYWAR Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations*, 3.

¹²⁴ Willmoore Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-16: An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on Chinese Communist Troops* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 3.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

the messages.¹²⁸ It was also learned that among the CCF, the average soldier would purposely acquire and conceal leaflets despite the threats of their officers.¹²⁹ During one study it was noted that due to the multiple versions of surrender leaflets that had been drawn up, possibly bred by the “quantity versus quality” mentality, confusion and indecision were prominent results. One CCF soldier had been saving many leaflets that encouraged surrender and he finally gave up. He had actually prolonged surrendering in case the UN forces dropped another leaflet that would render his others obsolete.¹³⁰

In a sister report of the one on the CCF, the same research unit conducted 768 interviews with North Korean EPWs over the same time period.¹³¹ The analysts’ methods of questioning enabled them to receive more valid feedback from the EPWs in determining what themes worked under given conditions. The two most important aspects of the interviews were that (1) they were conducted in a “conversational framework” and (2) the questions that were asked were “indirect and open-ended.”¹³² This made it much less likely that the data set could be skewed by the biases or fears of the captive EPW audience.¹³³ Most interesting about the North Korean surrenderers was their susceptibility to messages delivered by Korean villagers whom they met. More than half of the surrenderers had listed this as one of the aspects that led them to capitulate.¹³⁴ Leaflets were mentioned as the second most prominent reason.¹³⁵ Therefore, the high

¹²⁸ Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-16: An Evaluation of Psywar Influence on Chinese Communist Troops*, 3.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Berger, *An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets*, 61.

¹³¹ International Public Opinion Research, Inc., *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-12: An Evaluation of PSYWAR Influence on North Korean Troops* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), i.

¹³² Ibid., ii.

¹³³ Sandler notes that “there is the understandable tendency of prisoners to tell their captors just what they want to hear...” Sandler, *“Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations*, 36.

¹³⁴ Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-12: An Evaluation of PSYWAR Influence on North Korean Troops*, v-viii.

¹³⁵ Only 3 percent mentioned that leaflets were the sole “reason” why they surrendered. Ibid.

susceptibility to the messages of appeal by other “Korean brothers” on the peninsula was precisely where U.S. PSYWAR should have been focused.

c. *Environmental Conditions*

The realization derived from the aforementioned studies was that the particular conditions that soldiers operate under are the most important aspects in inducing their surrender. Especially noteworthy was the lack of differentiating effects in soldiers of “different ages, education, civilian occupation, marital status, and place of residence.”¹³⁶ Thus, persuasion was linked to the exploitation of the immediate environmental conditions and vulnerabilities of the combat soldier. Clearly the CCF enlisted soldiers were the most susceptible to the PSYWAR messages.¹³⁷ Conversely, the North Korean officers were the absolute least susceptible to the effects of the PSYWAR disseminations.¹³⁸ Notably, in a 1953 ORO report, the authors made the recommendation that “surrender-mission psywar” be crafted for specific target audiences.¹³⁹ Unfortunately many of these recommendations came too late to affect positive change in PSYWAR effectiveness during the war. However, such recommendations did help to facilitate positive steps toward the creation of more viable PSYWAR doctrine for future conflicts.

d. *Operation Moolah*

Considered by many to be the most effective PSYWAR effort during the war was Operation Moolah, in the spring of 1953.¹⁴⁰ This is highly arguable, however, since the program did not achieve its desired results. This operation was an attempt by the United States to offer money as an incentive to obtain a defecting pilot with a Soviet MIG. The leaflets that were disseminated offered a \$50,000¹⁴¹ reward to any MIG pilot

¹³⁶ Kendall, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-12: An Evaluation of PSYWAR Influence on North Korean Troops*, vii.

¹³⁷ Lessing A. Kahn and Julius Segal, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-40: Psychological Warfare and Other Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1953), 3.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁰ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 68.

¹⁴¹ The equivalent in 2005 of more than approximately \$354,000.

who successfully defected with his aircraft.¹⁴² A bonus of an additional \$50,000 was also offered to the first defector to do so.¹⁴³ The leaflets and radio broadcasts were developed and disseminated in Chinese, Korean, and Russian.¹⁴⁴ Shortly after the broadcasts began it was noted that the Russian versions were being jammed from somewhere in North Korea.¹⁴⁵ Soon thereafter, the North Korean to U.S. kill ratio in air combat soared to fifty-five to one.¹⁴⁶ This denoted that the pilots who were now flying were clearly not the best ones. It was assumed that the North Koreans had replaced the Soviet pilots now flying the MIGs.¹⁴⁷ While no MIG pilot defected during the war as a result of this PSYWAR program, one did defect two months after the signing of the armistice.¹⁴⁸ Upon interrogation, however, it was learned that the pilot had neither seen leaflets nor heard broadcasts; he was merely disenchanted with communism.¹⁴⁹ The “success” of the program was the period in which the communists greatly curtailed their sorties and then ceased them altogether for a period of eight days.¹⁵⁰ This was not, however, the desired objectives that PSYWAR was striving to achieve.¹⁵¹

D. PSYWAR LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR

Although heavy research, development, and procurement operations for PSYWAR specific equipment such as mobile leaflet production centers and mobile broadcasting radio stations were underway after the start of the war, it was the emphasis on the personnel training and PSYWAR methodologies that were the most drastically in need of improvement.¹⁵² Many of the problems that PSYWAR experienced during the

¹⁴² Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953*, 70.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 71.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 72.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 73.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 72.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 73.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 72.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 74.

¹⁵² Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 118.

Korean War were due mainly to their lack of training and expertise in key areas. Such shortcomings led to indiscriminate leafleting, an overabundance of themes, poor target audience analysis, and poor intelligence. However, these areas are all inextricably linked to the initial deficiencies in PSYWAR training that were inherent to the Korean War psychological warfare units.

1. Indiscriminate Leafleting

Some of the critical lessons learned by the leadership in the psychological warfare community during the war were articulated in a report prepared by PSYWAR officers and forwarded to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 28 August 1953. One shortcoming addressed in this report was concerned with the dissemination of leaflets to target audiences, specifically, the inability to accurately put paper on the desired target.¹⁵³ The interrogation of EPWs had yielded a host of data to illustrate that, despite the tons of leaflets that were dropped, not all communist soldiers had actually come into contact with many leaflets, and some had not at all.¹⁵⁴ This led the author of the report to speculate that due to dissemination of nearly one billion leaflets per year, one of two plausible outcomes must have occurred. It was true that either, “the enemy is walking about in miles of leaflets up to his ankles” or, “if he hasn’t seen them [the leaflets] as the [E]PW reports indicate, the billions of leaflets disseminated are being wasted on untenanted terrain.”¹⁵⁵ This report effectively condemned the concept of simply attempting to “blanket” the foreign countryside with leaflets. Feedback such as this also led years later to a scientific study in the dissemination of leaflets via leaflet bomb and the determination of practical calculations to achieve more precise leafleting.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign—A Study*, 3.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ This included the calculation of the bomb release point and function point (detonation of the leaflet bomb). Such calculations are based on wind speed, direction of drift, and kind of paper utilized to cover effectively the desired target with about 90 percent of the leaflets in the bomb (about 10 percent of leaflets are so erratic that where they land cannot be effectively predicted). Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Group, *Low, Medium, and High Altitude Leaflet Dissemination Guide* (San Francisco: 7th Psychological Operations Group), 86.

2. Too Many Themes

Also voiced in the report was that the disseminated messages conveyed too wide of an array of themes that were not mutually supportive of one another. The plausible result was the over stimulation of the enemy, or “propaganda fatigue,” that may have conflicted enemy soldiers as they attempted to act in accordance with these messages.¹⁵⁷ This was also the result of having multiple PSYWAR entities producing, printing, and disseminating leaflets without coordination or communication with one another. These entities were able to conduct decentralized operations without any sort of planning coordination involved. This disjointedness was fueled by the conventional Army’s emphasis on mass amounts of leaflets as a concrete measure of PSYWAR efforts. This disregard for the judicious use of leaflets, the emphasis on the “quantity rather than quality of propaganda,”¹⁵⁸ further risked conditioning the enemy into ignoring the leaflets as commonplace.¹⁵⁹

3. Poor Target Audience Analysis

Feedback revealed problems in dissemination across all PSYWAR media and reported that target audiences were not receiving messages that were commensurate with their given level of literacy. It was noted that, “PSYWAR personnel, especially in Eighth Army and certainly including an appreciable portion of the PWS [Psychological Warfare Section] staff, were inexperienced and untrained.”¹⁶⁰ Also, those foreign personnel (Korean and Chinese) who were hired to provide language expertise in the development of PSYWAR products were in many cases unwilling to “stoop” to the level of the commoners’ language.¹⁶¹ For a translator to use less aristocratic forms of the language

¹⁵⁷ Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign— A Study*, 5. Harry S. Truman Papers, “Memorandum of Conversation between LTC Weaver, Dr. Allen, Charles Johnson, Dr. Craig, and Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Allen’s office, 1500 06 May 1952” (White House Central Files: Psychological Strategy Board Files, 1951-1953), 2.

¹⁵⁸ Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare*, 307.

¹⁵⁹ Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign— A Study*, 6.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

would cause him to lose face and was therefore unacceptable.¹⁶² Also, many of the radio products that were produced by the PWS “were in a format and mood that smacked of Hollywood and the writers’ awareness of Occidental styles and preferences.”¹⁶³ Clearly, the *ad hoc* forming and training of these PSYWAR organizations had not lent itself toward being proficient in languages, customs, or cultures of the Far East. Captain Avedon also noted that “repeated attempts to procure qualified Chinese or Korean personnel met with failure.”¹⁶⁴

4. Poor Intelligence and Evaluation

Another deficiency noted was the severe lack of data that existed about the size of potential radio broadcast target audiences.¹⁶⁵ The underlying necessity was the need for relevant intelligence and demographic analyses of specific target audiences for prescribing appropriate broadcast programming.¹⁶⁶ The PSYWAR radio scripts were mostly “broadcast without having been checked for accuracy of translation by a US citizen...”¹⁶⁷ The report also analyzed the systemic inadequacies for receiving feedback on disseminated products. These processes help to refine future PSYWAR products. In short, there were no systems in place:

For all practical purposes, no evaluation of FEC psywar programs is conducted. Program personnel are relying on (1) criticism from foreign nations on the PWS translation and announcing staff, (2) occasional criticism from Plans and Policies, Operations, and high officials in PWS, (3) occasional letters from [S]outh Korean listeners, or (4) occasional comments from informed outsiders.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶² Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign—A Study*, 9.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 10.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ “[T]his was the case with all Korean scripts during the period under study.” Wilbur Schramm, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20: FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, February 1952), 3, 70.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 44.

5. Poor Training

Poor training was the most predominant underlying factor across the myriad of PSYWAR shortcomings in the Korean War:

It is apparent that the men feel their own preparation was inadequate in at least three important respects – area training, language training, and previous psywar experience. In the opinion of ORO the analysts, the lack of area training was so important as to justify the future elimination of almost any other kind of psywar training for appropriate personnel...¹⁶⁹

Avedon's report also noted the severe lack in operational capability of PSYWAR loudspeaker personnel. He further stated that, "the principal weakness in all psywar operations and no more noteworthy among the loudspeaker teams than in other psywar operations on all levels, is the lack of experienced, trained, qualified personnel."¹⁷⁰ Not only did his report highlight that personnel were deficient in PSYWAR training, but in general Army training as well.¹⁷¹

Pettee similarly noted that in tactical loudspeaker operations specific "attention must be given to producing psywar materials of effective content, and not merely to physical production and dissemination."¹⁷² In other words, the crafting of an appropriate message in the target audience's language was essential to effective psychological warfare and simply broadcasting "surrender" messages in situations that were not conducive for the enemy to surrender would, by contrast, be utterly ineffective.¹⁷³ Furthermore, Pettee stated that:

Content-production capacity...calls for skilled language ability, that can put the message not merely into the scholars [sic] version of the enemy language, but into the common idiom that will sound familiar to the enemy soldiers...The language function calls for a genuine language knowledge. It is no better to address a Chinaman [sic] in the language of a

¹⁶⁹ Schramm, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20: FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio*, 4.

¹⁷⁰ Avedon, *A Study of Psychological Warfare Operations in the Recent Korean Campaign— A Study*, 16.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 7

¹⁷³ Ibid.

part of China which he does not know, than it is to use the dialect of Brooklyn on a Texas audience. Psywar can, of course, get results without such “refinement,” but its real capabilities will never be measured by such results.¹⁷⁴

Insufficient training was a predominant issue presented in Captain Avedon’s report to the Psychological Warfare Center due to its ramifications throughout the entirety of PSYWAR operations in the Far East Theater. During the duration of the Korean War, the 1st L&L Company had a total of only “about six or seven section leaders and two CO’s [commanding officers] who had been trained in psywar.”¹⁷⁵ One may presume that throughout the latter stages of the Korean War, soldiers trained in psychological warfare would finally have arrived in theater. Incredulously, Avedon notes that:

There never has been one, repeat one, enlisted graduate of the PsyWar School assigned to psywar in the Far East. There never have been psywar personnel who were area specialists. There never have been psywar personnel who were linguists with the exception of one officer who was not fluent in the pertinent language. There never have been loudspeaker or radio announcers who were psywar trained...¹⁷⁶

Lieutenant Colonel John Weaver traveled to the Far East area of operations in the spring of 1952 to assess ongoing psychological warfare operations. Among his assessments that were provided to the Psychological Strategy Board were that training in both media operations and propaganda were paramount to PSYWAR soldiers, but “the ideal, however, would be to have area specialists [including language specialization] who could be trained in propaganda techniques.”¹⁷⁷ Also, noted by George Pettee was that

¹⁷⁴ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 66.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁷⁷ Harry S. Truman Papers, “Memorandum of Conversation between LTC Weaver, Dr. Allen, Charles Johnson, Dr. Craig, and Mr. MacDonald, Dr. Allen’s office,” 3.

effective loudspeaker tactical operations could only be made effective through the training in “specific psywar skill, language skill, and intensive liaison and indoctrination activities.”¹⁷⁸

Wilbur Schramm wrote an ORO report on PSYWAR radio operations during the Korean War and heavily emphasized the role of PSYWAR, language, and cultural training. He asserted that “The potential effectiveness of the operation has...been severely limited by the absence of training in the culture and language of the target audience, and by the fact that there is almost no previous psywar experience anywhere on the staff.”¹⁷⁹ He further characterized the radio operations as hampered by the fact that:

The propaganda writers tend to be young men, who have had neither area nor language training adequate to their task. They have no way of judging whether the English scripts they produce are suited to the target; moreover, the scripts are translated into a language that they do not understand, and are often broadcast without having been checked for accuracy of translation by a US citizen...¹⁸⁰

Therefore, Schramm prescribed the “cultural and linguistic training of psywar personnel”¹⁸¹ while making the clear distinction that, “Mere interpreters are not sufficient.”¹⁸² He further discussed that:

There is a need for a far greater supply of skills, and of training to provide it, as regards the language of the target audience, its culture, and its communications system. (No US citizen in the employ of PWS [psychological warfare staff] was able to check scripts produced by PWS in Japan after they had been translated into Korean, the only Korean-speaking American in the unit having been assigned to Korea...Furthermore, no one in the radio company had gone through systematic area training in Korean or Chinese culture, and in fact most of

¹⁷⁸ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 5.

¹⁷⁹ Schramm, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20: FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio*, 2, 4.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 46.

the members of the unit did not know the barest rudiments of the culture to which they were expected to communicate.”¹⁸³

E. IMPLICATIONS

By end of the Korean War in 1953, psychological warfare forces had gained experience and knowledge that were beneficial to improving combat PSYWAR. However, the end of the war also led to the reemergence of the “PSYWAR syndrome.” Despite the gradual atrophy of the PSYWAR forces, the predominant difference when contrasted with the post-World War II time period was the continued existence of PSYWAR units in the peacetime Army. Furthermore, the Psychological Warfare Center and School both maintained PSYWAR institutional knowledge and furthered the research of PSYWAR principles. Many of the lessons that were learned during the Korean War were subsequently addressed prior to and during the Vietnam War. However, despite numerous past references to the importance of training in PSYWAR, regional, cultural, and linguistic training, these issues remain inadequately addressed to this day. In the words of Wilbur Schramm, “Why should not the nation be training future psywar personnel in a number of cultures and a number of languages?”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ Schramm, *Technical Memorandum ORO-T-20: FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio*, 70.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

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III. THE DPRK: A FORMIDABLE PSYOP CHALLENGE

*If you are looking for an easy war, fight an information-controlling state....If you are hunting a difficult conflict, enter the civil strife that arises after the collapse of an information-controlling state.*¹⁸⁵

A. DPRK INFORMATION CONTROL AND REGIME SECURITY

1. Methodology versus Mysticism

For over half a century the diabolical term *brainwashing*¹⁸⁶ has been used by numerous authors and analysts to describe the brand of North Korean information control that it exercises over its populace.¹⁸⁷ While such terminology connotes an arcane and perhaps irresistible succumbing of individuals to propaganda, the North Korean system of information control is much more methodological than mystical. The usage of *brainwashing* to characterize the perpetuation of communist ideologies took root in an era when the use of subliminal messages was feared as a means of subversion.¹⁸⁸ These beliefs were further propelled by such Hollywood portrayals of subliminal brainwashing

¹⁸⁵ Ralph Peters, "Spotting the Losers: Seven Signs of Non-competitive States," *Parameters* 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 39.

¹⁸⁶ "This rather frightening term was originally used to describe the persuasion tactics used on American prisoners in Communist Chinese prison camps during the Korean War. These camps were totalitarian environments in which the captors came to control the thoughts of the POWs [prisoners of war] by controlling all sources of information and by systemically rewarding and punishing appropriate and inappropriate thought." Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 305.

¹⁸⁷ See the following for more recent examples: Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), "The DPRK Report, No. 5" (January-February 1997); available from URL: <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/dprkrprt/97janfeb.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005. Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 14. Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 25. Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 361.

¹⁸⁸ "Despite the claims in books and newspapers and on the backs of subliminal self-help tapes, subliminal influence tactics have not been demonstrated to be effective." Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, 292-293.

as in the 1962 film, *The Manchurian Candidate*.¹⁸⁹ Despite the fact that such myths have since been dispelled, the description of the North Korean brand of information control is still rendered in such mysterious terms. What is true, however, is that the “North Koreans have been exposed to massive and sustained indoctrination and an ‘organizational life’ shielded from external sources of influence”¹⁹⁰ through the “...depth, ubiquity, and never-ending self-parody of regime propaganda...”¹⁹¹ for more than fifty years.

2. Manufacturing Truth

The successive communist regimes of Kim Il-sung and son Kim Jong-il have dominated all facets of the lives of the indigenous North Korean population for decades. In doing so, these regimes have actively utilized propaganda as their primary means of inculcating communist ideologies and both creating and perpetuating the mythologies of the party leadership among the populace. Therefore, when the *truth* does not exist to support the goals of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), it is merely manufactured and magnified:

The state’s propaganda machine constructs and repeats absurd myths about these two [Kims]. Sometimes the myths are built on a kernel of truth; sometimes they are pure fabrication.¹⁹²

These methods were utilized effectively during the generation of the communist Korean War veterans; however, they appear to be even more ingrained in the fabric of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) society within its post-Korean War generations. This is a direct result of the heavy indoctrination that all elements of society

¹⁸⁹ “The movie, starring Angela Lansbury, Frank Sinatra, and Laurence Harvey, tells the story of an American soldier captured during the Korean War and brainwashed by the Chinese Communists. The POW is programmed to go into a hypnotic trance and to assassinate U.S. political leaders on command.” Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, 21.

¹⁹⁰ Young C. Kim, “North Korea in 1974,” *Asian Survey* 15, no. 1 (January 1975): 51.

¹⁹¹ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: The New Press, 2004), 141.

¹⁹² O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, 24.

undergo from the youngest of children to the most elder members. This fanaticism has served to promote the legitimacy and strengthen the powerbase of the Kim regimes for a number of years.

After the Korean War, the North Korean communists, under the leadership of Kim Il-sung, conducted propaganda operations against such target audiences as U.S. forces, Republic of Korea (ROK) forces and civilians, and most distinctively – their own civilians and military forces. The latter was clear evidence of the protective nature of the communists for their ideologies and their fear of vulnerability to U.S. psychological warfare. True of that era and no less so today is that, “The North Koreans believe that no matter how absurd or spurious the propaganda, given time and repeated propagation, it can develop a veneer of credibility or, at the least, plausibility in susceptible minds.”¹⁹³ Such methods are representative of those utilized by Joseph Goebbels during his propaganda campaigns of World War II in that, “*What the masses term truth is that information which is most familiar.*”¹⁹⁴ Goebbels asserted that:

The rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious. In the long run only he will achieve basic results in influencing public opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms and who has the courage to keep forever repeating them in this simplified form despite the objections of intellectuals.*¹⁹⁵

Therefore, no level of absurdity in propaganda is so great that it cannot be made believable through repetitious dissemination.¹⁹⁶ This has been a dominant practice of both Kim regimes throughout the years and shows no signs of changing at present. While North Korean propaganda had little affect on U.S. forces during the Korean War, the

¹⁹³ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment: Potential North Korean Propaganda Exploitation of US and Coalition Captives” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, 2002).

¹⁹⁴ Emphasis in original. Pratkanis and Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, 182.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. The authors’ original footnote number 5 is denoted as * and refers to “R.E. Herzstein, *The War That Hitler Won* (New York: Paragon House, 1987), 31.”

¹⁹⁶ It is further noted that “...repetition of a piece of information increases its perceived validity.” Ibid.

manipulation of their own military forces and civilians was masterful and continued well after the signing of the armistice. Their efforts were enhanced by the draconian isolation of its populace following the end of combat operations that has remained the *status quo* to this day. Thus, the state's media control, message repetition, and heavy indoctrination when compounded with decades of shielding its citizens from external influences have enabled the communist Kim regimes to define their own "truths" among the North Koreans of today.

3. Anti-Americanism: A Central Theme

In the years since the armistice agreement, anti-Americanism has been one of the most consistently pursued themes propagated by the Kim regime to shape the perceptions of successive generations of DPRK citizens. The Museum of American Imperialist Atrocities in the North Korean city of Sinchon attests to the extreme methods that the DPRK propaganda machine is prepared to use to demonize the United States.¹⁹⁷ This serves as a counterpoint to reinforce official mythologies surrounding the regime leaders that both legitimize their rule and glorify their "revolutionary achievements."

The regime's obsessive anti-Americanism testifies to the general xenophobia that pervades the North Korean culture, a xenophobia that conditions the minds of the post-Korean War generations. Anti-American themes enable the regime to promote maintenance of its national security through its drastic "military first" policy.¹⁹⁸ This has proven effective despite the calamitous social policies that have produced such severe and devastating famines experienced in the DPRK beginning in the mid-1990s.¹⁹⁹

The propaganda apparatus of the DPRK has successfully evolved since 1953 and has proven an effective means of control and stability for the Kim regimes and the Korean Workers' Party. North Korea's adept application of information control in executing its domestic policies has allowed it to face numerous economic and agricultural

¹⁹⁷ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, June 1980), I-5.

¹⁹⁸ Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country*, 189.

¹⁹⁹ It is estimated that anywhere from 500,000 to one million North Koreans died as a result of the devastating famines. *Ibid.*, 178.

setbacks, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and over a half-century of bold opposition from the U.S.-ROK alliance, without the much anticipated “collapse” that has been prophesied for years.²⁰⁰

A large part of his [Kim Il-sung’s] objective clearly was to make the population inaccessible to propaganda and other subversion efforts. While the South Koreans and Americans liked to imagine that isolation would threaten his rule, Kim believed that even more isolation was the way to preserve his system. In more than four decades to come, he was never proved wrong about that.²⁰¹

Thus, the DPRK has proven that its societal grip is not just a passing phase. After years of being subjected to anti-American indoctrination, the North Korean populace has an understandably distorted view of the United States. Such perceptions could profoundly inhibit the future abilities of U.S. forces to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction operations, or even combat operations, on the Korean peninsula.

4. Chapter Methodology

This chapter focuses on the DPRK’s domestic propaganda apparatus, and its objectives, indoctrination methods, and information control throughout the years from the Korean War to the present. The first part will survey North Korean propaganda during the reign of Kim Il-sung. The second part will focus on the time period encompassing Kim Jong-il’s reign up until the present. It is very important to note that this is neither a comprehensive account of the past domestic propaganda of the DPRK, nor a complete measure of their future capabilities. Little is published on the subject of North Korean domestic propaganda, which is surprising given that propaganda is a key component of power and control in all communist regimes. However, ignorance is most certainly due in large part to the extreme isolation of the North Korean populace under the regime’s revival of a modern day “Hermit Kingdom.”

²⁰⁰ The “Big Bang [theory] refers to a sudden internal collapse of North Korea and the ensuing chaos.” Chung-in Moon, “The North Korean Problem and the Role of South Korea,” in *North Korea After Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?* Eds. Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), 95.

²⁰¹ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 125.

B. PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM IL-SUNG

1. North Korean Psychological Warfare: 1950-1953

Psychological warfare played a central and significant role in communist North Koreans' war fighting strategies during the Korean War. Their propaganda machine actively targeted a host of varied audiences including their own civilians and military. Many of their propaganda operations adapted Stalinist or Maoist practices, while others were even modeled on U.S. concepts.²⁰² These imitations and the heavy measures that the North Koreans undertook psychologically to inoculate their forces, betrayed the communist fears of the threat posed by credible U.S. PSYWAR.²⁰³ Similar to the message dissemination techniques that were utilized against them, the communists likewise conducted leaflet operations, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker operations. However, they further expanded their propaganda activities to include agitation and the massive use of communist workers to blend propaganda with organizational structure.²⁰⁴

The North Korean propaganda activities were fully coordinated with their invasion force as it attacked into South Korea. Their preparation was underscored by a broadcast disseminated to the North Korean populace by the DPRK Department of the Interior on 25 June 1950:

The South Korean puppet national defense army suddenly attacked North Korea at the 38th parallel, in the early morning of June 25. The enemy attacked at three points (names of the places omitted here) and advanced from one to two miles. The Department of the Interior of the Democratic People's Republic has ordered its police forces to beat off the invading forces. At present, the Republic's police guard is resisting the enemy, and a severe defensive war is in progress.*²⁰⁵

²⁰² Many North Korean leaflets merely echoed the themes utilized in the U.S. leaflets with only minor changes. George S. Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 4.

²⁰³ Ibid., 51.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 54.

²⁰⁵ Wen-hui C. Chen, *Chinese Communist Anti-Americanism and the Resist-America Aid-Korea Campaign* (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, 1955), 10. The author's original footnote is denoted by * and corresponds to his number 25 in reference to "The Southern Puppet Army Attacking North Korea at Three Points, Public Announcement Warns the Puppet Government to Stop the Advance; Otherwise a Decisive Step Will Be Taken,' *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai), June 26, 1950."

The communists directed propaganda against their own soldiers to mitigate the effects of any U.S. PSYWAR products that might reach them. North Korean soldiers were routinely indoctrinated before impending contact with enemy forces. Each North Korean Army (NKA) division had a “cultural section” that was comprised of approximately 250 personnel whose responsibilities included assurance of the political indoctrination of communist units.²⁰⁶ These cultural sections claimed that U.S. forces invariably executed any prisoners of war.²⁰⁷

Reports told of lectures and mass rallies being held to indoctrinate enemy soldiers against the leaflets. Soldiers were being threatened with reprisals against their families if they should surrender. Troops were exhorted to commit suicide rather than face torture and execution by United Nations forces. They were reminded that they would be shot by their own security troops if they should attempt surrender.²⁰⁸

Themes alleging the barbarity of U.S. soldiers were common as were claims of the chemical-biological contamination of U.S. leaflets.²⁰⁹ This was a preemptive effort by the communists to stop their soldiers from picking up the leaflets, thereby preventing the U.S. message from even being read. Leaflets that depicted the guaranteed medical care and humane treatment granted to U.S. enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) as a compelling reason for surrender were twisted by the communists as examples of the horrible atrocities of U.S. germ warfare experimentation.²¹⁰ Black bars were routinely printed over EPW faces in the U.S. leaflet pictures to protect their identities. However, this practice was discontinued after repeated claims by the communists that such alterations were necessary to conceal the disfigurements that resulted from the gross human experimentation that was conducted on United States held prisoners of war.²¹¹

²⁰⁶ Pettee, *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War*, 54.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 51.

²⁰⁸ “Psychological Warfare in Korea: An Interim Report,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (Spring 1951): 69.

²⁰⁹ Stephen E. Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea, 1950-1953* (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1992), 81.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

While the North Koreans were adept at propagandizing their own people, their messages tended to have little affect on the U.S. forces. Part of the lack of success of communist propaganda directed toward U.S. forces may have been attributable to the high usage of political themes “...which often called upon GIs to end ‘the unjust war,’ ‘send a message to Truman,’ ‘Bring the Troops Home,’ etc.”²¹² Furthermore, the North Korean propagandists were also hindered by the shortage of available aircraft that rendered their dissemination of leaflets “rare.”²¹³ Leaflets were one of the U.S. PSYWAR establishment’s most utilized forms of dissemination, yet the same mass quantities could not be matched by the communists. Regardless of the dissemination means, however, the North Koreans exhibited a relatively unified thematic focus. The more prominent themes that were stressed included the emancipation of women, emancipation of labor, redistribution of land, Korean nationalism and communist ideologies, and unification.²¹⁴ Although it would later change in the years after the Korean War, North Korea’s theme for reunification was defined as “unification by force.”²¹⁵

The DPRK propaganda methodologies were characterized as “an unbreakable system of constant public indoctrination plus a ruthless policing system to keep the populace under control.”²¹⁶ As further initiatives to ensure audience attentiveness, “People were stopped in the street by the police and quizzed to see if they had remembered the message of the latest propaganda campaign.”²¹⁷

As Seoul changed hands and was occupied by the North Koreans, once for as long as three months, the North Korean psychological warfare campaigns were vigorous and

²¹² This is contrasted by the U.S. PSYWAR focus that tended to avoid political themes unless their “...military implications and significance were clear, and for the most part held to military subjects.” Stanley Sandler, *Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 208.

²¹³ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953*, 121.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 126-129.

²¹⁵ Soon Sung Cho, “The Politics of North Korea’s Unification Policies 1950-1965,” *World Politics* 19, no. 2 (January 1967): 219.

²¹⁶ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953*, 124.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 125.

unrelenting.²¹⁸ Posters depicting communism's key leaders were brightly displayed everywhere and stood in sharp contrast to the war ravaged surroundings.²¹⁹ The North Koreans also employed loudspeakers, handbills, and mandatory indoctrination lectures to influence the masses.²²⁰ In themes eerily similar to those espoused in contemporary U.S. operations in Iraq:

While they occupied parts of the South the Northerners tried to portray themselves positively as liberators, but with only mixed results. Communist propagandists sought to make the best of the American intervention by attacking the Rhee [South Korean] regime for flunkeyism, in an appeal to South Koreans' nationalist feelings.²²¹

As the armistice took root, North Korea enhanced and expanded their propaganda apparatuses to extend their control over their people. Thus, their grip on state-controlled information solidified with the cessation of combat operations and subsequent reduction in U.S. PSYWAR activities.

2. Post-Korean War Propaganda

a. Countering Operation Jilli

The propaganda war did not end with the signing of the armistice. The North Koreans continued to engage in a number of operations that attempted to subvert operations in the south. The United States and the Republic of Korea continued to disseminate leaflets and conduct radio broadcasts for a number of years. Operation Jilli was one such leaflet program conducted by U.S. psychological operations units in the mid-1960s.²²² Radio broadcasts continued to be of little use to the U.S. PSYOP forces due to the low availability of radios among the North Korean people.²²³ Though the North Koreans possessed a high literacy rate, the United States was unable to exploit this characteristic because the dissemination of leaflets via leaflet artillery shell or leaflet

²¹⁸ Pease, *PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953*, 126.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 125-126.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 89.

²²² *Jilli* was the transliteration of the Korean word for "truth." Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Group, *A Report on Operation Jilli* (San Francisco: 1967), 2.

²²³ Ibid., 5.

bomb would constitute a breach of the armistice agreement.²²⁴ Thus, the U.S. PSYOP units began employing leaflet balloons both to circumvent the explicit proscriptions set forth in the armistice agreement and to inject truth into the information-deprived North Korean populace. The first such mission took place in 1964 and resulted in the dissemination of millions of leaflets into North Korea.²²⁵ While the North Koreans had employed leaflet balloons for a number of years, their operations were not of nearly the scale of those launched in execution of Operation Jilli.²²⁶ Interviews were conducted with North Korean defectors to determine the effectiveness of these U.S. PSYOP products. The “respondents were also unanimous in their opinion that the North Korean Communists are now forced to reevaluate their existing internal political indoctrination of the people and their propaganda output directed at the South Korean audience, in order to cope with the constant pressure applied by Operation Jilli.”²²⁷ Consequently, the North Korean regime was forced to undertake substantial counterpropaganda techniques to mitigate the effects of Operation Jilli. Such techniques included the mass gathering of leaflets for incineration followed by speeches refuting the leaflets’ themes.²²⁸ Further, the PSYOP analysts noted that, “The success of the Jilli program has been underscored by the use of Jilli themes and techniques by the North Koreans in their own leaflet dissemination program.”²²⁹ Also, analyses of “the North Korean Labor Party newspaper over a ten-month period has revealed a four to five-fold increase in what can be interpreted as counter-Operation Jilli, pro-North Korea, propaganda (specifically, in newspapers three months prior to, and seven months following, the start of Jilli leaflet drops).”²³⁰ Hence, the conduct of Operation Jilli appeared inadvertently to help North

²²⁴ Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Group, *A Report on Operation Jilli*, 5.

²²⁵ The most favorable winds for these leaflet drops were from mid-April to mid-September. *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

Korea hone their own leaflet efforts as their styles and themes soon began to “coincide with the basic principles used in producing leaflets for Operation Jilli.”²³¹

b. Writing is Believing

The North Koreans have historically concerned themselves with extracting “confessions” from POWs that articulate that their actions were wrong and that the communists were both fair in treatment and valid in ideology. These confession techniques have been evidenced several times since the signing of the armistice including the sailors taken prisoner from the captured USS *Pueblo* in 1968.²³² These methods are reminiscent of the Chinese attempts to convert U.S. POWs to communism during the Korean War and their reliance on the written word:

And the Chinese knew that, as a commitment device, a written declaration has some great advantages. First, it provides physical evidence that the act occurred....A second advantage of a written testament is that it can be shown to other people. Of course, that means it can be used to persuade those people. People have a natural tendency to think that a statement reflects the true attitude of the person who made it. What is surprising is that they continue to think so even when they know that the person did not freely choose to make the statement.²³³

Therefore, for the North Korean propagandists it is true that “writing is believing.”²³⁴

c. The Propaganda and Agitation Department

The overall control of the multi-faceted DPRK propagandist media and societal activities rests with the KWP’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.²³⁵ The Korean People’s Army (KPA) has historically possessed some of its own control of propaganda operations as well. During the mid-1960s it was noted that the General Political Bureau of the KPA had a Propaganda and Instigation Bureau; however, this

²³¹ Headquarters, 7th Psychological Operations Group, *A Report on Operation Jilli*, 20.

²³² “In January 1968 the North Koreans seized the U.S. spy ship *Pueblo*, capturing the crew and keeping it in prison for eleven months...” Bruce Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 480.

²³³ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, rev. ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993), 76-77.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

²³⁵ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, i.

agency primarily functioned to conduct external propaganda activities.²³⁶ The KWP, for purposes of informational control, developed “a sophisticated domestic and international propaganda organization to propagate Kimist ideas and further its peninsular goals.”²³⁷ The same purposes of maintaining power and control have remained constant throughout the years as has government centralized control of all forms of media consolidated at the KWP level. Furthermore,

...radios available to ordinary citizens...were fixed so that they could receive only government broadcasts. The newspapers purveyed strictly the party line.²³⁸

The facts, lies, embellishments, and myths that the KWP promotes are disseminated with national authority throughout the country while international information is carefully filtered at the highest echelons before any domestic distribution is authorized.

3. The Monolithism of *Juche*

Throughout the evolution of North Korea, one of the most unifying propaganda concepts has proven to be “*juche*.” *Juche*, or Kim Il-sung’s “self-reliance” ideology, was first vocalized in 1948, but was not brought into the forefront of DPRK propaganda until a couple of years after the signing of the 1953 armistice.²³⁹ This “autarkic autonomy” strategy pursued under the rubric of *juche* was the “idiosyncratic developmental alternative based on a blend of ethnocentric nationalism, Stalinist jargon, and Korea’s ‘hermit kingdom’ legacy.”*²⁴⁰ The *juche* ideology was advanced due in no small part to the geographical boundaries that the regime utilized to isolate the North Korean people

²³⁶ Daniel P. Bolger, *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 16.

²³⁷ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, iii.

²³⁸ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 368.

²³⁹ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, I-2.

²⁴⁰ Edward A. Olsen, *Toward Normalizing U.S.-Korea Relations: In Due Course?* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 24. The author’s original footnote is denoted above by * and refers to his number 35: “For insights into North Korea’s dilemma, see Joseph C. Kun, ‘North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking,’ *China Quarterly*, no. 31, July-September 1967, pp. 48-58; Chin O. Chung, *Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow*, University: University of Alabama Press, 1978; and Joseph Chung, *The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development*, Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1974.”

and bolster state monopoly of information. While these constraints prevented outside influences from penetrating the society, the promotion of the *juche* concept served to answer all of the questions of why the society sacrificed in the way that it did. Therefore, *juche* was “a viable rationalization for existing societal and economic shortcomings.”²⁴¹ In other words, the individual sacrifice and hard work ethic exhibited by the populace helped to preserve the overall good of the society.

Agitation and propaganda operations heavily emphasized *juche* idealisms and simultaneously advocated “the call for absolute loyalty and adoration for the Leader [Kim Il-sung].”²⁴² *Juche* was officially declared to be “the monolithic ideology of the party” in 1978 and was subsequently referred to as “the only thought” (*yuil sasang*) of the North Korean people.²⁴³ Clearly the “*juche*” concept is still to this day a prominent factor in the DPRK “Kimist” adaptation of Marxist-Leninist practices and has even been characterized as possessing adherence and reverence among North Koreans on a level comparable to that of a religion:

Long before his death in 1994, Kim Il Sung had been deified as the personification of Korean national pride, and “Kim Il Sungism” had become the national faith. The holy trinity in North Korea still consists of Kim the father, Kim Jong Il the son, and *juche* the holy spirit.²⁴⁴

4. Reunification of the Fatherland

The concept of Korean reunification was a prominent propaganda theme that originated under the reign of Kim Il-sung but was championed by both sides during the Korean War.²⁴⁵ Domestically these themes persisted in North Korea after the war and also continue to constitute a large portion of today’s propaganda themes as well. Whereas the Korean War rhetoric focused on unification through force, the post-war

²⁴¹ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, I-3.

²⁴² Kim, “North Korea in 1974,” 51.

²⁴³ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Special PSYOP Study: North Korean Psychological Operations Threat* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, October 1985), II-2.

²⁴⁴ Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*, 16.

²⁴⁵ Cho, “The Politics of North Korea’s Unification Policies 1950-1965,” 219.

messages were softened to advocate a desire for peaceful reunification.²⁴⁶ The North Koreans utilized such seemingly benevolent themes yet displayed their propaganda prowess in that, “Despite every effort of the South Korean government to jam radio broadcasts and censor newspapers, northern propaganda for unification originating from Pyöngyang, Kaesöng, and Wönsan radio stations somehow reaches the intellectuals and students in the South.”²⁴⁷

Encouragement for reunification was originally manifested under Kim Il-sung’s rule in such seemingly benign activities as North Korean children’s school songs because, “To reunify the fatherland is the supreme national duty and the most important revolutionary task facing the entire Korean people.”²⁴⁸ Kim was continually portrayed in domestic propaganda as tireless in his efforts to reunify the two nations while in contrast it was the ROK puppet regime under the U.S. imperialist thumb that was obstructing such efforts.²⁴⁹ Noted at the celebrations honoring the twentieth anniversary of the DPRK in 1968 was that:

From the highest government officials to the tour guides and interpreters, all seemed imbued with a war mentality. The North Koreans believed a war to be inevitable, and they were confident that they will fare well. Frequent references were made to a war of liberation and officials constantly talked about American imperialism. Anti-American posters, many with warlike themes, were in abundance. The intensity of the anti-American propaganda approached a hate-America campaign.²⁵⁰

In June 1974, in concert with the designation of an “Anti-American Struggle” month numerous public rallies were held that espoused similar themes with the most prominent being “that U.S. presence in South Korea is the fundamental impediment to

²⁴⁶ Cho, “The Politics of North Korea’s Unification Policies 1950-1965,” 218.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, I-4.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., I-5.

²⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Information Cable: Conditions and Atmosphere in North Korea as of mid-September 1968” (October 1968), 2.

the reunification of Korea and the prime source of the evils and dangers of war.”²⁵¹ In a speech by Kim Il-sung later that same year he stated that:

North Korea supports and encourages the patriotic struggle of the south Korean people for the democratization of south Korean society. This is not an [sic] interference in south Korea’s internal affairs nor is it intended to instigate revolution in south Korea. For the reunification of the fatherland, we regard it as our noble national duty to support the just struggle of the south Korean people.²⁵²

Little has changed in this respect in contemporary times while the domestic propaganda in the DPRK continues to profess U.S.-ROK obstructionism in reunification efforts.

5. Kim Il-sung: The “Great Leader”

Culturally, Kim Il-sung was represented in all facets of DPRK life. It had been widely accepted for a number of years until his death in 1994 that, “All that is good, all innovative ideas, and all of what constitutes modern North Korea is attributed to Kim.”²⁵³ Such depictions unified North Koreans under the pervasive view that Kim Il-sung was the father figure of their one national Korean family.²⁵⁴ To emphasize his paternal authority and stature as the nation’s “Great Leader,” Kim’s name was always printed in publications in bold type and all photographs of Kim were regarded as “sacred.”²⁵⁵ All “official photographs (those that hung in rooms and offices for ceremonial use)” were “treated as controlled items” by the people.²⁵⁶ This was widely enforced and “many North Koreans have risked their lives to protect these photographs, quite possibly out of

²⁵¹ Kim, “North Korea in 1974,” 45.

²⁵² Ibid., 46.

²⁵³ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, II-3.

²⁵⁴ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Study:” Title Classified (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, June 1992).

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

fear of the adverse consequences of not doing so.”²⁵⁷ Each room in the DPRK, with the exception of lavatories, was required to have on display photographs of both Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il.²⁵⁸

The mythologies that surround Kim Il-sung, his early life, and his rise to power were fabricated, given deeply rooted ideological overtones, and were broadly disseminated throughout the country. One such myth is Kim’s supposed 264 mile journey in seeking the “revolutionary truth” as a fourteen year old in 1925.²⁵⁹ This example is typical of the mythologizing of Kim’s “revolutionary” past. Such stories abound and served Kim well in solidifying his powerbase and legitimacy with the people. Also, it was noted during the 1970s that the North Korean citizens were “encouraged” to show their undying loyalty for Kim Il-sung by wearing badges bearing his picture over their hearts.²⁶⁰ At least seven badges were prevalent at one time.²⁶¹ More than 34,000 monuments to Kim were erected during his lifetime.²⁶² Clearly this manufactured reverence of Kim Il-sung by the North Korean people was instilled in the successive generations as well. Now that such widespread and unchallenged disinformation has been promoted for a protracted amount of time, the deification of Kim Il-sung is no longer necessary – it is the *truth* as defined by the DPRK.

6. Indoctrination of the Masses

The methods of perpetuating and promoting KWP propaganda were primarily through the systematic use of political indoctrination. Indoctrination was, and remains, prevalent throughout all social classes and ages within the society of the DPRK. It focuses on key communicators such as party cadre and also on the nation’s youth.²⁶³

²⁵⁷ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Study:” Title Classified.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, II-4.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, 25.

²⁶³ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Special PSYOP Study: North Korean Psychological Operations Threat*, II-4.

Meanwhile, mobilization propaganda focuses on the whole of the adult population.²⁶⁴ While initially individuals had to adapt to such measures, the post-Korean War generations have been inculcated with Kim mythologies from soon after birth. Thus, they are taught only that which is sanctioned by the KWP. When children are only three months old their mothers go back to work while the children are monitored by state-run daycare centers:

From this point on, the state becomes the dominant influence in a child's life. Often the first words a child speaks are "Papa Kim." At age three, children attend nursery school where conformance to group behavioral standards is stressed. Children are taught songs lauding Kim and play games which depict mock battles between the "valient [sic] North Korean people" and the dreaded "US imperialist monster" or which illustrate the freeing of the "oppressed South Koreans."²⁶⁵

Around the age of ten children begin receiving their first military oriented classes.²⁶⁶ Children are required to belong to special interest organizations just like the adults in the society. Such organizational affiliation "provides the party [KWP] with instruments for indoctrination and mobilization, and it serves as a controlled forum for determining public opinion about government policies."²⁶⁷ This prohibits the populace from being able to speak their minds in public if what they advocate is at all contrary to the KWP's guidance. There was little change in propaganda operations when the leadership of the country passed from the elder Kim to his son. Thus, it can be seen how easily the North Koreans have applied the concept of the "writing is believing"²⁶⁸ method of persuasion into their daily lives -- by incorporating the concept of *juche* into all educational undertakings.

²⁶⁴ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Special PSYOP Study: North Korean Psychological Operations Threat*, II-17.

²⁶⁵ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, IV-6.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, VI-7.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, VI-9.

²⁶⁸ Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 81.

C. PROPAGANDA UNDER KIM JONG-IL

1. Early Reign of the “Dear Leader”

By the time of the death of the elder Kim, Kim Jong-il had already been involved in the communist party and the propaganda process for a number of years. His longtime grooming for ascendancy to his father’s position was solidified in 1994 through Kim Il-sung’s assertion that, “In our country, Comrade Kim Jong Il has been wisely leading the work of the party, the state, and the armed forces; thus the problems of succession has been brilliantly solved.”*²⁶⁹ Thus, Kim Jong-il’s rise to power was a continuation of the processes and institutions already successfully established under his father’s reign. While considered far less charismatic than his late father, similar legitimizing mythologies were concocted of the “revolutionary” past of the son as well.²⁷⁰ Although he was really born outside of North Korea, the story surrounding Kim Jong-il’s birth has been revised into a dramatic tale taking place on the peak of Mount Paektu, the tallest mountain within either of the two Koreas.²⁷¹ To further glorify the event it was added that, “The sky was brightened by a star and a double rainbow.”²⁷² Other no less exaggerated tales insist that he “wrote over 1,000 books during college alone.”²⁷³ However, in addition to the continuing process of legitimizing Kim Jong-il’s rule, other unforeseen forces threatened to destabilize the regime.

²⁶⁹ B.C. Koh, “Recent Developments in North Korea,” in *North Korea After Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?* Eds. Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), 2. The author’s original footnote number three is denoted by * and refers to “*Nodong sinmun* (Labor news) (Pyongyang), January 5, 1994.”

²⁷⁰ Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo, “Introduction,” in *North Korea After Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?* Eds. Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), xiii.

²⁷¹ “Like Koguryō [a Korean Kingdom that lasted approximately seven centuries until 668 A.D.] North Korea utilized this mountain as part of its founding myth, and now Kim Jong Il is said to have been born on the slopes of Paektusan [Paektu Mountain], in the desperate year of 1942 (he was actually born along the Russo-Chinese border south of Khabarovsk, and accounts conflict as to whether he was in China or in Russia).” Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History*, 28.

²⁷² Peter Maass, “The Last Emperor,” *New York Times Magazine* (19 October 2003): 41.

²⁷³ O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, 25.

Not long after Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, floods, drought, and famine swept North Korea while the economy devastatingly plummeted.²⁷⁴ Yet despite the widespread social effects resulting from those disasters, the KWP was able to continue to tout the external threats of the state as a cohesive and legitimizing theme in maintaining its tight grip on the North Korean populace. It was true that, "Most North Koreans still blindly believe that their society is the most just and prosperous in the world, and that their motherland is about to be invaded by imperialist and other enemies."²⁷⁵ North Korea subsequently undertook economic reforms to attempt to improve its anachronistic economy that continues to struggle in an age of interdependence. Thus, their hardships persist while:

North Koreans are now expected to buy much of their own food at open markets rather than receiving it from the state, but inflation has risen far more than increases in official wages, according to a report by the U.S. World Food Program. The study, released last month, found that the price of a liter of vegetable oil, for instance, increased threefold from September 2003 to September 2004 to about \$1.50 – an amount roughly equal to a week's salary for many North Korean workers.²⁷⁶

Despite these market reforms, the state still retains its monopoly on information and its rigid prohibitions against criticisms of DPRK officials in the press.²⁷⁷ The success with which the KWP has continued to limit unauthorized information is indicative of the sad reality that a:

²⁷⁴ "North Korea's economy dropped precipitously in the 1990s with gross national income falling from \$21.3 billion in 1994 to \$12.6 billion in 1998, according to the Bank of Korea." Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country*, 181.

²⁷⁵ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), "The DPRK Report, No. 5."

²⁷⁶ Anthony Faiola, "For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave," *Washington Post*, 13 December 2004, 12A.

²⁷⁷ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), "Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea," *Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report* 10 (November-December 1997); available from URL: <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsn120197.html>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

...considerable portion of North Korean society has lost the ability to perceive reality objectively, is exhausted to its limits not only physically (as a result of material deprivation) also psychologically by fear of the emergence in its thoughts of ideas “alien” to the official ideology and the ruling regime.²⁷⁸

Therefore, the regime has shown no signs that they are contemplating an abandonment of its “military first” policies that are so harmful to the North Korean economy.²⁷⁹ Individuals who fail to adhere to the authoritarian information guidelines set forth by the KWP are subject to having their personal possessions confiscated, performing forced labor, or even execution.²⁸⁰

The methods of indoctrination that were established under the rule of Kim Il-sung continue unabated to this day. Political indoctrination dominates the lives of the North Korean people and the education system primarily accommodates the propagation of Kimist philosophies among students of all ages:

The entire country devotes two hours daily to political classes. All enterprises and offices spend Saturdays on political education...Educational institutions allocate most of their time to studying the teachings of the two Kims, their biographies, and the KWP’s history....In secondary schools, stories about the two Kims and their teachings are studied in all details and are supposed to be the most important subject. At the college level, *juche*-ism dominates the curriculum and requires thousands of hours of classwork and homework. At factories and offices...participants recite editorials of central newspapers, swear to fight “American imperialism” and its “lackeys” in Seoul, and recount their own contributions to the cause of *juche*-ism.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “The DPRK Report, No. 5.”

²⁷⁹ Jae-Chang Kim, “The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance,” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* XV, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 74.

²⁸⁰ Kristin R. Gustavson and Jinmin Lee-Rudolph, “Political and Economic Human Rights Violations in North Korea,” in *North Korea After Kim Il Sung: Continuity or Change?* Eds. Thomas H. Henriksen and Jongryn Mo (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1997), 137.

²⁸¹ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea.”

Meanwhile, Pyongyang's repetitive propaganda themes disseminated through these indoctrination programs have allowed the Kim regime continually to avoid publicly addressing the harsh realities of life in North Korea. Its "state-sponsored brainwashing has succeeded remarkably well with its captive and isolated audience, which blames the outside world for most of its problems and reveres its leaders (especially the late Kim Il Sung)."²⁸²

2. Propaganda Themes

Today few changes distinguish North Korean propaganda themes from those of the immediate post-Korean War era. There are no aspects of North Korean society that are excluded from the dominating control of the Korean Workers' Party.²⁸³ The "official cultural model" continues to be *socialist realism*, which elevates the roles of the two Kims in the overarching ideological perpetuation of communist philosophies.²⁸⁴ Socialist realism "does not espouse a 'realistic' or 'naturalistic' reproduction of life but must describe reality as the party defines it; both characters and events must be idealized in order to educate and indoctrinate the public on the party line."²⁸⁵ The Ministry of Culture and Art controls the usage of all culturally oriented propaganda.²⁸⁶ The regime's propaganda machine relies heavily on its "manipulation and exploitation of history" to create "evidence" in order to promote themes that perpetuate the concept of *juche*, attest to North Korea's role as the birthplace of traditional and authentic Korean culture, promote reverence for Kim Il-sung and his anti-Japanese heroics, create revolutionary

²⁸² O'Hanlon and Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, 25.

²⁸³ Strategic Studies Detachment, "Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea" (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, August 2002).

²⁸⁴ Socialist realism is derived from Soviet cultural practices dating back to 1934 and involves the relentless promotion of socialism through the arts. *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, VII-5.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII-2.

credibility for Kim Jong-il, and foster anti-Americanism.²⁸⁷ Other propaganda initiatives target the North Korean workers to expedite and induce the overproduction of goods.²⁸⁸ These operations seek to “whip its people into a revolutionary frenzy...Carried on at breakneck speed and referred to in borrowed military terminology as ‘speed battles.’”²⁸⁹

Domestic North Korean counterpropaganda operations were necessitated by the once prevalent ROK PSYOP products disseminated in North Korea; however, these efforts have subsided in recent years due to various agreements between the two states.²⁹⁰ Leaflet balloons were actively utilized by the ROK PSYOP forces as were novelty items such as radios. In methods similar to those of the Korean War, propaganda balloons launched from South Korea that did make it across the DMZ were alleged by the KWP to be “poisoned.”²⁹¹ Only those individuals who were considered the most loyal to the regime were chosen for the mission of retrieving the balloons, which was made difficult by the fact that they usually descended on urban areas.²⁹²

a. The Rise of Anti-Americanism

Years of anti-U.S. indoctrination themes have bred a hostile view of the people of the United States in successive North Korean generations. Anti-Americanism spans the whole of the North Korean education system, therefore, “Starting in kindergarten and continuing through adulthood, North Koreans are taught to despise the United States as an aggressor and an imperialist that ignited a fratricidal war between northern and southern Koreans by prompting the South to invade the North in 1950.”²⁹³

²⁸⁷ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Military Capabilities Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Appendix C: Psychological Operations” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 4th Psychological Operations Group, November 1998).

²⁸⁸ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 362-363.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Barbara Demick, “Balloon Launch to N. Korea Aims to Sow Dissent Activists Hope the Radios Included in the Airborne Parcels will Help Open Northerners’ Minds,” *Los Angeles Times*, 30 June 2003, A3.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 385.

²⁹³ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Military Capabilities Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Appendix C: Psychological Operations.”

The DPRK has mastered the repetitive use of history to continue to stoke this anti-American sentiment among the North Korean people. Themes that attribute U.S. imperialist aggression against Korea to as far back as the 1866 sinking of a U.S. gunboat near Pyongyang are still persistently exploited as though it were recent news.²⁹⁴ The DPRK also continues to purport that the United States is the main hindrance preventing the unification of the Korean peninsula. Thus, the North Korean populace perceives that U.S. dominance of the ROK regime is oppressing the populace of South Korea and preventing meaningful progress toward reunification.²⁹⁵ Such practices were initiated under Kim Il-sung and have not changed substantially in that:

South Korea is treated invariably as the “military fascist puppet” of the United States. Citizens of the DPRK are called upon “to fight to the end for the toppling of the fascist dictatorship” in the South. The term “to liberate” is used concerning Pyongyang aims vis-à-vis the ROK.²⁹⁶

North Korean propaganda directed toward South Korea may have provided some chillingly effective results because “anti-Americanism is growing at a startling rate in South Korea, potentially escalating into a serious problem that could jeopardize the future of the U.S.-Korean alliance.”²⁹⁷ With improved ROK democratic freedoms that were granted in 1987, the ability of North Korean philosophies to permeate South Korean society has increased.²⁹⁸ Due to the stringent anti-communist regulations that were fundamental to South Korea’s Cold War existence for decades, the increased liberalization removed significant barriers to North Korean sources of information and “it

²⁹⁴ “In August 1866, an American trading ship, the *General Sherman*, sailed all too brashly up the Taedong River to P’yŏngyang, only to be set afire by a mob of local residents and soldiers, resulting in the death of all twenty-four crewmen on board.” Carter J. Eckert, et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul: Ilchokak for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990), 194.

²⁹⁵ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Military Capabilities Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Appendix C: Psychological Operations.”

²⁹⁶ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea.”

²⁹⁷ Seung-Hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea” *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002-2003): 109.

²⁹⁸ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 365.

cannot be denied that anti-American sentiment among the young generation [of South Koreans], which is undermining the US-ROK alliance, is closely related to North Korean propaganda.”²⁹⁹

After decades without contact with such ideas, perhaps it should not have been surprising that substantial numbers in the South were not inoculated with the skepticism needed to counter the simple if often deceptive appeal of Northern propaganda. The inherent attraction of the new and previously forbidden enhanced the attraction.³⁰⁰

North Korean themes divisively portray the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as imperialists and condescendingly chide the ROK for continuing to endure “the ignominy of having foreign troops on its soil, ‘controlling’ its armed forces, buying its women, golfing on its prime real estate and disseminating crass American culture over...television.”³⁰¹

b. Thematic Shifts and Recent Developments

While the majority of propaganda operations conducted under the regime have maintained thematic continuity over the years, of late there have been some noticeable shifts to attempt to account for recent DPRK troubles. Themes that involve the hardships of the famine and economic difficulties in the years after the death of Kim Il-sung are cropping up.³⁰² This is a break from the traditional form of North Korean socialist realism that was prevalent under Kim Il-sung in that they are acknowledging, to a certain degree, the shortcomings of the state.³⁰³ The incorporation of these events portray Kim Jong-il as being too dramatically involved in national security and military issues to be able to oversee agricultural production.³⁰⁴ However, modified calls for

²⁹⁹ Kim, “The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance,” 70.

³⁰⁰ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 365.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 366.

³⁰² Robert Marquand, “Pyongyang Propaganda Concedes Hardship,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 August 2003.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

personal sacrifices are still demanded from a starving population through the “strain of guilt injected in the message – that people don’t work hard enough to feed the ‘Dear Leader.’”³⁰⁵

President Bush’s post-September 11 castigation of North Korea as constituting one arm of an “Axis of Evil” certainly served to provide new anti-U.S. materials to the KWP propagandists.³⁰⁶ Despite the resurgence of tensions primarily centered on North Korea’s reassertion of its overt nuclear ambitions,³⁰⁷ both North and South Korea continued to take measures toward de-propagandizing the DMZ. In June 2004, “The billboards and broadcast towers proclaiming South Korea’s ‘freedom, abundance, happiness’ or North Korea’s ‘politics by a generous king’” were slowly being dismantled.³⁰⁸ But at the end of July more than two hundred North Koreans defected to Seoul and the following day two hundred twenty seven more did the same.³⁰⁹ This was the largest mass defection from North Korea in its short history.³¹⁰ Thus, by August the talks between the two Koreas had stalled and the removal of DMZ propaganda ceased about halfway through to completion.³¹¹

There has also been much recent discussion involving the removal of Kim Jong-il’s pictures from prominent places, mostly those visited by foreign diplomats.³¹² Some claim that this is one step in a gradual movement toward preparing another

³⁰⁵ Robert Marquand, “Pyongyang Propaganda Concedes Hardship,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 August 2003.

³⁰⁶ “After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush lumped North Korea into what he described as an ‘axis of evil’ with Iran and Iraq, even though North Korea now has few if any real links to terrorists and even though recent history suggests it can be influenced through engagement.” O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea*, 14-15.

³⁰⁷ In April 2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁰⁸ Donald Greenless, “Trying Hard to Communicate,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 167, no. 32 (12 August 2004): 18.

³⁰⁹ “North Korean Exodus,” *Wall Street Journal*, 30 July 2004, 10A.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ Greenless, “Trying Hard to Communicate,” 19.

³¹² Anna Fifield, “North Korea Politics: N Korea Warns US to Stop ‘Smear Campaign,’” *Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire*, 13 December 2004. Faiola, “For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave.”

dynastic successor to Kim; however, others feel that it is evidence that Kim is merely trying to “update his image.”³¹³ North Korea has condemned these reports in stating that, “Recently the US let reptile media and riff-raff spread the sheer lie that portraits of leader Kim Jong-il are no longer displayed in the DPRK.”³¹⁴ They further alleged that such claims were part of a U.S. psychological operations campaign that sought to instigate a regime change in North Korea.³¹⁵ While such claims are hardly accurate, the DPRK propagandists take close note of U.S. PSYOP forces and their actions abroad. This is evidenced in a *Nodong Sinmun*³¹⁶ article that analyzed U.S. combat operations in Iraq and noted that:

The United States is combining several kinds of special operations with its large-scale military strikes to occupy Iraq. Their greatest effort among these special operations is in psychological warfare.³¹⁷

Further North Korean protests voicing their paranoia of U.S. PSYOP activities precipitated a statement in December 2004 that presaged a DPRK withdrawal from the “six-party talks over dismantling its nuclear weapons programmes [sic], warning the US to stop its ‘undisguised psychological operation aimed at a regime change’ in Pyongyang.”³¹⁸ The DPRK Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also released a statement that articulated:

The hatred of the army and people of the DPRK towards the US is rapidly mounting due to its escalation of the smear campaign to bring down the political system in the DPRK. Under this situation the DPRK is

³¹³ Faiola, “For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave,” 12A.

³¹⁴ Fifield, “North Korea Politics: N Korea Warns US to Stop ‘Smear Campaign.’”

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ This is a widely published North Korean newspaper.

³¹⁷ BBC, “North Korean Paper Describes US ‘Psychological Warfare’ in Iraq,” *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 31 March 2003.

³¹⁸ Fifield, “North Korea Politics: N Korea Warns US to Stop ‘Smear Campaign.’” The Six-Party Talks over the North Korea nuclear issue involve the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan.

compelled to seriously reconsider its participation in the [Six-Party] talks with the US, a party extremely disgusting and hateful...³¹⁹

Thus, in February 2005, North Korea unambiguously announced that it indeed possesses nuclear weapons and that it would no longer participate in the Six-Party Talks.³²⁰

3. North Korean Media

North Korea's multi-faceted, state-managed media is the cornerstone of maintaining the KWP monopoly on information. North Korea continues to employ newspapers, radio and television programs, and films to perpetuate the ideological saturation of the society. Amazingly, many of the themes that they utilize have changed relatively little over the years. A recent DPRK poster campaign called for the North Korean populace "to smash the US imperialists' moves to stifle the DPRK and defend the nation's right to existence [sic]."³²¹ Such a generic declaration could easily have fit into the immediate post-Korean War era of propaganda operations. But while the state's domination of information access and flow continues, the global trends in increased porosity of state borders synonymous with the Information Age are challenges that require active countermeasures by the North Korean regime. Speculation continues to abound that North Korea's precarious economic condition and other factors could be eroding their abilities to maintain continued isolation from unwanted external influences. Therefore, "As North Korea enters the 30th month of its experiment with free-market reforms – including deregulating prices and increasing foreign trade – diplomats, analysts, intelligence sources and recent defectors say that the once airtight lid on information in what is known as the Hermit Kingdom is gradually loosening."³²²

While the DPRK may have achieved success in controlling internet access, the infiltration of cellular phones is becoming more of a problem evidenced by the recent

³¹⁹ Fifield, "North Korea Politics: N Korea Warns US to Stop 'Smear Campaign.'"

³²⁰ James Brooke, et al., "North Koreans Say They Hold Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, 11 February 2005, A1.

³²¹ Julian Manyon, "Propaganda Machine Keeps North Koreans in the Dark While Their Government Stokes the Nuclear Crisis with America, Most of the Country's Inhabitants Remain Unaware of the Threat, Reports Julian Manyon in La Jin," *Daily Telegraph* (London), 2 February 2003, 30.

³²² Faiola, "For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave," 12A.

estimate that “as many as 20,000 North Koreans – particularly those trading in the newly thriving border area with China – now have access to Chinese cellular phones.”³²³ Thus, as the prolonged state-led battle to monopolize information continues, emergent technologies will remain a potent threat to these efforts. However, their domination of conventional forms of media continues relatively unabated.

a. Newspapers

Several daily North Korean newspapers are published and serve as the written voice of numerous KWP interests within the country. The published propaganda themes have remained so constant throughout the years that:

When one reads a North Korean newspaper, one gets the impression that it is a very old newspaper except for dates and names. Otherwise it contains essentially the same ideas, slogans, style, and logic.³²⁴

There are four national newspapers and eleven provincial newspapers that are produced as well as a few others at the local level.³²⁵ The *Rodong Sinmun* (*Workers’ Daily*) is the official newspaper representing the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee.³²⁶ The *Minju Choson* is representative of the government; the *Ch’ongnyon Chonni* represents the “Youth Vanguard” of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League (KISSYL); and the *Choson Inmingun* represents the Korean People’s Army.³²⁷ On an international level, the DPRK widely distributes the *Pyongyang Times* in both English and French and has continued to do so in excess of thirty years.³²⁸ Domestically acquiring these newspapers, however, is also a highly state-controlled process:

³²³ Faiola, “For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave,” 12A.

³²⁴ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea.”

³²⁵ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea.”

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

Newspapers are not sold through retail channels and are available exclusively through subscription. Subscriptions are handled through district authorities, who decide who reads what. Each family may subscribe to only a single periodical; everything else must be read in libraries. Foreign media are available only to the Central Committee of the KWP, the Foreign Ministry, certain other government agencies, and the Academy of Social Sciences.³²⁹

Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial printed on New Year's Day in 2001 celebrating its 20,000th edition. Emphasized within the article was the role of the media in furthering propaganda on behalf of the Kim regime stating, "The socialist press is the resolute defender and speaker for the leader's ideas and cause."³³⁰ It then explicitly developed the critical objectives that should be followed in promoting such propaganda:

- Publicize the greatness of Kim Chong-il [sic] by emphasizing his achievements.
- Promote the so-called Military-First Policy by treated [sic] the KPA [Korean People's Army] as the nation's last bulwark against foreign diplomatic, economic, and military pressures.
- Increase "class awareness," for example, guard against ideological contamination from capitalism, especially among North Korea's post-Korean War generations.
- Encourage workers to intensify their efforts to improve NK's [North Korea's] economic infrastructure.
- Educate "all compatriots" on the NK [North Korean] formula for rational reunification.
- Support the global anti-US movement.³³¹

Thus, it is apparent the unconcealed and prominent role that the media plays in supporting a wide range of regime objectives.

³²⁹ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), "Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea."

³³⁰ Strategic Studies Detachment, "Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea."

³³¹ Ibid.

b. Radio and Television Broadcasts

While new forms of media have been developed over the years, the KWP utilizes all possible communication channels that it controls to influence domestic (and international) audiences. Presently, vehicle-mounted loudspeakers conduct broadcasts on a daily basis in North Korea at major hubs of activity to bolster workers' morale and continue the mobilizing emphasis on "Kimist" ideologies.³³² This is important for stifling any cynicisms of the North Korean laborers while simultaneously promoting hard and efficacious work.

Radio broadcasts continuously operate under the auspices of the state while access to outside broadcasts is explicitly prohibited by the government:

North Koreans in possession of private radios must report to authorities, who mechanically alter them to catch only local stations. Those caught listening to outside radio broadcasts can be sent to prison, according to North Korean defectors.³³³

However, this does not stop all efforts to acquire and conceal radio receivers that are unaltered and thereby still capable of receiving international broadcasts:

...many [defectors] were spurred on by foreign broadcasts they heard on new imported radios smuggled in from China. Unlike those approved for sale in North Korea, the Chinese radios can pick up transmissions from abroad, abounding in tales of Seoul's glittering skyscrapers and streets jammed with late-model cars.³³⁴

Therefore, in recognizing the susceptibilities of its people to such broadcasts, the DPRK has gone to great lengths to control the use of domestic radio receivers and to try to bargain with the South Korean government to stop harmful broadcasts into the DPRK. In September 2003, the DPRK ceased broadcasting its own propagandist "Voice of National

³³² Strategic Studies Detachment, "Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea." Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, "The New North Korea," in *Korea Briefing 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification*, eds. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 87.

³³³ Soo-Jeoung Lee, "N. Korea Wants S. Korea to Drop Broadcasts," *The Associated Press News Service*, 29 August 2003.

³³⁴ Faiola, "For North Korean, Openness Proves a Two-Way Street; As Increased Trade and Communication Bring Outside World In, More Citizens are Spurred to Leave."

Salvation” into South Korea in efforts to invite reciprocal cessation of ROK Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcasts into North Korea.³³⁵

North Korea also centrally controls television broadcasts. Similar to the mechanical alteration of radio receivers, the North Koreans only sell archaic televisions that utilize a dial which is then soldered into place.³³⁶ Much of what is broadcast for television are movies and documentaries that promote the specified themes:

The North Korean populace has been brainwashed into uncritical acceptance of the Kim legend by a propaganda machine that has utilized not only Workers Party indoctrination, a state-controlled educational system, and a monopoly of radio and television but also a highly developed motion picture industry.³³⁷

Movies that are broadcast via this medium are typically created by one of three “national film studios” that disseminate storyline plots that typically depict fictional revolutionary characters who are martyred for the overall good of the socialist state.³³⁸ Each of these studios annually creates approximately thirty movies each, some of which are distributed abroad as products of *Mokran Video*.³³⁹ Most of the movies that are made are “documentaries” that utilize the same themes found in all other disseminations throughout the country.³⁴⁰ Documentaries and films about the two Kims constitute approximately 20 percent of all North Korean radio and television broadcasts.³⁴¹

Within the last several years the DPRK has acquired satellite television broadcasting capabilities and has conducted increased internet propaganda distribution to affect international audiences. In the past, the DPRK television broadcasts were

³³⁵ Lee, “N. Korea Wants S. Korea to Drop Broadcasts.”

³³⁶ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 395.

³³⁷ Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement*, 14.

³³⁸ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea.”

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Strategic Studies Detachment, *Basic PSYOP Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, VII-4.

³⁴¹ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey Institute of International Studies) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Diplomatic Academy, Moscow), “Visits of Russian Communists to North Korea.”

inaccessible to the people of South Korea due to the incompatibility of the broadcasting formats. The DPRK broadcasts in PAL, except for Kaesong TV, and the ROK utilizes NTSC.³⁴² The usage of a Thaicom 3 satellite on the part of the DPRK beginning in 1999, however, has negated this incompatibility and enabled foreign propaganda to reach much larger audiences.³⁴³ While the ROK's National Security Law criminalizes consumption of communist materials, President Kim Dae-jung relaxed these laws to authorize news affiliates to screen and rebroadcast North Korean shows that penetrate into South Korea.³⁴⁴ Thus, while increasing its abilities to propagandize abroad, North Korea maintains its anachronistic monopoly on information in an age when increasing capabilities of global communications continue to be on the rise. This remains as one of the regime's main strengths and helps to explain its ability to prevent the development of realistic internal opposition to its existence to this day.

D. IMPLICATIONS

In the event of any scenario that reunifies the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea there will be great difficulties. The main point related in this chapter is that one of the largest challenges in the reunification process will be the social reintegration of the two significantly divergent groups of people and the difficulties of U.S. participation in such a process. While the citizens of both countries were unified as one nation in the past, remembrance of times prior to partition are fading from memory as generations pass from one to the next. Thus, the previously valid claim that Koreans are all one people is rapidly becoming an irrelevant argument to western observers. However, Koreans do not necessarily see it that way. Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, the ROK has become increasingly westernized while the DPRK has increasingly sought to maintain its Hermit Kingdom status. The once culturally and linguistically

³⁴² Strategic Studies Detachment, "Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea." NTSC (National Television Standards Committee) is used by the United States and PAL (Phase Alternating Line) is common in Europe. The Thaicom 3 satellite is part of a satellite system supported by Thailand: "The Thiacom Satellite System," available from URL: <http://www.mlesat.com/Thaicom.html>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

³⁴³ Strategic Studies Detachment, "Special PSYOP Assessment: The Propaganda and PSYOP Capabilities of North Korea."

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

homogenous nation has thereby evolved following civil war and partition into two distinctly separate and divergent branches. This is evident in the numerous practices of daily life and even how the people are taught (or allowed) to think.

Kim Il-sung, and to a lesser extent, Kim Jong-il, are both mythologized by the DPRK propagandists. This has solidified their legitimacy in leading the dynastic communist regime. Post-Korean War generations of North Koreans have been inculcated from birth with nothing but *juche*, anti-Americanism, and the undying DPRK emphasis on reunification. As the generation of Korean War veterans fades from view it will become exponentially more difficult for the DPRK populace to have any realistic understanding whatsoever of their “Korean brothers” to the south. Especially under the recognition that the DPRK domestic propaganda capabilities are so impressive that, “Call it brainwashing or education, or credit the art of a host of well-trained actors; no matter how the authorities had managed to pull it off, a visitor was left with the feeling he had traveled to the center of a great and still-burning faith.”³⁴⁵ Furthermore, anti-Americanism is also on the rise in South Korea as at least a partial result of North Korea’s unrelenting external propaganda South Korean perceptions of U.S. policies.

Undoubtedly the ramifications of more than a half-century of anti-Americanism are of concern for the future U.S. interests in the region, especially with its active pursuit of objectives in fighting a Global War on Terror. Such aggressive U.S. activities are already unpopular across many nations of the world and denounced as imperialistic without the specific indoctrination of people to foster its development. Meanwhile, “North Korean anti-American indoctrination and self-imposed isolation have produced generations of North Koreans who have an extremely simplistic and distorted view of American soldiers and the society they come from.”³⁴⁶ The widespread use of North Korea’s authoritarian information control across all aspects of its society poses a significant threat to the success of possible U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations that could be necessitated by the renewal of combat operations on the

³⁴⁵ Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty*, 361.

³⁴⁶ Strategic Studies Detachment, “Special PSYOP Assessment: Potential North Korean Propaganda Exploitation of US and Coalition Captives.”

peninsula or through peaceful reunification. As the United States continues to fight for winning the “hearts and minds” of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is vital to begin training for the possibilities of future operations in Korea because countering more than a half-century of methodical communist indoctrination will involve much more than cursory preparation.

IV. CONTEMPORARY PSYOP: A NEED FOR CHANGE

*Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work.*³⁴⁷

A. POST-COLD WAR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Breaking the “PSYWAR Syndrome”

Following the Vietnam War and the subsequent ten year regression into the “PSYWAR syndrome,” psychological operations finally began to be revived under the Reagan administration.³⁴⁸ Later, shortly after the creation of the United States Special Operations Command in 1987, both Army civil affairs and psychological operations forces were organized under the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.³⁴⁹ Thus, psychological operations began gaining more of a funding focus that coincided with the decline of the Cold War. The U.S.-led Persian Gulf War in 1991 involved a large PSYOP effort that was also highly publicized by the media due to its largely overt nature.³⁵⁰ During the war, PSYOP efforts were “credited with netting a large proportion of the 87,000 EPWs [enemy prisoners of war] counted at the close of the conflict.”³⁵¹ Thus, the end of the Persian Gulf War did not witness the same downward spiral into PSYOP irrelevancy that had been recurrent since World War II. However, the U.S. military as a whole continued

³⁴⁷ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 185.

³⁴⁸ This is due in large part to President Reagan’s declaration of the informational element to national power in his national security strategy. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 29-30.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., 31. USACAPOC was established in 1990. The United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command is a subordinate unit to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command also located at Fort Bragg. Psychological operations is one among the U.S. Army’s five special operations forces. The other four are civil affairs, special forces, special operations aviation, and the rangers.

³⁵⁰ Although PSYOP did play a role in both Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983) and Just Cause (Panama, 1989), their roles were not nearly of the magnitude of Operation Desert Storm. Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: *A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 320-330.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 331.

to be subjected to the practice of post-war reductions in manpower and funding.³⁵² Throughout the 1990s, the 4th Psychological Operations Group remained the Army's only active duty PSYOP group despite the increased operational tempo that ensued.

2. Post-Cold War Military Paradigm Shifts

The onset of the post-Cold War period also saw the rise of intrastate conflicts over the once prevalent interstate wars that were characterized largely by conventional warfare tactics:

With the decline in East-West tensions, neither the Soviet Union (later Russia) nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in parts of the world that were now perceived to be strategically inconsequential, such as sub-Saharan Africa. This allowed international organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in efforts to bring an end to several long-standing conflicts.³⁵³

Therefore, as the United Nations became increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations so, too, did the United States.³⁵⁴ Between 1990 and 1995 the United States executed “forty-seven major operational deployments – a 50 percent increase over the Cold War years.”³⁵⁵ The latter years of the 1990s involved even more frequent and larger troop deployments to the Balkans in peacekeeping roles and a continued presence in the Persian Gulf. Thus, with the end of the Cold War the United States has averaged new involvement every eighteen months in states requiring post-conflict reconstruction.³⁵⁶ This increased emphasis placed on military personnel serving in non-combat roles

³⁵² The number of active duty U.S. Army divisions dropped from eighteen to ten. Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 168.

³⁵³ Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16.

³⁵⁴ “In the decade from 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed thirty-three peace operations, more than double the fifteen missions that the organization conducted in the four preceding decades.” *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁵⁵ Franks, *American Soldier*, 170-171.

³⁵⁶ Robert C. Orr, “Preface,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), x.

involved missions that the U.S. military was not historically trained to conduct. Psychological operations were no exception.

a. Increased Civil-Military Interaction

The rise of the postmodern period in military affairs that is characterized by the “interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres” has increased the interactions between deployed soldiers and a host of organizations with varying interests.³⁵⁷ These increased civil-military interactions are concomitant with the increasing usage of the military in functions that are not traditionally military (multinational peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance)³⁵⁸ or in post-conflict environments such as those currently evidenced by Iraq and Afghanistan. Such surroundings are permeated by numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs)³⁵⁹ and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs).³⁶⁰ These organizations provide a myriad of vital services to needy populaces. The number of non-governmental organizations alone rapidly increased in the 1990s from approximately 6,000 to more than approximately 26,000 by the end of the decade and these trends have continued with the dawning of the new century.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, “Armed Forces After the Cold War,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2.

³⁵⁸ Charles C. Moskos, “Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,” in *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*, eds. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.

³⁵⁹ “NGOs are defined as private, self-governing, not-for-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human suffering; or to promoting education, health, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or to encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.” Pamela Aall, “What do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?” In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 367.

³⁶⁰ “An IGO exists when two or more governments sign a multilateral treaty to form such a body and agree to finance its operations.” The most well-known IGO is the United Nations. Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 3, 5.

³⁶¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 90.

b. Post 9/11 Paradigms of Nation-building

Following the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States is much more mindful of the fact that “failed states matter.”³⁶² Prior to this event, President George W. Bush had stated:

I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war...I believe we're overextended in too many places.³⁶³

However, it has since become clear that, “In the age of global terrorism, transnational crime networks, and border-hopping disease, state weakness and failure are a real threat to Americans and their way of life.”³⁶⁴ Thus, the concept of stabilizing and reconstructing such states as a means to rehabilitate and strengthen security (both internal and external), have come to the forefront of U.S. national security interests as a means of proactive defense. However, doing so requires not just improved security, but comprehensively addressing a host of other cross-cutting issues that foster stable governments and societies. Such areas include participatory governance, socio-economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.³⁶⁵

3. Korean Reunification

While it is clear that the United States military must be prepared for conflict because of the continued nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea (the other two members of the “Axis of Evil”), preparations must also be taken to support the potential destabilizing effects of a Korean reunification.³⁶⁶ Due to the protracted nature of the Korean War, which never successfully resulted in anything more than an armistice,

³⁶² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Foreword,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), vii.

³⁶³ This statement was from candidate Bush’s presidential campaign in 2000. Robert C. Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 14.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁶⁶ Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 14-15.

reunification would constitute a post-conflict environment. Partition has greatly divided not only the territory of Korea – but the culture as well. The United States military should be prepared to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations in such an environment. In the event that this scenario comes to pass, PSYOP forces should be fully capable of supporting such operations. However, at this time they are not adequately prepared to conduct effective support to stabilization and reconstruction operations in general – and particularly in Korea. This is despite more than fifty years of combined operations with Republic of Korea forces. The painful lessons of psychological warfare efforts during the Korean War may well be evidenced again unless reforms are undertaken to improve PSYOP capabilities.

4. Chapter Methodology

This chapter will begin by explaining the new U.S. emphasis on stabilization and reconstruction operations and what they entail. It will then explain the role of psychological operations in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Next, it will describe the contemporary difficulties associated with psychological operations executing missions in a stabilization and reconstruction role in a reunified Korea. It will then discuss the shortfalls that characterize PSYOP training and their impediments to effective support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Finally, this chapter will conclude with the prescription of ten PSYOP transformation recommendations to help meet the challenges of future U.S. operations.

B. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

1. Increasing Emphasis on Stabilization and Reconstruction

Recent post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the National Security Strategy's emphasis on the threats to U.S. security posed by terrorist havens and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation³⁶⁷ have led to the realization that the

³⁶⁷ President George W. Bush stated in the National Security Strategy that, "The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination." The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002), ii; available from URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

United States must actively seek to stabilize states that are in danger of failure or collapse:

As the world's richest and most powerful country with a truly global presence, the United States is a prime target for those who would use weak states as a base of operations. In a world of increasingly globalized threats from terrorist networks and from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United States has a disproportionate interest in ensuring a functional international system.³⁶⁸

In September 2004, the U.S. Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and named Ambassador Carlos Pascual to the post.³⁶⁹ The mission of this new office is "to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."³⁷⁰ In early 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that:

We have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. And so we are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states.³⁷¹

³⁶⁸ Orr, "The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 3.

³⁶⁹ United States Department of State, "Establishment of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)," *United States Department of State Press Release*, 28 September 2004, available from URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36558.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

³⁷⁰ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, "About S/CRS," available from URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

³⁷¹ Secretary of State Rice asked for an allocation \$24 million dollars in fiscal year 2006 funds for the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Condoleezza Rice, "President's FY 06 International Affairs Budget Request: Secretary Condoleezza Rice Prepared Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," 16 February 2005, available from URL: <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/42343.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

Conducting such operations may also include close liaison with Department of Defense agencies, especially in a post-conflict scenario.³⁷² The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has clearly stated that their goals in this regard are to:

- Coordinate civilian stabilization and reconstruction participation in military planning and exercises.
- Deploy Humanitarian, Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (HSRT) to Combatant Commands to participate in post-conflict planning where U.S. military forces will be heavily engaged.
- Develop mechanisms for coordinating military and civilian operational planning across the full spectrum of possible military involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.³⁷³

Thus, the importance of implementing comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction programs abroad to promote democracy and security while reducing terrorist safe-havens and WMD proliferation is at the heart of U.S. national security interests in the post-9/11 era: “With global terrorism a reality, the United States does not have the luxury of ignoring troubled countries no matter how small, how poor, or how distant.”³⁷⁴

2. The “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction”

The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the United States Army have jointly formulated a “four-pillared” approach to post-conflict reconstruction.³⁷⁵ These are means to stabilize a state through the improvement of four vital areas: security, social and economic well-being, governance and participation, and

³⁷² Opponents of such a view include Chalmers Johnson who has argued that the current presence of U.S. military forces deployed extensively around the globe serve as a “new form of empire.” Furthermore, Johnson warns that, “Americans may still prefer to use euphemisms like ‘lone superpower,’ but since 9/11, our country has undergone a transformation from republic to empire that may well prove irreversible.” Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 1, 4.

³⁷³ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, “Monitoring, Early Warning, Planning,” available from URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/37970.htm>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

³⁷⁴ Orr, “Preface,” x.

³⁷⁵ Initially a “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework” was published in 2002, however, it has since evolved into a more in-depth work entitled *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 305-327.

justice and reconciliation.³⁷⁶ Glaringly, current U.S. military doctrine does not articulate how to provide adequate support to bolster the cross-cutting imperatives involved in stabilizing and reconstructing a state.³⁷⁷ It is unlikely, however, that this will continue to be the case due to the current emphasis on post-conflict strategies, U.S. Army transformation, and the involvement of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) involvement in the joint project to develop the “four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.”³⁷⁸ Therefore, it is important that notice be taken of the factors that facilitate effective stabilization and reconstruction operations.

a. Security

Security is considered to be the “precondition” for fulfilling the other three pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.³⁷⁹ While security may be provided by external actors, “To be lasting, security must ultimately be provided by indigenous actors on behalf of the country itself....”³⁸⁰ The basic importance of security to a state was articulated in Max Weber’s assertion that “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.”³⁸¹ Therefore, the state’s overall legitimacy is dependent, along with the deliverance of other “political goods,”³⁸² on the establishment of this monopoly of the use of force within its borders. This pillar of security includes both protections from external

³⁷⁶ Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 11.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 15.

³⁷⁸ General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan is a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff and the current president of AUSA.

³⁷⁹ Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 15.

³⁸⁰ Scott Feil, “Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 40.

³⁸¹ Emphasis in original. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, eds. Patrick O’Neal and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 34.

³⁸² “Nation-states exist to deliver political goods – security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities – to their citizens.” Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” in *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics*, eds. Patrick O’Neal and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 63.

threats as well as from internal ones. The adequate establishment of security fosters an environment where “citizens can conduct daily business relatively free from violence or coercion directed at them by the government, organized crime, political organizations, and ethnic groups.”³⁸³ This can be made quite difficult in post-conflict societies where armed factions have disintegrated and diffused back into society, but possess no civilian skills to earn a living.³⁸⁴ Thus, the importance of effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former armed forces and armed factions is evident in their potential destabilizing affects on a state’s national security.³⁸⁵

b. Social and Economic Well-Being

The improvement of social and economic well-being is essential to post-conflict operations.³⁸⁶ It is true that in the wake of violent conflict only “a small window of opportunity exists to restore economic hope and social well-being.”³⁸⁷ With greater security, improved economies reverse the myopic behaviors that are induced by warfare.³⁸⁸ This further reduces the numbers of individuals who are likely to seek employment from insurgent groups. The short-term efforts are focused on returning basic human services and then shift into “long-term social and economic

³⁸³ Feil, “Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities,” 40.

³⁸⁴ Roy Licklider, “Obstacles to Peace Settlements,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 704. This was also evident in Iraq with the disintegration of the Iraqi Army following the U.S. ground invasion in 2003. Bathsheba N. Crocker, “Iraq: Going it Alone, Gone Wrong,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 267-268.

³⁸⁵ Crocker, “Iraq: Going it Alone, Gone Wrong,” 272-273.

³⁸⁶ This is made difficult because “civil war interrupts and indeed reverses economic development...on average during a civil war a country loses around 2.2 percentage points off its normal annual [economic] growth rate. Since the average civil war lasts around seven years, by the end of the war per capita income is around 15% lower than it otherwise would have been.” Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy* (World Bank, 15 June 2000), 65.

³⁸⁷ Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Restoring Hope: Enhancing Social and Economic Well-Being,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 73.

³⁸⁸ Paul Collier, “Doing Well out of War: Paper Prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999” (World Bank, 10 April 1999), 8.

development.”³⁸⁹ Essential human capital that was depleted due to the conflict must be replenished by returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes or by completely re-creating these capabilities.³⁹⁰ Health care must be rapidly expanded to combat the spread of diseases and to treat those already afflicted – especially those with HIV/AIDS and malaria which spread very rapidly in the wake of violent conflict.³⁹¹ Improved educational opportunities must be afforded to help reduce the risk of conflict and to provide long-term social, political, and religious tolerances: “A state’s inability to support basic education also leaves room for religious schools that exclude women or indoctrinate young men to elevate violence as a political means.”³⁹² Efforts must also be taken to diversify economies that are primary resource commodity dependent.³⁹³ Such dependence has been found to be the single greatest predictor of conflict.³⁹⁴ Reducing primary commodity dependence helps to minimize natural resource predation and rent-seeking behaviors.³⁹⁵ Such predatory behaviors are integral in funding rebellions.³⁹⁶

c. Governance and Participation

Improving governance includes creating “mechanisms, processes, and institutions”³⁹⁷ that are viewed as legitimate, ensure the enfranchisement of the populace, and deliver the necessary political goods.³⁹⁸ *Participation* is essential because it further

³⁸⁹ Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 11.

³⁹⁰ Mendelson Forman, “Restoring Hope: Enhancing Social and Economic Well-Being,” 80.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 84. Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, 22-26.

³⁹² Mendelson Forman, “Restoring Hope: Enhancing Social and Economic Well-Being,” 83.

³⁹³ Paul Collier, *Policy for Post-conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of Renewed Conflict* (World Bank, 17 March 2000), 2.

³⁹⁴ “The peak danger level is when natural resource exports constitute around 25-30% of GDP.” Ibid.

³⁹⁵ Rent-seeking “refers to attempts by individuals and groups to maximize economic ‘rent’ by manipulating the laws and institutions governing the disposition of factors of production in an economy.” Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 75.

³⁹⁶ Collier, *Policy for Post-conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of Renewed Conflict*, 2.

³⁹⁷ Robert C. Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 59.

³⁹⁸ Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” 63.

helps to legitimize the government and promotes governmental accountability to the citizenry. Thus, the “cardinal rule of governance” is to ensure “indigenous ownership of the process.”³⁹⁹ Developing transparency in governmental processes, budget development, fiscal flows, and deliverance of goods is important to reducing corruption and its harmful effects.⁴⁰⁰ Guaranteeing free and unfettered media is also vital to allowing for the free flow of information as well as further promoting government accountability.⁴⁰¹

d. Justice and Reconciliation

The establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict states while also addressing past grievances, crimes, and atrocities is vital toward moving societies further away from the clutches of the “conflict trap.”⁴⁰² Judicial systems must be created that are independent (of the executive), impartial, and accountable.⁴⁰³ The state corrections institutions must be humane and law enforcement agencies must be effective and mindful of human rights.⁴⁰⁴ The concept of post-conflict reconciliation is that of “both a *goal* – something to achieve – and a *process* – a means to achieve that goal.”⁴⁰⁵ It is comprised

³⁹⁹ Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” 63.

⁴⁰⁰ Vito Tanzi, “Corruption around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,” *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers* 45, no. 4 (December 1998): 575-576.

⁴⁰¹ Orr, “Governing When Chaos Rules: Enhancing Governance and Participation,” 68.

⁴⁰² Michèle Flournoy and Michael Pan, “Dealing with Demons: Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 89. The “conflict trap” is the term used to describe a state’s increased likelihood to revert to a state of war if the previous conflict was ended recently. “A country that has survived for a decade or more after independence before it first falls into the [conflict] trap has a risk of new war ten times higher just after that war is ended than before the war started. If the country succeeds in maintaining post-conflict peace for ten years or so, the risk is considerably reduced, but remains at a higher level than before the conflict.” Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, 83.

⁴⁰³ Orr, “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 11. Flournoy and Pan, “Dealing with Demons: Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” 92. Neil J. Kritz, “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 805-806.

⁴⁰⁴ Flournoy and Pan, “Dealing with Demons: Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” 90.

⁴⁰⁵ Emphasis in original. David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse, eds., *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook* (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003), 12.

of four major components: healing, truth-telling, restorative justice, and reparations.⁴⁰⁶ It is clear that reconciliation is a long-term process:

The damage wrought by mass atrocities and lawlessness in post-conflict societies usually takes years, if not decades, to begin to repair. But failure to address justice and reconciliation needs on a priority basis is a recipe for failure in reconstruction operations.⁴⁰⁷

Therefore, it is important to begin the establishment of reconciliatory mechanisms, such as truth-telling commissions, in the early stages of post-conflict operations; however, their effects may not be evident for generations.

3. Increased Face-to-Face Interactions

Inherent to the inevitably increased involvement of the United States in stabilization and reconstruction operations is the concept of military forces operating among the civilian populace of a given state in face-to-face roles. Such missions will require increased language, cultural, and regional training to communicate not only with the indigenous populace, but with the host of IGOs, NGOs, and other transnational actors that more and more are operating in post-conflict environments. These interactions, when conducted properly, can improve perceptions of U.S. involvement and may also improve critical U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities with regard to numerous issues including the most significant threats facing U.S. security interests today: WMD proliferation and terrorist cells. It is true that “IGOs, IOs [international organizations], and NGOs frequently possess valuable information but are reluctant to share intelligence with security forces for fear of reducing their rapport with the population that serve and increasing their own risk by appearing partial.”⁴⁰⁸ However, the increasing prevalence of these organizations makes contacts and cooperation somewhat inevitable. Furthermore, increased positive military interactions with the indigenous populace and NGO, IGO, and IO members can help to build *social capital* to the great benefit of both the United States and the post-conflict state.

⁴⁰⁶ Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, eds., *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, 24.

⁴⁰⁷ Flournoy and Pan, “Dealing with Demons: Enhancing Justice and Reconciliation,” 100-101.

⁴⁰⁸ Feil, “Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities,” 53.

4. Social Capital, Networks, and Trust

The building of social capital is critical to strengthening the viability of a post-conflict state and ultimately for “making democracy work.”⁴⁰⁹ Social capital is defined as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”⁴¹⁰ Wars destroy human capital and social capital as well:

...civil war can have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is an expectation of honesty, to one in which there is an expectation of corruption. Once a reputation for honesty has been lost, the incentive for honest behavior in the future is much weakened.⁴¹¹

As wars are waged and violence escalates, economies decline, large-scale migration of refugees and IDPs occur, and myopic outlooks on life take hold: “Because life is so uncertain, people shorten their time horizons and are less concerned to build a reputation for honesty.”⁴¹² Therefore, to place in the perspective of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,”⁴¹³ war-torn societies do not observe the “shadow of the future,”⁴¹⁴ but merely focus on the present and the payoff for immediate defection. Thus, the rebuilding of trust through

⁴⁰⁹ Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, 185.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., 167.

⁴¹¹ World Bank, *Civil War and Development Policy* (7 February 2003), 9.

⁴¹² Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*, 20.

⁴¹³ The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” of game theory is “a binary choice game based on the following scenario: Two partners in a crime have been apprehended. The prosecutor separately offers a reduced punishment to each prisoner if he or she will discuss the involvement of the other. If only one prisoner defects – that is, gives the prosecutor the information he is seeking – he or she stands to gain; if both prisoners defect, both stand to lose. If neither defects, however – that is, if they cooperate with each other – both prisoners will avoid penalty.” Elinor Ostrom and James Walker, eds., *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research*, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, vol. 6 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003), 391-392.

⁴¹⁴ “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the players might meet again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back on the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (Basic Books, 1984), 12.

repeated interactions is essential to resuming the normalcy of life and catalyzing commerce in the post-war years:⁴¹⁵

Networks facilitate communication and extend trust. When success spreads through a network, it stimulates more cooperation, providing models for others about what works. Innovation increases as the latest information and trends create a large-scale learning system in which many potential users share knowledge.⁴¹⁶

Networks can further the realization of the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction by addressing important issues at a grass-roots level. While all four areas may be addressed, this may be the most significant in terms of beginning reconciliation processes between former warring parties: “Establishing trustful and respectful relations between men and women, and between particularly targeted groups of men and women, is essential for fashioning a democratic society.”⁴¹⁷

As the United States finds itself more and more entwined with attempts to stabilize and reconstruct failing, failed states, and post-conflict states, the military will continue to play a vital role in contributing across a wide range of areas such as security, training, humanitarian assistance, etc. The increased face-to-face interactions provide opportunity to foster realization of the “shadow of the future” within the indigenous populations. Through such mechanisms as grass-roots level networks, the United States can help to more efficiently move a nation toward democracy and stability while reducing labor to insurgent groups.

In the Age of the Network, horizontal connections explode, not vertical ones. The winners in the 21st century – companies, countries, and people – will be those with the greatest social capital.⁴¹⁸

Furthermore, these networks may provide critical HUMINT to U.S. forces engaged in rooting out terrorist cells and stamping out WMD proliferation.

⁴¹⁵ “Trust, reciprocity, and networks are all mutually reinforcing, whether on the rise or on the wane.” J. Lipnack and J. Stamps, *The Age of the Network: Organizing Principles for the 21st Century* (New York: Oliver Wight Publications, Inc., 1994), 189.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 189.

⁴¹⁷ Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, eds., *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, 13.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., 198.

5. The Role of PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

As one of the few arms⁴¹⁹ of the United States military that is mainly concerned with “soft power,”⁴²⁰ psychological operations forces have a vested interest in promoting favorable U.S. perceptions abroad – especially in post-conflict nations that continue to be plagued by insurgency such as Afghanistan and Iraq. This is no less true in U.S. efforts to resuscitate failing states and stabilize entire geographic regions.

a. Supporting the “Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction”

Psychological operations themes should bolster the strengthening of the “four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction.” While many themes are in line with such concepts, it is imperative to target comprehensively these four critical areas and their associated sub-tasks. Psychological operations forces exist to “influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals *to support U.S. national objectives*.”⁴²¹ Therefore, it is imperative that PSYOP forces transform to support their impending use in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

b. Building Social Capital

Central to the concepts of improving stability within failing states is the building of social capital. Psychological operations forces are critical to building trust at local levels to improve perceptions of the United States and their military forces and to facilitate cooperation on the part of the indigenous populace. For the U.S. military, PSYOP forces are the primary “soft power” assets that can be utilized to catalyze other operations. Such operations necessitate interpersonal, face-to-face, two-way communications. To do so, however, requires specific expertise in language, customs, culture, and the region – as well as utilization of networks to expand influence throughout communities.

⁴¹⁹ While there are other information operations components that are concerned with the same, the other most significant wielder of soft power are the civil affairs forces which can provide concrete benefits to local communities while increasing positive civil-military interactions.

⁴²⁰ Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, x.

⁴²¹ Emphasis added. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.302: Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, June 2004, 1-1.

c. Providing Critical HUMINT

The vital importance of reliable human intelligence (HUMINT) has become apparent in the post-9/11 atmosphere. The Department of Defense recently announced its new Strategic Support Branch of the Defense Intelligence Agency that “is providing enhanced human intelligence capabilities to better support combatant commanders in the war on terror.”⁴²² Psychological operations, however, could provide a great deal of useful and reliable information to the U.S. Army and Department of Defense through their interactions with civil society and transnational actors operating within a state. While not explicitly stated as one of the five PSYOP missions,⁴²³ proper training, preparation, and execution will yield important HUMINT contributions to the continued Global War on Terror and in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

C. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. Lessons Learned, But Not Heeded

Following the noted difficulties of psychological warfare in the Korean War and more than fifty years of U.S. involvement in observing the armistice, one would expect that modern psychological operations would be quite adept as a result. However, this is not the case. Modern PSYOP forces are ill-prepared to conduct operations in Korea – and especially in the event of reunification. The Korean War era PSYWAR soldiers noted numerous shortcomings that they deemed essential to conducting effective operations in Korea. The most glaringly among these were in reference to the little, if any, training received prior to deployment.⁴²⁴ In many cases, these deficiencies remain inadequately addressed to this day. While the difficulties posed to effective U.S. psychological operations by the information-controlling regime of North Korea have

⁴²² “The new teams, made up of about 10 civilians and servicemembers, are being deployed to support combatant commands’ warfighting capabilities with improved human intelligence, officials said. The teams may include case officers, linguists, interrogators and other specialists...” Donna Miles, “Pentagon Explains New Human Intelligence Program,” *Pentagon Brief*, 1 February 2005, 2.

⁴²³ These missions are “Advising the supported commander,” “Influencing foreign populations,” “Providing public information,” “Serving as the supported commander’s voice,” and “Countering adversary propaganda.” Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-53: Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, September 2003, I-5.

⁴²⁴ Including language, culture, and regional training. See Chapter II.

been highlighted,⁴²⁵ it is important to address the difficulties of operations within South Korea as well. A stabilization and reconstruction operation following a Korean reunification would involve U.S. communications with both societies as they attempt to merge, if the new state accepts that U.S. role.

2. Mutual Unintelligibility

Current U.S. psychological operations in the Republic of Korea involve deployments throughout the course of the year to participate in various exercises. These exercises are short in duration and U.S. PSYOP forces redeploy to the United States upon their conclusion. Although these exercises are “combined,”⁴²⁶ U.S. and ROK PSYOP forces within the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF) have difficulty in communicating with one another. There are insufficient numbers of translators and few U.S. and ROK counterparts speak one another’s language effectively, if at all.⁴²⁷ Therefore, the entire task force relies upon a minority of personnel who can communicate in these two languages. These are barriers that can be overcome with proper training. The inability of U.S. forces to communicate effectively with their ROK counterparts in the designing of leaflets and preparation of radio/television broadcasts highlight the unprepared nature of PSYOP forces for contingencies requiring face-to-face operations under a stabilization and reconstruction role. Furthermore, more than a half-century of partition has exacerbated the initial bifurcation of the once homogenous Korean culture. Thus, not only must PSYOP soldiers understand “ROK Korean” language and culture, but they must also be able to distinguish and operate utilizing “DPRK Korean” language and culture, as well as the regional dialects within each category.

⁴²⁵ See Chapter III.

⁴²⁶ U.S. and ROK Forces in Korea fall under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquartered in Seoul. Operations and training events are conducted in a “combined” fashion that incorporates the interactions and planning of ROK and U.S. military counterparts to foster seamless mission execution.

⁴²⁷ Although civilian analysts are hired by the Army for the PSYOP Group’s strategic studies detachment (SSD), there is only one Korea analyst. “The SSD is made up entirely of Army civilian PSYOP analysts who provide area expertise, linguistic skills, and an organic social research capability to the regional POB [PSYOP Battalion]. Most analysts have an advanced degree and all read and speak at least one of the languages in their area of expertise.” Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, November 2003, 3-8.

3. South Korean Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism in South Korea has been on the rise.⁴²⁸ Little is being done by U.S. PSYOP to combat this anti-Americanism. There are no U.S. PSYOP forces stationed on the Korean peninsula to provide active PSYOP support to the Combined Forces Command (CFC). However, South Korea still constitutes a psychological battlefield in that, “The fact that North Korea vehemently focuses on nurturing anti-American sentiment in South Korea indicates that North Korea is still engaged in a civil war against South Korea and that it is now in the stage of attacking the alliances of its rival.”⁴²⁹ While there are many reasons for the rise of anti-U.S. sentiments in South Korea, some of the most prominent are the “U.S. military bases on Korean soil, the Korean media’s negative image of the United States, changing demographics, Korean nationalism, and skepticism [toward U.S. policies].”⁴³⁰ The demographics have shifted insofar as the Korean War generation of South Koreans, those that most strongly support close ties with the United States, is waning.⁴³¹ It has further been speculated that, “Current trends suggest the great possibility that South Korea’s resentment toward the United States will become more aggravated in coming years.”⁴³² Countering such trends requires forces that are trained and capable of influencing public opinion in favor of the United States.

⁴²⁸ “According to a recent public opinion poll, 63 percent of South Koreans have unfavorable feelings toward the United States, and 56 percent feel that anti-Americanism is growing stronger in the Republic of Korea.”* Seung-Hwan Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002-2003): 109. The authors original footnote number 1 is denoted by the * and refers to “Public opinion polls were conducted by Media Research Inc. (Seoul) on February 23, 2002, immediately after the short-track speed skating incident at the Winter Olympics in Utah. See *Chosun Ilbo*, March 3, 2002; ‘Poll Shows Rising Anti-Americanism,’ *Sisa Journal*, March 7, 2002.”

⁴²⁹ Jae-Chang Kim, “The New International Order and the US-ROK Alliance” *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* XV, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 70.

⁴³⁰ Kim, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” 111.

⁴³¹ “This generation is aging, however, and constitutes a diminishing percentage – 21 percent – of South Korea’s population. Two-thirds of the country’s population is under the age of 40, and younger Koreans’ attitudes toward the United States are knotty.” *Ibid.*, 113.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, 115.

D. TRAINING SHORTFALLS

1. Perpetuation of a “Cold War Mentality”

Despite the worldwide reduction in conventional interstate wars and rise of civil wars⁴³³ in the 1990s, U.S. PSYOP is still largely reminiscent of a “Cold War mentality” in how it trains for and executes operations. A large degree of emphasis is habitually placed upon the technological aspects of PSYOP product production, distribution, and dissemination in order to keep pace with the rapid changes in mainstream media. However, regardless of the mode of dissemination, the most important aspect of conducting psychological operations is the message content. Psychological warfare soldiers who were hastily deployed for the Korean War determined that inadequate training was one of the primary disadvantages to effective operations.⁴³⁴ While such shortcomings were known early on in the lifespan of psychological operations, the cyclic “PSYWAR syndrome” then hindered subsequent efforts to modernize and improve PSYOP forces. When the importance of psychological operations was again acknowledged, and funding subsequently increased, great strides were taken to improve the technological aspects of both print and broadcast capabilities.⁴³⁵ These primarily focus on long-range dissemination methods via broadcast or leaflet. While it may have been adequate in the Cold War era to conduct face-to-face operations via loudspeakers – this is really only one-way communication. However, “Governments of countries threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face communications, as a first line of internal defense.”⁴³⁶ Thus, the PSYOP role in U.S.-led stabilization and reconstruction operations provides the impetus for training soldiers more effectively to foster interpersonal, face-to-face, two-way communications.

⁴³³ Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare and the Third World* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 6.

⁴³⁴ See Chapter II for more PSYWAR lessons learned in the Korean War.

⁴³⁵ “Several Army initiatives in the early and mid-1980s upgraded active and reserve component print, radio, loudspeaker, and audiovisual capabilities.” Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” 37.

⁴³⁶ William F. Johnston, “Some Thoughts on Psychological Operations,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 97.

However, as a result of the predominant focus on technological innovations and acquisitions, current psychological operations forces are not equipped with the requisite training for operating in post-conflict environments:

...PSYOP has perhaps suffered most from identification with the hardware and missions of the tactical battlefield – that is, leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasting. As a result of all this, PSYOP has had very low priority in terms of... training, exercising, and doctrine.⁴³⁷

Thus, adequate training in culture, language, and region have continued to fall by the wayside under the opinion that familiarity is all that is needed for effective psychological operations. A “cookie-cutter” approach has continued to dominate the field of psychological operations. Leaflets or broadcasts that were deemed effective during prior conflicts are dusted off, translated, and disseminated to a new target audience. Therefore, only limited linguistic, cultural, or regional training was necessary. In the 1980s, the Army separated both its psychological operations and civil affairs forces from the foreign area officer (FAO) military occupational specialty.⁴³⁸

The change was disturbing because it separated psychological operations from the specialty that had provided its intellectual lifeblood. The core of the area expertise (knowledge of foreign cultures) and the analytic capability of psychological operations fell within the FAO specialty.⁴³⁹

The contemporary training that psychological operations forces undergo is disjointed and largely ineffectual for the future of U.S. operations. Less overt methods of message dissemination than broadcasting a compact disc prerecording over a loudspeaker must be utilized. The PSYOP soldiers should not be clearly identifiable as PSYOP soldiers. Their actions at the local level should be linked to persuasion principles⁴⁴⁰ that induce

⁴³⁷ Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 84.

⁴³⁸ Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” 37.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Cialdini’s “Weapons of Influence:” reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, rev. ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993).

indigenous individuals to act in desirable manners. This requires proper training. Therefore, by building expertise in the appropriate areas of study and revising doctrine and techniques to support stabilization and reconstruction operations, psychological operations forces will then be able to build trust in communities, utilize and *map* networks to identify appropriate target audiences and themes, and help to improve human intelligence to the supported commander. Such preparatory measures are essential to preparing for the challenges posed by Korean reunification.

2. PSYOP Enlisted Soldier (37F) Training

a. No Regional Training

It is widely regarded that enlisted PSYOP specialists⁴⁴¹ “conduct psychological operations.” In other words, they craft the messages for specified target audiences. Therefore, the training that is provided to these soldiers is paramount to ensuring effective and persuasive communications. However, the training that is currently provided is inadequate for crafting messages for long-range dissemination (leaflet, radio/television broadcast), let alone for face-to-face operations in a post-conflict environment. Immediately following basic training these soldiers attend a twelve week 37F Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁴⁴² This course provides training in “doctrine, including concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures organization, equipment, capabilities, and employment across the range of military operations,” as well as common soldier tasks.⁴⁴³ Thus, despite the doctrinal assertion that “PSYOP soldiers bring an in-depth knowledge of the culture, religion, values and mindset of TAs within a country or region of operations,”⁴⁴⁴ they receive no specific

⁴⁴¹ These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 37F (Psychological Operations Specialist).

⁴⁴² U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.

⁴⁴³ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Graduation Criteria: 37F10 MOS Psychological Operations Specialist (AC and RC) and CMF 37F10 Reclass” (6 January 2004), 2.

⁴⁴⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, 1-8.

training in these areas whatsoever.⁴⁴⁵ This is a severe shortcoming in the training process because “culture is at once the most basic and the broadest environmental determinant of individual behavior.”⁴⁴⁶

b. No Language Capability

Following the 37F Advanced Individual Training Course, soldiers are sent to attend a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC) for a given language. However, this training provides little more than language “familiarity.” While the current BMLC language proficiency goals for its graduates increased in 2004,⁴⁴⁷ the standards are still below those necessitated by operations of a post-conflict nature. Thus, under the old standards soldiers were to achieve a level in listening skills in which they comprehend “with reasonable accuracy only when this [listening] involves short memorized utterances or formulae.”⁴⁴⁸ Under the revised standards they are currently required to achieve a slightly higher level in which they can understand “very simple face-to-face conversations in a standard dialect.”⁴⁴⁹ Similarly, pre-2004 standards called for a level of reading capability in which the graduates are “unable to read connected prose.”⁴⁵⁰ Current standards require one to be capable of reading “very simple connected written material.”⁴⁵¹ Previous graduation evaluation criteria, and indeed Department of the Army language tracking, only focused on these aforementioned listening and reading skills.

⁴⁴⁵ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Info Papers,” and “Advanced Individual Training Psychological Operations (37F) Specialist Scope,” available from URL: http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.

⁴⁴⁶ Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., “Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms,” in *Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies*, eds. Frank L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, Jr. (Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 55.

⁴⁴⁷ Military language skills are measured on a scale from Level 0 (no proficiency) to Level 5 (functionally native speaker) in listening, reading, speaking, and writing. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management* (Washington DC: February 1996), 35-42. The previous BMLC standards required soldiers to graduate at a level of 0+/0+ (reading and listening). Current standards require soldiers to graduate at a 1/1/1 level (reading, listening, and speaking). “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” *Special Warfare* 17, no. 1 (September 2004): 63.

⁴⁴⁸ Listening Level 0+. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 37.

⁴⁴⁹ Listening Level 1. Ibid., 38.

⁴⁵⁰ Reading Level 0+. Ibid., 39.

⁴⁵¹ Reading Level 1. Ibid.

However, these parameters have recently been expanded to include an emphasis on speaking skills as well.⁴⁵² This is due to the widely acknowledged lack of U.S. language capabilities in the post-9/11 era⁴⁵³ and that, “We are also paying for America’s decades of neglect, in government and outside, of foreign languages and area studies.”⁴⁵⁴ Therefore, current graduates of BMLC are now required to reach a level in speaking capability in which the speaker is “unable to produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed material.”⁴⁵⁵ Meanwhile, tactical PSYOP units are doctrinally charged with conducting face-to-face communications, but this espousal does not underscore the fact that this is largely one-way communication via loudspeakers due to a lack of language expertise.⁴⁵⁶

c. No MOSQ Requirement

While there are other enlisted soldiers who are more proficient in language capabilities assigned to PSYOP units, these soldiers are largely used for translating and are not trained in psychological operations. These soldiers are identified as Human Intelligence Collectors⁴⁵⁷ and are organized under the Army’s military intelligence branch. Language training for these soldiers is conducted at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, where they are trained to higher standards than those required of the Basic Military Language Course.⁴⁵⁸ Soldiers assigned to the military occupational specialty 97E are considered “language-dependent” for mission

⁴⁵² “SF Officers, NCOs Must Meet New DLPT Minimum,” 63.

⁴⁵³ A General Accounting Office report in 2002 analyzed “four agencies – the Army, the FBI, the State Department and the Commerce Department’s Foreign Commercial Division – with some of the largest foreign-language programs. The GAO found that staff shortages at those agencies ‘have adversely affected agency operations and hindered U.S. military, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism and diplomatic efforts.’” Stephen Barr, “Looking for People Who can Talk the Talk – In other Languages,” *The Washington Post*, 12 March 2002, B2.

⁴⁵⁴ David Ignatius, “Tongue-Tied in the Arab World,” *The Washington Post*, 11 July 2003, A21.

⁴⁵⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 36.

⁴⁵⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, 3-13, 3-14.

⁴⁵⁷ These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 97E (Human Intelligence Collector).

⁴⁵⁸ Basic language courses taught at the Defense Language Institute are designed to train individuals to level defined as “limited working proficiency [Level 2].” When applied to speaking skills, this level of proficiency enables one to “satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 4, 36.

execution and must therefore retain the same Defense Language Institute minimum levels in language proficiency or be forced into an alternative military occupational specialty.⁴⁵⁹ Psychological operations specialists (37F) are classified by current Army regulations as a “non-language-dependent MOS,” and therefore do not similarly have the same language requirement as part of their MOS qualification requirements. Therefore, languages *obtained* at government expense are not required to be *retained* by the soldier.⁴⁶⁰ This is a drain on both budgets and resources. Thus, the doctrinal assertion that PSYOP soldiers provide “provide regional, cultural, and linguistic expertise”⁴⁶¹ is largely a misnomer.

3. PSYOP Officer (39B) Training

a. No Language Capability

Psychological operations officers⁴⁶² receive training at a four week Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), a seventeen week Regional Studies Course (RSC), and the Basic Military Language Course.⁴⁶³ Therefore, PSYOP officers, who do not share the enlisted soldiers’ focus on message crafting, receive formal regional training to increase their knowledge of a particular geographic area of the world. This is the primary disconnect of the current training system. They receive the same cursory language course as the enlisted PSYOP specialists and are likewise not required to maintain their language capabilities.⁴⁶⁴

b. Irrelevant Postgraduate Degrees

Some officers are further afforded the opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) to study at the postgraduate level. These officers are often sent to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations Low-

⁴⁵⁹ This is referred to as a requirement for military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ). Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 7.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 4, 36.

⁴⁶¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, 3-7.

⁴⁶² These soldiers belong to military occupational specialty (MOS) 39B (Psychological Operations Officer) which in the future will be changed to 37A.

⁴⁶³ The only difference between this training program and the one prescribed for Civil Affairs officers is the inclusion of the Civil Affairs Officer Course (CAOC) in lieu of the PSYOP Officer Course. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management* (Washington DC: October 1998), 166-172.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., 167.

Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program (as are the civil affairs officers).⁴⁶⁵ However, out of the myriad of sub-component areas of expertise that comprise psychological operations, SO/LIC is but one setting for their usage. Psychological operations utilize aspects from area studies, language, marketing and advertising, media operations, and persuasion and social influence. Yet these relevant courses of study that underpin the principles of effective PSYOP are not pursued. Postgraduate work should focus on areas that will further the study and improvement of PSYOP and not simply result in a master's degree in unrelated fields of study.

c. No Professional Discourse

The PSYOP community does little to provide a professional outlet for information through academic discourse and institutional knowledge.⁴⁶⁶ While some PSYOP soldiers publish articles in the quarterly periodical *Special Warfare*, it is predominantly an outlet for special forces discourse and is frequently little more than a newsletter for the special forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP branches.⁴⁶⁷ *The Disseminator* was a publication of the 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion that was previously published and distributed throughout the PSYOP community; however, its printing fell by the wayside with the burgeoning needs of supporting both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. However, it was not a publication for professional discourse commensurate with *Special Warfare* or other military journals.

E. TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PSYOP SUCCESS

The following comprise ten recommendations for psychological operations success in supporting future global U.S. missions. These recommendations target three major areas: PSYOP training, PSYOP doctrine development, and PSYOP in the

⁴⁶⁵ This program yields a Master of Science (MS) Degree in Defense Analysis with a specialization in Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. United States Naval Postgraduate School, "Department of Defense Analysis Special Operations Curriculum," available from URL: <http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

⁴⁶⁶ Samuel Huntington cites the publication of military journals as one of the contributors to the rise of professionalism within the United States military. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, 20th ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 243-244.

⁴⁶⁷ *Special Warfare* is published quarterly by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Republic of Korea. These recommendations support preparations for a reunification of the Korean peninsula as well as other operations of the post-Cold War era – such as stabilization and reconstruction operations – that require increased roles for face-to-face operations.

1. PSYOP Training

a. Language Training

Language training must be conducted to the DLI level of proficiency to provide greater capabilities to all PSYOP soldiers (officer and enlisted). Previous standards of the Basic Military Language Course were too low to produce individuals with the requisite working knowledge to conduct face-to-face operations.⁴⁶⁸ The requirements were made more stringent toward the latter part of 2004;⁴⁶⁹ however, these standards are still below those necessary for operating in post-conflict environments and for soldiers who are widely assumed by the rest of the military to be experts in language and culture.⁴⁷⁰ These standards do not facilitate the provision of the critical expertise to supported units necessitated by interactions among an indigenous populace, especially in the face of an ongoing insurgency. Standards should be increased to provide psychological operations soldiers at least a level of language capability commensurate with graduates of the Defense Language Institute.⁴⁷¹ This will place them at a level of “limited working proficiency” that allows them to provide improved capabilities to the supported commander in difficult environments.

b. Language Maintenance

Maintenance of language capabilities to DLI standards must be made a requirement for MOSQ of all officer and enlisted soldiers. Concomitant with the investment in increased language capabilities of PSYOP soldiers, standards need to be instituted to require that trained soldiers maintain their language capabilities. Current

⁴⁶⁸ Level 0+/0+ (listening and reading).

⁴⁶⁹ Level 1/1/1 (listening, reading, and speaking).

⁴⁷⁰ As espoused by current U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations*, 3-7.

⁴⁷¹ Level 2/2/2 (listening, reading, and speaking).

PSYOP military occupational specialty requirements do not mandate language upkeep as a necessity for maintaining the PSYOP MOS (officer or enlisted).⁴⁷² Therefore, to ensure the viability of the language needs of the Army and to maintain returns on the language training investment, PSYOP soldiers should be required to maintain the minimum standards of 2/2/2 to be considered qualified in their military occupational specialty (MOSQ). This will also further ensure that commanders allot the appropriate time to their soldiers for mandatory language maintenance training thereby sustaining the language readiness of the force.

c. Officer Recruitment

Officers from across the Army possessing skills vital to PSYOP, especially in critical languages, should be actively recruited by PSYOP utilizing bonuses and other incentives. In 2004, the Department of the Army Form 4037, otherwise known as the Officer Record Brief,⁴⁷³ began accounting for officer language proficiencies – including speaking skills. Therefore, this tool should be rigorously utilized by the PSYOP branch to recruit officers possessing critical language capabilities, especially those languages that are considered more difficult such as Mandarin Chinese, Korean, Arabic, etc.⁴⁷⁴ Those officers possessing such skills should be actively recruited by PSYOP utilizing bonuses or other incentives to reduce cost and training time but bolster the population of qualified personnel.

d. Regional Studies for Enlisted PSYOP Specialists

Psychological operations enlisted soldiers must receive regional and cultural training. It is imperative that those soldiers who are the primary executors of psychological operations receive regional training. The current training model inhibits regional expertise and cultural familiarity by excluding such training of the majority of

⁴⁷² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, 166-172. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 4, 36.

⁴⁷³ The Officer Record Brief is a “snapshot” of a particular officer’s career, schools, awards, languages, etc.

⁴⁷⁴ Languages are arranged into four categories with Category IV being those languages that are considered most difficult. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 10-11.

the soldiers involved in crafting psychological operations messages and conducting face-to-face operations. This facet of PSYOP remains a historically unaddressed issue dating back to the Korean War era. The proper inclusion of regional training for PSYOP soldiers is crucial to ensuring the viability of PSYOP in forthcoming global missions.

e. Officer Advanced Degrees

Psychological operations officers should pursue master's degrees in those disciplines that form the underpinnings of PSYOP such as regional studies, persuasion and social influence, and marketing. The current ability of the U.S. PSYOP community to dispatch officers to various civilian institutions of learning to receive relevant degrees cannot be underestimated. However, current officers have a tendency to attend the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) under the auspices of the Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict program.⁴⁷⁵ Meanwhile, NPS offers degrees in specific regional studies that are frequented by U.S. Army officers studying to be foreign area officers – the “lifeblood”⁴⁷⁶ from which PSYOP was removed two decades ago.⁴⁷⁷ Regional studies degrees are far more relevant to psychological operations in general. The Naval Postgraduate School has also recently developed a degree focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations, which is becoming more and more relevant to U.S. operations.⁴⁷⁸ Furthermore, degrees in marketing and persuasion and social influence should be pursued to help build PSYOP institutional knowledge. While the new Army Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program has encouraged PSYOP attendance at NPS – it is important that the areas of academic pursuit are vital to PSYOP for the importance is not merely the completion of a postgraduate degree.

⁴⁷⁵ United States Naval Postgraduate School, “Department of Defense Analysis Special Operations Curriculum,” available from URL: <http://www.nps.navy.mil/da/>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

⁴⁷⁶ Paddock, “No More Tactical Information Detachments: US Military Psychological Operations in Transition,” 37.

⁴⁷⁷ Such degree programs can be found at numerous other U.S. universities. Some even provide programs that are more narrowly focused such as Korea Studies as opposed to Asia Studies.

⁴⁷⁸ United States Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, “About the MA in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” available from URL: http://www.csrns-nps.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/ma_security_building; internet; last accessed March 2005.

f. Professional PSYOP Journal: “Military Influence”

The 4th Psychological Operations Group should publish its own professional journal of military PSYOP, encourage discourse, and invite both the reserve component groups and other services to contribute. It is essential during the current Global War on Terror and Army transformation processes to engage the professional minds of the PSYOP community. Therefore, a professional PSYOP journal should be established and published in electronic format. This journal should integrate knowledge from all PSYOP forces and encourage discourse among both active and reserve component soldiers and be circulated at all levels of the PSYOP community – include units from other services. Such a journal would promote the furtherance of PSYOP studies and initiate new and improved practices in PSYOP training, doctrine, procurement, equipment, and mission execution.

2. PSYOP Doctrine

Just as current U.S. military doctrine does not adequately address operations in failing, failed, or post-conflict states, neither does PSYOP doctrine address the comprehensive support to such operations.

a. Supporting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

*Corresponding to current trends in military operations, the principles that underpin stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably the “four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction,” should be closely scrutinized for doctrinal advancements in PSYOP support.*⁴⁷⁹ In the increasing U.S. focus on stabilization and reconstruction as a strategy in the Global War on Terror, it is important for PSYOP to devise methodical means to support those areas that constitute the “four pillars.”

b. Establishing Psychological Operations Networks (PONs)

Trained PSYOP personnel should be utilized to establish Psychological Operations Networks (PONs) as a means of persuading target audiences at a grass-roots level. Such networks utilize the building of social capital via interpersonal interactions

⁴⁷⁹ This should be done through interaction with the newly established Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Information on this center can be found at URL: <http://www.security-building.org/public/spd.cfm/spi/welcome>; internet; last accessed March 2005.

utilizing two-way face-to-face communications in the target language while allowing the *mapping* of the varied nodes in the network. Messages that are delivered are adaptive and persuasive in pursuing PSYOP objectives. This enables PSYOP to improve its persuasiveness in supporting U.S. objectives while gathering critical HUMINT, identifying insurgents or potential insurgents, facilitating the facets of stabilization and reconstruction operations, and ultimately winning more “hearts and minds” than previously possible.

3. PSYOP in the Republic of Korea

a. Deployment of Trained PSYOP Personnel to South Korea

It is imperative that the training and deployment of a PSYOP detachment to the Korean peninsula be expedited. While it is clear that the United States military, under its current strategies for restructuring its geo-strategic positioning, is withdrawing large amounts of troops from bases in South Korea, psychological operations forces should conversely deploy forces to the peninsula. This unit should be fully trained in the Korean language and culture, with special care given to determining the divergent points along these lines with regard to the two distinctly separate nations. Current PSYOP soldiers deploy multiple times a year from the United States to the Republic of Korea for exercises and then redeploy back to the United States. Thus, personnel continually rotate and the focus is merely on the exercise at hand – not on improving combined psychological operations. Furthermore, these multiple transitions are far from seamless and often detract from improving relations or capabilities. These soldiers can provide a continuous presence on the Korean peninsula that avoids the difficulties that are always associated with short deployments to and redeployments from the region. After more than fifty years of combined operations, PSYOP forces should have more substantial ties and capabilities within the Republic of Korea than those currently possessed.

b. Active Combined Psychological Operations

The conduct of active combined psychological operations, focused on both ROK and DPRK target audiences, must be instituted immediately. Permanently deployed PSYOP soldiers should devote time to the study of current marketing and media operations within both South and North Korea. These units should focus on

counterpropaganda operations with designs to dilute anti-American sentiment and promote the ROK-U.S. alliance. Such operations will further hone the PSYOP capability in the Republic of Korea by ensuring language immersion for current Korea specialists, one of the most difficult languages,⁴⁸⁰ and also by maintaining up to date knowledge of regional and cultural trends.

⁴⁸⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 611-6: Army Linguist Management*, 10-11.

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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

*American is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.*⁴⁸¹

-President George W. Bush

Given the relatively short history of U.S. psychological operations forces as a continuous unit and the cyclic post-war neglect that has hindered developmental progress, today's PSYOP forces may have finally broken with the "PSYWAR syndrome." In light of the fact that effective changes in the realm of individual training have not been adequately addressed since their recommendation in the wake of the Korean War, contemporary PSYOP forces have the precise moment in history to affect such reforms. Furthermore, the Army as a whole is cognizant of the need for rapid and effective transformation to support the Global War on Terrorism. Doing so, however, requires abandoning the "Cold War mentality" that colored the latter part of the twentieth century in favor of transforming psychological operations training, doctrine, and tactics in a manner that is consistent with the postmodern trends of the military and Information Age principles. However, this does not necessarily mean increasing emphasis on technology. While technological advancements have increased global communication capabilities and simultaneously reduced cost, the true emphasis for PSYOP transformation needs to shift toward providing more comprehensive training to its soldiers. Technology serves merely as the means for dissemination, not as the origination of the message itself. The modern PSYOP parallel to the Korean War era PSYWAR emphasis on "quantity over quality"⁴⁸² is the current emphasis on "technology over training." This issue is further underscored by the predominant tactical PSYOP role as loudspeaker operators instead of face-to-face communicators with verbal abilities. The emphasis on disseminating previously recorded messages continues to perpetuate an ethos of limited "warrior deejays" instead of capable

⁴⁸¹ Robert C. Orr, "The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction," in *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004), 3.

⁴⁸² See Chapter II.

“warrior diplomats.” As the U.S. Army Special Operations Command has stated as its “Special Operations Force (SOF) Truths:” “Humans are more important than hardware,” “Quality is better than quantity,” “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced,” and “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”⁴⁸³ Hence, PSYOP needs to analyze its current investments in human capital and determine how to maximize their efficacy. Consequently, such increased investment in human capital also requires careful scrutiny of those areas of the world that are the most critical for developing linguistic, cultural, and regional capabilities.

Psychological Operations transformation is necessitated by growing civil-military interactions in military missions and an increased need for effective, two-way, face-to-face communications. Furthermore, by entering into such social interfaces, PSYOP forces can better assist the supported commander through more effective persuasion, communication, and increased human intelligence (HUMINT) acquisition capabilities. Each personal interface between PSYOP personnel and a given individual in a post-conflict setting serves as one node in an overarching “Psychological Operations Network” that can be mapped. Such information can further highlight those local areas or individuals that are in need of PSYOP attention – as well as other needs such as those met by civil affairs forces. Such work is advantageous to identifying further, and sometimes less obvious, key communicators in grass-roots settings to affect more widespread PSYOP influence.

The rising importance of stabilization and reconstruction operations to transform failing, failed, or post-conflict states as a means of fostering regional stability and enhancing U.S. security also necessitates careful contemplation on the part of psychological operations planners. Specific doctrinal support to the “four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction” and their respective sub-tasks should be developed to enhance

⁴⁸³ Headquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command, “HQ USASOC Special Operations Forces Information: Truths,” available from URL: http://www.soc.mil/hqs/hqs_home.htm; internet; last accessed March 2005.

PSYOP capabilities and efficacy under such scenarios. Such research should not merely be placed on hold until Army doctrine is revised due to the growing importance of such operations.

The relevance of initiating substantive changes in the aforementioned critical areas is brought to light when viewed through the lens of Korean reunification. The prospects of conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations on the Korean peninsula represent a multitude of difficulties for the potential use of U.S. forces. This includes interactions with both the North Koreans and South Koreans. While preparations must be pursued in readying PSYOP for support to stabilization and reconstruction operations in general, the case of a reunified Korean peninsula offers a unique challenge due to the severity of the protracted Cold War partition. The communist regime of North Korea, led by Kim Jong-il, continues to play upon its citizens' xenophobia by repetitively utilizing anti-Americanism in its domestic indoctrination programs as well as its externally distributed propaganda. These themes, which have changed relatively little over the half-century since the Korean War, serve as a means through which DPRK nationalism can be stirred and the detrimental "military first" policy can continue.⁴⁸⁴ The deification of the dynastic rulers of North Korea through an active propaganda machine that effectively monopolizes information and defines truth is a particularly foreboding and anachronistic phenomenon in the Information Age. Generations of North Koreans have now been raised completely from birth in the ubiquity of "Kimism." Furthermore, the prolonged partition of the Korean peninsula has fostered two separate and distinguishable cultures that also have linguistic difference. Such peculiarities must be understood and effectively utilized by PSYOP forces if true persuasion is to be affected.

While the people of South Korea have not been inculcated with anti-American ideology in ways commensurate with North Korea, external DPRK propaganda is at least partially accountable for anti-American sentiments that have been on the rise in South

⁴⁸⁴ See Chapter III.

Korea for a number of years.⁴⁸⁵ Such opposition further heightens the difficulties that U.S. forces may face in occupying a role as a stabilizing force during a Korean reunification. In light of such trends, however, current U.S. PSYOP forces are doing little to counter such anti-U.S. perceptions within South Korea. Continued inaction in this respect only further reduces future PSYOP prospects for success under a stabilization and reconstruction role and threatens to undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance.

It is imperative that PSYOP forces, properly trained in the Korean language and culture, be positioned in South Korea and conduct active, psychological operations to improve the perception of the ROK-U.S. alliance among the South Korean populace. Furthermore, these forces should focus on examining contemporary ROK and DPRK culture, media, and advertising to increasingly hone PSYOP persuasion techniques and to ensure that the specific differences between the two nations are observed. In transforming to support future U.S. national interests, the PSYOP community should carefully research a number of vital areas to avoid “cookie-cutter” approaches and continue to seek improvements to the psychological operations profession. Such fields include stabilization and reconstruction operations, transnational actors (especially IGOs and NGOs), language requirements for specific regions, and marketing, media, and social influence and persuasion tactics within given cultures. These fields of study are fluid and therefore require continued attentiveness for determining subsequent shifts that are relevant to PSYOP programs. Such areas will prove critical in the future as the United States becomes more proactive in preserving its national security through stabilizing other states – sometimes through the active use of U.S. military forces.

⁴⁸⁵ See Chapter IV.

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