



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

THESIS

**REINTEGRATION OF THE IRAQI MILITARY
IN POST-CONFLICT ERA**

by

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March 2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2005	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Reintegration of the Iraqi Military in Post-Conflict Era.			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Ertürk, Sait				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) A historical analysis of the Iraqi military suggests that certain actions should be taken if the state building process of the United States led coalition is to be successful. The fulcrum of power in Iraq has always been the internecine ethnic, religious, and tribal relationships and interactions. This thesis studies the recently constructed security structure of Iraq, particularly the new Iraqi Armed Forces, by focusing on likely influences of the ethnic and sectarian factions and social structure of the country on security and reconstruction/reintegration of the new Iraqi Military. The thesis brings into sharp focus a singular fact that the military of Iraq has always been used in one way or another against one section of the population or another by the prevailing political power using the time-honored virtues of patronage and corruption. The use of the military in Iraq as an internal political tool more than anything else contributed to the lack of national identity, the prerequisite for a sound military structure. The thesis presents some situational operating methodologies that if followed should provide a structurally sound modern Iraqi military rather than a supernumerary police force. The recommendations would not only provide a military as a strong basis for national unity and identity, but they would create a military contributing to regional stability.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Iraq, Ethnic and Religious Factions, The Second Gulf War, Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi Military, Armed Forces Restructuring, Security Sector Reform, State Building.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 149	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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IN POST-CONFLICT ERA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

A historical analysis of the Iraqi military suggests that certain actions should be taken if the state building process of the United States led coalition is to be successful. The fulcrum of power in Iraq has always been the internecine ethnic, religious, and tribal relationships and interactions. This thesis studies the recently constructed security structure of Iraq, particularly the new Iraqi Armed Forces, by focusing on likely influences of the ethnic and sectarian factions and social structure of the country on security and reconstruction/reintegration of the new Iraqi Military. The thesis brings into sharp focus a singular fact that the military of Iraq has always been used in one way or another against one section of the population or another by the prevailing political power using the time-honored virtues of patronage and corruption. The use of the military in Iraq as an internal political tool more than anything else contributed to the lack of national identity, the prerequisite for a sound military structure. The thesis presents some situational operating methodologies that if followed should provide a structurally sound modern Iraqi military rather than a supernumerary police force. The recommendations would not only provide a military as a strong basis for national unity and identity, but they would create a military contributing to regional stability.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Vali Nasr and Professor Karen Guttieri for their support and enthusiasm for my effort, and Charles Espey for his help in reading my written work. I would like to thank my father and mother, Okan and Sevdije Ertürk, for their endless support and confidence throughout my life, and a very special love to my wife, Ceylan, and my daughter, Zeynep Ceren, for their understanding and infinite patience, and a warm and heartfelt thank to all those who contributed to my education, especially to the Turkish Armed Forces for giving me this academic opportunity.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The excesses of United States optimism about the potential to reconstruct Iraq after invading that country, alongside coalition partners in 2003, are well-known. The U.S.-led Coalition forces failed to establish security and a nasty insurgency festered. Now domestic military forces are vital to secure state authority for a new, democratizing Iraqi government. As a natural consequence of this security environment, the construction of the new Security Forces, and particularly the Iraqi Armed Forces, which had been in the past the foremost institution in Iraq to maintain the state authority, has emerged as the most crucial requirement of the new Iraqi Government.

After the success of major combat operations in Iraq, U.S. officials and scholars cited the reconstruction of Germany and Japan as models for the reconstruction and stabilization or ‘nation building’ in Iraq. These cases were not applicable to Iraq due to their social, economic, demographic, and cultural differences with Iraqi society and in particular, the form of the Iraqi State that had emerged after the First World War. Iraq was an artificial state founded as a monarchy with a heterogeneous society and had no real democratic experience since its emergence under the British Mandate. It had a state authority in its territory; however it never had a state structure in which its factions could be represented without restriction. A key feature of Iraq after 1921 was the dominance of one sectarian faction within the state structure, at the expense of other groups. Iraq has been governed by tyranny for 24 years and this eroded state institutions including the security services and the military. The State had lost its authority in some part of the country due to sanctions after the first Gulf War. Ultimately, the Iraqi state lost its functional capacity with the collapse of the former Saddam Hussein Regime after the decisive military operations against Iraq in May 2003.

After the end of the Second Gulf War, the U.S.-led Coalition directly ruled the country for a period of approximately one year via the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), alongside an Iraqi Governing Council that lacked authority. The CPA could not provide security, the primary responsibility of any occupying force. The Coalition did not have sufficient military force for this requirement. Besides, it could not conduct suitable

policies neither in providing security nor in creating a capable security structure. The main intention of the U.S.-led Coalition was to construct the necessary conditions and institutions for Iraqis by Iraqis. This was a worthy goal that would reduce the cost of stabilization and reconstruction. However, the implementation did not match the announcement. The Coalition made severe mistakes, which would challenge the long-term stability of Iraq and even repeated mistakes made by the U.K. during its mandate period from 1921 to 1932 in Iraq.

In June 2004, the CPA “transferred authority” to another interim regime, the Iraqi Interim Government led by Ayad Allawi. This was officially a sovereignty transfer. However, the second interim government did not have real authority due to shortages in the security service, including the Iraqi Armed Forces, and deteriorating security circumstances. In this environment, the Multinational Forces became the real authority of the country to provide security. However, the security condition worsened dramatically. Tensions between the ethnic and religious factions escalated. Consequently, Iraq faced threat of civil war just before the January 30, 2005 elections. Fortunately, the election period was exercised without any major clashes amongst the factions. Yet, the election was only a new start for a period that will shape the future of the country. Before such a critical period, what the third Iraqi Interim Government would take over from the second Iraqi Interim Government is not a monopoly on the use of force. There are an estimated 30,000 members and 200,000 active supporters of insurgents in Iraq and existing militia structures of different ethnic and religious parties, estimated at 100,000. The new Iraqi Government will have a 127,000 strong security force with dubious effectiveness. Therefore, the establishment of an effective security structure is a crucial step in the state building process in Iraq.

The reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces or security services should be evaluated along with the construction of a working state structure and creating a state capacity that will maintain order in the country without intervention from the international community in a unified territory. Ongoing security problems, including aggravating ethnic and religious tensions, underline the importance of the Iraqi Military as a historically significant organization to provide state capacity. Iraq does not have sufficient conditions for a nation-building process. Iraq urgently needs a state that will

include the necessary means in an institutionalized structure, and will be respected and acknowledged by all its factions as the unique authority in its territory. In this context, the establishment of an effective security and defense organization that will offer the Iraqi Governments the necessary capability to claim a monopoly on the use of force in the entire country without damaging long term concerns of the country, particularly in terms of ethnic/sectarian affiliations and civil-military relations, has emerged as a natural result of the deteriorating security conditions in Iraq and specific characteristics of the Iraqi society in an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous structure with different political agendas for the future of the country.

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the reconstruction process of the new Iraqi Military, the significance of the Iraqi Armed Forces for the success of stabilization and reconstruction efforts and the long term stability of Iraq, and the possible impacts of ethnic and sectarian differences within Iraqi society on this process. While looking for the answers to these questions, the thesis assumes that the end state of the Second Gulf War was 'to construct a sovereign country with a representative self-government in its ensured territorial integrity.' The thesis will explore historical episodes and current incidents to underline similarities and to exploit lessons for future efforts. In order to find the satisfactory answers:

- First, the thesis examines the role and influence of the military in Iraq since its emergence under the British mandate;
- Next, the thesis will examine the Iraqi Society. What are the expectations of different groups and the likely effects of social reorganization within the Iraqi society upon the security circumstances and the Iraqi military?
- Third, the thesis will scrutinize ongoing construction of the new security structure. What will this process contribute to state capacity for the new Iraqi Government? How might it temper hostile tendencies of different factions? Finally, according to the findings of these three chapters, an effective Iraqi Armed Forces should be built without domination and reflection of any ethnic or sectarian group. Officers loyal to the values of democracy and the unified Iraqi Government will be the main institution to provide the most significant state function, 'monopoly of the use of the force in its territory,' and protect the stability and security of Iraq. Caution is needed, however, as ethnic and sectarian factions will seek to exploit the new Armed Forces for their political agendas. A likely ethnic or religious dominance in the Iraqi Armed Forces will degrade security and the long-term stability of Iraq.

The thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. The orders, regulations, memoranda, reports, speeches, testimonies, briefings and interviews issued on the CPA, U.S. Defense Department and State Department websites, news, speeches and interviews of or about the Coalition and Iraqi Officials published by the mass media, and reports, researches and polls prepared by United States General Accounting Office for the Congress comprise the primary sources. As the secondary resources, the thesis utilizes articles and research papers issued by think-tanks, Army War College, journals, the websites of U.S. Military, Defense Department and State Department, the commercial websites, electronic databases, and books on Iraq, Iraqi Society and Iraqi Security Forces. All sources exploited in this thesis are unclassified and available to the public.

The thesis will comprise five chapters including this introduction, which presents general view, and a conclusion chapter.

- The second chapter will review the former Iraqi Military to explore the principal factors that could apply to the ongoing process. In this context, it will inquire about the major policies conducted by the U.K. and then Hashemite Monarchy while creating the Iraqi Army, principal ideologies that dominated the Iraqi Army and its officer corps, and the role of the Iraqi Army in domestic politics of Iraq during different periods.
- The third chapter will examine the structure of the Iraqi Society and its ethnic and sectarian factions by exploring both historical episodes and the current situation in order to evaluate likely threats posed by ethnic and sectarian diversities. Considering the current security problems, the chapter will focus on the security problems emanating from ethnic geography in Iraq, ethnic nationalism and secessionist desires, militia capacities, traditional elites including religious and tribal leaders and their political views for the future of Iraq.
- The fourth chapter will study the post-war security policies of the U.S.-led Coalition and its efforts and strategies in the construction of a new security structure. While evaluating these policies, the chapter will explore the long-term challenges resulting from the policies and strategies conducted to provide security and to build the new security forces, and particularly the new Iraqi Armed Forces.
- Finally, the fifth chapter will conclude the thesis by giving a brief background and presenting a summary of findings and some recommendations for the ongoing process of the reconstruction and reintegration of the new Iraqi Armed Forces.

II. THE IRAQI MILITARY IN HISTORY

Modern Iraq emerged from the First World War to undergo three periods of regime type in which the military played an increasing role in the political process of Iraq. The first era was a period of monarchy that began with the invasion of Iraq by the British and ended in 1958 with the military coup and the demise of the monarchy. The second era was a period of a military authoritarian regime between 1958 and 1968. The third period started as a civilian authoritarian regime, under the reign of a single party with pan-Arabic nationalist ideology. This regime became totalitarian under Saddam Hussein in 1979. It ended with the American and British-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein and ended Ba'th rule on May 1, 2003. As a general trend of these three periods, the Iraqi Military, with the support of the Iraqi Police Service, became the principal organization for the governments to achieve internal security and to claim state authority in the country and on its ethnic and religious diversities. This chapter examines the former Iraqi military and its influence on the political process and stability of the country between 1921 and 2003. In particular, this review will highlight the factors that influenced the stability of the country in order to identify lessons from the reconstruction process for the new security structure in Iraq.

A. PREVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT

During the period 1921-1936 the Iraqi army had non-interventionist characteristics, as the Syrian army had during the period of 1920-1948, or the Egyptian Army had from 1882 to 1936.¹ The British authority that relied on the Royal Troops, Royal Air Force, and Iraqi Levies was the most powerful actor in Iraqi politics until the independence of Iraq.² Besides the British authority, the nonexistence of a powerful structure based on the failure of the Hashemite administration to legitimize the conscription law, and the personal influence of King Faisal were the most valuable reasons for the non-interventionist position of the Army during this period. However, King Faisal's attempts to create a powerful military structure as the symbol of the Iraqi

¹ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times, On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 128.

² Matthew Elliot, *'Independent Iraq': The Monarchy and British Influence, 1941-1958*, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1966), p. 8.

nationalism resulted in the emergence of an Army with a Sunni hegemony, which caused suitable conditions for the intervention of the Army into the politics of the country. Consequently, after the sudden death of King Faisal, the Iraqi Army with its Sunni identity, made the first coup of the Arab World in the 20th century. However, this coup, or the other six coups that occurred until 1941, did not aspire to remove the monarchy, nor was it intended to create a military regime. The 1936 coup was the result of the cooperation of the army with a civilian organization, the Ahali Group.³ Consequently, the result of this intervention was a kind of ‘the Arbitrator Regime’ in which “they [the military] indirectly control the political and civilian institutions, but they do not dominate the executive, the government, or the bureaucracy.”⁴

The order formed by the 1936 coup survived until the second British invasion in 1941, a result of the pro-German policies of the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi Monarchy entered a new period under British influence that would be carried out until the 1958 coup. As the most crucial policies of this period, particularly enacted in the initial phase, the British occupiers and the new Iraqi Government purged the army and the administration in Iraq from the nationalists.⁵ The British Embassy, the palace and the certain politicians, especially Nuri Said who was the prime minister of ten of 30 cabinets constructed during this period, were the most influential players of this era. Although 1941-1958 can be characterized as a period of some liberalization that caused as an increase in the “representation of Shias, Kurds, effendis and younger politicians in government,”⁶ a range of civil opposition appeared in Iraq against the regime and Britain. Despite relative progress in internal reforms and British assistance, a military coup by a group of nationalist officers grown underground and led by General Abd al-Qasim, with the support of Communist groups in the country, overthrew the Monarchy.⁷

The outcome of the 1958 coup was a military regime under the authority of General Qasim, which was different from the result of the coup series between 1936 and

³ James A. Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (October 1969), p. 51.

⁴ Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. 141.

⁵ Elliot, ‘*Independent Iraq*,’ p. 14.

⁶ Ibid., p. 163.

⁷ Bill, “The Military and Modernization in the Middle East,” pp. 52-53.

1941. Besides the military, Qasim also relied on the Iraqi Communist Party and its militias, at least during the period of 1958-1960. However, a power struggle started within the military and regime just after the coup, as generally occurred following a successful takeover in the Middle East, and as a result of this power struggle, the military regime under the rule of Qasim was removed from power by another military coup led by Abd-al Salam Arif in 1963.⁸ The alliance of some nationalist officers opposing Qasim for his lack of concern with Arab unity,⁹ with the reorganized Ba'th party gave rise to another coup and a "party-army regime"¹⁰ emerged in the country. However, the military removed the Ba'thists from the administration nine months after the coup, dramatically with the support of some Ba'thist officers, and the military regime survived until its collapse with the Ba'th takeover in July 1968, when another military coup occurred with perfect coordination between the civilians and military.

After the coup in 1968, the Ba'th Party did not make the same mistake in its second reign. Despite the initial balance between the Ba'thists and the influential officers in the administration to begin with, the Ba'th party started to remove officers from administration posts. Consequently, what emerged in Iraq under the rule of the Ba'th Party was a civilian authoritarian regime led by Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, a senior Free Officer, and a second very influential man in the administration, a civilian, Saddam Hussein, supported by the armed forces. Finally, the regime turned over an "authoritarian personal regime" ¹¹ in 1979, with the presidency of Saddam Hussein.

During the Ba'th Party and Saddam Hussein reign, the Iraqi military was strictly under civilian control. However, this was a kind of Communist regime type civilian control with a politicized military. In particular, the politicization of the military became greater during the Ba'th authority. The military became a tool of the Ba'th regime rather than a force that served the nation. Ideological indoctrination became one of the main

⁸ Bill, "The Military and Modernization in the Middle East," pp. 53-54.

⁹ Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship*, (London: I. B Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1990), p. 95.

¹⁰ Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. 146.

¹¹ Elizabeth Picard, "Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State," in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani, (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1990), p. 196.

tools of the regime to control the military. The party influence eroded military morale. In particular, the injection of party apparatchiks into the force undercut established lines of military authority. Particularly after Saddam Hussein's presidency, the military lost most of its professional capabilities owing to the destructive policies employed by Saddam Hussein for the control of the military, even on decisions on a tactical level during war time. Consequently, what was left of the Iraqi Military when the U.S invaded Iraq in May 2003, was a de-moralized institution. This structure was disbanded by the Coalition Provisional Authority as a result of a de-Baathification policy in order to construct a new security structure.

B. THE BRITISH MANDATE (1921:1932)

When Great Britain invaded Iraq in 1918, during WW1, they relied on two types of security forces (British Imperial troops including 33 battalions, along with the superiority of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Iraqi Levies numbering 4,000 men, mostly from Assyrians under the command of British officers) for the internal and external security of the country in the first years of their mandate. Although a 'Ministry of Defense' structure was established simultaneously with the construction of an Iraqi government by British officials in January 1920, "the only army the country could claim was limited to a skeleton Headquarter Staff of ten Iraqi officer."¹²

The main concern of Great Britain at that time was to maintain a maximum influence in the region with the lowest cost. Therefore, the British Colonial Office decided to create a new security configuration, including an Iraqi Army of 15,000 men for the defense of the country, two detachments of the Royal Air Force, and the Levies. Besides the economic and security concerns, it was a political decision to create an indigenous force that would symbolize national sovereignty. While creating a national army, the main concern in the preservation of the Levies was to provide a shock-absorber for the duration of the British authority in Iraq against the central Government in Baghdad and the tribal elements of the country.¹³

¹² Mohammad A. Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941*, (London: KPI Limited, 1985), pp. 75-76.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 75-77.

The British recruited heavily from the tribal elite. While the Hashemite administration saw the urban areas as the main and appropriate human resource for the recruitment of the officer corps of the new Iraqi army, the British High Commissioner “constantly encouraged the recruitment of tribal soldiers for the rank and file and sons of the Sheikhs for the officer class”¹⁴ in recruitment for the military college. However, these conscription and education efforts by the British Mandate officials also concentrated on the Sunni population of Iraq and ultimately, “the overwhelming Majority of high-ranking officers continued to be the ex-Turkish and ex-Sharifian officers,”¹⁵ in particular from the Sunni population, within the Iraqi officer corps.

The Iraqi people did not display much enthusiasm to join the army as enlisted personnel, as was expected by the Iraqi Government and the British officials. The lack of a national spirit and relatively low salaries of the private soldiers, when compared to Levies, were two principal reasons for this reluctance.¹⁶ Although the first decision of the British Colonial Office was to create a relatively small and efficient army based on a voluntary system, particularly in order to guarantee internal order of the country without bankrupting the state, the main intention of the Iraqi administration, especially King Faisal and his Hashemite officers, was to build an army that would be an instrument and a powerful symbol of a strong Hashemite Arab State in order to protect the Hashemite monarchy against the well-armed tribes and to contribute to the nation-building process through conscription.¹⁷ Therefore, they favored mass conscription as a mechanism of Iraqi nationalism within a Hashemite interpretation in order to achieve national unity.

King Faisal’s use of conscription in order to expand the army was not so easy to justify and employ, due to the opposition of the British mandate officials and the strong resistance of the tribal sections of the population, especially from the Shi’a and Kurds.

¹⁴ Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2003), p. 142.

¹⁵ Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, p. 78.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 83-85.

¹⁷ Ahmed Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power,” *The Middle East Journal*, 57, 1, (Research Library, Winter 2003): pp. 12-13.

British officials did not display their opposition for the conscription directly, but conveyed it by means of recommendations and covered warnings as stated by the British High Commissioner in 1926:

If the Iraqi Government desire[s] to press on with the project of conscription, H.M.G. will not oppose it, although fully aware of the great difficulties which lie in its way. But in their judgment conscription is not in [the] present circumstances essential and it should be possible for the Iraqi Government to maintain and pay for a sufficiently efficient army on the voluntary system. If the Iraqi Government nevertheless insist[s] on attempting to apply conscription, British forces will not be available for the purpose and Iraq must rely on her own forces.¹⁸

Besides the British officials' implied opposition, the main resistance to conscription came from the tribal sections of the population, especially from the Shi'a and Kurds. As a result of this resistance and insufficiencies of the Government, Iraq did not have the necessary circumstances for conscription until 1932, for the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independence state.

C. INDEPENDENCE AND IRAQI MONARCHY (1932:1958)

After the Anglo-Iraq treaty in 1930 that agreed on Iraq's independence of and the admittance of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independent state, the Iraqi administration focused on the legalization of the Conscription Bill despite the ongoing resistance of the tribal sectors and the majority of the ulama, even after the death of King Faisal in September 1933. While the negotiations for independence continued between the Iraqi Monarchy and the UK, Iraq faced another domestic problem. The Assyrians displayed their desires for secession or at least autonomy and applied to the League of Nations. Since their aspiration was refused by the U.K., the League of Nations, and the Iraqi Monarchy, the Assyrians revolted in July 1933. The Iraqi Army, with the support of the Kurdish Tribes, suppressed the Assyrian uprising. The victory of the army against the Assyrian revolt in August of 1933 also encouraged the Iraqi Government to put the conscription decision into action. Consequently, conscription was enacted in June 1935 with a royal decree in early 1934 along with the necessary arrangements, such as a census

¹⁸ Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, pp. 92- 93.

made in 1934. After conscription, “the army’s total strength, which had stood at less than 12,000 in 1933, had risen to 15,300”¹⁹ by the end of 1935.

Fifteen years after the British Colonial Office decided to create a small national army, Iraq possessed a relatively large conscript army of 20,000 with a Sunni hegemony in the officer corps, particularly within the upper ranks, as “an important vehicle of social climbing for rural Sunnis.”²⁰ Despite the use of British Officers, manuals and style in the education of young Iraqi officer cadets, anti-British, anti-colonial, radical, and revolutionary ideologies became predominant in the education of young officer cadets.

The newly established army became the most substantial organization of the Iraqi monarchy, enabling the King to assert government authority over the several ethnic and sectarian diversities of the country. The officer corps, as the most educated and sophisticated ‘class’ of Iraqi society, had the personal favor of the king, and therefore, enjoyed significant privileges and benefits.²¹ Even though the main intention of King Faisal was to construct a National Army as a main instrument of the nation-building, Pan Arab Nationalist ideas, which were not appropriate for the ethnic and sectarian structure of the country, became the predominant ideology within the army, particularly among the Sunni origin officers, against the “Iraq-First” ideology favored mostly by the Turcoman and Kurdish origin officers who “saw Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Pahlavi in Iran as models”²² for the future of Iraq. Consequently, pan-Arabic ideology grew during the British mandate within the officer corps, (as happened in Syria during the French mandate), and became a significant rationale for the interventionist tendency of the Iraqi officer corps.

Despite pan-Arabic nationalist ideology, the Iraqi Army did not have an interventionist attempt until 1936. The existence and influence of the British in Iraq, the relatively insufficiencies of the Iraqi Army, particularly in so far as the size and equipment based on economic constraints and the failure of the government in

¹⁹ Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, pp. 93- 94.

²⁰ Iraq: Building a New Security Structure, International Crises Group (ICG) Middle East Report No. 20, (23 December 2003): p. 2.

²¹ Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-military Relations in Iraq,” p. 14.

²² Ibid.

legitimizing the Conscription Bill, and finally the personal authority of King Faisal prevented the Iraqi Army from intervening in politics during the first 15 years of Iraq. However, after the death of King Faisal in 1933, the authority vacuum of the country opened the door for the army, particularly the officer corps, to intervene in the political process. The success of the Army against the Assyrian revolt in 1933 and its “campaign against the tribes of Southern Iraq [Shi’a tribes] and the Kurds of the North”²³ also increased the prestige and influence of the Army in Iraq. The first coup of the 20th century in Iraq and indeed all of the Arab Middle East occurred on October 29, 1936. General Bakir Sidqi, General Commander of the Iraqi Army, overthrew the government, the Cabinet of Yasin al-Hashimi but not the King and Monarchy, by a coup in which the army officer corps teamed up with a progressive civilian organization, the Ahali Group.

Although the army became the foremost institution of the political environment and army officers appeared as the most influential political force of the country,²⁴ the Iraqi military did not directly rule the country during this era. Nor did they seek to change the 1924 constitution and to entrench their position. However, they destabilized the political system. Assassinations, plots and a sequence of coups became a part of such an unstable political environment.²⁵ Seven cabinet changes after the 1936 coup in Iraq during the period of 1936-1941 were caused by a coup or pressure of the army on civilians. On 1 April 1941, as the last coup of this period, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, a pro-German civilian and pan-Arabic nationalist, took control of the country after a coup associated with the nationalist officers. The Rashid Ali Government collaborating with the Nazi Administration in Germany directly threatened the interests of the U.K. in Iraq and the Middle East. Therefore, Great Britain had to intervene militarily in order to re-order the Iraqi politics according to its interest in the county and region. As a result of this intervention, the Rashid Ali Government collapsed on May 30, 1941, after the defeat of the Iraqi Army and the invasion of the country by Great Britain.

²³ Andrew Parasiliti, “The Military in Iraqi Politics,” in *Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States*, ed. Joseph A. Kechichian, (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave, December 2001) pp. 85-86.

²⁴ Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, p. 186.

²⁵ Elliot, ‘*Independent Iraq*,’ p. 12.

The British presence in Iraq continued between 1941 and 1945, until the end of the Second World War. Although Iraq functioned as an independent state during this era, this period was described by the Iraqi nationalists as the Second Occupation, because of the extreme influence of the British over the new Iraqi governments in this era and the existence of a large number of British forces and advisers within the country. While the Iraqi Army and its officer corps were purged from Iraqi politics, the British, the palace, and some certain politicians, particularly Nuri Said, became the principal actors of this era. During the second British occupation, particularly in the first stage between 1941 and 1945, the elimination of the army and bureaucracy, mostly in the education sector, from the nationalist and pro-Axis elements became the priority of the British and the new Iraqi government. The British influence in Iraqi politics, even after the departure of the British troops from Iraq at the end of the Second World War by means of the British advisers, was decisive in this era and affiliations between the Iraqi Monarchy/Iraqi Government and the U.K. arrived at the highest level in the 1950s.²⁶

The army was forced to withdraw from politics by the new Government with the encouragement and support of the British officials and hundreds of nationalist officers were detached from the service. There was no successful coup in Iraq between 1941 and 1958. However, the nationalist movement survived and spread within the army, even underground. Besides the internal dynamics of the country, a number of outside events of the late 1940s and early 1950s igniting pan-Arabic view such as, the Palestinian issue, the 1948 Arab-Israel War and the defeat of Arab armies, the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951, Nasser's reign in Egypt in 1952 and the bold move against Britain and France over the Suez Canal in 1956²⁷ sparked nationalist demonstrations against the Iraqi Monarchy and its Cabinets cooperating with the U.K. As a result of this political dissatisfaction in

²⁶ Elliot, *'Independent Iraq,'* p. 100.

²⁷ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, p. 43.

the Army and society, a military coup of “free officers”²⁸ overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in July 14, 1958 and the Iraqi military became again one of the active and decisive participants in Iraqi politics.

D. AUTHORITARIAN RULE (1958-1968)

The 1958 coup had been planned and executed by the ‘free officers,’ consisting of less than five percent of the entire Iraqi officer corps, led by Abd al-Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif, who were generally not known. However, there was large support from the rest of the Army and Iraqi Society for the coup and for the abolition of the monarchy. The new regime removed some officers in higher ranks from the army, civil service, and police due to suspicion about their loyalty to the new regime, and the ‘Free Officers’ dominated the new existing cabinet.

It was immediately obvious that there was lack of a common ideology among the new emerging rulers of the country. While Qasim and his followers were described as the ‘left wing’ with the Iraqi nationalist ideology and relied on the support of the Communist Party for their political endurance, Arif and his followers were depicted as the ‘right wing’ with their Arab nationalist ideology. In this political environment, competition for the supreme power resulted in the removal of Arif by Qasim, with the support of the Communist Party as the largest political force in Iraq at that time, due to the lack of powerful support based on tribal or kinship relations as Saddam Hussein had later.

After a power struggle between two wings of the coup plotters, Qasim emerged as the sole leader in the aftermath of the revolution, particularly after the elimination of Arif from the political theater of the country in February 1959. Yet, Iraq did not have a stable political environment. Besides the Arab nationalists and the Iraqi Communist Party, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party that was established in Iraq during the period of the Monarchy in 1949, began to expand its influence within the society and army after the second half of 1958.²⁹

²⁸ “Free Officers” occurred as a clandestine movement within the Iraqi army in December 1956, along with the formation of a supreme committee. The realization of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel in 1956 became effective in this formation. The supreme committee included the army and air force officers all of whom were of the rank of major and above. The number of the free officers was about 200, “less than five percent of the entire membership of the officer corps.” For details see Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship*, (I.B Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London, 1990), pp. 47-48.

²⁹ Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’athist Iraq, 1968-89*, (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 10.

The government formed a militia group, the people's resistance (al-Muqawama al-Sha'biya), with 11,000 volunteers, at the request of the Iraq Communist party for the protection of the new regime. In return for the Qasim Government's attempts to solidify its authority, the opposition, including Arab nationalists and the new emerging Iraqi Ba'athists, organized underground and addressed the Iraqi Army, particularly the Officer Corps in order to employ them for their political efforts against the Government.³⁰

Despite the general support from the Army and society for the 1958 Coup and overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy, the final results of the 1958 coup d'état were not encouraging for Iraq in terms of political stabilization. Neither the Government nor the opposition chose democratic means in order to seize or maintain their authority. Alliance with some units of the military against the Government, exploitation of tribal structure and tribal militias against the government, construction of party militias (by both government and opposition), assassinations and coup attempts were the main instruments of the power struggle in this era, and also as generally occurred in Iraq. In this context, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, who had come back to the country after a 17 year exile, attempted to overthrow Qasim by encouraging the tribes in the Middle Euphrates to rebel against the government. Another upheaval attempt occurred in Mosul, on March 8, 1959, by participation of some nationalist 'Free Officers' led by Colonel Shawaf, the commander of the Mosul Garrison. An assassination attempt on Qasim was planned by the Ba'ath Party and carried out by a 23 year old Ba'athist, Saddam Hussein, on October 7, 1959. As well as the power struggle between the government and opposition, conflict amongst the ethnic, sectarian and tribal structures erupted, particularly in the north. Two most remarkable instances occurred. A grave outbreak of fighting coincided with the Mosul Coup in March 1959 amongst the ethnic residents of Mosul comprising the Arab, Kurd, Turcoman and Christian population of the city and between the Arab tribal factions. A similar conflict exploded in Kirkuk, in the first anniversary of the 1958 Coup, among the Kurds, supported by the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Turcoman "who had always dominated the socio-economic and political life of the town."³¹ The result was the death of 79 people, mostly from the Turcoman population of the city.

³⁰ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 62-65.

³¹ Ibid., pp.61-71.

Despite the attempts of Qasim to re-gain the support of the Arab nationalists and the Iraqi Army, he could not prevent the coup, plotted by a group of nationalist and Ba’thist officers in 1963. Eventually, “on February 8, 1963, the [Ba’th] Party overthrew Qasim in a bloody coup d’état with the help of Nasirite and other pan-Arab army officers headed by Col. ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif ”³² and a new period in Iraq began under the Ba’th authority.

After removing its rivals with the execution of Qasim and replacing the Ba’thists and nationalists in strategic points of the state in the initial stage of its reign, an intensive struggle within the new regime between the Ba’thists and nationalists occurred for the distribution of power.³³ Instead of the president Abd al-Salam Arif and the Cabinet, Ali Salih al-Sadi, who was the Ba’th secretary-general and Deputy Prime Minister, emerged as the real authority of the country by using the ‘National Guard,’ the irregular paramilitary force of the Ba’th Party in the period of February-November 1963. Yet, his power survived for a short period and the nationalists, interestingly with the support of some Ba’thist officers opposing al-Sadi, removed him from his post.³⁴ Consequently, the first Ba’th supremacy ended and President Arif took control of the country with the support of the Army and some “‘centrist’ Ba’th officers (including General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr) and politicians”³⁵ in November 1963. The National Guard, along with al-Sadi and his team were dismantled, and Iraq entered a five-year period under the Arif Brothers’ reign dominated by the military.

For the endurance of his reign, Abd al-Salam Arif relied on the Army and his kinship with tribal relations. While eliminating the Ba’thists, he also disbanded the ‘National Guard’ because it was an instrument of the Ba’th Party as the militia wing of it and loyal to al-Sadi. After disbanding the ‘National Guard,’ he created the Republican Guard as a new and special security unit within the Army for the protection of his regime.

³² Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’athist Iraq*, p. 12.

³³ The Iraqi Ba’athists also had ties to Arab Nationalism. However, this was a kind of revised version of pan-Arabism. So that, while the followers of pan-Arab ideology favored and sought a unified Arab Country (Arab Union), the Iraqi Ba’athists saw the sovereignty of the Iraqi State in its own territory and supremacy of the Iraqi Ba’ath party as the essential elements of their ideology and rule.

³⁴ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 85-87.

³⁵ Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’athist Iraq*, p. 12.

The centrist Ba'thist officers and politicians, who helped in the purge of al-Sadri, were removed from their posts. The key points within the army, air force, intelligence and security forces were occupied by the friends and relatives of Arif. Besides the Republican Guard, the Arif Government created the National Defense Council as a new institution.³⁶ Ultimately, instead of the cabinet, the National Defense Council and the Republican Guard became the core instruments for Abd al-Salam Arif in order to maintain his authority in the country.

Abd al-Salam Arif died suddenly in a helicopter accident in April 1966. His brother, Abd al-Rahman Arif, became the new president of Iraq. However, an authority vacuum occurred in his reign. Besides the leadership problem within the existing regime after the death of Abd al-Salam Arif, economic constraints within the country and insufficiencies of the government to generate proper solutions, the failure of the regime in creating the necessary policies for the ongoing conflict with the Kurds in the North, the loss of society's confidence in the government based on the defeat of the Arab Armies against Israel in 1967 and "the failure of the Iraqi Army to support Jordan and Syria effectively in their war"³⁷ provided favorable conditions for the Ba'th Party, waiting for the right circumstances and having made the connections with the key elements of the government, particularly in the security sector on which the regime relied, to overthrow the regime. Finally, the Ba'th Party, along with its supporters within the nationalists and the Army, took power in a classical military coup on July 17, 1968.³⁸

E. THE MILITARY UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, a senior Free Officer, a Ba'thist from Takrit, and vice-president of the first Arif Government became president after the 1968 coup. Colonel Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif, Director of the Military intelligence during the Arif brothers' reign, and Colonel Abd al-Rahman al-Da'ud, the commander of the Republican Guard, occupied the prime minister and the minister of defense posts, as the strong supporters and executors of the coup within the military. A cabinet, including eight Ba'th officers and six supporters of al-Naif and al-Da'ud, was formed and a 'Revolutionary Command

³⁶ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 93-95, 97.

³⁷ Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'athist Iraq*, pp. 13-14.

³⁸ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 107-112.

Council' was created with the participation of seven powerful officers within the Ba'thists and the Army, as the real authority of the country.³⁹

At first, the distribution of the posts within the government reflected a balance of power among the Ba'thsits and the Army. However, in a very short period, the Ba'thists determined not to repeat the mistake of 1963. They would not share authority with the military and give the officer corps the opportunity to eliminate the Ba'th Party from the government. Al-Bakr started the consolidation of his authority by the elimination of the Minister of Defense, al-Daud, and the prime minister, al-Nayif from their posts within the government and the Revolutionary Command Council, and "by appointing over 100 Ba'thist officers to [the] positions in the Republican Guard and other key units."⁴⁰

After the elimination of two powerful officers, al-Daud and al-Nayif, from the administration, al-Bakr re-formed the Cabinet and Revolutionary Command Council. In this political environment, the Revolutionary Command Council, and in particular al-Bakr, due to his strong ties with the army and Party, emerged as the real authority of the country. In the initial phase of the Ba'th reign, al-Bakr and his colleagues concentrated on the strengthening of the Ba'this ideology and the isolation of the opposition within the country. The Ba'th authority focused on the Iraqi Military and other security structures of the country in order to insure the survival of their regime, as generally happened in the history of Iraq after 1920. They employed an intensive replacement and isolation policy against untrustworthy officers, the officers whose loyalty to the Ba'th Party was doubtful, and started the Baathification of the military.

Although the Ba'th Party took power with the support of the Iraqi Army and officer corps, the Ba'th regime looked at the military both as the necessary means and the most substantial challenger for its authority. The decisive factors in this thought and in the relations between the Ba'th regime and the Iraqi Military (the control mechanisms over the military and Iraqi officer corps, and the position of the military within the regime) were the general trend of the Iraqi military for intervention in the political agenda of the country, the ideas of the Ba'thist ideology about the role of the military in political

³⁹ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 113-114.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 115.

life, and the presence of sympathy for the Egyptian leader Abd al-Nasr within the Iraqi Military.⁴¹ As a result of this view, besides the Baathification of the Army, the Ba'th Regime constructed a personal security structure led by Saddam Hussein and formed a new Regional Council with the appointment of the Ba'thists mostly made up of civilians with a non-military background, except al-Bakr and Ammash, as the initial stages of the elimination of the military from the political agenda of the country and consolidation of the Ba'th regime within the country and military.⁴²

According to Shibli al-Aysami, a Ba'thist ideologue, "the military must be prohibited from interference in the political process because the military cannot rule effectively."⁴³ It was and also is possible for the foreign powers to exploit the military's political ambitions. As a result of this ideological approach and the lessons learned from the failure in 1963, the Ba'th Party, particularly the civilian wing, emphasized the necessity of the "hegemony of the party over the military and instituted a series of wide-ranging controls."⁴⁴ However, rather than democratic control over the military, based on democratic institutions, procedures, and norms, conveniently the general characteristics and policies of the regime, Civilian Control over the Iraqi Military under the Ba'th and Saddam reign occurred as a kind of subjective civilian control in a totalitarian regime, as described by Samuel Huntington:

In a totalitarian regime,...., the power of military may be reduced by breaking the office corps up into competing units, establishing party armies and special military forces (Waffen-SS and MVD), infiltrating the military hierarchy with independent chains of command (political commissars), and similar techniques. Terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and force are the methods of governments in a totalitarian state; terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and force are the means by which the civilians in such a state control their armed forces.⁴⁵

Similar to Professor Huntington's description, the Ba'th regime and Saddam Hussein used stringent mechanisms such as rotations, retirement, mass purges and

⁴¹ Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," pp. 16-18.

⁴² Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, pp. 120-121.

⁴³ Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," pp. 17-18.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, 2003: 20th printing), p. 82.

executions in order to prevent the military and officer corps from interfering in the political process of the country. The Ba'th regime started to use these means in weakening the officer corps following the July, 1968 Ba'th takeover. Between two and three thousand officers whom the new regime considered politically unreliable were retired. While rotation was used to prevent officers from building up a close relationship with their units, execution was used mostly against the officers endeavoring to bring down the Ba'th regime. These methods were used not only against the officers whose loyalty were suspect, but also used to remove the officers who had distinguished themselves in battle and became popular and powerful within the military and society, especially during the Iran-Iraq war.⁴⁶

Besides the mechanisms mentioned above, Saddam Hussein created an overlapping structure of security services in order to watch each other and the armed forces and created a parallel military structure including the regular army, the Ba'th popular Army (constructed as a counterweight to the regular armed forces), Republican Guards Force (constructed in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war), and Special Republican Guards Force (constructed in 1995 under the supervision of Qusayy, the younger son of Saddam Hussein, in order to protect the president).⁴⁷ In addition to these factions within the military, the new internal security organs (the most important was al-Mukhabarat) were created and recruited from the young men who were poorly educated and from a low socio-economic environment mostly within the Sunni population and from the Tikrit area.⁴⁸

Another control mechanism of the Saddam regime over the military was political penetration. In Iraq, the Ba'th regime and Saddam Husayn used the principles of Ba'thism, the concept of Pan-Arabism in an interpreted version, and a type of supervising mechanisms similar to communist regimes in order to maintain the ideological control over the military and in order to ensure the survival of the regime against the likely threats from the regime and in order to prevent the involvement of the military in the

⁴⁶ Hasim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," p. 19.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

⁴⁸ Amatzia Baram, "Saddam Husayn, the Ba'th Regime, and the Iraqi Officer Corps," in *Armed Forces in the Middle East*, ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney, (London, 2002), p. 210.

political process of the country by creating a politicized or ideological military, as can be seen in the case of Syria. Additionally, Saddam Hussein constructed a security and intelligence oversight over the military by means of an enormous architecture of security and intelligence services, which occurred as the main device for the survival of the regime including 100.000-150.000 personnel and a wide-spread spy network.⁴⁹

In addition to the control mechanisms mentioned above, corporate interests of the military, personally or organizationally, such as promotions, appointments, assignments, retirement policies, budget allocations, payments, benefits, and living conditions were also used by Saddam in order to maintain control over the officer corps.⁵⁰ However, these never included institutional processes or professional norms and instead, relied on the loyalties to the Ba'th Party and leadership, tribal and/or kinship relations, and personal choices and decisions of the leadership became the decisive factors, as occurred in 1976 with the promotion of Saddam Hussein to the rank of four star general without any military background by President al-Bakr, or the promotion of Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam who served as a driver of a fuel tanker as his most significant military career to a four star general by Saddam Hussein.⁵¹

Besides harmful control procedures over the officer corps, Saddam used a personal decision making process and pacified the officer corps not only about strategic and political issues of the country, but also in operational and even in tactical decisions of the military in battle. This kind of intervention influenced the performance of the military, particularly in the Iraq-Iran War between 1979 and 1989. Similarly, the invasion of Kuwait was Saddam Hussein's decision after a meeting with his cousins, Husayn Kamil and Ali Hasan al-Majid, and "the General Staff and the minister of defense learned of the decision only from a public radio broadcast."⁵²

Despite the firm control mechanisms, there was always a tension between Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi officer corps, including not only the officers of the regular army, but also some of the officers of the Republican guards and special republican guards. In

⁴⁹ Hasim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," pp. 22-23.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.25.

⁵¹ Baram, "Saddam Husayn, the Ba'th Regime, and the Iraqi Officer Corps," pp. 211-213.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 213-216.

addition to Saddam's disrespectful policies, worsening relations between Saddam and the tribes providing the majority of the officers and the decline of the benefits provided by Saddam for the officer corps due to the sanctions on the regime after the first Gulf War affected the relations between the officer corps and Saddam Hussein. Based on this tension, and sometimes with the support of foreign intelligence services, several coup attempts occurred in Iraq. However, it is a reality that none of these attempts had mass support within the military and society because of the fear based on the terrible punishment methods and the overlapping security structure within the military and society.⁵³ As a result, the Iraqi military under Saddam's rule lost its efficiency as an institution and became a victim of the regime, together with most of the Iraqi Society. By employing these policies, Saddam destroyed the professionalism of the Iraqi Armed Forces, damaged its traditions, honor and self-respect as an institution and its officer corps.

F. LESSONS FOR TODAY

Exercising elections is not enough of an indicator for democracy. Even though Iraq has had several elections since 1924, this does not necessarily mean that Iraq has had the experience of democratic government in its history. For instance, while the first constitution was relatively democratic, this was only on paper and implementation was far from reality. Despite the electoral process, the traditional elites that occurred before the Saddam Hussein Regime or fear as happened in the elections during the Saddam Hussein era were the real influential factors instead of the public's view. In such an environment, the Iraqi military has played a significant role in the political process of the country since the appearance of the Iraqi State under the mandate of Great Britain in 1921.

The military was a tool of civilian authoritarian regimes which emerged in Iraq, or it ruled as a military regime directly. It has regularly intervened in the political life of Iraq between the periods 1936 to 1968. Despite the fact that the intention of King Faisal and his administration was to create an institution as a means for the nation-building process of the country, the military did not have the required attitudes for this kind of vision. While conscription, despite resistance particularly from tribal sectors of the country,

⁵³ Hasim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," pp. 26-29.

started to weaken tribal loyalties in one respect, what replaced it was the rise of a pan-Arabic ideology within the military instead of a nationalistic approach based on the idea of citizenship, and “the ideological indoctrination of Iraq’s officer class undermined the state-building role that militaries have traditionally played in developing some states.”⁵⁴ Even during the period of 1941-1958 under the influence of British policies, or under the Ba’th and Saddam Hussein Authority after 1963 coup, with severe control mechanisms, the Iraqi military’s intension was that of intervention mixed with its political anxieties.

The former Iraqi Military was dissolved by the Coalitional Provisional Authority in 2003 as the initial step of the creation of a new security formation. However, it is most likely that the new security architecture will be the target of several ethnic and sectarian groups of the country and they will attempt to employ similar initiatives in order to attain their special interests. The creation of a western style security structure will not be so easy in this political environment. Therefore, historical experiences, as recapitulated below, will be important for the effectiveness of the re-constituted Iraqi Military, or in a broader term Security Structure in Iraq:

- **The ethnic and sectarian factions, or political elites can tend to dominate the key positions in the Military or other Security Services in order to employ them as a repression instrument against other groups according to their political agenda:** Nationalism based on pan-Arabic ideology and Sunni hegemony within the officer corps, particularly in the top ranks, were predominant factors within the Iraqi Military and defense/security structure. This structure not only prevented the military from unifying the Iraqi society with its ethnic and sectarian diversities, but also provided the emergence and existence of several types of authoritarian, or in some cases, totalitarian regimes, particularly with a Sunni hegemony of 15-20 percent of the population. These regimes, either civilian or military, utilized the military as a means of suppression, particularly over the other ethnic and sectarian groups. In the new process, this phenomenon should not be neglected, because the ethnic or sectarian factions of the country can have the same tendency to use the military for their special intentions in the future, which will be able to cause the emergence of a new authoritarian regime in Iraq.
- **The ethnic, sectarian, or party militias and parallel military formations will probably weaken the state authority against traditional social structure and ethnic/religious factions, and cause hostilities amongst the factions of Iraq:** All the groups that operated

⁵⁴ Parasiliti, “The Military in Iraqi Politics,” p. 85.

against the government had the intention to cooperate with the military to overthrow the previous regime in the past. Additionally, they mostly relied on a dual military architecture or existence of paramilitary groups besides the regular military structure for the protection of the regime, such as the People's Resistance after the 1958 coup, or the 'National Guard' during the first reign of the Ba'th Party, or Republican Guards, Special Republican Guards, and other special security formations in an overlapping structure during the Saddam Hussein Period. The exploitation of the Army to intervene in the government caused the coups and instability in the country. Additionally, the militia groups and armed groups of ethnic, sectarian, or tribal factions increased internal security problems in the country. Correspondingly, the existence of the militia groups of the several ethnic and sectarian parties threatens the success of the reconstruction process and long-term stability of the country.

- **The Military is likely to intervene as soon as foreign powers depart:** Nationalism in Iraq arose, particularly during the British mandate and the second invasion period. Although the military did not display interventionist behavior during these periods, as a result of rising nationalism, also with the contribution of some internal or external episodes such as the Assyrian uprising or the Palestinian issue, the military had a tendency to intervene in the political process of the country, in particular, after the departure of the foreign powers as happened in 1936 and 1958. This kind of a phenomenon can occur after the withdrawal of the U.S.-led Coalition, as a result of nationalist thoughts that can rise within the new Iraqi Military during the existence of the Coalition Forces in Iraq.
- **Civil-military relations in Iraq will be problematic not only from the military perspective, but also from the civilian perspective in reconstruction and post-reconstruction period because of the lack of a democratic tradition in either the military or civilian side of the country:** Since its creation in 1921, democratic civilian control over the Iraqi Military has not occurred. Despite the fact that the military was under civilian control during the Saddam Hussein regime, this period did not include the institutionalized norms, rules, and procedures. Instead, the non-institutionalized procedures in terms of the professional process of the military, such as appointments, promotions, or assignments based on personal or political loyalty; the political intervention into the military structure, especially after the rise of Ba'th regime, and the politicization of the military; the general intention of using the military as a means of enforcing domestic politics emerged as the most highlighted characteristics of civil-military relations in Iraq. All these methods damaged the professionalisation and effectiveness of the military. Therefore, in order to create an effective military structure, it would be essential to re-formulate and institutionalize the civil-military relations and

National Security Process in post-war Iraq, not only from the point of the view of the military, but also from the point of the view of the civilian government.

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III. IRAQI SOCIETY AND THE IRAQI MILITARY TODAY

There are two main theoretical explanations of the linkage between ‘the collapse of a state’ and ‘ethnic and/or internal conflict.’ One argument assumes that ethnic or internal conflict causes the collapse of state. Another argument assumes that “state collapse causes ethnic or internal conflict.”⁵⁵ In this context, Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller argue that:

When the center dissolves, factionalization increases as loyalties shift from the state to more traditional communities and local leaders that offer psychic satisfaction and physical protection. Unless the process is reserved, it may result in communal violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide.⁵⁶

One of the main concerns for the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq after Saddam was, and still is, the possibility of a conflict amongst factions on the basis of its heterogeneous ethnic and sectarian composition. Additionally, the ethnic/religious composition and structural characteristics of a society are significant since they are the human source of the security services of the new Iraqi State. Divisions within Iraq and possible threats emanating from this structure will affect the reconstruction processes of the country and the reconstruction and reintegration of security systems. One must understand the multiethnic and sectarian diversities, tribal and family affiliations and middle class living in cities as the basic framework of an Iraqi society in order to create new security structures for the country.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Iraqi society with its ethnic and sectarian diversities and tribal structure in order to identify historical patterns and to figure out the current situation. What are the possible influences of Iraqi social structure on the security and political stability of the country generally and on the reconstruction and reintegration of the security structure of Iraq specifically? The first part of the chapter draws a general view of Iraqi society with its ethnic and sectarian factions by underlining their proportion of the population of the country, and their geographical location. Next, it

⁵⁵ Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller, “An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners,” *The Fund for Peace*, Washington, D.C., p. 12.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

gives an historical overview to highlight the historical experiences and examples for future assessments. After that, it examines the current position of the ethnic and sectarian communities in order to ascertain their possible influences over the security and reconstruction and reintegration of the new Iraqi Security forces by focusing on their relations with the United States and the Iraqi Interim Government constructed after the war; the ethnic geography of the country; the political agenda of each group and their elites, such as tribal chiefs, and religious leaders; and their security concerns and paramilitary capabilities. Finally, it presents a summary of findings for use in the last part of the thesis.

A. A GENERAL OVERVIEW

The Iraqi Military, although a key institution of the Iraqi State, has not been an instrument for Iraqi identity formation. Despite its role as a core institution in providing the state capacity to govern, the military has not represented a unified national identity with a discussible exception of the regular Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq war. It was not an institution in which all the people of Iraqi society, without discrimination on the basis of his/her ethnic, religious, or social statues, had a chance to join and to be promoted to the high ranks and top positions with institutionalized norms and procedures. Instead, the military was an instrument of the repression of a minority dominated regime to guarantee his authority in the country. At this point, the failure of the Iraqi Military to emerge as a national institution and keep the people from all social and demographic factions of the country in its body with a unified view in terms of the role and missions of the Military is far from the collapse of an institution. Failure of the Iraqi Military as a national institution corresponds to the failure of the Iraqi state and society to unify. The explanatory factors for this failure were political structure, dominant ideologies unfitting for the nation building vision, influence of the traditional social structure over the formation and procedures of the military, the influence of traditional elites on the process and institution, the personal security anxieties of political/military leadership, security challenges of the country, and security policies of the government, including the dual formations of security organizations and reliance on militia forces.

The British had created a state, not a nation, after World War I. The Hashemite Monarchy and military under British mandate was not based upon consensus amongst the

people living on Iraqi territory. Instead, the British rulers relied on a minority group, the Sunni Arabs, to maintain their authority. The main intention of the British rulers was to create a state structure, which would not challenge their interests, but also operate functionally in its territory. The emerging military was dominated by the Sunni officer corps, even after the expansion of the military via the conscription bill. This dominance was also a preference of the ruling elite, King Hussein and his Sunni Arab politicians and bureaucrats (civil and military) in order to survive their authority by using sectarian ties. Even though the participation of the Shiite Arabs and other ethnic communities in the bureaucracy and military increased numerically, the dominant position of the Sunni Arabs in key positions continued.

The traditional social structure of the country (ethnic/sectarian/tribal/clan affiliations) and the influential role of the traditional 'strong men' also affected the process of the creation of strong institutions reflecting a national identity. Opposition from the Shiites and Kurds towards conscription in this period was not only a result of their anxieties concerning the emergence of a powerful military structure as a tool of the Sunni Arabs, but also was a consequence of the traditional elite's fears that a powerful military could enable the central government to break their dominant positions over society. Meanwhile, pan-Arab ideology emerged as an ethnic based national view within the military but was not proper for Iraq with its ethnic diversities. Moreover, the Shiite Arabs also did not favor pan-Arabism, because it was seen as a means of eventual Sunni Arab dominancy. Consequently, discrimination policies of the British Colonialism and the ruling elites that banned the other ethnic and sectarian communities from participating in the military and other state institutions, the obstacles based on traditional social structure and elite anxieties, and an improper ideology that was not appropriated by most of the population resulted in the failure of nation-building. In these circumstances, the Iraqi Military, having been created under Sunni domination, could not be transformed into a respectful national institution with a unified national view embracing the entire Iraqi society.

The collapse of the monarchy after the 1958 revolution and the Republic of Iraq was welcomed by Iraqi Society and the Iraqi military. However, the Sunni Arab domination within the state structure did not change. The new regime could not offer the

proper ideology that would unify Iraqi society. Neither communism nor Arab nationalism was suitable ideologies to create a national identity in Iraq. Furthermore, these ideologies deepened the frictions within the society and caused grave security problems. Despite some major reforms, particularly carried on by Qasim, and the relative decline of the traditional social structure in favor of the growing urban population, the ruling elite, either Qasim or the Arif Brothers, seeking support to maintain their authority, utilized the traditional approach, as in the period of the Monarchy: family/clan affiliations (Arif Brothers) or party alliances (Qasim).

It was a phenomenon that Iraq always had– and still has, that of a well-armed society. Tribes had their own militias to further their interests and to provide their own security against other tribes. The use of the militias by the governments to provide state authority, particularly in rural areas, was also another phenomenon that also occurred during the British Mandate and Monarchy.

In the period of 1958-1969, government reliance on militia groups dramatically escalated. In fact, the formation of militia became an unwritten policy of the government and they were used by all the rulers until the collapse of the Saddam Hussein reign in 2003. The escalating role of the militia groups harmed the construction of an institutionalized state structure with efficient security services that would provide security for all parts of the society, not only just for the ruling elite.

The Ba'th Party period and particularly Saddam Hussein's reign was a catastrophe in terms of the deepening diversities within the ethnic and sectarian factions and increasing hostilities between the state and its citizens. While the ruling elite were still from the same group as before, it was much more narrowed and personalized during the Ba'th party period and particularly after the presidency of Saddam Hussein in 1979. The top positions, key points and high ranks in government, bureaucracy and security organizations were appropriated according to personal loyalties. The procedures, principles and norms, which were not strong, were totally replaced by un-institutionalized methods. Even though the Ba'thist ideology viewed the tribal structure clan/family relations as the main obstacle to social development, the policies used to destroy this architecture in the initial period of the Ba'th regime were abandoned by Saddam Hussein

in order to cement his rule by exploiting this structure. The Iran-Iraq war was also decisive in these policies, because Saddam Hussein viewed tribes as a main source for recruitment.

The essential expansion of the military due to the Iran-Iraq war resulted in two paradoxical incidents. The first was an increase in the number of soldiers from the Shiite population within the regular Army, and the construction of the Republican Guard, in some respects a Sunni militia force, and its dramatic rise as a repression tool of the regime against its ethnic and sectarian rivals. The Iraqi Army had a role for the first time in its history, with a small exception of the Arab-Israel War in 1967, “to defend the country against a foreign enemy, rather than to meddle in domestic politics.”⁵⁷ The Iraqi Shiites, on the contrary, to the trepidation of the government, fought against Iran within the regular Iraqi Army and displayed loyalty to the Iraqi State, despite ongoing discrimination and repression policies that had been conducted for years by the governments. However, they could not gain their social and political desires. Besides, the Iraqi regular Army could not have the honor of its performance in the war. Additionally, the cooperation of the Kurds with Iran during the war to achieve their political demands⁵⁸ and the harmful response of Saddam Hussein by using the Republican Guard units and chemical weapons worsened the relations between the state and ethnic/sectarian composition of the country.

The situation, in terms of the relations between the state and its population, worsened during the aftermath of the First Gulf War. The Shiite uprising in the south, the revolts of the Kurdish groups in the north and military response of Saddam Hussein resulted in the establishment of ‘safety heavens’ and economic sanctions. While safety heavens caused the collapse of the state authority in northern Iraq in favor of two Kurdish groups, KDP and PUK, economic sanctions weakened the economic power of the state that was the main instrument to providing the support of the tribes. Additionally, economic sanctions damaged the social and economic circumstances of the middle class in favor of tribal and religious architecture. In this worsening situation, Saddam Hussein

⁵⁷ Parasiliti, “The Military in Iraqi Politics,” p. 90.

⁵⁸ Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 2nd ed., (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 243-244.

enlarged his personal security web, such as the Special Republican Guard under the command of his younger son Qussay.

Personal loyalties and family/clan affiliations became more important. Even though state structure did not disappear, with the exception of northern Iraq under the domination of two Kurdish groups, the state-society collaboration collapsed totally. In sum, despite the fact that Iraq has not faced a broad ethnic conflict amongst different factions of the country until now, it also could not have a unified society with sustainable security, “which refers to its ability of a society to solve its own problems peacefully without an external administrative or military presence.”⁵⁹ In these circumstances, the Iraqi Military, despite the conscription conducted since 1935, in some respect, with an exception of the regular military during and after Iran-Iraq war, could not transform into an institution that would reflect a national view respected and appropriated by the majority of the population.

When the state structure almost totally collapsed under the weight of the coalition invasion in 2003, what remained from the former Iraqi state was a divided society with different political agendas for the future of Iraq and a social structure on the basis of tribal, clan, or religious affiliations that deepen ethnic and sectarian fragmentations. Furthermore, recent events that occurred in Iraq since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein Regime have indicated that it is too hard to provide a sustainable peace environment in which all groups will seek the future of Iraq by means of negotiations without the support of the international community in deteriorating security circumstances.

B. A SYNOPSIS OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY

The social and demographic structure of a society and ethnic and religious formation of a country is a significant variable for the future predictions about security as a risk factor of internal conflict.⁶⁰ Iraq is a varied society with its ethnic and religious diversities and lack of a cohesive identity. The estimated population is approximately 22 million according to the 1997 census. However, there is no trustworthy data about the exact numbers of the population and precise portions of the ethnic, sectarian, or religious

⁵⁹ Baker and Weller, “An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse,” p. 10.

⁶⁰ Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy” in *Turbulent Peace*, Chester A. Crocker, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela All (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), p. 148.

groups and assertions are mainly based on estimations. While there is a tendency to examine the Iraqi population as three main ethnic/sectarian groups, the Shiite Arabs (55 percent), the Sunni Arabs (17 percent), and the Kurds (15 to 22 percent), and other minorities,⁶¹ the Turkmen community, “not least the estimated 2 million Turkomans who live mainly in the north-east,”⁶² constitutes another major ethnic group according to the final results of the 1957 Census (the last reliable census in Iraq) declared by the Iraqi government in 1958. In accordance with the final results of 1957 Census, the Turkmens represented 9% of the total Iraqi population of 6,300,000 with 567,000 counted Turkmens, while the population of the Kurds was placed at 819,000, 13% of the Iraqi population.⁶³ In addition to these four ethnic and religious groups, there are the Jewish and Christian minorities including the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, Armenians and Catholics.⁶⁴

The Shia community is the largest sectarian group in Iraq with an estimated 60 to 65% of the Iraqi population. While Southern Iraq is considered the major geographic area of the Shia population in Iraq, there is a tendency to consider the Shia population in Iraq as only ethnically Arab. There are also “the Kurdish Failis in [the] northeastern provinces, the Turkmen in Kirkuk and Mosul, and the Iraqis of Persian origin in [the] Holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Kadmiya.”⁶⁵ Despite the sectarian ties of the Shi’i population to the other ethnic groups with Shi’i Arabs, they have mostly their own political agenda. The Shi’i Arabs within the Shia community are the majority in Iraqi society with a population of approximately 55%.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Mark Lattimer, “Challenges for Establishing Inclusive Democracy,” in *Building Democracy in Iraq*, (London: Minority Rights Group International, February 2003), p. 6.

⁶² Owen Bowcott and Brian Whitaker, “Trouble Looms after Coalition Tells Kurds Self Rule Can Stay,” *Guardian Foreign Pages*, January 6, 2004, p. 17. Available at <http://www.nexis.com/research/search/documentDisplay? docnum...> accessed on 3/17/2004.

⁶³ Soner Cagaptay, “Turkmens, the Soft Underbelly of the War in Northern Iraq,” *Policy Watch*, the Washington Institute, Number 735, (March 27, 2003). Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2003/735.htm> accessed on 12/20/2004.

⁶⁴ Lattimer, “Challenges for Establishing Inclusive Democracy,” p. 6.

⁶⁵ Laith Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” in *Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf States*, Joseph A. Kechichian (ed.) (New York, N.Y.: PALGRAVE, 2001), p. 79.

⁶⁶ Lattimer, “Challenges for Establishing Inclusive Democracy,” p. 6.

Even though the Shiite Arabs constitute the majority in Iraq, they have also factions including the religious and secular groups. Additionally, each sub-group has their own splinter groups. In this respect, one of the major issues in the post war era is “the fierce struggle within the Shi’ite religious circles [that] took an ominous turn on April 10 with the murder of Abd al-Majid al Kohei,”⁶⁷ who was a representative of the idea of ‘quietism’ that “shield[s] the highest Shi’ite religious leadership, the marjaiyya, from politics.”⁶⁸ Al-Dawa Islamiyah (the oldest Shiite Islamist political movement that was founded in 1957), the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Sadr Group (led by the young radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a follower of the Iraqi exile Ayatollah Kazim al-Husseini al-Haeri that accepts cleric rule with an Iranian view) and Hawza al Ilmiya (circle of scholars) and its leader Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani have become the main competitors of power struggle in Iraq, not only with other political establishments, Shiite or non-Shiite, but also amongst themselves in the post-war period. However, the Shiites are also aware that the post-Saddam era has offered them an opportunity to seize power for the first time since the emergence of Iraq from under British rule. Finally, despite their diversities, they are politically the most organized community in Iraq.

The Sunni Arabs, comprising approximately 17% of the population and who have been in power for 83 years, constitute the predominant population in the west of the country, particularly in the areas of Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tikrit (the so-called Sunni Triangle). A large number of Sunni Arabs are also living in Baghdad, and the north and north-west provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. Due to their dominant position in the Ba’th Party, especially during the Saddam Hussein era, they are now concerned about their future, particularly in terms of a de-Baathification process and a new possible state formation that will be predominantly Shiite. Sunni Arabs have been usually the most secular Arab community in Iraq. However, there is skepticism that they will remain the

⁶⁷Yitzhak Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 2003). Available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030701faessay15402-p10/yitzhak-nakash/the-shi-ites-and-the-future-of-iraq.html> accessed on 11/26/2004.

⁶⁸ Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq.”

same, particularly with a growing Sunni militancy that is emboldened by emerging outside extreme religious terrorist organizations that provoke their circumstances and fears in the post-war era.

The Kurds are one of the major non-Arab ethnic communities in Iraq with an estimated 13-22% of Iraq's population. While most of the Kurdish population are Sunni Muslims, a small portion of them are also Shiite Muslims, named Feili Kurds.⁶⁹ They fought with the Baghdad government several times for broad autonomy. Even though they gained autonomy from the Ba'th government in 1970, the clashes continued due to the dimension of the autonomy, particularly for their territorial demands on the oil-rich Kirkuk province, also with the encouragement of the external powers, such as Iran and the United States. After the Iran-Iraq war, they were exposed to a massive military campaign by Saddam Hussein, including the use of chemical weapons, because of their collaboration with Iran during the war.⁷⁰ After the end of the first Gulf War, they enjoyed a de facto autonomy without the supremacy of the Baghdad regime provided by the safety havens established after the war. By using this de facto situation, they improved their political, economic, and militia capacities during the 1990s.

The two main Kurdish Groups (KDP and PUK) operated in cooperation with the U.S.-led Coalition during and after the Second Gulf War and as a result of this cooperation, they emerged as the most benefited group in the post-war era. Despite the fact that they have unified their political efforts in the post-war era, the two main political groups, KDP and PUK, have their own administrative organizations and their own militia capacities. Additionally, the Kurdish Islamic Union is another political organization "formally established in 1994 and is said to be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, a moderate Sunni party well established in the Middle East."⁷¹ In addition to these political compositions, tribal ties are a significant factor in the Kurdish population, as can be seen as a general social characteristic in Iraq. Demands of the Kurdish Groups on Kirkuk

⁶⁹ Lattimer, "Challenges for Establishing Inclusive Democracy," p. 6.

⁷⁰ W. Andrew Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in Post Saddam Iraq*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003), p. 25.

⁷¹ "Who is Who in Iraq: Kurds," in *BBC News*, June 18, 2004. Available at http://news.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3770621.stm accessed on 10/22/2004.

because of its rich oil fields and their independence aspirations stated by their political and tribal elites have been a source of tension amongst the other ethnic and religious factions.

The Turkmen are another non-Arab community in Iraq with close cultural and linguistic ties to Turkey. They include populations in both Shiite and Sunni belief. Geographically, they mainly live in the northern and north-west provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul, Irbil, Salahaddin, and Diyala. Additionally, a Turkmen population lives in Baghdad.⁷² Even though the presence of the Turkmen population and their cultural and linguistic rights were recognized by the Iraqi governments in the declaration of the Independent Iraqi Monarch in 1932 and in the decree of the Revolutionary Council issued on January 24, 1970, these were not continued by the later Iraqi governments. Furthermore, the Turkmen community was subjected to assimilation policies of the Iraqi governments, particularly after 1980, even including the massacre, as occurred in Irbil, in 1996, which was registered in a report of the U.N. Human Right Commission (A/51/496/add. 18 November 1996).⁷³ Additionally, a number of Turkmen, together with the Kurds and Assyrians, were forced to leave the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, as a result of the 'arabisation' policies of Saddam Hussein. In the post-war era, the Turkmen population in Iraq has been represented by two political organizations both of which are in favor of a democratic Iraq: the Turkmen Front and the Turkmen National Association.

In addition to the Muslim population of Iraq, ethnically from the Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, there are also Christian and Jewish minorities. While the Christian population, including the Assyrians, the largest Christian community in Iraq, the Chaldeans, and small numbers of Syrian Orthodox, Armenians and Catholics, constitute approximately 3 to 4% of the entire Iraqi population, the Jews are only a few hundred, since approximately 150,000 of them were forced to leave Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. Except for a large number of Assyrians living in the north-west provinces of the country, the Christians and Jews live in Baghdad.⁷⁴ In the recent history of Iraq, while Iraq was

⁷² "The Turkmen of Iraq," *Arab Gateway Website*. Available at <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/background/turkoman.htm> accessed on 11/30/2004.

⁷³ "Turkmen Haklari," *Iraqi Turkmen Front Website*. Available at <http://www.turkmenfront.org/Turkish/Bilgi/haklar.htm> accessed on 6/29/2004.

⁷⁴ Lattimer, "Challenges for Establishing Inclusive Democracy," p. 6.

transforming to an independent monarchy in 1932, the Assyrians revolted on the basis of their autonomy demands, and were repressed by the Iraqi military. During the Ba'ath regime and Saddam Hussein rule, they were subjected to "internal deportation programs [together with the Kurds and Turkmens] aimed at maintaining the Arab and Sunni dominance of the country's oil regions."⁷⁵ In the post-war era, the Assyrian Democratic Movement has been the political organization of the Assyrians and is also represented by a member in the Iraqi Governing Council.

Besides the ethnic and religious multiplicity, the tribal structure and kin affiliations are also fundamental characteristics of Iraqi society that should be considered in the reconstruction and stabilization of the country. "There are an estimated 100 major tribes, 25 tribal confederations and several hundred cohesive clans in Iraq, and experts estimate that perhaps 40 percent of Iraqis still feel a close affinity to their tribes,"⁷⁶ although 72% of Iraqis live in urban areas where tribal structure is not so effective. Tribal structure and tribal chiefs were significant in the political life of Iraq and were exploited by the governments during the British mandate and the Iraqi monarchy in order to solidify their authority. After the emergence of the Ba'th Party regime in 1968, the tribal structure, the influence of tribal chiefs, and tribalism weakened on the basis of the Ba'thist ideology that tribal structure is one of the main obstacles to the improvement of society and the spread of Ba'th ideology within society. As a paradox, the unsuccessful land reform conducted in 1969 influenced this trend by increasing immigration from rural to urban areas. However, the Iran-Iraq war enhanced the significance of tribes for the Saddam Hussein regime and escalated the relations between Saddam Hussein and the tribes.⁷⁷ Even though these relations worsened, even in the Sunni areas, as a result of the economic weaknesses of the State to reward the tribes and tribal chiefs, they have emerged as a critical actor in Iraq in the post Saddam era.

⁷⁵ "Who is Who in Iraq: Assyrians," in *BBC News*. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3770907.stm accessed on 6/29/2004.

⁷⁶ Susan Sachs, "In Iraq's Next Act, Tribes may Play the Lead Role," *the New York Times*, June 6, 2004, p.4.14. Available at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=647369701&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1109553684&clientId=11969> accessed on 11/26/2004.

⁷⁷ Serhat Ekmen, "İç Etkenler Açısından Irak'ın Geleceği," in *Stratejik Analiz Dergisi*, Vol. 38, Avrasya Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi (ASAM), June 2003. Available at <http://www.avsam.org/turkce/yayinlar/stratejikanaliz/makale/makalestranl38.htm> accessed on 7/29/2004.

While tribal relations are significant, particularly in rural areas of the country, the middle class emerged in the large cities as a result of “the process of urbanization [that] has resulted in the erosion of traditional social structures and the old loyalties of extended family, tribe and religion.”⁷⁸ Another factor that accelerated the role of the middle class in Iraq was the increase in the educated population. However, both factors could not broadly break the ethnic and sectarian ties in favor of an Iraqi citizenship concept. This social establishment can make a significant contribution to the construction of a post-war order in the country. On the other hand, their deteriorating economic conditions and security concerns are challenges in the new era that may be exploited by the ethnic and religious elites due to their ethnic and religious ties. This can cause security problems such as the riots against the new emerging state authority or intercommunity conflicts as a result of provocations of the ethnic or religious groups living in the large cities with their intermingled population.

C. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF THE IRAQI SOCIETY

Historical experiences of a country are significant, particularly since nations that have experienced civil war are likely to experience it again.⁷⁹ Iraq has not fortunately had an ethnic civil war since its genesis in 1921.⁸⁰ Also, it has not had a unified society based on citizenship or a democratic structure in which citizens have equal rights. Instead, a minority Sunni Arab community, even only the elite part of it with clan relations, generally dominated the key points of the government and bureaucracy. From this standpoint, the other communities tracked their political desires via other means, including conflict and violence. The response of the governments against these actions was violent and included the use of overwhelming military force and even the use of chemical weapons against civilians.

1. The British Mandate and Iraqi Monarchy (1921:1958)

The Iraqi state that emerged under the British mandate in 1921 “was weak, unstable, poor, and underdeveloped ... [with its] tribal, ethnic, sectarian, and regional

⁷⁸ Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq*, p. 138.

⁷⁹ Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” p. 147.

⁸⁰ A civil war is defined as “a dispute about political, economic, social, cultural or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities.” See Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,” p. 147.

differences.”⁸¹ Before the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy under the British mandate, several groups had different ideas for the post-Ottoman configuration in Iraq. For instance, some tribal chiefs, particularly those who were benefiting from the British invasion during the First World War, wanted the continuation of British rule. On the other hand, the Shi’a clergy’s desire was an Islamic state, while the Kurds and the Assyrians were seeking autonomy.⁸²

Before the solidification of British rule in Iraq after the invasion of the country in the First World War, the Shiite religious leaders in Southern Iraq and the Sharifians based in Syria had a consensus on the formation of an Arab Islamic State “ruled by an Arab Muslim king, one of the sons of ... Sharif Husayn, bound by a national legislative assembly [as an oversight mechanism of the Shiite Clerics over the legislative process] based in Baghdad.”⁸³ After the San Remo resolutions, which had placed Iraq under the mandate of the U.K., “both the Sharifians and Mujtahids [Shiite clerics] ... gave the highest priority to achieving unity between Shi’is and Sunnis.”⁸⁴ The Shi’i tribes in the lower Euphrates rebelled in August 1920 after the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Taqi Shirazi that proclaimed “none but Muslims have a right to rule over Muslims.”⁸⁵ When the rebellion was suppressed by British forces, the Sunni Arabs were given the leadership role in the country by the British as a consequence of their cooperation with the British authorities in order to insure their communal interests,⁸⁶ and as a result of the general intention of colonialism to rule the colonized country with “a weak minority-based client regime,”⁸⁷ as could be seen in Syria under the French mandate after World War I. Consequently, the rule of the Sunni Arab minority started in 1921, despite the majority position and displeasure of the Shi’ite Arabs and dissatisfaction of other ethnic and religious communities of the country.

⁸¹ Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq,” p. 12.

⁸² Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, p. 9.

⁸³ Yitzak Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 65.

⁸⁴ Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, p. 68.

⁸⁵ W. Andrew Terrill, *The U.S. and Iraq’s Shi’ite Clergy: Partners or Adversaries*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2004), p. 6.

⁸⁶ Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p. 3.

⁸⁷ Terrill, *The U.S. and Iraq’s Shi’ite Clergy*, p. 6.

The reluctance of the British to work with the Shiite majority was not the only reason for the emergence of Sunni domination in governmental and bureaucratic posts. The unwillingness of the Shiites to accept ministerial and bureaucratic posts on the basis of the 'fatwas' of the Shiite clerics that prohibit working with an 'unjust reign' and the inadequate number of educated population due to the lack of secular schools in the Shiite provinces were other significant reasons for the British not to work with the Shiites. Additionally, the governments utilized discrimination and repression policies. Eventually, these policies resulted in the disenfranchisement of the Shiites from the government, bureaucracy, civil-services, and Iraqi security organizations in favor of the Sunni Arabs and "the state caved to tribal Arab Sunni pressures, whose influence became dominant in the army and security organizations."⁸⁸ As an example, in the cabinet posts in the period of 1920 to 1936, "the Shi'a who formed 56 percent of the population of Iraq, provided only 24 percent of cabinet members."⁸⁹ As another instance to display the degree of disenfranchisement applied to the Shiites, while "the Kurds [as another community ethnically different from the Sunni Arab rulers] ... held 22 percent of the high-ranking government posts [in 1930], the Shi'is, who formed the majority of the population, hold only 15 percent."⁹⁰ Although the prohibitions on the basis of the fatwas of the Shi'ite religious leaders for the acceptance of posts in ministries and bureaucracy was removed in 1927 and the Shi'ites started to express their preference to work with the British, indeed to be ruled directly by the British instead of the Sunnis, they could not have enhanced their numbers in ministerial and bureaucratic posts due to the reluctance of the Sunni governments to share the authority and British disinclination to change the balance of power between the Sunni and Shi'i Arab communities of Iraq.

Besides discrimination against other ethnic and sectarian groups to participate in the government and bureaucracy, the political system did not offer real choices for the population, even the Sunni Arabs'. The traditional tribal structure and the power of the tribal chiefs over the population, insufficient education that fed this structure, and reward/punish policies utilized by the governments to cooperate with tribal sheikhs were

⁸⁸ Kubba, "Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq," p. 67.

⁸⁹ Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, p. 47.

⁹⁰ Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp. 109-110.

effective on this phenomenon. This structure was also encouraged and exploited by the Iraqi governments and their British supporters for the maintenance of their authority. For example, after the 1920 Shiite revolt, the Iraqi governments and British mandate attempted to break the power of the Shi'ite religious leaders by cooperating with tribal sheikhs and strengthening their ties with the central state via economic and political privileges, such as offering them seats in the Assembly.⁹¹ Consequently, rather than the vote of the ordinary people, "election results in the country side were the outcome of various clashes and compromises between the will of the government... and the wishes of the major chiefs of landlord."⁹²

The main security problems in Iraq during the Hashemite Monarchy were ethnic and/or tribal uprisings with different political and economic desires, such as autonomy, objection to conscription, or local issues, such as taxes, land or irrigating privileges, and riots, particularly as a consequence of the deteriorating economic conditions of the urban population during and after the Second World War. While the Iraqi government was exploiting the authority of the landlords and local power holders, with the exception of the Iraqi Shiite clergies, it also attempted to strengthen the state authority in the country overall. The army emerged as the main instrument to claim state authority and to provide internal security, especially after crushing the Assyrian rebellion in 1933. Arabic identity and Arab nationalism emerged as the favorite ideology of the ruling elite to create a national identity, which was paradoxical with the ethnic and sectarian structure of the country. Arab nationalism, contrary to the intention of the governments to create a national identity, escalated the ethnic movements and revolts of non-Arab communities. On the other hand, the state policies to strengthen the central authority, such as the conscription bill to expand the size of the military, were seen as a threat by the Shiite Arabs and Iraq's non-Arab ethnic communities, especially the Kurds, and particularly in tribal areas. In addition to the motivating influence of these policies, particular stimulates such as the personal security concerns of tribal chiefs, or their anxieties on taxes, land or

⁹¹ Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp. 88-92.

⁹² Elliot, *'Independent Iraq'*, p. 9.

irrigation benefits given to some particular tribes by the government resulted in unrest in the country as had occurred in the mid-Euphrates region.⁹³

The number of communities other than the Sunni Arabs, particularly the Shiites in ministerial positions and bureaucracy increased in the 1940s and 1950s. This was a result of the increase in the number of educated young Shiites with a secular mentality. However, the Sunni Arabs were in the key positions in the civilian and military bureaucracy and there were strict restrictions for “the Shi’is [in the entry] to the military and police academies, as well as against the very small number of Shi’i officers in the army and on the police force.”⁹⁴ In this context, a political attempt of the Shiites in 1952 with the demand for direct elections instead of official candidate lists to balance the power of the Sunnis in the government via parliamentary majority was suppressed by the army that was called by the Iraqi government.⁹⁵

The failure of the ethnic and sectarian communities, particularly the Shiite Arabs to reach their political demands resulted in the spread of radical movements, such as communism and Islamic ideology in the late 1940s and 1950s, the last years of the Iraqi Monarchy, even though they were opposing ideologies. In this perspective, the Communist Party became effectual within the Kurdish population, with the catchwords emphasizing Kurdish rights and autonomy,⁹⁶ and among the educated young Shiites mostly from urban areas, who controlled the high level party organizations, as a response to the government’s reluctance to share power, the revival of Islamic Ideology and its politicization with the al-Dawa Party, was not only a result of an intent to create an Islamic State in Iraq, but was a consequence of the fear of the Shiite clerics over the spread of communism within the young generation of Shiites.⁹⁷ The worsening economic conditions of the country due to the Second World War were also an influential factor that escalated the opposition to mobilize the population and caused the riots, “most

⁹³ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, pp. 79-84.

⁹⁴ Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp. 123-127.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 131.

⁹⁶ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, p. 27.

⁹⁷ Nakkash, *The Shiites of Iraq*, pp. 132-136.

spectacularly the Parsmouth Riots of January 1948 and the 1952 intifada.”⁹⁸ Eventually, the Monarchy was ended by the coup of July 14, 1958 led by free officers.

2. The Collapse of the Monarchy and the Period of 1958-1968

The 1958 coup and the emergence of the new government under the reign of General Qasim was a result of the alliance between the army and the Iraqi communist Party (ICP). The alliance with the ICP and its supporters, including the party militias, ‘the People’s Resistance’ was a necessity for General Qasim, “who had neither kin nor regional networks at his disposal,”⁹⁹ in his struggle with Abd-al Salam Arif, to provide mass support for his authority. As the most highlighting characteristics of the Qasim era, in the period of 1958-1963, the land reform, housing policies, and developments in education and health services weakened the influence of the Shi’a land owners in favor of the poor Shi’ite population in the cities and the Shi’te peasants. Additionally, some obstacles to the Shiites to join the military academy and the Staff College were removed. Yet, the successors of Qasim, the Arif Brothers, did not track the same policies with their pan-Arabic nationalist view. Finally, the representation of the Shiites in top positions was limited to 16% in the top governmental and bureaucratic positions, while it was 35% in the secondary level positions during the period of 1958-1968.¹⁰⁰

The rise of the ICP and Communist ideology also escalated the security problems. The communist ideology was opposed not only by the Arab nationalists, mostly from the Sunni Arabs, but also by the Islamists, including both the Shiite and the Sunni religious leaders and Islamic political formations. Consequently, this resulted in a political hostility that emerged within the society and was fed by the ethnic, sectarian and tribal enmities, which caused “serious political violence, the most evident of which were the infamous massacres in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad.” ¹⁰¹

The Mosul incidents started as a clash based on the political aggression between the local nationalist and communists, on March 7, 1959. The next day some army troops led by nationalist commanders revolted. Eventually, the violence escalated as a result of

⁹⁸ Elliot, ‘*Independent Iraq*,’ p. 18.

⁹⁹ Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, p. 55.

¹⁰⁰ Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁰¹ Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p .67.

“long standing ethnic and inter-tribal rivalries between Arabs and Kurds and between different Arab tribal factions, and with the hatred of peasants for their landlords.”¹⁰² On the other hand, the Kirkuk incident was mainly an ethnic based conflict between “the Turcoman population of the city and the more recent Kurdish incomers.”¹⁰³ The violence started as a result of political appointments in the city in favor of the Kurds on the basis of their close relations with the ICP “with the result that the Turcomans, who had always dominated the socio-economic and political life of the town, now felt themselves increasingly disadvantaged.”¹⁰⁴

Besides the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, and deteriorating security conditions in the large cities, the refusal of the autonomy demand of the Kurdish groups by the government resulted in the Kurdish revolt. The fighting was not only between the rebelling Kurdish tribes and government forces, but also between the rebellion groups and some other hostile Kurdish tribes. While the government could not suppress the revolt totally, the rebellions could not achieve their political desires either and consequently they looked for another alliance connected with the Ba’th Party that had a Pan-Arab nationalist and secular view.¹⁰⁵ After Qasim was taken over in 1963 by another military coup with the alliance of the Ba’th Party, the negotiations started just after the coup between the new government and the Kurdish Groups, particularly ‘Kurdistan Democrat Party’ (KDP). However, the negotiations collapsed with the demands of the Kurdish Groups, including “an expanded Kurdish province administrated exclusively by Kurds, defended by Kurdish Armed Forces, with independent finances based on local taxes and on a fixed proportion of oil revenues,”¹⁰⁶ and a military campaign continued until the break down of the revolt in 1975 during the Ba’th authority.

3. The Ba’th Regime and the Period of Saddam Hussein

The Iraqi Ba’th Party was founded by Fuad al-Rikabi, a Shi’ite engineering student from Nasiriya, in 1949. Its first members were mostly the Shiite Arabs who were the relatives and friends of Rikabi. While the Party was small in size with only a few

¹⁰² Sluglett and Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, p. 68.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 79-91.

¹⁰⁶ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p. 172.

hundred members before the 1958 coup, it expanded dramatically underground between the period of 1958 and 1962, particularly after its assassination attempt on Qasim in 1959. Just after the overthrow of the Qasim government in 1963, three fractions emerged in the party on the basis of personal, factional, and sectarian ties. Among these, the group named as “centrists,” consisting of mainly Sunni Arabs, held power in the party. Eventually, the representation of the Shiites in various regional leadership positions declined from 54% to 14% during the period of 1963 and 1970 in favor of the Sunni Arabs, particularly in favor of the Sunni Arabs mostly from Tikritis, when the Ba’th Party took over the Iraqi authority in 1968.¹⁰⁷

The role and representation of the population was more narrowed in the period of the Ba’th Party and especially after the presidency of Saddam Hussein. Despite the initial policies attempting to break down the tribal structure, the ruling elite was mostly from the Tikritis, a tribe in the town of Tikrit in the north-west part of Iraq. Moreover, family kinship and personal loyalties became more decisive in holding the key points in Party, government, bureaucracy, and security services. Despite the fact that the Shiites and non-Arab population were motivated to join the Party organizations, “the most important positions in the government, army and internal security remained safely in Sunni-Arab hands (and, to a large extent, in the hands of people hailing from Tikrit, General Bakr’s and Saddam Husayn’s home town).”¹⁰⁸ Additionally, while “in many symbolically prominent positions, as well as in local organizations, the whole range of Iraq’s diverse population was well represented”¹⁰⁹ as a strategy of Saddam Hussein to provide a unifying identity, all so-called national organizations were under the personal control of Saddam Hussein. Consequently, the Ba’th party, and particularly during the Saddam Hussein Period, can be characterized as the peak of the family/tribe affiliations and personalization of the rule in Iraq. In this respect, “the ideology of the Ba’ath party was to be whatever he [Saddam Hussein] said it was”¹¹⁰ during the Saddam Hussein reign.

¹⁰⁷ Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq*, pp. 9-15.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, pp. 227-228.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 237.

In the first years of its rule, “the Ba’ath government contained a major Kurdish rebellion in the north, as well as a small scale communist guerilla movement in the marsh areas in the south.”¹¹¹ The aggression between the government and the Shiites in the south and the Kurdish revolts, sometimes as guerilla movements, continued as the most important security issues throughout the Ba’th regime and the Saddam Hussein reign. The major differences of the movements of these two communities were the following. While the Shiite movements were against the type of regime and its repression policies over the Shiite community, particularly in religious and religious education, the main reason for the Kurdish rebellions concerned the type and geographic area of their autonomy. The rebelling Kurdish groups mostly interacted with Iran, and were encouraged and supported by Iran either during the Shah period in order to solve the border dispute in favor of Iran or after the Iran Islamic revolution during the Iran-Iraq war. However, the Iraqi Shiites were not involved in a broad alliance with Iran, even during the Iran-Iraq war, and “fought against their Iranian coreligionists, showing that their loyalty to the Iraqi state overrode their sectarian allegiance and their discontent with the Sunni-dominated Baath regime.”¹¹²

The response of the Ba’th regime against the security problems and political demands of the ethnic and sectarian communities included violence, with some exceptions such as the autonomy given to the Kurds in 1970. The state violence was not only against the rebelling groups but also against the civilians and “the level of violence initiated and orchestrated by the state against its own citizens [was] one of the worst throughout the region.”¹¹³ The use of chemical weapons in Halabja, named al-Anfal, in March 1988 against the Kurdish population that resulted in the death of an estimated 4,000 people including women and children and the harsh suppression of the spontaneous Shiite uprising in Basra, Nasiriyya, Najaf and Karbala after the first Gulf War in March 1991 by using the Republican guards with a cost of an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 civilian casualties¹¹⁴, were the most brutal instances of the Ba’ath regime.

¹¹¹ Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p. 71.

¹¹² Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq.”

¹¹³ Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p. 71.

¹¹⁴ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, pp. 245, 256.

Besides the conflict between the state and its different ethnic and sectarian communities, the clash among the sub-groups of the Kurdish communities was another phenomenon during the Ba'ath and Saddam era. The most prominent example of this type of fight occurred between two Kurdish groups, KDP and the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK). In this respect, while the KDP was supported by Iran during the 1970s for its actions against the Iraqi government, the PUK cooperated with the Ba'ath government.¹¹⁵ Paradoxically, in 1996, during the fight between the two groups, the PUK was supported by Iran, while the KDP cooperated with Saddam Hussein,¹¹⁶ despite the al-Anfal campaign of 1988 mentioned above.

The first Gulf War was very decisive in terms of the current situation of the Iraqi population and its ethnic/sectarian factions. Particularly the establishment of the 'safe havens' just after the first Gulf War, including no-fly zones over the north of the 36th parallel and below the south of the 32nd parallel, which was extended to the 33rd parallel in 1996, as an effort to protect the Kurds and Shiites from a military campaign similar to al-Anfar in 1988¹¹⁷ and the UN sanctions that "meant that Iraq was unable to sell its oil to earn foreign currency and was severely limited as to what it could import"¹¹⁸ were two major incidents that shaped the current circumstances of ethnic and sectarian communities and national unity in Iraq. In this context, while the Kurdish groups enjoyed de-facto sovereignty as a result of the international restrictions on the Baghdad administration, and improved their political autonomy and paramilitary capacity, "the Shiite Arabs were not so lucky and continued to suffer the regime's oppression."¹¹⁹ On the other hand, the UN sanctions weakened the economic and social circumstances of the Iraqi middle class living in the large cities, particularly in Baghdad, representing 'an Iraqi national identity' in favor of the ethnic, religious/sectarian, tribal, or ideological sub-identities of the country.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p. 229.

¹¹⁶ Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p. 26.

¹¹⁷ Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane's Security Assessment-The Gulf States, November 16, 2004, p. 15. Available at <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/iraqs070....> accessed on 12/29/2004.

¹¹⁸ Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p. 261.

¹¹⁹ Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane's Security Assessment-The Gulf States, p. 16

¹²⁰ Kubba, "Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq," p. 69.

According to a common view, the fundamental reason for the Coalition Forces in the First Gulf War in 1991 not to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime was a general anxiety about the emergence of an authority vacuum and chaos environment in post-Saddam era in Iraq. Consequently, what emerged after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the second Gulf War was a similar portrait of Iraq with a more fragmented society with its ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, and ideological identities and political agendas.

4. Implications of History

A fortunate indicator from its 83-year history is that Iraq has not had an ethnic war. On the other hand, Iraqi society did not have a 'national identity' either. In this respect, the most significant historical experiences of Iraqi society, and its ethnic and sectarian factions that should be considered for the future security assessments and policies follow.

- Minority dominated governments, since the emergence of Iraq as a nation state in 1921, have been a source of instability. Other ethnic and sectarian communities could not have a chance to be represented in the key points of the governmental and bureaucratic (civil and military) positions;
- Tribal structure, family relations and elite relations have been more effective in the politics and institutions of Iraq than individuals. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss options for the entire population, even for the ordinary Sunni population, to compete for the key positions in government and bureaucracy;
- The Sunni Arab dominated regimes attempted to mobilize pan-Arabism instead of an Iraqi identity based on citizenship, despite the dissatisfaction of the other ethnic and sectarian groups, indeed including the Shiite Arab majorities;
- The Iraqi society was, and still is well-armed and the ethnic, sectarian and tribal structures have had militia forces. This portrait resulted in the revolts of either the Shiite Arabs or some of the other ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds and Assyrians, against the government in order to achieve their political or economic desires. However, each group had fractions within their own communities due to the political fragmentation and traditional social structure including tribes, family affiliations, or sub-sectarian formations, which was exploited by the governments via the temporary cooperation and alliances with these fractions for the maintenance of their authority;
- Shiites and Kurds share resentment of Sunni dominance, but political objectives differ. Shiite objectives were mostly related to the type of regime. The Kurds have generally a political agenda with the goal of

autonomy or independence. Kurd separatism threatened the territorial integrity of Iraq and resulted in the frictions with the other communities, particularly the Sunni Arabs and Turkmen, living in the same geographical area with the Kurds;

- Iraq has not had an ethnic war, but governments have used the military against the civilians. This includes use of overwhelming force and the use of chemical weapons, to suppress the political desires of the other ethnic or sectarian groups in all periods of modern Iraq.

D. ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN INFLUENCE ON RECONSTRUCTION

One of the main pre-war discussion topics was the possible reactions of different ethnic and sectarian communities to a U.S. led military campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime.¹²¹ In this respect, in the north, while the Kurds were considered a natural alliance based on a 12 year de-facto, the fundamental issue on the Turkmen population of the country was generally related to Turkey and the main intention was to ignore the Turkmen population despite their 9% (at least) population in Iraq according to the final results of the 1957 census and their demographic, social and economic position in the oil rich provinces of Kirkuk and Mosul. On the other hand, while there was a consensus that the Sunni Arabs would resist in the north-west, west, and Baghdad, the general thought about the possible reaction of the Shiite Arabs was that they would welcome a military campaign that would end a long period of repression.

Not surprisingly, the Kurdish groups, particularly paramilitary forces of KDP, led by Barzani, and the PUK, led by Talabani operated in cooperation with the U.S. forces in the north. In contrast to general expectations, "large segmentation of the population [with the exception of a small resistance in the south] remained neutral in the confrontation between the U.S.-led coalition and Saddam's defenders."¹²² Besides the neutrality of the population, the reluctance, and insufficiencies of the Iraqi military offered a quick victory to the Coalition Force. However, this quick victory paradoxically influenced the post-war era due to the sensitivities of the country and the inadequate preparedness of the Coalition Planners for these sensitivities, either to exploit or to oppose them. The multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian structure of the country, security problems based on this structure, and

¹²¹ Karen Guttieri, "Post-Conflict Iraq: Prospects and Problems," *Strategic Insights*, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Contemporary Conflict, February 20, 2003). Available at <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/feb03/middleEast3.asp> accessed on 2/2/2004.

¹²² Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p. v.

“its potential for communal and political violence”¹²³ emerged as the biggest threat for the reconstruction and stabilization of the country.

Despite the fact that multi-ethnic demography is not always a threat for the security and stability of a country, this idea is acceptable mostly for the countries that have a well institutionalized democratic structure with a population connecting to each other, with the concept of a civic nationalism. In this respect, historical tensions among the factions, the ethnic geography of a country, along with the national ideologies and the economic circumstances, including the share of economic resources (particularly crucial in Iraq), security concerns of ethnic and religious communities and their independent militia capacities, and the political agenda of each group and their elites are significant intervening variables as “the underlying causes of ethnic and internal conflicts.”¹²⁴

1. Ethnic Geography, National Identity and Secessionist Demands

The existence of the ethnic minorities in a country is a risk factor for stability and the possibility of an ethnic/internal conflict. On the other hand, geographic distribution of the ethnic/sectarian communities is another factor affecting the possibilities. In this respect, while “in some states with ethnic minorities, ethnic groups are intermingled; in others, minorities tend to live in separate provinces or regions of the country.”¹²⁵ Additionally, secessionist tendencies are more likely in countries where ethnic and sectarian factions are not intermingled geographically. It is another risk factor for the security and stability of a country that secessionist demands can result in “direct attacks on civilians, intense guerilla warfare, forced expulsion, and genocide.”¹²⁶ Furthermore, if there is a competition for the resources of the country that are existing in particular territories with mixed ethnic or sectarian population, as happened in Iraq, security problems are much more likely.

In terms of ethnic geography, Iraq has a both separate and intermingled demographic structure. In the south, the population is mostly Shiites with some small

¹²³ Kubba, “Domestic Politics in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” p. 70.

¹²⁴ Michael E. Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts,” in *Turbulent Peace*, Chester A. Crocker, ed. Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela All (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pp. 214-218.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 215.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

exceptions. In Baghdad, there is an intermingled population while the majority is Shiite Arabs. In western Iraq, particularly in the so-called Sunni triangle, the population is mostly Sunni Arabs, generally in tribal structure. On the other hand, the north-western part of the country is a composition of Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, and other Christian minorities. Finally, the majority of the population in the provinces of northern Iraq is the Kurds, in mostly tribal structure and including two main political groups in a political, economic and military competition before the war, and Turkmen and Assyrians.

The population of southern Iraq and the cities of Karbala and Najaf are mostly Shiites, ethnically with a majority of Arabs. Additionally, Karbala and Najaf are two significant religious centers of Shiite belief. As mentioned in the section of historical experiences, the Shiites did not have secessionist demands and actions in general, even during the Iran-Iraq war, despite the discrimination policies conducted by the Iraqi Sunni political elites since the emergence of Iraq under the British mandate in 1921. The Second Gulf War and the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime have offered an opportunity to the Shiites “to emerge as dominant in Iraqi politics.”¹²⁷ Moreover, territorial integrity of Iraq has been significant for both the Shiite and Sunni Arab communities since the emergence of Iraq in 1921. In this respect, the Shiite Arabs are most likely aware that a new state that will be constructed in southern Iraq will result in the loss of the holy cities of Kazimain and Samara, and the capital city, Baghdad, an important historical and political center with its Shiite population that constitute approximately half of the population of the city. Additionally, such a division will deprive the Shiites of the oil revenues of Kirkuk and Mosul provinces.¹²⁸ At this point, the surprising resistance in the initial stage of the War by some Iraqi Military units and militia groups against the Coalition Forces and the reluctance of the Shiites in the southern Iraq not to cooperate with the U.S.-led Coalition can be explained in two ways. First was their feeling that the U.S.-led Coalition betrayed them during the spontaneous uprising in 1991, which resulted in hundred of thousands of Shiites killed as a result of the military campaign of the Baghdad regime. The second was their skepticism about the

¹²⁷ Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p. 17.

¹²⁸ Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq,” p. 2.

long-term objectives of the United States and their abhorrence of “the idea of an Iraqi government installed by the United States to further America’s interests, just as the Sharifians were brought in by the British in 1921.”¹²⁹

While these are not secessionist intentions in the Shiite dominated areas of southern Iraq, the attacks targeting the civilians, the Shiite religious leadership, or the Shiite temples can ignite the counter-attacks against the minor Sunni population living in this part of the country, which will be able to result in a wider sectarian conflict. The recent attacks that occurred in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in December, just before the upcoming elections in January, and were reacted to with the warning of the Shiite leaders to be calm can be evaluated in this perspective that the aim of the attacks was to inflame the sectarian division by provoking the Shiites to respond with violence against the Sunnis.¹³⁰

Baghdad, contrary to southern Iraq, has an intermingled population in terms of ethnic and sectarian factions of the country. In this respect, the city is a risk area, particularly for a Sunni-Shiite clash. The deteriorating economic and social circumstances of the middle class residents of the city, the attacks to the religious and political leaders and temples of the Shiite and Sunni population in Baghdad, and such incidents in other cities, as mentioned above, which will result in clashes between these sectarian communities by provocations of extremists and terrorist organizations are the factors that will increase the possibility of a clash, particularly between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs.¹³¹ Emerging hostilities after these kinds of incidents can cause the conflict between the communities on a larger scale in the future.

The main concern of the Sunni Arab population in the post-war era is to maintain their social and economic benefits that they gained since 1921. In this respect, the

¹²⁹Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq,” p. 8.

¹³⁰ “Election Drives Attacks on Shia,” in *BBC News*, December 20, 2004. Available at http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4111363.stm accessed on 12/22/2004.

¹³¹ As an example of this kind of incident, a clash between the Sunnis and Shiites in the Hurriya area of western Baghdad, where the people lived together in harmony before, occurred on December 9, 2003. After the murder of three Sunnis in an explosion at the Ahbab al-Mustafa mosque as a result of a rocket attack by foreigners, the Shiites from the members of the Badr Brigades and Al-Dawa as claimed by the imam of the mosque, “disguised Sunni gunman claiming to belong to the ‘Khalid bin Walid Forces’ flooded the district and stormed a local Shia prayer house” according to Shiites blaming the Sunni Islamists for the incidents. For details see “Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane’s Security Assessment-The Gulf States,” p. 23.

incidents in the Sunni dominated provinces, particularly in the so-called Sunni triangle, occurred as insurgencies and terrorist acts against the U.S. forces, Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition Forces, and foreigners participating in the reconstruction and reintegration process. The former Ba'athists and outsiders, particularly the foreign Sunni terrorists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are the contributing factors that provoke and accelerate the violence in the Sunni areas.¹³²

The north and northeast of Iraq are the most problematic territories in Iraq in terms of ethnic geography, secessionist desires, and the possibility of an ethnic conflict. In this context, the Sunni Arabs are in favor of a unified Iraq. However, their main concern is about the loss of their power in the government and their social and economic privileges before the war. The Turkmen groups are also looking for a unified democratic Iraq in which they will be secure and their cultural rights will be protected. Their main concerns are the existence of an ethnic based authoritarian government that will restrict their cultural and political rights or the construction of an ethnic based federal structure, particularly under the rule of the Kurdish groups. In this respect, during the debates on the 'Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period,' Songul Chapouk, the Turcoman member of Iraq's Governing Council, stated that "Turcomans would declare their own 'Turkmanistan' if the Kurds looked like fulfilling their ambition."¹³³ On the other hand, the political agenda of the Kurdish groups includes their desires for the construction of an ethnic based federalism in Iraq, their territorial demand for the oil rich Kirkuk province, and their reluctance to disband their militia forces, namely peshmerga, which are in contradiction with the other ethnic groups, interim government, and even with the U.S.-led Coalition.

Despite the autonomy given by the Ba'ath government according to the 1970 agreement, the Kurds were in conflict with the Baghdad government. In addition to the policies conducted by the government, the demands of the Kurds to expand their autonomy, to keep the peshmerga under their control independently from the central government, and to take the Kirkuk province under the control of Kurdish groups were

¹³² "Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane's Security Assessment-The Gulf States," p. 6.

¹³³ Owen Bowcott and Brian Whitaker, "Trouble Looms After Coalition Tells Kurds Self Rule Can Stay," *The Guardian* (London), January 6, 2004, p. 17.

the main reasons for the clashes between the central government and the Kurdish groups. After the first Gulf War, the Kurds have enjoyed de-facto autonomy in the north under U.S. protection and strengthened their political circumstances and militia capacities. Even during this period, their political desire on the city of Kirkuk continued, and as a result of this political agenda, “the Kurdish parliament that met in late 2002 agreed that Kirkuk ... must be the capital of a common autonomous Kurdish region with virtual independence from Baghdad except in national Defense.”¹³⁴

Before and during the second Gulf war, the Kurdish Groups cooperated with the U.S.-led Coalition, and as a result of this cooperation, they have had the chance to hold critical positions in the interim government and bureaucracy in Iraq since the end of the war. Despite their cooperation with the CPA, the major problem of the Kurdish groups with the interim government, the other ethnic groups, and with the CPA is on the type of government for the future of Iraq. In this respect, despite the ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’¹³⁵ confirmed on March 8, 2004 and declarations of the United States and CPA officials, emphasizing their desire for a unified Iraq, the leaders of the Kurdish groups have continued to make announcements for a federal ethnic based structure. In fact, Mesud Barzani, the leader of KDP and a member of the ‘Transitional Governmental Council’ in Iraq before the interim government, declared that not only federalism but also independence is the right of Kurds in Iraq.¹³⁶ As a last attempt on this issue, the Kurdish groups gave the UN a written application stating their desire for an independent state in the north of Iraq.¹³⁷ At this point, a demand including a separatist movement or an ethnic based federal construction is a threat to the security and stability of Iraq, because the other ethnic groups have strong

¹³⁴ Marina Ottoway and Judith Yaphe, *Political Reconstruction in Iraq: A Reality Check*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, March 27, 2004), p. 2.

¹³⁵ According to 4th article of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, “the system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the regional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.”

¹³⁶ “Mesut Barzani: Bağımsızlık Hakkımız,” *e-kolay.net Haber*, March 16, 2004. Available at <http://www.e-kolay.net/haber/haber.asp?PID=64&HID=1&haberID=179420> accessed on 3/16/2004.

¹³⁷ “Bağımsız Kürt devleti için 1.7 milyon imza,” *Hurriyet Daily Newspaper*, December 23, 2004, Available at <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0.sid~1@w~3@tarikh~2004-12-23-m@nvid~514192,00.asp> accessed on 12/24/2004.

objections on this issue. In this respect, the representatives of the Arab and Turkmen population in the Kirkuk city council made a declaration indicating their concerns for the demands of the Kurdish groups for an ethnic based federal structure and emphasized that such an attempt can result in a civil war in Iraq.¹³⁸

Another issue emerging as a threat in northern and northeastern Iraq is related to the political agenda of the Kurdish groups mentioned above: their territorial demands on the Kirkuk provinces. Kirkuk is an oil-rich province of Iraq with its mixed population including the Arab, Turkmen, Kurd, and Assyrian communities. While there is no exact data on the proportion of the ethnic population of the city, “the last census considered reliable, done in 1957, showed a Turkmen majority in the city.”¹³⁹ The Kurdish groups “view the city as an essential part of a future Kurdish state, because of its oil-fields.”¹⁴⁰ In this respect, they fought with the Iraqi government in 1970s. One of the major incidents on the Kirkuk issue is that “under Saddam Hussein’s ‘arabisation’ policy, uncounted thousands of Kurds, Turcomans and other non-Arabs were driven out of Kirkuk to make way for mainly Shia Arabs brought up from the south.”¹⁴¹

At the end of the Second Gulf War, the Kurdish militias came into the city along with the U.S. forces and destroyed some records in Public Registration and deed offices. There were clashes between the Kurdish Peshmarga and the other ethnic groups in Kirkuk. After these incidents, Kurdish immigration was encouraged by the Kurdish groups to change the demographic structure of the city for a possible population census and an estimated 72,000 Kurds immigrated to the city. Additionally, it was reported that an intimidating policy has been started by the Kurdish groups, particularly against the Arab population of the city. On this issue, Major General John Batiste, the commander of the first U.S. infantry Division located in Kirkuk, emphasized that attempts to change the

¹³⁸ “Federasyon Talebi iç Savaş Çıkarır,” *e-kolay.net Haber*, December 27, 2003. Available at <http://www.e-kolay.net/haber/haber.asp?PID=64&HID=20&haberID=162553> accessed on 3/16/2004.

¹³⁹ Cameron W. Barr, “Kirkuk, a Mirror of Iraq’s Schisms,” *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), March 4, 2003, p. 6. Available at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=00000029386111&SrchMode=1&sid=3...> accessed on 11/26/2004.

¹⁴⁰ Bowcott and Whitaker, “Trouble Looms.”

¹⁴¹ Jim Muir, “Kurds Anxious over Iraq’s Future,” in *BBC News*, July 6, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3848587.stm accessed on 7/29/2004.

demographic structure of the city can result in long term instability.¹⁴² Despite the declarations of the U.S. officials that emphasize the situation in Kirkuk as a part of a unified Iraq, the Kurdish leaders stated their demands on the city. In this context, Mesud Barzani declared their desires in a speech with a covered threat: “We had the power to force people out of area. We avoided that ... but if things don’t go right, maybe things will get beyond our control and people will take matters in [to] their own hands.”¹⁴³ Eventually, it seems that Kirkuk, most probably together with Mosul, another oil rich area, in the north-west with an intermingled population, will be another risky area for a possible ethnic conflict amongst the ethnic communities and their militia capacities will increase the risk factor on this issue.

2. Security Concerns and Militia Capacities of Ethnic and Sectarian Communities

Ethnic and sectarian security concerns motivate each group to form their own defenses. This is particularly common in countries with limited security for its territorial borders,¹⁴⁴ as in Iraq today. Supporters of Saddam Hussein, comprising the core members of the Ba’ath regime, ‘local Sunni extremists,’ ‘Shiite extremists,’ ‘external terrorist groups,’ and ‘local criminals’ have been the major sources of the threat to security in Iraq.¹⁴⁵

As stated in U.N. reports, the security situation began to worsen after the bombings of the Jordanian Embassy and the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad and the assassination of an important Shiite leader, Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim, in a massive car bombing in the Shiite holy city of Najaf in August 2003.¹⁴⁶ After these incidents, the violence against the CPA, international organizations, Iraqis cooperating with the

¹⁴² “Kerkuk Kurtleşiyor,” *Hurriyet Daily Newspaper*, September 17, 2004, Available at <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~1@w~1@tarih~2004-09-17-m@nvid~469465,00.asp> accessed on 9/17/2004.

¹⁴³ Daniel Williams, “Iraqi Kurdish Leader Demands guarantees,” *The Washington Post*, January 18, 2004. Available at <http://www.nexis.com/research/documentdisplay? docnum...> accessed on 3/17/2004.

¹⁴⁴ Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts,” p. 215.

¹⁴⁵ Walter B. Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Reform ‘Under Fire,’” pp. 6-8. Available at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/e-publications/SSR_yearbook2004/Chapter10_Slocombe.pdf accessed on October 2004.

¹⁴⁶ The U.N. Resolution 1511, 16 October 2003. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf?OpenElement> accessed on September 2004.

coalition authority, international civilian aid groups, and contractors working for the CPA increased. Simultaneously, anti-Shiite violence escalated with bombings against the Shiites in the cities with a large Shiite population. These attacks and the emerging sectarian threat has been

more the product of a deeply rooted rivalry in the region [Middle East] than the direct result of recent developments in Iraq. In other words, the Shi'a revival and the decline in Sunni Power in Iraq ha[ve] not created Sunni militancy; it has invigorated and emboldened it.¹⁴⁷

Sunni Arab fear and disappointment of losing power provided recruitment for terrorist organizations and insurgencies, as understood from the Al-Zargawi's letter to Bin Ladin.¹⁴⁸ Severe insurgencies occurred in Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit (the so-called Sunni Triangle), and two uprisings have occurred in Najaf led by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.¹⁴⁹ Actions taken by the radical Shiite militias against the coalition forces increased in April 2004 particularly in the southern cities of Karbala, Kut, Nassiriyah, Kufa, Najaf, Basra, and in parts of Baghdad. Finally, the instability has expanded to the Kirkuk and Mosul areas where there are severe tensions amongst the population based on the ethnic composition and rich oil resources of these provinces.¹⁵⁰ Iraqis are the victims of these attacks and the worsening security conditions, but discouragingly they also became a part of it. In this respect, the number of the people participating in the attacks and insurgencies is estimated at 200,000, according to Iraq Intelligence Chief General Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Vali Nasr, "Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq," *The Washington Quarterly*, 27:3, (Summer 2004): p. 8. Available at http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer_nasr.pdf accessed on 21/12/2004.

¹⁴⁸ "Al-Zargawi's Letter to Bin Ladin on 'Difficulties' facing 'Mujahadin,'" FBIS Report (Iraq) in Iraq Reconstruction Report No.229, June 17, 2004, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ "Iraq Security Picture" in *BBC News online*, September 13, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3651856.stm accessed on September 2004.

¹⁵⁰ "Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues," Report to Congressional Committees, (Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office (GAO), June 2004), p. 47. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04902r.pdf> accessed on September 2004.

¹⁵¹ "Insurgent attacks kill 20 in Iraq," in *BBC News online*, January 3, 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4142329.stm accessed on 1/4/2005.

While the security situation deteriorated in Iraq in 2004, “the only bright spot was in the south where Shia unrest was quelled.”¹⁵² The main reason for this progress was that the Shiites expect to take power, for the first time in Iraq, via the upcoming election in January 2005. In this respect, even Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical young Shiite Cleric whose militias, namely ‘Mehdi Army,’ “staged [an] uprising in Baghdad and the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in March 2004,”¹⁵³ has indicated his intent for the establishment of a party for the national elections in January 2005.¹⁵⁴ While the upcoming elections are welcomed by the Shiites, it also has increased the tension, and the violence escalated in the last weeks of 2004, particularly in Baghdad, Najaf, Karbala, and Mosul. Eventually, “fears of civil war in ethnically divided Iraq have again been voiced after the twin attacks on Shia cities Karbala and Najaf”¹⁵⁵ on December 19, 2004, which resulted in at least 60 people killed and more than 120 wounded. While the main intention of the attacks was to provoke the Shiite population for a reaction including violence and to ignite a conflict between two sectarian communities of Iraq in order to ban the elections, the leaders of the Shiite community warned the people to be calm before the elections.

Tension and violence increased before the election in January, making ethnic and sectarian based militia groups attractive to provide a security guarantee for their communities. However, these militias have emerged as another threat, as a security dilemma, for the security of other communities, and security and stability of the country by creating distrustfulness among the ethnic and sectarian communities and by damaging the state authority in terms of the monopoly on the use of force in its territorial border. Almost all ethnic and sectarian groups have their own militias with an estimated number of 100,000. Of these militia groups, the larger ones are the Kurdish Pashmarga (almost 70,000 under the control of two Kurdish groups, PUK and KDP), the Badr Brigade, the militia force of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with 20-

¹⁵² Paul Reynolds, “Iraq 2004: What Went Wrong,” in *BBC News online*, January 1, 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4123889.stm accessed on 1/4/2005.

¹⁵³ Heather Sharp, “Who is Who in Iraq: Overview,” in *BBC News online*, June 17, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3771141.stm accessed on 6/29/2004.

¹⁵⁴ Nicholas Blanford, “Sadr Changes his Role,” *Christian Science Monitor* (US), in Iraq Reconstruction Report No. 229, (June 17, 2004): p. 51.

¹⁵⁵ “Election Drives Attacks on Shia.”

30,000 militias, although it was named as “the Badr Organization after coalition officials banned party militias in September 2003,”¹⁵⁶ and the militia force of Moqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army, “the first Shia militia to organize on the ground”¹⁵⁷ in the summer of 2003. After the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Sunni Arabs have started to establish their own militias in order to employ them in possible future problems with other groups.¹⁵⁸ In addition to these militia organizations, almost all of the other tribal and political factions of the country have their armed militias in order to provide security for their leaders or communities.¹⁵⁹

In the post-war era, the Kurdish Pashmargas, the Badr Brigade and some tribal militias cooperated with the Coalition Forces against the insurgencies and terrorist threat. In this respect, while “Badr Corps units have apparently resisted Sadr’s militia operations, some tribal units have been engaged to protect transmission lines and pipelines passing through their communal areas.”¹⁶⁰ However, they also posed a threat for the security of other groups and for the stabilization of the country. In this respect, the Mahdi Army, which is already declared illegal by the CPA, emerged as the main actor of the Sadr uprising in Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. Additionally, the Mahdi Army also was involved in ethnic cleansing, as occurred in Qawliyya, as stated by Larry Diamond:

On the night of March 12, [2004,] apparently in alliance with fighter from the other Shi’ite militias and with the local Diwaniyya police force, the Mahdi Army invaded the Gypsy town of Qawliyya, after a dispute over what Sadr’s forces alleged were morals violations by the town. After pumping round upon round of automatic rifle fire, mortars, and RPGs into Qawliyya, the Mahdi Army brought in bulldozers and literally leveled a town of some thousand people.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ “Who is Who in Iraq: Sciri,” in *BBC News online*, June 17, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3769991.stm accessed on 6/29/2004.

¹⁵⁷ Patric Jackson, “Who are Iraq’s Mehdi Army?” in *BBC online*, April 6, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3604393.stm accessed on 5/29/2004.

¹⁵⁸ Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p. 24.

¹⁵⁹ Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Reform ‘Under Fire,’” p. 16.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Larry Diamond, “Transition to Democracy in Iraq? Averting the Slide into Civil War,” Presentation to the Hoover Institution/Woodrow Wilson International Center Session on Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East, (April 6, 2004): pp. 6-7. Available at <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/mediastream/videoOndemand/PDF/Hoovertalk.pdf> accessed on September 2004.

While the Mahdi Army has already been declared illegal, it was not the only militia group involved in illegal violence. The militia groups of two Kurdish parties, KDP and PUK have been employed in an attempt at ethnic cleansing to alter the demographic situation in Kirkuk.¹⁶²

In these circumstances, the CPA started negotiations with the militia groups, except the Mahdi Army, “for their disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into the new Iraqi police and armed forces.”¹⁶³ Even though there was an agreement in June 2004 for the integration of a significant number of militias into the newly constructed security organizations, it also envisaged a large number of the Kurdish militias to be under the command of the Kurdish political organizations, which “could spark friction among Shiites and Sunnis wary that an armed Kurdish force could potentially push for independence.”¹⁶⁴ The agreement could not be put into practice yet, and the militia problem remained a potential problem before the elections in January 2005. At this point, even if the militias were transferred to newly formed security services, it is doubtful that they will be actually under the command and control of the state authority without the influence of their ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political ties. On the other hand, it is another issue that while some groups still have their militia capacities, whether the other communities, tribes, or political organizations will accept to dismantle their militias, or will not attempt to strengthen their capacities due to their security concerns. Additionally, when the power and influence of the Iraqi elites, including the tribal chiefs, religious and political leaders, is considered, it is another threat that they will attempt to use these militias to repress their political rivals in order to pursue the political agenda of their personal or communal interests. Consequently, the militia issue will be a major challenge for the security and stabilization of Iraq emanating from the ethnic, sectarian and tribal structure of the country.

¹⁶² Larry Diamond, “Transition to What in Iraq,” Talk to the Stanford Institute for International Studies, (May 11, 2004): p. 7. Available at http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Transition_to_what_in_iraq.htm accessed on 9/25/2004.

¹⁶³ Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2004, p. 41. Available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83505/larry-diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq.html> accessed on November 2004.

¹⁶⁴ Peter Y. Hong, “Iraqi Militias to Disband, Join Official Forces,” *Los Angeles Times*; Jun 8, 2004; p. A.6.

3. Political Agenda and Elites

After 24 years of tyranny, what type of regime will emerge in Iraq with its ethnic/sectarian diversities and their different political agendas for the future? In countries in which the ethnic, religious, or tribal factions “have ambitious objectives, strong senses of identity, and confrontational strategies,”¹⁶⁵ there is a great possibility of ethnic or political violence. The political demands of each community in conflict with the other communities will affect the security and stability of the country. Additionally, since the ethnic/religious/tribal ties are strong, the attitude of the powerful elites in each community, including religious, political, or tribal leaders will be crucial in the inter group politics of the country.

From the point of view of the Shiite community, the post-war era has offered them the opportunity to take power in Iraq for the first time. Despite different views about postwar strategies within the Shiite community, they are politically the most organized faction in Iraq. Additionally, because they constitute the majority, the Shiite Arabs and their leadership, particularly the Shiite clerics will be more prominent in shaping the future of Iraq. However, the influence of the Shiite clerics on Iraqi politics also means that the Shiite belief will be influential within the state structure, including the legislative, government, bureaucracy, security services, etc., which “will be welcomed by the Shi’a and not by Sunnis, underscoring rather than erasing sectarian ties.”¹⁶⁶ The growing Sunni militancy, particularly within the Sunni Arabs, as a result of their postwar anxieties and the provocations of outsider radical groups, will also inspire the hostilities, if a religious government model emerges with the supremacy of the Shiite belief in the country. At this point, maybe the most significant question emerging in the postwar era in terms of the future assessments and predictions in Iraq is that “will the newly energized Shi’ite majority seek an Islamic government modeled after Iran, or will its members agree to share power with other communities?”¹⁶⁷

Even though almost all the Shiite groups have the same idea for a unified Iraq for the future of the country, they have different views in terms of the type of government. In

¹⁶⁵ Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts,” p. 216.

¹⁶⁶ Nasr, “Regional Implications of Shi’a Revival in Iraq,” p. 17.

¹⁶⁷ Nakash, “The Shi’ites and the Future of Iraq.”

this respect, the differences are not only between the secular and religious groups, but also within the Shiite religious factions. Despite the fact that an Iran type regime constructed on the basis of Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of Jurist was not appropriated by the majority of the Iraqi Shiites, the terror policies of the Saddam Hussein regime contributed to the growth of the jurist idea within the Shiite population.¹⁶⁸ In this context, the conflict between the supporters of two different concepts, 'quietism,' which dictates that the Shiite religious leadership should be out of politics, mainly represented by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and 'activism,' the main supporters of which are SCIRI, al-Dawa party, and Sadr movement, has emerged as a source of tension in postwar Iraq. In addition to these different views between the supporters of two traditional approaches, there are also diversities within the activists, particularly in terms of the strategies conducted in postwar era. In this respect, while al-Dawa and SICIRI have participated in the Interim Governing Council established by the U.S.-led Coalition, the Sadr group clashed with the Coalition forces, and "Muqtada al-Sadr called in mid-July for the establishment of an alternative Iraqi government and army to compete with the U.S.-appointed body."¹⁶⁹ In this environment, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani emerged as the most reliable Shiite cleric with his moderate views that emphasizes the necessity of elections, the significance of the demobilization of all militias and "the need to respect other traditions."¹⁷⁰

While the Iraqi Shiites rise as the new power center of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs have not only fears about their political position in the future of Iraq with their sectarian anxiety, but they also are a diverse group in terms of their political representation. Additionally, "the blanket de-Ba'athification program carried out by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hit the Sunni Community disproportionately hard, creating a sense of victimization, communal guilt by association, and disentanglement."¹⁷¹ The

¹⁶⁸ Juan Cole, "The Iraqi Shiites, On the History of America's Would-Be Allies," *Boston Review*, (October/November 2003). Available at <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/cole.html> accessed on 11/28/2004.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Reynolds, "Iraq 2004: What Went Wrong."

¹⁷¹ "IRAQ: Sunni Community Seeks Credible Leader," *Global Strategic Analysis*, Oxford Analytica, (July 28, 2004): p. 1. Available at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=22&did=000000723937521&SrchMode=1&sid=...> accessed on 11/26/2004.

anxiety of the Sunni Arab community also provides the available conditions for the growing Sunni Militancy as a security and instability concern in postwar Iraq. In this context, the Sunni Arabs are attempting to strengthen their militia capacities. Additionally, it is also likely that they can “pay considerable attention to the sectarian composition of emerging national military and police institutions since these are the traditional instruments of Sunni Arab domination.”¹⁷²

The KDP and PUK, as the most prominent Kurdish groups, unified their political efforts in the postwar era. In this respect, they will look for, at least, the continuance of their de-facto autonomy with an expansion of their territories by inserting the Kirkuk Province. It seems that their demand will emerge as one of the discussion topics while writing the new constitution and shaping the future of Iraq. Such an attempt, along with a possible desire to be dominant through political or militia capacities can result in a clash between the two major Kurdish groups. As another ethnic community, the Turkmens will most probably look for an alliance with other factions, having similar opinions for the future of Iraq. It is most likely that they will spontaneously resist any attempt that will try to ban their political preferences.

The political, religious and tribal elites of each community in Iraq will play crucial roles in the pre and post election period of the country. The result of the elections will mostly reflect the choice of traditional elites. In this respect, the elites’ anxieties of losing power over their own communities can result in a resistance to the efforts to construct a democratic structure.¹⁷³ The alliance of the Sunni Arab elite, most likely from the core of the former Ba’athists, should be examined from this point. The elites of the other communities, particularly the possible losers of the national elections can indicate similar reactions in a post election period with the fears of losing their traditional authority on the basis of ethnic, religious and tribal connections. On the other hand, the possible winners can conduct a policy to dominate within the state structure, including

¹⁷² Terrill, *Nationalism, Sectarianism*, p.25.

¹⁷³ Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq, Challenges and Opportunities,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Summer 2003): p. 68.

the judicial and security services. Such an attempt can result in a conflict between the winners and losers, or the emergence of another authoritarian regime based on ethnic or sectarian connections.

There is a threat to the security and stability of the country in the post-election process that the groups who will not gain their political interests by means of elections can attempt to use other strategies including violence and the use of their militias. Furthermore, there is a risk that the boycott of the elections by the Sunni Arabs and exclusion of some of the population from the national elections on the basis of security concerns will not only enhance the friction and fragmentation within Iraqi Society, but also can increase secessionist demands. In this respect, the militia capacities of different factions and an Iraqi society as a well-armed population, even in the Saddam Hussein era, are a multiplying factor for a possible ethnic conflict and long term instability in Iraq. On the other hand, to be dominant in the security services, and particularly in the newly constructed military, will most probably be one of the main intentions of the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal groups with their ethnic nationalist or religious extremist views as a traditional way of seizing authority in the country.

E. CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that Iraq has not faced an ethnic conflict since its emergence in 1921, the Iraqi State and its institutions mostly failed to create and/or reflect an Iraqi identity that would be accepted by all the ethnic and sectarian factions of the country and that would offer equal circumstances and opportunities to participate in the state organizations on all levels. The major reasons for the failure of the nation building process within the Iraqi State after 1921 can be categorized as the divisive policies of the British colonialism; the anxieties of the ruling elites to maintain their authority and their reliance on the narrow social affiliations; unfitting ideologies that were not appropriated by the majority of the population; dual military formations and dependence on the militias to provide regime security; the failure or reluctance, in some respect, to break down traditional social structure and influence of powerful local leaders; security problems emerging as opposition to the central government and improper state responses mostly in the type of military campaigns that targeted not only rebellious but also civilians; and an un-institutionalized state organization based on personalities,

tribal/family/religious affiliations, and private loyalties. In this context, the lack of a cohesive identity in the country, its ethnic and sectarian factions and traditional tribal structure are some of the principal factors that will be influential in the security and stability concerns, and in the reconstructed security organizations.

Since the historical practice of a country in terms of ethnic conflict is significant, Iraq's history is an encouraging factor for future assessments. However, increasing tension between the ethnic and religious factions of the country is a risk factor that can result in a large-scale conflict, particularly by the provocations of the extremist groups and extraordinary demands of ethnic/religious factions, such as ethnic autonomy or separation from Iraq, or a rule of law based on the principles of a religious faction. From this perspective, some territories of Iraq need to be monitored specifically because of their ethnically and religiously mixed demographic structure and specific economic, politic, and religious positions. Additionally, the areas consisting of a majority and a small minority should be watched closely since such attacks will provoke the majority population towards a larger incident against the minority population, which will result in the massacre of an ethnic or sectarian community. These kinds of events can easily ignite an ethnic conflict on a larger scale.

Baghdad, with its intermingled population, is the most risky area for a massive conflict between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. Moreover, Baghdad has a specific position for its political and historical significance. Kirkuk and Mosul are other critical areas in terms of the possibility of an ethnic conflict on the basis of their cosmopolitan demography, rich oil resources, and territorial demands of the Kurdish groups, particularly on Kirkuk. The clashes that occurred in Mosul and Kirkuk between the ethnic communities in the past are an alarming factor on this issue.

Increasing tension and possible clashes between different groups can influence the effectiveness of the security forces. The tension between the communities can result in a clash within the security units including recruits from different communities. On the other hand, troops constituted from one community can support their own community in a conflict and can attempt to put illegal pressure on the other groups. Close ethnic, religious, tribal and family ties are a dominant factor that would influence the

performance of the security services, particularly on the basis of local assignments of recruits while serving in their hometowns. These factions can also attempt to be influential in the new constructed Iraqi Armed Forces. In this context, it is a possibility that some personnel of the armed forces would continue his/her loyalty to his/her ethnic/religious/tribal ties instead of their services. Additionally, the elites can attempt to influence the promotion, appointment or other systems for the benefit of their colleagues by enrolling in the security services by using their political power.

The militia capacities of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal or political groups constitute a security dilemma in Iraq. The exploitation of tribes and militia capacities of ethnic and religious parties to provide local security and recruitments for the security services will be another factor that can damage stabilization and reconstruction. These kinds of policies would strengthen the power of the influence of ethnic, religious and tribal structure and their elites to place political pressure over the government and bureaucracy. This can pose long term problems for an institutionalized state structure. Indeed, some militias have been employed by the CPA in the post-war era. As a result of this employment, they now pose a threat to the security of other communities and the legality of the government, and increase the risk of secessionist movements and ethnic conflict. Moreover, it is also a possibility that the leaders of ethnic and religious communities will have a tendency to use their militias as a means of pressure over the other parties to achieve their political agendas while shaping the future of Iraq in the post-election period. Therefore, to disband these groups or to transfer them into the new constructed security services has been a vital obligation for the long term stability of Iraq. At this point, there are three challenges emerging on this issue:

- The demand of the Kurdish groups to keep some of their militias under their command or the change of the name the 'Badr Brigade' to the 'Badr Organization' is in contradiction of the main principle for the legitimacy of the state, the monopoly of the use of force on its territory. Additionally, these kind of demands or attempts increase the worries of other groups for their own security;
- Disbanding the militias or transferring them into the state security services is not enough for the long term solution. To conduct available programs for the integration of disbanded militias into civil life, including providing a job or transferring them into the security services as individual, but not as a total unit is also significant. Additionally, it is also a phenomenon that

most of the militias transferred into the security services will most likely tend to maintain their loyalty to their former command structure;

- The third challenge on disarmament, demobilizing, or reintegration of the militia groups is about state capacity. It seems impossible for the emerging state structure with limited capacity to conduct and enforce this process. Therefore, it is inevitable that the militia problem be resolved by contributions from the international community.

Ethnic based nationalism and/or a religion based government model are not appropriate for the security and stability of Iraq with its multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian demographic structure. In this context:

- Historical tendencies of the Shiite population, as the majority community in Iraq, in favor of an 'Iraqi' identity instead of a pan-Arab nationalist view are an encouraging factor for the future assessments. On the other hand, a possible demand of the Kurdish groups for an ethnic based federalism or independence is a risk factor that can activate ethnic based nationalistic thoughts of other communities and result in an ethnic conflict;
- A secular state formation that will respect and guarantee the religious beliefs of each group and individual, and that will separate the government and bureaucracy from religion will be the key factor in Iraq, not only to provide the security and stability, but also to construct a working democracy with its institutions. At this point, the secular groups and religious leaders with moderate views, particularly Ayatollah al-Sistani with his 'quietist' idea and popularity within the Shiite population should be monitored and motivated by the international community as the key actors of post-election period;
- In the current portrait, the conditions of the Sunni Arabs are suitable for the provocations of the Sunni extremists. The exclusion of a population constituting approximately 20% of the society would result in a chaos and instability in the country and provide the available conditions for the radical organizations to expand their influence. Therefore, the Sunni Arab population should be encouraged to participate in the process and the newly established state institutions including the new Iraqi armed Forces and other security organizations, by getting rid of their fears and anxieties in the post-war era.

The groups, including the radical elements and extremists, that will not achieve their political objectives by negotiations will most probably attempt to dominate state institutions and particularly security services as a traditional instrument of the authority, and attempt to exploit these structures in order to pursue their goals. It is a possibility that such an occurrence will result in the emergence of another authoritarian regime, in a

religious form or dominated by an ethnic/sectarian minority that will result in long term instability. Such an incident can also cause a civil war that will create long-term hostilities among the ethnic and sectarian diversities of the country.

Deteriorating security conditions influence the daily life of Iraqis. Additionally, the security concerns damage the legitimacy and trustfulness of the government in favor of ethnic, religious, tribal authorities, and sometimes terrorist organizations, who fill the authority vacuum. In worsening security circumstances, elections have been evaluated as a hope for the future of Iraq. However, it also includes difficulties and threats for present security and instability. The results of the elections mostly reflect the decisions of the tribal, religious, and political elites, and ethnic or religious tendencies. Moreover, the main objective of the elections was to constitute an assembly that will decide the future of Iraq. Therefore, the post-election period will be more problematic because it will cause new disputes amongst the factions with different political agendas. Accordingly, a possible escalation in security problems and tension between different groups should be considered in this context. In such an environment, it is inevitable that the government will need powerful security organizations to assert state authority and provide security.

IV. SECURITY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POST-WAR ERA AND THE NEW IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Designation of an achievable 'end state' for stability operations in the post-war era is a significant step that will be decisive in the determination of the policies and strategies, in the mobilization of the resources (including international intervention), and in the assessment of progress in reconstruction and stabilization according to criteria that would be designated from the 'end state' perspective. There is not an end state officially declared by the U.S.-led Coalition. However, it can be interpreted from the statement of the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz that construction of a state structure that could provide security for Iraqis by themselves has been the foremost priority of the reconstruction efforts¹⁷⁴. It is also vital to evaluate the situation of the country in terms of state capacity (at least in providing basic functions, security and the monopoly of the use of force in its territorial borders, judicial authority, and the defense of its territorial integrity) in a realistic view in order to designate reachable objectives and a realizable 'end state.' From this point of view, Iraq in January 2005, just before the national elections, can be described as a collapsed state that is in danger of mass violence according to the definition of Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller:

A collapsing state is one that is losing physical control of its territory, forfeiting the authority to make collective decisions for the national population, lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and cannot interact in formal relations with other states as a fully functioning member of the international community.¹⁷⁵

Iraq had an election on January 30, 2005. However, this election has not provided an absolute solution. Moreover, it has been a new starting point for a period of severe discussions, power struggles and most likely a continuing of conflict. Indeed, this election has individually sparked a dispute on the basis of security circumstances of the elections, threats to the people by insurgents and extremist religious terrorist groups, abuses in registrations and polling, the Sunni boycott of voting, the shortages of international observers, and finally the legitimacy of the election and the Transitional

¹⁷⁴ "Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Prepared for the House Armed Services Committee," Washington, D.C., June 22, 2004, p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ Baker and Weller, "An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse," p. 10.

National Assembly that will be formed according to election results. Additionally, it has been a kind of competition amongst ethnic or religious factions of Iraq rather than a political competition amongst democratically organized political parties. Finally, the main objective of the elections was to elect a Transitional National Assembly that will decide a new 'interim government,' which will govern Iraq until the approval of the new constitution to be written by the Assembly.¹⁷⁶ In this context, it is apparent that the January 30th election is a starting point of a new era that will be more problematic than the pre-election period with totally different political agendas and fractional visions for the future of Iraq.

Iraq exercised the January 2005 election under the authority, at least officially, of the Iraqi Interim Government led by Ayad Allawi. Yet, it was a government without the necessary means to govern. It was declared before the elections that the Iraqi Government and its security forces would provide the security for the elections, certainly with the support of the Multinational Forces. However, it was a security environment of 127,000 Iraqi Security Forces with a questionable efficiency, a number of insurgents and terrorist groups estimated as 30,000 active fighters, as well as 200,000 active supporters. Moreover, there are 100,000 ethnic, religious, or party militias under the authority of their local leaders. In such an environment, the Allawi cabinet could not be seen as a sovereign government. It is obvious that its successor, which will be the third interim government of Iraq in the post-war era, will not initially have the necessary means in order to rule the Country, because the policies of the United States and U.K. led Coalition in the post-war era has failed in providing security and the construction of the necessary instruments to provide security for a sovereign Iraq.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the policies and decisions of the U.S.-led Coalition that influenced the security situation of the country. First, it examines the decision of the demobilization of the former Iraqi Military by focusing on the worsening security circumstances, the state's incapacity to provide security, the influence of this policy on the former soldiers and the population (particularly in the Sunni Arab

¹⁷⁶ Karen Guttieri, "Elections in Iraq: Managing Expectations," *Strategic Insights*, Volume IV, Issue 2, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Contemporary Conflict, February, 2005). Available at <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/feb03/middleEast3.asp> accessed on 2/2/2004.

Community), and the use of the militias in providing security in the post-war era and its occurring and possible long term challenges. Second, the chapter inspects the process of the reconstruction of the new security services, particularly the new Iraqi Military and Defense sector. In this respect, the chapter mainly looks over the process of the reconstruction of the new Iraqi security formations by inquiring into the effectiveness and shortages of the strategies, and the influence of ethnic/sectarian factions on this process.

A. OVER DE-BAATHIFICATION AND DISBANDING THE FORMER IRAQI MILITARY

One of the main assumptions made by U.S. officials in the planning phase of the Second Iran-Iraq war was that “large numbers of the Iraqi Army units and Iraqi police would welcome the U.S. military and would be in place to assist in the rebuilding of Iraq.”¹⁷⁷ However, Paul Bremer, the civil administrator of Iraq appointed by the Bush Administration, ordered the dismantling of the all military organizations of the regime, including the regular military services, in his May 23, 2003 decree.¹⁷⁸ This was a part of the de-Baathification policy of the United States that was started by Lt. General Garner (retired) who was in charge as the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority before Ambassador Bremer and signed the Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, ‘De-baathification of Iraqi Society,’ on May 16, 2003. The initial intention of Mr. Garner, as could be understood from the CPA Order Number 1, was to remove the senior members of the Ba’ath Party in high ranks and key positions, and the junior ones who served in repression policies of the regime as full members of the Ba’ath Party.

The first plan for the former Iraqi Military in the post-war era favored by Mr. Garner was “downsizing of the Iraqi Army and employing the dismissed army units on public works projects.”¹⁷⁹ However, Ambassador Bremer enlarged the de-Baathification program and disbanded the entire military organization of Iraq, without considering the affiliations between the regime and regular military services during the Saddam Hussein Government and without discussing the strategic results of such a decision for the future

¹⁷⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Mark D. Franklin, “Iraq Reconstruction: Time for a Plan,” *USAWC Strategy Research Project*, (Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, May 3, 2004), p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities,” the Coalition Provisional Authority, May 23, 2003. Available at <http://hiciraq.org/lite/CPA/CPAORD2.pdf> accessed on 09/03/2004.

¹⁷⁹ Franklin, “Iraq Reconstruction: Time for a Plan,” p. 6.

security concerns and state capacity of the country in post-war Iraq with the Iraqi political identities and civil society.¹⁸⁰ Additionally, it was declared that “any person holding the rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a Senior Party Member, provided that such persons may seek, under procedures to be prescribed, to establish to the satisfaction of the Administrator, that they were not a Senior Party Member.”¹⁸¹

The decision to disband the former Iraqi Military, particularly the regular military services other than security organizations of Saddam Hussein¹⁸² was questionable for the security issues of post war Iraq. Since the force structure of the United States and its coalition partners has not been proper and sufficient to provide security in the entire country and to achieve stabilization missions, this decision caused a security vacuum. Additionally, releasing the former Iraqi Military members without an effective disarmament and reintegration policy provided human sources and armaments for the insurgencies, radical organizations, and militia establishments of the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal diversities of the country.

1. Security Vacuum and Post-War Security Policies

The Second Gulf War can be examined in two parts in terms of the type of the military operations: major combat operations (that ended on May 1, 2003, at least officially) and military operations other than war (or stability operations). The first part of the war was accomplished with a decisive victory of the U.S.-led Coalition. One of the foremost innovative characteristics of the Second Gulf War was the successful use of the ‘Overmatching Power’ concept. In this context, while Baghdad was taken over by the Coalition Forces, the number of U.S. ground forces was just over 100,000, and this was, according to U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the result of “overmatching the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using these capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.”¹⁸³ Despite the fact that ‘overmatching power’ concept and the force structure

¹⁸⁰ “Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” International Crisis Group (ICG) Middle East Report No. 20, 23 December 2003, p. i and p. 4.

¹⁸¹ Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities,” p. 2.

¹⁸² The Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, or the paramilitaries such as Saddam Fedayeen or Ba’ath party Militia were some of these organizations constructed for the protection of the regime and Saddam Hussein.

¹⁸³ DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers, March 21, 2003, p. 13.

deployed on the basis of this concept worked well in the first part of the Second Gulf War, the force structure and number of the Coalition Forces has not been adequate in providing and maintaining the security in reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq. The force requirement of the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq for the stabilization of the country had been estimated in pre-war planning as an approximate number of half a million according to force structure and numbers that were deployed for the peace operations in Bosnia.¹⁸⁴ However, the number of the forces deployed by the U.S. was approximately 150,000, one third of this number, in the first days of the January 2005, as the largest number of the post-war stabilization and reconstruction period.¹⁸⁵ In this security environment, disbanding the entire security structure of the country with an exception of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) did not only create a security vacuum in the country, but also it provided human sources and public support for the resisting groups, insurgency provocateurs, and terrorist organizations existing in Iraq after the invasion. Even Jay Garner, the retired American general who headed the first occupation government in Iraq and started de-Baathification, “criticized his successor, L. Paul Bremer, for disbanding the Iraqi Army, which left a large number of Iraqis jobless at a time manpower was needed for rebuilding.”¹⁸⁶ Even though the CPA declared its intention to create a new security structure for Iraq, different means and methods were employed on the basis of increasing security requirements. In this context, the militia capacities of the ethnic, sectarian and tribal entities and the former Iraqi soldiers in a kind of paramilitary structure were utilized along with the operations of the Coalition Forces. However, these policies were also discussible in terms of their long-term challenges for the stabilization of the country.

One of the major impacts of disbanding the former Iraqi Military without any plan to integrate the former Iraqi soldiers was to provide available socio-economic and

¹⁸⁴ Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2004, pp. 34-35.

¹⁸⁵ Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Seeks Broad Review of Iraq Policy,” *The New York Times*, January 7, 2005. Available at <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1315880/posts> accessed on 1/7/2005.

¹⁸⁶ “Retired general: U.S Has Made major Mistakes in Iraq,” *News max.com Wires*, November 26, 2003. Available at <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/26/110100.shtml> accessed on September 20, 2004.

psychological circumstances for the emerging insurgencies, ethnic/sectarian/tribal militias and terrorist organizations in post-war Iraq to have human resources for recruitment, particularly in the Sunni Arab area. When the former Iraqi military was dismantled, “hundreds of thousands of former soldiers, most of whom had displayed no loyalty to the regime and many of whom were too young to have participated in the atrocities in which the army had played a part, found themselves without pay, future, and honor.”¹⁸⁷ This policy influenced not only the soldiers released from service, but also their families in a worsening post-war economic environment and provided a multitude of people to participate in or support the insurgencies and other radical movements threatening the security and stability of the country. Eventually, disbanding the former Iraqi Military created 450,000 newly un-employed, an estimated 100,000 of them being from the Sunni triangle, created a recruitment pool for the emerging insurgency groups and terrorist organizations. It is notable that this area has been one of the main places when the insurgents and attacks against the Coalition are concentrated. Disbanding the former Iraqi Military contributed to the emerging anxieties of the Sunni Arabs that they would be excluded politically in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. These rising concerns were exploited by the Sunni militancy appearing in Iraq in the post-war era. In this context, “of 10,000 unemployed former Iraqi Security service members, an estimated 2,000 of them, most especially those without any source of finance at all, are likely to be recruited by Islamic fundamentalist groups, like Ansar al-Islam.”¹⁸⁸

While all conscripts were demobilized from service by the decision of disbanding the military, the officer corps of the military was also eliminated from their military ranks. Furthermore, the officers in high ranks, namely colonel and above were banned from the participating in the newly constructed Iraqi security services, since they were delineated as senior members of the Ba’ath Party.¹⁸⁹ The elimination of the former Iraqi officers from their ranks and from the services was also influential, because this most probably has become one of the major reasons in the emerging ‘leadership problem’ of

¹⁸⁷“Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” p. i.

¹⁸⁸ “Iraqi Insurgency Groups,” *Global Security. org.*, July 13, 2004.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_insurgency.htm , September 20, 2004.

¹⁸⁹ “Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” p. 5.

the new Iraqi Military and other security organizations, which would be critical for the efficiency of the new security formations in the fight against insurgencies, terrorist activities, and other criminals.

a. *The Fallujah Brigade*

On the basis of worsening security circumstances and insufficiencies of the coalition forces in post-war security missions, the CPA utilized the former Iraqi military members and created, in some respect, its own militia forces. In this context, the so-called Fallujah Brigade was the first instance of such a formation. The Fallujah Brigade was formed by the CPA under the operational control of the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force by employing the former Iraqi Soldiers under the command of a former Iraqi Republican General. The main intention in the creation of the Fallujah brigade was stated by the United States competent authorities as “to have Iraqi security forces completely cooperative and cooperating with the coalition forces to provide security tasks and eventually to assume responsibility for security and stability throughout Iraq.”¹⁹⁰ While creating this formation, the U.S. military officials also expressed their ‘initial confidence’ for the Iraqi General who would command the Fallujah Brigade.

Considering particularly the time and location of the formation of the Fallujah Brigade, it is noticeable that the decision was a result of the operational necessities in a critical area with increasing insurgencies. However, it was in contradiction to the initial assertion of the CPA that was asserted while disbanding the former Iraqi Military services. At this point, it is controversial that the CPA preferred, or had to prefer to create a local militia structure, particularly by employing the former soldiers and officers of the Republican Guard Units, instead of the rehabilitation and reintegration of the former Iraqi Military (particularly regular military services in which almost all the population are represented) in a central and hierarchal chain of command under the control of the new Iraqi Government. The Fallujah Brigade was dismantled in September 2004 because of its inefficiency, reluctance of its members to fight against

¹⁹⁰ John D. Banusiewicz, “1st Marine Expeditionary Force Creating 'Fallujah Brigade,’” *on the web site of United States Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service*, WASHINGTON, April 30, 2004. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/n04302004_200404303.html accessed on 1/19/2005.

insurgencies and in fact, the cooperation of some members of the Brigade with insurgents. However, “its members [were] better armed, better equipped and better off, having received salaries and weapons from the Marines,”¹⁹¹ when the Fallujah Brigade was dissolved by the Coalition Forces. In sum, while the Fallujah Brigade was a result of the intention to provide security in one of the most problematic areas in post-war Iraq in terms of security, it was also the creation of “a new sectarian militia”¹⁹² in a country where the militias of ethnic, sectarian and tribal diversities have already posed grave problems for short term security and long term stability.

b. *The Exploitation of Ethnic/Sectarian Party Militias*

In the face of enhancing the security requirements of the post-war era, the U.S.-led Coalition also exploited the ethnic, sectarian or tribal militias with the concern of providing security. Iraq always had a huge militia capacity. Despite the fact that the estimated number of militia establishments with the country is approximately 100,000, this number should be re-evaluated when it is considered that Iraq had a well-armed society even during the period of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Moreover, the post-war era circumstances and disbanding of the Former Iraqi Military without conducting a disarmament policy has increased this capacity. In this context, whereas almost all ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political groups have their own militia formations, the most prominent militia groups in post-war Iraq have been **the Kurdish Peshmargas** with approximately 70,000 personnel under the control of two major Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, KDP and PUK; **the Badr Corps**, the militia wing of the SCIRI with an estimated number of 20,000-30,000, and **Al-Mahdi Army**, the militia of the Sadr Movement. Additionally, the militia of Iyad Allawi led Iraqi National Accord, Free Iraqi Forces (FIF), the militia of Ahmat Chalabi led Iraqi National Congress, the militia wing of al-Dawa Party, Turkoman Front militia, and Communist party militias have been other important militia establishments of post-war Iraq.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Alissa J. Rubin, “Dissolution of Brigade is Setback for Marines,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 11, 2004, Available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/091204B.shtml Accessed on 11/12/2004.

¹⁹² “Testimony of Larry Diamond to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Washington, D.C., May 19, 2004, p. 10. http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/Senate_testimony_051904.htm Accessed on 10/14/2004

The cooperation and alliance of the U.S.-led Coalition with some militia groups, particularly with the Kurdish Peshmarga and INC Militias, started before the war. The Kurdish Peshmarga groups of KDP and PUK operated together with the U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Brigade and U.S. Special Forces in the northern front. In the post-war era, the alliance with the Kurdish Peshmargas has continued increasingly. The United States led Coalition used the Kurdish Militias against insurgencies in Fallujah, Najaf and Sadr City. For instance, 2,000 Kurdish Peshmargas operated along side the Coalition Forces in Fallujah during the operations in November 2004.¹⁹⁴ Additionally, these groups “have been deployed in the provinces of Northern Iraq, particularly in the cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, Baqubah, and Tal Afar.”¹⁹⁵

A similar de facto contribution was made by Badr Corps and al-Dawa militias that clashed with Al-Mahdi Army. In this respect, “the U.S. military was forced to rely on the cooperation (or at least forbearance) of the SICIRI and Dawa militias to evict and defeat the Mahdi Army, and this sharply reduced the CPA’s leverage over them.”¹⁹⁶ In addition to party militias, some tribal militia units were involved in security missions such as the protection of transportation lines and pipelines in their local areas, as mentioned in Chapter III. Moreover, “the leaders of a number of southern tribes have been installed as new replacement governors and police chiefs in areas where they assisted the Coalition in opposing Sadr's uprising,”¹⁹⁷ as a result of the security policies of the U.S led Coalition that envisaged the employment of the local paramilitaries accompanied by the Coalition Forces until the security institutions of the central Iraqi government were ready to provide security in the country.

¹⁹³ “Security and Foreign Forces, Iraq,” Jane’s Security Assessment-The Gulf States, pp. 10-13. December 8, 2004. Available at <http://80www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfu/iraqs150.htm> accessed on 12/29/2004.

¹⁹⁴ Richard Sale, “Iraq Edges towards Civil War,” The Washington Times, United Press International, December 28, 2004. Available at <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20041225-085745-9627r.htm> accessed On 1/24/2005.

¹⁹⁵ Dr. George Friedman, “Iraq: Is a Kurdish-U.S. Alliance Inciting Insurgents?” The Braden Files, October 9, 2004. Available at <http://braden.weblogger.com/2004/10/09> accessed on 1/24/2005.

¹⁹⁶ Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” p. 41.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Knights, “Short-term stabilization in Iraq could have long-term costs,” Jane's Intelligence Review, June 01, 2004. Available at <http://80www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2004/jir00958.htm> accessed on 11/8/2004.

c. Construction of New Militia Structures: The Political Battalion

Besides the use of the militia capacities of different factions separately, the CPA also evolved a plan to construct a new type militia establishment that would be called the ‘counter-terrorism’ battalion in early December 2003 with the participation of approximately 750-800 militiamen from five political parties of Iraq, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), the Iraqi National Congress (INC), SCIRI, the Kurdistan Democrat Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The idea to create a new militia formation was opposed particularly by independent members of the Iraqi Governing Council their concerns being about the risk of a possible internal conflict in Iraq and the likely role and influence of the existing militias for and in such an incident.¹⁹⁸ It was another concern that the militiamen employed in this formation would continue their loyalties to their former organizations and leaders. There were also warnings asserting that the creation of “a force of party-based militias would only legitimize the existence of various militias around the country, which have the potential to turn Iraq into a Lebanon or Afghanistan.”¹⁹⁹

Despite the anxieties and opposition for the creation of a new type of militia formation by the participation of the ethnic or sectarian based political parties, it was observed that a paramilitary force called ‘the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion’ or ‘the political battalion’ was created within the structure of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,’ which was also a militia type security force constituted as a part of a new security structure of Iraq and recruited locally in the post-war era, and employed along with the Coalition Forces against insurgencies in Fallujah in April 2004. The Iraq’s 36th was a composition of the militias of five political parties, as first envisaged in 2003. At this point, three major challenges were scrutinized according to the Fallujah experiences. The first one was about the ineffectiveness of the battalion. It was announced that some militiamen mostly from the militias of SCIRI, INC, and INA refused to fight against insurgencies, The second challenge concerned the members of the Battalion who did not

¹⁹⁸ Internal Affairs, Iraq, Jane’s Security Assessment-The Gulf States, p. 15. November 16, 2004. Available at <http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/gulfsu/iraqs070....> accessed on 12/29/2004.

¹⁹⁹ Spencer Ackerman, “Action Report,” on the web site of *New Republic Online*, April 22, 2004. Available at <http://www.tnr.com/blog/iraqd?pid=1599> accessed on 11/16/2004.

obey the rules of engagement, which is more crucial in stability type operations conducted in areas with a high density of civilians. In this respect, it was asserted that “Kurdish members also ha[d] a reputation for brutality, and [for] shooting anyone in the field of fire,”²⁰⁰ which could, and in some respect, did enhance and ignite the hostilities between ethnic and sectarian communities.²⁰¹ As the third challenge, the battalion was formed within the structure of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. However, it was observed, and indeed stated by some military officials, that the members of the 36th battalion continued their loyalty to their former command chain and their ethnic, sectarian, or political leaders instead of the interim government of Iraq.²⁰² Moreover, this was also a problem of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps on the basis of its recruitment system. Consequently, not only the 36th Battalion, but also the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, was problematic in terms of their efficiency on duty and loyalty to the new Iraqi Government as militia formations.

The exploitation of the militia capacities of different factions was not the only occurrence in terms of the security concerns of post-war Iraq. Additionally, the ethnic, sectarian, tribal or political militias were employed by their communities and leaders in order to provide their local authority in a post-war environment with the lack of a powerful state authority after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. The militias have engaged in actions to provide security for their leaders and communities. For instance, SCIRI deployed its militias, Badr Corps, “to the streets to enforce security in Al-Najaf when the leader of the party, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was assassinated in August 2003.”²⁰³ However, the function of the militias has not been only defensive. The Al-Mahdi Army, indeed was declared illegal and involved in insurgencies, took over public buildings, attempted to control the schools and daily life of the people,

²⁰⁰ Noah Shactman, “Who are Iraq’s 36th?” *on the web site of Defense Tech.org*. Available at <http://www.defensetech.org/archives/001189.html> accessed on 11/16/2004.

²⁰¹ In order to assess these kinds of incidents in Iraq, it is also necessary to consider the ‘blood feud’ phenomenon, which is very common throughout all Iraqi society. From this perspective, it was reported by quoting an interview with an insurgent in Fallujah Who expressed his hostility against Kurds on the basis of his daughter’s murder by the 36th Battalion’s fire by saying “I will send my brother north to kill the Kurds.” For details see Ackerman, “Action Report.”

²⁰² Shactman, “Who are Iraq’s 36th?”

²⁰³ Charles Recknagel, “Iraq: Militia Members Could Have Role In Establishing Security,” *Radio Free Europe*, 2003. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/12/iraq-031205-rferl-174518.htm> accessed on 1/24/2005.

and in fact “set up illegal sharia courts, imposed their own brutal penalties, and generally made themselves a law unto themselves.”²⁰⁴ While the existence of some militia groups, such as Badr Corps or Dawa militias, has been kind of de facto in the post-war security environment, the Kurdish Peshmargas have been legitimized in some respect by the ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,’ approved on March 8, 2004. While the 27th Article of the Law makes all military and militia establishments illegal that are not under the control of the Iraqi Transitional Government, the exception stated in the same article gives the Kurdish groups the right of preservation and control over their own police forces and internal security formations. This has weakened the Iraqi Transitional Government’s control over these Kurdish Militias.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, this kind of legal arrangement has created de facto legitimacy for other ethnic or religious militias and has made the disarmament of militia capacities of other ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political factions much more difficult for the Iraqi Governments in the post-war era.

2. Assessment of the Post-War Security Policies

Disbanding the former Iraqi Military completely was one of the most discussed and criticized policy decisions of the CPA in post-war Iraq. Besides causing a security vacuum in a period with increasing security problems and providing human resources and armament for the insurgents, terrorist organizations, or militia groups of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political factions, the dismantlement of the former Iraqi Military also damaged the new Iraqi government’s (Iraqi Interim Government) ability to provide security and assert its authority over the entire country. This policy or expansion of de-Baathification in a broader view was seen by the Sunnis as the exclusion of Sunni Arabs from the process. This situation was also exploited by the radical groups or terrorist organizations, which have emerged or expanded in the post-war era, provoking the Sunni Arab population against the CPA and the Iraqi Interim Government.

²⁰⁴ Diamond, “Transition to Democracy in Iraq? Averting the Slide into Civil War.”

²⁰⁵ Article 27(b) Armed forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law. Article 54 (a) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues that fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as specified in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal government, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region. See for details the ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional period’ available at http://www.cesnur.org/2004/iraq_tal.htm.

Dissolving the former Iraqi Military also eradicated initial plans or expectations of the U.S. planners to provide security in the post-war era that assumed employment of some units of the former Iraqi Military, particularly from the regular military, after the rehabilitation and reintegration of them in a relatively short period and with relatively fewer resources when compared with the resources spent in the current process of the reconstruction of the security services in Iraq. In particular, it is apparent that most of the officer corps of the regular military, particularly the ranks from lieutenant to colonel, could have been employed by the new Iraqi Military and security services instead of insurgents, terrorist groups, or ethnic, sectarian or party militias. This would have solved the leadership problem of the new security forces in the field, as also stated by Larry Diamond:²⁰⁶

The CPA [and also the Iraqi Governments (transition and Interim) constructed in post-war era] lost the opportunity to reconstitute some portions of it to help restore order, and it left tens of thousands of armed soldiers and officers cut out of the new order and prime candidates for recruitment by the insurgency.

In an environment of deteriorating security conditions, the force structure of the U.S.-led Coalition has not been appropriate to achieve the stability missions. It was not only the quantity problem. The type of forces and tactics and doctrines used in stability operations were also problematic in providing security without hurting or at least reducing damage to the civilian population in urban areas. The tactics employed by the coalition forces, especially in urban areas with a high density population, such as helicopter and air assaults, have not only damaged the legitimacy of the Coalition Forces from the perspectives of most of the Iraqis, but also increased the support of the population for insurgencies and terrorist actions against the Coalition Forces and deprived the Coalition Partners of the support of local entities.

In facing intensive security problems, the Coalition Forces have had to rely on the existence of militias or they created new ethnic or sectarian militia formations, while the reconstruction process of the Iraqi security services continued. Even though the militias, particularly the Kurdish Peshmargas and INC militias (Free Iraqi Forces), were employed by the Coalition Forces, their use was expanded after the Fallujah insurgencies and

²⁰⁶ Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq," p. 44.

SADR uprisings in April 2004. The increasing tendency of the U.S.-led Coalition Forces in exploiting the militia capacities of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political fragmentations of Iraq was evaluated by Milt Bearden, former CIA chief of the Afghanistan operation, as a kind of ethnic playing card with a similar policy conducted by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.²⁰⁷ Consequently, the militia capacities of each group have become one of the main concerns of Iraq in terms of an ethnic or sectarian based civil war.

Besides enhancing the possible escalation of the hostilities amongst the factions of the country, the militia policy of the Coalition in Iraq makes providing state authority in the entire country more difficult. Dissolving the militia capacities of each group has been more problematic in an environment that creates a lack of confidence amongst the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or political communities of Iraq. In this environment, “the United States has returned sovereignty to a new government [Iraqi Interim Government headed by Iyaad Alawi] in Iraq, but power on the ground [has] remaine[d] in the hands of local and regional militia,”²⁰⁸ as contended in a report of the Washington Institute issued just after the hand over of the authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004.

B. THE NEW IRAQI SECURITY SERVICES

Even though the policies conducted by the U.S.-led Coalition do not confirm it, the main intention of the U.S. for the post-war era in Iraq was “to encourage and enable Iraqis to defend, guard and police Iraq for themselves,”²⁰⁹ according to Wolfowitz’s statement. This was an appropriate approach, but it required providing the necessary means for the post war Iraqi Government to have a state capacity that would ensure ‘sustainable security’ in a short period with less cost. This kind of a policy would also make the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis easier. However, it was difficult to create a state capacity in order to provide security and in order to assert the monopoly of the use of force in the entire country from the zero level. Therefore, it was essential to exploit some institutions of the former Iraqi regime or to employ their members in the new services. The Iraqi Military, particularly the regular military, was one of these institutions

²⁰⁷ Richard Sale, “Iraq Edges towards Civil War.”

²⁰⁸ “Report: Militias still control Iraq,” *World Tribune.com*, July 2, 2004. Available at http://216.26.163.62/2004/me_iraq_07_02.html accessed on 1/24/2005.

²⁰⁹ “Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,” p. 2.

pointed out by the military planners and scholars who are experts on the Middle East region and Iraq before the Second Gulf War. These include Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, who emphasized in a report issued by the U.S. Army War College just before the beginning of decisive operations of the second Gulf war, that “the United States should recognize that the Military is a national institution and one of the few forces for unity within the country.”²¹⁰ Dr. Crane and Dr. Terrill also proposed a mission matrix displaying the phases of post-war operations, a timetable, critical tasks that should be done in each phase and a possible proportional decrease in Coalition Forces in each phase of the post-war period.

According to the proposed timetable, the U.S.-led Coalition should have been in the third phase of ‘Building Institutions,’ just before the January 2005 elections, and should have been continuing the state security and military reorganization, if this proposal had been realized. Additionally, the size of the Coalition Forces should have been half of the initial force structure, if everything had occurred as intended.²¹¹ However, the post-war strategies did not realize prewar suggestions or assumptions. While the security circumstances were relatively encouraging just after the decisive operations in May 2003, the security situation began worsening in August 2003, three months later after the U.S. president George W. Bush declared that the major combat operations ended in Iraq. Moreover, the CPA dissolved the entire military, despite the initial planning assumptions and recommendations, via a decree issued on May 23, 2003, as mentioned in the second part of this chapter. By the same decree, the CPA announced its intention to construct “a new Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self defense capability for a free Iraq.”²¹² As a result of the U.S. strategy that aimed at the improvement of a state capacity for Iraq to provide security, the U.S.-led Coalition began the realization of strategy that envisaged the transition of security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Organizations in four stages:

²¹⁰ Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 29, 2003), p. 2.

²¹¹ Crane and Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions.”

²¹² “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003, p. 3.

(1) [A]n initial phase, called mutual support, where the multinational force establishes conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqis are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic over watch, where Iraqi Forces on a national level are capable of maintaining security environment against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the multinational force.²¹³


As a part of this strategy, the U.S.-led Coalition has started to develop the new security capacity of the country. In this context, the CPA started the reintegration and reorganization of the Iraqi Police Service, which was the only security institution that the CPA “decided to reform ..., rather than to rebuild it from scratch,”²¹⁴ and started the establishment of the new security services of Iraq comprising ‘the new Iraqi Army’ created by the CPA Order Number 22 issued on August 7, 2003; ‘Department of Border Enforcement’ created by the CPA Order Number 26 issued on August 24, 2003; ‘Iraqi Civil Defense Corps’ created by the CPA Order Number 28 issued on September 4, 2003; and ‘the Facilities Protection Service’ created by the CPA Order Number 27 issued on September 3, 2003. While these services were being created by the CPA, the only ministerial structure was the Ministry of Interior that had administrative control over some of these services, since the Ministry of Defense had been dissolved by the CPA Order Number 2 and was created by the CPA Order Number 67 on March 21, 2004,²¹⁵ interestingly seven months after the announcement of the construction of the new Iraqi Army. Moreover, the CPA created the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as a militia force by relying on local recruitment and interestingly kept this structure under its own control without connecting into the new Iraqi Military or Iraqi Police Service until April 2004. This section of Chapter IV will examine the new security structure of Iraq under two ministerial organizations, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, and the

²¹³ “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” Report to Congressional Committees, (United States General Accounting Office (GAO), June 2004), pp. 53-54. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04902r.pdf> accessed on 10/14/2004.

²¹⁴ “Security and Foreign Forces, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States,” November 8, 2004. Available at <http://www4.janes.com/K2.doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sentgulfisu.iraqs...> accessed on 11/27/2004.

²¹⁵ “Ministry of Defense,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67, March 21, 2004. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040321_CPAORD67_Ministry_of_Defence.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, separately by showing the structural changes and organizational transitions between these two ministries since the autumn of 2003.



1. After the transfer of the authority on June 28, 2004.
2. The Iraqi National Guard was disbanded in January 7, 2005, and integrated into the Iraqi Army.

Figure 1. Iraqi Security Services

1. The Security Services under the Control of the Ministry of Interior

In the initial stage of the establishment of the new security structure, the Ministry of Interior was the only ministerial organization of Iraq that had administrative, but not operational control, over three security services of the country: the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Department of Border Enforcement, and some elements of the Facilities Protection Service. Recently, additional units, the Civil Intervention Force, Special Police Commando Units, and Emergency Response Unit (ERU), have also been added as a reply to the emerging requirements of the worsening security conditions, growing insurgencies, and increasing terrorist attacks.

Among these, the new security services under the control of the Ministry of Defense, the IPS has been the largest security organization in Iraq, with the exception of the Facilities Protection Service, which can be considered in a different category. In this context, it has developed up to approximately 55,000 personnel readily available, trained

or on hand, in reply to planning objectives and a number of 135,000 was projected.²¹⁶ The main reason for the IPS achieving a relatively high number of recruitments in comparison to other security services recently created in the post-war era was that the CPA did not choose to dissolve it but to reform it, contrary to what happened to other institutions, in particular the military, in order to exploit it to “deal directly with the Iraqi population in a drive to enhance security, and take pressure off Coalition troops who were coming under guerilla-style attack in an ongoing low-intensity campaign.”²¹⁷

The recruitments for the IPA have been made locally. Even though the local recruitment was a result of the structure of the former Iraqi Police Service and the necessity of local personnel with the knowledge and experience on the local areas for the effectiveness of the security services, the local recruitments also caused a dilemma in terms of the effectiveness of the IPS by “making them susceptible to intimidation by insurgents in restive areas. [Such as] About 75% of the 4,000-person police force in Mosul fled an insurgent offensive in November 2004.”²¹⁸ In addition to the local recruitment, the training and equipment shortages have also appeared as severe obstacles to the effectiveness of the IPS. As an indicator of insufficient training, a report issued by the CPA displayed that “only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy training.”²¹⁹ One of the reasons for this failure in training has been the time limitations on the basis of the enhancing requirement of the CPS for the support of the Iraqi Security forces in the worsening security circumstances. In this context, while the initial intention

²¹⁶ There are several numbers about the planning objectives and current numbers of the new Iraqi Security Forces stated in several resources. However, these resources, indeed including the announcements of the U.S. officials, are in contradiction to each other. In this respect, while Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that the current number of the Iraqi Police Service on duty is 90,000 policemen (“Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Prepared for the House Armed Services Committee,” p. 9), this number was 44,836 (as trained/on hand) according to the statistics issued by the State Department’s Iraq Weekly Status Report on January 19, 2005. In order to realize a standardization in the number of the security services recently established in Iraq, the thesis will use the State Department’s statistics while mentioning about the number of the new security services required or trained/on hand. See “Iraq for Weekly Status Report” issued by the State Department on January 19, 2005. Available at http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/state_wklyrpt_011905.pdf accessed on January 29, 2005.

²¹⁷ “Security and Foreign Forces,” p. 1.

²¹⁸ Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post Saddam Governance,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, The Library Congress, updated December 22, 2004, p. 32. Available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/38004.pdf> accessed on 1/4/2005.

²¹⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Inexcusable Failure: Progress in Training the Iraqi Army and Security Forces as of Mid-July 2004*, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, July 20, 2004), p. 7. Available at http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf accessed on 10/12/2004.

was an eight-week training period for the IPS and some part of the IPS were and still are trained in academies in Iraq, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, a majority of the IPS personnel on duty was trained in a shortened program conducted in three weeks in the local areas according to a curriculum named the 'Transition Integration Program.' Another reason for the training failure of the IPS has been the dissimilarity between the training subjects and realities in the field. While the training program of the IPS recruitments included "basic police training in such subjects as basic human rights, firearms familiarization, patrol producers, and search methods,"²²⁰ it was not sufficient to provide essential skills for the IPS members in the fight against well-armed terrorists and insurgents in the urban area. In addition to training failure, there have been critical equipment problems in the IPS. As an instance of this indicating the level of equipment shortages in the IPA, on March 28, 2004, just before the beginning of the insurgencies in Fallujah and Najaf, the Iraqi Police Service had "41% of its required patrol vehicles, 63% of its required uniforms, 43 % of its required pistols, and 21% of its required hand radios."²²¹

In late June 2004, the second Iraqi Interim Government started to establish another police unit attached to the Iraqi Police Service, the Civil Intervention Force (CIF), which would be a three-battalion force with 4,920 and equipped with the light armored wheeled vehicles, in order to deploy against mass demonstrations, riots, and insurgencies. According to a report issued in September 2004, "the CIF had taken delivery of an estimated 50 ex-Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) BTR 94 8x8 Armoured personnel carriers."²²² The Civil Intervention Force has been organized as two sub-services, 'Public Order Battalions (POB)' and 'Special Police Regiments (SOR).' As stated by the program manager of the CIF, U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Greg Kleponis, the CIF would comprise nine POBs and two SPRs, and "most of the battalions [would] be recruited from the areas where they [would] be assigned."²²³ . In this respect, the first

²²⁰ "Rebuilding Iraq," p. 56.

²²¹ Cordesman, *Inexcusable Failure*, p. 10.

²²² "Security and Foreign Forces, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-The Gulf States."

²²³ "Security: Iraq's Public Order Battalions begin training," *Portal Iraq web site*, October 6, 2004. Available at <http://www.poratliraq.com/shownews.php?id=551> accessed on 11/30/2004.

recruitments for the POBs were made in October 2004. As to the final number, the CIF has developed approximately 2,900 by January 19, 2005 according to the statistics of the U.S. State Department.

The Emergency Response Unit, also attached to the Iraqi Police Service, has been another police force under the supervision of the MoI. The establishment of the Emergency Response Unit was started in June 2004 with the intention of creating a special unit similar to American Police SWAT teams in order to “provide a national, high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high risk search, arrest, hostage rescue, and crisis response operations.”²²⁴ The personnel of this unit were preferred among the candidates that completed the standard eight-week basic training course or three-week transition integration program and were trained by the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team. As to the 270 required, the number of the Emergency Response Unit has increased to 205 by January 2005.²²⁵

The Department of Border Enforcement was established as another department of the Ministry of Defense to “monitor and control the movement of persons and goods to, from and across the borders of Iraq.”²²⁶ The number of Border Enforcement Troops has developed to approximately 15,000 whereas 28,630 are required.²²⁷ The effectiveness of the Border Enforcement Units has been problematic as has occurred in the IPS. In this respect, the local recruitment has been a major factor for the poor performance of this service. It has been observed that the personnel having been recruited from the local tribes or families condoned illegal transition from the borders because of their loyalty to tribal or family affiliations, particularly at the Iraq-Syrian and Iraq-Saudi Arabia borders. Indeed, it was seen in some incidents that some personnel of these units directly

²²⁴ “Iraq’s Elite Emergency Response Unit Sends Second Group to Training,” House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2004. Available at <http://www.house.gov/hasc/GoodNews/emergencyresponseteam.html> accessed on 1/29/2005.

²²⁵ “Iraq for Weekly Status Report,” p. 5.

²²⁶ “Creation of the Department of Border Enforcement,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 26, August 24, 2003, p.1. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030824_CPAORD_26_Creation_of_the_Dept_of_Border_Enforcement.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

²²⁷ “Iraq for Weekly Status Report,” p. 5.

participated in illegal incidents, such as smuggling.²²⁸ Eventually, even though a department was created with the monitoring responsibility of the borders, the leaking borders of Iraq have been problematic in terms of illegal transitions, including terrorists and other criminals.

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) was established by the CPA on September 4, 2003 to maintain the security of the office and properties of the ministries and other governmental organization and strategic infrastructure of the government, such as pipelines, oil fields, electric pylons, etc. In reality, the FPS has been under the supervision of individual ministries and governmental organizations. The reason to examine this service in the section of the Ministry of Interior is that the MoI has been the authorized and responsible ministerial organization in describing and issuing the standards in training, uniform, equipment, etc. for “all members of the FPS whether contracted or employed directly by the governmental agency.”²²⁹ While the initial number was 14,500 in December 2003, the number in this service is 74,000, as planned in the beginning, with mostly tribal based employment in local areas by June 2004.²³⁰

2. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (The Iraqi National Guard)

Almost along with the creation order of the new Iraqi Army, the CPA declared construction of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as a new security service on September 3, 2003. It was established as a temporary formation and dramatically was not connected to either the Iraqi Police Service or the new Iraqi Army. Instead, it was announced that it would be under the direct authority of the CPA and operate under the supervision of the Coalition Forces. It was also announced that it would not exercise internal law enforcement functions. However, it was apparently a domestic security service as seen from its task areas described by the CPA Order Number 28, it was

²²⁸ Barak A. Salmoni, “Iraq’s Unready Security Forces: An Interim Assessment,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No.3, September 2004, p. 14.

²²⁹ “Establishment of the Facilities Protection Service,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 27, September 4, 2003, p. 2. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030904_CPAORD_27_Establishment_of_the_Facilities_Protection_Svc.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

²³⁰ Salmoni, “Iraq’s Unready Security Forces,” p. 12.

inevitable for the ICDC not to engage in domestic law enforcement missions.²³¹ Additionally, it was a kind of militia force, which could be turned into a dual military formation because of its separate structure from the police and Military.

The numbers of the ICDC developed rapidly when compared to other security services, and particularly the new Iraqi Military. While the initial number of the ICDC units was approximately 15,000, including the Political Battalion with its 800 members mentioned in the second part of this chapter, this number developed to 32,000 during the severe uprisings in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbala. This was a natural result of local and tribal based recruitment and employment of the militia capacities of ethnic or religious parties. However, this kind of expansion resulted in quantity and efficiency problems. Furthermore, the loyalty of these troops to their former ethnic/religious/tribal command chain was problematic in terms of both their effectiveness on duty and long term challenges of this loyalty for the future of Iraqi State. It also caused exclusion of some ethnic/religious groups in participation in the ICDC units, particularly in Sunni Arab areas. Ultimately, the ICDC Units were employed in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbala during the April 2004 uprisings and gave a poor performance against insurgents. One of the main reasons for the poor performance of the new established ICDC units was the pressure of the local insurgents on the soldiers and officers of the ICDC troops, and their families, ²³² along with insufficiencies in training, equipment, and leadership. In this context, while the intention to exploit recruiters with their knowledge about the local area and its residents seemed a proper policy, the CPA officials ignored the significance and likely influence of traditional ethnic, religious, and tribal connections on these militia forces.

²³¹ The tasks of the ICDC was defined in the first section of the CPA Order Number 28 (Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps) issued on September 3, 2003. According to this decree, the main tasks of the ICDC would consist of the following task areas: "patrolling urban and rural areas; conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; providing crowd and riot control; disaster response services; search and rescue services; providing support to humanitarian missions and disaster recover operations including transportation services; conducting joint patrols with Coalition Forces; and participating in other activities designed to build positive relationships between the Iraqi people and Coalition authorities including serving as community liaisons." See Creation of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps," Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28, September 3, 2003. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030903_CPAORD_28_Est_of_the_Iraqi_Civil_Defense_Corps.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

²³² Salmoni, "Iraq's Unready Security Forces," p. 19.

After the Fallujah uprising, the CPA transferred the ICDC under the authority of the new established Iraqi MoD and it became an element of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Despite this organizational change, the CPA kept the ICDC under its operational control together with the other services. Its recruitment system did not change. Moreover, the exploitation of indigenous troops by the Coalition Forces increased. The employment of the local elements, mostly from the Kurds, by the American 101st Airborne Division for operations in the summer of 2004 was a remarkable instance of the deployment of ethnically formed units.²³³ It is remarkable that the security problems in the northwest, particularly in the area of Mosul became more problematic after this cooperation and deployment. Additionally, the Iraqi National Guard troops have been primary targets of the insurgents and terrorist attacks. While the shortages in training, equipment, and discipline of these units was a main reason for the increasing attacks and casualties of the Iraqi National Guard Units, the ethnic friction and the rising hostilities against these units, particularly against their offensive approach to the other ethnic, religious, or tribal factions, was another reason for these attacks.

After the transfer of the authority from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi changed its name to the ‘Iraqi National Guard’ and declared that the improvement of the capacity of the Iraqi National Guard would be one of the priorities of the new Interim Government in the development of the Iraqi Security Services. However, the Iraqi Interim Government dissolved the Iraqi National Guard by incorporating it into the regular Iraqi Army as the last reorganization within the Iraqi Armed Forces before the national election in January 2005, on January 7, 2005. The official reason for disbanding the ING and integrating it into the regular Army was announced as “to ensure unity of command and effort to meet the security challenges [Iraq] currently face[d]”²³⁴ by Iraqi General Babakir Al Zibari, the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Even this was an acceptable and proper reason for the integration of the ING into the Iraqi Regular Army. Another reason was most likely the increasing casualties of the ING units because they were ill-disciplined paramilitary forces with

²³³ Salmoni, “Iraq’s Unready Security Forces,” p. 16.

²³⁴ “Iraqi Army Day Celebrates Service, Honors Sacrifice,” *on the Website of U.S. Department of Defense*, January 10, 2005. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2005/n01102005_2005011003.html accessed on 2/1/2005.

insufficient training.²³⁵ It is notable that after the decision of the abolition of the ING and the integration of its units into the regular Iraqi Army, the resignation of soldiers from the ING has increased suddenly in comparison to other previous desertions.

3. The New Iraqi Military and the Ministry of Defense Establishment

The Ministry of Defense structure of the Former Iraqi regime was dissolved along with all its entities on May 23, 2003 by the CPA as a result of the de-Baathification policy, as mentioned in the second part of this chapter. By the same decree, the CPA announced its intention to construct “a new Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self defense capability for a free Iraq.”²³⁶ The main intention of the Coalition planners was to construct a national institution that would mobilize national unity in Iraq.²³⁷ As a consequence of this intention, the CPA started the construction process of the new Iraqi Army under the administrative and operational authority of the CPA without establishing a new Ministry of Defense organization. In order to fill the administrative gap of the lack of a national ministerial institution, the Defense Support Agency was established under the authority of the CPA for the administrative and logistical support of the New Iraqi Army on September 19, 2004.²³⁸ The new Iraqi Ministry of Defense was established by the CPA Order number 67 on March 21, 2004, seven months after the creation of the new Iraqi Army, “to operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Administrator of the CPA”²³⁹ until the transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Army was renamed as ‘the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF)’ and the IAF, together with the Defense Support Agency were transferred to the administrative control of the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense. As the next step, the ‘Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was created with 45 battalions and 40,000 soldiers as a temporary institution to provide security and “to

²³⁵ “Iraq to Dissolve National Guard,” *BBC News Online*, December 29, 2004. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4133039.stm accessed on 1/9/2005.

²³⁶ “Dissolution of Entities,” p. 3.

²³⁷ Rod Nordland and Christopher Dickey, “Tribe versus Tribe” *Newsweek*, January 24, 2005. Available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6831675/site/newsweek> accessed on 2/2/2005.

²³⁸ “Creation of Defense Support Agency,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 42, September 19, 2003. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030923_CPAORD42.pdf accessed on 8/14/2004.

²³⁹ “Ministry of Defense,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67, March 21, 2004. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040321_CPAORD67_Ministry_of_Defence.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

perform operations that exceed the capacity of police,”²⁴⁰ all were transferred to the Ministry of Defense on April 22, 2004 as a part of the IAF, Consequently, the MoD of post-war Iraq has comprised the Iraqi Armed Forces consisting of Army, Air Force, Coastal Defense Force, the Iraqi National Guard (the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps with its first name), the Military Special Operations Force and the Intervention Force.

The construction of the new Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) began in August 2003 with CPA Order Number 22 for the creation of the new Iraqi Army.²⁴¹ According to initial planning objectives, the main intention of the CPA was to create a small force, particularly when compared to the former Iraqi Military, comprising 27 light infantry battalions organized as nine brigades and three divisions, “a small coastal defense force, and a small air transport unit-totaling something like 35-40,000 personnel.”²⁴² While the creation of the new Iraqi Army was announced in August 2003, the recruitment process already began in July 2003 in four principle cities of the country, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Erbil. According to initial planning objectives announced by the CPA, the construction of the new Iraqi Army would take two years. However, this period was shortened to one year. In this respect, while the initial plan for the training period of the new recruits was eight weeks, this was reduced to three weeks by relying on an assumption that the personnel joining the new Iraqi Military would be mostly from soldiers of the former Iraqi Military with basic military training and experience.

The training of the new Iraqi Army began in September 2003 under the supervision of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) at the Kirkush Military Base located 70 miles west of Baghdad. The first Iraqi Army Battalion accomplishing its training process in October 2003 was deployed in Kirkuk under the operational control of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division Mechanized. The 2nd battalion trained by the CMATT was based at Taji after the completion of its training period in early

²⁴⁰ “Creation of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,” p. 2.

²⁴¹ “Creation of the New Iraqi Army,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22, August 07, 2003. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

²⁴² Walter B Slocombe, “Iraq's Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform 'Under Fire,’” eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Transaction Publishers, 2004, p. 242.

January 2004. The 3rd battalion completed its training process in late January 2004 and was employed in the Mosul Area.²⁴³ The initial problems appeared during the training period of the 1st Battalion. More than half of the Battalion Personnel abandoned their unit because of “low pay, inadequate training, faulty equipment, ethnic tensions and other concerns”²⁴⁴ as stated by the Coalition Military officials.

One of the main reasons for the resignation of the recruits from the new Iraqi Army was the problems in personal matters. Low salary was one of these problem areas. The average salaries of soldiers in the new Iraqi Army were lower than police officers. In fact, the salary of a private enrolled into the new Iraqi Army was “about half the amount paid to the people who fill sandbags around the Baghdad headquarters of the U.S. led occupation authority”²⁴⁵ according to the Coalition military officials in charge of the training of the new Iraqi Army. Another issue that caused displeasure among the recruits, particularly the officers of the former Iraqi Military joining the new Iraqi Army, was that all candidates were enrolled as mere soldiers to be promoted according to their performance during the training period. This recruitment policy motivated possible human resources negatively, particularly the former officers, who joined the new Iraqi Army.²⁴⁶

The tension among the soldiers from different ethnic and sectarian communities was another factor contributing to the resignations and initial poor performance of the new Iraqi Army. In the planning phase of the construction of the new Iraqi Army, the Coalition planners envisaged creating a force architecture comprising personnel from all ethnic and sectarian varieties of Iraq. Most likely, and also appropriately, the main reason for such an intention was to create an institution that would symbolize an Iraqi identity comprising the entire sub-identities of the country. In this respect, the 1st battalion was formed according to this principle and included personnel from all ethnic and sectarian

²⁴³ “New Iraqi Army (NIA),” *Global Security Org. Website*. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/nia.htm> accessed on 4/18/2004.

²⁴⁴ “Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Recruits Abandon Iraqi Army,” *The Washington Post*, December 13, 2003, p. A01. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A60899-2003Dec12?language=printer> accessed on 11/10/2004.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ “Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” p. 15.

communities. However, “about 100 Kurds quit in the first few weeks of training after their tribal leaders objected to the battalion’s ethnic mixture.”²⁴⁷ The opposition from the ethnic/sectarian/tribal chiefs for ethnic or religiously intermingled Army troop compositions was, and still is an obvious indicator of the possible future attempts of the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal structures and particularly the leaders of these structures. As could be easily observed in this case, their aspiration for the construction of the Army (or other security services) troops as ethnically or religiously separate units is to be able penetrate and influence these institutions of the new Iraqi State and particularly the new Iraqi security and defense formations in order to exercise their authority over the communities.

Despite the ethnic tension emerging amongst the personnel of the new Iraqi Army Battalions, the idea to form intermingled units was an appropriate approach when the long term interests of Iraq and Iraqi society was considered. However, the main mistake at this point resulted from the methods used in the recruitment process. One of the primary principles in CPA order number 22 that created the new Iraqi Army was that the new Iraqi Military would not be involved in domestic politics. However, by making a crucial mistake that would result in another type of polarization and politicization, the CPA relied on the candidate lists formed or controlled by the local authorities in the recruitment process. As a result of this process, the loyalties of the new recruits to the Iraqi State have been doubtful. As an instance of this kind of debate, some Iraqis drew attention to the declarations of some Kurdish leaders affirming these debates:

...one should follow the principle of each one on his own territory. No Arab soldier should be assigned to Kurdistan [northern Iraq] and no Kurdish soldier should be assigned to the Arab regions. Soldiers from Ramadi [a Sunni Arab region to the west of Baghdad] ought to patrol the border with the Saudi Arabia. And the North is too cold for Arab soldiers.²⁴⁸

According to the first declaration of the CPA, the missions of the New Iraqi Army would be limited to national defense and internal relief operations and would not include

²⁴⁷ Cha, “Recruits Abandon Iraqi Army.”

²⁴⁸ “Iraq: Building a New Security Structure,” p. 15. From an interview of International Crisis Group (ICG) with Adel Murad, a member of the PUK political bureau, made in Baghdad, on September 11, 2003.

internal law enforcement functions.²⁴⁹ Despite this initial intention, as a consequence of the insufficiencies of the Coalition Forces against deteriorating security problems, “recently formed army units have been deployed domestically”²⁵⁰ along with the Coalition Forces and other Iraqi security services, the IPS and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). However, initial performance of the New Iraqi Army, and also other Iraqi Security Units was poor and discouraging. In this respect, the 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi Army, having been based at Taji, refused to fight during the Fallujah uprising in April 2004 against the insurgents. As stated by the U.S. DOD officials, besides the weak leadership, insufficient equipment and poor training, “the belief of the soldiers, reinforced by briefings during their training, they would never be used as an internal security force”²⁵¹ was a significant contributing factor for their shocking performance.

Coinciding with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense on March 2004, the new Iraqi Army was transferred to the administrative control of the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense and renamed “the Iraqi Armed Forces. After that, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was under the authority of the CPA, was transferred to the Ministry of Defense supervision and became a part of the Iraqi Armed Forces.²⁵² After the transfer of the power of the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June 28, 2004, the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Armed Forces were transferred to the authority of the new Iraqi Interim Government by the last order of the CPA issued on June 28, 2004. CPA Order Number 22 that declared the construction and principles of the New Iraqi Armed Forces

²⁴⁹ “The mission of the New Iraqi Army and of the national defense forces generally is the military defense of the nation, including defense of national territory and the military protection of the security of critical installations, facilities, and infrastructure, lines of the communication and supply, and population. The tasks of the New Iraqi Army and of additional units of the national defense forces of Iraq include developing a military capability during the period of the authority of the CPA in order to provide the basis for military effective, professional, and non-political armed forces for the military defense of the nation after the conclusion of the CPA’s tenure. The New Iraqi Army shall not have, or exercise domestic law enforcement functions, nor intervene in the domestic political affairs of the nation. Tasks of the New Iraqi Army will also include participation in domestic relief operations associated with natural or man-made disasters and humanitarian relief missions. See “Creation of the New Iraqi Army, Section 3: The Mission and Command Structure of the New Iraqi Army,” p. 3.

²⁵⁰ Salmoni, “Iraq’s Unready Security Forces,” p. 12.

²⁵¹ “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” p. 58.

²⁵² “Transfer of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps to the Ministry of Defense,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 67, April 22, 2004. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040425_CPAORD_73_Transfer_of_the_Iraqi_Civil_Defences_Corps_to_the_Ministry_of_Defence.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

preventing it from involving itself in domestic law enforcement functions was revised as “[e]xcept as authorized by orders or regulations of the Iraqi Interim Government as well as duly promulgated legislation or regulations of any subsequent Iraqi government, the Iraqi Armed Forces shall not have, or exercise, domestic law enforcement functions.”²⁵³

Just before the handover of sovereignty from the CPA, Ayad Allawi, the Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government on June 28, 2004, declared their desire to utilize the Iraqi Armed Forces for providing internal security on the basis of the worsening security circumstances threatening the stability of the country.²⁵⁴ In July 2004, after the transfer of the authority, the new Iraqi Interim Government started the establishment of the Iraqi Intervention Force (an army branch of three brigades with 6,360 planned personnel for the missions of fighting against insurgencies and terrorists particularly in urban areas)²⁵⁵ and the Military Special Operations Force (comprising the Military counter-terrorist force with 764 personnel and the commando battalion with 829 personnel) to deploy against the most elusive terrorists by the MoI according to the authorization of the Ministerial Committee for National Security. Additionally, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was renamed the Iraqi National Guard to enhance its capacity and operation area from the local security missions to the static security tasks.²⁵⁶ In addition to these changes and new establishments, a limited number of the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (for the protection of the coast of Iraq from illegal activities) and the Iraqi Air Corps (for surveillance and providing operational mobility to the Iraqi Army) was constructed and attached to the Iraqi Armed Forces.

After the end of the administration of the CPA and transfer of the sovereignty to the new Iraqi Interim Government, the absolute control of the Iraqi Security Services was also transferred to the new Iraqi Government. At this point, the position and operational

²⁵³ “Transitions of Laws, Regulations, Orders and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority,” Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 100, June 28, 2004. Available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040628_CPAORD_100_Transition_of_Laws_Regulations_Orders_and_Directives.pdf accessed on 8/17/2004.

²⁵⁴ Ayad Allawi, “Speech to the Iraqi people, June 20, 2004: Establishing Effective National Security Institutions, Command and Control systems, and Coordinating Mechanisms,” National Security Strategy of the Republic of Iraq (Draft), Baghdad, July 29, 2004, p. 18.

²⁵⁵ “The Iraqi Intervention Force,” Global Security Org. Website. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/iif.htm> accessed on 10/18/2004.

²⁵⁶ Allawi, “Speech to the Iraqi people,” pp. 18-19.

function of the Multinational Forces was, or at least should have been challenging in terms of relations with a sovereign state and it should have been inquired and revised from this perspective. However, the Iraqi Security Forces, both military and police, were insufficient as to both quantity and quality. Therefore, it was stated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz addressing the statements of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari declaring the insufficiencies of the Iraqi Interim Government in providing security and their necessities for the support of multinational force that “the objectives and functions of the Multinational Force after the transfer of sovereignty [would] remain as it has been, except that it [the Multinational Force] [would] now coordinate with the sovereign Iraqi government through agreed consultative mechanisms.”²⁵⁷ As could be seen apparently, the only problem from the perspective of the U.S.-led Coalition was coordination. As a solution to this problem, in addition to the administrative organization of the security forces, a ‘Joint Operating Center,’ was created with the participation of “representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Defense and the Interior, the Multinational Force Commander and the Chief of the Office of Security Transition”²⁵⁸ in order to make the connection and coordination between the Ministerial Committee for National Security functioning on a political level and the Joint Command Centers that were created for the enhancement of the coordination of the Iraqi security services on a tactical and operational level, particularly by the participation of the representatives of the Iraqi police, Iraqi National Guard and Multinational Forces, in order to increase their speed and effectiveness.²⁵⁹

After the handover of authority, Prime Minister Allawi declared that “the highest priority in developing the Iraqi Armed Forces would be the establishment of units to combat the persistent guerilla insurgency in the country.”²⁶⁰ As a result of this priority, the new Iraqi Interim Government expressed its priorities in terms of the future progress

²⁵⁷ “Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,” p. 7.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁵⁹ Fob Colwell, “Joint Command Centers being Created in Iraq,” *the National Guard Website*, October 8, 2004, Available at <http://www.ngb.army.mil/news/story.asp?id=1259> accessed on November 11, 2004.

²⁶⁰ “World Armies, Iraq: Army Organization,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-Jane’s World Armies, August 17, 2004. Available at <http://www4.janes.com/K2.doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwar/jwar2048.htm> accessed on 11/27/2004.

of the Iraqi Security Forces as the Iraqi Intervention Force, the Special Operations Forces, the Iraqi National Guard, and the regular Army units. The training and equipping of the Iraqi Armed Forces continued in this respect. The number of completely trained Iraqi Security Forces (military and police) on duty was declared as 100,000 by both Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and U.S. President Bush (U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had also declared the same number approximately ten months ago, on November 4, 2003).²⁶¹

While the training process continued, the units of the Iraqi Armed Forces completing their training period have been engaged in military operations against insurgencies and terrorist groups conducted in Samarra, Babil, Fallujah, Mosul, and Baghdad along with the Multinational Forces and the Iraqi Police Service. In this context, 2,000 Iraqi Forces from the Iraqi Army and National Guard participated in operations under the control of U.S. Forces in Samarra on October 1, 2004. The Iraqi Special Forces took part in a counter insurgency campaign conducted by U.S. troops in the Babil Province on October 5, 2004. In November 2004, during the Fallujah Operations, approximately 2,000 Iraqi Forces from the Iraqi Intervention Force and Regular Army units were deployed along with 10,000 U.S. troops against insurgents.²⁶² A regular Army Brigade accomplishing the training process has participated in operations in the Mosul province and “another Regular Army brigade and Intervention Force Brigade have [been] deployed to Fallujah to relieve units currently deployed.”²⁶³ Finally, the Iraqi Armed Forces has reached an operational capacity of 18 battalions (six regular Army battalions and 12 Intervention Force Battalions) and an additional 42 Iraqi National Guard Battalions, totaling 45,000 troops in January 2005. Additionally, the construction of the first elements of the 1st Mechanized Brigade of the new Iraqi Army was completed before the January 30, 2005 elections.

Despite the progress in construction of the new Iraqi Armed Forces, it is not sufficient for the current requirements of Iraq. The number of the Iraqi Armed Forces,

²⁶¹ Patric B. Baetjer, “Iraqi Security and Military Force Developments: A Chronology,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 28, 2005. Available at http://www.csis.org/features/041201_SecurityForcesTimeline.pdf accessed on 1/30/2005.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction -Back to January 2005 Report, Appendix I: Security and Law Enforcement,” the Bureau of Resource Management, US Department of State, January 5, 2005. Available at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/2207/jan2005/html/40362.htm> accessed on 1/16/2005.

considered along with the security services under the control of MoI, is not sufficient when the estimate number of insurgents, terrorists, and their active supporters is considered. Additionally, the militia problem is still a threat. In addition to quantity shortages, there are still ongoing training and equipment problems. Despite the great enthusiasm of the second Iraqi Interim Government to develop the capacity of the Iraqi security Services, economic inadequacies to achieve planning objectives are a major obstacle for the Iraqi Government. In this context, the final budget allocated to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense in 2005 fiscal year does not match the proposed requirements of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.²⁶⁴ Therefore, it is predictable that development of the Iraqi Armed Forces and other security services will still be an essential, but difficult task for the third Iraqi Interim Government and they will still need financial, technical, and training support of the international community during this process.

Despite the initial intention to create an institution reflecting the national unity of Iraq, there is skepticism about the current situation. In this context, even though the Coalition Military officials assert that there is no ethnic or religious discrimination in the new Iraqi Armed Forces, there is another claim that “key units and leaders are clearly dominated by Shiites and Kurds.”²⁶⁵ The problem is not individuals and their ethnic or religious sub-identities. However, from this perspective, the problem, which can be evaluated as the most severe one in some respects, is how this domination will influence the performance of the new Iraqi Armed Forces in case the new Iraqi Government had to use it to uphold its authority against their former chiefs. It is also questionable how these units will respond to likely demands of their former leaders aiming to exploit them against other factions or against the Iraqi Government in order to achieve their political agendas. Additionally, it is significant that this domination is a result of the current circumstances or will it be a permanent episode within the new state structure and its institutions, as occurred in Iraq during the period of 1921 to 2003? The efforts of the Allawi Government to improve the capacities and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Services, including the Iraqi Armed Forces were appreciable and should be continued by the next government. In this context, incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the

²⁶⁴ “Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction -Back to January 2005 Report.”

²⁶⁵ Nordland and Dickey, “Tribe versus Tribe.”

Iraqi Army in January 2005 was one of the most substantial steps because it dissolved a militia structure, which could be exploited as a dual military structure on the basis of its close ethnic, religious, and tribal ties. However, still doubtful is how much time this integration will take to remove all the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal ties of these units. Additionally, it is doubtful that the next government will have enough power and/or willingness to conduct these kinds of policies without the support and/or enforcement of the U.S.-led Coalition and international community.

4. Performance, Capacity and Capability Assessment

Performance of the new Iraqi Security Institutions can be assessed from two perspectives: from the point of the view of the Iraqi People and according to the evaluation of the civil/military experts and/or Iraqi politicians. From the first perspective, according to the results of research conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Iraq, which relied on media resources, public and official sources, polls, and interviews with Iraqis, Iraq is in a ‘danger zone’ in terms of security, such that the daily life of the people in Iraq is still affected by terrorist actions, ongoing insurgencies, and other types of violence and crime. Yet, encouragingly, Iraqis have reacted positively to the presence of the Iraqi security forces. In this context, results of a poll taken in March 2004 displayed that “the Iraqi police received the most positive rating of the seven government institutions surveyed: 79 percent of Iraqis gave the police a positive rating, while 61 percent gave the army a positive rating.”²⁶⁶ It is certain that these kinds of polls or research are significant to ascertain the general situation or tendencies. However, when considering the poor performance of the Iraqi Security Services, particularly in Fallujah, Najaf, and other problematic areas in the first and second quarter of 2004, just after the polls, it is also evident that psychological factors also influenced the public view. From this perspective, the more important result of this research in terms of the view of the Iraqis about the Iraqi Security Services was that Iraqis felt themselves safer “when U.S. Forces [were] not around and when Iraqi police

²⁶⁶ “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” *The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project*, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), September 2004, p. 21.
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf accessed on 10/14/2004.

patrol[ed] their neighborhoods.”²⁶⁷ This point can be, and should be exploited in order to assess the significance of the Iraqi security Forces in providing security.

The assessment of the performance, capacity, and capability of the new Iraqi Security Forces from the perspective of civil/military experts or Iraqi politicians governing Iraq is certainly different. In this context, it is significant to make an accurate evaluation about the adequacy of the current Iraqi Security Forces in offering necessary capacities for the new Iraqi Government that will be formed after the elections in order to provide security in a highly problematic security environment with ongoing insurgencies, terrorist actions, and potential of ethnic and sectarian tension with a highly politicized and large ethnic/sectarian/political militia capacity, which could encourage a civil war.

The military Coalition experts and the officials of the Iraqi Government stated that the performance and capacity of the units of the Iraqi Armed Forces participating in counter insurgency operations was encouraging and enhancing. However, they also declared that the recent operations indicated inabilities and weaknesses of the Iraqi Armed Forces and other security services. The Security Services including the new Iraqi Armed Forces progressed since the autumn 2003 both as to quantity and quality, even if it was limited. Nevertheless, the insurgents and terrorist organizations have also expanded in Iraq and they have had increasing support from the Iraqi population. In this context, while the final number of the Iraqi Security services has been approximately 125,000²⁶⁸ instead of the 227,000 required according to the initial planning objectives, the estimated number of insurgents (as fighters and active supporters) has been 200,000 according to Iraq’s new Intelligence Chief, General Muhammad Shahwani.²⁶⁹ Additionally, the party militias have continued their existence. It is also remarkable that all parties that will form the Transitional National Assembly have their own militias. Therefore, it is really speculative as to how they will solve the militia problem. Moreover, it is significant as to

²⁶⁷ “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction,” p.21.

²⁶⁸ This number includes the all security services under the control of MoI and MoD, but not the ‘Facility Protection Service’ operating under the control of individual ministries. The number of the Iraqi armed Forces has been declared as approximately 52,000 (Army: 7,598; National Guard: 36,827; Intervention Force: 5,884; Special Operations Force: 674; Air Force: 145; and Navy: 495) in return to required/planning number of 96,000. For details see “Iraq for Weekly Status Report” of U.S. State Department, p. 5.

²⁶⁹ Nordland and Dickey, “Tribes versus Tribe.”

whether they will attempt to use their militias to dictate their political agendas to the other factions, which will be represented or not represented in the Transitional National Assembly and in the third Iraqi Interim Government. When this political environment, security circumstances, and shortages of the Iraqi Security Services, along with the other essential state institutions, are considered, it is evident and also declared by the Iraqi officials, such as Iraq's Interim President Ghazi Yawer, Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan, and Interior Minister Falah al-Naqib,²⁷⁰ that Iraq and the third Iraqi Interim Government will need the support of the international community and the existence of Multinational Forces, until the factions of Iraq have reached a consensus for the future of the Iraqi State and until the Iraqi Government has enough security instruments to provide security and state authority in the entire country.

C. CONCLUSION

The reconstruction and stabilization stage of Iraq after the Second Gulf War has encountered similarities when compared to the period of the British mandate. As the U.K. after the end of the First World War, the United States and U.K. led Coalition has not had enough military forces to provide security in the country, which is the foremost priority of an occupation force. However, contrary to the U.K. in 1920, the Coalition had an opportunity to reorganize and exploit the former security structure of Iraq. Indeed, the initial intention of the U.S. planners was to rely on the former Iraqi Military, at least the Regular Army, during this time. This was an appropriate approach in terms of creating a state capacity in a relatively short period with relatively fewer costs. It was a fact that the former Iraqi Military and its officer corps had been humiliated and made ineffective by means of the harmful and non-democratic control mechanisms of the former Iraqi Regime. However, it would have been easier to reorganize the former (Regular) Iraqi

²⁷⁰ Just after the elections, these three officials declared that Iraq did not have necessary means to provide security in an environment with ongoing insurgency and political indefiniteness. In this context, President Yawer stated that the leave of the coalition troops would cause a vacuum of power and chaos and the number of multinational forces could be reduced by year-end. Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan's explanation was specifically addressed insufficiencies of the Iraqi security Services. In this context, he frankly stated that "they [multinational forces] will leave when security is stabilized and there is a strong army and police force." See "Iraq rules out US troop pullout," in BBC News, February 1, 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4227253.stm accessed on 2/2/2005. Announcement of the Interior Minister was more optimistic than Defense Minister's. He contended that the Iraqi Security Forces will be ready to provide security without foreign forces in eighteen months. See "Iraq 'Can Take Over in 18 Months,'" BBC News, February 2, 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4231323.stm accessed on 2/2/2005.

Military than the construction of a new one from scratch. It is most likely that the new Iraqi Government would have had its Security Mechanisms in a short period and at less cost in this manner. However, by ignoring the pre-war planning assumptions and recommendations, the CPA dissolved the entire security and defense organizations of the country (except the Iraqi Police Service). This policy not only resulted in a security vacuum in Iraq, it also increased the anxieties of a main ethnic/sectarian community of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs, who had already grave fears about the post-war era on the basis of their prominent role in the former regime. These anxieties, combined with the implementation of an excessive de-Baathification policy, contributed to the spread of radical thoughts and an increase of insurgents and terrorists against the Coalition and the new Iraqi Governments in the post-war era. It is also a fact that the excesses of de-Baathification resulted in the de facto disenfranchisement and/or reluctance of the Sunni Arabs from the reconstruction process, as similarly occurred during the British mandate for the Shiite Arabs.

After disbanding the former Iraqi Military, the U.S.-led Coalition addressed some traditional strategies, which were also conducted by the British during the mandate. In this context, the U.S.-led Coalition employed militia capacities of ethnic, religious, and tribal factions. The Kurdish Pehmargas and INC Militias were directly employed by the Coalition Forces, as the British relied on Iraqi Levies mostly from the Assyrians, during the British Mandate. This reliance encouraged the Kurdish Groups to implement their political agenda with a demand for autonomy at least or independence if possible, although ‘the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’ has declared that the federal system shall not be based upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession²⁷¹ and additionally, the U.S. officials have often emphasized that the U.S. government favors a unified Iraq. Even the January 30 election turned into a referendum for the Kurdish groups who voted also to display their preference for the future of Iraq.²⁷² This is also another similarity with historical facts when compared to

²⁷¹ “The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 4.

²⁷² Coinciding with the January 30 elections, a referendum was conducted by the Kurdish groups by offering three options to the people that would vote for this referendum. As stated by the Kurdish Groups, approximately 2 million Kurds voted for independence rather than a Federal Iraq or unified Iraq. See “2 milyon Kürt bağımsızlık istedi,” in *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, February 6, 2005. Available at <http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~3@nvid~533342,00.asp> accessed on 2/6/2005.

the autonomy desires of Assyrians and their revolt during the last period of British Mandate and in the first years of an independent Iraq. It is uncertain how these kinds of desires will influence the future security environment and affiliations amongst the ethnic and sectarian factions of Iraq. It is also another concern that the improved militia capacities of these factions will be a multiplying factor of ethnic or religious conflict risks that Iraq faced in the post-war era.

Considering the historical experiences of Iraq since the British Mandate, military establishments and dual military structures (the popular militia, Iraqi Levies, the Communist Party Militia, the National Guard, Republican Guard, Special republican Guard were well known instances), even these were under the supervision of the government, posed security challenges and political instability. Construction of these kinds of militia forces, such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, the Iraq's 36th (or named as political battalion), in the post-war era was a repetition of this historical catastrophe. Fortunately, the Allawi Government ignored this mistake by incorporating the militia type Iraqi National Guard (the Civil Defense Corps as named initially) into the Iraqi Army. Despite practical difficulties in terms of the power of the Iraqi Government to complete this process, it has been a positive step that should be encouraged to establish a unified force structure, which will have loyalty to the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people.

The construction of a new security structure for Iraqis by the Iraqis has been a positive strategy. This would have made the stabilization stage shorter and easier at less cost. However, the several mistakes made during this process (as well as disbanding the former Iraqi Military) increased the cost (financial, political, and military) while decreasing efficiency:

- Reliance on local recruitment gave the opportunity to the ethnic, religious, and tribal authorities to influence the process. The abandonment of the recruits of the 1st Army Battalion according to their local leaders' desires was an indicator of this influence. These kinds of attempts can be assessed by comparing the resistance of the tribal elements and religious leaders for conscription during the Monarchy. While the real reason of the tribal chiefs and religious leaders to resist conscription was their worries about loosing their power against the state, the resistance of the Kurdish Groups for the assignments of their recruits in intermingled Army troops and for

the assignments of Army Units including Arab soldiers can be evaluated from the same perspective.

- Local assignments influenced the performance of the new recruiters due to the ethnic, religious, tribal, and family affiliations, loyalties and intimidations of insurgents and terrorists over the recruits and their families.
- Low salaries (which was another interesting similarity with the salaries of the privets during the British mandate and general reluctance to enroll in the Army for this reason) and deficiencies in the protection of the security service members and their families in a very problematic environment influenced the recruitment process and performance of the security services negatively.
- Deployment of the troops with insufficient training and equipment for the highly risky tasks under stress not only resulted in poor performance of the security services, but also affected the motivation of people who were neutral between the insurgents and Coalition led security services.²⁷³ The poor performance of the security services most probably injured the esteem of the Iraqi population on the Iraqi Security services. Additionally, casualties of the security services caused difficulties in recruitment by affecting the motivation of the people willing to enroll into the new security services.
- Leadership problems, particularly for troops in the squad, company, and battalion level in the field became another factor resulting in the ineffectiveness of the new Iraqi Security Services. Considering the problems and difficulties of urban guerilla warfare, note that leadership of the squad, company, and battalion level troops will be more important.

Consequently, the U.S.-led Coalition has failed to provide the necessary circumstances and instruments for the Iraqi People, for the new elected Assembly, which will write a draft of the permanent constitution for Iraq, and for the third Iraqi Interim Government that will be assigned by the Assembly and rule the country. The third Iraqi Interim Government will have to rule in an environment with more powerful insurgents, terrorist organizations, and ethnic/religious militias than the state security services, as the Hashemite Monarchy had to rule despite well-armed tribal elements. The new government will not have the necessary means to provide security and to claim a

²⁷³ Despite the positive view of the Iraqis for the Iraqi Security Services according to the poll conducted by Center for Strategic and International Studies on March 2004 and issued on September 2004, actual view of the Iraqi Population should be re-searched and re-assessed after the performance of the security services since April 2004. It should be considered that the Iraqi Army constructed during the British Mandate increased its prestige after its successful campaign in repressing Assyrian revolt and Shiite and Kurd uprisings.

monopoly on the use of force in the whole country, at least without the support of the multinational forces and international community. Therefore, along with shaping the future of Iraq, the construction of a state structure with all its organizations, institutions, norms and principles will be the main obligation of the third Iraqi Government; but it is an obligation that will be carried out under fire and will need continued international support. As the last, but not least concern for the future of Iraq after the January 30 election, the reluctance of the parties that will dominate the Iraqi politics to share power with all factions and their possible attempts to politicize the state institutions and particularly internal security services, judiciary, and Iraqi Armed Forces would result in a new authoritarian regime under one of the ethnic or religious parties.

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V. CONCLUSION

Before the Second Gulf War, the U.S Government had two factions with different visions in terms of their post-war reconstruction objectives and the end state for the future of Iraq. While one group represented by Paul Wolfowitz visualized a macro transformation under the administration of the United States, the other group comprising Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was in favor of a minimal approach envisaging the removal of the leadership with its high level staff and exploiting the rest of the state structure for the establishment of a new order and stability.²⁷⁴ It is not clear which approach was favored by the Bush administration. Nevertheless, when the post-war policies are examined, they justify neither macro transformation nor the minimal approach. The U.S.-led Coalition ruled Iraq directly via the Coalition Provisional Authority between the periods of May 2003 to June 28, 2004. Even though there was an Iraqi Government, the first Iraqi Interim Government was only a showcase and did not have real authority, either officially or practically.

The over de-Baathification, which caused de facto disenfranchisement and reluctance of the Sunni Arabs to join the reconstruction process, was the most remarkable incident of the first months of this era. Disbanding the former Iraqi military was the most questionable part of this policy because of security concerns in Iraq. Considering the de-Baathification policy of the CPA, it can be seen that the U.S. Government was favoring Wolfowitz's approach. However, the military capacity of the CPA was not sufficient to conduct this policy while facing a deteriorating security condition. Thus, the CPA had to rely on indigenous sources. Despite the fact that the U.S. officials declared their 'for Iraqis by Iraqis' intention several times, to create a new security formation having enough capacity and capability from zero was not possible in a short period. Therefore, the CPA used traditional means, ethnic and religious militias, as the British used during the 1920s, despite the long term challenges of this policy for the stability of Iraq. Additionally, the CPA started the construction of a new security formation, including the Iraqi Police Service, the new Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which was a militia type security formation. The units of these services were on duty when serious uprisings

²⁷⁴ Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and History Denied*, pp. x-xi.

occurred in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbal in April 2004. However, their performance and capacities were problematic. This ignited a new debate about the effectiveness of the policies conducted in construction of the new security structure of Iraq. In June 2004, the CPA transferred its authority to the second Iraqi Interim Government. Nevertheless, this was a handover mostly on paper, since the new Iraqi Government did not have the necessary means to govern Iraq and provide security. Therefore, it had to rely on the Multinational Forces.

Despite the efforts of the Coalition and the second Iraqi Interim Government, they neither provided security, nor created a state capacity including an efficient security architecture. Just before the January 2005 elections, Iraq faced an ongoing insurgency, increasing terrorist actions, and a huge militia capacity of ethnic and religious parties compared to 127,000 security troops with questionable effectiveness. This portrait with an increasing ethnic tension threatened a civil war. Providentially, an ethnic or religious clash did not occur during the elections despite the terrorist provocations. However, some groups asserted that there were abuses in the elections by some parties and their militias, even in the form of Iraqi Security Services.²⁷⁵ Moreover, the election was to construct a Transitional National Assembly that will write a permanent constitution for the approval of the Iraqi People and assign the third Iraqi Interim Government. This means that the real debate is now starting in Iraq with ongoing violence, enhancing ethnic and religious tensions, and a divided society ethnically, religiously, and politically with their strong militia capacities. In such a period, the third Iraqi Interim Government does not have a sufficient state capacity consisting of an effective security service, a working judicial system, a functional bureaucracy, and a powerful military. In such circumstances, to improve these four functional areas has been the inevitable responsibility of the Iraqi Government and the Coalition. Amongst these four institutions, improvement of the

²⁷⁵ The major disputes and objections on the abuses in elections have been in the north and northwest area of Iraq. According to Turkmen and Arab groups, the Kurdish Groups brought a huge number Kurds (according to some sources 100,000) to vote in elections in Kirkuk. The people under the age of eighteen or even dead have been registered and voted. Besides, some people voted in two different election centers. Moreover, lots of Turkmen and Arab voters have been prevented from voting on the basis of some restrictions employed by the Kurdish parties, including the use of the Kurdish peshmargas and National Guard of Kurdish Origin. For details see 'Press Release on the Iraqi National Elections' of the Turkmen Front issued on January 31, 2005. Available at <http://www.siatec.net/bloggersperlpage/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=740> accessed on February 2005.

security services, and particularly the Iraqi Armed Forces, will be the foremost priority of the third Iraqi Government as a natural consequence of the current security conditions. The major challenge on this issue is that the third Iraqi Government has to do it under fire. Therefore, it needs the substantial support of the international community.

The thesis argues that the Iraqi Armed Forces will be the foremost institution to achieve a state capacity in Iraq and according to current security circumstances; it will have an inevitable role in providing internal security and stability in the country. On the other hand, the Iraqi Armed Forces, as a traditional way of seizing authority in Iraq, will be addressed by the factions competing to achieve their political agendas. Therefore, the new Iraqi Military, which should be built without domination and reflection of any ethnic or sectarian group and particularly whose officer corps will have loyalty to a unified Iraqi Government and constitutional order, will be the main institution that would provide and protect the stability and security of Iraq in the state building stage. Additionally, a military structure that would rely on institutionalized norms and procedures will contribute to long-term democratization and nation-building efforts in Iraq.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The multiethnic and multi sectarian structure of Iraq is the most challenging characteristic of the country if it is going to construct a stable future. Despite the fact that the ongoing insurgencies and terrorist actions also pose a serious danger for Iraq, the most crucial influence of those insurgents and terrorist organizations will be to ignite an ethnic or religious clash by provoking the factions. A possible desire to build a religious based state structure according to the Shiite belief or to construct an ethnic based Federal state structure, or secessionist demands are all possible challenges for Iraq with its multiethnic and multi sectarian population. Can Iraq face these kinds of demands in the next period while writing a permanent constitution?

The historical facts of Iraq have displayed that ethnic and religious groups can tend to enforce their political desires on the Iraqi governments by means of their well-armed militias. Additionally, opposition groups attempt to make connections with security services and particularly with the Army to provoke and to exploit it against the Iraqi government and state authority. Understandably, not only government, but also the opposition can have a tendency to use undemocratic ways and violence in order to

archive their political agendas. Therefore, the Iraqi military, along with other security services will be a target of groups desiring authority or achieving their political interests in the country during the next period. As another historical tendency, the future governments can try to dominate the Iraqi military to assure the survival of their authority by exploiting it against their political rivals. To achieve this, they can attempt to abrade the rules and procedures in the military and they can seek to politicize the new Iraqi officer corps. Such an affair can result in another authoritarian regime dominated by an ethnic or sectarian group in Iraq.

The huge militia capacity of ethnic or sectarian groups is a serious danger for the stability of Iraq. The exploitation of tribal militias was a general way of providing security in local areas and suppressing local incidents in Iraq's history. However, this was an episode with its long term challenges for the state authority and stability. In return for their alliance to the government, tribal authorities also exploited the state and expanded their power in the past and this resulted in a dilemma for Iraq. Unfortunately, the U.S.-led Coalition made the same mistake. While exploiting the ethnic or religious party militias, it also condoned their expansion. This policy has made disbanding the party militias more difficult in Iraq. Consequently, the CPA and the second Iraqi Interim Government could not manage to dissolve the party militias and these militias emerged as one of the most influential actors in Iraq under the control of their ethnic or sectarian authorities. In the post-election period, it is most likely that the political groups, which are not satisfied with the results of elections or the results of the negotiations about the permanent constitution, may attempt to mobilize their militia capacities to enforce their political agendas. Therefore, dissolving these militias will be one of the most fundamental tasks of the next Iraqi Governments, to achieve state authority and to reach sustainable security in the country. However, it is obvious that the third Iraqi Interim Government will not have enough power to realize this process without international support. Furthermore, considering that the political actors of the new era will be the leaders of ethnic and sectarian political establishments, which have the real authority over these militias, it is also doubtful that these political elites will have the desire to loose these powerful and traditional tools. Even if they have to dissolve their militia structures, they will most

likely attempt to integrate these militias into the new security services but as units not individuals, to keep their authority over those elements.

The natural resources of the country offer both economic opportunities and severe tensions for a possible conflict for the future of Iraq. One of the highlighting post-war disputes has been territorial desires of the Kurdish Groups particularly in Kirkuk. This was not a new occurrence. Two main reasons for the uprising of the Kurdish Groups in the 1970s, despite given autonomy by the Ba'ath Government in 1970, were their desire to control Kirkuk and its oil revenue, and to keep their militia capacities. Considering these historical episodes along with the recent occurrence and disputes, it can be easily assessed that the Kirkuk and Mosul provinces and the share of the oil revenue of these two areas will be problematic for the security and stability of Iraq with their huge oil resources and intermingled population. A possible attempt to dominate these two provinces and their oil fields by the Kurdish groups or other ethnic groups can result in chaos and civil war.

A radical religious movement, either from the Sunnis or Shiites will be another risk factor that can ignite a sectarian war. At this point, the Sunni militancy increasing in the post-war period constitutes one part of the puzzle. The Sunni Arabs were evaluated as the most secular Arab Community in Iraq. However, post-war anxieties and de facto exclusion of the Sunni Arabs provided suitable conditions for emerging terrorist organizations to gain support from this community in the post-war era. The January 30 elections deepened this situation. As a result, the exclusion of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs from either the political process or state institutions, similar to disenfranchisement of the Shiites in 1920s, has emerged as one of the challenges to a stable Iraq. The other part of the puzzle, where some Shiite Clerics, particularly Moqtada al-Sadr can pose a threat by insisting on a Iranian type regime in Iraq. This is also problematic in a country with an approximately 40% Sunni population. Additionally, this is also a source of tension within the Shiites. Besides current challenges, radical religious elements would pose a threat for the stability of Iraq after the establishment of a working state structure based on a moderate ideology. Now and in the future, these radical elements will attempt to spread to the security services and particularly to the Iraqi Armed Forces and its officer corps.

As historical episodes indicated, the Iraqi Military was the most substantial institution in Iraq in terms of providing state authority and internal security. However, according to findings, the former Iraqi Military also failed to be an institution that unified all the factions of Iraq, as the Iraqi State failed. Sunni dominance in the key positions and high ranks, dual military establishments, un-institutionalized procedures, relying on tribe/family affiliations and personal loyalties, unfitting ideologies, and politicization of the officer corps were influential in this period. Considering the requirements of the current security environment and competence of the other security services compared to the size of insurgents, terrorist organizations and party militias, it evidently seems that the Iraqi Military will be once more one of the foremost institutions of the Iraqi government in order to seize authority and provide security in the country. From this perspective, starting to build a new security structure was a suitable step to create a state capacity and to reduce the cost of stabilization. However, the creation of a militia type Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (the Iraqi National Guard) and the Iraq's 36th were attempts at ignoring catastrophic historical examples of Iraq with dual military establishments and militia type force structures, as could be seen in the National Guard, Republican Guard, or Special Republican Guard examples during the Ba'th Party and Saddam Hussein period. Exclusion of some groups such as the Sunni Arabs, Turkmen, or Assyrians from the key positions and dominance of the Shiites and Kurds in the Armed Forces, or in other state institutions, according to ethnic and religious concerns will be a repetition of the same mistake made by the British and Iraqi Governments between the periods of 1921 to 2003.

While creating a new Iraqi Army, several mistakes during the process delayed the development of the constitution and challenged the long term effectiveness of the Iraqi Armed Forces and stability of the Country. Among these, insufficiencies in the recruitment system and relying on local authorities, inadequacies in salaries and other benefits (particularly insufficient force protection for recruits and their families), assignment of recruits in their hometowns, employment of troops with insufficient training and equipment, the early decision of the CPA not to use the new Iraqi Army in internal security, and leadership problems in squad, company, and battalion level troops based on excessive de-Baathification have been the most underlining errors during the reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces. In addition to these shortages, to use the Iraqi

Security Forces under the control of the Multinational Force after the handover of the authority to the Second Iraqi Interim Government damaged the prestige of the Second Iraqi Interim Government and legacy of the operation of the Multinational Forces.

The CPA favored an all-volunteer system in recruitment for the new Iraqi Armed Forces. Considering the circumstances, this decision could be evaluated as a proper policy, because there could be difficulties in the implementation of conscription on the basis of possible resistance from some ethnic or religious factions. On the other hand, the benefits of the recruits should have been appealing to people based on the security situations. However, salaries were low compared to other services. Additionally, there were security problems for the recruits and their families. The members of the security services became one of the primary targets of the terrorist attacks. These problems made recruitment difficult and influenced the performance of the units. Moreover, assignments of the new recruits in their hometowns also resulted in the poor performance of these units against insurgents and other criminals on the basis of the pressure of the ethnic/religious/tribal/family affiliations on the personnel.

One of the suitable decisions in the construction of the new Iraqi Army Units was to form ethnically and religiously mixed units reflecting the factions of Iraq. The main reason for the formation of these kinds of mixed units was to improve the interaction amongst the ethnic and sectarian diversities of Iraq. Additionally, to recruit from only one ethnic or sectarian group would be another way of creating ethnic or sectarian fractions within the Iraqi Military. This kind of an approach could result in a clash between the Army units. The intention to build intermingled units was damaged by ethnic leaders because of the wrong recruitment policies that increased the influence of those local authorities and political parties on the system. Consequently, this episode displayed that ethnic, sectarian, or other local authorities will want to be decisive within the Iraqi Armed Forces just as it occurred in the past.

Insufficiencies in training and equipment are a big failure. However, employment of the troops with insufficient training and equipment was bigger than the first one. This failure resulted in the poor performance of these units against insurgents and terrorists, and caused high rate casualties. Also, the weaknesses of the units in the field encouraged

insurgents and terrorists, and most probably discouraged the people from enrolling in the new security services. Moreover, these weaknesses most likely injured the respect of the population towards the new Iraqi Security Forces. The leadership problem was, and still is another factor for the insufficient performance of the units. This was a result of disbanding the officer corps of the former Iraqi Military. Even though it has been decided to accept these officers for the service, they have been recruited as enlisted personnel but not officers with their former ranks to promote their ranks according to their performance during the training process. This discouraged these former soldiers from enrolling. Also most likely, these disappointed officers preferred joining insurgencies or terrorist organizations.

Despite the initial intent of the Coalitional Provisional Authority not to use the new Iraqi military for internal security concerns, it has been recently seen that it is inevitable not to use the Iraqi Army for internal security on the basis of intensive security problems. The early decision not to deploy the new Iraqi Army in domestic security had good intentions, but it was not fitting for the current security circumstances of the country. In view of its discouraging experiences in its history, it can be argued that the use of the military for internal security problems would be harmful in the long term democratization process. However, there are practical examples, even in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s displaying that the Army units can be employed for internal security when the capacity of the internal security services could not respond to the incidents. Moreover, it should be thought that the foremost priority of Iraq is not to build a democracy, but to construct a functioning state structure that will provide enough capacity for the Iraqi government to maintain security and also that will comprise all factions and be respected by almost all the population.

As the last finding, after the handover of the authority from the CPA to the Second Iraqi Interim Government, the existence of the Multinational Force inevitably continued. In fact, the real authority in Iraq, at least in terms of security, was the Multinational Force. However, except for some declarations by Iraqi officials, there was not a signed agreement or 'Memorandum of Understanding' that would authorize this situation between the second Iraqi Interim Government and the countries constituting the Multinational Force. Despite the fact that there was no official objection to this situation,

this was injurious to the sovereignty and prestige of the second Iraqi Interim government, and legacy of the existence and operations of the Multinational Force in Iraq.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the fact that the main purposes of this thesis is to examine the reconstruction process of the Iraqi armed forces and possible influences of the ethnic and religious factions and tribal structure of the country in this process, this part of the thesis will comprise the recommendations not only about this main topic, but also the recommendations to respond to the security challenges emanating from the factions of Iraq, because these challenges directly influence the main subject of the thesis. Considering an appropriate flow, first it will offer some recommendations on providing security until the Iraqi Government has a capacity to provide security for itself and Iraq has a sustainable security during or at the end of the period of negotiations amongst the factions of Iraq. After that, it will present a set of suggestions about the ongoing reconstruction process of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

1. Recommendations on Providing Security

It is evident that the third Iraqi Government does not have enough state capacity to provide security and authority in the entire country. Therefore, the Multinational Force should continue its mission in Iraq until the construction of the Iraqi Security Forces is completed. On the other hand, it is apparent that there is an increasing anger, and indeed hostility against the U.S.-led Multinational Force within the population. Improper tactics, such as helicopter and air assaults particularly in urban areas with high density populations, increases these hostilities. Therefore, the Multinational Force should revise its tactics; particularly in urban areas, not to ignite mass revolts.

Considering that Iraq has a sovereign government, an agreement that will authorize the existence and operations of the Multinational Force should be signed between the Iraqi Government and the countries having troops within the Multinational Force. This kind of an agreement would increase the legitimacy of the existence of the Multinational Force and the prestige of the Iraqi Government in and outside of Iraq. Additionally, a civilian should be assigned, by the U.N. by preference or by the Coalition, in order to provide coordination between the Multinational Force and the Iraqi Government. While designating operational and legal responsibilities, the transfer of the

area responsibilities between the Multinational Force units and Iraqi Security Forces should be within the framework of a timetable for the Iraqi Security Services.

The best way for providing a sustainable security in Iraq is to encourage all factions to reconcile their differences about their political agendas. Territorial unity, the principles of the new Iraqi State (religious or secular), the autonomy desire of the Kurdish Groups and their territorial demands on Kirkuk, share of the oil revenue, disbanding the militias, and exclusion of some ethnic or sectarian groups, particularly the Sunni Arabs, seem to be the most problematic subjects that will influence security and the stability of Iraq. The following policies should be conducted in this context.

- The international community, and particularly the U.S.-led Coalition, should endorse negotiations and inspire all factions that an ethnic or religious based federation will incite the security problems and hostilities amongst the groups. All parties should be persuaded, and politically compelled if needed, for an agreement on a unified Iraq;
- Despite the claims, the main reason for territorial demands on Kirkuk is its rich oil resources. To remove the tension on this issue, initially Kirkuk should be cleaned from the militia and militia origin Iraqi Security Forces and should be put under the sole control of the Multinational Force until enough Iraqi Army Units take security responsibility. After that, the share of the oil revenue of Kirkuk and all other oil rich areas should be decided according to an equality principle;
- Ethnic based nationalist views and a state structure based on religious belief are not proper ideologies and will be a source of instability in Iraq. Therefore, the groups favoring a state structure based on a nationalist view of citizenships that will assure the cultural and political rights of all ethnic groups and a secular view that will guarantee the rights of individuals for their belief should be supported by the international community;
- Since disenfranchisement of the Sunni Arabs will result in political instability and increase security problems, the Sunni Arabs should be included in the negotiation and drafting of a permanent constitution process;
- All militias must be dissolved according to a DDR program. However, it is obvious that the third Iraqi Government does not have enough power to achieve this. Therefore, the international community should plan and carry out this process in coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi Government. This process should also include the security units under the control of the Kurdish Groups defined in the 'Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the transitional period.' Consequently, all armed units should be under the control of the Iraqi Government. The militias that will

participate in the Iraqi Security Services should be transferred to these services as individuals, but not whole militia units. Besides, it should be observed and insured that these transferred militias will not continue their loyalties and command ties with their former leaders in the political parties. This kind of a connection would result in the politicization and polarization of the Iraqi Security Services. Despite difficulties, it should be the aim to complete this process before the referendum of the permanent constitution in order to prevent this referendum from possible influences by these militias.

2. Recommendations on Reconstruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces

Considering the current security circumstances, insufficiencies of the Domestic Security Services, and the intention of the second Iraqi Interim Government, it seems that the Iraqi Armed Forces will be one of the main institutions of the Iraqi Government for providing state authority, internal security, and long term stability. However, as the other services, the new Iraqi armed Forces, and particularly the new Iraqi Army should be developed as quality and quantity in a short period as much as possible. Additionally, the major factors influencing the performance of these units should be removed.

The United States and the CPA officials have declared several numbers contradicting each other about the development of the Iraqi Security Services. These contradictions have decreased the confidence of the public in and outside of Iraq concerning the process. Therefore, absolute information displaying the current situation of the Iraqi Security Services should be declared by the Iraqi government and the U.S.-led Coalition. In conjunction with this announcement, a timetable indicating applicable planning objectives should be prepared and declared officially. After that, development on the construction of the security services should be announced according to the timetable. This would remove speculations about the process.

While formatting the units in the Iraqi Armed Forces, constructing units with one ethnic or religious group should be avoided. Doing otherwise would result in the construction of ethnic or sectarian armies within the military. Instead, the planners should favor intermingled units as initially intended. Considering the initial experiences in the first army units, and influence of the local leaders on the recruits, a centralized recruitment system that will remove the influence of the ethnic, religious, tribal or

political powers on the recruitment process and on recruits should be constituted based on objective criteria as in modern militaries.

A centralized recruitment system is necessary but not sufficient to attract people to join the military. For that reason, the personal benefits of the members of the Iraqi Armed Forces, such as salaries, government housing, etc. should be attractive to the candidates. Those benefits should be exploited to motivate candidates to break off their ties and loyalties to their local leaders. Economic problems in the country pose both difficulties on this issue in terms of state capacity, but also opportunities for high unemployment rates.

Personal security, along with the security of their families is significant for the performance of the units of the Army and other security services, particularly in today's security environment. Considering the ongoing insurgencies and terrorist actions, construction of military bases consisting of government houses can be a way of providing personal security by mobilizing fewer forces on this issue. These kinds of bases would also reduce the pressure of local insurgencies on the recruits.

Considering the traditional tribe/clan/family ties, the recruits should not be assigned in their hometowns. An appointment system that will envisage the employment of the soldiers in different provinces according to a rotation would be a useful way to accomplish this. However, this appointment and rotation system should be based on institutionalized procedures instead of personalized decisions as before. Party militias are also a human source for recruitment. However, they should be accepted for the service individually. Moreover, their possible ties and loyalties with their former chain of command or insurgencies and terrorist groups should be observed and punished decisively.

Returning to leadership problems in small units, the recruitment of the former officers should be enhanced. However, these officers should be recruited as candidates with their former ranks in the Former Iraqi Military but not as enlisted as implemented currently. Training periods should be used to evaluate their ability to execute their responsibilities. Considering the significance of the squad, company, and battalion leaders against the guerilla type insurgencies and terrorist groups, special training

programs should be implemented for the officers from lieutenant to Lt. Colonel. These programs should also emphasize the importance of the leadership in ethnically and religiously mixed troops and present some principles to the leaders to implement while commanding their units.

The training period and training subjects should be reevaluated and decided according to requirements of the current security conditions. None of the units or recruits should be assigned in the field without completing the training period. Additionally, in order to decrease tensions amongst the soldiers from different factions, a special program emphasizing the importance of a unified Iraq with its all cultural varieties and significance of a unified military to defeat the current threats should be arranged and added to the training programs.

NATO has started to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Armed Forces. However, the number of trainees has not developed as seen in the initial planning objectives. In return for the reluctance of some countries to participate in this initiative, such as Germany, France, and Greece, individual NATO members should be encouraged by the Coalition to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Additionally, the Iraqi personnel who have had experience in the field and displayed success compared to their fellows should be employed in the training of the units, particularly recently recruited officers and new cadets.

The use of the military in domestic security missions is a specific situation, comprising a projection from the riots in urban areas to the guerilla type terrorism or insurgencies, and has specific requirements of equipment, training, tactics, doctrine, and organization. Additionally, and maybe as the most important, special legal arrangements that will prevent the security organizations from violating the international agreements and human rights. These legal codifications are necessary and significant both in terms of the legality, efficiency, and respect of a government and its military for its own citizens, and relations of the country with the international community. As a result of these special necessities:

- Training, equipment, and emplacement of the units of the Iraqi Armed Forces that will be allocated internal security missions should be thought and planned in this direction. For the training process, the international

community should increase its support. Particularly, the countries having experience in domestic security concerns and the use of the military for internal security missions, such as the U.K. and Turkey should be encouraged to contribute to the training of the Iraqi Army, and particularly its officers and non-commissioned officers who will be decisive in the success of these kinds of missions.

- While placing the Army units in the country, the problematic areas should be carefully examined in order to evaluate force planning. In this context, Baghdad for its political and historical significance, Mosul and Kirkuk with their intermingled population, increasing tension among the residential factions, and political and economic desires of the Kurdish Groups, particularly on Kirkuk should be assessed in placement of the Army units.
- Deployment of the Army units in domestic security missions should be decided by civilian authorities. By considering the personalized decision making process in the past, legal arrangements should be made designating the use of the Iraqi Armed Forces in internal security. The legal arrangements should clearly define the role and responsibilities of the presidency, government, parliament, judiciary, MoI and MoD, local administrators, and finally, security services. Additionally, coordination between the Army and the Iraqi Police Service should be considered as a responsibility of civilian administrators. Therefore, it should be considered that the Iraqi Government will need not only military, but also civilian expertise that will organize these coordination requirements and cooperation between the Army units and other services.

The measures suggested above are related to the short term requirements of Iraq. However, coinciding with these short term necessities, the long term requirements for an effective and modern military structure should be considered and the measures should be planned and carried out in this direction. As the measures that could be taken in this context:

- The Iraqi Armed Forces, along with the other security services and bureaucracy should be available for all citizens of Iraq to enroll in. The only way to join the Iraqi Armed Forces should be competition amongst candidates according to credible criteria instead of personal favoritism and/or ethnic, religious, or tribal affiliations. Moreover, all personnel of the Iraqi Armed Forces should have a chance to be promoted to high ranks and assigned to key positions. To achieve this, an institutionalized system should be constituted aiming at a single State-level defense organization including ministerial administration, oversight mechanisms (executive, legislative, judiciary, and public oversight), and a decision making process on defense and security policies of the country;

- The constitutional roles and missions of the Iraqi Armed Forces and its relations with other state institutions and governments should be described clearly. While doing this, the only concern in terms of the civil-military relations should not be a possible intervention of the military via a classical military coup, but also protection of the Iraqi Military from the possible attempts of the political parties to politicize the Iraqi Military and its officer corps. For that reason, an institutionalized personnel system that will design recruitment, appointments, promotions, assignments, and other benefits of the members of the Iraqi Armed Forces should be realized according to the norms and principles employed in modern militaries;
- In a country with a lack of democratic institutions and a democratic culture, to redefine civil-military relations and to put them into practice is a process that needs time and education. Moreover, it needs leaders with a belief in the need for this kind of institutionalized structure or a strong motivation and ongoing monitoring of the international community. Since the existence of leadership with this kind of view is doubtful, the international community should constitute a monitoring program for development in the Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as economic assistance and international initiatives such as 'Partnership for Peace' as used in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁷⁶
- Education is vital to achieve long term objectives. Therefore, coinciding with the normalization in security, an education program should be started for the Iraqi Officer Corps and civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense in universities, either in Iraq or outside of Iraq, to provide expert requirements of the Iraqi MoD and Iraqi Armed Forces. Additionally, Iraqi officers should be sent to military academies or war colleges to improve their professional view and to interact with the officers of other countries, particularly NATO members. This will also facilitate normalization of the civil military relations in Iraq.

²⁷⁶ Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded as a federal after a severe internal conflict. The peace agreement ended the clash between the groups. However, the central state could not have a single state level defense organization. Two federations still have their armies and defense structure. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster classify Bosnia and Herzegovina with its weak central state and government institutions, point out the existence of multiple armed forces, absence of effective central state/government political control of armed forces, and serious ethnic conflict occurred in the first half of 1990s as the main problems of civil-military relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For details see Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," in *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, p. 31. This kind of structure poses a threat in a country with hostilities amongst the groups based on historical incidents. Additionally, it is an obstacle for the state to assert its monopoly of the use of force in its territory. Besides, it is not a fitting situation for NATO initiatives in terms of civil-military relations. From these points of the view, a Defense Commission comprising local administrators, scholars in defense and civil-military relations field, and representatives of strong international institutions and countries, proposed a report including recommended reforms for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a participant of 'NATO's partnership for Peace Program' and "as an important step on Bosnia and Herzegovina's road to NATO membership and full integration with Euro Atlantic structures." For details see "The Path to Partnership for Peace: Report of the Defence Reform Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina," Defense Reform Commission, Sarajevo, September 2003.

Ultimately, it should be frankly stated that the former Iraqi military had rules, laws, and procedures. The real problem was in their implementation. Therefore, Iraq will need a period of close monitoring in terms of politico-military interaction, possible attempts of the factions of Iraq at politicization and employment of it for several reasons. However, the monitoring process needs to be arranged carefully so as not to hurt the Iraqi Government and its institutions. It should be considered that excess intervention can result in the rise of a radical view within the military as occurred after 1941 on the basis of the political, economic, and militarily domination of the U.K. in Iraq. Therefore, instead of excess interference, the international community and particularly the United States should prefer an approach based on mutual relations after Iraq reaches a sustainable peace.

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