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KEY CHARACTERISTICS EFFECTING COMMAND AND
CONTROL FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS INVOLVING
UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES

by

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Preface

Throughout the past century multinational warfare has been the basic framework for virtually every major contingency operation involving U.S. military forces. There is no reason to expect this reliance on alliance and coalition partners to change in the twenty-first century, in fact, the current global war on terrorism increases the opportunities for establishment of even more regional coalitions.

Alliances and coalitions are seldom formed and maintained without some level of tension between member states. A key area of tension has historically centered on the issue of command and control. This research paper is an effort to suggest critical characteristics effecting establishment of effective multinational command and control.

I would not have been able to complete this research without the help and support of the staff at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC. Additionally, the superb professional support of the library staff at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama was invaluable to getting this project off the ground and providing the initial vector required to focus my efforts. My thanks to all for giving me access to the tools and research material to complete this project.

Abstract

Multinational warfare has been the basic framework for virtually every major contingency operation the U.S. has been involved in throughout the past century, and as indicated by the National Security Strategy and current events, will likely continue to be the dominant construct by which the U.S. engages in contingency operations for the foreseeable future. One primary source of tension between participants in multinational operations has historically centered on the issue of command and control. This sensitivity reflects participants' concern over who will command their forces and what authority that commander will have.

This research identifies specific instances of how command and control in multinational warfare has both aided and inhibited contingency operations since WWI. The focus is on combined operations with our NATO allies, with the notable exception of an examination of UN-led operations in Somalia. The key questions focusing this research were: what are the enduring qualities and considerations influencing establishment of effective command and control in alliance and coalition warfare? What statutory, policy, and doctrinal guidance does the U.S. have regarding command and control of U.S. forces participating in a multinational military operation? Does this guidance help or hinder multinational partnerships?

This research led to development of the following list of areas of qualities and considerations influencing establishment of effective command and control for multinational military forces:

1. The nature of the precipitating event and the extent (or lack) of sanctioning of military action by an international organization / regional alliance will be a critical

determining factor in determining the type of command and control structure established.

2. Wherever practical, unity of command is the preferred command structure to facilitate unity of action by multinational participants.
3. Clearly defined mission, objectives, and rules of engagement (ROE) in governing agreements are critical to fostering clear unity of purpose among multinational partners.
4. Establishment of an integrated multinational military staff with representation from all member states is essential to exercising effective command of a combined military force.
5. Selection of U.S. officers sensitive to concerns of multinational partners and placement of these officers in command and staff positions commensurate with the extent of U.S. involvement in the operation has historically proven effective.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Multinational warfare has been the basic framework for virtually every major contingency operation the U.S. has been involved in throughout the past century, and will likely continue to be the dominant construct by which the U.S. engages in contingency operations for the foreseeable future. The National Security Strategy of the United States specifically states “America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.”¹ Particularly with regard to Europe, the National Security Strategy further states that NATO “...must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions.”² The implication is clear – U.S. military forces must be ready to operate in multinational combat operations anywhere in the world in a manner best able to leverage the contributions of each coalition partner.

But coalitions are seldom formed and maintained without some level of tension between its member states. As Winston Churchill said so eloquently prior to WW II, “the history of all coalitions is a tale of the reciprocal complaints of allies.”³ One primary source of tension between coalition participants has historically centered on the issue of command and control. In fact, a large body of research suggests “the most contentious

aspect of coalition operations is command and control. This sensitivity reflects the participants' concern over who will command their forces and what authority that commander will have. The converse is equally significant to military and political leaders in each nation contributing forces to a coalition: the degree of day-to-day control national authorities will have over the employment of their own forces.”⁴

On 14 October 99, as a result of a cumbersome command and control arrangement during Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton issued a joint prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee which specifically stated the U.S. needed to work with our allies to “develop an overarching command and control policy and agree on procedures for the policy’s implementation.”⁵ This research paper is effort to suggest critical characteristics of effective coalition command and control to aid in this policy formulation.

There is nothing new about American forces serving under the operational control of foreign commanders during multinational contingency operations.⁶ In fact, Presidential Decision Directive 25 specifically states, “American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests.”⁷

This research will identify specific instances of how command and control in coalition warfare has both aided and inhibited contingency operations since WWI. The focus will be on combined operations with NATO allies, with the notable exception of an

examination of UN-led operations in Somalia. To focus this research, some of the key questions I will endeavor to answer are: what are the enduring qualities and considerations influencing establishment of effective command and control in alliance and coalition warfare? What statutory, policy, and doctrinal guidance does the U.S. have regarding command and control of U.S. forces participating in a multinational military operation? Does this guidance help or hinder multinational partnerships?

For the purposes of this research, ‘multinational operation’ is used as “a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.”⁸ ‘Contingency operation’ refers to a military operation “designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force.”⁹ Additionally, ‘peacekeeping’ is defined as “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”¹⁰ These and other relevant definitions are provided with additional detail in the glossary section of this document.

¹ White House, September 2002, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America*. [Internet.WWW]. Available: White House Website; ADDRESS: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. [Accessed 25 September 2003]. Pg. 25

² White House, September 2002, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America*. [Internet.WWW]. Available: White House Website; ADDRESS: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. [Accessed 25 September 2003]. Pg. 25

³ Churchill, Winston S.. *Marlborough: His Life and Times*, vol V. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. Pg 246.

⁴ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>). Pg. 152.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review*. 14 October 1999. Accessed 23 October 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html>. Section VI 'Alliance and Coalition Warfare'.

⁶ See Appendix A for a list of major multinational operations the U.S. has participated in this century, both under U.S. and foreign command.

⁷ Federation of American Scientists. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives [PDD] Clinton Administration 1993-2000, PDD-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 3 May 94. On-line. Internet, 10 Sept 2003. Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html>. N.p., para V.A. under 'KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (AS SPECIFIED IN PDD 25, MAY 1994..

⁸ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 5 June 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

⁹ Government Printing Office. "United States Code – Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 1 – DEFINITIONS, Sec. 101. Definitions", para (a) (13), 1 Oct 1986, and as amended through 2 Jan 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/uscmain.html>.

¹⁰ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 5 June 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

Chapter 2

Statutory, Policy, and Doctrinal Basis for Command and Control of U.S. Forces During Multinational Contingency Operations

Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of—most often to lead—coalition operations.

General Robert W. Riscassi, USA
“Principles For Coalition Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly
Summer 1993

The current U.S. position regarding command and operational control of U.S. forces engaged in multinational contingency operations is rooted in the U.S. Constitution, Title 10, U.S. Code and further refined – with regard to peacekeeping operations – in the Clinton Administration’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). The joint doctrinal basis for implementing this statutory and policy guidance is principally found in Joint Publications 1 ‘Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States’, Joint Publication 0-2 ‘Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)’, and Joint Publication 3-16 ‘Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations’.

Alliances and Coalitions

First, it is critical to understand the strategic political environment in which multinational operations are conceived and conducted. Multinational operations take place in the context of an alliance or a coalition. According to Joint Publication 1-02, the

‘DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’ an “alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.”¹¹ Regarding command arrangements within an alliance,

Generally, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus. Doctrine, standardization, and political consensus characterize alliances. However, these command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially when alliance operations may include non-alliance members. However, **use of alliances for purposes other than those for which their integrated structures were designed, or in operations for which they have not had the lead time necessary to develop integrated plans and structures, may result in behavior that more closely approximates that of a coalition**¹² (bolding added by author).

This latter statement is particularly applicable when the case of NATO is considered. NATO’s involvement in post-Cold War military operations have seen a fundamental shift from the concept of collective security and defense of member nations against the threat of the USSR and Warsaw Pact to involvement in small-scale contingencies focused on ensuring regional stability, deterring regional genocide, and active involvement in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions. In fact, the realization that the operational employment of NATO forces over the past decade has been as a part of a coalition – albeit in some cases a coalition formed under a NATO mandate – led NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, to refer to NATO as “the world’s largest permanent coalition” during a November 2003 speech to the Atlantic Treaty Association General Assembly.¹³ At this same venue, General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, went on to refer to NATO as “the ultimate – the ultimate – coalition of the willing.”¹⁴ The implication is clear: while NATO is itself an alliance, in the post-Cold War environment NATO member nations have largely contributed national forces to fight as part of

coalitions that do not always include military participation from all NATO member nations. Moreover, these coalitions often include partnerships with non-alliance members.

What then are some characteristics regarding command and control as it relates to a coalition? Joint Publication 1-02 defines a coalition as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”¹⁵ Because coalitions tend to lack the stability and longstanding nature of an alliance, they present unique challenges to coalition commanders. Regarding command and control of coalition forces,

Within a coalition formed to meet a specific crisis, the political views of the participants may have much greater influence over the ultimate command relationships. National pride and prestige of member nations can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Coalition missions and objectives tend to evolve over time. This variation will, in turn, affect the overall command capability to react to a changing mission. Political objectives and limitations will also change over time, further complicating the task of the MNFC.¹⁶

Additionally, in any type of multinational operation a clear, common understanding of the terms used to describe command and control of military forces is critical. Within an alliance, particularly a longstanding alliance such as NATO, integrated military command structures are established and partner states have had prolonged exposure to combined military exercises to develop a common, collective understanding of the military capabilities of the alliance. Additionally, common terms of reference are developed which reflect the individual sensitivities of member states. For instance, within NATO, ‘full command’, is defined by Joint Publication 1-02, the ‘DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’ as “the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and **exists only within national services. The**

term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control”¹⁷ (bolding added by author). The recognition that no NATO commander has ‘full command’ of international forces illustrates the sensitivity that the alliance places on the issue of national sovereignty with regard to the command and control of multinational forces.

Conversely, since a coalition is often established quickly to meet a specific crisis, it often lacks an established, proven integrated military structure, and senior national military commanders may have only a cursory understanding of the military capabilities each partner can contribute. Additionally, there are often no commonly agreed upon nor understood ‘terms of reference’ to reduce the chance of miscommunication between coalition partners. Also, coalition military command and control structures are often developed from scratch, with the composition of coalition command staffs driven more by political requirements and sensitivities than by a desire to form an effective, integrated military staff. While this is often mitigated, to some extent, by that fact that many coalitions involving U.S. forces are conducted with traditional NATO partners, the inclusion of non-alliance coalition members and the political views of all coalition participants dictate that each coalition will have its own unique command and control challenges. The difficulty in forming an effective, coherent military force from diverse contributing states has historically been a key factor hampering UN command of military coalitions.

U.S. Law, Policy, and Military Doctrine

Given this context, what are the U.S. law, policy, and military doctrine regarding command and control of U.S. military forces in multinational operations? Despite the fact that U.S. military forces are operating within the context of a coalition with increasing frequency, “no President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. **The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate**”¹⁸ (bolding added by author). This does not, however, preclude the President from placing U.S. forces under the *operational control (OPCON)* or *tactical control (TACON)* of a foreign commander.

Title 10, U.S. Code provides a statutory basis for assignment of forces to combatant commands and establishment of U.S. chains of command for all U.S. military forces as outlined above. Regarding assignment of forces, Title 10 specifically directs that “Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified commands or to the North American Aerospace Defense Command.”¹⁹ Further, for these assigned combat forces, Title 10 states that “except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to, **and under the command of**, the commander of that command”²⁰ (bolding added by author). This guidance provides the statutory basis for establishment and maintenance of a U.S. chain

of command for U.S. military forces – even for those military forces that may be participating in a multinational operation.

As a result of problems encountered regarding U.S. participation as part of U.N. operations in Somalia, the Clinton Administration released Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) in May, 1996 establishing U.S. policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. While PDD-25 specifically addressed coalition peace operations, it provides a valuable insight into the concept of command and control of U.S. forces as part of multinational operations. The following excerpt from PDD-25 is particularly relevant (bolding added by author):

V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces

A. Our Policy: The **President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces.** On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. **Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.**²¹

Joint Publication 3-16 ‘Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations’ provides the doctrinal basis that the President, through his combatant commanders retains command over all U.S. forces, regardless of mission. This document further specifies that “it is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place U.S. forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place U.S. forces under the OPCON of non-U.S.

commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed U.S. force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE).”²²

When placed under a foreign multinational commander, in keeping with established U.S. military doctrine, “US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the United States has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commanders. If the issues remain unresolved, the US commanders will refer the matters to higher US authorities.”²³ This same rule applies to “...foreign forces placed under the OPCON of US MNFCs. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations”, therefore, as logic would suggest, “in multinational operations, consensus through compromise is often essential to success.”²⁴

As a result, U.S. forces participating in a multinational operation – either a coalition or as part of an alliance – effectively have two chains of command. One is through the multinational command authority overseeing the operation, the other originating with the U.S. national command authority. The same ‘parallel command structure’ is true for the military forces of every state involved in a multinational operation. The balance for the multinational commander is a delicate one: between managing a heterogeneous military force with preeminent allegiance to their national capitols and subject to the desires of their respective political leaderships, and employing these forces as a homogeneous fighting force with maximum military effectiveness. The extent that parallel command

structures can negatively impact effective military operations will be discussed in later chapters.

Operational Control, Tactical Control, and Support Relationships

When command of U.S. forces participating in a multinational operation is exercised by a foreign officer, the type of operational authority exercised is operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. The specific type of operational authority the gaining foreign commander will exercise is specified by the Secretary of Defense. Foreign officers do not exercise ‘combatant command’ over U.S. forces – this authority remains in a U.S. chain of command as defined by Title 10, U.S. Code.

Operational control provides the gaining commander the broad “authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command....Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.”²⁵

Tactical control is defined as “...command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned....Tactical control provides sufficient

authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.”²⁶ A support relationship is also a command relationship and can take a number of forms. In general terms, support denotes “an element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat.”²⁷

¹¹ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 22 March 2004, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

¹² Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-7.

¹³ Speech by the Right Honorable Lord Robertson, Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during Plenary Session 10, Atlantic Treaty Association General Assembly, 7 November 2003, Edinburgh, Scotland

¹⁴ Speech by General James L. Jones, USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during Plenary Session 3, Atlantic Treaty Association General Assembly, 5 November 2003, Edinburgh, Scotland

¹⁵ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 22 March 2004, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-7.

¹⁷ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 March 2004, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>. Bolding added by author.

¹⁸ Federation of American Scientists. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives [PDD] Clinton Administration 1993-2000, PDD-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 3 May 94. On-line. Internet, 10 Sept 2003. Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html>. Para V.B. under ‘KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY ON

REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (AS SPECIFIED IN PDD 25, MAY 1994.

¹⁹ Government Printing Office, “United States Code – Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 6 – COMBATANT COMMANDS, Sec. 162. Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command, (a) Assignment of Forces”, 1 Oct 1986, and as amended through 2 Jan 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/uscmmain.html>.

²⁰ Government Printing Office, “United States Code – Title 10, Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 6 – COMBATANT COMMANDS, Sec. 162.(a) Combatant commands: assigned forces; chain of command”, subpara (4), 1 Oct 1986, and as amended through 2 Jan 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/uscmmain.html>.

²¹ Federation of American Scientists. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives [PDD] Clinton Administration 1993-2000, PDD-25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 3 May 94. On-line. Internet, 10 Sept 2003. Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html>. Para V.A. thru V.D. under ‘KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S POLICY ON REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS (AS SPECIFIED IN PDD 25, MAY 1994.

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-3 - II-4.

²³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-5.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 22 March 2004. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-4 - II-5.

²⁵ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

²⁶ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

²⁷ Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 17 December 2003, Joint Electronic Library, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 Sept 2003, available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html>.

Chapter 3

Historic Examples of Command and Control in Multinational Operations

There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.

President George W. Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

Throughout the 20th century, command and control arrangements in multinational operations involving U.S. military forces have ranged from loose overall unity of command structures marked by parallel command structures, to strong central command and control of coalition operations. As we will see in the following examples, there is no standard command and control arrangement for multinational operations; the command structure is influenced by too many dynamic factors that must be considered on a case-by-case basis. In addition, every participating state participating in a coalition has their own domestic law(s), policy, and cultural predisposition which will influence how much – or how little – they will allow foreign command of their participating armed forces.

The specific coalition operations examined in this research are, briefly, WWI and WWII to provide historical background, with a more indepth look at United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), Operation DENY FLIGHT (Bosnia), Operation DELIBERATE FORCE (Bosnia), and Operation ALLIED FORCE (FRY).

World War I

World War I saw a metamorphosis for command and control of allied coalition forces. Initially, this conflict was marked by strong parallel command structures in which coalition partners maintained command of their own national forces. Though some political and military leaders called for a unified coalition command structure at the onset of this conflict, British and U.S. senior leaders remained skeptical. According to Field Marshal William Robertson, British Chief of the Imperial Staff during WWI:

I submit that, except in very special circumstances, the placing of armies permanently under the control of a foreign General, having no responsibility to the Parliament of the country to which they belong, can never be a measure that any soldier will recommend, or any Government will sanction, without reluctance. The presumption is that armies fight better under a Commander in Chief of their own than under a foreigner, and there are other obvious objections to the latter in respect of questions of casualties, discipline and appointments.²⁸

In fact, “on his assumption as commander in chief of the British army in France in 1915, General Sir Douglas Haig was reminded by the War Minister, Lord Kitchener: ‘Your command is an independent one and you will in any case not come under the orders of any allied general.’”²⁹ This sentiment was echoed within the U.S. chain of command as evidenced by a directive to General Pershing from the Secretary of War which specifically stated: “In operations against the Imperial German government, you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in doing so the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved.”³⁰

It was not until after America’s entry into the conflict and the “...near collapse of the Western Front in March 1918 following the major German offensive that changes were

made in command and control among the Allies.”³¹ To this end, in April 1918 the Prime Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and senior allied commanders met at Beauvais, France to review command and control arrangements for Allied forces. At this council, General Pershing made the following statement regarding his thoughts for the correct command and control arrangement for coalition forces:

The principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for the Allies to follow. I do not believe that it is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander. We have already experience enough in trying to coordinate the operations of the Allied Armies without success. There has never been real unity of action. Such coordination between two or three armies is impossible no matter who the commanders-in-chief may be. Each commander-in-chief is interested in his own army, and cannot get the other commander's point of view or grasp of the problem as a whole. I am in favor of a supreme commander and believe that the success of the Allied cause depends on it. I think the necessary action should be taken by this council at once. I am in favor of conferring the supreme command upon General Foch.³²

As a result, “World War I forced the evolution of command and control in a coalition from parallel command to unity of command, exercised finally by a Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, General Foch. The inability of coordination measures...to meet the demands of Allied action against the rapidly changing in the spring of 1918, persuaded the Allied leaders that unity of command was a prerequisite of effective Allied warfighting.”³³

As Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief on the Western Front, General Foch's personal qualities of tact and forbearance with allied commanders aided immeasurably in ensuring unity of action within the coalition. He viewed his new role with a profound sense of realism, which pervaded his interaction with allied commanders, saying that the phrase “unified command gives a false idea of the powers exercised by the individual in question—that is, if it is meant that he commanded in the military sense of the word.”³⁴

General Foch well understood the limits of his ability to command the diverse coalition, contending “that his was the power to persuade and suggest, not to order.”³⁵ General Foch’s sensitivity to the needs of the coalition members is further captured in this enlightened statement from his memoirs: “each army has its own spirit and tradition; each has to satisfy the requirements of its own government; and the latter, in its turn, has its own particular needs and interests to consider.”³⁶

World War II

WWII arguably represents coalition warfare at its strongest. According to one British military historian, “World War II saw the development of coalition warfare to a peak never passed before or since. The principle of unity of purpose at the grand strategic level, reflected by unity of command within specified theaters, had been firmly established.”³⁷

Specifically, when General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander for the combined invasion of North Africa in late 1942, “the principle of unity of command and a supreme allied commander for the theater had been established. Recognizing, however, that this was the first time a British army had served under a US commander, General Anderson, Commander of the 1st (British) Army, was given the right of appeal to national authorities – subject to some constraints – if he felt his army was threatened with dire consequences. While this right of appeal was in principle retained throughout the war, it was seldom exercised.”³⁸

Major General Bull, U.S. Army, Chief of Plans at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) had this to say about the reasons for the unprecedented level of cooperation and integration of coalition forces during WWII:

I can conceive of no scheme which will work unless three actions are taken: First, firm political decisions made and clear objectives set by national leaders above the theater commander. That is to ensure unity of purpose....If your international high level decisions are to be made at the theater level, I'd say, "God help us in unity of purpose"; [second] Unity of command to ensure unquestioned and timely execution of directives; [third] Staff integration with mutual respect and confidence in combined staffs to ensure sound development of plans and directives fully representing the major elements of the command.³⁹

Given this broad history from the World Wars regarding coalition command and control during combat operations, what types of coalitions involving combat operations – albeit smaller in scope – has the U.S. participated in since Operation DESERT STORM, and what types of command and control were established? How well – or poorly – did these command and control arrangements function?

United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II)

U.S. military operations in Somalia from Aug 1992 – March 1994 fell into three phases, gradually progressing from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. The initial humanitarian mission was conducted under the auspices of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF in support of UN Security Council Resolution 751. However, by November 1992, the deteriorating security situation and magnitude of the humanitarian mission dictated that additional measures had to be taken to establish a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid. As a result, in December 1992, Operation PROVIDE RELIEF transitioned to Operation RESTORE HOPE, in which the U.S. led and provided military forces to a UN-sponsored coalition known as the United Task Force (UNITAF). This force involved contributions by more than thirty nations and was intended to bridge the gap until the situation in Somalia stabilized and operations could be turned over to a permanent UN force. The follow-on UN force was led by a Turkish general officer and

was known as United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The UN mandate for UNOSOM II implied two key missions: “to provide humanitarian assistance to the Somali people, and to restore order in southern Somalia.”⁴⁰ Because of the implicit requirement to use force in accomplishing this mission, this review will focus on command and control of U.S. forces under UNOSOM II.




Figure 1 UN & U.S. Chains of Command for Operations in Somalia ⁴¹

In UNOSOM II, the command arrangements reflected the fact that the operation was to take place under UN control. The UN Force Commander in Somalia was Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, a Turkish officer, his deputy was U.S. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery. In addition to his role as deputy to Lieutenant General Bir, Major General Montgomery was also dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSCOM). “The potential for conflict in this dual-hatting of command relationships was clear: as a

U.S. Commander, Major General Montgomery served under the command and control of CENTCOM. While as deputy to Lieutenant General Bir, he served under the operational control of the United Nations.”⁴² As if the dual-hatting was not a significant enough roadblock to unity of command, even within the U.S. command chain there were different, often competing, chains of command. In fact, the ‘lessons-learned’ for the Somalia operation go so far as to say “...*there should be no mistaking the fact that the greatest obstacles to unity of command during UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on itself.* Particularly at the end of the operation, these command arrangements had effectively created conditions that allowed no one to set clear, unambiguous priorities in designing and executing a comprehensive force package.”⁴³ Throughout this operation “MG Montgomery exercised his authority through an...unusual combination of direct support, operational control, and tactical control. These command relationships were unusual but reflected three fundamental objectives for UNOSOM II: to keep U.S. forces firmly under U.S. control, to reduce the visibility of U.S. combat forces in the operation, and to eliminate any misperception that those forces were under the command of the United Nations.”⁴⁴

Responsibility for the competing and cumbersome command and control structure is, according to one source, the direct result of civilian reluctance or inability to exert adequate control over the military forces deployed for this operation. Accordingly,

...civilian abdication, not military arrogance was to blame. Deferring to a zealous United Nations high commissioner – an American – neither the president nor the secretary of defense regarded American forces operating in Mogadishu as forces fighting a low-level war, but a war nonetheless, in which some effort should be made by national authority to harmonize ends and means. Far from abusing the military by micromanaging it, the Clinton administration abused it by failing to take the war seriously and inquire into means, methods, and techniques. Its civilian leadership

failed...by refusing to ask why American forces in Somalia were operating under several different commands – commands which communicated with another poorly and in some cases not at all.⁴⁵

Regardless of its origin, this lack of unity command proved to be a significant impediment to the operation. In fact, UNOSOM II Commander Lieutenant General Bir later “cited his lack of command authority as the most significant limitation of this operation or any other one organized under Chapter VII.”⁴⁶

As operations in Somalia progressed from humanitarian to combat operations, there was also an increasing reluctance on the part of contributing nations to expand the mission of individual national forces. This increasing erosion of unity of purpose for coalition forces created an untenable position for coalition military leadership. In fact, ‘lessons learned’ from this operation state “because most multinational contingents...make it a point to stay in close touch with their national capitals, concerns over the policy of hunting for Aideed grew along with increased potential for combat.”⁴⁷

This concern manifested itself in a pronounced tendency for some of these national contingents to seek guidance from their respective national capitals before carrying out even routine tactical orders. According to published reports, the commander of the Italian contingent went so far as to open separate negotiations with the fugitive warlord Mohammed Aideed—apparently with the full approval of his home government. With American backing, the United Nations requested this officer’s relief from command for insubordination. The Italian Government refused and life went on – a **useful demonstration of both the fundamental existence of parallel lines of authority and the fundamental difficulties of commanding a coalition force under combat conditions**⁴⁸ (bolding added by author).

Another key disconnect inhibiting effective command and control was the lack of an integrated coalition staff from the outset. In fact, “MG Montgomery met the UNOSOM II staff for the first time when he arrived in Somalia – and only 30 percent of them had arrived by the time the mission was launched.”⁴⁹ This 30 percent included a contingent

of 47 American personnel deployed by CENTCOM to provide critical skills during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, which, according to General Joseph P. Hoar, former CENTCOM commander, emphasized “the need for new procedures to people U.N. military staffs in contingency operations.”⁵⁰ Moreover, the initial slowness in setting up the UNOSOM II staff was aggravated by its composition; it was formed incrementally from the voluntary contributions of the multinational contingents who detailed personnel as they arrived.⁵¹ The result: the UNOSOM II staff was neither manned nor organized to effectively support contingency operations, nor was it ever effectively able to function as a battlestaff.

Operation DENY FLIGHT (Bosnia)

In support of the Dayton Peace Accords, Operation DENY FLIGHT was a coalition air operation conducted from 12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995 over the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation DENY FLIGHT was officially terminated 20 December 1995 when the implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for security of the airspace over Bosnia. The mission of this operation was three-fold:

1. To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816, which bans flights by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the “No-Fly Zone” (NFZ).
2. To provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces under the provisions of UNSCRs 836, 958, and 981.
3. To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe zones.⁵²

Initially involving approximately 50 fighter, reconnaissance, and tanker aircraft from France, the Netherlands and the U.S., by the last week of Operation DENY FLIGHT

4,500 personnel from 12 NATO countries – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States – were participating in the operation. Over the 983 days of Operation DENY FLIGHT, there were 23,021 No-Fly Zone sorties, 27,077 CAS / Air Strike sorties, and 29,158 SEAD, NAEW, tanker, ISR & support aircraft sorties flown.⁵³ Despite this impressive number of sorties, “...only 4 Galebs were shot down, eight CAS missions were performed, and ten strikes were conducted.”⁵⁴ Why? Three contributing causes for the limited use of airpower by the coalition were 1) a ‘dual-key’ command and control arrangement between the UN and NATO which inhibited timely decision-making; 2) a fundamental disconnect between the UN and NATO over what specifically validated the use of force – a crippling lack of unity of purpose which largely rendered the application of airpower impotent; and 3) ineffective staff organizations to handle complex operations.

First, this multinational combat operation used a parallel chain whereby NATO retained operational command of its forces while coordinating with UNPROFOR and the UN for approval to use airpower to enforce UN sanctions. This command arrangement did not provide a central authority; instead, a ‘dual key’ control system for the use of air power was adopted. First, a basic understanding of the NATO command structure for Operation DENY FLIGHT.

Within NATO, the operational command and control of day-to-day mission tasking for Bosnian air operations was exercised by the Commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), an Italian two-star general in Vicenza, Italy. The 5 ATAF commander was, in turn, subordinate to the commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Command (AIRSOUTH), an American general officer. The actual entity responsible for

conduct of air operations was the newly created Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy, established specifically to handle expanded air operations over Bosnia. On paper, this CAOC was to be a subordinate extension of the existing 5 ATAF command center, but in practice the CAOC commander – an American 2-star general – reported directly to AIRSOUTH. The AIRSOUTH commander “chose this arrangement over expanding the 5 ATAF facility because he believed it would give him tighter control over what he anticipated was going to be a fast-paced and politically hypersensitive situation.”⁵⁵ This decision also had the additional dimension of effectively removing the Italian 5 ATAF commander from the de facto NATO chain of command for Operation DENY FLIGHT. Rather than collocating his headquarters with the CAOC, the AIRSOUTH commander decided instead that “leaving the CAOC in Vicenza had the advantage of preserving at least the form of the existing NATO command structure by keeping the Italian commander of 5 ATAF in the formal chain of command.”⁵⁶ AIRSOUTH itself was subordinate to the commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), another American general, who reported to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) – another American. SACEUR, in turn, took his guidance from the ambassadors sitting on the NAC.⁵⁷

Against this organizational backdrop – and in part in reaction to it – in June 1993, NATO and the U.N. adopted a dual-key procedure for releasing close-air support (CAS) and offensive air strikes (OAS). This procedure was the result of concerns centering “...around the ‘Americanization’ of the intervention’s air option....Several European states, particularly those with lightly armed peacekeeping forces committed on the ground, had fears...circumstances could lead to a unilateral, American use of the air

weapon that might escalate the level of violence in the region or the intervention's role in it. Thus...several members of the NAC proposed the dual-key procedure to both NATO and the UN, in an effort to set up an arrangement that most people believed would preclude any offensive air action.”⁵⁸

The arrangement required appropriate officials in both the UN and NATO to turn their keys before any NATO aircraft could release weapons against a ground target. For NATO, any military commander, from the CAOC director up, could authorize CAS strikes in response to a UN request. CINCAFSOUTH retained release authority for offensive air strikes. For the UN, the decision thresholds were raised one organizational level. Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros-Ghali authorized his special representative, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, to release CAS strikes, while retaining for himself the authority to release offensive air strikes.⁵⁹

This arrangement meant that the UN retained the ability to request and authorize the use of NATO air power in support of UN Security Council Resolutions.⁶⁰ The salient point is that this dual-key procedure was never designed to expedite the decision-making process with regard to the use of airpower, it was “...about controlling a powerful and politically sensitive ‘weapon’ in the coalition’s arsenal, and part of it was about controlling the holders of that weapon.”⁶¹ Coordination between NATO and the UN was arranged through an exchange of representatives between 5th ATAF and the United Nations Headquarters in Zagreb and Sarajevo.⁶²

In its May 1995 ‘Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia’, the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the limited use of airpower in Operation DENY FLIGHT stemmed from a fundamental difference between the United Nations and NATO on the mission of this operation. Specifically, the GAO found that “according to NATO and U.N. documents and officials, the U.N. believes that the robust use of air power is inconsistent with ensuring the cooperation of all parties. NATO believes sufficient air power should be used to accomplish the mission of deterring attacks on U.N. personnel

and safe areas.”⁶³ Stemming from a fundamental lack of agreement on the sustaining causes of the Bosnian conflict, NATO and the UN had significantly different perceptions on how airpower should be used to intervene. The disparity between NATO and UN “...views of the causes of the war also had indirect significance on the air planners, because their contrariety undermined the ability of NATO and the UN, as corporate organizations, to develop consensus between themselves and among their members on what exactly to do about Bosnia. Consensus was a necessary prelude to action because both organizations are voluntary associations of sovereign states.”⁶⁴ Ultimately, this lack of unity of purpose reduced NATO’s potential ‘use of force’ to little more than a ‘threat of force’. From an operational perspective, this inconsistency between NATO’s and the UN’s perspectives regarding the use of force in Operation DENY FLIGHT is summed up as follows:

NATO believed it had three clearly defined missions: enforce a NFZ, protect UNPROFOR with CAS, and conduct strikes to protect U.N. designated safe areas....In reality, these missions were not so clearly defined because the U.N. did not share the same willingness to use of force.

The U.N. had legitimate reasons for not wanting to use force to the same extent as NATO. Enforcement of the NFZ, especially with respect to helicopters, posed a risk of shooting down non-combatants. Because UNPROFOR personnel had to call for CAS missions, they risked being seen as ‘party to the conflict’. This perception that UNPROFOR had ‘chosen sides’ hindered UNPROFOR’s ability to negotiate cease fires and risked making their personnel targets. Air strikes risked retaliation against UNPROFOR for NATO actions, e.g. UNPROFOR personnel were used as ‘human shields to deter attacks on potential targets’. **While both NATO and the U.N. had valid arguments for using or not using force, the lack of agreement demonstrated a lack of unity of effort. Since there was no controlling authority, there was no means within the parallel chain to resolve this lack of unity**⁶⁵ (bolding added by author).

Even within NATO there existed a divergence of opinion regarding the appropriate use of airpower in DENY FLIGHT. According to the Balkans Air Campaign Study, “in

their formal chain of command, the American flag officers in charge of DENY FLIGHT worked for the NAC, which was acting in support of the UN Security Council....Yet, in their informal chain of command, these officers were American, and by mid-1993 their government was on record in support of the use of airpower to halt or punish Serb aggression – a position that AFSOUTH leaders were inclined to agree with.”⁶⁶

Ultimately, while available, airpower was seldom employed in close air support or to conduct strikes. The salient point is that “the simple fact that NATO’s role in ODF was in direct support of UNSCRs did not necessarily mean that NATO and the U.N. shared unity of purpose. When objectives conflicted, the parallel chain provided the U.N. the means to veto the use of force. In this case, the parallel chain of command caused command gridlock.”⁶⁷

Additionally, the NATO staffs involved in this operation were insufficient to plan, manage, or execute complex combat operations. According to The Balkans Air Campaign Study, during this period the “...5ATAF headquarters was small, and its control center was equipped with obsolescent equipment. It possessed none of the state-of-the-art automated air planning and information downlink systems that had proven so successful in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. Similarly, AIRSOUTH was a small planning headquarters...(and) neither AIRSOUTH nor AFSOUTH had crisis-planning cells to deal with the rapid onset and fast-paced political and military evolution of something like DENY FLIGHT.”⁶⁸

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE (Bosnia)

Although initiated in reaction to a marketplace mortar attack in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was in planning over a much longer

period of time. The operation itself was conducted from 29 Aug – 14 Sep 95, with weapons released against Serb targets in Bosnia on just twelve days. During the operation, 3515 total sorties flown and 1026 munitions dropped against 338 individual targets. About 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support aircraft from eight NATO nations participated in the operation, with the U.S. flying 65.9% of the total sorties.⁶⁹ While technically a phase of Operation DENY FLIGHT⁷⁰, DELIBERATE FORCE's limited operational focus, brevity, and mission mark this as a distinctly separate operation that deserves its own discreet scrutiny as a coalition combat operation.

Despite Operation DELIBERATE FORCE being fundamentally a regional alliance's (NATO) enforcement of a global political organization's (UN) resolutions, and the plethora of organizational and national agendas that could have derailed unity of purpose for the coalition, remarkably, unity of purpose remained steadfast throughout the 22 calendar days of this operation. The commitment of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was unflinching, as noted in their unanimous decision to initially authorize airstrikes, as well as in their decision to resume airstrikes after a pause requested by Lt General Janvier, Force Commander, UN Preventive Force two days into the operation. Specifically,

NATO diplomats on the North Atlantic Council...recognized the importance and value of the bombing campaign. Their collective decision to authorize air operations in the first place was clear evidence of their expectation that the potential benefits of the operations outweighed their risks....On the same afternoon that the pause began, Secretary-General Claes called a meeting of the NAC to confirm that the members remained willing to let operations resume when the commanders deemed it necessary....All members favored resuming the bombing if the Serbs failed to show evidence of complying with UN demands....Having taken the international and domestic political risks of initiating DELIBERATE FORCE, the members of the NAC were determined to see it through.⁷¹

In fact, the resumption of the bombing campaign on the morning of 5 September 1995 served as “hard evidence that the UN’s and NAC’s expressions of unanimity and commitment were real.”⁷² Even more than the initial start of bombing, “...the resumption of the bombing became the pivotal moment of the campaign,” clearly signaling to the Serbs that the UN and NATO were committed and that Serb opportunities for military success and diplomatic maneuvering were running out.⁷³

Unlike Operation DENY FLIGHT, there was not a continuous requirement for dual-key decisions by NATO and the UN for each strike package and sortie flown in support of Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, significantly streamlining the decision-making process for air operations. The 28 Aug 95 mortar attack on civilians in the Sarajevo marketplace resulted in the only requirement for a ‘dual key’ decision, which occurred on 29 Aug 95 when the commander UNPROFOR reported that the Serbs were responsible for the marketplace mortar attack. In response to this report, CINCSOUTH and the U.N. Protective Force (UNPF) Commander ‘turned their keys’ allowing for the initiation of air strikes on 30 August 1995.⁷⁴ As a discreet air operation designed to reduce Serb military capabilities to threaten or attack UN designated safe areas, the DELIBERATE FORCE concept of operation and associated targets had been approved in principle by NATO and the UN military leadership prior to the operation’s execution, with final UN approval of the initial targets 29 August 1995.

Unity of command was achieved for Operation DELIBERATE FORCE with General Ryan, commander AIRSOUTH, exercising close operational command through the Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy. Reflecting his and Admiral Smith’s – commander AFSOUTH – conviction that ‘every bomb was a political

bomb,' General Ryan personally oversaw the selection of every target.⁷⁵ Facilitating this unity of command was the fact that every major command position during the conduct of this operation was held by an American general officer, from a 2-star AF general in the CAOC, to 4-star flag officers commanding AIRSOUTH, AFSOUTH, and serving as SACEUR.

Also in contrast to Operation DENY FLIGHT, DELIBERATE FORCE was conducted with a robust, if not transitory, CAOC staff. During the preceding months "...neither 5 ATAF nor AFSOUTH were organized, manned, or equipped to handle the scale and complexity of an operation like DENY FLIGHT, let alone DELIBERATE FORCE."⁷⁶ However, "...on the eve of DELIBERATE FORCE, all major staff positions at the CAOC and most at AIRSOUTH were filled by USAF colonels."⁷⁷ In fact, in the months leading up to DELIBERATE FORCE, the AFSOUTH commander "...drew heavily on US manpower and equipment to expand the CAOC's capabilities. Several hundred TDY augmentees began flowing in from US bases everywhere, along with a flood of state-of-the-art communications, intelligence, and automated planning systems....Taken together, these actions pretty much completed the effective 'Americanization' of the CAOC..."⁷⁸ While dominated by U.S. personnel, the expansion of capability of the CAOC – in terms of personnel and equipment – was critical to managing the complexity of air operations carried out in DELIBERATE FORCE.

Operation ALLIED FORCE (Kosovo)

Operation ALLIED FORCE was initiated by NATO on 24 Mar, 99 in response to increasing Serbian – Kosovar Albanian violence in Kosovo and Milosevic's refusal to

sign the Rambouillet Agreement that would have established peace and self-government in Kosovo. Throughout the 78-day operation, over 38,000 allied combat sorties were flown by allied aircraft from 13 NATO countries with no U.S. or allied casualties.⁷⁹ As the largest combat operation in NATO's history, Operation ALLIED FORCE presented unique command and control challenges. According to former Secretary of Defense Cohen, the U.S. and NATO had three primary strategic interests during Operation ALLIED FORCE:

Ensuring the stability of Eastern Europe. Serb aggression in Kosovo directly threatened peace throughout the Balkans and thereby the stability of all of southeastern Europe. There was no natural boundary to this violence, which already had moved through Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia.

Thwarting ethnic cleansing. The Belgrade regime's cruel repression in Kosovo, driving thousands from their homes, created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions. Milosevic's campaign, which he dubbed "Operation Horseshoe", would have led to even more homelessness, starvation, and loss of life had his ruthlessness gone unchecked.

Ensuring NATO's credibility. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia signed agreements in October 1998 that were to be verified by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and monitored by NATO. In the period leading up to March 1999, Serbian forces increasingly and flagrantly violated these agreements. Had NATO not responded to Milosevic's defiance and his campaign of ethnic cleansing, its credibility would have been called into question.⁸⁰

To protect these strategic political interests, NATO's specific strategic objectives in this operation were to "(1) demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Belgrade's aggression in the Balkans, (2) deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing, and (3) damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations."⁸¹

While unified in the need to conduct action, as demonstrated by the 22 March 1999 NAC decision to grant NATO Secretary General Solana the authority to initiate hostilities, there was little agreement or unity of purpose among the 19 member nations of NATO regarding specific military objectives for the operation. Despite agreement on the broad strategic objectives outlined above, once hostilities commenced, the de facto primary objective for military operations was to demonstrate that NATO could act militarily in concert against a common enemy. Lessons learned from this operation found that “NATO’s restrained escalation of force, with no threat of ground attack and a gradual application of increased air power, violated conventional U.S. military doctrine to maximize shock. A desire to sustain allied unity largely caused this restraint, and ceded time and initiative to Milosevic.”⁸²

Ultimately, according to General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe during Operation ALLIED FORCE, “...the cohesion of the alliance was more important than any single target we struck....”⁸³ To maintain unity of purpose at the political level, General Clark “...acknowledged that he was compelled to sacrifice basic logic of warfare to maintain the political cohesion of the alliance.”⁸⁴ As a result, maintenance of the alliance became the overriding concern, not maximizing the military effectiveness of airpower against Serb targets. Why was maintaining the alliance of such overriding importance during this operation? According to a joint statement from U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “...*the solidarity of the alliance* was central in compelling Belgrade to accept NATO’s conditions. Because Milosevic could not defeat NATO militarily, his best hope lay in splitting the alliance politically. Thus, it was not

enough for NATO simply to concentrate on winning a military victory; at the heart of the allied strategy was building and sustaining the unity of the alliance.”⁸⁵

As a result of “...inadequate strategic planning at the highest political levels”⁸⁶ and the lack of communication of the overriding political nature of this operation to senior NATO military commanders, there existed, almost from the onset of ALLIED FORCE, tension caused by the lack of coherent political direction and the military objectives for this operation. Even within the U.S. chain of command there was little understanding by General Wesley Clark of the factors influencing political considerations that would ultimately have a significant impact on the objectives of ALLIED FORCE. In fact, according to Gen Clark, “I had little idea, and never had during the entire crisis, how the commander in chief, or the secretary of defense were making their decisions.”⁸⁷




Figure 2 NATO & U.S. Chains of Command For Operation ALLIED FORCE ⁸⁸

As was the case in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, we find a U.S. dominated chain of command in place for ALLIED FORCE. As the likelihood of hostilities increased, in January 1999 the United States European Command created Joint Task Force (JTF) Noble Anvil to establish a parallel U.S. chain of command and to link U.S. and NATO command structures.

Joint Task Force Nobel Anvil, commanded by Admiral Ellis, established an intermediate command level between the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, on the one hand, and the Commander, Sixth Fleet and Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, on the other....Lieutenant General Short, the Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, who was also the Combined Force Air Component Commander, now became the U.S. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as well. Similarly, Vice Admiral Murphy, already the Commander, Sixth Fleet, as well as the Commander, Allied Strike Forces, Southern Europe, was also the U.S. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).⁸⁹

Rather than simplify or streamline decision-making, the parallel U.S. chain had the opposite effect. In fact, according to a 14 October 1999 joint statement from Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Shelton before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures and systems complicated operational planning and maintenance of unity of command.”⁹⁰ The reason for this, in part, was that the parallel U.S. command structure inhibited any real coalition staff integration, thereby inhibiting the cross-flow of operational information between U.S. forces and coalition allies. In fact,

Throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE, the United States remained extremely cautious about sharing sensitive information with its NATO allies....Operation ALLIED FORCE therefore involved two separate Air Tasking Orders (ATOs). The NATO ATO, which was distributed to all NATO Alliance members, listed sorties to be flown by European aircraft and nonstealthy U.S. aircraft. A separate, U.S.-only ATO tasked the sorties to be flown by B-2 bombers and F-117 fighters, support elements for all strike packages, and U.S. Tomahawk and CALCM cruise missiles to strike selected targets. This second ATO was distributed only to U.S. officials to ensure maximum secrecy about the advanced weapons. This

arrangement inevitably caused problems, because the ATO is in principle a comprehensive document containing information about every sortie being flown on a given day. General Short later acknowledged that the two separate ATOs led to confusion when U.S. aircraft suddenly showed up on NATO radar screens with no advance warning.⁹¹

To further complicate the challenge to unity of command, within NATO there existed strong parallel command structures between a number of the participating combat forces and their national capitals. The impact of this lack of command unity was most clearly evidenced in constant changes made to the target list by the political leadership of coalition partners. Here, parallel command and control arrangements within NATO and between national capitals and their participating military forces amplified differences in perspective between coalition members at the national political level, causing short-term, tactical military objectives to be effected by political adjustments in target lists.⁹² In fact, “for selected categories of targets – for example, targets in downtown Belgrade, in Montenegro, or targets likely to involve high collateral damage – NATO reserved approval for higher political authorities. NATO leaders used this mechanism to ensure that member nations were fully cognizant of particularly sensitive military operations, and, thereby, to sustain the unity of the alliance.”⁹³

The extent of national involvement in the targeting process had a profound effect on the military effectiveness of Operation ALLIED FORCE. Specifically, each

...target had to be proposed, reviewed, and approved by NATO and national authorities before being added to the master target list. This cumbersome process revealed major divisions among the NATO allies and limited the military effectiveness of the operation.

The first step in this process was to identify a potential target....The prospective targets were passed on to the joint Target Coordination Board, which was jointly chaired by Lieutenant General Michael Short, the air component commander for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), and Vice Admiral Daniel Murphy, AFSOUTH's Commander of Striking

and Support Forces. The Board then passed its recommended targets up through the chain of command...

Military officers and political leaders from each of NATO's 19 members analyzed specific aim points, proposed munitions for each target, and estimated the potential for civilian casualties. Member states retained the right to veto any proposed target for any reason, and no target could be included on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) until it had received unanimous approval. This intensive national review process severely limited the number of targets. According to Pentagon estimates, more than 80 percent of the targets struck during the first four weeks had been attacked at least once before.⁹⁴

Moreover, according to General Wesley Clark, "most nations had their lawyers check the targets that were actually struck by the pilots before the pilots flew. We had a couple of cases of pilots turning around in flight and saying, Oops, we just got told that this doesn't [meet] the test of such and such—a domestic legal procedure."⁹⁵ This level of attention by individual national governments led to considerable frustration on the part of some senior military commanders involved in the operation. In fact, "NATO military leaders, including General Clark, General Naumann, and General Short have criticized the extent to which they were unable to conduct the operation based upon military objectives, and have called for an examination of the alliance's decision making processes once a military operation has been undertaken."⁹⁶

²⁸ Robertson, William. *Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918*, Vol 2. London: Cassel, 1926. Pgs 296-297.

²⁹ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>). Quote is specifically from John Terrain's "Lessons of Coalition Warfare," *RUSI Journal*, 134 (Summer 1989), 57-62.

³⁰ Pershing, John J., VanDiver, Frank E.. *My Experiences in the First World War*, Vol 1 (rpt.; New York: De Capo Press, 1995). Pg. 38.

³¹ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>).

³² Pershing, John J., VanDiver, Frank E.. *My Experiences in the First World War*, Vol 1 (rpt.; New York: De Capo Press, 1995). Pg 375.

³³ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>).

³⁴ Foch, General Ferdinand (trans T. Bentley Mott). *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*. New York: Doubleday, 1931). Pg 185

³⁵ Cohen, Eliot A. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press, 2002. Pg 80.

³⁶ Foch, General Ferdinand (trans T. Bentley Mott). *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*. New York: Doubleday, 1931). Pg 185

³⁷ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>).

³⁸ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>).

³⁹ Rice, Anthony J., Colonel, British Army. 1997. "Command And Control: The Essence Of Coalition Warfare", *Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly*, Spring 1997, 152-167. Available from the World Wide Web: (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97spring/rice.htm>). Excerpt from lecture on "Combined Operational Planning" given by Major General Harold R. Bull to Armed Forces Staff College 25 April 1949.

⁴⁰ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg. 16.

⁴¹ Reproduced from Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pgs 27. This chart has been

redrawn to improve its presentation while remaining faithful to the raw material in the original chart.

⁴² Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pgs 24-25.

⁴³ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 60. Italics in original text.

⁴⁴ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 57

⁴⁵ Cohen, Eliot A. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*. New York: Free Press, 2002. Pg. 201.

⁴⁶ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 34.

⁴⁷ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 34.

⁴⁸ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pgs 56-57.

⁴⁹ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg. 26.

⁵⁰ Hoar, Joseph P., Gen, 1993. "A CINC's Perspective". *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly* No.2.56-63 Autumn 1993. Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0902.pdf). Pg. 62.

⁵¹ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 26.

⁵² Regional Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 18 July 2003. *Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT*. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/denyflight/DenyFlight/FactSheet.htm>). Np.

⁵³ Regional Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 18 July 2003. *Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT*. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/denyflight/DenyFlight/FactSheet.htm>). Np.

⁵⁴ Gawne, Brian G. 1996. *Dual Key Command And Control In Operation Deny Flight: Paralyzed By Design*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College. Pg 6.

⁵⁵ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 14.

⁵⁶ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 14.

⁵⁷ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 10-11.

⁵⁸ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 16.

⁵⁹ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 15-16.

⁶⁰ Gawne, Brian G. 1996. *Dual Key Command And Control In Operation Deny Flight: Paralyzed By Design*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College. Pg 2.

⁶¹ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 16.

⁶² Regional Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 18 July 2003. *Fact Sheet: Operation DENY FLIGHT*. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/denyflight/DenyFlight/FactSheet.htm>). Np.

⁶³ U.S. General Accounting Office, "Peacekeeping Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia." (Washington: 1995). Available from World Wide Web: (<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns95148b.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>). [Accessed 16 October 2003]. Section entitled 'NATO AIR POWER USED SPARINGLY'.

⁶⁴ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 10.

⁶⁵ Gawne, Brian G. 1996. *Dual Key Command And Control In Operation Deny Flight: Paralyzed By Design*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College. Pg 8.

⁶⁶ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 13.

⁶⁷ Gawne, Brian G. 1996. *Dual Key Command And Control In Operation Deny Flight: Paralyzed By Design*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College. Pg 9.

⁶⁸ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 11.

⁶⁹ Regional Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 2002. *Fact Sheet: Operation DELIBERATE FORCE*. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm>).

⁷⁰ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 9.

⁷¹ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2", *Airpower Journal* 11:6-26 Fall 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/fal97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 16.

⁷² Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2", *Airpower Journal* 11:6-26 Fall 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/fal97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 17.

⁷³ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2", *Airpower Journal* 11:6-26 Fall 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/fal97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 17.

⁷⁴ Regional Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe. 2002. *Fact Sheet: Operation DELIBERATE FORCE*. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm>).

⁷⁵ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2", *Airpower Journal* 11:6-26 Fall 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/fal97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 9.

⁷⁶ Owen, Robert C., USAF, 1997. "Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1", *Airpower Journal* 11:4-24 Summer 1997. Available from World Wide Web: (<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/sum97/owen.pdf>). Pg. 11.

⁷⁷ Hornburg, Lt. Gen. Hal. "Briefing." Briefing to Balkans Air Campaign Study team, Air Force Wargaming Institute. Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 14 March 1996. General Hornburg was deputy director of the CAOC at the time of DELIBERATE FORCE.

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⁷⁹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review*. 14 October 1999. Accessed 23 October 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html>. Pg 1.

⁸⁰ Department of Defense. 2000. *Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report: Report To Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. Pg 1 "Message From Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton" cover letter.

⁸¹ Department of Defense. 2000. *Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report: Report To Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. Pg xviii.

⁸² Gallis, Paul E. 1999. *Kosovo: Lessons Learned From Operation ALLIED FORCE*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. This passage found in 'Summary' at beginning of document.

⁸³ Clark, General Wesley K., quoted by Erin Q. Winograd, "Clark Says Air Campaign Wasn't Slowed by Coalition Requirements," *Inside the Army*, August 9, 1999, p. 2.

⁸⁴ Drozdiak, William. "War Restrained By Politics," *The Washington Post*, July 20, 1999, pg.14.

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review*. 14 October 1999. Accessed 23 October 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html>. n.p., quote found in Section III 'Why Did Milosevic Acquiesce?'. Italics in original.

⁸⁶ *After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare* (Proceedings from 1999 Topical Symposium). Fort McNair, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999. Quote is from Panel Five Highlights – Implications for Coalition Operations.

⁸⁷ Clark, General Wesley K.. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Pg. 341.

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⁸⁹ Department of Defense. 2000. *Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report: Report To Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 31 January 2000. Pg 20.

⁹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review*. 14 October 1999. Accessed 23 October 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b10141999_bt478-99.html>. Section VI 'Alliance and Coalition Warfare'.

⁹¹ Peters, Fohn E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corporation, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1391/>>. Pg. 41-42.

⁹² Gallis, Paul E. 1999. *Kosovo: Lessons Learned From Operation ALLIED FORCE*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Pg CRS-4.

⁹³ Department of Defense. 2000. *Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After-Action Report: Report To Congress*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 31 January 2000. Pg xx.

⁹⁴ Peters, Fohn E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corporation, CA. Available from World Wide Web: <<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1391/>>. Pg. 25-26.

⁹⁵ Clark, General Wesley K., testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington DC, 1 July 1999.

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Chapter 4

Enduring Characteristics of Multinational Command and Control Structures and Their Influence on Military Operations

No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations.

Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
5 April 2000

Effective multinational operations are the product of many factors, but the keystone is command and control. In establishing command and control for a combined military operation, one looks for a standard rather than a scientific or mathematically derived solution to identify the best command structure to fit the prevailing geo-political environment. There is no prevailing template that applies for all operations: the variables are simply too many, arising from the nature of the precipitating event, the nature of the enemy (ies), domestic considerations of coalition partners, public opinion, and international reaction to the multinational operation itself. Given the broad historical, statutory, and policy backdrop outlined in previous chapters, what are the enduring – even defining – characteristics that determine the type of command and control structure established for a multinational operation? The following list identifies broad qualities and considerations influencing establishment of effective command and control for multinational military forces:

1. The nature of the precipitating event and the extent (or lack) of sanctioning of military action by an international organization / regional alliance will be a critical determining factor in determining the type of command and control structure established.
2. Wherever practical, unity of command is the preferred command structure to facilitate unity of action by multinational participants.
3. Clearly defined mission, objectives, and rules of engagement (ROE) in governing agreements are critical to fostering clear unity of purpose among multinational partners.
4. Establishment of an integrated multinational military staff with representation from all member states is essential to exercising effective command of a combined military force.
5. Selection of U.S. officers sensitive to concerns of multinational partners and placement of these officers in command and staff positions commensurate with the extent of U.S. involvement in the operation has historically proven effective.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COALITION COMMANDS




Figure 3 Common Characteristics of Coalition Commands

The nature of the precipitating event and the extent (or lack) of sanctioning of military action by an international organization / regional alliance will be a critical

determining factor in determining the type of command and control structure established.

Perhaps the single most critical factor influencing the type of command and control established for a multinational operation is the nature of the event that led to the establishment of the coalition in the first place, and the extent that combined military action is 'sanctioned' by the international community. For instance, when a perceived international threat poses no immediate threat to allied territory or classical national interests to serve as a *causus belli* for military action, the consensus for action will likely remain fragile. In such a scenario, the combined military operation will likely be marked by limited unity of purpose, a narrowly defined mission, limited objectives, and restrictive rules of engagement, as illustrated by military operations in Somalia, and to a lesser extent in Kosovo. Conversely, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991 there was a clear precipitating event galvanizing international support for establishment of a coalition. UN Security Council Resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion further legitimized combined military action by the international community. In the case of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait, unity of purpose for the coalition was directly linked to the perceived severity of action taken by the 'aggressor', which met with almost universal condemnation from the international community. Therefore, in a very real sense the fundamental ingredient to establishment of a multinational combat force with an integrated coalition command structure rests not with the individual coalition participants, but in the action(s) which precipitated the establishment of the coalition in the first place.

Second, while UN sanctioning of a multinational military operation – particularly through UNSCR(s), is often vital to underpinning the scope and focus of a fledgling coalition, UN active involvement in execution of the military operation has historically proven counter-productive to military effectiveness. UN-sanctioned – not UN-managed has proven to be a much better recipe for effective coalition military operations. Moreover, according to the National Security Strategy of the United States, even for coalitions created by NATO mandate, or for mission-based coalitions with NATO participation, we must continue to “streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands.”⁹⁷

Wherever practical, unity of command is the preferred command structure to facilitate unity of action by multinational participants.

Once a multinational operation is decided upon and partner states have contributed military forces, unity of command is critical to establishing unity of effort and unity of action for the combined military force. Recall General Pershing’s statement from WWI, that the “...principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for the Allies to follow. I do not believe that it is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander. We have already experience enough in trying to coordinate the operations of the Allied Armies without success. There has never been real unity of action.”⁹⁸ This sentiment is echoed in the Joint Publication 3-16, ‘Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations’ which states that regardless of whether a combined military action is conducted under the auspices of an alliance or a coalition, “participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the extend possible, with

missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants.”⁹⁹

In Somalia, the importance of unity of command was again underscored in the UNOSOM II after-action report: “Unity of command and simplicity remain the key principles to be considered when designing a JTF command structure. The warfighting JTF commander must retain operational control of all forces available to him in theater and be allowed to posture those forces under UNAAF doctrine.”¹⁰⁰

As demonstrated in Operation ALLIED FORCE, coalition warfare marked by strong parallel command structures can inhibit overall military effectiveness on the battlefield. Specifically, in Operation ALLIED FORCE, the continuous, overt use of parallel command structures “produced a slower, more deliberate air campaign, which accommodated the essential consultative and deliberative functions necessary to prevent defections from the 13 participating states, and to secure domestic and international popular support for the operation. This approach allowed NATO to sustain a political consensus throughout the 78 days of the air campaign, but it constrained the size, pace, targets, and amount of force applied during the operation.”¹⁰¹

Coalitions marked by parallel command structures, and to a lesser extent a lead nation command structure, have an additional hurdle to overcome when there is a lack of information sharing – real or perceived – among coalition members. Such a perception has historically created tension among allies and inhibited effective unity of effort by coalition members. For instance, in response to observations made during Operation ALLIED FORCE,

In November 1999, the French Ministry of Defense released a report on lessons learned from Kosovo, which chided the United States for failing to

fully cooperate with its Alliance partners. The report states that ‘The conclusion cannot be avoided that part of the military operations were conducted by the United States outside the strict framework of NATO and its procedures.’ When French Minister of Defense Alain Richard presented this report during a press conference, he emphasized that France was not the only Alliance member that did not entirely subordinate its military to the Alliance’s integrated command.¹⁰²

This sentiment underscores the fact that when all forces are not subordinated to a common integrated command, multinational operations run the very real risk of undermining the overall allied unity of effort, and thereby the military effectiveness of the entire military operation.

Clearly defined mission, objectives, and rules of engagement (ROE) in governing agreements are critical to fostering clear unity of purpose among multinational partners.

Consensus is a necessary prelude to combined military action because alliances and coalitions are fundamentally voluntary associations of sovereign states. The extent and specificity of this consensus, in terms of individual goals and objectives for military intervention, can run the spectrum from general consensus to strong agreement on the use of force. Strong unity of purpose is a key element in the establishment of a unified command structure. As stated by Field Marshal William Robertson, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff during WWI:

It is essential, too, before trying to establish “unified command” that the allied Governments should be agreed among themselves as to the general policy to be pursued, and be satisfied that the agreement will not be disturbed, since without unity of policy unity of command may lead to the operations being conducted in the interests of one ally rather than the others, and so defeat its own ends.¹⁰³

Without unity of purpose, a coalition will necessarily lack unity of effort and unity of action, and individual actions by coalition members may be in competition and conflict

with one another. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States “effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility.”¹⁰⁴ We saw the results of having a lack of unity of purpose in Somalia where ‘mission creep’ changed a humanitarian mission into an operation involving combat operations; we saw this in Operation DENY FLIGHT where the UN and NATO had a decidedly different view of the mission. Even with the perception of unity of purpose, “...a detailed mission analysis must be accomplished and is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations. This analysis should result in a mission statement and campaign plan for the MNF as a whole and a restated mission for the US element of the force.”¹⁰⁵

Clearly defined rules of engagement (ROE) must also be developed to provide guidance on the use of force. Because a coalition is made up of sovereign nations with differing domestic laws, national security policies, and widely varying military capabilities, developing coalition ROE requires negotiation and consensus, not dictation. All members must be represented at these negotiations, and the resulting ROE must be judged against the overriding principle of simplicity. From a purely political perspective, a commonly developed and agreed upon ROE will prevent military operations from expanding beyond the political objectives that initially led to the development of the coalition.¹⁰⁶

Establishment of an integrated multinational military staff with representation from all member states is essential to exercising effective command of a combined military force.

According to General Robert RisCassi, former Commander in Chief of the United Nations and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, “theater headquarters – the theater command and each of the component commands – should be both joint and combined in configuration and manning. Regardless of the nationality of the commander, the staff must represent the cross section of units under command.”¹⁰⁷ This sentiment is echoed in Joint Vision 2020, which states that the “commander must have the ability to evaluate information in it’s multinational context. That context can only be appreciated if sufficient regional expertise and liaison capability are available on the commander’s staff.”¹⁰⁸

Following Operation ALLIED FORCE, a RAND study reaffirmed the importance of establishing an integrated multinational staff, stating “no single coalition structure will be appropriate for all missions and environments. But regardless of their specific form, all coalition structures must provide, at a minimum, a basic framework for headquarters and their subordinate units, complete with communications architectures that will support the consultative, deliberative, and political aspects that often enjoy increased priority in these types of circumstances.”¹⁰⁹

Largely as a result of the ad hoc nature of coalitions formed and managed under UN mandate, UN-led operations tend to lack an integrated coalition staff with a firm grasp of the military capabilities of the contributing member nations. According to General Andrew Goodpaster (retired),

Notably absent in the planning and conduct of UN operations is a capable general staff headquarters. As a result, UN military operations have often had serious command and control problems. In 1994, for example, UNPROFOR’s headquarters staff was brought together for the first time just days before troops were deployed to the former Yugoslavia. In that time, they had to create operations orders and deployment timetables, with

only a sketch of what military assets might be available. In Somalia, when the United States transferred its task force responsibilities to the UNOSOM in 1993, only 25 percent of the UN staff was assembled.¹¹⁰

Selection of U.S. officers sensitive to concerns of multinational partners and placement of these officers in command and staff positions commensurate with the extent of U.S. involvement in the operation has historically proven effective.

Often overlooked, the qualities of the individual multinational military commanders and key staff personnel are a key consideration to effective, coherent combined operations. In fact,

“the personality of the allied commander is key since the demands of the job are as political as they are military....In addition to lack of clear guidance, rarely will a combined commander have coercive authority over allied commanders and formations. Hence, gaining unity of effort requires a particular leadership style and techniques of command best characterized as collegial. As a result of the usual lack of political clarity and unanimity, allied commanders normally feel that their tasks exceed the authority given and that national tendencies to oversupervise and control their own forces undercuts the common cause. Therefore, the ‘tone of cooperation’ the allied commander sets at the top must permeate the entire structure and is critical to its success.”¹¹¹

This is even more important when a coalition operation enjoys unity of purpose, yet lacks unity of command. In this setting, this ‘tone of cooperation’ will often be the single most important element focusing member nations toward a common unity of action, particularly when the command structure is characterized by a strong parallel command or lead nation structure.

In addition, as a former allied commander during WWII, General Dwight Eisenhower had this to say about the importance of the qualities of coalition commanders:

The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theater. Since

cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field. This is true if for no other reason than no commander of an allied force can be given complete administrative and disciplinary powers over the whole command. It will therefore never be possible to say the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential.¹¹²

Joint Pub 3-16 'Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations' echoes this sentiment, saying that "often the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged and often the MNFC...must depend on their diplomatic as well as warrior skills."¹¹³

⁹⁷ White House, September 2002, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America*. [Internet.WWW]. Available: White House Website; ADDRESS: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. [Accessed 25 September 2003]. Pg. 26.

⁹⁸ Pershing, John J., VanDiver, Frank E.. *My Experiences in the First World War*, Vol 1 (rpt.; New York: De Capo Press, 1995). Pg 375.

⁹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 22 March 2004. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg.II-7.

¹⁰⁰ Allard, Kenneth. 1995. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. Pg 60-61.

¹⁰¹ Peters, Fohn E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corporation, CA. Pg. 24-25.

¹⁰² Peters, Fohn E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corporation, CA. Pg. 41.

¹⁰³ Robertson, William. *Soldiers and Statesmen 1914-1918*, Vol 2. London: Cassel, 1926. Pgs 296-297.

¹⁰⁴ White House, September 2002, *The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America*. [Internet.WWW]. Available: White House Website; ADDRESS: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. [Accessed 25 September 2003]. Pg. 25.

¹⁰⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations*, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg III-1

¹⁰⁶ Bennett, Drew A., Macdonald, Anne F.. "Coalition Rules of Engagement." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995 (No. 8), pp 124-125. Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/coal8.pdf> [Accessed 21 Oct 2003]. Pgs 124-125.

¹⁰⁷ RisCassi, Robert W., General, USA. 1993. "Principles for Coalition Warfare". *Joint Force Quarterly*, no 1 (Summer 1993), pp 58-71. Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0901.pdf). Pg. 67.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2020: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*. Washington: GPO, June 2000. 21 October 2003. <<http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm>>.

¹⁰⁹ Peters, Fohn E., Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams. *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. RAND Corporation, CA. Pg. 97.

¹¹⁰ Goodpaster, Andrew J. 1996. *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Pg 24.

¹¹¹ Freeman, Waldo D., MGen, US Army, Commander Randall J. Hess, US Navy, Lt Col Manuel Faria, Portugese Army. "The Challenges of Combined Operations." *Military Review*, US Army Command & General Staff College, vol LXXII, no. 11, November 1992. Available on World Wide Web < <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/>>. [Accessed 7 Oct 2003]. Np; passage found in 'Combined Operations' Section of document.

¹¹² Chandler, Alfred D., ed., *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1970). Pg. 1420-24.

¹¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations*, 5 April 2000, Joint Electronic Library. On-line. Internet, 24 Sept 2003. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Pg I-1.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Within a coalition formed to meet a specific crisis, the political views of the participants may have much greater influence over the ultimate command relationships.

Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
5 April 2000

There is no template for the appropriate command and control structure for multinational operations, nor given the complex interplay of considerations can there be a 'book answer'. The ability of – and desire for – member states to fully integrate into a multinational operation is influenced by a number of political, domestic, and international factors and considerations which are simply beyond the ability of contributing states to adequately consider before an event occurs which may require a multinational response. What is the nature of the precipitating event? Who is the enemy and what are their military capabilities? Has military action been sanctioned by an international organization or a regional alliance? What states are contributing forces to the multinational operation? Is there broad international support? Is there strong domestic support from each of the contributing states, or is the domestic support weak? Each specific event which may require a multinational military response has it's own unique considerations, considerations that will determine the acceptable command and control structure for the multinational force.

Retention of command and control by national authorities is not a new phenomenon, nor, as history has shown, has any single country been alone in employing a parallel command structure for national forces engaged in a multinational operation. According to General Robert RisCassi, former Commander in Chief of the United Nations and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command “the ability to integrate rests largely on one of principle. Unity of command is the most fundamental principle of warfare, the single most difficult principle to gain in combined warfare. It is a dependent of many influences and considerations. Because of the severity and consequences of war, relinquishing national command and control of forces is an act of trust and confidence that is unequalled in relations between nations.”¹⁴

Even without unity of command, ultimately unity of purpose is the glue that will hold a coalition together. Every coalition must be founded on a clearly defined mission, objectives, and rules of engagement (ROE) to foster clear unity of purpose among coalition partners. While a coalition can function without unity of command, as evidenced in Operation DESERT STORM, a coalition cannot effectively function without unity of purpose. There will be times when unity of command is simply not possible due to the prevailing political climate, but this need not severely inhibit military effectiveness. The key in these circumstances will be the nature and character of the individual senior commanders, and the ability of the integrated multinational staff to operate effectively. Do the senior commanders foster teamwork? Are they culturally sensitive to the needs of all coalition partners? Are they as astute as politicians as they are as military commanders? Does the multinational staff function as an integrated, homogeneous organization guided by a common understanding of the mission and

military objectives? Does it have a firm grasp of the military capabilities and limitations resident throughout the coalition?

The reality of multinational warfare is that there will be times when compromises must be made in the area of military effectiveness to maintain the unity of the alliance or the coalition. The balance for the multinational commander is a delicate one: between managing a heterogeneous military force with preeminent allegiance to their national capitals and subject to the desires of their respective political leaderships, and employing these forces as a homogeneous fighting force with maximum military effectiveness. In the final analysis, maintenance of the coalition itself becomes a legitimate, and often overriding objective – either stated or implied – for every multinational military operation. Therefore, consensus is both the strength, and the price for conducting multinational operations.

¹¹⁴ RisCassi, Robert W., General, USA. 1993. “Principles for Coalition Warfare”. *Joint Force Quarterly*, no 1 (Summer 1993), pp 58-71. Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0901.pdf). Pgs 66-67.

Appendix A

Examples of U.S. Military Forces Subordination To Foreign Military Control

Since 1900, there have been numerous examples of U.S. troops having been subordinated to foreign operational control or operational command. The instances of this subordination include both for combat and non-combat operations. The below list is not all inclusive; it serves to illustrate the fact that U.S. military forces can and have been subordinated to foreign control with little concern for the loss of national control this action may imply. This list is drawn heavily from “U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: PDD—25 and Precedents”, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.

1900. International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. An eight-nation force, led by a British general and later a German, included U.S. units comprised of 2,000 soldiers and marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through meetings of a Council of Generals.

1918. Allied Armies in France, World War I. Some 2,000,000 Americans served alongside and within French and British armies under the overall coordination of a Frenchman, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, Marshall Ferdinand Foch. A precedent was set that U.S. soldiers should remain in large units under U.S. command. The French and British originally argued that U.S. soldiers should be placed in Allied units as individual and small unit replacements as soon as they arrived in theater, a concept successfully vetoed by the senior U.S. commander, General Pershing.

1918. Allied Intervention in Russia, vicinity of Murmansk in the Far North. Some three U.S. battalions joined British, Canadian, Italian,

Finnish, and Serbian units under command of a British general at the end of World War I during the Bolshevik Revolution. Similar activities in Siberia were not formally integrated with the allies, due to disagreement on political goals.

1942. Allied Operations in World War II. Due to the combined nature of Allied operations against Axis powers, U.S. and U.K. commands and staffs were often inter-layered. U.S. units were subordinated to British commanders a number of times, for example, in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the China-Burma-India Theatre. This experience, in general, made the U.S. military a proponent of coalition warfare and a world leader in its practice.

1948. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine. Longest-lived UN peace observer mission. The United States has contributed various numbers of observers and support personnel through time, from an early peak strength of 327 officers and enlisted men to 17 in 1994. Some 17 nations have participated, successive commanders coming from Sweden, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Norway, and Finland. Many precedents, agreements, and laws have derived from this experience.

1949. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). One of 14 nations participating, the United States contributed up to 29 military observers and an aircrew until 1954. The group was headed successively by generals from Belgium, Canada, and Australia.

1950. United Nations Command (UNC), established for the Korean War and maintained. The ground component of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC) has today one U.S. division (-) and 22 ROK divisions. It has been commanded by a South Korean general since 1992.

1951. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Integrated command structure created to defend against Warsaw Pact. Although the Supreme Allied Commander has always been American, senior intermediate commanders from Germany and the United Kingdom would have commanded major U.S. formations in wartime. Since 1967, a U.S. ship has operated in the multinational Standing Naval Force Atlantic under an annually rotating command; since 1992, a similar force patrols the Mediterranean. NATO envisions all corps being multinational. Through continuous association, planning, and exercises, members of NATO have achieved levels of military interoperability that sets the standards and procedures for modern coalition warfare. U.S. personnel on NATO staffs often work under foreign officers.

1962. United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for the UN temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea. A U.S. Air Force Task Force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in-country support for operations commanded by a Pakistani general.

1965. Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. First peacekeeping force of the Organization of American States. After the initial U.S. intervention, six Latin American nations sent small forces to join some 21,500 U.S. troops – soon reduced to 12,000 – in a multinational force commanded by a general from Brazil.

1982. Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF). About 1,200 U.S. troops joined contingents from France, Italy, and U.K. to assist in departures of PLO, Syrian, and Israeli troops from Beirut, Lebanon. No central command structure was established, although coordination was effected through a Liaison and Coordination Committee. A terrorist attack killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers on October 3, 1983; the MNF withdrew in March 1984.

1982. Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO). A ten-nation, independent force empowered by Egypt and Israel to supervise truce provisions in the Sinai Peninsula. The ten Participating States -- currently Australia, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, the United States, and Uruguay -- provide the MFO with military contingents that make up the Force and perform specific and specialized tasks. The United States provides a support battalion and an infantry battalion rotated every six months; Congress limits participation to 1,200 personnel. The military commander is a Canadian general, and the Director General is an American operating from Rome. This mission continues.

1991. Desert Storm Coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Over 23 nations joined to eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. U.S., U.K., and French forces under the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Central Command, while Arab forces were under the Saudi Commander of the Joint Forces Theater of Operations; the two entities were linked in the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Center. Within that structure, a U.S. brigade from the 82d Airborne Division was placed under operational control of the French 6th Light Armored Division for operations against Iraqi forces.

1992. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. Some 21 nations are protecting humanitarian relief and attempting to aid peacemaking in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States sent a 342-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to Zagreb for use by UNPROFOR soldiers under French command. In 1993,

some 600 U.S. soldiers were sent to patrol the Macedonian border under a Swedish commander.

1993. United Nations operation in Somalia after U.S. humanitarian intervention of December 1992 – UNOSOM II. The U.N. force of 25,000 from 28 nations was commanded by a Turkish general, assisted by a U.S. deputy – 3,000 U.S. forces were under their operational control. U.S. combat forces of 9,000 remained solely under a U.S. chain of command. U.S. operations ended in March of 1994.¹¹⁵

1995. Implementation Force (IFOR) & Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on UNSCR 1031, NATO was given the mandate to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. A NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR), and later the Stabilization Force (SFOR), provide a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thirty seven nations currently provide personnel to support this mission, including combat and combat support units from the United States. This operation is currently commanded by a US general, with a UK general as deputy

1999. Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. KFOR troops come from 30 NATO and non-NATO nations, falling under a single chain of command under the authority of Commander KFOR. The U.S. has provided combat and combat support troops since KFOR's inception in 1999. As of 3 October 2003, this operation is commanded by a German general; the deputy commander is currently an Italian general.

¹¹⁵ Brunner, Edward F.. *U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: PDD-25 and Precedents*. Washington D.C., as updated 1 November 1995: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress. Pgs CRS-2 – CRS-4. Information updated and edited to ensure currency and relevance.

Glossary

Abbreviations:

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AIRSOUTH	Allied Air Forces Southern Command (NATO)
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
CAOC	Combined Air Operations Center
CAS	Close Air Support
CENTCOM	Central Command
CINCAFSOUTH	Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	Government Accounting Office
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
MG	Major General
MNF	Multinational Force
MNFC	Multinational Force Commander
NAEW	NATO Airborne Early Warning
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ	No Fly Zone
OAS	Offensive Air Strike
ODF	Operation DENY FLIGHT
OPCON	Operational Control
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive

ROE	Rules of Engagement
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
TACON	Tactical Control
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	United Action Armed Forces
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USAF	United States Air Force
USFORSCOM	US Forces Somalia

Definitions:

alliance. (DOD) An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02).

coalition. (DOD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02).

combatant command (command authority). (DOD) Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant command; combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02).

- direct support.** (DOD) A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Also called DS. See also close support; general support; mission; mutual support; support. (JP 1-02).
- full command.** (NATO) The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control. (JP 1-02)
- general support.** (DOD, NATO) 1. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. See also close support; direct support; mutual support; support. 2. (DOD only) A tactical artillery mission. Also called GS. See also direct support; general support-reinforcing; reinforcing. (JP 1-02).
- multinational force commander (MNFC).** (DOD) A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander's command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. See also multinational force. (JP 1-02).
- multinational operations.** (DOD) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02).
- mutual support.** (DOD, NATO) That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. See also close support; direct support; support. (JP 1-02).
- operational command.** (NATO) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander. See also command. (JP 1-02)
- operational control.** (NATO) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. See also operational command. (JP 1-02)
- operational control.** (DOD) Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command

over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (JP 1-02).

peacekeeping. (DOD) Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also peace building; peace enforcement; peacemaking; peace operations. (JP 1-02)

support. (DOD) 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. See also close support; direct support; general support; interdepartmental or agency support; international logistic support; inter-Service support; mutual support. (JP 1-02).

tactical control. (DOD) Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. See also combatant command; combatant command (command authority); operational control. (JP 1-02).

tactical control. (NATO) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1-02)

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