

**PROSPECTS FOR A  
CONVENTIONAL ARMS  
REDUCTION TREATY AND  
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
MEASURES IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

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## FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-fourth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). In addition to supporting research toward immediately applying the results to contemporary policy issues, INSS seeks to encourage bright young researchers to think outside of the inbox and project new ideas into the future. This is just such an effort. In this paper, Bonnie Jenkins looks at creating an infrastructure within which to address Northeast Asian security issues and against which to begin the process of regional arms control. Of significance, the paper addresses some of the barriers to be encountered in attempting to superimpose structures and norms developed for Europe upon this very different region of the world. This is instructive for similar efforts in other regions as well. Also significant is the paper's emphasis more on the process of arms control than on any one particular product, particularly while regional mechanisms and trust are still being built. This paper is also timely, as the summitry process begins between the Koreas, and as it draws in the other regional actors at least at the margins. It is a paper that presents both ideas and ideals worth considering.

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JAMES M. SMITH  
Director

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Background and Initial Ideas**

The first of two goals undertaken in the research for this paper is to explore the possibility of establishing in the Northeast Asian region a conventional arms control treaty negotiation leading to an agreement similar to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). It is presumed a reduction in conventional forces will promote stability in the region similar to what has occurred in Europe. The second goal undertaken in this research is to determine the prospects for establishing a Northeast Asian Security Forum similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This body would promote transparency and confidence in Northeast Asia similar to what the OSCE has been able to achieve in Europe.

The process by which these proposals would take place would be two fold. The arms control path would begin between North and South Korea. Only after the two Koreas have negotiated such an agreement would it be extended to other states in the region. The reason for this process is that it is important to first reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The potential for conventional and sudden conflict in the region exists predominantly on the Peninsula. The two Koreas have already acknowledged the need for a reduction in conventional weapons and have established the basis for this type of agreement in their 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North. A second process, a Northeast Asian Security Forum, could be established immediately and would include all states of the Northeast Asian region. This forum would focus on establishing confidence and security-building measures dedicated to military transparency.

## **Results of Research**

My research has determined that there exists a great deal of trepidation to the prospect of establishing a Northeast Asian Security Forum that would discuss confidence-building measures. There is also reluctance to the prospect of a conventional arms control treaty, either on the Peninsula or in the region. The vast majority of individuals I spoke with in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and experts at research centers in Hawaii shared this feeling.

There were a number of reasons given for this reluctance. Those who did agree to the necessity of a regional forum highlighted the importance of keeping bilateral relations paramount, while the multilateral forum (to be established sometime in the “indefinite future”) would be complementary to existing bilateral relationships. Some wanted to let the Four Party Talks play out before trying to establish new forums. Some wanted to see if the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) could serve as the site for a new Northeast Asian Forum and were reluctant to establish a separate forum (which I prefer). Some were not comfortable with the prospect of reducing arms since there was not enough trust in the region that other states (particularly North Korea) would similarly reduce their arms or be willing to be adequately verified through on-site inspections. Others pointed out the differences that exist in Europe and Asia, and doubted whether the CFE Treaty and the OSCE could serve as an adequate example. If there were to be a conventional treaty and a regional forum in Northeast Asia, they would have to reflect the particular peculiarities of the region.

However, underneath the objections to a conventional forces treaty and a security forum in the region, I felt there lay the general feeling that most would support such a forum if the regional situation was conducive to such proposals (for example, if there existed more trust and confidence among the states). They did recognize the positive

results a security forum, and reduction in arms, could have for the Peninsula and the region. Therefore, a certain degree of trust must exist *prior* to these states working to reduce regional tension.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that everyone does not share this feeling. South Korean, Japan and Russian officials have all in the past expressed interest in a Six Party Talk (which would include these three states and the U.S., China and North Korea).

## ***Prospects for a Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty and Confidence-Building Measures in Northeast Asia***

Cold-war sentiments still linger in the [Northeast Asian] region there remain many uncertainties. There are unsettled territorial disputes, regional rivalries, military imbalances, arms race, trade conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including the North Korean nuclear weapon and missile program, deep-rooted mistrust and animosity toward neighboring countries, and isolation of North Korea the existing bi-lateral relations in the region are not capable of resolving the diverse conflicts of the new post-cold-war environment; there is no multi-lateral regional security mechanism to deal with the conflicts that threaten regional security; furthermore, the perspective of regional arms control is not bright.<sup>1</sup>

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Initial Goals of the Research**

The first of two goals undertaken in the research for this paper is to explore the possibility of establishing in the Northeast Asian region a conventional arms control treaty negotiation leading to an agreement similar to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). It is presumed that a reduction in conventional forces by both North and South Korea will eliminate disparities in conventional weapons between the two, reduce the capability for launching surprise attack, and thereby promote stability in the Northeast Asian (NEA) region similar to what has occurred in Europe among the States Parties to the CFE Treaty.<sup>2</sup> The second goal undertaken in this research is to determine the prospects for establishing a Northeast Asian Security Forum, similar to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). A NEA Security forum would promote transparency and confidence in Northeast Asia similar to what the OSCE has developed in Europe through the establishment of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The process by which these two goals would be accomplished in Northeast Asia is two fold. The conventional arms control treaty would be between North and South Korea. Only after the two Koreas have negotiated such an agreement would it be extended to other states in the region. The reason for this process is that it is important to first reduce military tensions on the Korean Peninsula since it is the most volatile area in the region. The potential for conventional and sudden conflict in the region exists predominantly on the Peninsula. The two Koreas have already acknowledged the need for conventional arms reduction on the Peninsula as reflected in their 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (Basic Agreement). The Basic Agreement includes principles for the reduction in conventional weapons on the Peninsula. Unfortunately, the Basic Agreement has not been implemented by the two states. A second process, the establishment of a Northeast Asian Security Forum, could begin immediately and would include all states of the Northeast Asian region and a number of other states detailed later in this paper. This forum would focus on developing confidence and security-building measures dedicated to military transparency.

After conducting a number of interviews, my research determined that there exists a great deal of trepidation to the prospect of establishing a Northeast Asian Security Forum that would discuss confidence-building measures. There is also reluctance to the prospect of a conventional arms control treaty, either on the Peninsula or in the region. The majority of individuals I spoke with in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and experts at research centers in Hawaii shared this feeling. Most acknowledged that it is premature at this point to discuss arms control measures, and there was a resounding reluctance to reduce

current bilateral arrangements to any type of multilateral forum. However, there was a minority who was positive about establishing a Northeast Asian Forum sooner rather than later.

There were a number of other reasons given for the reluctance of many individuals to the two proposals. Some wanted to let the Four Party Talks play out before trying to establish new forums. Some wanted to see if the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) could serve as the site for a new Northeast Asian Forum, and they were reluctant to establish a separate forum. Some were not comfortable with the prospect of reducing arms since there was not enough trust in the region that other states (particularly North Korea) would similarly reduce their arms, or would be willing to agree to on-site inspections on their territory.<sup>3</sup> Others pointed out the differences that exist in Europe and Asia, and doubted whether the CFE Treaty and the OSCE could serve as adequate examples. They noted that, logically, if there were to be a conventional treaty and a regional forum in Northeast Asia, they would have to reflect the particular peculiarities of the region.

However, underneath the objections to a conventional forces treaty and a security forum in the region, I felt that generally most would support such a forum and conventional arms reduction if the regional situation was conducive to such proposals (for example, if there existed more trust and confidence among the states). They did recognize the positive results a security forum, and reduction in arms, could have for the Peninsula and the region. Therefore, a certain degree of trust must exist *prior* to these states working to reduce regional tension and *prior* to the establishment of a forum dedicated to increasing trust and confidence in the region.<sup>4</sup>

### **Organization of the Paper**

The paper is presented in four sections. The first contains a review of some considerations for a future NEA multilateral forum, and it reviews the proposal for conventional arms reduction and CSBMs in the NEA region. The second section highlights some ongoing activity currently promoting confidence and trust in the region. These activities serve as possible foundations for future activity that would promote confidence and trust among the Northeast Asian states. The third section explores some possible options for building openness and trust among states in the region that would one day provide a basis for a regional security forum. The Northeast Asian states could meet in a forum that would not be a “security forum,” but one that focuses on other areas of interest.<sup>5</sup> This “interim” multilateral Forum would transition to a Northeast Asian Security Forum (NEASF) once the states, through this “interim” Forum, have developed the necessary trust and confidence to engage in a security dialogue. The fourth section is the most ambitious. It describes a proposed Northeast Asia Security Forum including the participating states and organizations. In addition to the participants, it outlines a number of working groups subordinate to the Forum that would report to the Forum. Some of the working groups would be more autonomous than others, but they would all report in some way to the Forum to maintain important coordination in Northeast Asian security activities. Finally, there is a brief discussion of the recent White House decision to ease some sanctions on North Korea with the understanding that North Korea would not test long-range missiles of any kind as the US and North Korea work towards normalizing relations and possible next steps. A complaint I heard quite often during my interviews was US noncompliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework (one of the

obligations in the Agreed Framework is that both the US and North Korea will move toward full normalization of both political and economic relations). Normalizing relations is an important step towards North Korean participation in a multilateral forum. The move to normalization will spur interest in Japan and South Korea (ROK) in also normalizing relations with North Korea.

The summary below simplifies the points I make in the paper:

*Original proposal:* A NEA Security Forum focusing on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures to reduce tensions while building trust and confidence, and promoting stability in the region.

*Proposal after conducting interviews:* Due to lack of political will to negotiate a conventional arms control treaty and to establish a multilateral security forum, the states should do the following to achieve the same goal: 1) establish an “interim” forum focusing on non-security issues (transnational crime, environmental issues, etc.), to build the trust needed to engage in arms control and confidence-building measures prior to the mid-term step of; 2) establish a NEA Security Forum focusing on conventional arms reductions control and confidence- and security-building measures; to 3) in the long term reduce tensions while building trust and confidence, and promoting stability in the region.

## **NORTHEAST ASIA AND A CONVENTIONAL FORCES TREATY**

We begin with a discussion of some advantages for states in the NEA region for a conventional forces treaty (first negotiated on the Peninsula) and military confidence and security building measures. This includes some of the problems regarding the establishment and promotion of these ideas.

### **Why a Multilateral Forum?**

In no other region of the world are institutions as extensive and as well-developed as those in Europe. Consequently, Western policymakers trumpet the importance of creating webs of overlapping institutions outside of Europe. Special

emphasis is placed on Asia, where there are only a few weak institutions, and where fear of Japan, coupled with the rise of China and the prospect of a further reduction in the American presence, has observers worried about future stability in the region.<sup>6</sup>

A Northeast Asian multilateral regime could promote peace in the NEA region. The ROK, Japan, and Russia have expressed an interest in multilateral discussions to address security issues in the form of Six Party Talks. China and the US, though not advocating a multilateral forum of that type, participate in the Four Party Talks and have proposed, along with the ROK, ideas that would enhance trust and promote confidence-building between the two Koreas.

Extensive precedence for the benefits of multilateral regimes in promoting regional peace and stability can be found in Europe. Multilateral regimes and organizations, like the OSCE and the European Union, have pervaded and existed for many years on the European continent. These regimes and organizations increase interaction among regional states, provide forums for discussions at different levels of state representatives, and promote interdependence of issues among the states (who are then more reluctant to cheat in one issue area in fear of retaliation on another area). There is increased information available to the states about a state's domestic and international security and non-security policies and activities, which in turn promotes confidence. Possible agreement also exists among parties that may affect all parties, as opposed to a series of separate bilateral agreements that can possibly overlap or contradict similar agreements of other states in the region.

There are, of course, many differences between Asia and Europe that must be taken note of in using European models for a NEA

multilateral forum. These include differences in economic development and political development.

Achievements in Europe and elsewhere have been made possible not so much by sheer approaches towards them having been well taken as by the fact that more fundamental backgrounds—in terms of security interests of states involved, political, economic, historical or cultural and infrastructure, necessary for such achievements—had existed in the first instance and were then suitably ripening. In Northeast Asia, the infrastructure in this sense is sadly, barely present.<sup>7</sup>

Other reasons put forth for the inability of NEA states to develop a multilateral forum include the fact that countries in the region have no common threats or enemies; potential conflict on pending issues are both too complicated and diverse; and there still exists distrust and animosity among the countries as the result of past experiences.<sup>8</sup>

In light of the reluctance of NEA states to engage in a NEA security dialogue, the states in the region should work to promote a dialogue among themselves that would provide a *basis* upon which a Northeast Asian Security Forum (NEASF) can emerge. This mechanism would be an “interim” forum that would provide an opportunity for these states to discuss issues of a non-security nature that are of common interest. This “interim” NEA multilateral forum could focus on the following type of non-security issues: the environment; economic cooperation; and transnational crime.

Upon the establishment of the NEASF, the forum would continue to address non-security issues as well as security issues so there can be an approach to NEA security that takes into account related non-security issues. This broader scope would also allow Japan to continue to play an integral role. The forum must have Japan as a

participant to be truly representative of the region. However, some states in the forum may feel uncomfortable with Japan participating in purely security-related discussions. By not limiting the issues to security, Japan can contribute to forum discussions regarding aid, investment, etc. In addition, a major task for this forum would be the eventual drafting and agreement on security confidence-building measures to be accomplished in one of the Forum's Working Groups.

Both the "interim" NEA Multilateral Forum and the later NEASF would have as its participants all the states in the region, the US, Canada and representatives from KEDO (only in the Northeast Asian Security Forum), ASEAN and the EU, represented at these NEA Security talks.

### **Conventional Arms Control on the Peninsula and Northeast Asia**

North Korea is strengthening war preparations through modernizing military equipment, increasing its capability to wage surprise attacks, forward deploying its troops and equipment, and arousing a spirit for war, thus posing a serious military threat to South Korean security.... North Korea's military strategy is a quick strike to sweep the entire peninsula, emphasizing a preemptive surprise by launching simultaneous attacks on the front and the rear lines in the early stages of war.... North Korea would plunge deeply into South Korea before the additional deployment of US troops.<sup>9</sup>

A reduction in conventional weapons on the Korean Peninsula surrounding the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) would have the positive effect of reducing tensions. Any regional conventional force reduction should originate on the Peninsula and then, where possible, encompass the region.

There are two outstanding reasons why conventional arms control would be advantageous on the Peninsula:

1. the immediate interest of reducing tension on one of the world's most volatile areas and promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula;
2. a positive step towards the long-term goal of bringing North Korea and South Korea together into a reunified state.

The CFE Treaty serves as an example of what can be achieved on the Peninsula and in the NEA region through the reduction of conventional arms. The CFE was signed in November 1990 by 22 states, divided between NATO and the group of six (the USSR and the then five remaining former Warsaw Pact states). It has undergone changes to accommodate the break-up of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, and has undergone adaptation to accommodate the change in NATO membership, among other things. The CFE Treaty is noted as the “cornerstone of European security and stability” since it has improved military transparency and predictability, which opens the way to further arms control.<sup>10</sup> The CFE has three objectives. These objectives, noted below, are appropriate for reducing tensions on the Peninsula:

1. Promote security and stability through verifiable lower levels of conventional armed forces;
2. Eliminate disparities prejudicial to this objective; and
3. Reduce the capability for launching surprise attack initiating large-scale offensives.

The core components of the Treaty are also important and are as follows:

1. phased national reductions of treaty-limited equipment (for the CFE, that period was for three years, 1992 – 1995);
2. limits on specified military equipment within the area of Europe covered by the Treaty;

3. detailed national data exchanges and notifications on force structure, and equipment holdings; and
4. on-site inspections. These were intrusive, short-notice on-site inspection.

The Treaty sets equal ceilings on conventional weapons that are essential for conducting a surprise attack. The types of equipment limited include specified types of armored combat vehicles, tanks, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. According to CFE obligations, to meet the Treaty's limits, each state party to the Treaty must destroy specified numbers of such equipment or convert them to non-military purposes. This resulted in the reduction of over 48,000 pieces of equipment. The Treaty also provides for detailed procedures for the destruction of treaty-limited equipment. Parties have the right to monitor the process of destruction without quota limits. More than 3000 on-site inspections have been undertaken under the CFE regime.

Also of importance is the establishment in the CFE Treaty of a multilateral forum consisting of representatives of all the State Parties to the treaty with the responsibility for resolving and addressing outstanding implementation issues, including other responsibilities. This forum is the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which meets regularly in Vienna, Austria.

*Reasons Given for Reluctance to Promote a CFE Treaty on the Peninsula.* Despite the possible advantages of conventional weapons reduction on the Peninsula, such an agreement is not believed by those interviewed to be appropriate or workable at this time. Many believe that other issues must be addressed first, particularly those highlighted in the Confidence for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE, which is the predecessor of the OSCE) agreed documents. This refers to the CSCE "three Baskets" that address multilateral

regional progress in three subject areas: Basket One promotes security in Europe, including principles guiding relations among participating states and confidence-building measures; Basket Two promotes cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology, and the environment; and Basket Three promotes cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. The viewpoint therefore is that Basket One can only be achieved after the other two Baskets are achieved or progress made towards these two. In addition, others noted that at present, the states in the region are interested in build-up and modernizing their conventional weapons, not in reducing such weapons; they believe their security requires such build-up.

The DPRK recognizes that one of its assets is its conventional weapons and forward-deployed troops. It recognizes how threatening to the ROK is its artillery, which is dug into the DMZ. They have studied for years how to deal with a first strike against them, and how to conduct a first strike. These advantages are bargaining chips they would want to use at the right time.<sup>11</sup> They know most of their leverage is in bombarding Seoul with artillery. If the DPRK withdraws this threat of war, there will remain little leverage for it to use at a later date.

The DPRK views arms control as concessions they'd be making for the US and others in the region. They are aware the US is fearful of war and casualties that would be suffered as the result of a war on the Peninsula. However, they are also concerned about their own security. As long as they keep their artillery within range of Seoul, they are able to inflict danger quickly in case war does occur and they don't feel as threatened. The DPRK will do what it can to survive and will not agree to any proposal they believe goes against that objective.<sup>12</sup>

One interviewee noted, however, that the North Koreans believe that promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula through an arms control agreement is equivalent to depriving the SK government of its reason for being and its “mantle of legitimacy.”

Extensive arms control would subsequently dismantle the ROK regime, establish a democratic government in its place, rehabilitate those arrested, imprisoned or executed on charges of violating the National Security Law with proper compensation offered to them, and most significantly, rob the US of whatever pretext to maintain their armed forces in South Korea.<sup>13</sup>

### **Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Northeast Asia**

The CSBMs referred to in this paper that can be used as a model upon which NEA states can develop their own CSBMs are those adopted by the CSCE. On September 19, 1986, the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) reached agreement on CSBMs designed to increase openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. The principal measures of CSBMs adopted in 1986 are the following:

1. 42-day prior notification of military activities taking place within region;
2. mandatory invitation of observers from all participating states to attend notified military activities;
3. exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities; and
4. on-site inspection from the air to ground or both to verify compliance with agreed measures, with no right of refusal.

Since 1986, in subsequent meetings among the participants of the CSCE, and later the OSCE, these measures have been further developed and expanded.

Measures similar to the basic CSBMs developed by the CDE in 1986 can be adopted by states in the NEA region to promote openness and transparency of military activities among those states. This would address a fundamental problem faced by states in the NEA region: unpredictability and uncertainty in the future. In addition to the CSBMs adopted early on by the CDE that may serve as a model for NEA states, other CSBMs that have been suggested for the region include the following:

1. publication of a common form defense white paper and conferences on defense policies;
2. utilization of the UN measures and regional application of them;
3. increase in military personnel exchange and contacts; and
4. maritime security cooperation measures.<sup>14</sup>

*Reasons Given for Reluctance to Promote CSBMS in the Region.* As noted above, CSBMs in the NEA region would help promote stability in that region. However, NEA is not Europe. NEA is very vast geographically, the countries within the region are politically distinct, and there is much more cultural heterogeneity than that of Europe. A different approach to address security issues in the Northeast Asian region from those used in Europe is required. Parallels between Europe and NEA may be difficult, and it may be illogical to predict the outcome of CSBMs on the Peninsula by referring to the European experience.<sup>15</sup>

A particular concern regarding NEA CSBMs is the possible lack of cooperation by the DPRK. The DPRK believes that if it opens itself up to CSBMs, the outside threat to their existence will result in their collapse, as occurred in the Soviet Union. After the establishments of such obligations<sup>16</sup>, it would be bound to those CSBMs and logically North Korea is therefore reluctant to open itself

to CSBMs.<sup>17</sup> In addition, there is a long history of bilateral relations in the region, and the DPRK may believe it will lose control of its own agenda in a multilateral setting. CSBMs will require transparency in DPRK military activities. It is very unlikely the DPRK will sign an agreement that requires monitoring and verifiable obligations, as evidenced by their concerns regarding International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The DPRK will resist the eventual external effect on their internal affairs that accompany CSBMs.<sup>18</sup>

#### *CSBMs on the Peninsula*

North and South Korea have had little success discussing CSBMs, and it has been used by both states as a political lever. There is a difference in view between the two states regarding when CSBMs should be negotiated. South Korea believes the two Koreas should negotiate CSBMs before they can engage in real talks on larger issues. Once those CSBMs are established, other discussions regarding security on the Peninsula would fall into place. However, the North Koreans believe that the first step is to remove US troops from the ROK. It is only after that point that the North Koreans would engage in CSBM discussions.

Progress on CSBMs on the Peninsula will also be slow without the development of North Korea's political and economic conditions. The European experience showed that arms control and confidence-building measures are tied to the development of both political and economic fronts.

In Europe, it was helpful to have the negotiations take place within a framework that provided some sense of the direction in which Europe should be moving.... Perhaps a broad framework should be considered in Korea.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the difficulties both Koreas face in negotiating CSBMs, the two Koreas negotiated the “1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and North.” Included in the agreement was a commitment to not interfere in each other’s internal affairs, not attempt to sabotage or overthrow each other, and to work together to promote national prestige and interests in the international arena. The agreement established a South-North Political Committee to discuss measures to ensure implementation of the Agreement. In addition, the Agreement was to establish a South-North Joint Military Commission to discuss and carry out steps to *build military confidence-building measures*. These were to include *phased reductions in armaments* including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and verification. There were to be exchanges of military personnel and information and peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone.

Unfortunately, this Agreement was negotiated in 1991 by the DPRK because at that time they required an escape from a possible total collapse that had recently occurred in East Europe. After they signed the agreement, the DPRK realized it no longer needed that escape mechanism and their desire for implementing the agreement has waned ever since.<sup>20</sup>

#### **Other Problems in Moving Forward with North Korea**

The North Koreans view both Japan and the ROK as “puppets” of the US and insist on conducting security related issues directly with the US. Once they have been able to do that and address the issues of concern to them, the North Korea will initiate dialogue on security issues with Japan and the ROK.<sup>21</sup>

North Korea will not engage in dialogue it believes is hostile to it while it is simultaneously losing confidence in maintaining its

military strength. North Korea will not promote an idea that will make it abandon its military stance against South Korea.<sup>22</sup>

North Korea may reduce its hostile stance if Japan, the ROK and the US normalize relations with North Korea. At the time both Koreas joined the UN in 1991, there was an expectation other states that had not yet done so would recognize both Koreas at that time. The ROK asked the USSR, before it collapsed, to be recognized. Both Russia and China have recognized the ROK. However, while Russia and China recognized the ROK, the US and Japan did not recognize North Korea.

North Korea has asked Japan to be recognized, and Japan has not done that. Both Japan and the US are the two richest countries in the world. So, why have they not recognized North Korea? The reason is they will gain nothing from recognizing North Korea. As long as North Korea has nothing to offer, they will not be recognized. All North Korea can offer is a threat of missiles and nuclear weapons. They are the only things the US and Japan will listen to. That is what they are doing. You would do the same thing. The US does not listen to anything else. Why does the US never ask North Korea about its culture or its art? They only ask about the range of their missiles, and their nuclear weapons capabilities.<sup>23</sup>

If this impression is the one held by the DPRK, there will be little chance for movement forward on proposals for regional arms control or CSBMs in the near future.

#### **CURRENT CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES**

This Section focuses on what can be done to increase confidence and trust in the NEA region that is necessary for NEA states to agree to the proposals set forth in the paper. However, before suggesting future work, the paper discusses some current activities that are promoting

confidence building in the region. These include the ongoing US/DPRK discussions, KEDO, the Four Party Talks, ASEAN, and implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

There are currently ongoing activities among states in the Northeast Asian region and other states that promote interaction and discussion of both security and non-security related issues. While they are not pure security-building organizations, they do reflect the fact that Northeast Asian states can engage in multilateral discussions and that the reluctance to establishing a multilateral security forum may not be an issue of whether they can engage in discussions as a group, but the issue to be discussed at that meeting. These states can and should continue to engage in areas that are of mutual concern and these forums can serve as a foundation for future security forums.

#### **US/DPRK Discussions**

The US and DPRK have engaged in regular bilateral discussions on numerous security issues, including those related to DPRK missile testing. The two states began these bilateral discussions in 1993 when the US opened direct dialogue with the DPRK as a result of the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty. This marked a major reversal of US and ROK policy since both the US and the ROK previously promoted direct dialogue between the two Koreas without the US playing an intervening role. The US and ROK were concerned that direct DPRK/US discussions would weaken the US/ROK partnership and make the DPRK less cooperative in inter-Korean talks.

The DPRK and US also engaged in intense bilateral dialogue regarding suspected underground construction in the DPRK, which would be a violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The two concluded an agreement regarding the site on March 16, 1999, which

provided a mechanism to remove US suspicions about the site and allow for continued implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The DPRK has fostered this bilateral process. The DPRK prefers to deal directly with the US on security issues and has treated the ROK as a secondary partner. The DPRK participation in the Four Party Talks was based on their opportunity to deal directly with the US. The DPRK continues to make clear their preference for bilateral discussions with the US during the Four Party Talks and at other occasions.

#### **1994 Agreed Framework (AF)**

The United States and the DPRK continue to work towards the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). The AF was signed between the US and DPRK in October 1994, and contains both nuclear and non-nuclear objectives. The nuclear objectives are freezing and eventually eliminating the suspected North Korean nuclear weapons capability. Specifically, the AF has four elements: the provision of two light-water reactors (LWR) to the DPRK; the resumption of an inter-Korean dialogue; improvement of relations between the DPRK and the US; and strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The main focus of the AF continues to be the overall resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue. However, the AF provides an important basis from which multilateral security dialogue can emerge. As in the above case (US/DPRK discussions), the improvement of relations between the US and the DPRK, along with improved inter-Korean dialogue, serves as a solid basis from which a larger Northeast Asian Security Forum could develop. US and DPRK adherence to the AF will help ensure its viability and the US recent decision to ease sanctions on North Korea is a definite step in that direction.

Close coordination with the ROK and Japan is required for the continued implementation and success of the AF. However, the challenge ahead is not merely implementing the AF, but pursuing a larger strategy for reducing tension on the Peninsula.

**The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)**

The participating states in KEDO, including the US, the ROK, the EU, and Japan and the DPRK (but not China) are working together to provide the light-water reactor project (LWR) to the DPRK as provided in the 1991 Agreed Framework.<sup>24</sup> While KEDO is responsible for supplying the LWR, the DPRK is responsible for other tasks and items for the LWR project.

KEDO is an example of what can be achieved through cooperation of states addressing Korean issues. A major advantage of KEDO is that it fosters joint work between the two Koreas. It is evidence to the North Koreans that such cooperation is possible. What must be highlighted is not only what can be accomplished regarding NEA security issues (by implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework), but also what can be accomplished on other issues.

KEDO has provided a vehicle for regular negotiations involving the ROK, Japan, the DPRK, the European Union, Canada and the United States. This has kept the DPRK in regular contact with the outside world. Through KEDO, direct contact continues also between the North and South Koreans on both a formal and informal level. The ROK and North Korea directly negotiate a number of issues under the umbrella of KEDO. There are lessons learned about negotiations with the DPRK that all taking part in the process can obtain.

Through KEDO, ROK contractors and subcontractors have entered into labor contracts whereby the DPRK is providing labor,

goods and other services and the reprocessing construction site. More than two hundred ROK and DPRK workers regularly interact at the site. In the future, thousands of North and South Koreans will work side by side in building the light water reactors.<sup>25</sup>

KEDO has shown that the DPRK can engage in continuous negotiations on issues that are of concern to all countries involved. The DPRK has concluded a number of agreements with KEDO to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework, including a 1995 Supply Agreement that serves as a roadmap for the LWR project, outlines the project's scope, terms of repayment, and general terms and conditions under which KEDO will operate at the site. KEDO and the DPRK have also negotiated a number of additional protocols and agreements that address such issues as KEDO's juridical status, transportation, communications, takeover of the site, DPRK provision of labor and services, and penalties for non-payment of financial obligations by the DPRK and KEDO.

KEDO and the DPRK have worked to build housing facilities, a medical facility, roads, water services, and electricity services. This new village has a restaurant for North and South Korean workers, a soccer field, and a ROK branch bank. North and South Koreans are served food from the same kitchen. Recently, the turnkey contract was signed with the Korea Electric Power Corporation to govern the full-scale construction of the overall project.<sup>26</sup>

Clearly, these achievements indicate that the DPRK can work programmatically with other states to resolve issues and differences on issues of concern to them.

KEDO has...provided important political benefits to its founding members.  
KEDO has become an important feature of the landscape of the Korean Peninsula

...it serves as an example of how a cooperative and targeted international diplomatic effort can lead to resolution of regional security or political crisis. KEDO has become an important mechanism for coordinating and harmonizing Japanese, South Korean, American, and European interests and policies. This is especially important given the historical tension between Japan and Korea.<sup>27</sup>

#### **The Four Party Talks**

The Four Party talks (US, the DPRK, the ROK and China) were initiated by the ROK in 1996 as a result of North Korea's refusal to agree to an inter-Korean dialogue and the pursuit of a peace agreement with the U.S. The ROK believed the Talks could serve as a way forward on Korean peace and security.

On the part of South Korea and the United States, the purpose of the four-party talks is to realize a peace treaty, arms reduction, as well as political, economic and cultural reconciliation between South and North Korea. Some issues are best suited to bilateral negotiations between South and North Korea, such as family reunions, cultural exchanges... Other issues, such as armistice, arms reduction and peace treaty, are largely issues between South and North Korea in principle, but involve the United States and China as balancers of regional security.<sup>28</sup>

At present the DPRK is focused on bilateral talks between themselves and the United States. This has limited the potential developments for Korean security issues in the Talks. For example, during the summer of 1999, the DPRK continued to insist that the talks reflect their concerns regarding US withdrawal of troops on the Peninsula. However, both the United States and the ROK proposed that the Koreas begin projects that can build trust between the Koreas, such as installing direct phone lines between arms officials and reporting on military drills.<sup>29</sup> These suggested activities would

promote confidence building and the needed trust to expand to other types of confidence-building measures. These activities are also relatively easy to accomplish. The ROK also suggested at the talks that the two Koreas create a peace agreement that would include provisions on non-aggression and peaceful settlement of conflicts.<sup>30</sup> However, the response by the DPRK was to reiterate its position that the US must first remove its troops from the Peninsula. Regarding the talks on permanent peace, the NK stated that it requires a treaty between them and the US first. At the conclusion of those talks, the Ambassador from China (who chaired the Four-Party session) noted that “Progress at the four-party talks falls far short of the aspirations and expectations it is still far from reaching the ultimate objectives.”<sup>31</sup> These remarks reflect the lack of interest on the part of North Korea to engage in serious discussion outside of their particular priorities.<sup>32</sup>

However, there can be success in the Four-Party Talks. There is a chance that the continued exchange of these talks can develop into a more institutionalized regime. Both Russia and Japan have expressed an interest in being involved in these negotiations.<sup>33</sup>

#### **ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**

The ARF was formed in 1994 under the auspices of ASEAN. Its purpose is to provide for annual discussions on security issues among the Asia-Pacific nations. Its mission is to “work closely to ensure and preserve the current environment of peace, prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region [and] to continue to be a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional, political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk to security.”<sup>34</sup>

The ARF currently has 22 members consisting of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos,

Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Canada, the European Union and the United States. The ARF has been engaged in developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) for its members. The ARF has an evolutionary, step-by-step approach to confidence-building that is a three-stage process, the first being the promotion of confidence building. The second is the development of preventive diplomacy and the third is elaboration of approaches to conflicts. While China has been reluctant to discuss measures of preventive diplomacy, it has become increasingly comfortable with CBM issues. At a recent annual ARF meeting, the Chinese Foreign Minister spoke of the need for confidence building in the region. This was taken as a positive endorsement for CBM in the Asia-Pacific region and represents a growing commitment on the part of China to a multilateral security dialogue.<sup>35</sup>

The type of CBMs developed include exchanging information on a voluntary basis; observer participation in and notification of military exercises; increasing high-level defense contacts and military exchanges/training; and submitting to the ARF on a voluntary basis an annual defense policy statement. Not all of the proposed CBMs have been implemented. However, these CBMs can serve as a foundation for further, more developed CSBMs in the Northeast Asian region.<sup>36</sup>

What is questionable to many is how effective ASEAN and the ARF are for providing a forum for Northeast Asian security issues.<sup>37</sup> While the ARF is a possible forum for North East Asian discussions, what I envision is a multilateral forum focused on Northeast Asian issues. The ARF members outside Northeast Asia, with the exception of the US, the EU and Canada, have less inclination to devote the necessary time and energy within the ARF to the complex

and varied security issues predominant in Northeast Asia. This problem is highlighted when an original ASEAN country chairs ASEAN and that country's primary strategic focus is not Northeast Asia.<sup>38</sup> The forum's dialogue is limited in its discussions on the Korean Peninsula. The security agenda of NEA is quite different from that of Southeast Asia, and it is necessary to establish a separate NEA regional dialogue so NEA states can promote security cooperation amongst themselves. However, the ARF can be instrumental in providing a forum for NEA states to meet and discuss security issues of relevance to a future NEA Security Forum.

**The 1992 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) and the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration).**

The South-North agreements themselves were excellent frameworks for arms control regimes. The problem was that no actual measures for the implementation of the agreements were able to be taken because of the North Korean's unilateral and intentional neglect of the agreements. Instead of holding South-North dialogue or implementing the agreements, North Korea has attempted to resolve all the problems related to the Korean Peninsula through the US-North Korea direct talks. This means that North Korea does not have any will for arms control and was not interested in the implementation of the agreement from the beginning.<sup>39</sup>

The ROK and the DPRK are not currently implementing either the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) or the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration). However, the two agreements include obligations that would provide the basis for extensive bilateral collaboration on security issues.

The Basic Agreement consists of obligations somewhat similar to those of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, with “three baskets” as follows: principles of relations between states; confidence-building measures and security/disarmament; and economic, science and technology, and environmental cooperation. Its purpose is to build a combination of confidence in the political, military, economic and social areas, enhance political confidence, and promote practical military measures for confidence building between the two countries.

The Joint Declaration was to further enhance the confidence between the two Koreas initiated by the Basic Agreement. It established a Joint Nuclear Commission to implement the agreement that would have authority to conduct mutual inspections. From March to December 1992, the two Koreas met 13 times to discuss the modalities for mutual inspection upon which time the Commission ceased to meet. North Korea has refused to continue these meetings based on their complaint of the US/ROK Team Spirit exercises and in protest to the IAEA request for special inspections of its nuclear facilities. This also spelled an end to implementation of the Basic Agreement in the near future.<sup>40</sup> The North Korean protest to the implementation of the Basic Agreement also includes the following:

The major military threat comes not from the ROK armed forces but from the US force, the sole superpower in the world. In this crucial sense, the 1991 pact is irrelevant in the absence of a Peace Treaty between the DPRK and Washington or a working peace mechanism to prevent resumption of hostilities between them.<sup>41</sup>

Hopefully the recent steps by the US Administration to ease sanctions on North Korea will help alleviate the North Korean’s strict attitude against the implementing the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration.

## **BUILDING TOWARD A NEA SECURITY FORUM**

Regimes arise because actors forgo independent decision making in order to deal with the dilemmas of common interest and common aversions. They do so in their own self-interest, for, in both cases, jointly accessible outcomes are preferable to those that are or might be reached independently. It is in their interest mutually to establish arrangements to shape their subsequent behavior and allow expectations to converge, thus solving their subsequent behavior and allow decision making.<sup>42</sup>

While it may be premature to establish a NEA Security Forum to address issues of security in Northeast Asia, states in the region can discuss issues they have a common interest in and which, due to the overlap of interests and jurisdiction, require coordination. By focusing on these areas, the Northeast Asian states would be able to share in the benefits of multilateral cooperation and establish a foundation on which a future multilateral security forum may develop. This would be complementary to current multilateral discussions (KEDO, Four Party Talks, US/DPRK discussions, etc) that promote trust and confidence among the Northeast Asian states.

Current North and South Korean bilateral non-security activities should continue to be promoted and strengthened. These include cultural exchanges, family reunions and economic cooperation. Implementation of the Basic Agreement can promote North and South Korean activities in non-security issues. For example, in addition to the military confidence-building measures noted earlier, the 1992 Basic Agreement includes provisions for the promotion of economic exchanges and cooperation, “including the development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures.”<sup>43</sup> Other relevant provisions include the promotion of free intra-Korean travel and contacts and the free correspondence, meetings and visits between

dispersed family members. In addition to the South-North Joint Military Commission and the South-North Political Committee mentioned earlier, the agreement establishes the Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission and a commitment to establish other joint commissions for specific sectors.

However, to be successful, discussions among states cannot be zero-sum. Under such conditions there will be no basis for a regime; there will be no reason to coordinate policies since one actor's loss is viewed as another's gain. However, there are situations where common interests require a regime to ensure that all actors do not pursue their dominant strategy so they can, instead, arrive at an outcome that is best for all states.<sup>44</sup>

What KEDO exemplifies is that the North Koreans are willing to engage in continuous negotiations on issues of concern to them. While the DPRK may not be enthusiastic about a NEASF at this date, they may be willing to engage in discussions that do not focus on security, are not zero-sum games, and where they have an interest.

This section discusses issues in which states in the region have a common interest and that can serve as a basis for multilateral cooperation. This process will not only provide a mechanism for regular contact among the states, but will work towards establishing the necessary trust for these states to engage in security building at a later date. The emphasis of these meetings and discussions will not be on security, but on non-security issues. The issues highlighted are environmental, transnational criminal activity and agriculture development. Other issues of a non-security nature not mentioned in this paper and which the states have a common interest in coordinated action might also be addressed by the NEA states during this interim stage.

Given the bitter experience of the Korean War and the long period of tense military confrontation over the past 40 years, the removal of the perceived threat and recovery of identity are the first priority. No physical and hardware arms control can be expected without the development of mutual confidence on security and stability between South and North Korean.<sup>45</sup>

#### **Korean Peninsula Agriculture Development Organization (KADO)**

In the economic field, interdependence can increase the dialogue and cooperation of countries so as to maintain economic growth. This can form the basis of dialogue in the Northeast Asian region. An idea that was suggested in interviews is the development of an organization to address long-term DPRK agriculture problems—problems that have resulted in recent famine in North Korea.<sup>46</sup> This organization, which may be titled the Korean Peninsula Agriculture Development Organization (KADO), could mirror the organization and method of work of KEDO; however, it would focus on agriculture development in North Korea.<sup>47</sup> The parties would work with the DPRK to establish a program to address long-term agriculture development and improvement in the DPRK. The organization could include the same parties as are currently in KEDO, or the parties can be a subset of those parties with the possible addition of China. This would allow for multilateral cooperation in addressing agriculture concerns in China as well. KADO would also help depoliticize US and Japanese food aid issues and show support to the ROK for its engagement policies.

A more specific idea on this proposal is that the organization be chaired by the ROK (or jointly by the ROK and US) who would administer food aid and agricultural assistance programs. The program would not provide handouts to the North Koreans but, as noted, would

promote agricultural development for North Korea's long-term food requirements.<sup>48</sup>

### **Energy and Environment**

Mr. Mark Valencia, a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, promotes the possible joint use by North and South Korea of certain strategic areas and resources as a means of building confidence and trust on the Peninsula. However, while he focuses on the Peninsula, environmental issues can be an area Northeast Asian states can jointly work towards improving and maintaining.

Some of the areas outlined for possible future cooperation are as follows:<sup>49</sup> managing the environment of the DMZ and the fisheries in its offshore extension, fisheries and petroleum resources in and around Tok Do; exploitation of possible petroleum resources in the Korea Bay and off North Korea's east coast; offshore monitoring of dumped nuclear waste in the East Sea, co-operation in investment and production in North Korea's Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic and Free Trade Zone; and the promotion and preparation of the unified Korean Peninsula as a transportation hub for Northeast Asia.

The Koreas could work to maintain the relatively pristine environment of the DMZ. Both North and South Korea have expressed interest in maintaining the biosphere reserves on the DMZ. In this respect, the Koreas could conduct separate but parallel species inventories of candidate areas of the DMZ in addition to declaring and administering jointly or separately world heritage sites or biosphere reserves in the DMZ.<sup>50</sup>

In addition, the two states could agree to a joint fishing zone in the Special Maritime Zone offshore the DMZ. Currently there is inefficient use of the resources and potential conflict due to issues of shared stocks, depletion of stocks, and lack of an agreed boundary.

Species of interest in that area are Alaska pollack, squid, saury, crab, shrimp, mackerel, and sardine. The joint fishing zone would allow North Korea to catch squid, sardine, saury, and mackerel on the South Korean side, and South Korea could fish the scarce Alaska pollack on the North Korean side. This type of joint use of the zone would help strength relations between the Koreas and increase benefits to the fishermen of both Koreas.

As a last example, Japan, Russia, North and South Korea can work together to monitor the waste and its effects of nuclear waste dumped in the East Sea. Both Japan and Russia have dumped radioactive waste in the East Sea. Multilateral activity addressing this issue has consisted of bilateral Japan/Russia meetings of ministry experts, proposals for a joint South Korea/Japan/Russia survey, and Japan's proposal for an international cooperative fund to assist Russia in treating its nuclear waste. North Korea offered to host an international seminar on pollution control regimes. In 1994, a joint Japan-South Korea-Russia-IAEA expedition began searching for signs of radioactive waste contamination in the East Sea. Costs of the expedition were shared equally among the participants. A long-term effort to monitor the East Sea would not only prove extremely advantageous for the people and environment, but would also provide another forum for Northeast Asian dialogue.

In this respect, the Energy, Security and Environment in the Northeast Asia Project, part of the Nautilus Institute (based in Berkley, California), sponsors a collaborative effort between the Nautilus Institute and the Tokyo-based Center for Global Communications at the Institute University of Japan. This project analyzes energy, security, and environmental issues related to large-scale energy use in Northeast Asia with the primary purpose of developing joint US-Japanese policy

initiatives directed towards realizing a safe and sustainable energy future in the region. This project can serve as a catalyst for environmental multilateral work in the Northeast Asian region.<sup>51</sup>

Other ongoing work that can be strengthened to promote NEA multilateral non-security discussion is the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP)'s Maritime Cooperation Working Group that has developed Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation. These Guidelines are fundamental, non-binding principles that are to help manage regional maritime cooperation and ensure a common understanding and approach to regional maritime issues. The Guidelines should dampen tensions regarding areas of enclosed or semi-enclosed sea with disputed or overlapping maritime jurisdiction. The Guidelines apply the concept of comprehensive security in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>52</sup>

In April 1999, the US and Japan met to discuss new projects under the US-Japan Common Agenda. The Common Agenda, inaugurated by President Clinton and then Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1993, covers bilateral cooperation on global issues including climate change, disease prevention, science and technology research, and natural disaster mitigation. Both countries have collaborated on approximately 200 projects.<sup>53</sup>

In another forum, the US and China held a workshop, also in April 1999, to develop a bilateral water resources management program. The workshop was recommended and agreed to by the US-China Forum on Environment and Development co-chaired by Vice President Gore and Premier Zhu Rongji. At the first meeting of this Forum, in May 1997 in Beijing, the working groups on Energy Policy, Environmental Policy, Science for Sustainable Development and Commercial Cooperation identified water resources management as a

significant issue that requires action by both countries. At the workshop were approximately 200 government, academic, non-governmental and business sector representatives who identified potential elements of a coordinated program on sustainable water resources management between the US and China.<sup>54</sup>

These existing relationships that foster discussion on the environment serve as a foundation for more expanded, multilateral work that can foster trust among the states.

### **Issues of Transnational Crime**

Northeast Asia is increasingly confronted with emerging issues of drug trafficking, international organized crime, terrorism and piracy. The increase in these problems is predominantly a result of the end of the Cold War, which unleashed suppressed threats. There are two major characteristics about these crimes. The first is their externality in that one country's innocent policies and activities may adversely affect its neighbor's security and welfare while the former is not charged for the costs of their policies and activities on the latter country. Secondly, their elimination or reduction requires regional cooperation.

International organized crime cannot be eradicated without intelligence sharing, joint investigation and extradition, besides region-wide tightening up of laws and regulations and their strict enforcement, which all presuppose a closer regional cooperation, as do the safeguard of sea lanes of communication and the protection of the environment.<sup>55</sup>

These non-security issues threaten both the social health and rule of law in the region. Without a regional approach to address these issues, disputes can result as each country attempts to eradicate the problem. For example, one government may be tempted to violate another state's territorial waters in an attempt to control or interdict the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics. There has been an

increase in drug trafficking and use in all Northeast Asia countries. However, there has been little initiative to promote region-wide efforts to cope with drug trafficking.<sup>56</sup> The emphasis on collaboration in the region has been on a case-by-case basis.

Secretary of State Madeline Albright during her recent opening remarks at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference on July 27, 1999 highlighted this issue. The Secretary noted the importance of working to prevent transnational crime. She also noted possible cooperative attempts on narcotics to reduce demand, cut supply, intercept shipments and seize profits. The states could also work to reduce the illegal trafficking of women and children.<sup>57</sup>

One such effort to address the area of trafficking and law enforcement in general is the US-China Law Enforcement Joint Liaison Group. In 1998, the US and China concluded a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the establishment of a Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement Cooperation. According to this Memorandum of Understanding, the two states will work towards mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and assign counter-narcotics officers to their respective embassies.<sup>58</sup> Another effort in addressing transnational crime took place in July 1999 when the US and Japanese officials and the International Organization for Migration conducted a 2-week training program on illegal migration and trafficking in women and children at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok. Additionally, twenty-three Asian and Pacific nations are scheduled to participate in a US-Philippines program, the “Asian Regional Initiative to Combat the Trafficking of Women and Children” in March 2000 where the participants will discuss national action plans and develop a regional strategy to prevent trafficking, protect victims, reintegrate trafficking victims into society, and prosecute traffickers.<sup>59</sup>

NEA states should work together to eradicate these problems. One suggestion has been the negotiation of a regional convention among South and North Korea, Japan, Russia, China and other interested states to prevent, investigate and try international suspects of illicit activities. The fear by those closely following this issue is that states in the region will not work together to attack the problem until the more traditional regional security disputes are settled. By that time, it may be too late to adequately control these non-security but urgent problems.

#### **A NEA SECURITY FORUM—A PROPOSAL**

This is the most ambitious section of the paper. Here I set forth my design for a Northeast Asia Security Forum. The participating states to the Forum would consist of the ROK, the DPRK, Japan, China, Russia, Canada, Mongolia, the United States, as well as a representative from ASEAN, the European Union (EU), KADO and KEDO. The inclusion of ASEAN would keep the Forum participants officially knowledgeable of ASEAN activities related to the Forum's work, while the inclusion of the EU would allow the Forum to take advantage of EU expertise in multilateral forum building and working with the NEA states in KEDO. To recognize the important role that Track II discussions play in promoting security in the region, there would be continuous feedback between those activities and the Northeast Asian Forum. However, while the Track II participants may regularly inform the Forum of its work, the Forum would only selectively inform the Track II representatives of activities of the Forum (as some states may want to keep some information on an official level). In the US the position of "US North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State" occupied by Dr. William

Perry would become permanent within the Department of State and that person would represent the US at NEASF meetings.

In addition to the participants themselves, the Forum, which would meet in plenary session twice per year, would have a number of subordinate working groups. Each working group would consist of different participants and meet more regularly (they would establish their own schedules). Some of the working groups can be more autonomous than others, but they would all provide reports to the Forum to maintain important coordination in Northeast Asian security activities. I recognize that some of the working groups I list under the NEA Forum may not be adequate. For example, the Four Party Talks have reached a level where the participants may wish to keep that forum separate and not part of a larger NEASF process. However, as I note below, in that case all that may be required is a representative from those talks to take part in NEASF discussions to ensure the coordination of activities taking place in the Four Party Talks and the Forum. None of the working groups would address US Mutual Defense Treaty issues. The US/ROK military defense arrangements, like those of US/Japan, are based on bilateral treaties that would be out of the purview of the multilateral discussion (unless the parties to those agreements decide Forum business requires them to discuss those bilateral Treaties). In addition, the NEASF will continue activities on non-security issues that began during the “interim” NEA Multilateral Forum (as noted earlier in the paper).

However, before discussing the NEASF in more detail, the paper first reviews the issue of bilateral versus multilateral methods for addressing NEA security issues in addition to the necessity for cooperation among the NEA states on regional security.

**Bilateral vs. Multilateral**

The relations between Northeast Asian states are conducted through bi-lateral contacts. Problems arise when these bi-lateral contacts or ties head towards opposite directions. That is, the problems take place when there emerges imbalance between one bi-lateral relation and another bi-lateral relation. There is no mechanism of mediation.<sup>60</sup>

Security issues of Northeast Asia have traditionally been addressed in a bilateral rather than multilateral forum. Most people prefer bilateral mechanisms, and they will remain the predominant vehicle for addressing security issues in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean Peninsula. Fewer welcome the idea of multilateralism, and those that do note that such multilateral efforts must remain subordinate to current bilateral efforts.

States in NEA are very committed to present bilateral arrangements that exist in the region. Despite the limitations of the overshadowing bilateral relations, many individuals in these states prefer to maintain such bilateral relations and either want to push proposals for multilateral forums to the back burner or they weakly support such proposals. So far, bilateral methods to address NEA security issues have worked to their satisfaction, and there is little incentive to switch to multilateral arrangements.

However, many security issues in Northeast Asia affect more than two states. For example, the US and the North Koreans are engaged in discussions on North Korean missile development and testing due to the geographic proximity of Japan and South Korea to North Korea. Though these negotiations involve only two parties, the result of such discussions directly affect both Japan and the ROK, who feel immediately threatened by the effect of such missile testing. Local disputes can easily lead to conflicts affecting all states in the region.

While bilateral relationships have been the norm for many years, they also serve to keep issues isolated when in fact many issues concern more than two states. This forces progress on security issues to be a step-by-step process when there may be a more appropriate method for addressing overall NEA security and non-security issues.

*Specific Concerns Raised About the Transition to a Multilateral Security Arrangement.* In a multilateral forum, the North Koreans may not be sure whom they can trust. As noted earlier, in a bilateral setting they know who they are dealing with, and they prefer that.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, China may be reluctant to embark on multilateral military discussions with Japan since that would put both Japan and China on an “equal footing.”

In a larger forum, small states such as the ROK may lose influence on issues of concern to them. Therefore, in any such forum, it is imperative there are subgroups where ROK issues and concerns can be adequately addressed. This should be balanced with the recognition that the more prominence the ROK has in any multilateral forum, the more North Korea may be reluctant to participate in that forum.

For the US, bilateralism allows the US much influence in the region. The US may not be prepared to sacrifice the predominant bilateral structure for a more uncertain multilateral structure. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of a multilateral forum subordinate to the bilateral structure of the region.

The states in Northeast Asia all have an interest in the security of the region. It is not going to be possible in the long run to achieve that peace unless there is a mechanism where all states can work together to promote peace and stability. Bilateral arrangements have

played a valuable role. However, multilateral methods to address the region as a whole will be necessary before the entire region is at peace.

### **Coordination**

A successful approach to security in Northeast Asia must be comprehensive and integrated to address the many aspects of NEA regional security. It is important that the many ongoing efforts among the international players be coordinated. A Northeast Asian Security Forum would provide that coordination mechanism on the international level, whereas a permanent person in the US Department of State similar to that of William Perry for North Korea but expanded to include NEA security issues, could assume that responsibility for the United States.<sup>62</sup> Northeast Asian security requires concrete advance planning. The process cannot move forward without the participation of the top leadership of these countries.

### **Northeast Asia Security Forum**

Northeast Asia needs a wider regional security forum to bring together the two Koreas and the other regional countries and interested states. It is necessary to build a more stable and wider system of peace and security on and around the Korean peninsula. A Northeast Asian Security forum would recognize the intricate web of bilateral relations and alliance systems in the region. While this forum is not a panacea to problems in the region, it is a necessary step in the process of solving existing security concerns leading to mistrust and lack of confidence in the region. A regional security forum would also promote the implementation of existing regional agreements and allow for more frequent interaction.

*NASF Membership.* As noted, the membership of the NEASF should be as follows: the US, Russia, Japan, ROK, DPRK, China and Canada. There should be representatives from the European Union,

ASEAN, and KEDO. It may be advantageous to include Mongolia in the forum. This is due to its geographical location, it has had diplomatic ties with North Korea since WWII and diplomatic ties with South Korea, the North Koreans are comfortable with Mongolia, and Mongolia can play the role of an honest broker for the participants when required. In addition, there should be constant contact with Track II activities. This can be accomplished with a formal mechanism to exchange information between the Forum and various Track II organizations. The Forum may decide to invite members representing Track II activities to Forum meetings, as appropriate. What follows is a short discussion on the proposed Track II membership.

#### *Track II*

Track II dialogues facilitate the cooperation and development of mechanisms for trust building in Northeast Asia as these forums allow academics and non-governmental representatives from the different countries to participate and exchange ideas in their unofficial capacities at conferences and other gatherings. Also of importance is the participation of government officials who, though participating of an unofficial capacity, bring to these Track II functions their ideas and take back to their governments ideas shared and discussed at these meetings. The informality of the Track II process allows the participants to more openly voice concerns and allows discussion on new approaches to security building in the region.

At present, Track II multilateral forums are the only ones existing for the Northeast Asian Region. Some of these forums have a strong interest in arms control and confidence-building measures. Two such Track II forums are the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). CSCAP consists of regional institutes (represented in Asia

Pacific countries, not just Northeast Asian countries) that address issues of international security and hosts regional/functional workshops attended by academics, business leaders and governmental officials from either former or current ministries of defense and foreign affairs. It has established several Working Groups that examine confidence and security building measures, maritime cooperation, cooperative security and other similar issues. The Pacific Forum, located in Hawaii, runs CSCAP.<sup>63</sup>

CSCAP includes representatives from countries that have diplomatic relations with the North Koreans. Therefore, at CSCAP functions, the North Koreans (when they do attend) do not feel they are there “alone” and the other participants are against them. These types of forums also allow for informal interaction between the North and South Koreans.

Other Track II activities include the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). The NEACD was established in 1993. This dialogue is hosted by the Institute on Global Conflict & Cooperation and sponsors an informal, high-level forum for dialogue among government officials from the US, China, Japan, Russia, and North and South Korea as well as non-governmental academics assessing the region’s security issues.<sup>64</sup>

*NEASF Working Groups.* The NEASF would have a number of working groups subordinate to the Forum, each having varying levels of autonomy. As noted earlier, the working groups would decide their own schedule of meetings. However, each working group would report its progress to the Forum and would be responsible for keeping the other working groups informed of issues that may have impact on issues addressed in other working groups.

The working groups are as follows: the Four Party Talks (if included would likely have a great deal of autonomy); Six Party Talks; Trilateral Talks (US/Japan/ROK); CSBM negotiations; North/South Korean Dialogue; and a 1994 AF Periodic Discussions. A diagram of the working groups is included in the Appendix to the paper.

#### *1. Six Party*

The Six Party talks can discuss security issues in NEA. The talks were originally proposed by the ROK because it recognized the value and necessity of a Six Party dialogue. In addition, since the Four Party Talks focus on the Peninsula, the Six Parties could discuss issues focusing on the region.<sup>65</sup> The general feeling of some experts is that presently a Six-Party talk would not be meaningful. The Four-Party talks should be advanced first. However, the mandate of such talks need not be in conflict with those of the Four Party talks.

The role of Japan in a Six Party Talk remains in dispute. Some believe the time is not right for Japan to join in Korean discussions. They believe that when Japan does join, Japan's role should be limited to the economic sphere.<sup>66</sup> Russia is interested in joining the Four Party Talks, and has been for some time. Russia has been an ally of North Korea for many years. They have a long history with both North Korea and China, and are geographically located next to China, North Korea and Japan. Their proximity to these states makes their involvement in any regional incident extremely likely. Russia continues to have good relations with China and its relations have significantly improved with Japan.<sup>67</sup>

The concern regarding Russian participation in NEA security dialogue is that Russia's importance in the region has faded due to its domestic problems. Asia is not at the top of Russia's concerns at present. Its main focus, in order of preference, is Europe, the former

Republics, the Russian domestic situation, and Asia. While this is not a problem for a strong global power, it is difficult for a country undergoing domestic problems to have adequate resources to involve it in many regions of the world.<sup>68</sup>

### *2. Four Party*

The Four Party talks can continue their process and possibly be included as a working group under the NEASF. However, if the Four Party talks cannot be appropriately included as a separate working group under the NEASF, they can provide a representative to the bi-annual formal Forum meetings to take part in Forum discussions.

### *3. Trilateral Talks*

While the US views the North Korean nuclear program as a threat to global nuclear nonproliferation, both the ROK and Japan view it somewhat differently. Both Japan and the ROK recognize the global aspect of the North Korean nuclear issue; however, they also see the problem as a regional issue, with the ROK viewing it as a concern with a neighbor located next door. This difference in view has sometimes led to complications in the handling of North Korean nuclear issues. This point highlights the importance of coordination among the three parties, particularly in light of the fact that only one of the three is engaged in security dialogue with the North Koreans.<sup>69</sup> The same can be said of the relations among these three parties regarding the handling of the North Korean missile threat.

US/DPRK discussions must be coordinated among the US, ROK and Japan. The US/ROK/Japan should also ensure the positions taken at different forums are not contradictory and are all aimed at achieving the same goals. This highlights the importance of a trilateral forum.

The three should continue working together so as to establish a strong, trilateral relationship in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As long as the United States continues to keep its commitment to the peace and stability of the East Asian, and South Korea and Japan find a common interest in keeping close relations, the trilateral security cooperation will be likely to be strengthened among the United States, South Korea and Japan. However, such cooperation should be developed in a direction that would not intend to contain a specific country such as China or North Korea, but to maintain peace and stability in the region.<sup>70</sup>

#### *4. North Korea/South Korea Dialogue*

The Peninsula has often been called the last bastion of the Cold War because of possible confrontations between the two Koreas. In fact, as the result of uncertainties in ROK relations with North Korea in the post-Cold War world, the ROK security policy agenda is now more complex and sensitive. North Korea has repeatedly rejected proposals for North/South dialogue, instead insisting on a North Korean/US dialogue. In response the ROK has traditionally maintained that the two Koreas are the parties to discuss a solution to peace on the Peninsula.

Despite the lack of real progress in inter-Korean dialogue, the environment for inter-Korean dialogue and activity between the two Koreas has improved since the end of the Cold War. These include KEDO, the Red Cross Talks, unofficial private-sector contacts related to inter-Korean trade and investment, inter-Korean dialogue over fertilizer assistance and ROK organized tours in the DPRK. Inter-Korean dialogue and activity that has developed in recent years should be enhanced.

Trust between the two Koreas must develop so there can be meaningful dialogue on future security issues. The North Koreans must view South Korea as a legitimate negotiating partner. The reactivation of negotiating forums between North and South Korea would help establish the trust and confidence necessary for these states to engage in serious bilateral security discussions. New ideas for ways to foster this relationship can be addressed in this forum and could address any issue of mutual concern; not strictly security related issues.

The two states would need to decide which issues they can effectively discuss amongst themselves and which would require the involvement of other states in the region. They would also need to decide in what sequence such discussions would take place. Some issues are best discussed bilaterally (family reunions, cultural exchanges, and political/economic cooperation), while others are largely between the two Koreas but involve the US and China, such as armistice and arms reduction.<sup>71</sup> While the NK/SK talks will be a separate group within the Forum (as it should be), working under the umbrella of the NEASF will allow the two parties to rely on international assistance when needed.

If meetings do occur, the two Koreas can engage in discussions to promote implementation of the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration. In February 1999, in a letter from the DPRK to the ROK, the DPRK recognized the need for the two Koreas to work together. The letter included the following areas of cooperation between the Koreas:

1. new era of reunification and prosperity and cooperating to avert the approaching danger of war;
2. arrange dialogue between authorities and other wide-ranging dialogues between the North and South;

3. a basic method for opening a new phase to reunification is through national independence and grand unity is extensive dialogue between the North and South; and
4. continues to call for resolving the two country's reunification issues through dialogue.<sup>72</sup>

However, the DPRK also insisted, once again, that the ROK end its dependence on outside forces, something that is not negotiable at this time for either the ROK or the US.

### **CONCLUSION**

Any approach to stability in NEA will have to be made mindful of the fact that two different approaches may be required. Those for addressing instability on the Peninsula may be different from those required to address instability in the NEA region. This will require different parties to be involved in activities to address NEA security issues. KEDO, the Four Party Talks, US/DPRK dialogues, the 1994 Agreed Framework and Track II activities are steps in the right direction, and such varied approaches should be encouraged. What is missing, however, is coordination of these approaches that would allow the US and our international partners to outline a longer-range strategy for addressing Northeast Asian security issues, particularly that of the Peninsula.

In his testimony before the Senate Arms Services Committee on October 12, 1999, Dr. William Perry, U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, made a very significant statement. Following his eight-month review of US policy toward North Korea, he stated that "while North Korea is undergoing terrible economic hardship, these hardships are unlikely to cause the region to be undermined. We therefore must deal with the DPRK regime as it is, not as we wish it to be."<sup>73</sup> This is a realistic view of relations with North Korea and states, including the

U.S., should move forward in their relations with the DPRK with that understanding in mind. It makes more sense to engage the North Koreans despite their regime rather than too severely limit relations with North Korea because the DPRK does not have the type of government we would prefer. In this respect, Dr. Perry suggested that if North Korea is willing to forgo its long-range missile program and its nuclear weapons program that the US should move on a path to “comprehensive normalization of relations, including establishment of a permanent peace.”<sup>74</sup>

Following up on this suggestion, on September 17, 1999, President Clinton announced that the United States would ease some sanctions against the DPRK. The President noted that this action is to “pursue improved overall relations with North Korea and support the Agreed Framework.”<sup>75</sup> This US move was made with the understanding that the DPRK would not test long-range missiles of any kind as the two sides move towards normalization of relations. The easing of sanctions will allow consumer goods to be exported to North Korea, in addition to the importation of most DPRK origin goods into the US. There will be a relaxation of transportation restrictions allowing for commercial air and sea transportation between the two states for both passengers and cargo.<sup>76</sup> The easing of sanctions does not affect US counter-terrorism or nonproliferation controls on North Korea (prohibiting exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most US assistance). In addition, restrictions on DPRK based on multilateral arrangements remain in place, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement.<sup>77</sup>

This recent action by the US addresses an issue that has been of real concern to the DPRK: lack of progress toward normalization of relations with the US. The US has made an overdue step toward

implementing an important aspect of the 1994 AF. This should ease somewhat the lack of willingness of North Korea to engage in further discussions with the US and states in the region. It can promote further the normalization of relations between the DPRK and Japan, and the DPRK and South Korea. The easing of sanctions is also a complement to the Sunshine Policy of South Korea toward easing relations with the DPRK. These actions should go far towards easing the DPRK's feeling of isolation and will hopefully encourage them to respond in kind, not only through restraint on their missile testing, but also through increased interest in developing and engaging in multilateral security discussions where the participants can then negotiate regional confidence- and security-building measures and engage in conventional arms control negotiations.

Dr. Perry also noted that these recent developments present one of the best opportunities to move relations with North Korea forward. In his view, this represents an opportunity for both South Korea and Japan to also begin negotiations for diplomatic recognition of North Korea. In fact, the DPRK has recently established diplomatic ties with Italy and has resumed diplomatic discussions with Japan and Australia. The DPRK is also considering relations with Canada and Britain and has reportedly approached the Philippines about joining ASEAN. These steps would certainly place these countries in a better position to develop trust that can promote some of the ideas put forth in this paper.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Seo, Woo-Duck, “Arms Control Environment and Verification in the N.E. Asia” [hereinafter “Arms Control Environment and Verification”] North Pacific Disarmament Workshop, Confidence Building in the North Pacific, Multilateral Approaches to the Korean Peninsula Problem June 10, 1996 [hereinafter “North Pacific Disarmament Workshop”].

<sup>2</sup> The area of application is the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe including all island territories of the States. The States Parties to the Treaty are the U.S., France, Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Poland, Italy, Iceland, Denmark.

<sup>3</sup> Japan, South Korea, China and Russia, who are all parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), have already agreed to on-site inspections in at least on other arms control treaty. For example, parties to the CWC must accept on-site inspections to ensure they are complying with the obligations of that Convention.

<sup>4</sup> It is important to note that everyone does not share this feeling. South Korean, Japan and Russian officials have all in the past expressed interest in a Six Party Talk (which would include these three states and the U.S., China and North Korea). However, China and North Korea have not shown real excitement for such a forum, and the US has not been promoting the idea either.

<sup>5</sup> The states taking part in the intermediate forum would be the same as envisioned in the Northeast Asia Security Forum set out in Section IV of this paper.

<sup>6</sup> John J. Mearshimer, “The False Premise of International Institutions”, *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95).

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Ambassador Tomoya Kawamura.

<sup>8</sup> Seo, Woo-Duck, “Arms Control Environment and Verification.”

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<sup>9</sup> Man-kwon Nam, “Scenario for Limited Force Deployment Zones (LDZs) in Korea: Conceptual Development”, North Pacific Disarmament Workshop.

<sup>10</sup> The CFE Treaty and CFE-1A Agreement, <http://www.acda.gov/factsheet/conwpn/cfe-1.htm>

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Robert Gallucci, August 1999.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Kim Myong Chol, August 12, 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Jin-Kyu Ryoo, “Confidence-Building in East Asia: A South Korean Perspective,” North Pacific Disarmament Workshop.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Ambassador James Goodby, August 4, 1999.

<sup>16</sup> The European CSBMs are not legally binding but are political commitments.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Ambassador Goodby, August 4, 1999.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with San Hoon Park, August 3, 1999.

<sup>21</sup> It is the view of the DPRK that the division of Korea into two Koreas is the cause of current military tensions, and therefore the removal or neutralization of such troops is important and crucial. “The important next steps is to formally end the state of war, and the improve relations with the US. The DPRK has diverted all of its available resources to modernize its armed forces, fortify the land, arm the population and develop strategic missiles forces that are capable of hitting US targets abroad.” Kim Myong Chol, DPRK Perspective.

<sup>22</sup> Bon Hak Koo, “Challenges and Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations under the New Leaderships” [hereinafter “Challenges and Prospects”], the *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, The Korea Institute for

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Defense Analysis, Summer 1998 [hereinafter *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*].

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Professor Dae Sook Suh, August 18, 1999.

<sup>24</sup> The two LWR will be units with two coolant loops and a generating capacity of approximately 1,000 MW(e) each, to the DPRK on a turnkey basis.

<sup>25</sup> Desaix Anderson, "Remarks to Harvard University Program on US–Japan Relations," October 20, 1998.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Bon-Hak Koo, "Challenges and Prospects."

<sup>29</sup> Shin Yong-bae, "Prospects Dim as 4-Party Talks Move to Sub-Panels," *Korea Herald*, August 7, 1999.

<sup>30</sup> "Seoul Calls for end to State of War Between Two Koreas," *The Korea Times*, August 5, 1999.

<sup>31</sup> Elif Kaban, "Missile Row Casts Shadow on Korean Talks," Reuters, August 6, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Currently North Korea desires to maintain tension in the region as tension provides a reason for maintaining control of their regime and acquire domestic support. The NK can also use this tension to control the speed of their relationship with the ROK. If the relationship develops too fast, it may cause unwanted changes in the DPRK. This is also a reason why the tension reduction talks are not progressing.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Dean Robert Gallucci, August 1999.

<sup>34</sup> See, Foreign Affairs and Trade, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arfintro.html>.

<sup>35</sup> Jeannie Henderson, "Reassessing ASEAN," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Papers* 328, May 1999 [hereinafter "Reassessing ASEAN"].

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<sup>36</sup> Foreign Affairs & Trade–Australia homepage, [http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/Matrix\\_Att.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/Matrix_Att.html).

<sup>37</sup> See, Jeannie Henderson, “Reassessing ASEAN.”

<sup>38</sup> ASEAN states rotate to the Chairmanship position every second round.

<sup>39</sup> Seo, Woo-Duck, “Arms Control Environment and Verification.”

<sup>40</sup> Interview with San Hoon Park, August 3, 1999.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Kim Myong Chol, August 12, 1999.

<sup>42</sup> Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

<sup>43</sup> Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchange, Cooperation Between the South and North, <http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1953/arne.htm>

<sup>44</sup> Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>45</sup> Man-Kwon Nam, “Scenario for Limited Force Deployment Zones.”

<sup>46</sup> Interviews with Jim Prztstup, September 15, 1999 and Ralph Cossa, August 18, 1999.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Desaix Anderson, September 29, and Pryztup, and Cossa.

<sup>48</sup> Interview with Ralph Cossa, August 18, 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Mark Valencia, “Joint Utilization of Strategic Areas in Preparation For the Reunification of the Two Koreas”, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 26, 1998 [hereinafter “Joint Utilization”].

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<sup>50</sup> See Joint Utilization for more details on these ideas.

<sup>51</sup> Nautilus Institute, ESENA Project, <http://www.nautilus.org/esena/>. The project has explored the following issues: financing advanced clean coal in China; energy-related marine issues; and, acid rain.

<sup>52</sup> <http://coombs.anu.edu.au/Depts/RSPAS/AUSCAP/memo4.html>. Some examples of the Guidelines are as follows: the parties are encouraged to develop cooperative approaches to the maintenance and protection of sea lines of communication; consider cooperative approaches for naval cooperation and sharing of information resulting from maritime surveillance; and will promote the prevention, mitigation and management of maritime natural disasters, including preparedness and early warning systems.

<sup>53</sup> US–Japan Joint Efforts on Global Issues, Such as Climate Change and Disease Control, Under the Common Agenda, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999>.

<sup>54</sup> US–China Water Resources Management Workshop, April 18-22, 1999, [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/rpt-us-china\\_water\\_9904.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/rpt-us-china_water_9904.html).

<sup>55</sup> Robert Bedeski and Kwan Chi Oh, “Non-traditional Security Challenges,” North Pacific Disarmament Workshop.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Secretary of State Speech to the AEASN Post Ministerial Conference, July 27, 1999.

<sup>58</sup> Joint Press Statement: US–China Law Enforcement Joint Liaison Group, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998>.

<sup>59</sup> Clinton Administration Anti-Trafficking Initiatives, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/picw/trafficking/trafin/html>.

<sup>60</sup> Jin-Kyu Ryoo, “Confidence –Building in East Asia: A South Korean Perspective,” the North Pacific Disarmament Workshop.

<sup>61</sup> Interview with Jin Song, August 19, 1999.

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<sup>62</sup> In Dr. Perry's 1999 report on the US–DPRK relationship, he also recommends that his position become permanent, though my suggestion would give that person more responsibility than envisioned in the Perry Report.

<sup>63</sup> The Henry Stimson homepage, <http://www.stimson.org/cbm/china/track2.htm>.

<sup>64</sup> Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation homepage, <http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/igcc2/neacd/aboutneacd.html>.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with San Hoon Park, August 3, 1999.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Man Kwon Nam, August 16, 1999.

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Professor Robert Valliant, August 20, 1999.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with San Hoon Park, August 3, 1999.

<sup>70</sup> Hahnkyo Park, "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK–Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 1998.

<sup>71</sup> Ban Hak Koo, "Challenges and Prospects."

<sup>72</sup> Ralph Cossa, "The US–DPRK Agreed Framework: Is It Still Viable? Is It Enough?" Appendix Document, Pacific Forum CSIS, April 1999.

<sup>73</sup> Dr. William Perry, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, [http://www.state.gov/www/policy\\_remarks/1999/991012\\_perry\\_nkorea.html](http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/991012_perry_nkorea.html), [hereinafter "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee"].

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> "White House Announces Decision to Ease Some North Korea Sanctions," <http://www.arc.org.tw/USIA/www.usia.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkor917.htm>.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> The Wassenaar Arrangement consists of export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The participating states control all items set forth in the list of dual-use goods and technologies and the munitions list with the objective of preventing unauthorized transfers or re-transfers of these items.