Urban Population Control in a Counterinsurgency
Abstract
Historically, guerrilla movements have had more success in the rural countryside than in the city. From the urban uprising of the Paris commune to the urban revolts in Shanghai, most urban insurrections have ended up smashed and leaderless. Usually, it is a mistake for the guerrilla to move into the city. In the city, the guerrilla is surrounded by a thousand eyes and a thousand jealousies. The government can mass forces and move rapidly within the city. The guerrilla force must stay small and fragmented in order to survive. The guerrilla cannot conceal large weapons and cannot conduct on-site training and rehearsals. In Peru, the Sendero Luminoso did well as long as they fought from the mountains and jungles. The government was able to respond effectively only after the movement shifted its forces to the cities. The Peruvian government conducted an effective urban information campaign against the Sendero Luminoso while building and conducting an impressive urban intelligence effort. Then the government smashed the movement. Sendero Luminoso is now resurrecting itself and making a comeback in the jungles and mountains. Local government and local forces have had fair success in rooting out urban insurgencies. It gets stickier when an outside power, particularly one which does not share the same language, culture, history and religion, has to destroy the urban insurgency. How does an outside power control a local urban populace and elicit voluntary or involuntary cooperation? How does an outside power conduct an effective counter-insurgency in a city? How does an outside power, whose dominant religion and culture are different from those of another people, introduce new controls and procedures without sparking riots and attacks?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA434983
Entities
People
- Amanda S. Mitchell
- Laurie King-irani
- Lenny Tasa Bennett
- Lester W. Grau
- Mounir Elkhamri