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Doctrine for Joint Special Operations



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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides the overarching doctrinal guidance for the conduct of joint special operations (SO) across the full range of military operations. It describes the characteristics of special operations forces (SOF), joint SOF core tasks; the typical organization; and command and control of SOF. It further provides a joint force commander (JFC) the guidance and information necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for SOF. This publication summarizes support requirements necessary to conduct SO missions and defines the training and education responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command, geographic combatant commanders, and the Services.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'T. J. Keating', is positioned above the printed name.

T. J. KEATING
VADM, USN
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05, DATED 17 APRIL 1998

- **Adds a discussion of special operations and principles for military operations other than war**
- **Adds a discussion on the nature of special operations warfare**
- **Revises discussion of special operations missions to special operations core tasks**
- **Deletes special operations collateral activities**
- **Changes mission of “civil affairs” to core task of “civil affairs operations” and mission of “combatting terrorism” to core task of “counterterrorism”**
- **Clarifies command and control of special operations forces within a theater**
- **Adds a discussion of subordinate command and control organizations**
- **Adds a discussion on the Special Operations Command and Control Element**
- **Deletes the chapter on planning for joint special operations**
- **Adds coverage of air support, geospatial information and services support, and fire support of special operations forces**
- **Adds an appendix on special operations forces education and training**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Overview of Joint Special Operations
 - Discusses the Forces and Core Tasks Used in Joint Special Operations
 - Describes Command and Control of Joint Special Operations
 - Discusses the Support of Joint Special Operations
 - Describes Education and Training of Special Operations Forces
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An Overview of Joint Special Operations

Special operations (SO) have become an integral part of a theater campaign across the range of military operations.

The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on **individual and small unit proficiency** in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. The **small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency** (for short periods of time) of special operations forces (SOF) operational units provide the United States with **feasible and appropriate military responses**. These responses may not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces. Although SO may be conducted as a single-Service operation, **they routinely require joint support and coordination**. In addition to being **conducted across the full range of military operations**, SO may be focused on the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war. **SO are characterized by certain attributes that cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations**. SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. Alternatively, SO may be principally offensive, of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, and often time-sensitive targets. **The principles of war** (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) and **the principles of military operations other than war** (objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy) **apply to SO** in the same way they apply to conventional operations. Commanders and SO planners must understand these principles and how they relate

to SO. They must also understand the importance of integrating and synchronizing SO with conventional missions.

Forces and Core Tasks

Success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually requires units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units.

The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities. **The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces.** Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities. **SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.**

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and information operations.

Command and Control

Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive, command and control (C2) by an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) C2 element.

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all SOF based in the United States are under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, US Special Operations Command. SOF assigned to a theater are under the COCOM of the geographic combatant commander. **Within a geographic combatant command, command and control (C2) of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command.** Normally, C2 of SOF is executed through either the theater special operations command (TSOC) or a joint special operations task force. Although designated as SOF, PSYOP and civil affairs support both SO and conventional operations; their C2 relationships will reflect this. **Deconfliction and coordination** with conventional forces are always critical concerns for SOF commanders. To fully integrate SO and conventional operations, **SOF must maintain effective liaison** with all components of the joint force to ensure that unity of effort is maintained and risk of fratricide is minimized.

Support of Joint Special Operations Forces

SOF require equipment and support that are tailored to specific mission requirements, yet are flexible enough to respond to changing employment parameters.

The joint character of SO **requires support arrangements** across Service lines in order to sustain operations that are often independent and remote. Further, SOF must be able to exploit the full range of available national support systems such as those offered by emerging technologies and space-based assets.

Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in determining SO mission objectives, identifying relevant targets, and mission planning and execution. The nature of many SO objectives and tactics requires intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than that needed in conventional operations. **Counterintelligence support must also be considered** in protecting sensitive SOF missions. **The TSOC commander** (or, when a joint task force is established, the joint force special operations component commander) **determines logistic requirements** for in-theater SOF for the geographic combatant commander. Logistic support for SOF can be provided through one or more of the following: Service support, joint in-theater support, nonstandard support, SO-peculiar support or host-nation support. **SOF medical support** is characterized by an austere structure and a limited number of personnel with enhanced medical skills. Provision of medical support beyond SOF capabilities depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning with the conventional medical support structure. **Command, control, communications, and computer support to SOF must be global**, secure, jointly interoperable, and flexible so that it can be tailored to any SO mission. The sensitivity of many **SO mandates thorough and accurate public affairs guidance and legal support**. **Combat camera support** to SOF is used to portray the true nature of US operations. **Air support** is provided to SOF to facilitate effective and responsive operations. **Space support ensures SOF commanders understand the capabilities available to support them and facilitate or enable effective operations**. **Meteorological and oceanographic support services are critical** to the success of SO missions. From initial planning through execution, environmental information should be included in the decision-making process.

Education and Training

SOF require education and training that are tailored to specific requirements.

SOF require a combination of education, basic military training, and specialized skill training to achieve operational proficiency. SOF-specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides guidance for the planning and execution of joint special operations across the range of military operations. It also provides guidance for commanders who determine the force structure, budget, training, materiel, and operational requirements necessary to prepare SOF to conduct the tasks herein described. Further, it provides commanders information necessary to identify, nominate, and select objectives and missions appropriate for SOF.

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

"Today we see a bewildering diversity of separatist wars, ethnic and religious violence, coups d'état, border disputes, civil upheavals, and terrorist attacks, pushing waves of poverty-stricken, war-ridden immigrants (and hordes of drug traffickers as well) across national boundaries. In the increasingly wired global economy, many of these seemingly small conflicts trigger strong secondary effects in surrounding (and even distant) countries. Thus a "many small wars" scenario is compelling military planners in many armies to look afresh at what they call "special operations" or "special forces" — the niche warriors of tomorrow."

Alvin and Heidi Toffler
War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century
1993

1. Introduction

This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special operations (SO). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) of special operations forces (SOF) when assigned to a geographic combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander. Specific SO operational guidelines are provided in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*, JP 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, and JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.

2. Special Operations

a. **These are operations** conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities **for which there is no broad conventional force requirement**. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. **SO differ from conventional operations** in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SO are an **integral part of theater campaigns**. While SO can be conducted unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, **the majority of SO are designed and conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign**. SO must **complement — not compete with nor be a substitute for — conventional operations**.



Special operations forces are made up of individuals highly proficient in specialized combat skills.

c. The successful conduct of **SO relies on individual and small unit proficiency** in a multitude of specialized, often nonconventional combat skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. **The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible and appropriate military responses. These responses may not entail the degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.**

d. **SO can be conducted directly** against an adversary by forces acting in a single engagement such as a raid against a critical communications node, **or indirectly**, for example, by organizing, training, and supporting an indigenous force for unconventional warfare (UW), or a host nation (HN) force for foreign internal defense (FID), **or through the use of psychological operations (PSYOP)** to influence the opposing military or the local civilian populace. In all cases, the results are normally disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

e. **SO are inherently joint.** Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation, most are planned and executed as a joint operation. SO routinely require joint support and coordination.

3. Special Operations and the Range of Military Operations

Military operations are conducted across a range consisting of two general states: war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). This model assists the geographic combatant commander in articulating strategic situations within a theater that are described by a variety of political,

economic, and military conditions. Although each state within the range of military operations is described in discrete terms, in actual circumstances **there may be no precise distinctions where a particular state ends and another begins**. The model gives the JFC **the ability to describe any situation in clear terms and allows the JFC to define needs, devise strategies, and project resources to meet the threat**. SO are not bound by any specific environment. The principles by which SO are planned and conducted apply equally to both war and MOOTW.

a. **War.** SO can be conducted across the range of military operations at all levels of war and throughout all phases of a joint campaign. Commanders and planners should focus SO at strategic and operational levels to maximize efficiency. SO can also be applied tactically although the greatest utility is at the strategic level.

(1) **The President designates national objectives** and sanctions the military means to achieve them. In pursuit of these objectives, SO may be conducted under the direct supervision of the President or Secretary of Defense.

(2) **Theater objectives are established by geographic combatant commanders**, based on national objectives, and are an integral part of a theater campaign plan. The integration of SO through the theater special operations command (TSOC) can help the commander attain these objectives.

(3) **Operational objectives established by subordinate JFCs support theater objectives and lead directly to theater success**. SO provide the JFC with a selective, flexible deterrent option or crisis response capability to achieve operational objectives.

(4) SO may be conducted in support of a conventional force's tactical objectives **when doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that conventional force**.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS STRATEGIC UTILITY

1942, World War II, the German command ordered an increase in production of "heavy water" at the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork, in occupied Norway. This was the world's only facility capable of manufacturing sufficient quantities of the element essential to the development and production of an atomic bomb. Churchill and Roosevelt were aware they were in a race with Hitler for possession of a strategic weapon powerful enough to determine the fate of the free world, accordingly the plant was ordered destroyed.

The reinforced construction of the plant and location of its critical processing machinery in the basement eliminated attack by bomber because of the lack of aircraft capable of the mission. The plant was built on a cliffside in a remote mountainous area and almost impregnable to ground attack.

In November 1942, after a glider-borne commando operation failed and its survivors were executed by the Gestapo, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) took over the project. A four-man SOE Norwegian advance team parachuted in several months prior to receiving a six-man assault force also inserted by parachute. The assault force, using cover as students on a skiing vacation, reconnoitered the plant from a safe distance and located a lightly secured point of entry. On the night of 27/28 February 1943, the assault team slipped into the plant, destroyed the heavy water production machinery, and quickly retired into the surrounding mountains. The Germans, with great difficulty, restored limited heavy water production. In November 1943, the US 8th Air Force launched an unsuccessful raid on the plant, causing casualties and loss of property in the nearby civilian community. In February 1944, a member of the SOE assault team sabotaged and sank a ferry carrying two railway cars of heavy water across a deep lake en route to Germany.

The effect of the operation put an end to Germany's strategic atomic bomb program. Hitler then redirected his scientists to concentrate on the V1 and V2 rockets, which history has shown had little effect on Great Britain's ability to wage war other than increase the resolve of the British people.

Thomas Gallagher
Assault in Norway. 1975

M.R.D. Foot
SOE: The Special Operations Executive, 1940-1946. 1984

b. **MOOTW.** MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States with the overarching objectives of deterring war and promoting peace, they also can include military support to US civil authorities. Especially when conducted outside the US, **SO may be the best means of achieving certain objectives**, and commanders and their staffs should be familiar with SOF capabilities when developing theater plans.

4. Characteristics of Special Operations

a. **SO are characterized by certain attributes that distinguish them from conventional operations.** SO can be designed and conducted **to influence the will of foreign leadership** and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or objectives. This may involve a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result. Alternatively, **SO may be principally directed at high-value targets of strategic significance.** Such operations are often time-sensitive and rely on surprise, security, and audacity, and frequently employ deception to achieve success. These missions can be overt, clandestine, or covert in nature. Some operations may involve high physical and political risk, and can offer the potential for high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first attempt fail.

b. SO normally require tactical-level planning, detailed intelligence, and knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the area where the mission is to be conducted. **Rigorous training and rehearsals** of the mission are integral to the conduct of all operations.

c. SO are often conducted at great distances from operational bases employing **sophisticated communication systems** and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

d. **SO frequently require a high degree of discriminate and precise use of force.** SOF require unique training and may also require the development, acquisition, and employment of weapons and equipment not standard for other Armed Forces of the United States.

5. Special Operations and the Principles of War

The principles of war apply to SO in the same way they apply to conventional operations. However, in some cases, specific principles have different emphases in the conduct of SO, primarily because SO are conducted by small units that seldom work with large formations or sizable reserves. Commanders and staffs must understand the principles of war — and how they relate to SO. The principles are an important doctrinal foundation and are essential to understanding and mastering warfare (see Figure I-1).




Figure I-1. Principles of War

a. **Objective.** SO are best employed in support of JFCs' strategic or operational objectives. Many missions are characterized as limited, surgical, physically challenging, low profile, and sometimes separate from the immediate battlefield.

b. **Offensive.** The lethal application of SO is **inherently offensive in nature** because they seek to strike or engage an adversary to compel or deter his actions. The unique manner of application of SOF offensive capabilities assists JFCs in achieving results that may be unattainable by larger conventional forces.

c. **Mass.** SO concentrate **combat power at critical times and in discriminate places to achieve decisive results**. Massing combat power while avoiding concentration of forces can enable numerically inferior SOF to achieve decisive results while minimizing both human loss and the wasting of resources. SOF's ability to strike at key nodes may create results equivalent to those achievable by large force concentrations.

d. **Economy of Force.** Economy of force is critical to the successful conduct of SO given the **small size and lack of redundant capabilities** inherent in SO tactical units.

e. **Maneuver.** SOF capability to maneuver allows them **to strike adversaries where and when they are most vulnerable and to avoid their strengths**.

f. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command fosters unity of effort and allows the JFC **to integrate and synchronize SO** with every aspect of the campaign. SOF C2 architecture is often tailored for each mission to achieve this end.

g. **Security.** SO planning and execution require high levels of security integrated fully with operations security (OPSEC) and force protection to protect the clandestine/covert nature of missions. Due to operational and political sensitivities the **planning and execution of many SO are compartmentalized and limited only to personnel with a need to know**. SO must balance security concerns with the need to rehearse and to integrate operations with other committed forces to facilitate unity of effort and help avoid fratricide. In addition, proper security planning and execution is essential to SOF force protection. Given their operating size, SOF are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units.

h. **Surprise.** Surprise is often the **most important principle in the conduct of successful SO and the survivability of employed SOF**. Even if complete strategic surprise is unattainable, an SO must achieve operational and tactical surprise to the extent that the adversary cannot react effectively.

i. **Simplicity.** Although SOF may require sophisticated and often unorthodox methods and equipment, the plans that drive their employment **must be simple and direct** in order to facilitate understanding, withstand the stress of operational environments, and adapt to changing situations.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

On the night of 19-20 December 1989, special operations forces (SOF), organized into a 4,400-man joint special operations task force (JSOTF), spearheaded Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama. US Army Rangers conducted pre-dawn airborne seizures of critical airfields. Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) were employed to block possible escape routes of Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega, by denying him the use of his Learjet at Paitilla Airport and disabling a Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) patrol boat in Balboa Harbor. Air Force Special Operations aircraft provided aerial insertion, pinpoint target interdiction, and aerial fire support. Army special forces (SF) set up a surveillance and antiarmor blocking position at the Pacora River bridge and conducted other operations to disable critical Panamanian telecommunications sites. SF and SEALs also conducted direct action raids and roll-up operations against Noriega's infrastructure. The JSOTF accepted Noriega's surrender at the Papal Nunciatura after an 11-day standoff. Subsequent to the initial assaults, Spanish-speaking SF soldiers — often backed up by Air Force Special Operations Forces gunships, Rangers, and conventional forces — were used to convince scattered PDF quartels to surrender peacefully. Army and Air Force psychological operations units communicated a call for surrender to PDF units, "dignity battalions," and other hostile parties via radio, television, print, and loudspeaker. As Operation JUST CAUSE gave way to Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, civil affairs and other SOF units were employed to reconstitute the country's political, economic, and security infrastructure.

SOURCE: Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

6. Special Operations and Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

SOF and their unique capabilities are valuable assets when conducting MOOTW. SOF are area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the cultures and languages found in an operational area. SOF units can provide liaison to facilitate multinational and interagency interoperability. The principles for MOOTW are shown in Figure I-2.

For further details see JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

7. The Nature of Special Operations Warfare

The following apply to SO across the range of military operations:

a. **Tempo.** Tempo is critical to SOF's ability to conduct SO. Rapid execution of a mission allows SOF to mass combat power at the critical place and time, accomplish the mission, withdraw before the adversary can react, and then attack again. A high tempo offsets small numbers and limited firepower by never allowing the adversary to bring his main strength (weight of numbers) to bear on committed

PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR	
OBJECTIVE	Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective
UNITY OF EFFORT	Seek unity of effort in every operation
SECURITY	Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage
RESTRAINT	Apply appropriate military capability prudently
PERSEVERANCE	Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims
LEGITIMACY	Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable

Figure I-2. Principles for Military Operations Other Than War

SOF. At the same time, a high tempo provides security through speed, allowing acceptance of a higher degree of risk than would be otherwise possible.

b. **Preemption.** SOF preempt the adversary by neutralizing its capabilities before the fight — either directly or in support of conventional forces. SOF do this through FID and UW efforts to build indigenous defense and intelligence capabilities; PSYOP directed at the adversary’s leadership, armed forces, and populace; civil-military operations (CMO) in areas brought under friendly control; counterproliferation activities to slow or inhibit development of a capability; direct action (DA) missions against an adversary’s critical operational or strategic targets; and counterterrorist operations. Deployed SOF often provide the geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC with first-hand information regarding local population perspectives, intentions, and other information.

c. **Dislocation.** SO dislocate the adversary force from chosen positions either by forcing it to move from these positions or by rendering its strength useless or irrelevant to the fight. DA missions may force the adversary to reposition combat forces away from the main battle area to protect lines of communications (LOCs) and other vulnerable areas. PSYOP as part of information operations (IO) may create diversions or deceptions that will cause the adversary to deploy in a manner favorable to friendly forces. SOF possess the capabilities to organize and direct large indigenous

forces that cause the adversary to spread its forces thin (through UW) or assist an HN in creating a military shield (through FID), behind which other government agencies can operate to remove the causes of insurgency.

d. **Disruption.** SO disrupt the adversary through attacks against strategic and operational targets and centers of gravity. This may preclude the adversary from conducting successful countermoves. SO can disrupt the adversary through special reconnaissance support of operational actions by conventional forces, DA strikes against critical operational targets, IO to disrupt adversary decision makers, and PSYOP directed at civilian and military leaders, military forces, and the adversary population—as well as an adversary’s political, economic, or military allies. Indigenous forces, trained through UW operations, can attack an adversary directly, thus disrupting its operations. When employed, SOF seek to avoid adversary strengths, and create and attack adversary vulnerabilities.

e. **Exploitation.** SO can provide the conventional force commander multiple means to attack the adversary’s will to resist. Exploiting psychological vulnerabilities can demoralize adversary troops, weaken the resolve of adversary leaders, separate the civilian population of an adversary nation from its leadership, and reduce or eliminate any external source of support. DA and UW can create the impression that there are too many forces for the adversary to counter effectively. With no safe areas, and adversary forces in rear areas subject to attack at any time, adversary morale can be significantly weakened.

f. **Main Effort.** The commander will designate a main effort for every operation. The activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. The commander should be prepared to change a main effort as the situation develops in order to exploit opportunities or to deal with crises as they arise. Generally, the main effort should be aimed at some critical adversary vulnerability (object or characteristic) which if attacked will contribute most directly to accomplishment of the mission.

g. **Intelligence.** SOF require timely, responsive, and accurate intelligence support to overcome their relative lack of size and firepower. Initially, SOF commanders use intelligence to find adversary weaknesses/vulnerabilities and avoid adversary strengths. Perfect intelligence is rarely if ever obtainable, but adequate, timely intelligence is a prerequisite for successful operations. Leaders must be able to act with less than perfect intelligence.

h. **Decentralization.** While SO personnel should be included in centralized planning at the combatant commander and subordinate JFC levels, successful SO requires decentralized planning and execution for individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination by SOF leaders at every echelon are vital to successful SO.

i. **Initiative.** SOF encourage an ability and willingness to make independent, time-critical decisions using all available information and guidance presented in higher headquarters (HQ) commander’s intent.

j. **Operational Mission Criteria.** The employment of SOF in support of the joint force campaign or operation plan is facilitated by five basic criteria. These criteria provide guidelines for both conventional

and SOF commanders and planners to use when considering the employment of SOF.

- (1) Is this an appropriate SOF mission?
- (2) Does the mission support the JFC's campaign or operation plan?
- (3) Is the mission operationally feasible?
- (4) Are required resources available to execute the mission?
- (5) Does the expected outcome of the mission justify the risk?

CHAPTER II

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND THEIR CORE TASKS

"The modernization goal is a joint special operations forces (SOF) capability, quantitatively and qualitatively manned, trained and equipped to react swiftly to conduct a wide range of special operations missions worldwide, across the full spectrum of conflict and crisis, . . . This capability must be founded on comprehensive joint doctrine, inclusion of SOF in all joint plans and, wherever feasible, in joint exercises, and the provision of dedicated and augmenting units forward deployed in, or immediately deployable to, all unified commands."

Casper Weinberger
Secretary of Defense 1981-1987

1. Introduction

a. Throughout history, success by a **small force against a strategic or operational objective** usually has required units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units. These characteristics have allowed such units to be employed in unconventional ways for which the adversary often was unprepared.

b. Conventional units are not normally trained, equipped, nor organized to conduct SO; any wholesale change to do so would restrict their ability to conduct their own mission-essential tasks. The need and opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drive the formation of **special units with specialized, highly-focused capabilities**.

c. SOF are those forces identified in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 167 or those units or forces that have since been designated as SOF by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Designated Special Operations Forces

a. **US Army.** Special forces (SF), Ranger, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), PSYOP, and civil affairs (CA) units, both of the active and reserve components.

b. **US Navy.** Sea-air-land team (SEAL), SEAL delivery vehicle team, and special boat team units, both of the active and reserve components.

c. **US Air Force (USAF).** SO flying (does not include USAF rescue/combat search and rescue units), special tactics, combat weather, and FID units, both of the active and reserve components.

d. **Conventional units conducting or supporting SO.** Designated SOF are the **force of choice** for the conduct of SO. However, **under certain circumstances, conventional forces may** be tasked to conduct limited SO on a mission-specific, case-by-case basis. Commanders should base this decision on the availability of SOF, the mission requirements, and the capabilities of available conventional forces. In addition, certain conventional forces receive enhanced

training and/or equipment to support SO and have developed habitual relationships with SOF units to conduct these missions.

3. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces

a. **SOF are inherently joint.** SOF conduct joint and combined training regularly, both within the SOF community and with conventional forces. SOF and their command elements routinely plan and execute joint operations. The SOF C2 structure is capable of and should be used to integrate SOF into joint force plans easily and effectively. SOF can conduct a wide range of operations in war and MOOTW, including a surgical, rapid, worldwide strike capability. Additionally, SOF routinely operate closely with other US Government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nations' military forces.

b. **SOF are distinct from conventional forces.** The demands of SO require forces with attributes that distinguish them from conventional forces. Commanders must be familiar with these characteristics to ensure that missions selected for SOF are compatible with their capabilities.

(1) Most SOF personnel undergo a careful **selection process** and mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. These programs make unlikely any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities.

(2) SOF are composed of mature and experienced personnel, many of whom maintain a **high level of competency** in more than one military specialty.

(3) Selected SOF are **regionally oriented** for employment; cross-cultural communications skills are a routine part of their training.

c. **SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces**, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities. Depending upon requirements, SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF should not be used for operations whenever conventional forces can accomplish the mission. When fully integrated into the joint campaign plan, SOF can complement conventional forces allowing the JFC to achieve an objective that might not otherwise be attainable. The **special skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF** also provide an adaptable military response in situations or crises requiring tailored, precise, and focused use of force.

d. **SOF Capabilities.** SOF can be formed into versatile, self-contained teams that provide a JFC with an extremely flexible force capable of operating in ambiguous and swiftly changing scenarios. They can:

(1) Be task-organized quickly and deployed rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations.

(2) Gain access to hostile or denied areas.

- (3) Provide limited medical support for themselves and those they support.
- (4) Communicate worldwide with organic equipment.
- (5) Conduct operations in austere, harsh environments without extensive support.
- (6) Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly.
- (7) Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations.
- (8) Organize people into working teams to help solve local problems.
- (9) Deploy with a generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.
- (10) Provide unconventional options for addressing ambiguous situations.

e. SOF Limitations

(1) **Improper employment of SOF could result in the depletion of forces.** SOF require a long lead-time to be effectively fielded. SOF cannot be quickly replaced/reconstituted nor can their capabilities be rapidly expanded. Improper employment of SO resources in purely conventional roles or on inappropriate/inordinately high-risk missions runs the risk of depleting these resources rapidly (see Figure II-1).

(2) **SOF should normally be employed against targets with strategic or operational relevance.** Such employment is congruent with the use of limited SOF resources.

(3) **SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces.** In most cases SOF are neither trained nor equipped to conduct sustained conventional combat operations, and therefore should not be substituted for conventional units that are able to effectively execute that mission.

(4) **SOF logistic support is austere.** A large number of SOF units generally cannot maintain themselves for extended periods of time without significant support from a conventional support structure.

4. Special Operations Forces' Core Tasks

SOF perform two types of activities. They perform tasks that no other forces in the Department of Defense (DOD) conduct, and they perform tasks that other forces in Department of Defense conduct but do so to a unique set of conditions and standards. By performing these tasks, SOF offers Department of Defense an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives. **SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the following nine core tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological**



Figure II-1. Special Operations Forces Truths

operations, and information operations (see Figure II-2). These core tasks represent the collective capabilities of all SOF rather than those of any one unit.

a. **Direct Action.** These are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. **Activities within DA include the following:**

(1) **Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults.** These are operations designed to achieve specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results. They are sometimes beyond the effective strike capabilities of conventional force elements. Such operations typically involve attacks on critical targets, interdiction of LOCs or other target systems, capturing designated personnel or material; or the seizure, destruction, or neutralization of adversary facilities or capabilities.

(2) **Standoff Attacks.** These are attacks by weapon systems or through IO. Standoff attacks can be **conducted by air, maritime, or by ground** platforms or units. When targets can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the commitment of close-combat forces, these attacks can be performed as independent actions.




Figure II-2. Special Operations Core Tasks

(3) **Terminal Attack Control and Terminal Guidance Operations.** These are actions to identify and precisely report the location of targets, and with global positioning systems, laser designators, beacons, or other means, conduct either terminal attack control (TAC) or terminal guidance operations (TGO) to effectively engage them. TAC involves actions to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. TGO includes any electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. TAC differs from TGO in that TAC includes the authority to clear aircraft to release ordnance and TGO does not. Because of this, TAC requires individuals to be qualified as joint terminal attack controllers, but TGO does not.

(4) **Recovery Operations.** These are operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. SO recovery missions are **characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis.** These operations employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, possible indigenous assistance, and the frequent use of ground combat elements.

(5) **Precision Destruction Operations.** These are operations in which collateral damage must be minimized, requiring highly sophisticated weapons and/or timed detonation of specific amounts of explosives placed in exact locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision destruction operations

can be conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot guarantee first strike success or when the contents of a facility must be destroyed without damage to that facility.

(6) **Anti-Surface Operations.** These are operations conducted against adversary maritime surface targets, including combatants. These include, but are not limited to, visit, board, search, and seizure operations which are shipboarding operations to board and seize cooperative, uncooperative, or hostile contacts of interest.

b. **Special Reconnaissance (SR).** These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Even with today's sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF's highly developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces or assets. Activities within SR include the following:

(1) **Environmental Reconnaissance.** These are operations conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information.

(2) **Armed Reconnaissance.** These are operations that involve locating and attacking targets of opportunity, e.g., adversary materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned general areas or



Special operations forces have a highly developed capability to get in and out of hostile or denied areas.

along assigned LOCs. Armed reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets.

(3) **Target and Threat Assessment.** These are operations conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to include collateral damage) of a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or toxic industrial material site.

(4) **Poststrike Reconnaissance.** These operations are undertaken for the purpose of gathering information used to measure results of a strike.

c. **Foreign Internal Defense.** These are operations that involve participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Both conventional and SOF units have a role and capability to conduct FID missions. **SOF's primary role** in this interagency activity is to **assess, train, advise, and assist HN military and paramilitary forces with the tasks that require their unique capabilities.** The goal is to enable these forces to maintain the HN's internal stability, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability. Internal stability forms the shield behind which a nation-building campaign can succeed. Successful FID missions can lead to strategic successes for US foreign policy. FID activities include the following:

(1) **HN Military Assistance.** These are operations that train HN military individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills, provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills.

(2) **Population Security.** These are operations that strengthen population security by providing supervision of tactical operations conducted by HN military units to neutralize and destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil population, and protect the civil population. As a subset of FID, designated SOF units may also train select HN forces to perform counterterrorist missions.

For more details on FID, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

d. **Unconventional Warfare.** These are operations that involve **a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations**, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander's overall theater campaign, or as an independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary aspects of resistance movements.

UW military activity represents the culmination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil populace against a hostile government or occupying power. From the US perspective, the intent is to develop and sustain these supported resistance organizations and to synchronize their activities to further US national security objectives. SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise, train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in existence to conduct UW and when required, accompany them into combat. When UW operations support conventional military operations, the focus shifts to primarily military objectives; however the political and psychological implications remain. Operational and strategic staffs and commanders must guard against limiting UW to a specific set of circumstances or activities defined by either recent events or personal experience. The most prevalent mistake is the belief that UW is limited to guerrilla warfare or insurgency. UW includes, but is not limited to, the following activities:

(1) **Guerrilla Warfare.** These are military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in adversary-held or hostile territory. **It is the military aspect of an insurgency or other armed resistance movement.** Guerilla warfare techniques can undermine the legitimacy of the existing government or an occupying power as well as destroy, degrade, or divert military capabilities.

(2) **Subversion.** **These operations are designed to undermine** the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime or nation. The clandestine nature of subversion dictates that the underground elements perform the bulk of the activity.

(3) **Sabotage.** These are operations that involve an **act or acts with intent to injure**, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. Sabotage selectively disrupts, destroys, or neutralizes hostile capabilities with a minimum expenditure of manpower and materiel.

(4) **Intelligence Activities.** These activities assess areas of interest ranging from political and military personalities to the military capabilities of friendly and adversary forces. SOF perform intelligence activities ranging from developing information critical to planning and conducting operations, to assessing the capabilities and intentions of indigenous and coalition forces.

(5) **Unconventional Assisted Recovery (UAR).** These operations consist of UW forces establishing and operating unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms and unconventional assisted recovery teams. UAR operations are designed to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an adversary-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control.

**UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM**

In early November, 2001 Army Special Forces teams (often reinforced with Air Force Special Tactics Team members) infiltrated Afghanistan via Special Operations Forces (SOF) aircraft and linked up with anti-Taliban Afghan forces. Their unconventional warfare (UW) mission was to facilitate the overthrow of the Taliban regime. These SOF teams immediately gained the confidence of the Afghans, and between the intelligence they received from the Afghans and what they were able to determine themselves, the arrival of the SOF teams produced an immediate and exponential increase in the number of Taliban targets that could be identified to conventional strike aircraft. In addition to radically increasing the effectiveness of United States airpower, the UW teams also improved the effectiveness of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces they joined. Less than a month after the first UW team arrived in country, the fall of the Taliban had begun, and in the weeks that followed, the last regions under Taliban control were liberated by anti-Taliban Afghan forces.

**Source: United States Special Operations Command
Public Affairs Office**

e. **Counterterrorism (CT).** These are operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. SOF's role and additive capability is to conduct offensive measures within DOD's overall combatting terrorism efforts. SOF conduct CT missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means. SOF's activities within CT include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and non-kinetic activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism.

(1) **Intelligence Operations.** These are operations to collect, exploit, and report information on terrorist organizations, personnel, assets, and/or activities. SOF have the capability to conduct these operations in an overt, covert, and/or clandestine manner.

(2) **Network and Infrastructure Attacks.** These are operations that involve preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations with the objective of destroying, disorganizing, **or disarming** terrorist organizations before they can strike targets of national interest.

(3) **Hostage or Sensitive Materiel Recovery.** These are operations conducted to rescue hostages and/or recover sensitive materiel from terrorist control, requiring capabilities not normally found in conventional military units. The safety of the hostages and preventing destruction of the sensitive materiel are essential mission requirements.

(4) **Non-Kinetic Activities.** These are actions that are focused on defeating the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism by non-kinetic means. These could include, but are not limited to, PSYOP, IO, CA operations, UW and/or FID.

f. **Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** CP refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of CP are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and their delivery systems; roll back proliferation where it has occurred; deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems; and adapt US military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. **The continued spread of WMD technology can foster regional unrest and provide terrorist organizations with new and potent weapons.** The core capabilities of CP include counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. SOF focus on counterforce tasks and conduct CP missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.

For more details on CP, see JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Counterproliferation Operations.

g. **Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).** These consist of CA activities and other tasks conducted by CA to support commanders conducting CMO.

(1) Commanders have an inherent responsibility to maintain proper, prudent and lawful relations with the indigenous population, authorities, and government within their operational areas. These relations are facilitated through CMO.

(2) Specialized CMO support is provided by CA personnel assigned as staff who plan, coordinate, and oversee CMO while implementation is performed by other elements of the joint force (i.e., other SOF, engineers, health services support, transportation, military police, security, and maneuver units).

(3) CA support to CMO enhances military effectiveness by focusing efforts to minimize civilian interference with military operations and limit the adverse impact of military operations on civilian populations and resources. CA give commanders the capability to coordinate and provide disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of a civilian population.

(4) CA activities include, when directed and by operational necessity, establishing and conducting a military government or civil administration within operational areas until civilian authority or government can be restored or transitioned to other appropriate authorities. These activities are planned and conducted by CA and involve application of functional specialty expertise in civil sector disciplines normally the responsibility of civil government (see Figure II-3).

(5) CA operations are predominantly joint, interagency, and multinational in nature and are conducted through or with indigenous populations, authorities and institutions, international organizations, and NGOs.

For more detailed information on CMO and CA activities, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.




Figure II-3. Civil-Military Operations Relationships

h. **PSYOP.** These are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to **influence** their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. **The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the JFC's objectives.** Planning and employment considerations include:

(1) **Force Multiplier.** PSYOP are among the most effective nonlethal weapons available to a commander. It can reduce casualties on both sides by reducing the morale and combat effectiveness of the adversary, creating dissent and disaffection within their ranks, encouraging surrenders or defections, promoting disobedience, or inducing a lack of support for a hostile regime within a civilian populace.

(2) **Combatant Commander Responsibilities.** Each geographic combatant commander is responsible for **conducting PSYOP programs in peacetime.** Such efforts are designed to create a favorable image of the friendly government, of the United States, and of the Armed Forces of the United States; encourage support for democratic institutions, human rights, regional stability, and counterdrug activities; and assist a HN in explaining and publicizing humanitarian and civic action projects to local citizens. When used as part of an integrated theater strategy or strategic information operation, PSYOP

can reduce the probability of conflict, reduce the damage if conflict does occur, and speed the transition to normality in the postconflict phase.

(3) **PSYOP Applications.** Taking advantage of their language and culture skills, in-depth knowledge of the region, and understanding of interagency operations, SOF provide the geographic combatant commander with a broad range of PSYOP capabilities to be employed independently or in support of a larger theater campaign. These capabilities include the following:

(a) **Developing, Producing, Distributing, and Disseminating.** PSYOP units design, develop, and produce programs. They distribute and disseminate products that support tactical, operational, and strategic goals.

(b) **Coordinating and Directing PSYOP Programs.** PSYOP support national policy goals with programs developed for and approved by higher authority. PSYOP personnel coordinate with the chain of command to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the program.

(c) **Producing PSYOP Studies and Estimates.** PSYOP personnel produce and maintain studies and estimates for the commander. They advise supported commanders on the expected psychological impacts of their courses of action (COAs). They identify the adversary PSYOP effort and the susceptibilities of friendly forces.

(d) **Support Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), Civilian Internee (CI), and Dislocated Civilian (DC) Operations.** PSYOP support can dispel rumors, create dialogue and pacify or indoctrinate EPWs, CIs, or DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations, and ensure safe and humane conditions persist.

(e) **Providing Support to HN Assistance Operations.** During CMO, PSYOP personnel may work with CA or conventional units to promote civic action projects either by or in support of the host government.

(f) **Employ Tactical PSYOP.** Tactical PSYOP forces, with augmentation, are capable of providing all functions of PSYOP, on a limited scale, to component commands within a designated area of operations (AO).

(4) **PSYOP Support to Information Operations.** PSYOP are a core capability of IO. PSYOP activities are integrated into IO plans and synchronized with IO objectives and themes. Mission-type orders and decentralized execution can give PSYOP forces considerable autonomy to conduct tactical operations within established IO guidance.

For additional information on PSYOP, see JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

i. **Information Operations.** IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO may be conducted in all phases of an operation, across the range of military operations, and at every level of war. IO involve many different capabilities which are applied either individually or

through integration. Major capabilities include computer network operations, electronic warfare, operational security, PSYOP, and military deception. Beyond intelligence support, other capabilities include counterintelligence, physical security, information assurance, public affairs (PA), and CMO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval.

For additional information on IO, see JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

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CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred."

William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA),
Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC),
Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and
Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR)
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, 1989

1. Introduction

a. **SOF may be assigned to either US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) or a geographic combatant command.** Operational control (OPCON) of SOF **assigned** to a geographic combatant command is exercised by the commander of the TSOC. OPCON of SOF **attached** to a geographic combatant command is normally exercised by the commander of the TSOC or other JFC (e.g., commander, joint special operations task force [CDRJSOTF]; commander, joint psychological operations task force; or commander, joint civil-military operations task force). In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

- (1) Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command.
- (2) Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.
- (3) Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.
- (4) Integrate SOF in the planning process.
- (5) Match unit capabilities with mission requirements.

b. **SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan (war or MOOTW). Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive C2 by an appropriate SOF C2 element.** The limited window of opportunity normally associated with the majority of SOF missions, as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions, requires a C2 structure that is, above all,



The nature of SO requires clear, responsive C2 by an appropriate SOF C2 element.

responsive to the needs of the operational unit. SOF C2 may be tailored for a specific mission or operation.

c. **Liaison** between all components of the joint force and SOF, wherever assigned, is **vital for effective employment of SOF as well as the prevention of fratricide.**

2. Assignment of Special Operations Forces

a. **SOF in the United States.** Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, **all SOF based in the continental United States are assigned to USSOCOM and are therefore under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the Commander, USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM).** USSOCOM is a unique unified command in Department of Defense in that it has the responsibilities of a functional combatant command, has Service-like responsibilities, and when established as a supported command, plans and conducts certain SO missions worldwide. CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM over assigned SOF through the commanders of its Service components or its subordinate unified command.

(1) In its role as a functional combatant command, USSOCOM provides SOF on a temporary basis to other combatant commands for operational employment. When transferred, the forces are **attached** to the gaining combatant command with the geographic combatant commander normally exercising OPCON over them.

(2) When directed, CDRUSSOCOM will plan and conduct SO missions as the supported commander. In certain situations, the President or the Secretary of Defense, depending

upon the specific mission requirements, could choose to exercise OPCON directly over SOF for a particular operation without any intervening levels of command.

b. **SOF in Theater.** SOF assigned to a geographic combatant command are under the COCOM of the respective geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander normally exercises COCOM of all assigned and OPCON of all attached SOF through the TSOC commander (see Figure III-1).

c. **SOF under control of a non-US command.** When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, geographic combatant commanders may place SOF units under the control of a non-US multinational forces commander. In such instances, OPCON of US SOF units will be retained by a US SOF commander within the multinational command structure.

For further information on command relationships, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

3. Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Theater

Normally, C2 of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. C2 of PSYOP and CA forces, based on their unique role in the theater, is discussed separately in JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, and JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*. **The**




Figure III-1. Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control

identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF should depend upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment. C2 of SOF is executed through one or more of the following:

a. **Theater Special Operations Command.** To provide the necessary unity of command, each geographic combatant commander (except for US Northern Command) has established a TSOC as a subunified command within the geographic combatant command. **The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization** capable of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities. The TSOC is also the primary mechanism by which a geographic combatant commander exercises C2 over SOF. **The TSOC commander has three principal roles.**

(1) **Joint Force Commander.** As the commander of a subunified command, **the TSOC commander is a JFC.** As such, he has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations as directed by the geographic combatant commander and exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces as well. The TSOC commander may establish JTFs that report directly to him, such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF), in order to plan and execute these missions.

(2) **Theater SO Advisor.** The TSOC commander **advises** the geographic combatant commander and the other component commanders on the **proper employment of SOF.** The TSOC commander may develop specific recommendations for the assignment of SOF in theater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The role of theater SO advisor is best accomplished when the geographic combatant commander **establishes the TSOC commander as a special staff officer on the theater staff** (in addition to his duties as a commander — i.e., “dual hatted”). In this case, the TSOC commander may appoint a deputy as his representative to the theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.

(3) **Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).** When designated by the geographic combatant commander, the TSOC commander will function as a JFSOCC. This will normally be the case when the geographic combatant commander establishes functional component commanders for operations, absent the establishment of a JTF. The TSOC commander can also be designated the JFSOCC within a JTF if the scope of the operations conducted by the JTF warrant it (see Figure III-2).

b. SOF Operational C2

(1) **JFSOCC.** The JFSOCC is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets; planning and coordinating SO; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The TSOC commander or CDRJSOTF will normally be the individual functioning as a JFSOCC. When acting as a JFSOCC, they retain their authority and responsibilities as JFCs. A JFSOCC may command a single or multiple JSOTFs. The TSOC




Figure III-2. Special Operations Forces Subordinate Joint Force Command and Control

commander will normally be established as a JFSOCC if there is more than one JSOTF to command (see Figure III-3). If only one JSOTF is established (i.e., within a JTF), the CDRJSOTF will be dual-hatted as the JFSOCC. When a joint force special operations component is established and combined with elements from one or more allied or coalition nations, it becomes a combined forces special operations component and its commander becomes a combined forces special operations component commander.




Figure III-3. Notional Joint Force Special Operations Component Command and Control

(2) **JSOTF.** A JSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. A JSOTF may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. A notional depiction of JSOTF elements is shown in Figure III-4.

(a) A JSOTF, like any JTF, is normally established by a JFC (e.g., a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander such as a TSOC commander, or a JTF commander). For example, a geographic combatant commander could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific region of the theater. Then either the geographic combatant commander or the JTF commander could establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that JTF, to plan and execute SO. Likewise, a TSOC commander could establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region assigned by the geographic combatant commander. A JSOTF may also be established as a joint organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater.

(b) A JSOTF is established to conduct operations in a specific operational area or to accomplish a specific mission. If geographically oriented, multiple JSOTFs will normally be assigned different operational areas.

(c) Within a JTF, if only one JSOTF is established, the CDRJSOTF will be dual-hatted as the JFSOCC. When a JSOTF is formed to directly support a combatant command headquarters, the TSOC commander normally acts as the CDRJSOTF. Regardless of who it is, a CDRJSOTF is a JFC and exercises the authority and responsibility assigned by the establishing authority. A JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOC staff or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other SOF or conventional units and/or personnel as appropriate.

(d) When a JSOTF is established and combined with elements from one or more allied or coalition nations, it becomes a combined special operations task force and its commander becomes a combined special operations task force commander.




Figure III-4. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Elements

For further information on a JSOTF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for JSOTF Operations.

c. Subordinate C2 Organizations

(1) **Air Force SO.** Air Force SOF (AFSOF) denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) **Air Force Special Operations Component (AFSOC).** The AFSOC (not to be confused with the Air Force Special Operations Command that is the Air Force component of USSOCOM) is the Air Force component of a joint SO force. It normally is composed of a special operations wing, special operations group, or special tactics group. When subordinate

Air Force SOF units deploy to forward operations bases (FOBs) or advanced operations bases (AOBs), the AFSOC commander may establish one or more provisional units.

(b) **Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD).** The AFSOD is a squadron-size AFSOF HQ that could be a composite organization composed of different USAF assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC, JSOTF, joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC), or JTF depending upon the size and duration of the operation.

(c) **Air Force Special Operations Element (AFSOE).** The AFSOE contains selected AFSOF units and is normally subordinate to a theater AFSOC or AFSOD, depending upon the size and duration of the operation.

(2) **Navy SO.** Navy SOF denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) **Naval Special Operations Component (NAVSOC).** A NAVSOC is the Navy component of a joint SO force.

(b) **Naval Special Warfare Task Force (NSWTF).** C2 structure to command one or more subordinate naval special warfare (NSW) task groups (NSWTGs). A NSWTF may be commanded by the in-theater NSW unit commander or a designated 0-5/0-6.

(c) **Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG).** Composed of a C2 element and one or more subordinate NSW task units (NSWTUs). Standing peacetime deployments dictate the basic structure of the theater specific NSWTG, and deviations from the basic structure will be designated as NSWTG plus or minus.

(d) **Naval Special Warfare Task Unit.** An independent component of a NSWTG consisting of a C2 element, an operational element, and a mobility element.

(e) **Naval Special Warfare Task Element (NSWTE).** A NSWTE is a temporary, task-organized force of a NSWTU, tailored to address a specific operational requirement.

(3) **Army SO.** Army SOF (ARSOF) denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(a) **Army Special Operations Component (ARSOC).** An ARSOC is the Army component of a joint SO force.

(b) **Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF).** If there is only one group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO, it is generally called an ARSOTF. The CDRJSOTF may establish multiple subordinate ARSOTFs. Each ARSOTF is organized around the nucleus of a SF or Ranger unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The CDRJSOTF assigns each ARSOTF an area within the joint special operations area (JSOA) or functional mission.

(c) **Special Forces.** SF units normally task-organize into a number of operations bases. Used in this sense, the term “operations base” connotes a headquarters and support element as well as physical location. SF operations bases include **the special forces operations base (SFOB), FOB, and AOB.**

1. Special Forces Operations Base. The SFOB is established by a SF group to synchronize activities of subordinate FOBs and AOBs. The SFOB normally serves as an ARSOC or ARSOTF HQ directly subordinate to the CDRJSOTF.

2. Forward Operations Base. A FOB is established by a SF battalion to control and support deployed operational elements. Tactical SF elements conduct mission planning and preparation at a FOB. Although generally subordinate to SFOB, an independent FOB may be established under the OPCON of the CDRJSOTF.

3. Advanced Operations Base. An AOB is established by an SF company to extend the C2 and support functions of a FOB. For example, an AOB may function as a launch-and-recovery or radio relay site.

(d) **Rangers.** Rangers normally exercise C2 through command posts collocated with other SOF or conventional units. They do not have the organic capability to establish their own operations bases.

(e) **Army Special Operations Aviation.** ARSOA are normally assigned to a JSOTF. OPCON may be exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either functional or Service components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a joint special operations air component (JSOAC) is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, and under certain circumstances, OPCON of ARSOA may be exercised through the JSOACC.

(4) Joint Special Operations Air Component. JSOAC refers to the commander, staff, and assets of a SO air component of a subordinate unified command, a joint force special operations component (JFSOC) or a JSOTF. A JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF may establish a JSOAC. It is established as a functional component within a joint SO force to control SO aviation assets. The JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for planning and executing joint SO air activities. This includes the responsibility to coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint SO aviation assets. The establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as appropriate) normally exercises OPCON of joint SO aviation through a JSOACC. However, there are also circumstances where the SOF commander may elect to place selected SO aviation assets under separate control. A JSOAC may be subordinate to a single JSOTF or separate, tasked to support the activities of multiple JSOTFs within a JFSOC (see Figure III-3). A JSOAC may be a standing organization or can be formed in response to a contingency or other operation.

d. Interagency C2 Considerations. A JTF HQ is the operational focal point for participating in interagency coordination. During interagency operations, the JTF HQ provides the structure for a unified effort. Depending on the level of a JSOTF HQ in the command structure of an operation, the JSOTF may play a key role in the interagency process. If the JSOTF is

the senior or stand-alone JTF, then, de facto, the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal point in the interagency process.

For further information on interagency considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

e. **Multinational C2 Considerations.** Any control of SOF operating elements transferred to a foreign commander must include an appropriate SOF C2 element for direct C2 of the operating elements.

For further information on multinational considerations, refer to JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

4. Special Operations Forces Command and Control, Coordination, and Liaison Elements

SOF commanders have available specific elements that facilitate C2, coordination, and liaison. They include the **special operations command and control element (SOCCE)** to command and control, and coordinate SOF activities with conventional forces; the **special operations liaison element (SOLE)** to provide liaison to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) or appropriate Service component air C2 facility; and **SOF liaison officers (LNOs)** placed in a variety of locations as necessary to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO within the operational area. Although not part of a SOF organization, there is also the **special operations coordination element (SOCOORD)** that advises Army corps commanders on SO. All of these elements significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance overall mission accomplishment of the joint force.

a. **Special Operations Command and Control Element.** The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force operations. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as appropriate). Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. The SOCCE normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support of a conventional force. It collocates with the command post of the supported force to coordinate and deconflict SO with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications interoperability with that force. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, and JSOTF component commanders may attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required. The SOCCE remains under the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the following functions:

(1) Exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements attached to, or placed in direct support of, the supported conventional commander.

(2) Advises the conventional force commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities, and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.

(3) Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported force commander's current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.

(4) Provides required secure communications links.

(5) Coordinates and deconflicts SO activities with supported force operations.

(6) When linkup becomes imminent, assists the supported force commander and staff with linkup planning and execution.

b. Special Operations Liaison Element

(1) A SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC to the JFACC (if designated) or appropriate Service component air C2 organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations.

(2) The SOLE director works directly for the JFSOCC. The SOLE director is not in the SOF chain of command, and thus command authority for mission tasking, planning, and execution of SO remains with the JFSOCC. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel in divisions of the joint air operations center (JAOC) to integrate with the JFACC staff. The SOLE accomplishes the coordination, deconfliction, and integration of SOF air, surface, and subsurface operations by providing a SOF presence in the JAOC that is aware of the activities of SOF units in the field and by providing visibility of SOF operations in the air tasking order and the airspace control order. The SOLE must also coordinate appropriate fire support coordinating measures to help avoid fratricide. A notional SOLE consists of 43 personnel, but in practice is tailored as appropriate (see Figure III-5).

c. Special Operations Coordination Element. The SOCOORD serves as the primary advisor to an Army corps commander with regard to SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations. The SOCOORD is the functional organic staff element of the corps operations division [G-3]. With augmentation, it can function as the operations directorate Special Operations Division if the corps is established as a JTF. A SOCOORD, while not organic to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF), may be established to augment the staff of a MEF.

d. SOF LNOs. SOF LNOs ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and **support information** to aid mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support, overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, PSYOP, CAO, and other operational issues based on ongoing and projected SO missions. These efforts are **crucial to maintaining the JFC's unity of effort, tempo, and coordination of limited resources and assets.**




Figure III-5. Notional Special Operations Liaison Element Functions

5. Joint Special Operations Area

a. Coordination and deconfliction with conventional forces are always **critical concerns for SOF commanders**. SOF are often employed prior to the arrival of conventional forces. **Effective coordination is vital** in the transition from advance force operations involving SOF to follow-on operations and in ensuring that the timing and tempo of the overall campaign is maintained.

b. The **JFC may establish a joint special operations area**. A JSOA is a restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same general operational area. When a JSOA is designated, the JFSOCC (or CDRJSOTF) is the supported commander within the designated JSOA.

c. While establishment of a designated JSOA for SOF to conduct independent operations assists in the ease of control of SO and the prevention of fratricide, the **JFC should always evaluate the value of isolating SOF** against the greater benefit of integrating SOF into the overall campaign plan.

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CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

“Closely allied to the confidence which is due to good leadership is that which is caused by the feeling of being supported.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Thoughts on War, 1944

1. Introduction

SOF support must be tailored to specific mission requirements yet flexible enough to respond to changing employment parameters. The joint character of SO requires support arrangements across Service lines with emphasis on unique support required in order to sustain independent and remote operations. Further, SOF must be able to exploit information derived from the full range of available national, theater, and tactical (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support systems.

2. Intelligence Support of Special Operations Forces

Timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence is vital in identifying relevant targets, COA development, and mission planning/execution. SO require detailed planning, often by relatively small units. Consequently, intelligence for SO is often broader in scope than that of conventional forces. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace provides the foundation for SO intelligence production. Like conventional operations, SO intelligence analysis focuses on the operational area and the area of interest (AI); however, the strategic nature of SOF missions frequently incorporates an expanded AI. SO planning requires a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical and socioeconomic situation in the operational area and AI to ensure all factors affecting mission success are considered.

a. **Interface with National and Theater Intelligence Assets.** The ability to interface with theater/national intelligence systems and assets is critical for SO mission success. The theater joint intelligence center (JIC) or joint analysis center is the focal point for intelligence activities in support of joint operations with additional support from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC). Joint force requests for information (RFIs) are forwarded to the combatant command JIC. If the theater JIC is unable to respond, RFIs are forwarded to the NMJIC. The defense collection coordination center is collocated with the NMJIC and will determine the appropriate tasking of national assets in response to RFIs. The accomplishment of a SO mission may depend on target or intelligence updates provided by other government agencies. A JSOTF, when formed, will have access to these same theater and national interfaces through the theater JIC and the NMJIC. Additionally, a JSOTF may be augmented with a national intelligence support team comprised of representatives from many national intelligence and combat support agencies.

b. **All-Source Intelligence.** The nature of many SO objectives and tactics requires fused, all-source intelligence support that is often more detailed than that required in conventional

operations. SOF often use intelligence information to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to intelligence information that would allow conventional forces to engage the adversary (see Figure IV-1).

c. **Expanded Focus During MOOTW.** Intelligence support to SOF in MOOTW requires various intelligence disciplines to widen their focus to include political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and relationships as well as adversary, friendly force, and target specific data. This is particularly true during FID and when tasked to participate in noncombatant evacuation operations.

d. **Sensitivity to HN and Adversary Collection Efforts.** SO missions are particularly sensitive to HN and adversary collection efforts. Counterintelligence support and OPSEC assist in protecting sensitive SOF missions.

For further information on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

3. Logistic Support of Special Operations Forces

Geographic combatant commanders and theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the TSOC, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided for assigned SOF. The TSOC commander or the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF, when a JTF is established, validates logistic requirements for SOF in theater for the geographic combatant commander. To the extent possible, SOF logistic requirements should be identified during the deliberate planning process. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the following:

a. **Service Support.** The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service, except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, JFSOCC, or a JSOTF. SOF Service-common logistic support includes equipment, material, supplies, and services adopted by a military Service for use by its own forces and their activities. These include standard military items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a Military Service to support and sustain its own forces, including those forces assigned to the combatant commands. Items and services defined as Service-common by one Military Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Military Services.




Figure IV-1. Examples of Special Operations Forces Intelligence Requirements

b. **Joint In-Theater Support.** The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the geographic combatant commander will determine if another Service component can do so through common or joint servicing arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements may also be used when more effective than normal Service support.

c. **Nonstandard Support.** When operations involving SOF impose time, geographic, and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure, making it impractical for the theater to provide the requisite support to SOF, the geographic combatant commander may request from CDRUSSOCOM the deployment of organic USSOCOM combat service support assets.

d. **SO-Peculiar Support.** SO-peculiar logistic support includes equipment, materials, supplies, and services required for SO missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the CDRUSSOCOM as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission. This support will be provided via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components.

e. **Host-Nation Support (HNS).** Countries with or without a government infrastructure may only be able to provide limited support. To negotiate for HNS, authority must be obtained through the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of State.

For further information on SOF logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.



Support, both of intelligence and material, is essential for successful Special Operations planning.

4. Medical Support of Special Operations Forces

a. **Austere SOF Support Structure.** SOF medical support is characterized by an austere structure and a limited number of medical personnel with enhanced medical skills. SOF medical personnel provide emergency treatment and a basic level of medical care at the operational team level. Medical support and patient movement (see Figure IV-2) provided to SOF units in the operational area is planned and conducted by SOF surgeons and medical personnel. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for SOF personnel is the transport of casualties by any expedient means possible. SOF medical personnel perform CASEVAC missions, forward of the intermediate staging base (ISB), on opportune aircraft or other means of transport, back to the ISB or a predetermined point where aeromedical evacuation (AE) assets are located. AE is conducted once the casualty is regulated into the patient movement system. AE is performed using fixed-wing aircraft and AE trained medical crews. It is the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities. **SOF units have varying degrees of Level I treatment capabilities and limited Level II capabilities. SOF do not have organic Levels III or IV capabilities available to them, and must rely either on available theater health service support assets, or local HN capabilities when access to Level III care is an urgent necessity.**



Figure IV-2. Strategic Special Operations Forces Patient Movement

b. **Conventional Support Structure.** Provision of medical support beyond SOF capabilities depends on the thoroughness of advanced planning so that the conventional medical support structure umbrella is extended to cover the limited organic capability or to meet requirements for additional medical assets (such as surgical intervention, evacuation, and expanded medical logistics). Certain operations may also require special security requirements to be put in place as to not compromise the identification of SOF personnel upon entry into the conventional medical system.

For further information on medical support, refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

5. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Support of Special Operations Forces

a. **Global Support.** Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) support to SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. C4 must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any SO mission, and it must add value to the SOF operational capability. C4 systems support the full range of SO worldwide. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and any time using the full spectrum of national capabilities required to support the mission. The SOF operational unit must have a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. C4 systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit on the ground, in the air, or at sea.

b. **Multiple and Varied Systems.** SOF C4 support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from the national to the tactical levels. C4 systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest operational level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control at the national level. SOF C4 systems must offer seamless connectivity.

c. **Interoperable Systems.** SOF C4 systems must be interoperable at the appropriate security level with the C4 systems deployed by US conventional forces, joint commands, allied units and US commercial networks to facilitate the seamless transport of critical information and common services. They must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems, but also must be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. Interoperability includes attaining commonality, compatibility, and standardization of C4 systems.

d. **CDRUSSOCOM Responsibilities.** CDRUSSOCOM, as do each of the Services, has the following C4 responsibilities:

- (1) To provide, operate, and maintain C4 facilities organic to assigned SOF, including organic Service elements.
- (2) To provide, operate, and maintain interoperable and compatible C4 systems.

(3) To provide the capability for interface of non-Defense Information Systems Network facilities.

(4) To provide the combatant commands with SO C4 systems and connectivity for SOF assigned to that command for inclusion in deliberate planning.

For further information on C4 support of SOF, refer to JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, and the JP 6-0 series of publications.

6. Public Affairs Support of Special Operations Forces

a. **Political Sensitivity of SO.** The political sensitivity of many SO, particularly in MOOTW, mandates that thorough and accurate PA guidance be developed during the operational planning stage and approved for use in advance of most SO.

b. **Accurate Reflection of the SO Mission.** PA planning must accurately reflect the objective of the mission to domestic audiences consistent with the overall PSYOP and CMO effort, and with strategic, operational, and tactical OPSEC requirements. The commander should develop proposed PA guidance that is coordinated with supporting commands and government agencies, as appropriate, prior to forwarding that guidance to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for approval.

For further information on PA support, refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs Support of Joint Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

7. Legal Support of Special Operations Forces

SO missions frequently involve a unique set of complex issues. There are Federal laws and Executive Orders, Federal agency publications and directives, the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement (ROE) that may affect SO missions as well as the SO joint planning and targeting processes. These guidelines become especially critical during sensitive MOOTW when international and domestic laws, treaty provisions, and political agreements may affect mission planning and execution. SOF commanders must seek legal review during all levels of planning and execution of SO missions, to include planning of the ROE.

For further information on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Joint, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support, JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, and JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning.

8. Combat Camera Support of Special Operations Forces

Combat camera provides still and video documentary products that support PSYOP and other SO missions. Many combat camera teams supporting SOF are specially equipped with night vision and digital image transmission capabilities. Combat camera also provides gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera imagery is used to portray the true nature of US operations to allies and civil populations, as well as adversaries, and to counter adversary disinformation with on-screen or gun camera evidence. The SOF link to combat camera support normally is through the supported geographic combatant commander's PA office.

9. Air Support to Special Operations Forces

Air support is often provided to SOF and requires detailed integration. The JFACC may provide additional support to SOF. This support can include terminal attack controllers, tactical air control parties (TACPs), and/or the capabilities of an air support operations center (ASOC) or elements thereof. TACPs can work directly for SOF units supporting various missions. ASOCs can help the SOF commander request and integrate air power into the JFC's special operations. Elements provided to SOF units may require additional training or equipment to effectively and safely facilitate air support during SO.

10. Space Support of Special Operations Forces

US Strategic Command can provide deployable space support personnel to SOF upon request through the supported geographic combatant commander. Space support teams and liaison personnel can assist SOF commanders and staff in understanding the capabilities, limitations, and effective application of space systems, and ensure that SOF support requirements are clearly understood. Space based support to SOF can include: precision navigation and/or geopositioning, global communications, global intelligence collection, surveillance and warning, meteorological support, imagery for geospatial support and targeting, blue force tracking data, and denying adversary use of space-based capabilities (see Figure IV-3). Satellite threat advisories can provide additional mission security by influencing SOF operational timing.

For further information on space support, refer to JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

11. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support of Special Operations Forces

a. **Use of Environmental Data.** Environmental information should be included in the SOF commander's decision-making process from initial planning to execution. Meteorological and oceanographic support (METOC) data can provide information such as studies of general climatology, hydrography, and specific weather forecasts for the operational area. These may provide the commander with the data which to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute,




Figure IV-3. Space-Based Support to Special Operations Forces

support, and sustain specific SOF operations. Local conditions may expedite a particular COA or render it impractical.

b. **Exploitation of METOC Conditions.** Potentially, an execution decision may be based on exploiting certain weather and METOC conditions to provide cover for operations while avoiding those environmental conditions that will hamper operations. However, these decisions often require finesse and judgment to ensure that, while the weapons systems are operating near their environmental limits, they do not exceed those limits.

c. **Environmental Effects on Space Operations.** With increased military reliance on space capabilities, the SOF commander must also be kept informed of environmental effects on space operations. METOC support personnel can provide information that will allow the SOF commander to plan for the possibility of the loss of one or more critical space-based systems.

For further information on METOC support, refer to JP 3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

12. Geospatial Information and Services Support of Special Operations Forces

a. **Foundation for SOF Visualization of the Battlespace.** Geospatial information and services (GI&S) support can provide SOF with timely, complete, and accurate information about

the battlespace. SOF commanders use geospatial data to help determine friendly and adversary COAs and to plan for deployment of SOF and key weapons systems. USSOCOM, when required, has the responsibility as defined in DOD Instruction 5000.56, *Programming Unique Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Requirements for Developing Systems*, to submit requirements for new geospatial data to support emerging systems. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency has primary responsibility for providing GI&S.

b. **Integral Part of SOF Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning.** GI&S deliberate planning identifies the AI, determines GI&S requirements for SO activities and weapons systems, determines current availability for resources to meet those requirements, determines risk, and then develops a production strategy to address shortfalls. During crisis action planning (CAP), the requirement to plan GI&S support for crisis operations depends greatly upon the scope of the mission, how much GI&S data can be adapted from existing deliberate plans, and the total time available for GI&S to be included in the CAP process.

For further information on GI&S, refer to JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations.

13. Fire Support to Special Operations Forces

SOF may require long-range ground-based joint fire support in remote locations or for targets well beyond the land, maritime, and amphibious operational force AO. SOF liaison elements coordinate fire support through both external and SOF channels. SOF liaison elements (SOCCE, SOCOORD) provide SOF expertise to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict SO fire support. Compatible communications and detailed procedures between fire support providers and SOF operating deep within enemy territory must be considered. Comprehensive fire support planning between SO and supporting elements will facilitate rapid, responsive and accurate mission execution.

For further information on Joint Fire Support, refer to JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

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APPENDIX A

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1. Introduction

Military education and training have an integral relationship. Many times, the two are indistinguishable, but they are in fact different. Military education is the instruction of individuals in subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war. Military training, on the other hand, is the preparation of individuals or units to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions, tasks, or missions. In other words, education provides an individual with the ability to determine **what** to do in a given circumstance while training provides the **how**. SOF require a combination of education and specialized training to achieve operational proficiency. Education enhances the understanding of joint special operations and fosters disciplined thought and creativity to develop solutions to complex problems in dynamic and ambiguous situations. Training is designed to produce SOF personnel and units that have mastered the tactics, techniques, and procedures through which SOF units accomplish their missions.

2. Education and Training Organizations

a. In addition to the common education and basic individual military skills training provided by the Services to SOF personnel, each Service component of USSOCOM has a school to provide education and/or training to its personnel in their combat specialties. These schools are the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Naval Special Warfare Center, and the Air Force Special Operations School.

b. USSOCOM has also established the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). It focuses on educating SOF senior and intermediate leaders and selected non-SOF decision makers, both military and civilian, in joint special operations. In addition to USSOCOM, the Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) provides specialized training for SOF and conventional staffs in special operations. As an example of the relationship of SOF education and training, there are three levels of learning for the education and training of JSOTFs. JSOU conducts the first two levels, which are focused on individual education, while SOCJFCOM conducts the third level, which is focused on battlestaff training.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

a. **Services.** The Services are responsible for basic individual military skill training and common professional military education (PME) for personnel programmed for assignment to SOF units.

b. CDRUSSOCOM

(1) **CDRUSSOCOM Responsibilities.** CDRUSSOCOM is charged by Title 10, USC, Section 167 with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings and ensure their interoperability with conventional forces as well as other SOF. SO-peculiar individual, continuation, and

professional training and PME are the direct responsibility of CDRUSSOCOM. Joint training of SOF is the shared responsibility of CDRUSSOCOM and the geographic combatant commanders.

(2) **USSOCOM Component Training.** The focus of USSOCOM component training is to ensure that SOF units are capable of performing assigned wartime missions through the accomplishment of individual and collective tasks. Component training, managed by the USSOCOM Service component commands, is governed by the doctrine of the Military Departments and primarily driven by mission requirements identified in the various geographic regions by the TSOCs.

(3) **Assessments.** USSOCOM closely monitors the assessment phase of the joint training system. Within this phase, the results of SOF collective training over time are translated into future training requirements for subsequent training cycles, developed into lessons learned, used to identify and resolve joint SO issues, and made available to geographic combatant commanders and other commands that may employ SOF. Assessments allow USSOCOM and component commands to use the aggregate results from all training events to judge the command's overall mission capability.

c. Geographic Combatant Commander

(1) **Geographic Combatant Commander Responsibilities.** Through the TSOC and in coordination with CDRUSSOCOM, geographic combatant commanders should articulate SO joint mission-essential tasks required to support theater campaign plans, operation plans, and operation plans in concept format. CDRUSSOCOM will develop and resource the SO-specific training architecture. USSOCOM component commanders then develop supporting mission-essential tasks for CDRUSSOCOM validation and implement training programs to meet validated requirements. Geographic combatant commanders conduct joint exercises, some Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored, which are supported and monitored by CDRUSSOCOM. Such exercises stress SOF under conditions resembling the operational environments in which they will be tasked. Further, these exercises build and reinforce the regional area orientation required to support theater campaign plans. This orientation, including language and cultural familiarity, is labor-intensive and may take years of preparation for units to reach full capability. A joint exercise program utilized extensively by SOF is the joint combined exchange training (JCET) program. The JCET is a means by which SOF maintain their combat readiness and at the same time participates in the theater security cooperation strategy.

(2) **Role of the TSOC.** As the operational commanders of in-theater SOF, TSOC commanders have the best perspective concerning ongoing and projected missions for deploying SOF. The use of mission letters can greatly assist CDRUSSOCOM in the execution of responsibilities for the preparation for employment in a specific theater. Mission letters serve as a formal link between theater missions and the training of CDRUSSOCOM-assigned, theater-apportioned SOF. Mission letters should be developed for specific units designated for deployment to the theater and provided to the unit commander in a timely manner to influence the unit's predeployment training program.

d. **Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM)**

(1) **CDRUSJFCOM Responsibilities.** Among other responsibilities, the Unified Command Plan 02 established US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the center of excellence for training, training support, and integration of US forces and its allies in preparing to conduct the full range of joint, multinational, and interagency operations in order to protect and defend US national interests. To this end, CDRUSJFCOM has assigned the mission for training of SOF to SOCJFCOM.

(2) **Role of the SOCJFCOM.** SOCJFCOM assists in CDRUSSOCOM's joint SOF training responsibilities through its JSOTF, JPOTF, and Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) training charter. SOCJFCOM conducts worldwide training and facilitates joint integration to enhance the effectiveness and interoperability of SOF in joint, multinational, and interagency environments. SOCJFCOM's derived tasks are:

(a) To conduct worldwide joint SOF training to enhance SOF effectiveness within the joint, multinational, and interagency environment in support of USJFCOM's training program; focus training on geographic combatant commanders' staffs, TSOC staffs, and JTF commanders and staffs as well as the identified training needs of the JSOTF, JPOTF, JCMOTF commanders and staffs.

(b) To improve JTF to JSOTF and JSOTF to JTF component interoperability through participation in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USJFCOM Joint Exercise Program.

(c) To facilitate joint integration, to include concept development and experimentation and enhance SOF effectiveness within the joint, multinational, and interagency environment.

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APPENDIX B

REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-05 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Title 10, USC, and as specifically amended by:
 - a. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
 - b. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as contained in the National Defense Authorization Act, for Fiscal Year 1987.
2. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01E, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 2002*.
4. CJCSI 3110.05A, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 1998*.
5. CJCSI 3110.06, *Special Operations Supplemental to JSCP FY 1998*.
6. CJCSI 3110.12, *Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP*.
7. CJCSI 3210.01 *Joint Information Warfare Policy*.
8. CJCSI 3214.01 *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 71-87, 29 May 1987, *Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command*.
10. *Unified Command Plan*.
11. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
12. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.
13. JP 1-01, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
14. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
15. JP 1-04, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military Operations*.
16. JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.

17. JP 2-03, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations*.
18. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
19. JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*.
20. JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*.
21. JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.
22. JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.
23. JP 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*.
24. JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*.
25. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.
26. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
27. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*.
28. JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*.
29. JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.
30. JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*.
31. JP 3-15, *Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare*.
32. JP 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue*.
33. JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*.
34. JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security*.
35. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations*.
36. JP 3-57.1, *Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs*.
37. JP 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*.

38. JP 3-59, *Joint Doctrine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support*.
39. JP 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.
40. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.
41. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.
42. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.
43. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*.
44. JP 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*.
45. USSOCOM Pub 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War*.
46. USSOCOM Pub 3-11, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Forces in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments*.
47. USSOCOM Document 525-7, *Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)*.

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APPENDIX C
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05, 17 April 1998, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-PJ-D//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//
CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, *Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands*.

Army:	US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181
Air Force:	Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896
Navy:	CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099
Marine Corps:	Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321
Coast Guard:	Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AE	aeromedical evacuation
AFSOC	Air Force special operations component
AFSOD	Air Force special operations detachment
AFSOE	Air Force special operations element
AFSOF	Air Force special operations forces
AI	area of interest
AO	area of operations
AOB	advanced operations base
ARSOA	Army special operations aviation
ARSOC	Army special operations component
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ARSOTF	Army special operations task force
ASOC	air support operations center
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CA	civil affairs
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAP	crisis action planning
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CDRJSOTF	commander, joint special operations task force
CDRUSJFCOM	Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CI	civilian internee
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CP	counterproliferation
CT	counterterrorism
DA	direct action
DC	dislocated civilian
DOD	Department of Defense
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FID	foreign internal defense
FOB	forward operations base
GI&S	geospatial information and services

HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
IO	information operations
ISB	intermediate staging base
JAOC	joint air operations center
JCET	joint combined exchange training
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFSOC	joint force special operations component
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIC	joint intelligence center
JP	joint publication
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOAC	joint special operations air component
JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JTF	joint task force
LNO	liaison officer
LOC	line of communications
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NAVSOC	naval special operations component
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NSW	naval special warfare
NSWTE	naval special warfare task element
NSWTF	naval special warfare task force
NSWTG	naval special warfare task group
NSWTU	naval special warfare task unit
OPCON	operational control
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PME	professional military education

PSYOP	psychological operations
RFI	request for information
ROE	rules of engagement
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SF	special forces
SFOB	special forces operations base
SO	special operations
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCJFCOM	Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command
SOCOORD	special operations coordination element
SOF	special operations forces
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SR	special reconnaissance
TAC	terminal attack control
TACP	tactical air control party
TGO	terminal guidance operations
TSOC	theater special operations command
UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
USAF	United States Air Force
USC	United States Code
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. Also called AE. (JP 1-02)

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 1-02)

area assessment. The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (JP 1-02)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

casualty evacuation. The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and between medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to evacuate casualties. Also called CASEVAC. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations. Operations conducted by civil affairs, the designated Active and Reserve Component forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct civil affairs activities and to provide specialized support to commanders responsible for civil-military operations. Also called CAO. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

collateral mission. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

combined joint special operations task force. A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called CJSOTF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “multinational joint special operations task force” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests. (JP 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.

Also called DA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations, and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint combined exchange training. A program conducted overseas to fulfill US forces training requirements and at the same time exchange the sharing of skills between US forces and host nation counterparts. Training activities are designed to improve US and host-nation capabilities. Also called JCET. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task

force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples

are as follows. a. permissive environment — Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. uncertain environment — Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. c. hostile environment — Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

raid. An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (JP 1-02)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (JP 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. (JP 1-02)

sea-air-land team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called SEAL. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Service-common. Equipment, material, supplies, and services adopted by a Military Service for use by its own forces and activities. These include standard military items, base operating support, and the supplies and services provided by a Military Service to support and sustain its own forces, including those assigned to the combatant commands. Items and services defined as Service-common by one Military Service are not necessarily Service-common for all other Military Services. See also special operations-peculiar. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special boat team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft. Also called SBT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term “special boat unit” and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area. Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations command and control element. A special operations command and control element (SOCCE) that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces operations. It performs command and control or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing special operations forces commander. Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. The SOCCE can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. The SOCCE remains under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE. See also special operations; special operations forces. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission. Also called SO-peculiar. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Also called SR. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special tactics. US Air Force special operations forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. They include combat control team, pararescue, and combat weather personnel who provide the interface between air and ground combat operations. Also called ST. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special tactics team. A task-organized element of special tactics that may include combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel. Functions include austere airfield and assault zone reconnaissance, surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; terminal attack control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. Also called STT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

terminal attack control. The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP 1-02)

terminal control. 1. The authority to direct aircraft to maneuver into a position to deliver ordnance, passengers, or cargo to a specific location or target. Terminal control is a type of air control. 2. Any electronic, mechanical, or visual control given to aircraft to facilitate target acquisition and resolution. See also terminal guidance. (JP 1-02)

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. 3. Any electronic, mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. Terminal guidance is not a type of air control. Those providing terminal guidance do not have weapons release authority, or authority to direct the maneuver of aircraft. See also terminal control. (JP 1-02)


terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 1-02)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-05** is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

