

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY – REQUIRED AND VALID?

by

Colonel P.J. Devlin
Canadian Army

Dr. D. Jablonsky
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Securing an Open Society Required and Valid?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) P Devlin				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel P.J. Devlin

TITLE: Securing an Open Society – Required and Valid?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Canadians live in an increasingly interconnected, complex and often dangerous world. They believe that threats to security and public safety, whether it be terrorist attack, the spread of infectious disease or natural disaster, are not just problems that other nations face. In April 2004, Canada released *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Strategy*. This was Canada's first ever comprehensive statement of national security policy and is billed as an action plan designed to ensure that Canada is prepared for and can respond to current and future threats. This paper asks whether Canada's National Security Strategy is required and valid.

The paper explores the requirement for a formal National Security Strategy by verifying the requirement from an international and domestic perspective. Canadian values and interests are then assessed to determine opportunities and challenges, before the focus areas in *Securing an Open Society* are considered to determine validity. This is followed by a proposed national Ends-Ways-Means-Risks paradigm offered to improve future National Security Strategies.

A formal National Security Strategy is necessary for Canada to be a strong and independent nation, and to pursue middle power statecraft in today's environment. Canada's strategy requires an integrated approach, across military, civil and private sector skills, unifying diplomatic, informational, military and economic efforts to combat national threats. A formal National Security Strategy is essential to buttress both national and domestic policy while assisting in making difficult policy choices. *Securing an Open Society* is a welcome addition that fulfills a national security need by providing guidance and direction. Improved analysis will increase its validity and make it a more compelling document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY – REQUIRED AND VALID?	1
THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FORMAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.....	1
THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWER – THE INTERNATIONAL NEED	2
CANADA – THE DOMESTIC NEED	3
REQUIRED?	5
THE VALIDITY OF SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY	5
VALUES AND INTERESTS	5
FOCUS AREAS	7
A LARGER VALIDITY	9
CONCLUSION - CANADA TODAY AND TOMORROW	12
APPENDIX 1 - CANADIAN ENDS, WAYS, MEANS, RISKS SUMMARY	15
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21

SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY – REQUIRED AND VALID?

It was a beautiful October day in Ottawa, Canada as Governor General Adrienne Clarkson and Prime Minister Paul Martin both prepared to deliver their speeches that would open the Thirty-Eighth Parliament of Canada. They sat together in the Prime Minister's office, under the warm shadow of the Peace Tower. A copy of *The Globe & Mail*¹ lay open on the corner of the table. Mr. Martin had been reading a story on Afghanistan. Afghan national elections were ongoing and the two Canadian leaders found their conversation drift to the tremendous progress that Afghanistan had made in three years and the significant role that a middle power, such as Canada, had played over that period. Canada had contributed over 40% of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops to this mission.² Martin and Clarkson were very optimistic for the young, democratic government that would be confirmed in December. They were well aware that this session of Parliament was special, because for the first time in history, the members began with a formal National Security Strategy (NSS). The 52 page document, entitled *Securing an Open Society*, had been created the previous April as “a strategic framework and action plan designed to ensure that Canada is prepared for and can respond to current and future threats.”³ There was a knock on the door and an aide announced that The Senate and The House of Commons awaited their arrival.

Canada's Governor General opened the Thirty-Eight Parliament of Canada by reinforcing the great achievements of the uniformed Canadian men and women on the beaches of D-Day and in Italy. The military makes an important contribution to both international and national security and she emphasized that Canadians gain in pride and in purpose from the deeds and service of Canadian Forces' (CF) members.⁴ The Prime Minister followed with an ambitious government agenda based on the national values of fairness, generosity, respect and caring. A nation, he concluded, has greatness both in the eyes of their population and the respect that is earned internationally in employing the elements of national power.⁵ Left unanswered, however, was the part to be played by the new NSS. Was the document required? And if so, was it valid for a middle power like Canada? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions, first by verifying the requirement from an international and domestic perspective, and then examining the validity.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR A FORMAL NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Security issues are not new to Canada. They were significant in the decision to create the country, and remain so today. Canada has managed a wide variety of threats, from health concerns such as the 1918 influenza epidemic, to the potential for war and the Soviet bomber

threat, which resulted in the formation of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957. While Canada continues to grow holding to a vision of prosperity, social responsibility and international pride, there are threats to this vision, and a strategy to combat these dangers is required.⁶ But does Canada need a formal NSS? The answer lies in a complicated mix of international and domestic issues.

THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWER – THE INTERNATIONAL NEED

Middle power is a term used to describe states that are not superpowers or great powers, but still have some influence internationally. It is a concept that includes physical attributes such as size, geographic location, population, and natural resources, as well as capabilities such as the size of military forces and foreign service, the gross domestic product, and most importantly, the manner in which the country pursues foreign policy objectives. Middle power status, in other words, can be succinctly encapsulated in five “Cs”: capacity; concentration; creativity; coalition-building; and credibility.⁷

Capacity is tied to components of national power such as a foreign service that possesses high levels of analytical skills. This is coupled with effective intelligence gathering and communication networks. Middle powers have a sufficient number of international and diplomatic missions that allows them to effectively disseminate their ideas and convince others of their utility. Second, middle powers are limited in the number of objectives that can be pursued at a given time. Resource limitations force a prioritization of objectives and concentration in those areas believed as most likely to produce the desired results. Some countries, including Canada, have also merged their foreign affairs and trade departments to increase focus and better pursue national objectives. Third, the essence of a middle power is the provision of intellectual leadership and brokerage across all elements of national power. Creativity enables middle powers to lead – not by force of authority, but by force of ideas. Fourth, middle powers are not powerful enough to impose their will; but they may be persuasive enough to have like-minded international actors see their point of view and act accordingly. Coalitions may be necessary to realize national goals; thus, middle power activity is often conducted within multilateral institutions. Lastly, the relative weakness of middle powers allows them to play a constructive role. Initiatives, such as brokering solutions or providing intellectual leadership are more acceptable if they come from a country that is unlikely to be the single largest beneficiary of a negotiated outcome.

These five attributes provide a plausible means of distinguishing middle powers from both small powers and superpowers. While none of the attributes may be unique to middle powers, it

is the combination of expertise, the constraints on resources requiring concentration, and the credibility that stems from not being a major player, which condition and distinguish middle powers. The end of the Cold War and the ever shrinking globe have extended the international agenda of middle powers over the past decade beyond territorial integrity to cover economic, social and environmental well being.⁸ These global and interdependent concerns include challenges such as free trade, poverty, ecology and human rights. Such subjects are not easily dealt with by a single nation state but rather through skillful multilateral management either using established institutions, such as regional organizations, or coalitions and confidence building. Middle power success, therefore, requires a specific pattern of statecraft: emphasizing coalition building and cooperation; demonstrating some degree of entrepreneurial and technical leadership; and adopting, on a selective basis, the role of catalyst and facilitator.

Canada has considered itself as a middle power for most of the Twentieth Century. It has always taken pride in playing roles such as being an honest broker, a peacekeeper, and a voice of conscience. As a consequence, Canada is continuing to direct its attention towards the domains where it holds resources and enjoys a strong international reputation – a practitioner of soft power, a mediator or broker between nations, and a bridge between the developed and developing world. This has enhanced Canada's status in the international community and created a constructive role that distinguishes it from other powers. In order to maintain that distinctive role, Canada requires a formal NSS that ensures consistency in its efforts to manage multilateralism and to foster international understanding.

CANADA – THE DOMESTIC NEED

Canada is a federation that shares the responsibility of governing with federal and provincial or territorial governments. Federalism combines unity with diversity, and enables the government to meet the common needs of all citizens despite Canada's size and diversity. It also allows the government to serve the special interests and characteristics of the country's various regions as well as cultural and linguistic communities. These are the same powerful forces that pushed the unification of British North America in 1867. The Fathers of Confederation were insistent on maintaining the identity, special culture and distinctive institutions of each of the federating provinces. They had a vision for a new nation – one of strength and independence. This was promoted by their first Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald who sought, "a different colonial system ... less a case of dependence on our part, and of overruling protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more a case of healthy and cordial alliance."⁹ Ingenuity, hard work and devotion contributed to the growth of the country

and a booming and diversified economy. Canada began taking a more active role in the world and enthusiastically helped create the new multinational organizations that emerged. This type of activism allowed Canada to assume a more prominent role in world affairs that reflected her status as a middle power.¹⁰

National harmony was, and is, tied to the challenging task of balancing priorities and the allocation of resources. Canada's internal stability depends on keeping the provinces satisfied, and that is no easy task. On one hand, Canadians demand an active and important role for their nation. They want to see Canada active abroad in ways that reflect the realities of global interdependence, the complex nature of current threats, and the need for an integrated approach in which diplomacy, military capability and development assistance work together to advance Canada.¹¹ On the other hand, Canadians are wary of foreign policy overextensions that could endanger domestic programs.

From this perspective, the publication of *Securing an Open Society* was a difficult government decision. It is risky to articulate a NSS because setting strategic ends, such as providing a strong military to prevent war and promote peace, can be interpreted as excessive defence spending at the expense of more popular domestic programs.¹² Moreover, there is also far greater accountability demanded and less flexibility for national leaders once the strategy is formalized. This limits a leader's room to maneuver and redirect resources effectively. An informal strategy is a safer agenda, and this coincides with the expectations of Canadians. One research institute recently studied this issue by asking what priority the government should place on a number of government programs. Defence and security ranked 13 behind issues such as health care, education, poverty and the environment.¹³

At the same time, Canadian leaders understand that a formal NSS coherently supports national objectives. A substantial investment in time and energy goes into the formulation of such a document. This endeavour promotes understanding and unity of effort throughout government departments, with a clear articulation of both the direction that the nation is moving, and how the nation intends to move there. Furthermore, the publication of a formal strategy ensures that other nations are aware of state intentions. This can significantly assist partners to work together consistently and logically, especially given the current security climate.¹⁴

There is domestic uncertainty as to whether Canada requires a formal NSS. This is the reason that before April 2004, there was no formal strategy. Balancing national harmony with the desire for an active and significant international role is challenging and frustrating. As one strategist opined, "those essential core values that people die for are democracy, freedom and justice, and not medicare and free education – medicare and free education are second order

values that are available only if the fundamental core values are assured.”¹⁵ Despite this view and the benefits coming from greater unity of government effort, it is clear that Canadians challenge the advantages of a formal NSS.

REQUIRED?

Is a formal NSS required? The benefits provided by a formal NSS outweigh the perceived disadvantages by the Canadian public of an informal strategy. Desires for middle power status and for minimizing the adverse effects of the current security environment are best met by a formal strategy. The key to domestic uncertainty is education on the need to formally document the interrelationship between foreign and domestic policy. As the 2003 National Forum for Youth pointed out, only in this way will there be an understanding that fundamental core values must be assured first, before second order values such as medicare and education.¹⁶ Without such an effort, Canadians will continue to challenge the need for a formal NSS.

THE VALIDITY OF SECURING AN OPEN SOCIETY

To be valid, a nation's NSS must build on its Grand Strategy and be consistent with the nation's values and interests as well as the values and goals of organizations to which the nation belongs. Its purpose is to identify the ways and means through which the nation may assert its national security interests in the international political and security system of today. *Securing an Open Society* is divided into eight chapters and states that it both articulates core national security interests and proposes a framework for addressing threats.¹⁷ The first two chapters, Canada's Approach to National Security and Building an Integrated Security System provide background on Canada's security interests and threats, as well as the security system required by Canada. This leads to six chapters on key strategic areas: intelligence; emergency planning and management; public health; transport security; border security; and international security. Each chapter outlines steps taken, identifies gaps and details approaches. Is Canada's strategy, *Securing an Open Society*, valid?

VALUES AND INTERESTS

Canada's NSS establishes three core national security interests.¹⁸ The foremost interest is the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad. This requires the physical security of Canadians, their values, and key institutions. Canada must also be able to defend against threats to sovereignty, ranging from illegal entry to incursions into territorial waters. In addition, it is essential that appropriate security measures be taken to protect diplomats, aid workers and other personnel representing Canada abroad. The second interest is to ensure that Canada is

not a base for threats to her allies. The interconnected nature of the modern world makes it impossible to isolate Canada from the effects of any serious threatening event or activity. Terror acts, such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., demonstrate the profound effect an event could have on Canadians and the need to work globally to address threats. There is a commitment to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing their security. Thirdly, the changing nature of the world has increased the number of international threats that can have an impact on Canada's national security. Failed and failing states can provide havens for terrorists that pose security risks. Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on the ability to contribute to international stability. This may require the deployment of military assets to protect against direct threats to international peace and security or the provision of development assistance to strengthen public institutions in these weaker states. It may also require Canada to play a leading role in strengthening and modernizing international institutions so that they can contribute to international security.

These interests are narrow and suggest more of a connection to defence and the military. The NSS would benefit from enlarging the perspective on interests, one that would help the Canadian public to understand the expanded concept of national power and the interrelationship of foreign and domestic policy in terms of national security affairs. This type of perspective was incorporated in a 2003 foreign policy report, which emphasized that security results from global stability enshrined in three core national interests: Canadian and Global security; Canadian and Global prosperity; and the Projection of Canada's values and culture.¹⁹ This approach is illustrated in Figure 1. It provides a sound basis from which to examine the intensity of the interests as well as Canada's opportunities and challenges, and should be added to the NSS.

This addition would serve as a valuable education tool that would enhance the Canadian public's appreciation of the validity of the NSS and thereby the need for such a document. From the revised NSS, Canadians would learn to appreciate security as vital in a broad sense with political, military, economic and social dimensions that are best advanced through global and regional stability. That stability, in turn, contributes directly to the defence of North America. In this regard, the revised NSS would clearly demonstrate that Canada must have a strong military, one that is modern, credible and capable of combat, conflict prevention and peace operations. The new approach would continue to emphasize that Canadian goals can be best pursued through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and NATO, as well as regional organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS). At the same time, it would also foster recognition that many of these multilateral organizations need

modernization in terms of organization and goals in order to improve their international relevance.

The new approach would also link the Canadian appreciation of national and global prosperity more thoroughly to the concept of security in Canada and throughout the world. It would reinforce the understanding that Canada as a trading nation requires an open and stable rules-based international system. Globalization demands continued effort towards further liberalization of international trade and investment. A stronger Canadian presence in emerging markets is therefore desirable. Moreover, a NSS that helps the development of coherent policies across departments, supports prosperity and thereby security. In a similar manner, the revised document would facilitate the projection of Canadian values based on human rights, democracy and diversity as a necessary, if peripheral, component of an enlarged concept of national security.

National Interest	Importance	Opportunities and Challenges
Canadian and Global Security	Vital	• Global stability • Regional stability with emphasis on North America • Peace support operations • Military assistance • Credible and capable military • International and regional organizations, coalitions and alliances • Economic development • Social assistance
Canadian and Global Prosperity	Important	• Free trade for goods, services and people • International and regional economic and financial organizations • Sustainable environmental stewardship • International assistance • Development cooperation
Projecting Canadian Values and Culture	Peripheral	• Promote and protect values and culture • Educational and cultural events and exchanges • Policy coordination • Development initiatives

FIGURE 1. CANADA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS – OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

FOCUS AREAS

How can Canada best provide for national security? *Securing an Open Society* believes that an integrated national security framework is required and that the synchronization of six focus areas in that framework will provide the required flexibility in responding to the potential threats. These focus areas include intelligence, emergency response, public health,

transportation security, border security and international security.²⁰ It is here that *Securing an Open Society*, which has done an adequate job of providing the necessary background to underpin a NSS, moves away from completing a strategic assessment, thus weakening its validity.

Securing an Open Society introduces a number of specific initiatives and the formation of several assessment centers, councils, roundtables, committees and departments. The proposals have varying amounts of detail with the majority being quite vague. Examples include an Integrated Threat Assessment Center, a Cross-Cultural Roundtable and a National Security Committee. Another example is a new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness which is responsible for policy leadership and ensuring cohesion within government.²¹ It is tasked to integrate the functions of security and intelligence, policing and enforcement, corrections and crime prevention, border services, immigration, and emergency management. These functions cross departmental boundaries, and assigned responsibilities are unclear. Further, where there is detail, it takes away from the duty of the department or program to develop, and thus own its respective initiatives.

A NSS should provide an Ends-Ways-Means-Risks analysis that is a foundation and provides guiding principles for the nation and all government departments. This is absent in Canada's strategy. Instead, projects are announced and depicted as the answer to current challenges. The details are not necessarily wrong; it is just that there is the absence of logic and understanding found in an Ends-Ways-Means-Risks analysis necessary to sustain strategic national policy.

Further complicating the 2004 NSS is the government's initiation of International Policy and Defence Reviews that are expected to be complete in 2005. These fundamental reports are expected to "make important recommendations regarding the Government of Canada's diplomatic, defence and development agenda as well as the structure of the CF."²² Thus, some of the commitments made in the security strategy could be considered premature. This includes the reaffirmation of the commitment to multilateralism and in particular, NATO and the UN; the intention to continue to deploy diplomats, aid workers and the CF to peace efforts like Afghanistan and Haiti; and the assertion of the need for a strong CF, an international development program and international development funds. *Securing an Open Society* can do more – it can be improved.

A LARGER VALIDITY

The ongoing Foreign Policy and Defence Reviews provide a remarkable and unprecedented opportunity for Canada to develop a complete and coherent approach to Canadian policy – domestic, international and security. Having established core national interests, the intensity of those interests, and the accompanying opportunities and challenges, an improved and more compelling NSS in the manner detailed at Appendix 1 is presented for consideration. The paradigm consists of a national Ends-Ways-Means-Risks study to further Canada's core interests of security, prosperity, and projecting well being. The basic premise is that Canada would continue to have socially responsible values, a modest military, a strong trade-based economy, mainly tied to the U.S., and an advanced informational capability with a soft approach to public diplomacy.

To begin, Canadian and global security is a vital core interest, as Appendix 1 demonstrates. There must be careful consideration on how to provide security and counter threats abroad and at home. These threats demand domestic and international security cooperation. Canada should respond to the current threat environment by coordinating a common regional approach to border, transportation, surveillance and disaster response. Cooperation with other nations increases the capacity to control border flows, facilitating beneficial traffic and inhibits organizations that threaten security.²³ Canada must continue to work multilaterally with the UN and G8 on a range of counterterrorism measures such as aviation security standards, the disruption of drug-trafficking networks, information sharing, police and judicial cooperation, and keeping new technologies out of terrorists' hands. There should also be recognition of the importance of fighting corruption and money laundering, which also funnel resources to threat organizations.

The rise of militant non-state actors has heightened concerns about nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons of mass destruction. Existing multilateral agreements deal with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, and nations must take measures to control the sale and export of items that might be used to construct such weapons. More global cooperation is needed both to promote compliance with non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreements, and to ensure that non-state agents are denied access to banned weapons.²⁴

Central to Canada's security agenda, is a CF capable of defending the country and supporting foreign policy abroad. For many years, Canada's national defence policy has identified three core objectives: to defend Canada; to work with the United States in defending North America; and to contribute to international peace and security. Canada now faces difficult

choices about its military commitments. Since a nation's ability to influence international security decisions depends in part on its capacity to shoulder responsibilities, the kinds and level of military capacity that Canada has will affect the future role in the world. Increasingly, forces are being called upon for a wide range of commitments that range from combat to restoring order, and from enforcing peace agreements to protecting civilians. The future is likely to see high demand for a CF with varied capabilities and one that can further Canada's nation interests.²⁵

Canada has long believed that a human security approach to foreign policy also had great advantages. It is crucial to address non-military sources of conflict that fuel societal instability and create environments in which political or religious extremism can flourish. In view of the dangers posed by fragile and poorly governed states, Canada and the international community must work with such states to strengthen their governing institutions and judicial systems, to hold their leaders accountable, and to support the rule of law. Stabilizing fragile states also requires conflict prevention and a sustained commitment to the reconstruction of states emerging from conflict. These tasks are best assumed in partnership with other nations, multilateral institutions, private-sector actors and civil society organizations.²⁶ International partnerships are equally critical in addressing other threats such as poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation. Preserving clean air and water are essential not only to Canadian security, but also to global stability in the decades ahead. Security today also safeguards the health of the people, and a strong emergency health response and health care plan is essential.²⁷ These are all ambitious security related ends, ways and means. Risks include a less than optimally focused effort and potential conflicts between domestic and international agendas. Moreover, affordability and achievement of the desired endstate must be ensured.

Prosperity is also a key element of the larger validity. This too is presented at Appendix 1 for inclusion in an improved NSS. Canada's economic prosperity is tied to a world economy undergoing unprecedented growth and market integration. The economy is among the world's richest and most open, and is developing within the framework of international trade bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Success is dependent on international trade and foreign investment.²⁸ Canada has derived significant advantages from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other free trade agreements. In April 2001, the Quebec City Summit of the Americas supported growing economic linkages across the Americas, while recognizing democratic freedoms, human rights, and environmental and labor standards as integral to the hemisphere's development. Globalization, though, is not without problems. Addressing the needs of disadvantaged countries will require continued efforts by international

financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to design assistance programs for crisis-afflicted countries, and the World Bank to originate programs to promote development and poverty reduction in emerging markets.

Canada's economic relationship with the United States demonstrates the benefits of a rules-based international trading system, and there should be commitment to the continued expansion of such a system. Economic growth and job creation will depend on being competitive in world markets and being attractive to investors. This requires an innovative society with a high level of skills, cutting-edge scientific expertise and extensive opportunities for learning. To succeed, Canada must find suitable foreign partners in investment, education and research, and must be able to attract workers with advanced knowledge and skills.²⁹ With this commitment, however, comes vulnerability to protectionism and trade actions that require advocacy and representation. The preservation of Canada's natural environment is another important issue that requires economic cooperation with countries around the world. It is necessary to promote environmentally sustainable growth. Canada's need to maintain growing trade and investment flows demands new measures in border management, infrastructure improvement and regulatory cooperation in order to boost confidence among investors and travelers, and to reduce transaction costs for traders and shippers.³⁰

Both economic interests and humanitarian concerns are served when Canada contributes to meeting international development and poverty eradication goals. For this reason, Canada must deliver assistance that is effective, flexible, timely and focused on areas of greatest need. Looking abroad, foreign investment by Canadian firms should be both competitive and responsible in its social and environmental impact. Some companies have had exemplary success in embodying Canadian values in their foreign business operations.³¹ Foreign investment can bring substantial benefits to developing countries, and will be central in helping to realize international development goals. These prosperity objectives must be consistent with foreign policy priorities, and with Canadian interests and values. The challenge is to find the best ways of combining these aims while keeping costs to a minimum.

Lastly, projecting Canadian values and culture is also key to a larger validity, but less so than security and prosperity. An improved NSS must address how best to achieve this, and an approach is also illustrated in Appendix 1. Canada's foreign policy agenda must reflect the nation. Respect and diversity run through the religious, racial, cultural and linguistic strands of Canada's communities. The experiences of immigrants from around the world and the cultures of Aboriginal peoples are woven into the fabric of the national identity.

Canada's place in the world is shaped by more than the relationships between national governments. As global interconnections grow ever more varied and pervasive, exchanges and relationships have multiplied between groups and individuals across national boundaries. This public diplomacy must become an integral part of how Canadians promote values, share experience and influence others abroad. At the same time, global conditions conducive to security and prosperity are fostered. The promotion of social and political values abroad will pay dividends domestically. Examples abound of Canada's potential in this area. In a world of intra-state conflict and ethnic strife, Canada's experience as a federal, bilingual and multicultural state can demonstrate that nations can combine diversity and social cohesion. The flexible federalism, which seeks to balance national solidarity with respect for local autonomy, can be taken as an example by other countries trying to unite peoples of different languages and cultures.³²

Amid current international tensions, Canadians should be able to play an important global role in fostering dialogue among different cultural communities. Highlighting the diversity within cultures and faiths may assist in responding to extremists who would radicalize religion for political aims. Another of Canada's foreign policy aims is to enrich countries by sharing education. Foreign students can foster the exchange of knowledge, cultural understanding and commercial prospects between citizens of Canada and other countries. The promotion of Canadian culture can also draw on the artists whose diversity and talents attract the world's attention. International successes by writers, musicians, filmmakers and other artists open doors through which Canadian exporters, investors and educators can follow.³³ This effort, however, is not without challenge for limited resources or the possible weakened domestic identity.

CONCLUSION - CANADA TODAY AND TOMORROW

Since the late 1980s Canada has been administered by governments that have placed domestic social issues rather than foreign and defence policy at the top of their political agendas. Canadian diplomatic activity, military operations abroad in support of Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian international aid and development have all diminished considerably. The shrinking of Canada's international capabilities directly undermines its ability to protect its interests and diminishes Canadian sovereignty by limiting options. Since confederation, Canada's security, prosperity, and domestic well-being has been directly related to Canada's willingness to play a role in global affairs. Canada's sacrifices in two World Wars and Korea laid the basis for Canada's emergence from colony to full nationhood and earned Canada a voice in the UN and in NATO, as well as at the IMF, the World Bank, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the WTO. Canada's eagerness to play a significant role in partnership with the U.S. in continental defence from August 1940, with the signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement, through the Second World War and the Cold War, gave Canada equal status with the U.S. on the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, NORAD, and a number of defence production and technology sharing and testing agreements. In each case, Canadian opportunities were maximized for advancing Canadian interests abroad, defining Canada as an independent nation, broadening the Canada-U.S. partnership, and protecting Canadian sovereignty by convincing the U.S. to share in decision-making regarding continental defence arrangements.

Canada must trade, and its prosperity depends directly on crucial international factors: international stability that supports and encourages the free flow of goods, capital, people and ideas; international trading agreements and conventions that allow Canadians a fair opportunity to sell into or buy from foreign markets; and good access to the U.S. which is Canada's largest customer and is likely to remain so. The more Canada is involved in the international community – the more influence and power she will wield, leading to a more significant impact on international events. It will thus be easier for the Canadian voice to be clearly heard in those international deliberations that will ultimately have the most impact on Canada. Importance derives from power which is often classified as “hard” – military or “soft” – reflecting factors such as economic capability, diplomatic skill and cultural influence. Hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive and are most effective when used in combination.

The Canadian government has made an effort to maintain the nation's stature despite the decline in resources invested in the instruments of foreign relations by stressing Canada as a country most suited to the use of soft power. The adoption of this position by Ottawa is evidenced by Canada's emphasis on projecting vice exporting Canadian values and culture.³⁴ Although this approach has proven successful, it has a finite lifespan and at some time needs to be reinforced with concrete investment, normally in a harder form of national power.

Considerable cut backs in Canadian military capabilities have reduced Canada's ability to join allies in fighting to sustain a democratic international regime and to play a significant role in continental defence. Reductions in Canadian aid and diplomatic establishments have further reduced the nation's ability to stay in touch with key governments, make intelligent choices abroad for national policies, and sustain an international reputation that Canadians once had for being a responsible middle power.

Canada's NSS, *Securing an Open Society*, is a welcome addition that fulfills a national security need by providing guidance and direction. That this need is not completely appreciated

by the Canadian public, calls for greater educational efforts concerning the advantages of such a document. The recommended improvements to the NSS will both highlight these advantages and considerably increase its validity. One such improvement is a more rigorous analysis of national interests combined with a detailed examination of the concomitant ends, ways, means and risks that are demonstrated in this study. That analysis, even in its preliminary form, indicates that Canada does not currently have the right balance of national power and that continued emphasis on soft power will require an investment in hard power, if Canada is to maintain an ability to influence the international community and advance Canadian interests.

Securing an Open Society is necessary for Canada in pursuing middle power statecraft and a strong independent nation in today's environment. Canada's NSS requires an integrated approach, across military, civil and private sector skills, unifying diplomatic, informational, military and economic efforts to combat national threats. It is reasonable to suggest that Canada cannot aspire, in the context of economic and political realities, to be active on all fronts with equal weight; Canada must make choices. A formal NSS is essential to buttressing both national and domestic policy while making these choices. The current strategy is not perfect, but it is a good foundation on which to grow and improve. The ambitious agenda that the Prime Minister presented in October 2004 is more achievable because it is supported by *Securing an Open Society*.

WORD COUNT=5719

APPENDIX 1 - CANADIAN ENDS, WAYS, MEANS, RISKS SUMMARY

Interest	Ends	Ways	Means	Risk
Canadian and global security	• Promote regional stability • Promote international stability • Ensure a sovereign Canada • Provide border security • Assure a healthy population	• Regional and multilateral alliances and organizations • Domestic and international disaster and assistance response • Peace support and nation building initiatives • Military assistance including flexible deterrent options • Humanitarian assistance • Public health • Emergency health response • Border and sovereignty patrols and exercises • Diplomatic efforts • Public diplomacy • Policy synchronization	• Capable and interoperable CF • Multilateral initiatives with priority to UN, NATO, NORAD and OAS • Disaster response team • Robust public health care system • Capable diplomatic corps • Strong foreign affairs bureaus • Well resourced Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)	• Diluted effort • Conflicting international and domestic agenda • Erosion of middle power status • Over extended CF • Affordability

Interest	Ends	Ways	Means	Risk
Canadian and global prosperity	- Promote a strong and diverse economy - Encourage free trade - Safeguard a sound and sustainable environment	- Free trade initiatives - Dependable trading partners - Enhanced transportation system - Environmental protection program	- Diverse economy - Trade liberalization - Multilateral economic arrangements including WTO, NAFTA, and IMF - Economic development and assistance program - Policy focus to reduce poverty and improve social justice and good governance - Environmental treaties and legislation	- Increased competition - Some domestic economic sectors not viable - Cost of participation in organization and respect of treaties
Projecting Canadian values and culture – well being	- Promote national harmony - Promote a well educated population - Promote a free, open, diverse and proud society	- Information campaign - Public supported education system - Policy synchronization	- Diplomatic corps - Information capability - Showcase Canada's culture - Balance domestic and international policies	- Affordability - Weakened provincial and community identity

ENDNOTES

¹ *The Globe & Mail* is the more established of Canada's two national newspapers. The other newspaper is *The National Post*.

² David Pratt, Minister of National Defence, "A Speech Given by at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual Seminar," 26 February 2004; available from <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/Pratt_on_Operation_ATHENA-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2004.

³ Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, Ottawa, Canada, National Library of Canada, April 2004; available from <<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>>; Internet; accessed 26 August 2004, vii.

⁴ Adrienne Clarkson, Governor General of Canada, *Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-eighth Parliament of Canada*, 5 October 2004; available from <http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2004.

⁵ Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, *Address by the Prime Minister in Reply to the Speech from the Throne*, 5 October 2004; available from <<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp?id=2>>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2004.

⁶ Clarkson.

⁷ John Ravenhill, "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52 (November 1998): vi; available from ProQuest; accessed 10 October 2004.

⁸ Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), 3.

⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canadians in the World: An Educational Resource Site*; available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/intrel_history-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 6 September 2004.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians*, June 2003; available from <<http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca>>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2004.

¹² Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of Its Military Power," *Parameters* (Autumn 2004): 76.

¹³ "Tracking Public Priorities," Ekos Research Associates, Ottawa, Canada, January 2004; available from <<http://ekos.com>>; Internet; accessed 20 October 2004.

¹⁴ These comments were presented by Major-General Mentemeyer, Deputy Commander U.S. Southern Command, to the International Fellows during the Unified Command Field Study at U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida on 1 November 2004.

¹⁵ Don McNamara, "Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Security," Issue 3 – Evidence, 3 May 2004; available from <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/03evd-e.htm?/>>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

¹⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs, *Summary of National Forum for Youth 2003*, 24 March 2003; available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/nf2003summaryreport-en.asp?pm=1>>; Internet; accessed 27 February 2005.

¹⁷ Martin, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, Foreword.

¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

¹⁹ Department of Foreign Affairs, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians, June 6, 2003*; available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/dialoguereport-en.asp>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2004.

²⁰ Martin, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. The focus areas are covered in each of Chapters 3 to 8.

²¹ Ibid., 9.

²² Ibid., 47.

²³ The Windsor and District Chamber of Commerce, *Canada-U.S. Border Relationship*, Sep 2001; available from <<http://www.windsorchamber.org/newsborder.htm>>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

²⁴ Foreign Affairs Canada, *The Proliferation Security Initiative*, April 2004; available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/psioverview-en.asp>>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

²⁵ Hugh Segal, "A Grand Strategy for a Small Country," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2003): 4.

²⁶ Robert J. Bunker, *Non-State Threats and Future Wars* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 51.

²⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians, June 6, 2003*.

²⁸ International Trade Canada, *Canada and the WTO: 2003 Trade Policy Review of Canada*; available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/WTO/tp-r-en.asp>>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

²⁹ David J. Johnston, "Canada's Role in Global Governance," *Policy Options* (February 2005): 71.

³⁰ Public Policy Forum, *Canada's Policy Choices: Managing our Border with the United States*, November 2001; available from <http://www.ppforum.com/ow/ow_p_11_2001A_frep.pdf>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

³¹ Department of Foreign Affairs, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians, June 6, 2003*.

³² Michael Ignatieff, *Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada*; available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/skelton/peace_order-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2004.

³³ Department of Foreign Affairs, *Canada in the World – Projecting Canadian Values and Culture*; available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/chap5-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005.

³⁴ David J. Bercuson, and others, *National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bercuson, David J., and others. *National Defence, National Interest: Sovereignty, Security and Canadian Military Capability in the Post 9/11 World*. Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003.
- Bunker, Robert J. *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Castellaw, Major-General, Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command. "Briefing to International Fellows." Unified Command Field Study to U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL, 4 November 2004.
- Clarkson, Adrienne, Governor General of Canada. "Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the Thirty-eighth Parliament of Canada." 5 October 2004. Available from <http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/sft_e.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 15 October 2004.
- Cooper, Andrew F. *Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1997.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *Canadians in the World: An Educational Resource Site*. Available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/intrel_history-en.asp>. Internet. Accessed 6 September 2004.
- Department of Foreign Affairs. *Canada in the World*. Available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/end-world/chap5-en.asp>. Internet. Accessed 12 December 2004.
- Department of Foreign Affairs. *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians, June 6, 2003*. Available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/dialoguereport-en.asp>>. Internet. Accessed 12 December 2004.
- Department of Foreign Affairs. *Summary of National Forum for Youth 2003, 24 March 2003*. Available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/participate/nf2003summaryreport-en.asp?pm=1>>. Internet. Accessed 27 February 2005.
- Foreign Affairs Canada. *The Proliferation Security Initiative*, April 2004. Available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/psioverview-en.asp>>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2005.
- Graham, Bill, Minister of Foreign Affairs. *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians*. Ottawa, Canada, National Library of Canada, June 2003. Available from <<http://www.foreign-policy-dialogue.ca>>. Internet. Accessed 20 October 2004.
- Granatstein, Jack. *The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's National Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S.* Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 2003.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for Canada*. Available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/departement/skelton/peace_order-en.asp>. Internet. Accessed 17 December 2004.

- International Trade Canada. *Canada and the WTO: 2003 Trade Policy Review of Canada*. Available from <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/WTO/tpr-en.asp>>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2005.
- Johnston, Donald J. "Canada's Role in Global Governance." *Policy Options* (February 2005): 68-71.
- Kelly, Colonel, Chief of Staff U.S. Pacific Command. "Briefing to International Fellows." Unified Command Field Study Trip to U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii, 12 November 2004.
- Martin, Paul, Prime Minister of Canada. "Address by the Prime Minister in Reply to the Speech from the Throne." 5 October 2004. Available from <<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp?id=2>>. Internet. Accessed 15 October 2004.
- Martin, Paul, Prime Minister of Canada. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa, Canada, National Library of Canada, Privy Council Office, April 2004. Available from <<http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>>. Internet. Accessed 26 August 2004.
- McNamara, Don. "Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Defence and Security." Issue 3 – Evidence, 3 May 2004. Available from <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/03evd-e.htm?/>>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2005.
- Mentemeyer, Major-General, Deputy Commander U.S. Southern Command. "Briefing to International Fellows." Unified Command Field Study Trip to U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL, 1 November 2004.
- Nunez, Joseph R. "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of Its Military Power." *Parameters* (Autumn 2004): 75-93.
- Pratt, David, Minister of National Defence. "A Speech Given at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual Seminar." 26 February 2004. Available from <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/Pratt_on_Operation_ATHENA-en.asp>. Internet. Accessed 3 October 2004.
- Public Policy Forum. *Canada's Policy Choices: Managing Our Border with the United States*, November 2001. Available from <http://www.ppforum.com/ow/ow_p_11_2001A_frep.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 7 February 2005.
- Ravenhill, John. "Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52 (November 1998): 309-326. Database on-line. Available from ProQuest. Accessed 10 October 2004.
- Segal, Hugh. "A Grand Strategy for a Small Country." *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2003): 3-6.
- Taylor, James H. "Canadian Foreign Policy and National Interests." *Canadian Institute of International Affairs*. Available from <<http://www.ciiia.org/proceedings/Taylor1999.pdf>>. Internet. Accessed 12 December 2004.

"Tracking Public Priorities." Ekos Research Associates. Ottawa, Canada, January 2004.
Available from <<http://ekos.com>>. Internet. Accessed 20 October 2004.

The Windsor and District Chamber of Commerce. *Canada-U.S. Border Relationship*,
September 2001. Available from <<http://www.windsorchamber.org/newsborder.htm>>.
Internet. Accessed 7 February 2005.