

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RESHAPING THE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY TO
WIN DECISIVELY: THE CASE FOR STABILIZATION**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force – and vital for future campaigns – is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. Finally, this paper outlines three key force attributes that must guide Army Transformation, if it is to generate an expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and progressive stabilization.

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RESHAPING THE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY TO WIN DECISIVELY: THE CASE FOR STABILIZATION

The United States is without question the world's premier super power and, as such, bears a heightened responsibility as the foremost champion of freedom. Major shifts in the security landscape have made fulfilling that responsibility increasingly difficult. In response, the United States made significant revisions to the objectives and concepts of its National Strategy with greater emphasis on leveraging all instruments of power to subjugate regimes whose oppressive rule, ideological opposition, and use of terrorism threaten the expansion of the global family of free and democratic states with open economies. America's armed forces are the most capable and formidable in the world. Their ability to swiftly defeat any adversary and terminate conflict on favorable terms is uncontested. But under the new strategy, conflict termination is no longer fully sufficient. Long term conflict resolution manifested by the emergence of a new democracy – regime change – has become the chief campaign objective of military intervention. Consequently, winning this Nation's future wars will require an expeditionary land force with broader campaign qualities in order to conduct both decisive combat operations and stability operations.

Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities? This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force – and vital for future campaigns – is the ability to conduct stabilization. It begins with exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Then, it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-conflict operations in the context of modern combat to more fully understand the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept - progressive stabilization - that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations while improving its ability to contribute to long-term conflict resolution. Finally, this paper outlines three key force attributes that must guide Army Transformation, if it is to generate an expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: A STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT

The case for stabilization and reconstruction as an essential warfighting capability begins by understanding the new threat and the corresponding changes to U.S. strategy that are

redefining the chief aim of armed conflict and the scope of future campaigns. Globalization has created a family of like-minded states who strive to institutionalize such ideological norms as free markets, open societies, the rule of law, and popular governance. In the process, globalization has also exposed a group of illegitimate and/or ineffective governments and non-state actors who violently reject these institutions because accepting them threatens their survival and challenges the ideologies on which they are founded.¹ Chronic instability, violent internal conflict, genocide, religious extremism, and rampant corruption are symptomatic conditions of ineffective, illegitimate, and oppressive regimes bent on insulating themselves from the influence of globalization. These conditions, in turn, invite an alliance with opportunistic non-state actors who are also ideologically opposed to globalization's precepts.² Oppressive regimes provide geographic sanctuary, a populace ripe for recruits, and a global venue for grievances while non-state actors provide the regimes with a new instrument of power capable of global reach using means a state cannot otherwise condone.³

The strategic aims of this new threat alliance are to remain in power and to block the spread of globalization into their region -- no matter what the social or economic cost. These aims put them on an ideological collision course with the world's champion of freedom -- the United States.⁴ The direct threat to the United States and its functioning partners is, therefore, the increasingly wide array of traditional, irregular, and catastrophic means employed by this alliance to erode U.S. power and achieve regional dominance.⁵ The use of traditional modern military forces to challenge U.S. resolve within a region remains a possibility. But, the use of irregular means such as inciting terrorism, insurgency, international crime, and civil war are now the chief asymmetric means employed by oppressive regimes and their non-state henchmen to mitigate U.S. strengths. The new race for weapons of mass destruction or similar effect weapons represents the most dangerous threat. These weapons give the threat the capacity to paralyze the political will of free nations, ignite regional instability, and create opportunities for regional dominance.⁶ Remaining in power is integral to the threat's overall security strategy. Pervasive internal oppression and autocratic governance become key strategic concepts. Invasive, omnipotent state-run security forces quell any internal opposition. State-run infrastructure and public services provide absolute control over every aspect of the populace's quality of life. Oppressive regimes strengthen their grip over the populace by instituting a system of national policies and domestic controls designed to block -- or at least marginalize -- outside ideological influences on the society and economy.

In response to this new threat, the United States is adjusting its security strategy in recognition that America can no longer ignore these emerging threats or their underlying cause

and remain a world leader. The core objectives of American strategy remain unchanged: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations, and respect for human dignity. Strategic concepts such as defusing regional conflicts, defeating global terrorism, and preventing or preempting threats from WMD represent new ways the United States intends to counter the new array of traditional, irregular and catastrophic threats it now faces. However, the most remarkable shift in U.S strategy is the prominence given to expanding the circle of development by building the infrastructure of democracy in place of tyrannical regimes.⁷ In this way, the new strategy acknowledges that the long-term security of the United States requires re-focusing the instruments of power towards resolving or removing the underlying conditions of conflict -- the oppressive regimes themselves. This revelation makes the business of proactive regime change a central feature of American strategy.

The strategic emphasis on democratization affects all instruments of power, but the impact on military forces and the scope of future armed conflict are especially profound. Achieving long term conflict resolution enjoys new prominence and the new measure of effectiveness is how well armed conflict refashions an oppressive regime into a free, open, and democratic society.⁸ Consequently, the terms of favorable conflict termination are also redefined under the new strategy. Swiftly defeating an oppressive regime's efforts to achieve regional dominance, acquire WMD, or support terrorism is no longer sufficient. Regime change is the new standard for conflict termination because it attains the pre-requisite for achieving the only acceptable outcome of war – a new democracy.⁹

Expanding the scope of armed conflict to include regime change (conflict termination) and democratization (conflict resolution) has, in turn, exposed a major gap in the Nation's strategic capabilities (Figure 1). Today's military instrument is optimized for achieving conflict termination in the traditional context. It is designed to defeat the direct threats to the United States and its partners, but not the underlying cause of those threats. The new strategy requires a military with a broader range of capabilities: adept at simultaneously destroying an adversary's military capability, removing the regime, and maintaining the long-term stability needed to foster progress toward a free and open society.¹⁰ Likewise, the Nation needs greater reconstruction capacity to rapidly exploit the stability achieved by the military. The ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction are essential to winning future conflict, but represent significant capability gaps in today's military force and other instruments of power.




FIGURE 1. STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION AS AN ENDS-WAYS-MEANS GAP

The United States implemented its new security strategy with high-stakes operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The success of both operations hinges on the ability of U.S. land forces to achieve the full measure of 'winning decisively' and provide the capacity for long-term stabilization commensurate with their new role in conflict resolution. Because 'you go to war with the force you have,' the Army has struggled with generating the right capabilities. The Army was not built for this new role in warfare. In the years preceding 9/11, the Army had a different view of its responsibilities in future warfare and embarked on a different modernization course, one that featured different capabilities than it now requires.

THE ARMY MISREADS THE FUTURE LANDSCAPE

In the 1990s, the Army leadership was confronted with two views of the future and a choice to make on what capabilities it needed in the post-Cold War environment. On the one hand, the success of DESERT STORM fostered a prevailing view that the chief role of the Army was to swiftly defeat an adversary's ground force and then promptly return home – leaving post conflict operations to someone else. Faced with 40% less combat force structure after the post-Cold War drawdown, this camp advocated a modernization path that improved strategic responsiveness through smaller, lighter, more lethal and leaner forces. The Army's vision centered on developing combat formations that were enabled by 'network centric warfare' with

enhanced deployability and precision lethality to complement the 'shock and awe' of the Joint Force.¹¹

On the other hand, the last two decades saw a sharp rise in the use of military force for a completely different type of mission – stability operations – with a need for vastly different capabilities. This trend was a source of great angst among senior military leaders and aggravated a long-standing cultural aversion to the use of U.S. military power for nation building. These operations represented everything military commanders hope to avoid: extended and open-ended deployments, ambiguous political and military objectives, no clear signs of military victory, and indifference among Americans at home for their sacrifice.¹² The increasing frequency of these missions around the world, however, was dismissed as an aberration rather than a forewarning of the future security environment and the role of America's Army.

Cultural aversion trumped experiential learning and the Army embarked on a modernization path defined by a new operational framework -- Rapid Decisive Operations. The Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept aimed at enabling the military instrument to quickly respond with smaller, more lethal forces to bring regional conflict threatening U.S. interests to a rapid and decisive close.¹³ Its central operational framework – effects based operations -- integrated the application of precision engagement, information operations, theater enablers, and dominant maneuver to produce a relentless series of multidimensional raids, strikes, and ground assaults throughout the battlespace. When correctly arranged in time and space, these operations attack the adversary in dimensions he is unable to counter allowing U.S. forces and their allies to dictate the tempo and terms of any operation.¹⁴ RDO was hailed as a revolution in military thinking. Its singular focus on rapid termination of the conflict, vice long-term commitment of forces to resolve long-standing problems, represented a bold shift from the former thinking about warfare.¹⁵ RDO became the rallying point for the Army's march into the future. It pervaded military thinking, equipment procurement, unit redesign, and force structure decisions regarding combat support and service support units.

The wake up call came when the United States required its military instrument to execute the new strategy. The mission -- permanently reduce the threat to the United States by defeating two errant regimes ideologically opposed to freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq and replace them with constitutional democracies. The Army, however, was not designed for the full task at hand. While the Army had perfected its ability to swiftly defeat any adversary, it had also mortgaged its ability to conduct protracted stability operations and deliver the enduring results the national strategy now insisted it achieve.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF RAPID DECISIVE FORCE TO PROMOTE STABILITY

There are two great truths distilled from the myriad of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. First, the U.S. military has superbly achieved the vision of Rapid Decisive Operations. U.S. forces are now capable of destroying an adversary's military and decapitating its national leadership with blinding speed and efficiency using exceptionally low force levels. Second, too much of a good thing is not always the right thing. Overwhelming success in RDO produces 2nd and 3rd-order effects detrimental to creating the conditions for a free and open society to emerge within a region -- the chief objective of military intervention in the modern environment. Figures 2 and 3 provide a theoretical comparison between traditional combat operations and rapid decisive operations in which the objectives of the military intervention are to destroy the adversary's military, collapse the errant regime, and set the conditions for nation-building.

The traditional form of combat operations has several inherent characteristics that make it conducive to setting the conditions for nation-building (Figure 2). Typical characteristics include: gradual build up of overwhelming force, offensive campaigns lasting extensive periods of time, progressive and foreseeable culmination of the enemy's military capacity, and a formal capitulation of the enemy regime followed by a cease fire.¹⁶ Upon conflict termination, the large military presence and relatively secure contiguous areas of operation facilitated a 'military occupation' and deliberate transition to post conflict stability operations. This, in turn, afforded the international community with the time necessary to plan reconstruction, muster resources, and begin the process of nation building in secure areas already occupied by large forces.




FIGURE 2. TRADITIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS¹⁷




FIGURE 3. RAPID DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS¹⁸

Conversely, rapid decisive operations are specifically designed to produce relentless pressure on an adversary's regime and its military force to induce a simultaneous and catastrophic collapse (Figure 3). Compressed timelines for crisis planning, rapid force deployments, and near immediate initiation of combat operations allow the friendly force to quickly dictate the tempo of operations. Commitment of relatively few ground combat units, empowered with overwhelming precision joint fires, ensures rapid maneuver and enables the force to induce the simultaneous and catastrophic collapse of both the enemy force and national leadership. Conflict termination occurs quickly – almost unpredictably – as both the opposing military force and national leadership flee for survival. The simultaneous collapse of the regime and its military forces also means an abrupt halt in internal security, emergency services, public services, and transportation infrastructure. Consequently, rapid decisive operations leave a power vacuum in oppressive regimes where internal security, economic, social, and political structures are already fragile after years of neglect.¹⁹

These characteristics of RDO exacerbate setting the conditions for conflict resolution in a number of ways. First, the rapid deployment of military force in response to crisis, immediate initiation of hostilities, and swift termination of conflict simply outpace the ability of United States and the international community to generate the capacity for post-conflict nation building. This makes the ground combat forces wholly responsible for filling the security and public service vacuum left by the catastrophic collapse of the regime. But a ground force optimized for RDO does not have the depth or breadth of capabilities required to fill a vacuum of the magnitude and complexity left by catastrophic collapse. Operations must take a 'strategic pause' while vital post conflict nation-building capabilities are mustered, deployed, and employed using military

and other instruments of power. Each passing day spent in this “strategic pause,” brings a heightened risk of internal security disintegrating, rampant lawlessness emerging, and the support of the ‘newly liberated’ populace waning as they fail to experience any improvement in their human condition. The impending internal deterioration affords non-state actors in opposition to the emergence of a free society with the tinderbox needed to ignite a liberation insurgency.

RDO is here to stay as the framework for conducting combat operations and terminating conflict. But, rapid decisive operations are only one component of the broader range of campaign qualities needed in the Army to conduct military interventions intended to liberate failing nation states, change the conditions that prompted conflict, and promote democracy.²⁰ In today’s security environment, the ability to promptly mitigate the adverse symptoms of rapid decisive operations is essential to achieving an enduring victory. It demands a military instrument with a force capacity to execute transparent and swift transitions from RDO to stability operations.

The challenges of modern warfare and modern political objectives demands an Army specifically designed to win battles and stabilize regions. Change depends on a fundamental shift in the military mindset -- one that genuinely considers stability operations as mission essential. More importantly, it relies on committing the resources necessary to build a viable capacity for stability operations on equal par with rapid decisive operations.

THE WINDS OF CHANGE BEGIN TO BLOW

The gap in national capacity to promote the emergence of a democratic regime in the aftermath of war has not gone unnoticed. Each instrument of power seems to be answering the call to close the gap. The Department of State has established an Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to lead and coordinate U.S. Government efforts to “stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”²¹ The U.S. Congress has recently proposed a wide range of initiatives aimed at synchronizing National Security Council and State Department efforts, creating a corps of permanent civilian employees that could respond to post conflict stability operations, and the creation of stability and reconstruction training facilities. The Bush Administration also recently proposed the Global Peace Operations Initiative, a \$661 million program, to assist other nations to train and equip military forces to participate in coalition stability operations.²²

Perhaps the most striking wind of change has come from within the Department of Defense – once the mainstay of opposition to committing military forces to stability operations. Spurred by recommendations of the Defense Science Board, the Secretary of Defense recently prepared a draft Department of Defense Directive directing the Services to reshape forces to provide a more robust stabilization and reconstruction capability.²³ More specifically, it directs the Army and Navy to lead the effort in organizing, training, and equipping Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Component forces to provide the range of combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities needed during transitions to and from hostilities. The directive also instructs the Commanders of Regional Combatant Commands to give primary responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction operations to their Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander.²⁴

Change is also evident in recent revisions of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (SOJOC). The SOJOC identifies two prime purposes of stability operations: to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of combat operations and to create favorable conditions for post conflict reconstruction and long-term success of the United States.²⁵ The joint concept establishes the importance of conducting stability operations concurrent with and immediately following major combat operations with emphasis on their inherent interdependence. During major combat operations, stability operations are essential to facilitating the forward momentum of combat operations. Immediately following conflict, stability operations ensure armed conflict does not re-emerge in the vacuum left by combat operations and enables other instruments of power to surmount the underlying conditions that led to conflict in the first place.²⁶ The SOJOC underscores the important role military forces have in establishing a safe and secure environment, providing essential social services, rebuilding critical infrastructure, and providing humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local civil governance.²⁷ The joint concept is founded on the premise that a successful marriage between combat operations and stability operations is so vital to the achieving national objectives in military conflict that it must be a core mission of U.S. military forces.²⁸ In fact, the joint doctrine suggests that, out to the year 2015, the most likely context for the employment of military forces to conduct stability operations is the aftermath of armed conflict to defeat transnational actors or errant regimes.²⁹

UNDERSTANDING STABILIZATION VERSUS RECONSTRUCTION

Precise use of terminology is always problematic when discussing the development of new capabilities. The recent proliferation of military thinking about post conflict operations is no exception. Two of the most widely used terms to describe the suite of new capabilities a land

force must possess are *stabilization* and *reconstruction*. Sometimes these terms are used interchangeably.³⁰ Other times they are used in conjunction with one another to describe a single capability (e.g. stability and reconstruction capability.) While current Joint doctrine does not define either term, the Department of Defense Directive instructing the Military Departments to develop 'stability and reconstruction' provides some useful definitions and distinctions.³¹ Stabilization is defined as the effort "to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter."³² Reconstruction, on the other hand, is the effort "to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people."³³ Hence, both stability and reconstruction are essential components of the larger purpose of stability operations to "maintain or reestablish order and promote stability."³⁴ But, they are also distinctly different efforts involving different tasks, performed by different organizations, at different operational levels.

As defined above, stabilization efforts are most closely tied to mitigating the adverse effects that rapid decisive operations have on security, populace, and critical infrastructure at the tactical level. The chief aim is two fold: provide immediate human relief, and ward off the conditions that can fuel an insurgency. Stabilization demands synchronizing activities with combat operations and integrating a wide range of capabilities throughout the battlespace – particularly immediately following major engagements in urban areas. For these reasons, military forces under military control are the most suitable agents for stabilization.

Stabilization sets the conditions for reconstruction where the chief aim is fostering the emergence of a new member of the global community. Reconstruction represents a shift towards rebuilding local and national institutions that provide legitimate governance, economic growth, national public welfare, and rule of law. As such, reconstruction is the primary domain of civilian agencies within government, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

While stabilization and reconstruction are distinctly different efforts, they overlap in both time and space and are equally interdependent. Stabilization must be successful in order for reconstruction to begin. Furthermore, stabilization efforts continue during the course of reconstruction by providing steadfast improvements in security, human condition, and infrastructure to facilitate extending the reconstruction operation throughout the battlespace. Consequently, the focus and intensity of stabilization efforts will vary at times and in different locations, but its purpose remains fixed on setting the conditions for reconstruction. Finally, only successful reconstruction ultimately terminates the stabilization effort and resolves the conflict.

A CLOSER LOOK AT STABILIZATION

While all instruments of international power contribute to stabilization, the burden to generate the necessary capabilities, prioritize resources, and integrate their execution on the battlefield falls squarely upon the land force. The *de facto* presence of military forces combined with their unique ability to operate in crisis environments under extreme conditions makes them the force of choice.³⁵ In the new American way of war, the success or failure of combat operations increasingly depends on the ability of land forces to overcome the gap between combat operations and reconstruction.³⁶ History confirms a direct correlation between the size of military presence during post conflict stabilization and reconstruction and the likelihood that favorable long-term conflict resolution is achieved.³⁷ Given that successful reconstruction of a nation state typically takes 4 years or longer, success depends on a land force with the capacity for protracted stabilization and a nation willing to commit its forces for the duration.³⁸

Stabilization requires the land force generate capabilities in four critical task areas to fill the void left by rapid decisive operations and set the conditions for reconstruction by other national and international instruments. These areas are: sustain the populace, repair critical infrastructure, provide internal and external security, and synchronize transitions and turn-overs (Figure 4).³⁹ First, the land force must have the capability to provide internal and external security as necessary to establish and maintain a foothold for all other stabilization activities to occur. This requires combat forces to defeat or destroy all internal or external elements that continue to oppose the emergence of a new society or that would promote anarchy after conflict termination. Security also involves imposing civil law and order by employing military police units working in lieu of or reinforcing indigenous police organizations.




FIGURE 4. FOUR BROAD TASK AREAS OF STABILIZATION

A second critical task is rapidly improving and sustaining the welfare of the populace in the wake of combat. Initially, the land force must focus on providing the local populace with emergency medical support and sustainment (food and water) in order to immediately improve the human condition. However, sustaining the populace over the course of stabilization may require the land force to quickly expand the scope of assistance beyond rudimentary life support. Providing preventive medicine, school restoration, supply distribution, refugee control, and reopening local markets are all vitally important to sustaining the populace in the interim, while reconstruction capacity continues to build. Expanding populace sustainment activities provides visible signs of progress key to maintaining indigenous support.

Third, rapid repair and protection of critical infrastructure are essential on a number of levels. These efforts improve the mobility of the populace, enable the work force to return to jobs, and facilitate the return of commerce – all highly visible signs of progress that set the conditions for the emergence of a new social and political order. Repairing critical infrastructure is also essential to ensuring effective, sustained, and uninterrupted military operations – particularly intra-theater mobility. Urban rubble clearance, road repair, bridging, airfield repair, ordinance disposal, water/natural gas pipeline repair, electrical power generation, and waste management are among the myriad of critical tasks the land force must accomplish in short order.

Finally, the land force must have the command and control capacity to handle the complexity of conducting stabilization in concert with combat operations and master rapid and smooth transitions with diverse outside agencies. Land force headquarters and staffs must have the depth and breadth of experience to anticipate and effectively control the transition from combat operations to stabilization operations at the tactical and operational level. These transitions will be erratic across the battlespace progressing more rapidly in some areas than others and requiring different combinations of capabilities to provide security, sustain the populace, and repair infrastructure. Foreseeing and controlling the transition from stabilization to reconstruction is equally important. As governmental and non-governmental organizations build reconstruction capacity within the host-state or region, the dependence on unique military capabilities lessens.

Understanding each of the four tasks involved in stabilization is essential to understanding what capabilities the Army must provide to mitigate the effects of rapid decisive operation and achieve the enduring results demanded by U.S. strategy. But, there is a missing component – a

coherent operational concept for how stabilization capabilities function in concert with rapid decisive operations as part of future campaigns. That concept is 'progressive stabilization.'

PROGRESSIVE STABILIZATION CONCEPT: THE MISSING LINK

Winning the Nation's future wars not only requires a land force that fully attains the Army's vision of 'an expeditionary force with campaign qualities,' but also expands that vision to include stabilization.⁴⁰ It obliges the Army to broaden the context of an expeditionary force to include the generation, employment, and integration of a more dynamic array of stabilization capabilities in ways that are complementary to rapid decisive operations. Overcoming this new challenge means the Army must retool how it employs forces to achieve the right balance of capabilities. Progressive stabilization provides a conceptual framework for fully integrating stabilization efforts with combat operations and defines a path forward for force modernization decisions. Progressive stabilization is founded on two principles: 1) early integration of emergency stabilization efforts into combat operations at the lower tactical level and 2) rapid expansion of stabilization efforts to exploit success and set the conditions for reconstruction.⁴¹

Integration of stabilization efforts at the outset of combat is vital to success.⁴² The initial aim of progressive stabilization is to mitigate the effects of combat on the populace and counter conditions that, if ignored, could ignite or support a liberation insurgency. To that end, the land force must be capable of infusing highly flexible stabilization force packages directly into forward brigade combat teams (BCTs) when and where combat allows. These stabilization force packages include a tailored mix of combat, combat support, and service support units under singular command and control – usually a battalion or task force -- provided to the BCT in either a command or support relationship. The mix and size of units assigned to a stabilization task force may vary, but the focus remains on providing forward brigades with an initial capacity to provide emergency relief to the populace and begin initial repair of the most critical infrastructure. Stabilization task forces may contain some specialized security force capabilities, but will rely most heavily upon the BCT to set security conditions. The intent is to provide forward Brigade Commanders with the ability to exercise mission command for initial stabilization efforts through a single subordinate and, thereby, maintain the freedom of action of organic combat battalions.

Rapid expansion of the stabilization effort in both scope and geographical area are paramount to exploiting the success of initial stabilization efforts and the larger combat operation. Generating larger brigade-sized units capable of accepting 'stabilization hand over' from the forward BCTs is vitally important. It enables the land force commander to preserve the

freedom of action of the combat force and becomes the principle mechanism for expanding the stabilization effort to set conditions for reconstruction. After hand-over, multi-functional stabilization brigades provide mission command over all stabilization efforts within an assigned area and focus on expanding both the scope of support to the populace and repair of infrastructure. These stabilization brigades must also include some combat security forces. However, their focus is on maintaining internal security and law enforcement at the local level. Consequently, the stabilization brigade will command a wide and ever-changing array of forces –to accomplish all four critical task areas.

The stabilization brigade enhances the land force commander's mission command over stabilization efforts that are essential to unity of effort, particularly during transitions at the tactical level. A major function of the stabilization brigade is ensuring that stabilization efforts expand in ways that are responsive to, and synchronized with, the combat operations of forward BCTs. For example, a stabilization brigade's area of responsibility may increase or decrease in direct response to the needs of forward combat brigades. Priorities for infrastructure repair are equally driven by requirement to support current and future combat operations as well as stabilization. Similarly, decisions on the flow and bed-down of displaced persons must support the combat operation. Unlike BCTs whose assigned sector shifts to facilitate a position of advantage against enemy forces, the stabilization brigade's area of operation remains generally fixed relative to the geography of demographics and infrastructure to facilitate establishing a rapport with the people and ensuring a smooth transition to reconstruction. While the chief aim of the stabilization brigade is expanding the scope of the stabilization effort, it must do so in a manner that both supports the forward BCTs and sets the conditions for long-term turnover to reconstruction organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY'S FUTURE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Future warfare requires an expeditionary Army with some new campaign qualities inherent in its organizational design. Figure 5 graphically illustrates a likely template for future campaigns where rapid decisive operations and progressive stabilization are complementary concepts. The expeditionary land force (Army and Marines) must rapidly generate the capability to provide land dominance during rapid decisive operations (blue line). But concurrent with the prosecution of combat operations, the land force must simultaneously build and employ capabilities to conduct stabilization operations (green line) throughout the remainder of the campaign. This construct underscores three expeditionary force qualities that the Army must move to achieve as it transforms the force.

First, the ability to initiate stabilization from the outset as an inherent part of combat operations demands a ready force pool of stabilization capabilities in the active force designed for rapid employment and integration into major combat operations (Figure 5 ①). The Army must have a robust force pool comprised of *modular* and *scalable* combat support and service support units that can be rapidly tailored under multifunctional battalion and brigade headquarters and integrated into operations as coherent force packages. Modularity ensures the correct combinations can be achieved; scalability ensures the force can be right sized for the specific mission. This facilitates the formation of stabilization task forces that can integrate directly into committed BCTs during the initial phase of combat operations to initiate stabilization efforts. As major combat operations mature and the stabilization effort grow, the force pool must be capable of generating larger stabilization brigades that are able to assume stabilization responsibility for larger areas to allow BCTs to continue combat operations or redeploy. Creating a modular, scalable, and modernized pool of stabilization capabilities in the active force is essential and represents the most 'bang for buck' in better preparing the Army for future warfare.




FIGURE 5. FUTURE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE REQUIREMENT FRAMEWORK

The need to simultaneously generate forces for RDO and progressive stabilization underscores the importance of a second defining attribute of future expeditionary operations – surge capacity for a wider and larger array of forces (Figure 5 ②). The Army must have a more

balanced surge capacity to generate the aggregate requirements for both RDO and progressive stabilization (red line). The issue centers on the capacity to surge the requisite combat support and service support units for stabilization in addition to those needed for RDO. Historically, the Army has minimized the amount of combat support and service support in the active force to the minimum required to support its basic combat formations. In the new force, the term 'early deployers' must encompass those capabilities needed to generate both a rapid decisive combat force and a progressive stabilization force. The Army must reconsider its previous force structure decisions and adjust the mix of combat, combat support and service support within the active force structure to fully satisfy the balanced surge requirement.

Finally, a distinguishing feature of future land campaigns is the relatively short duration of major combat operations (several months) compared to stabilization operations (three to four years or more.)⁴³ Campaign 'staying power' becomes a premier attribute of an expeditionary Army force structure, but is defined by protracted stabilization vice protracted combat operations. Consequently, a greater portion of the Army's active force and almost all of the reserve component must be organized, trained, equipped, and managed specifically to generate stabilization-oriented force packages (Figure 5 ③). This new dynamic has a profound effect on the overall force mix. To achieve a viable expeditionary force structure, the Army will have to increase the relative proportion of stabilization capability within the active force to reduce its complete dependency on the reserve component during protracted operations. Additionally, the reserve component will have to entirely reorient its force structure design to make generating stabilization force packages its central purpose.

Army Transformation must generate an expeditionary Army with the campaign qualities recommended above. The U.S. National Security Strategy demands the means to win decisively and achieve enduring results that eliminate the underlying conditions that promote conflict. For the military instrument, the emphasis on achieving enduring results extends military campaign objectives beyond conflict termination to include setting the conditions for conflict resolution. This fundamentally redefines the scope of an expeditionary land force and demands it broaden its core capabilities. Future victory depends on a land force equally adept at prosecuting rapid decisive operations and conducting progressive stabilization to mitigate the effects of combat and bridge the gap to reconstruction. Achieving that vision demands confronting tough choices in altering the present course of Army Transformation. Ignoring the challenge is to discount the need for real Army Transformation in the first place.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2003), 121-124. This concept is borrowed from Thomas P. M. Barnett's description of the new security environment as globalization's creation of a 'Functioning Core' and 'Disconnected Gap.'

² Ibid., 88-89.

³ Robert C. Orr, *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Strategic International Studies, July 2004), 9.

⁴ Barnett, 43-48.

⁵ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

⁶ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*, (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 2004), 4-6. This is summarization of the four challenges of the new security environment as outlined in the National Military Strategy. Judgments on whether they are the 'most likely' or the 'most dangerous' threats is derived from the speeches of a number of senior speakers from the Department of Defense participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series, U.S. Army War College, 2004-2005.

⁷ Bush. This is a summary of the strategic objectives and concepts outlined throughout the 2002 National Security Strategy.

⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Post Conflict Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 May 2004), 2.

⁹ Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," *Policy Review* 120 (August/September 2003): 17.

¹⁰ Myers, 12-13 and 18-19. This broad statement of the required force capabilities is summarized from the characterization of operations designed to 'swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary' or 'win decisively' in the National Military Strategy.

¹¹ Kagan, 7. The Army's specific modernization efforts focused on the development of precision, longer-range weapons and information technologies that would network unit formations together and provide enhanced situation awareness.

¹² James J. Anthony and Max G. Manwaring, eds., *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 8-15.

¹³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations -- White Paper Version 2.0*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2002), 4.

¹⁴ Ibid., 16.

¹⁵ Ibid., 21.

¹⁶ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004), xiv – xv.

¹⁷ Ibid., xiv. This figure is based on a similar figure contained in the executive summary entitled “Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions,”

¹⁸ Ibid., xv. This figure is also based on a similar figure contained in the executive summary entitled “New Challenges: Preemption and RDO,”

¹⁹ Ibid., 15-17.

²⁰ Department of the Army, *United States Army Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004), 7.

²¹ Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction; “About S/CRS,” available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm>>; Internet: accessed 13 March 2005.

²² Nina M. Sefarino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 2004), 7-8.

²³ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities,” Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.cc, Washington, D.C., 8 October 2004, 8.

²⁴ Ibid., 9.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2004), iii.

²⁶ Ibid., 22 – 27.

²⁷ Ibid., 10.

²⁸ Ibid., 16.

²⁹ Ibid., 1-2.

³⁰ Binnendijk. For example, the recent work done by the Center for Technology and National Policy at the National Defense University uses the term ‘stabilization and reconstruction’ as a single entity (e.g. S&R missions, S&R units, and S&R Commands).

³¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (As Amended Through 30 November 2004)*, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001). Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, is the central source for all ‘official terms,’ but it does not provide a definition for either stabilization or reconstruction.

³² Rumsfeld, 2.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept*, 2.

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Revision First Draft) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 September 2004), IV-34 to 36.

³⁶ Binnendijk, xv.

³⁷ James F. Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq," *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003): 90-94.

³⁸ Ibid., 104.

³⁹ Binnendijk, 22-23. The first three of the critical stabilization tasks directly correlate to those developed in Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson's work. The fourth task to 'synchronize transitions and turn-overs' is derived from their discussions on the important role of stabilization headquarters.

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, *United States Army Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004), 4-5. The description of an 'expeditionary force with campaign qualities' is chosen carefully to reflect the how these terms are used to frame the Army's vision for the future force.

⁴¹ Karl C. Rohr, "Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation Building and Stability Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette* 88, (April 2004): 48-51. The concept of progressive stabilization is an adaptation from Major Karl C. Rohr's work on a concept called 'Progressive Reconstruction.' This paper uses the term 'progressive stabilization' for consistency with the Department of Defense's definition.

⁴² Binnendijk, 27-28.

⁴³ Dobbins, 94.

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