

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED WAR
ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Wiersema
United States Army

Dr. Stephen D. Biddle
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 18 MAR 2005		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Effects of Protracted War on Representative Government				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Richard Wiersema				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Wiersema

TITLE: The Effects of Protracted War on Representative Government

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 34 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The argument: that protracted war has characteristics that are corrosive to representative governments, and therefore it is necessary to examine the phenomenon given American commitment to a strategy of protracted war against transnational terrorism. The paper presents a theory that posits the mechanisms by which protracted war may have demonstrated its corrosive effect on representative government, examines 3 historical case studies, then posits measures in mitigation. The case studies extend from antiquity, drawing on examples used by the framers of the American Constitution, through the American experience during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED WAR ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT	1
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF PROTRACTED WAR	1
THEORY OF PROTRACTED WAR'S EFFECT ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ..	4
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THREE CASE STUDIES	6
ATHENS DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR	7
THE ANGLO-FRENCH WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON	10
THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLD WAR, 1946-1991	15
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS	19
ENDNOTES	23
BIBLIOGRAPHY	27

THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED WAR ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF PROTRACTED WAR

There is no long war that does not put freedom at great risk in a democratic country. It is not that one must precisely fear to see winning generals take possession of sovereign power by force after each victory in the manner of Sulla and Caesar. The peril is of another sort. War does not always give democratic peoples over to military government; but it cannot fail to increase immensely the prerogatives of civil government in these peoples; it almost inevitably centralizes the direction of all men and the employment of all things in all hands. If it does not lead one to despotism suddenly by violence, it leads to it mildly through habits.¹

- Alexis de Tocqueville

While it is unreasonable that anyone should have turned to Tocqueville for policy guidance as Manhattan and the Pentagon smoldered, his observation is a useful point of departure in light of our current policy three and half years on. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the President of the United States announced and has since reiterated the intent to commit the United States to a protracted global war on transnational terrorism. Americans were advised to expect a "lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."² Not quite three years after those attacks, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz summarized the national leadership's estimate of the temporal commitment: "We must recognize that the struggle will be a long struggle, not something we will win in three years or eight years or perhaps even decades."³ Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee on March 1, 2005, he reinforced the administration's view that not only is the United States a "nation at war," but that:

...we must remain resolved and patient going forward, for there is much yet to do. A problem that grew up in 20 or 30 years is not going away in two or three. We may recall how long we waged the Cold War, and how long it took to rebuild Western Europe.⁴

From the outset then, the national policy in response to the 9-11 attacks has been described consistently as a war, and the war itself characterized as protracted. While there has been much attention given - by critics and advocates alike - to strategy, expenditures and execution in the global war on terrorism, its most salient feature, an open-ended duration, has for the most part escaped scrutiny or critique.

This omission is remarkable for two reasons. First, the very notion of a protracted war is contrary in concept and spirit to almost the entire body of American military doctrine as it existed

prior to September 2001. In the period following the Persian Gulf combat operations of 1991, American joint and service doctrines, regardless of differences of opinion over the primacy of air power, maritime power projection, or land forces, emphasized the efficacy of speed and decisive action in war.⁵ Second, and even more important, political theorists have long argued that protracted war is a threat to representative democracy. The framers of the US Constitution were concerned with the effect of chronic war on representative government and intended to establish institutional antibodies against it for reasons of economy and to preserve civil liberties. The republican form of government itself, in contrast to the monarchies of Europe, was thought by some to be a safeguard. Arguing to the contrary were realists like Alexander Hamilton, who advanced the position that the history of republics to date revealed that they were no less inclined to fight ruinous wars than monarchies.⁶ Though he understood that it was in the nature of states, regardless of their form of government, to make war, he also believed war created internal dangers for a republic.

Those who mistrusted a powerful government argued against a broad grant of authority not only in the fields of taxation and commercial regulation, but, and with especial force, in military matters as well. Even those, like Hamilton, who wanted to give the central government wide latitude in handling both purse and sword were also somewhat wary of standing armies. They too were concerned over the possible usurpation of political power by a military force or its use by officeholders as an instrument for perpetuating their personal power.⁷

From this debate emerged constitutional provisions familiar to any officer or civil servant charged with executing US defense policy: for example, limitations on the duration of military appropriations, and the division of powers between the executive and the legislature regarding the declaration of war and the raising and equipping of armies. More importantly, it follows that from the very beginning war was recognized as a threat to a free United States, less so due to the possibility that an outside power might conquer us, but because the chronic practice of war making would erode representative institutions.

Yet we have deliberately embarked on a protracted war with very little discussion of the either the constitutional framers' concerns or an examination of the mechanisms by which protracted war might threaten democracy. This is not to say that protracted war by itself inherently is against our interests as a free people – there may be enemies who can be overthrown in no better way. Rather, the concerns over protracted war that were expressed at the Constitutional Convention reappear throughout our history; and moreover they have a precedent, established by one of our most respected strategists during the 1940s as we began our ascendancy to a preeminent position in the world:

Given its domestic politics, and the added pressure of the war with Japan, it did not seem that the United States could fight a long war in Europe. As General Marshall once succinctly put it, "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years' War."⁸

If the framer's concerns are the point of departure, then the military aspect of the argument is necessarily subordinate to the civil. Military arguments against the idea of a long war tend toward the practical; that is, popular support may wane, costs become excessive, or the ill-will amassed as a result may militate against a lasting peace. The focus of this inquiry is on protracted war's effects as they apply to representative government itself; in short, what is the body of evidence that suggests that protracted war might by its nature be corrosive to representative government, and what are the mechanisms that might make it so. It seems essential to examine the phenomenon given our commitment to a strategy of protracted war against transnational terrorism.

Some working definitions are in order at the outset. For the purposes of this paper, representative government generally meets the following accepted definition: "one with the conditions of public contestation and participation...with [at least] a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of male citizens, contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature."⁹ The term protracted war applies to a war of long duration that involves active fighting, not merely bellicose rhetoric for the sake of emphasizing a particular policy (e.g., the state of war various Arab states have declared against Israel since 1948, or the US War on Drugs). The concern is not with the prosecution of a particular kind of war – total war, guerilla war, war for empire, defensive war - but with the conditions inherent in continuously being at war. The term "protracted" is temporally delimited as well. An examination of one hundred wars involving representative governments fought since the founding of the Athenian Republic in the Fifth Century BCE reveals forty-one that exceeded seven years in duration, while forty-eight lasted four years or fewer. Given this rough sampling of history, and the fact that US policy is unlikely to change before 2008 at the earliest, thus making 2001-2008 the shortest possible duration for what the current US government already has characterized as a protracted war, it seems reasonable to identify the threshold for "protracted" as a period of warfare seven years or greater in length.¹⁰

The inquiry itself advances along three sequential lines. First, it examines protracted war for general characteristics that distinguish it from other wars and posits resulting mechanisms that could make protracted war corrosive to representative government. Second, it applies the identified mechanisms against three case studies drawn from the database of protracted wars fought by representative governments: Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars, Great Britain

and France during the Wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and the United States during the Cold War. Lastly, it synthesizes general observations derived from the case studies and posits why the representative governments in question survived or failed in each. The inquiry concludes with potential applications for these observations in the development of US policy, given a protracted period of war against transnational terrorism.

A THEORY OF PROTRACTED WAR'S EFFECT ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

Thomas Hobbes, on his way to upending the classical idea that it was politics which distinguished man from the animals and establishing the principle of a strong constitution as the basis for justice, declared the tongue of man “a trumpet of warre, and sedition.”¹¹ From the outset, it was the threats of both war and sedition that exercised the framers of the American constitution, and protracted war was not a theoretical problem for the framers. It was a protracted and expensive war that produced American independence. Dissent over tax burdens from the equally protracted French and Indian War had provoked revolt in the first place, and servicing the resulting debt from the Revolutionary War became a major issue at the Constitutional Convention.

With these immediate experiences at hand, the framers continuously debated the need for both federal unity and the practice of representative government in wartime. The link between executive power and standing armies lay at the root of their fears.

In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defence agst. foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.¹²

At the same time, notes taken during floor debates of the Constitutional Convention show the members feared that personal ambitions that could be realized at the nation's expense, given wartime powers.

The President he [Mr Madison] said would necessarily derive so much power and importance from a state of war that he might be tempted, if authorised, to impede a treaty of peace.

Mr. Butler was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late perfidious policy of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro' to prolong the war of which he had the management.¹³

By starting with the concerns expressed above, the concentration of war making power, the accumulation of debt, and opportunities for personal ambition, it is possible to hypothesize mechanisms inherent in protracted war that threaten representative government.

The most basic of these is that wartime exigencies enlarge state powers. Armed forces and the administrative structures necessary to raise, support and employ them inevitably tend to concentrate capital, control and physical power. From this general observation follow two specific state powers that act in a manner corrosive to representative government: taxation and coercion. Taxation is the most obvious power, to the extent that it repeatedly is cited as a concern by the framers of the American Constitution, but the power to tax is neither inherently a threat to liberty nor always an unbearable burden. Sound government is founded on sensible tax policies. Taxation is of interest in understanding protracted war because protracted war threatens unusual financial burdens, and measures to secure wartime financing threaten to exhaust the economy and to become coercive. In addition, there is the need for security and order in time of war. The interests of security militate against personal liberties, whether in the areas of movement, association, commerce or communication. As the state's ability to monitor and control these areas expands, in the interest of achieving greater security, personal liberty is sacrificed. Even if done with the consent of the voters as expressed by free elections, the resultant loss of financial power and expansion of the state's apparatus of control concentrate government power. Furthermore, as noted above, the framers feared that wartime conditions not only would make the government stronger, but that the leaders would attempt to protract wars in order to preserve or expand this greater power.

Concerns over security, both of the population in general and the state in particular, lead to the second general mechanism, the effect of the law of large numbers and the increase in chance trials inherent in protracted war. In Carl von Clausewitz's famous description,

War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events."¹⁴

If the state's armed forces are the principal shield protecting the electorate and the government, then repeatedly risking them in battle increases the chance that no matter how effective those forces are in each engagement, at some point chance will intervene, they will fail, and thus expose both to the enemy. Even very low probability events eventually happen, given enough trials. Inherent in protraction is the potential for many, many trials. Military failure in war not only threatens the state with conquest or subjection to another state's power; it also reduces confidence in the government. At one level, this last effect may have adverse outcomes for the

government in power, but not the representative form of government. That is, the party in power may be voted out, or the electorate may refuse further support of the war effort. Either is a legitimate exercise of democracy, even an indicator of its strength. The greater danger from this mechanism lies in loss of confidence in the form of government itself. Representative rule is by its very nature contentious and inefficient. Given a national emergency resulting from a military defeat, forms of rule believed to be more unified and efficient may become more attractive, among both the ruling classes and the electorate.

War, then, increases the power of the state and is inherently an exercise in chance. In the course of protracted war, both of these characteristics would seem to pose increasing risk to representative institutions and sensibilities. To these strains is added the third and final mechanism, that of increases in opportunity for personal ambition. This increase results from the interplay of the two previous mechanisms. The longer a war continues, the greater the increase in fears and costs, and this may lead to the belief that the form of government itself is inadequate to retrieve the situation. A military disaster can lead to acceptance of the belief that an efficient hero as opposed to an array of contentious government processes will ensure success. An able military officer is the most likely efficient hero, able military officers are less likely to favor the comparative inefficiency of democratic process over military chain of command, and this view is liable to be magnified by the extent of the emergency, thus leading to the erosion of representative government.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: THREE CASE STUDIES

Given these three posited mechanisms – the burden of taxation and coercion, the risk of national emergency posed by increased chance trials, and the greater opportunities created for autocratic ambition – the next step is to assess them against three historical case studies, in an effort to see how and whether they might have operated in the past. The selection of these cases inevitably is arbitrary to some extent, given the scope of this paper, but the logic for each choice is consistent with the working definitions established earlier, and the intent to discover if there is an inherent relationship between the risks to representative government and a policy of protracted war. The first case study, Athens during the Peloponnesian War, was chosen because Athens is generally considered the first representative government, and therefore its experience in war would inform the development of all that followed. The second case study, the struggle between France and the United Kingdom during the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, offers the opportunity to examine what was initially two representative forms of government in protracted war against each other. America during the Cold War is the

third case. It is our most recent experience approaching a protracted state of war, and, as noted earlier, has been used as a reference point in explaining the current policy of protracted war on global transnational terrorism.

ATHENS DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Fifth Century Athens was the most populous city-state in ancient Greece, or *Hellas*, capital of a great empire, and a vibrant democracy, though its practice of slavery, lack of women's suffrage, and obsession with war make it alien to our contemporary concept of representative government. Among other ancient states, however, it has been called "the least illiberal" and the first true democratic exercise in political history.¹⁵ For twenty-seven years Athens fought a protracted, costly and ultimately disastrous war with its rival Sparta that ended with the latter's armies occupying the city and destroying its defenses. While there obviously are vast differences in size of population, sophistication of financial and economic systems, government administration and the war making requirements between this period and even that of the Anglo-French wars at the turn of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, let alone the post-World War II period that set the context for the Cold War, Athens was a reference point for the constitutional framers and its example may prove instructive. The purpose is not to determine why Athens lost the war, but to identify if the mechanisms were in operation against its democratic government, and if so, in what ways.

Athens was rich, relative to other city-states at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Silver mines paid for the warships that secured sea links to other trading centers. It was both capital reserves and the control of the seas that led Pericles at the outset of the war to adopt a strategy of avoiding Sparta's superior army and relying on the economic power of Athens to sustain a strategic defensive. By 413 however, Pericles was long dead and his strategy had been significantly compromised. A powerful Athenian expedition to Sicily, intent on capturing the city-state of Syracuse, met disaster. Within two years, a cabal of oligarchs organized a coup to overthrow Athens' democratic government and make peace with Sparta. However, an Athenian army, deployed to the island of Samos at the time of the coup, refused to accept the legitimacy of the oligarchs. In a remarkable turn of events, it returned to the city, overthrew their regime and restored democracy within a year.¹⁶ Still, in the earliest democracy, during a period of protracted war, representative government not only was threatened but, for a period, extinguished. "...It was no light matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom, almost a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants,"¹⁷ wrote Thucydides.

The Coup of the Four Hundred, as Thucydides and historians since have referred to this incident, had its origins in aristocratic discontent with the conduct of what had become a long, frustrating and burdensome war. Their members and others in the propertied classes had been carrying unprecedented financial burdens in support of the war. The taxpaying class had, moreover, shrunk during its course, dropping from perhaps as many as twenty-five thousand adult males before the war to about nine thousand late in its progress.¹⁸ Therefore, there is supporting evidence for prolonged and increasingly onerous taxation having provoked, or contributed to provoking, anti-democratic action. However, anti-democratic sentiment in the Athenian aristocracy dated back at least as far as 510 and the foundation of the democratic system. By 413, a "lack of strong, respected political leaders of noble birth... removed one of the buffers between the democracy and its critics."¹⁹ In the general matter of state power over the people, the oligarchs had nothing to gain by lessening such control once it was in their hands. Even prior to the stresses imposed by the Peloponnesian War, Athens had little of our contemporary understanding of rights in a free society. "As citizens, the Athenians exercised collective sovereignty, but they were not endowed with guarantees of civil liberty."²⁰

The evidence is straightforward regarding the second mechanism, where an increase in chance trials leads eventually to a military disaster that rebounds upon the representative government. The Sicilian expedition was a bold strategic venture for Athens and its best soldiers and warships were committed to the effort. Fear and outrage inevitably followed from a military catastrophe so complete that the typically prosaic Thucydides was moved to write what is perhaps the most poignant passage in his famous history of the war:

[The Athenians were] beaten utterly at every point and having suffered no slight ill in any respect – having met, as the saying goes, with utter destruction - their fleet, their land-force and everything perished, and few out of many came back home.²¹

Athens did not succumb to Sparta after the defeat in Sicily in 413, or as a result of the oligarchs suing for peace after the Coup of the Four Hundred, but following the naval defeat at Aegospotami in 405. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to postulate the loss of the Sicilian expedition as the proximate cause of the coup in 411, and therefore that the second mechanism did operate in this case.

The Coup of the Four Hundred also provides evidence that the third mechanism, that of opportunism by ambitious, anti-democratic individuals, especially military leaders, was in operation. One man in particular stands out: the notorious Athenian self-promoter Alcibiades, who led both Athenian and Spartan forces during the war, depending upon where he thought his personal fortune lay at a given time. In exile from Athens following his leadership of the disaster

in Sicily, he was under Persian protection, but sought to return to power in his native city. Leaders in Athens understood that Persia, a stronger power than either of the two quarreling Greek city-states, could tip the balance in either's favor should it choose to intervene. In particular, Persia possessed a strong navy, which Sparta lacked, and therefore Persian intervention on behalf of Sparta threatened to negate perhaps the most crucial Athenian strategic advantage in the war. It was believed that Alcibiades could bring Persia over to Athens instead, and Alcibiades did his utmost to encourage this belief. He communicated to influential men in Athens that he could return to Athens with Persian support. In exchange, Alcibiades demanded an end to the democratic government, which had exiled him, and establishment of an oligarchy with himself as the leader. It was this initiative that provided impetus for the coup in 411; however, in the maneuvering leading up to its execution, he was eventually excluded from the coup itself. The various intrigues that followed the coup are not the issue; what is significant is the influence of one highly capable man - and Alcibiades was that, if many other things as well - in engineering what became a plot to destroy the democratic government in Athens.

For Alcibiades, the motives were revenge for having been ostracized and a return to power. By linking the recent disasters with a need for an outside power to retrieve them, Alcibiades used the military and political emergency of the hour to elevate his own position at the expense of state interests. Persia would eventually demand that Athens accept quasi-client status, akin to what it had attempted to achieve by force during the Persian Wars of 491-479, in return for its cooperation, a price Athens could not afford to pay. Despite this, the restored democratic government rehabilitated Alcibiades, arguably persuaded by his own opinion of himself rather than a sober assessment of his record. He led another Athenian force to disaster at Notium in 408, and, having by this time alienated Sparta and Persia as well, ended up in exile on the Gallipoli peninsula.

In this case study, one of the earliest instances of a democracy operating during a period of protracted war, all three posited mechanisms operated against the democratic institutions of Athens: the economic burden necessary to support the long war, the loss of confidence in democracy resulting from a military disaster, and the opportunities that this combination of frustration and emergencies provided to an ambitious, anti-democratic individual. Protracted war exacerbated the damage from these mechanisms. The wealthy willingly funded a frustrating war with Sparta for well over a decade before deciding to revoke the constitution by force. Athens proved militarily robust enough to absorb the loss of the Sicilian expedition; had this disaster been a single event in a shorter war it is unlikely to have provoked the opportunism exhibited by the oligarchs or Alcibiades. In his case, protracted war meant protracted opportunity. Without a

long war, his talents for self-promotion could not have earned him repeat chances to lead, nor would the combined strains of taxation and battlefield failure have emerged to provide him with the chance to overthrow the government. Nonetheless, for a time, Athenian democracy proved more robust than its internal *and* external enemies. Not only was the coup defeated in 411, by army officers and their hoplites who supported democracy over oligarchy. Following the Spartan victory in 404, the Athenian oligarchy that came to power, the so-called Thirty, was short-lived as well. Athens returned to democracy in 403, "to flourish without civil war or *coup d'etat* almost to the end of the fourth century."²²

THE ANGLO-FRENCH WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON

The period 1793-1815 was marked by protracted war between Britain and France, though punctuated by brief periods of peace. It also marked the conclusion of almost five hundred years of Anglo-French wars that had their origins in dynastic disputes between their related ruling houses but had evolved into contests over commerce, empire, ideology, and great power status. Revolutionary France, with the execution of King Louis XVI and the establishment of rule by an elected assembly, joined Britain, with its constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system, and the newly formed United States with its modern republican experiment, as one of the few representative governments in the world, and promptly initiated a series of wars against the crowned heads of Europe in the name of spreading *liberte, egalite* and *fraternite*. After a brief period of attempted accommodation, Britain emerged as the principal financier and organizer of various coalitions opposing France. Around the halfway point in the struggle, 1799-1800, the French Republic, having incrementally ceded power to sequentially smaller groups of men, found itself ruled by one man, Napoleon Bonaparte. By 1804 he dispensed with the republican title of First Consul and crowned himself emperor.

Britain, by contrast, also entered the war with a representative government – of a kind; it lacked universal suffrage and of course retained a hereditary monarch as head of state, while legislative and executive powers also resided in an elected parliament characterized by robust party politics – yet emerged with its empire largely intact, its military, economic and diplomatic power greater than before, and, of most interest to this inquiry, without having suffered a lapse in its form of government during twenty-two years of almost continuous war. As with the case of Athens, general observations and conclusions beg discrimination and detail, in particular the contrast between the development of political institutions in Britain and France before and during this period, that are outside the scope of this paper. Here again, the matter of interest is whether or not the posited mechanisms can be observed in operation.

“Why, from the beginning, was [the French Revolution] powered by brutality?” asked historian Simon Schama,²³ and an objective view is likely to concede the salient feature of the first French Republic during its brief existence was brutality in myriad forms. Royalist rebellions, power struggles within its nascent political institutions, and the threat posed by external enemies – exacerbated to no small extent by the belligerent zeal of the new republic itself – all made for an unstable and violent political environment. Republican France was repressive from its inception, in an effort to establish state control in the wake of the deposed monarchy, and the added pressure of protracted war made it more so. Its various representative legislatures, which in hindsight appear more experimental than practical, grew increasingly less powerful relative to administrative committees acting in executive capacities.

Burdensome taxes followed the militarization of the revolution; during the period between the repulse of the Prussian Army at Valmy in 1792 and Napoleon's victory at Marengo in 1800, which brought about a five year pause in major land operations, as well as the effective end of representative government in France, French armies eventually numbering in the hundreds of thousands, far larger than any raised under the Bourbons, were actively and continuously campaigning. To finance these operations, the new republic resorted to taxes at least as onerous as those imposed by the *ancien regime* and enforced them with equal rigor.²⁴ By the time Napoleon established the empire in 1804, even these measures had become inadequate, and the French government “depended crucially on institutionalized extortion from occupied countries to keep the military pump primed.”²⁵ Furthermore, the financial drain of protracted war occurred within a context of state repression. The Reign of Terror, from 1793-94, where some 1,200 people were guillotined and thousands more were imprisoned for vaguely defined crimes such as counter-revolutionary thoughts or actions is probably the most notorious example.²⁶

To these pressures were added a series of battlefield disasters at the close of the century which together created opportunities for the ambitions of Napoleon Bonaparte. The government's inability to pay the soldiers in his first army command was one catalyst for then-General Bonaparte's lighting campaigns into the wealthy Po River valley in 1796-97, which thereby cemented both his military reputation and access to political power. Following these victories, a series of French defeats in 1799 rocked the already unstable republic: disaster followed disaster at the hands of Austrian and Russian armies, “resulting in the loss of Milan,[the] whole of Lombardy, not to mention the continuing threat of a Russian thrust through Switzerland. All that Bonaparte had won earlier in Italy had been lost.”²⁷ Bonaparte himself was deployed with a bold but ill-fated expedition to Egypt during these events. His return to France in

the fall of 1799 enabled the coup, commonly referred to by its date on the revolutionary calendar, 18 *Brumaire*, which brought him to power as First Consul.

In the annals of personal advancement wrought by war, Napoleon's record is second to none; as the opportunist who seizes autocratic power from a representative government in time of crisis, he is Exhibit A. The interplay between mechanism two, the chance trials of war, and mechanism three, increased opportunism, enabled him to rise from captain of artillery in 1794 to emperor of France by 1804. The succession of military disasters in 1799 made him the man of the hour: a proven general, not associated with these defeats, to whom could be entrusted the security of the state at the expense of (admittedly weak) representative institutions. Therefore, not only do we see both mechanism two and three in operation, the only countervailing argument is that democracy was an unfamiliar experiment for the French, so the various forms assumed by the French Republic were not as resistant to strong ambitions during times of peril as a more mature democracy might prove. That argument is insufficient. The French Republic picked most of its fights, repeatedly, and often successfully; by 1799 it had proven formidable at war making though internally unstable. If it lacked institutions strong enough to withstand the pressures of military disaster and personal ambition, this was at least in part the result of a deliberate and enthusiastically pursued policy of protracted war that did not permit their establishment.

"I was born even as my country was perishing,"²⁸ wrote Bonaparte, and he may be fairly charged with having hastened its demise over the course of his rule as consul and emperor. Not just French national power but the developmental impulses of French democracy declined as a result. France's first representative experiment ended some sixteen years before Napoleon left for exile and it would be seventy-one years before republican rule returned to Paris. As France declined, Britain waxed more powerful, and embarked on not quite one hundred years of *Pax Britannica*, following its successful prosecution of a protracted war against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. If protracted war's posited mechanisms operated against the survival of France's first representative government, it follows that representative government in Britain must have faced similar risks even while producing a much different outcome.

Representative government in Britain already was feeling the pressures of previous protracted wars at the outbreak of the long war with the French in 1793. Success against France during the long struggle for dominance in North America, from 1754 -1763, had triggered a revolt among British colonial subjects that resulted in the recent loss of the Atlantic seaboard colonies. Disputes over how to finance debts incurred from the long war were the primary cause of the American revolt. In Edmund Burke's view, that rebellion was a natural expression of the

rights of Englishmen already established in the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution; it did not amount to treason against the crown or a refutation of the parliamentary system.²⁹ And Britain did have robust political freedoms that served it well, even given the war weariness, food riots, naval mutinies and rebellions in Ireland that occurred during this period. Still, attempts to expand the voting franchise and increase the frequency of parliamentary elections were defeated in 1792 and 1797³⁰ and the general character of William Pitt the Younger's terms as prime minister, from 1783-1801, and 1804-1806, revealed a shift from an initial impetus toward reform toward one of repression. This shift may be traced to war pressure: the Alien Act (1793), the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* (1794-95), and various measures taken to restrict public meetings all had their origins in efforts to suppress domestic movements sympathetic to the French Revolution.³¹

Reform movements persisted however, and were neither extinguished nor marginalized as a result of the reactionary impulses brought on by protracted war. "Not unpredictably, these policies led to greater polarization and strengthened the reformer's commitment to their cause."³² It is important to note that the middle classes in Britain were sufficiently concerned over the prospect of the French Revolution being exported that they largely supported the conservative governments of the period. While reform was stymied, it did not die, and at the same time the middle classes felt sufficient engagement with the government's policies that they provided continuous support to the war against France. There were significant liberal reforms during this period, (though the Irish rebellions were put down with typical ferocity, in part because of their instigation by French revolutionaries attempting to export their revolution through Ireland to overthrow the British crown): specific examples include enlightened regulation and rights in the vitally important Royal Navy (1797), abolition of the slave trade (1807) and steps toward Catholic emancipation.³³

While its civil liberties may be characterized as somewhat battered but largely intact during this period, Britain escaped the consequences of the economic burdens inherent in a protracted war by enlarging its economy as the fighting dragged on.

The truth was that the wars of the French Revolution grew the British economy as never before. Trade boomed between 1798-1802 as the navy's control over the Mediterranean and captured French colonies in the West Indies opened key new markets for the goods of the Industrial Revolution.³⁴

Britain could control not just its own commerce, but global commerce, the bulk of which moved on the seas. British financial, administrative and industrial institutions established and expanded a "truly international trading network from the Caribbean to Ceylon and Canton, all converging on London. All this while Britain was supposedly engaged in a life or death struggle with its

archenemy Napoleon Bonaparte.”³⁵ Not only was Britain's economy growing, and establishing a new global economic order, but in consequence of its naval blockade on Napoleonic Europe, the economies there were shrinking as a result of being denied access to both Britain and the global market. The entire war period, 1793-1815, was financially burdensome all the same, costing just over £1 billion, and paid for out of an income tax (introduced in 1798, repealed in 1815)³⁶ but also, and importantly, out of increased customs and excise duties, which in turn was possible due to the explosive growth in trade.³⁷ In short, representative institutions and an expanding economy enabled Britain to both prosecute and finance a protracted war without risking support for government policy or, by extension, the form of government itself.

Regarding the second mechanism, the combination of what John Mearsheimer has termed “the stopping power of water”³⁸ and a maritime strategy enabled by a powerful fleet provides a clue as to why it did not operate in Britain as it did in France. With a small population in comparison to that of France, and an even smaller army, British leadership relied on the naval shield to prevent the enemy making a direct, existentially threatening attack, and then limited the operational exposure of its few, relatively high quality army forces which in turn were augmented by continental proxies; that is, by fighting comparatively few battles, and these of comparatively smaller scale than their French opponents, the British mitigated the mechanism whereby prolonged war increases the chances of military defeat at some point. While they did suffer defeats during this period, none was in the course of a general naval action, where defeat would have meant disaster, and none on land threatened to compromise the general maritime-economic strategy.

This result in turn mitigated the need for a popular hero to rescue a desperate situation. The lack of a military disaster of the scale faced by Athens or France may have weakened incentives for a usurpation of the government. This lack can be traced in part to Britain's very different politico-military strategy and its effect in mitigating the risks of protraction. Absent the pressures of a failing economy, popular or factional unrest, and military catastrophe, no autocratic man of the hour emerged because no circumstances emerged to encourage the belief that one was needed. Certainly, there were popular British heroes of the day; arguably, none in their history rates higher than Horatio Nelson, and the Duke of Wellington parlayed successful generalship into a political career that eventually led him to become Prime Minister. In neither case however, did either man's military success or extraordinary popularity threaten the stability of Britain's representative institutions.

Here again, as in the case of Athens and France, the three mechanisms operated with one another. In this case, however, their mitigation produced a chain of *corrective* effects that

eased pressure on the democratic government during a period of protracted war. Britain's fiscal health enabled it to maintain, and also depended upon, the maritime strategy, which in turn mitigated to a great extent the risk of too many chance trials in battle. As a result, the military forces necessary to Britain's survival and that of its subjects were rarely exposed to defeat or destruction, and therefore no pressing need emerged for a military hero to rescue a perilous situation. All three mechanisms appear to have operated largely unchecked against the survival of French representative government. Conversely, Britain seems not only to have mitigated their effects, but to have strengthened its strategic position, economic power and eventually its political liberties in the process.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLD WAR, 1946-1991

Strictly speaking, the Cold War does not fit the definition of protracted war presented above, which applies to hot wars of greater than seven year duration. Yet it bears enough of the features of a protracted hot war to be instructive. "There was never a victory parade, nor had there ever been a declaration of war. Yet the Cold War was a real war, as real as the two world wars," wrote Norman Friedman, historian and protégé of Cold War strategic theorist Herman Kahn, not quite ten years after the event.³⁹ Certainly, the political and military confrontation with the Soviet Union focused American strategy for nearly fifty years, and that experience has informed the thinking of senior policy makers now crafting strategies for the global war on transnational terrorism.

The Cold War generated economic and domestic pressures that increased the power of the government; there is evidence that the first mechanism operated throughout. American policy making appears to have been informed by its dangers fairly early. A clear example of this occurred after the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949. This event prompted a revision, what amounted to a militarization, of the American containment strategy promulgated by the Truman administration at the start of the Cold War. Drafted by Paul Nitze of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in the spring of 1950 and known as NSC 68, the revision argued that not only nuclear deterrence but a massive conventional force buildup, in air defenses, naval units and ground forces, was needed, primarily to hold off a Soviet offensive in Europe, or adventurism in the Middle East or Asia, and buy time for the greater industrial power of the United States and Western Europe to be mobilized.⁴⁰ NSC 68 assumed that the American economy could support greater military expenditures than had been programmed following the end of World War II. It obviated the cheaper strategy of relying solely on the nuclear deterrent in exchange for achieving conventional strategic options, but there were doubters in the Truman

administration; it was not until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that NSC 68 became the plan for US rearmament.⁴¹ Nonetheless, by 1953, when the Eisenhower Administration came to power, the NSC 68 strategy, with its estimate that 40% of US Gross Domestic Product could be committed to defense, was judged a threat to the health of the national economy and labeled a "budget breaker." Faced with a bloody conventional stalemate in Korea and burgeoning military expenditures, newly-elected President Eisenhower promptly scaled back the aggressive buildup called for in NSC 68. The strategic revision was known as the New Look, and, while maintaining some forward-based conventional deterrence, it called for a policy of overwhelming nuclear attack in response to any Soviet aggression. While viewed by many at the time as horrific, even insane, the policy recognized what would prove to be the defeat mechanism of the Soviet Union: US economic primacy.

The possibility of a U.S. economic meltdown, due to the sheer cost of maintaining an army to fight and win in Europe, was a far greater danger...If deterrence worked as expected, the Soviets would surely concentrate on economic and political subversion rather than on general war. To resist this type of attack, the United States needed the soundest possible economy...[This] argument explains the New Look perfectly.⁴²

With this step, the Eisenhower administration arguably established the vital condition for the eventual American success in the Cold War. Not only did economic health trump military spending, but the precedent that military spending, even in the face of an existential threat, was subject to scrutiny and revision was upheld. The significance of nuclear weapons was not that they made a US-Soviet war unthinkable, but impractical; neither side was liable to achieve its political aims through an exchange of hydrogen bombs. Therefore, the field of decision had to shift away from military toward economic and to a lesser extent diplomatic means. The American economic expansion that followed networked our economy with that of our allies, and made our continued prosperity a matter of international interest in a way that the USSR's economic system never could be. It was not a strategy that yielded immediate results, and the hour of victory when it arrived at last was as unexpected in the United States as in the rest of the world. Yet not only did the long period of economic expansion, which began in the late 1940s and terminated only with the oil shocks and inflation of the 1970s, give the United States a tremendous strategic advantage over its more militarized opponent. The robust economy served as a buffer to domestic turmoil of the Cold War period as well. While unquestionably the United States underwent tremendous social change from 1946-1991, and the financial costs of the Cold War should not be dismissed as trivial, it is reasonable to posit that a coincident economic failure would have meant a serious, even disastrous, loss of domestic equilibrium.

It was not just taxation and military spending that remained at issue for the Cold War's duration, so was government intrusion into civil liberties. Here was a similar pattern of aggressive government policy followed by more graduated mitigation as time went on and abuses were uncovered. Contrary to the fears that dominated the framers' debates in 1787, one of the most notorious abuses of government power during the Cold War came not from the executive but the legislative branch, in the form of the McCarthy anti-communist investigations that took place from 1948 to roughly 1955. Inspired by fears of fifth column infiltration into the US government and civil society, the investigations nominally targeted communist party members in the United States but soon became exercises in the denial of due process and fundamental constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly. The measures adopted or inspired by Senator Joseph McCarthy's investigations had effects far beyond securing the nation from communist infiltrators.

It has been estimated that out of a work force of 65 million, 13 million were affected by loyalty and security programs...over 11 thousand individuals were fired...more than 100 people were convicted...the "silent generation" that emerged from McCarthyism is testimony enough to the widespread effects...of the political repression of the era.⁴³

McCarthyism faltered for several reasons, chief among them being public exposure (Senator McCarthy's hearings, and therefore his methods, were broadcast live on television for the first time in 1954) and subtle but effective – if late, in the view of some – intervention by President Eisenhower. While there have been defenses of McCarthyism, the two most common ones – that there really were some communist infiltrators in the US government⁴⁴ and that the repressive measures made the American Communist Party ineffective as a fifth column throughout the Cold War – were judged insufficient to justify the means employed.

In a similar way, covert activities that were expanded or established during the early period of the Cold War not only ended up bound by greater legislative controls, but were subjected to open hearings on legal breaches committed in the name of national security, for example, during the Church Committee hearings in 1973, or the Iran-Contra Scandal in the 1980s. The result of the Church hearings is particularly instructive, as they were prompted not by Central Intelligence Agency excesses overseas, but domestically, as well as the fact that, in common with the downfall of McCarthyism, the role of the free press was paramount.

On Dec. 22, 1974, a front-page New York Times article set in motion a process that would ultimately expose and confirm many of the CIA's abuses. The article said that the CIA had been engaging in massive domestic spying. The allegations stunned then-President Ford, who quickly created a special commission to investigate CIA activities inside the United States.⁴⁵

Following a series of hearings chaired by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike, the Congress enacted stricter oversight laws governing intelligence activities in general, and domestic surveillance in particular.⁴⁶ Given examples such as these, it appears that while the impetus to establish features of a security state was extant in the Cold War, both public and political institutions proved resistant to the idea, though in reaction to excesses that already had manifested themselves.

Regarding the second mechanism, a containment strategy by design limits the exposure of military forces to the risk of defeat. The protection afforded by two oceans certainly aided the United States in maintaining strategic standoff distance with the USSR, but the deployment of a significant portion of its army to western Europe during this period argues that Mearsheimer's "stopping power of water" was less relevant in this case than it was for Great Britain. While over a forty-five year period there were intervals of combat, in Korea and Vietnam most significantly, and near outbreaks of nuclear war, over missiles in Cuba or misread indicators during military exercises, at no time were either forces or interests risked on a battlefield to the extent where the outcome threatened either with catastrophe. Admittedly, during the Cold War the United States suffered what is often referred to as its only lost war, in Vietnam. If a battlefield catastrophe threatens democratic rule, a lost war should as well. Yet while the *conduct* of the Vietnam War provoked large scale, even violent, unrest domestically, to the extent that some commentators looking back have referred to fears of civil war breaking out in 1968, the *loss* of the Vietnam War passed with no public panic, no marches on the national capital, and no conspiracies of disgruntled warriors seeking to destroy the government.⁴⁷ That fact alone argues that the conflict there was not over a vital national interest, even if it was not apparent to all at the time. Because the loss in Vietnam did not threaten the United States with invasion or lesser power status, it can be argued that the population as a whole was more receptive to forgetting the event than radically altering the form of government in response.

Regarding the third mechanism, its absence is tied to success in mitigating the first two. It is significant that the World War II general elected to the presidency in 1952 was not Douglas MacArthur, a flamboyant orator with a (carefully publicized) record of wartime success, an ardent anti-communist with proven abilities as a government executive from the occupation of Japan, and apparently enormous support following his relief for defying presidential orders not to expand the scope and scale of the Korean War. His political capital was in fact minimal and his probes at a presidential campaign largely tentative. Throughout the Cold War this proved to be the case for other generals, such as Curtis LeMay or Alexander Haig, who attempted to translate a military reputation into executive power. Dwight Eisenhower is the exception; for the

most part, the military men who achieved elected office were former junior officers or draftee enlisted men with brief periods of wartime service, either in World War II, Korea or Vietnam. In fact, the political influence of military men can be said to have *declined* during the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence, the introduction of business management practices to the Defense Department, and the explosive growth of the federal bureaucracy lessened the stature of career soldiers, as did a popular backlash against the military, particularly following the Vietnam War. American society refused militarization, and American government had no need for it.

In general, the evidence supports that the United States escaped the anti-democratic effects of protraction for three basic reasons: it was able to expand its economy, protect, however imperfectly, the civil liberties of its society and maintain the infrequent operational exposure of its military forces.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Obviously, a brief survey of three long and complicated wars pulled from 2,400 years of history will not yield a precise distillation of policy guidelines for an equally complicated war of potentially great length in our own day. It is neither necessary nor proper for the past to dictate the present. However, given that the three posited mechanisms do appear to have operated against the representative governments concerned, with varying results, it is possible to arrive at conclusions as to why they operated with greater or lesser effect in each. From there, general principles may emerge to shape contemporary policy under the assumption that a protracted war is underway and will continue for some period.

The first general conclusion is that protracted war *can* produce pressures that lead to the overthrow of representative governments; it happened in the cases of Classical Athens and Republican France. The second general conclusion is that representative governments can survive those pressures, successfully fight protracted wars and survive *as representative governments*. Both Georgian Britain and Cold War America proved able to do so. How they accomplished this may be significant in crafting contemporary policy for a protracted war; what specific conclusions are possible from the case studies?

First, aggressive and continuous challenges to restrictions on civil liberties during the course of a protracted war are essential in preserving the representative form of government. This is not to say that restrictions on civil liberties are altogether inappropriate in time of war. Rather, Georgian Britain and Cold War America did not permit unchecked pressure on civil liberties, thereby preventing the concentration of state powers over the long term. In both cases, the state imposed restrictions, yet there was sufficient opposition to them to ensure the

recovery, even expansion in some cases, of lost liberties and the restoration of equilibrium between the electorate and the state.

Second, in both the British and American cases, the states concerned avoided the need for onerous taxation and debt financing to fund their wars over the long term. The Athenian practice of narrowing the extended cost burden to a progressively smaller segment of their society backfired in the form of an aristocratic coup. French rapacity in making conquered territories fund their wars failed to relieve the domestic fiscal strain. The solution that Britain and America arrived at was, in the broad view, the same. If war expenditures are expressed as a fraction of overall national economic output, then their method may be understood as simultaneously expanding the denominator and restraining the growth of the numerator. To achieve the former, each successfully networked a global economic system that not only generated sufficient wealth to maintain a long term war effort, but also granted strategic flexibility in the form of economic power that could be brought to bear against their adversaries. This in turn relieved the pressure on military power, permitting military economies of force that enabled achievement of the latter.

Third, both Britain and America avoided the continuous operational exposure of their military forces, and by extension, the risk of exhausting their military potential in the course of continuous fighting over protracted periods. While each suffered defeats during their protracted wars, the mechanism posited was that military failure would lead not to a lack of confidence in the sitting government – indeed, William Pitt the Younger and Lyndon Johnson would both suffer the loss of their executive positions in part as a result of battlefield misfortunes⁴⁸ – but that failure would result in a national emergency that endangered the form of government itself. Athens and France suffered catastrophic defeats that not only produced national emergencies, but led to the rise of ambitious, anti-democratic men, Alcibiades and Napoleon. The distinction here seems to lie between the needs of war and the emergencies of war. All four representative governments entered into their protracted wars understanding that war required extraordinary efforts such as controls on the population, financial exertion, and raising and supporting significant military forces. The two that suffered the loss of their representative governments at the hands of their most capable leaders, Athens and France, did so in moments of extreme peril - the loss of the finest Athenian ships and soldiers in Sicily and the string of military disasters in northern Italy and along the Rhine frontier - without parallel in the British or American experience.

Finally, protracted war mechanisms are interconnected, and therefore mitigation of one supports mitigation of the others. For example, success in mitigating the impact of the financial

costs of war supports civil liberties and reducing the operational exposure of military forces, which in turn means fewer opportunities or emergencies that encourage authoritarian ambitions. Athens and France failed in part because war costs and battlefield disasters encouraged the rise of ambitious men to rescue their respective situations at the expense of representative government. British and American success in maintaining their representative institutions may be attributed to either understanding these relationships or exploiting them in the course of experience. Given these conclusions, what are the policy implications for a protracted American war against transnational terrorism?

First, regarding civil liberties, the implication for policy debates such as those surrounding the USA PATRIOT Act, is neither that its content or purpose is right or wrong. Rather, it is essential to maintain both counter-pressure on restrictions to civil liberties and a long term perspective on the effects of this and future measures for the duration of the war. It is neither unpatriotic nor harmful to the war effort to do so. The mistake, if there is one, is to assume from the outset that wartime exigencies preclude the practice or refinement of representative government or civil liberties. In fact, the evidence from the case studies here suggests exactly the opposite: civil liberties are a means as well as an end, and care in their maintenance is essential to preserving the representative form of government.

Second, large scale military operations are too expensive to be sustainable over the long term, where "long term" may be a period of decades, even generations. Heavy debt financing will not work given time scales of that magnitude. The red line for our defense outlays probably lies around the percentage of GDP sustained during the Cold War. As a benchmark, Eisenhower's New Look reduced defense spending per annum from the NSC 68/Korean War high of 15% of GDP – which his administration judged to be ruinous in the long term - to under 10% of GDP by 1955. Defense spending further declined to 8% before the Vietnam War spike from 1965-70, which never exceeded 10% per annum. From 1955-1991, the rounded average was 7.5% of GDP.⁴⁹ The FY 2004 defense budget was 4.2% of GDP; it has increased every year since the 9/11 attacks and is now up 33%, from 3.2% in the year 2000.⁵⁰ The danger to avoid is risking long term economic health for the sake of short term policies. What is expedient in the course of one defense budget, congressional or presidential election cycle, may prove disastrous in the long term.

Third, while we should expect that the law of large numbers applies even to technologically transformed forces, the nature of the terrorist enemies and the quality of our military forces makes the chance of our suffering a catastrophic military defeat remote, though not impossible. However, there is a variant scenario posed by the terrorist threat that warrants

serious consideration. Over the course of a long war, repeated chance trials against defeating a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction against our civilian population must obey the same logic as repeated chance trials in battle: given enough trials, we should expect that the enemy may succeed. This expectation argues for a high priority to the planning for and resourcing of effects mitigation - "consequence management" in the policy vernacular - in the event of such an attack. Otherwise, the effects could be as if we had suffered a battlefield defeat. Given a large scale strike on a major American city, it is not too farfetched to postulate a national emergency that may spin unchecked, and might put the republic at risk to opportunistic authoritarians. With military defeat a remote possibility, this last is probably the most likely type of authoritarian rescuer scenario we need to guard against during the course of the war.

This paper has sought to provide a different lens through which to view contemporary policy debates over how to fight the global war on terrorism. While these debates have at times addressed issues of civil liberties, defense expenditures and the employment of military forces, a principal concern in any of them must be the shaping of policy solutions in the context of sustaining a representative government committed to a protracted war. Our immediate concern need not be Caesar or Sulla overthrowing the government. By better understanding how protracted war may erode representative institutions and sensibilities, we decrease the possibility that our war effort might, over the decades this war may last, eventually undermine our system of government.

WORD COUNT=10,085

ENDNOTES

¹ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy In America*, translated and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 621.

² George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," 20 September 2001; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004.

³ Paul Wolfowitz, "Remarks as prepared for delivery to RAND by Deputy Secretary of Defense," Grand Hyatt Washington, Washington, DC, 8 September 2004; available from <<http://www.dod.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040908-depsecdef0721.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

⁴ Paul Wolfowitz, "Prepared statement for the Senate Budget Committee: FY 2006 Defense Budget Request," available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2005/sp20050301-depsecdef1141.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

⁵ A typical example, which fuses many of the developments from this period, is Joint Forces Command J9 White Paper, "A Concept Rapid Decisive Operations", available from <https://www.daml.org/2002/01/experiment/RDO_White_Paper.pdf>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

⁶ Federalist Paper No. 6, though concerned primarily with advancing the case for a strong federal government to prevent ruinous war among the 13 newly independent American states, itemizes Hamilton's long view of wars fought by republics from the time of classical Athens to that of the Dutch Republic in the 18th Century. *Federalist Paper No.6*, available from <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed06.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2004.

⁷ Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *The Formative Years, 1783-1812* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, Army Historical Series): 105-106; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-05.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

⁸ Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/sp1943-44/introduction.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

⁹ Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 123.

¹⁰ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1986). This compilation and sampling of wars is derived from the Dupuy's chronology.

¹¹ Paul Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 378. I owe this observation to my reading of Rahe's work, but the quotation he cites appears in Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society*, available from <<http://www.constitution.org/th/decive05.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

¹² James Madison, "Notes from Constitutional Debates," September 1787; available from <<http://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc-0907.txt>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret translators, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 117.

¹⁵ Rahe, 188 passim.

¹⁶ Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Viking Press, 2003), 136-141 passim.

¹⁷ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, C.F. Smith translation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), 311.

¹⁸ Kagan, 364.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Rahe, 196.

²¹ Thucydides, 181.

²² Kagan, 486.

²³ Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 860.

²⁴ Schama, 854.

²⁵ Schama, 856.

²⁶ Wikipedia, "French Revolution," available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Revolution#The_Directory>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

²⁷ Alan Schom, *Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 201.

²⁸ Schom, 1.

²⁹ Edmund Burke, "Speech Urging Reconciliation with the American Colonies," 22 March 1775; available from <<http://odur.lct.rug.nl/~usa/D/1751-1775/libertydebate/burk.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005; and "The Fruits of the American War," in *Burke's Politics*, eds. Ross J.S. Hoffman and Paul Levack, 100.

³⁰ Joel H. Wiener, ed., *Great Britain: The Lion at Home: A Documentary History of Domestic Policy, 1689-1973* (London: Chelsea House, 1974), 537.

³¹ Ibid., 324-325.

³² Ibid.

³³ Pitt would resign from his first term as prime minister in 1801 over his failed attempt to enfranchise Britain's Catholics, as his principal opposition was also his most important political ally, King George III.

³⁴ Arthur Herman, *To Rule the Waves* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 403.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Weiner, 325.

³⁷ Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: St Martin's Griffin, 1997), 153.

³⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: WW Norton, 2001), 44.

³⁹ Norman Friedman, *The Fifty Year War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), xi.

⁴⁰ Friedman, 138 passim.

⁴¹ Friedman, 143.

⁴² Friedman, 197

⁴³ Joseph L. Gibson, "Political Intolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare," *American Political Science Review* 82 (June 1988): 514.

⁴⁴ This was substantiated in part during the late 1990s by public release of the VENONA surveillance records.

⁴⁵ Brian Hansen, "Intelligence Reforms, (25 January 2002): 49-72 [database on-line]; available from The CQ Researcher Online; accessed 8 March 2005.

⁴⁶ Ibid., passim.

⁴⁷ Marchers on the capital were, for that matter, either indifferent to the war's outcome, or in favor of a North Vietnamese victory; their interest was in ending American participation regardless.

⁴⁸ As a result of the French victory at Austerlitz, in 1805, and the Vietnamese communist Tet Offensive in 1968, respectively.

⁴⁹ Defense and the National Interest, "Defense Spending as % of GDP," briefing chart, available from <http://www.d-n-i.net/charts_data/defense_percent_gdp_1940_2000.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.

⁵⁰ Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006, Historical Tables," (US Government Printing Office), 306.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Burke, Edmund. "Speech Urging Reconciliation with the American Colonies," 22 March 1775; available from <<http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/D/1751-1775/libertydebate/burk.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.
- _____. "The Fruits of the American War," *Burke's Politics*, Ross J.S. Hoffman and Paul Levack, ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
- Bush, George W. "Statement before joint session of Congress, September 20, 2001," available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 December 2004.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, translators. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
- Defense and the National Interest, "Defense Spending as % of GDP," briefing chart, available from <http://www.d-n-i.net/charts_data/defense_percent_gdp_1940_2000.htm>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.
- Dupuy, R. Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N., *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present*, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
- Friedman, Norman. *The Fifty Year War*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
- Gibson, Joseph L., "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *American Political Science Review*, Vol 82, No.2, June 1988.
- Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History*. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
- Hamilton, Alexander. *Federalist Paper No.6*, available from <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed06.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 November 2004.
- Hansen, Brian. "Intelligence Reforms," (25 January 2002): 49-72 [database on-line]; available from The CQ Researcher Online; accessed 8 March 2005.
- Herman, Arthur. *To Rule the Waves*. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.
- Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. New York: Pelican Classics, 1968.
- _____. *De Cive, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society*. Available from <<http://www.constitution.org/th/decive05.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2005.
- James, Lawrence. *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*. New York: St Martin's Griffin, 1997.
- Kagan, Donald. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Viking Press, 2003.
- MacGregor, Morris J., Jr., *The Formative Years, 1783-1812* (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, Army Historical Series): 105-106; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH/AMH-05.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005

- Madison, James. "Notes from Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787" available from <<http://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc-0907.txt>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.
- Matloff, Maurice. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944*; available from <<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/sp1943-44/introduction.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.
- Mayer, Michael S., ed. *The Eisenhower Presidency and the 1950s*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: WW Norton, 2001.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. New York: WW Norton, 2004.
- Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006, Historical Tables," US Government Printing Office, 2005.
- Rahe, Paul. *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
- Russett, Bruce. *Controlling the Sword*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Schama, Simon *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
- Schom, Alan. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. New York: Harper Collins, 1997.
- Strassler, Robert, ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996.
- Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by C.F. Smith. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy In America*. Translated and edited by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
- Wiener, Joel H., ed., *Great Britain: The Lion At Home, A Documentary History of Domestic Policy, 1689-1973*. London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974.
- Wikipedia. "The French Revolution." available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Revolution#The_Directory>; Internet; accessed 7 Mar 2005.
- Wolfowitz, Paul. "Remarks as prepared for delivery to RAND by Deputy Secretary of Defense," Grand Hyatt Washington, Washington, DC, 8 September 2004; available from <<http://www.dod.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040908-depsecdef0721.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.
- _____. "Prepared statement for the Senate Budget Committee: FY 2006 Defense Budget Request," available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2005/sp20050301-depsecdef1141.html>>; Internet; accessed 10 March 2005.