

The Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

Edward G. Gunning, Jr.

INSS Occasional Paper 41

Regional Security Series

July 2001

USAF Institute for National Security Studies
USAF Academy, Colorado

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUL 2001		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USAF Institute for National Security Studies,USAF Academy,CO,80840				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT see report					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 53	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The paper is approved for public release by the Department of Defense; distribution is unlimited.

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Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies
HQ USAFA/DFES
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27
USAF Academy, CO 80840
phone: 719-333-2717
fax: 719-333-2716
email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at
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ISBN: 0-9710900-4-1

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this forty-first volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). As the United States continues to adjust to its role in the post-Cold War world, the transatlantic partnership remains fundamental to US security concerns. Commander Gunning's paper is a wake-up call suggesting that Europe is concerned about US intransigence when it comes the security partnership with Europe. While the United States has often encouraged the Europeans to improve capabilities and take on a greater share of the defensive burden, their recent efforts to do so have often been viewed as paradoxical to US concerns. Policymakers on this side of the Atlantic worry that Europe in some ways is moving towards going it alone with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Still, US desires for increased burdensharing need to be reconciled with ESDP. Commander Gunning highlights these differences and spells out how, in his opinion, it is possible for the United States to remain engaged in Europe and to allow the European Union to develop its own defense identity. The differences of opinion between the two sides are more "speed bumps" than "road blocks" and some disagreement and frustration is to be expected. The conclusion here is that security interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be served in the long run by encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability and through American patience as that process unfolds.

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JAMES M. SMITH
Director

THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One clear outcome of the Kosovo conflict was a realization on the part of several leaders of the European Union (EU) that the EU's current military capabilities are inadequate. Kosovo highlighted the EU's inability to address crises in its own back yard. The United States bore the brunt of the air war against Serbian forces, notably in the areas of: (1) all weather delivery of precision guided munitions; (2) electronic warfare support and attack; (3) aerial refueling; (4) strategic lift; and (5) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Although European nations are providing most of the current ground units in Kosovo, European militaries are stretched to the limit to meet these requirements while deploying only two percent of their total forces. As the European Union moves forward with its integration, many EU leaders are focusing on the requirement to develop more autonomous defense capabilities to support the development of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In December 1999 at Helsinki the European Council decided to develop the EU's crisis management capability with the commitment to build a force of 60,000 troops capable of out-of-area operations before 2003. This force is designed to deal with future Kosovos and provide the operational basis for the new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

For ESDP to be successful it is sold as supporting a growing role for the European Union in world affairs. United States' leaders are reluctant to sacrifice their dominance of European security affairs, especially when prospects for substantive capability improvements are remote. Without US support ESDP is unlikely to succeed in the long

run, and this might entail disastrous results for the transatlantic alliance. United States leadership must delicately balance expectations at home, and allow the Europeans to slowly develop their capability and lever their initial momentum.

ESDP is a delicate balancing act for both the European Union and the United States. Its failure might damage transatlantic relations and threaten tenuous congressional support for American security burdens in Europe. Its success might raise the specter of an American withdrawal under the justification that US forces would no longer be needed in Europe. It is important for US policy and transatlantic relations as a whole that a middle ground be achieved in this effort.

More equitable transatlantic relations best serve European security interests. This will require Europeans to shake the complacency of fifty years of American dependence and move forward with substantial capability improvements. In turn, the United States will have to accept a more balanced position in the area of European security. It will be a difficult road for both sides.

In the near term, little will change with respect to US requirements in Europe. This continued burden would place a strain on ESDP development. American leaders will need to accept that ESDP is indeed a “European” development and allow it to take its course with measured support. United States relations will benefit from a stronger partner in Europe. Although it may take a decade to achieve greater capabilities, patience on the US side will reap its reward. The United States is a committed European partner. It does not have the option to withdraw from European affairs.

United States interests are best served through encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability. It is unrealistic to expect the United States to continue to dominate European security efforts indefinitely. The EU nations recognize this reality and

expect greater success in their collective efforts to develop improved capabilities on the basis of European integration. A more capable European partner will provide flexibility and strength to the transatlantic security relationship. A sustainable and viable security relationship with the European Union will remain the cornerstone of US peace and stability efforts worldwide. The United States cannot withdraw from Europe and cannot expect to sustain the current imbalance with respect to security. European Union efforts to develop a more autonomous defense capability may be the best avenue to solidify the crucial transatlantic security link.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This article is the result of research conducted on behalf of INSS while serving as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. Special thanks are owed to both organizations as well as to David S. Yost, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Although he commented on an earlier draft of this article, he naturally bears no responsibility for the views expressed herein.

The Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

INTRODUCTION

[ESDP] should be nominated to replace US-Canadian relations as the most boring issue on the transatlantic circuit.

--Richard Perle, former Pentagon official¹

One clear outcome of the Kosovo conflict was a realization on the part of several leaders of the European Union (EU) that the EU's current military capabilities are inadequate. Kosovo highlighted the EU's inability to address crises in its own back yard. The United States bore the brunt of the air war against Serbian forces, notably in the areas of: (1) all weather delivery of precision guided munitions; (2) electronic warfare support and attack; (3) aerial refueling; (4) strategic lift; and (5) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Although European nations are providing most of the current ground units in Kosovo, European militaries are stretched to the limit to meet these requirements while deploying only two percent of their total forces. As the European Union moves forward with its integration, many EU leaders are focusing on the requirement to develop more autonomous defense capabilities to support the development of their Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In December 1999 the European Council met at Helsinki and decided to develop the EU's crisis management capability. It committed to build a force of 60,000 troops, capable of deploying within 60 days for up to a year, and handling the so-called "Petersberg tasks." These include humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management including peace making (or peace enforcement), but fall short of NATO Article 5 collective self-defense abilities.² The force is

designed to deal with future Kosovos and forms the foundation of the new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).³

The EU nations have had little success on a collective basis in developing more autonomous defense capabilities, and the task ahead of them is quite daunting. That is why skeptics like Perle consider Europe's current effort un-exhilarating. But Perle's skepticism highlights a crucial aspect of current European efforts—without credible operational capabilities, little will change. To overcome the EU's frustration with its dependence on United States military might and US frustration with an unsustainable burden-sharing arrangement, the EU will need to demonstrate the capabilities and willingness to carry more of the load. This will require difficult decisions in Europe and patience among US policymakers.

Continued progress with ESDP may be a requirement for the long-term viability of the alliance. To be successful, it should provide the European allies with a credible military force to meet the security challenges that they will face in the region in circumstances in which NATO is not fully engaged, while strengthening their core collective defense capability. At some point it may provide the United States more flexibility in its force deployments and demonstrate adequate burden sharing by European allies to help silence isolationist critics in Congress. The complete development of a viable European Security and Defense Policy may indeed strengthen the United States engagement in Europe and provide a solid anchor for European security. However, if the process is not properly orchestrated on both sides of the Atlantic, it may prove damaging to transatlantic ties that have provided the bedrock of security in Europe for more than half a century.

Maintaining the viability of this transatlantic link is the focus of this study. It opens with an overview of the perspectives of three key European nations and the United States in the development of ESDP.⁴

What are the driving forces behind each country's support for efforts to develop more autonomous defense capabilities in Europe? The study examines current challenges faced by European efforts to improve defense capabilities. What capabilities will the Europeans develop and improve and in what timeframe? What effect will European efforts to develop more autonomous defense capabilities have on the transatlantic relationship? The final section of the study provides recommendations for United States policy in support of ESDP.

In a recent seminar focusing on the challenges of transatlantic relations with respect to ESDP, a European defense observer provided a clever anecdote about the challenges ahead. He began with a general description of a defense initiative on one side of the Atlantic that has confounded policymakers on the other side. The proponents had not adequately discussed the issue with their allies across the Atlantic, and the misunderstandings had the potential to disrupt transatlantic relations and the international security environment. He concluded, "of course I am referring to National Missile Defense (NMD)." This was a surprise ending for a group that had spent the day discussing ESDP, but an important lesson in how one's perspective can skew perceptions. It highlights the importance of each side accepting the long-term probability of both NMD and ESDP; American efforts should therefore focus on smoothing the transition.

Clearly the removal of the colossal threat once posed by Soviet military power has allowed differences in strategic threat perceptions to come to the forefront. Europe is currently focused on regional threats to security, while the United States is working to develop a system to protect against the threat of ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction from nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. While Europeans are beginning to accept the inevitability of some form of US National Missile Defense and the US perspectives on its development,

American policymakers are beginning to accept the inevitability of the European Security and Defense Policy. This paper is intended to clarify European perspectives on ESDP and to offer policy recommendations for the US government that will maintain the vitality of transatlantic relations.

COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

1999: A Busy Year for the European Union

Developments within the European Union are often monitored with a combination of ambiguity and schizophrenia in the United States. Some Europeans have noted a familiar pattern in US reactions to ESDP: “First inattention, then assertions that it cannot succeed, then warnings of danger once success appears imminent.”⁵ However, some diligent US observers have noted an apparent watershed for the European Union in 1999, likely instigated by the Kosovo crisis. In a short time-span of nine months, the EU made a series of firsts:

It endorsed a hot war by NATO forces, with the full support of all EU neutrals; came to regard the Balkans not as the barbarian East but as a part of Europe that must be raised to European standards of human rights; was shocked by its own impotence relative to America’s electronic-weapons wizardry; held together for 78 days in the face of bitter popular opposition in Greece to the NATO war next door; agreed to fold the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU; appointed the high-profile politician Javier Solana rather than a faceless clerk to be Europe’s inaugural “Mr. Foreign Policy” and double-hatted him as interim WEU secretary-general, with ex officio right to sit in on North Atlantic Council meetings; set the goal of creating up to 60,000 European rapid-reaction troops that could be mobilized within two months for a two-year deployment; held a joint meeting of EU foreign and defense ministers; and put Turkey on the candidate list for future EU membership.⁶

A general explanation for the progress within the European Union argues

that it is a natural progression from the economic integration symbolically cemented with the initiation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999. Building on their economic solidarity, the EU countries are moving toward political integration and the development of common policies with respect to external relations. This Common Foreign and Security Policy encapsulates the contentious issues of enlargement and ESDP. The EU is often accused of being an economic giant, but at the same time a political and military midget. The development of stronger autonomous defense capabilities is intended to change this reality by providing the necessary muscle behind CFSP.

Yet there are more specific reasons why the European Union decided in June 1999 in Cologne to set a December 2000 deadline for substantive developments with respect to ESDP, creating a backdrop for an intensification of activity in 1999. In December 2000 at Nice (France) the European Union conducted an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on institutional reform and agreed on some necessary treaty amendments with respect to defense. ESDP, a new endeavor for a European Union not previously designed to handle security issues, has raised the prospect of significant institutional changes, some of which required treaty modifications. The sensitive nature of ESDP will wed it to the progress and pace of the IGC.

Such complex institutional developments have moved to the forefront of policymaker agendas in the Foreign Offices and Ministries of Defense in London, Paris, and Berlin. The French held the presidency of the European Union in the latter half of 2000, and ESDP is a special priority for them. All three capitals seek tangible results within a short timeframe. To better understand what is driving ESDP developments in Europe, it is essential to take a closer look at policy developments in the three leading nations, beginning with the UK. Its transformation was most significant as it embraced the movement towards a more

autonomous defense capability.

The United Kingdom

*Getting Europe's voice heard more clearly in the world
will not be achieved through merging the EU and WEU
or developing an unrealistic common defence policy.*

--Tony Blair, UK Prime Minister⁷

It is unlikely that the British Prime Minister's remarks after the Amsterdam Summit (1997) will come back to haunt him, but they clearly indicate that a reversal of the United Kingdom's position on a European defense identity has taken place in the interim. During the EU Heads of State meeting in Pörschach (Germany) during October 1998, the British—for the first time—supported the position that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis.” This agreement now forms the basis for the St. Malo British-French Declaration on European Defense (December 1998).⁸ The British had previously been reluctant to accept a greater security role for the European Union, preferring to focus on NATO as the principal security organization for Europe. The phrase “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” is peppered throughout documents to highlight the British (and for that matter European) position that a capacity for autonomous action is pursued not to compete with NATO, but rather to supplement and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. It is preparation for the probability of American reluctance to participate in the management of small-scale crises on the periphery of Europe. From a European perspective, the United States has continually asked the Europeans to contribute a greater share to support the defense burden while sending ambiguous signals about America's commitment to crisis reaction. It is only prudent for them to prepare for the potential requirement to react to crises without complete US support.

Prime Minister Blair has taken a keen personal interest in the

development of the ESDP. For him it is an opportunity to capitalize on the traditional leadership position of the United Kingdom in security affairs in Europe. The Prime Minister struggles with a populace more and more reluctant to sign on to the Euro and a powerful Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown who is focused on building a legacy of fiscal responsibility.⁹ This bodes poorly for the country's choosing to seek EMU accession in the near future. To offset the marginalization that may result as the UK remains outside the EMU, Blair pursues a leadership role in Europe for himself and Britain within the ESDP framework. Due to the "special relationship" between the United Kingdom and the United States, the British have been tasked with the lead in selling the initiative to the US.

British Minister of Defence, Geof Hoon, is facing accusations from his Tory shadow, Iain Duncan Smith, who traveled to Washington to "warn the Americans that Mr. Blair has abandoned Britain's formally Atlanticist policy and is now part of a 40 year-old French agenda to separate the two halves of NATO and give the EU an army of its own."¹⁰ Apocalyptic challenges from the Tories ring a bit shallow when their second in command, Michael Portillo, proposed as the Tory candidate Minister of Defence in 1996, said "that European countries acting without America should be able to use NATO equipment for humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks."¹¹

More balanced critics, such as the noted historian John Keegan, question the political will of EU nations to develop viable autonomous capabilities, and the value of proposing their development prematurely.

Europe is still far from establishing its military independence of the United States. Until it can do so, it should carefully consider whether it is desirable to make military gestures that do nothing to alarm the enemies of European security—the Balkan warlords,

the resurgent Russian militarists—but may unnecessarily offend Europe’s transatlantic protectors.¹²

Indeed, it is a challenging tightrope for the British—maintaining their privileged position with respect to the United States while pursuing more influence in continental European affairs. They appear to have succeeded thus far.

France

The French do not face a similar internal political challenge with respect to ESDP as they have continually supported a greater security role for the European Union. For the French, ESDP is a natural progression of European integration and an essential element in the validity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certainly the French consider a stronger unified Europe as a balance to United States dominance, a position shared by their European partners, but more freely expressed by the French. And although these developments should entail a balancing influence in transatlantic relations, the French (and their partners) consider a stronger Europe a better partner in the security arena, not a fiercer competitor.

As the French took over the presidency of the European Union in July 2000, ESDP remained a number one priority for them. Along with the Germans, the French have been the engine of European integration. France, more than any other European nation, champions the autonomous development of European Union institutions. The French were never comfortable with the American dominance of NATO, however essential it may have been to deter Soviet aggression. As the security aspects of the European Union were developed, French insistence on the EU’s internal development prior to negotiation with outside elements such as NATO was interpreted by some as a lack of transparency. Nonetheless, developments with respect to ESDP have in some ways openly integrated the French military more closely with

NATO. For example, the Eurocorps headquarters assumed day-to-day command in Kosovo, placing the Eurocorps under NATO command for the first time.¹³

The French are often criticized for their cartesianism: a strategic and institutional focus on logical problem solving in accordance with specific principles, often at the expense of pragmatic results. Their emphasis on “verticality” with respect to ESDP is a clear example of French cartesianism. With verticality the French expect to ensure that ESDP has the proper mechanisms at all levels, most specifically with respect to strategic intelligence and command and control. The French and their European partners understandably wish to obtain adequate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to make autonomous security decisions. Nevertheless, France’s European partners are unlikely to contribute adequate resources to produce the level of verticality for ESDP that the French would prefer. Much to the chagrin of the French, it is likely that the ESDP efforts of their European partners will focus resources on other capabilities and rely on American predominance in the C4ISR arena for the short term.¹⁴

Germany

Germany is clearly more comfortable than France with the predominant position of the United States within NATO as a whole. The Bundeswehr (the German military) has its origins within NATO; most Bundeswehr forces are attached to NATO; and unlike the United Kingdom or France, Germany is predominately reliant on the American nuclear umbrella. However, a diminished threat to the east has laid the groundwork for a normalization of German security policy on an unprecedented scale. Determined to remain within the multilateral context of the European Union and still reluctant to be perceived as in the forefront, Germany has underlying national concerns that are coming to light.

Germany was in the presidency of the European Union in June

1999, when the EU first released its plans for ESDP. Germany, with its tradition of incorporating military forces into multilateral organizations, is probably more willing to surrender the authority over its military forces to the European Union than Britain or France. The Germans are cognizant of the importance of transparency in the development of ESDP. They share the sentiment of several European nations that the success of ESDP depends in part on how it is perceived in the United States. Only complete transparency with NATO and the US will help ensure a positive reception of ESDP in the United States.

Germany is realistically restricted in its support with respect to ESDP after the fallout from the Weizsäcker Commission¹⁵ and the accompanying German Chief of Defense Staff reports on the future of the Bundeswehr. These major studies, in line with similar efforts ongoing or recently completed throughout Europe, furnished the fundamental groundwork for the future of the Bundeswehr. This future will be dominated by reduced defense budgets and a shrinking military.

One of the fundamental issues addressed by these studies is conscription, a politically volatile issue that will help to determine the core force level and make-up of the military. Although a professional force is the centerpiece of other evolving militaries in Europe, it is

unlikely that Germany will abolish conscription. According to Klaus Becher, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Conscription is enjoying not only majority support in terms of public opinion but, above all is considered indispensable for Germany for political as well as strategic reasons by most political leaders and by the Bundeswehr's military leadership. The lasting advantage of the Bundeswehr's accepted role as "citizens in uniform," the value of conscription for recruitment, the strategic importance for a land power to maintain a sufficient pool for force regeneration, and the indispensable role of 170,000 conscientious objectors who currently opt for alternative service in

social care are very likely to convince the German leadership that conscription should be preserved, though in an adapted way.¹⁶

Germans remind those who criticize their low levels of defense spending that Germany practically bought the Soviet military out of Eastern Europe with their financial assistance to Moscow in the early 1990s. Many Germans consider their extensive financial investment in stability in eastern and central Europe a major contribution to European security. Germans argue that the slow progress of Bundeswehr reform may be attributed in part to the disruptive effects of incorporating the East German military and reducing an overall force of 521,000 soldiers in 1990 to 323,000 by 2000.¹⁷ German military experts also highlight the fact that Germany's central front-line position in Europe requires maintaining some of the heavy forces that are first on the chopping block in militaries more comfortably focused on crisis response.

Initial indications from the Ministry of Defense are that the German military will face further reductions, but postpone other painful reforms. The Bundeswehr will be cut to about 285,000 troops while retaining 80,000 conscripts.¹⁸ This is likely to present the Germans with the challenge of making improvements while retaining conscription in some form, a potentially more costly endeavor. This framework should allow German policymakers to slowly develop a force more suited for crisis response but unable to commit to any new substantive improvements in capabilities.

United States

As in other areas of foreign policy, it is too early to pinpoint the Bush Administration's view on ESDP. "Robert Zoellick, one of Bush's long-standing foreign policy advisors and his new Trade Representative, has often argued that the Europeans are more likely to spend money on boosting military capabilities if they are going to be able to use them autonomously under an EU banner."¹⁹ There are indications that

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is much more skeptical and considers ESDP a threat to NATO: “I personally will be watching carefully to see how things evolve, because we have so much at stake with that [NATO] alliance. We need to be vigilant to see that we don’t do anything that would inject instability into the alliance.”²⁰ It is unclear at this point where the dominant strain in foreign policy resides within the Bush Administration, but it is likely that resistance to ESDP will subside with further consultation. Nonetheless, ambiguity and tempered support are likely to remain as in the previous administration.

The Clinton Administration’s view on ESDP attempted to strike “a delicate balance between doing too much and not doing enough.”²¹ Doing too much encourages Europeans to “free ride” and jeopardizes American public and congressional support for US military engagement in Europe; doing too little challenges the credibility of the American commitment to Europe.²² The administration appeared to recognize that a stronger and more capable Europe could be a better partner. Still, the United States has not conveyed a unified vote of support for ESDP efforts by its European partners.

On the whole, across most sectors, there is a unified voice in support of improved capabilities and the concept of Europeans taking on a larger share of the burden. However, beyond that point, there is much skepticism surrounding the prospect of European success in demonstrating improved capabilities. “For all their posturing about an independent security and defense identity, EU members have been wildly unenthusiastic about matching their rhetoric with their money,” warned John R. Bolton while a defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute.²³ As the only country that has devoted immense resources to develop the vast array of capabilities that European nations are striving for, the United States appreciates the challenge for Europe. Americans will scrutinize European capability improvements and use this assessment

as a measure of the program's success.

Various factions within the US Congress have repeatedly questioned the large US commitment to European security, and recent concerns about a deteriorating European contribution in the Balkans have brought this issue to the forefront. Noting recent ESDP developments, Senator Carl Levin, present Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (D- Michigan) observed: "I am mystified why our NATO allies have not provided more police for deployment in their own back yard.... On my scorecard, the European nations and the European Union are flunking the test."²⁴ In a further indication of distress in Congress, during his tenure as the former chairman, John W. Warner (R-Virginia) said he would seek to withhold half of the \$2 billion appropriation for American troops in Kosovo unless European nations increased their financial contributions to efforts there.²⁵ Senate Democrat Robert C. Byrd has recommended tying additional financing for Kosovo to a plan to turn over peacekeeping in Kosovo to the Europeans.

It is just possible that the Europeans will excel at peacekeeping duties in Kosovo if ever they are allowed to emerge from the overwhelming shadow cast by the United States. Unfortunately, we will never know if we do not tie further American investment in Kosovo to a rock-solid plan to turn the peacekeeping operation over to them—sooner rather than later.²⁶

Some Congressional sentiment clearly supports greater efforts with respect to ESDP. However, expectations are considerable, and many are not content with European progress to date.

Members of Congress have also raised concerns about the effect of ESDP efforts on NATO. "I look upon it [ESDP] as being virtually an abrogation of European responsibility to NATO," said Herbert Bateman, then Republican Chair of the House Armed Services Committee's Military Readiness Panel.²⁷ Although clearly an extreme position on ESDP within Congress, this view highlights the confusion associated

with ESDP. Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D- Delaware), now Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has raised a more tempered and valid concern:

The Europeans have raised the bar pretty high, and whether they go over it or under it, there are likely to be consequences. If this is handled badly from a public relations standpoint, it could well fuel a growing sense of isolationism in the United States. That's why it's so important to the Europeans to stay the course in terms of dollar and troop commitments to Kosovo, and with ESDI.²⁸

ESDP will continue to face a skeptical group in Congress demanding more burden sharing yet wary of the effects of ESDP on transatlantic relations.

There are indications in some circles, including statements from State Department representatives, that the growing "European" voice in security matters is not completely appreciated.²⁹ There is a great reluctance to surrender the dominant voice of NATO (read the United States) in European security issues. These sentiments are reinforced through comments from traditional "Atlanticists" currently outside the government who are wary of the motivation behind European efforts for more autonomous capabilities.³⁰ Skeptics could argue they are simply uncomfortable with the reality of the inevitable momentum towards a more balanced transatlantic relationship. But such a simplistic explanation for the sentiments of America's most skilled observers and ardent supporters of the transatlantic link would be unwise.

CHALLENGES TO ESDP—THE ROAD AHEAD

Psychological Dimension

A major challenge to the development of ESDP will be the psychological and political aspects that arise from the historical framework of the alliance and the uncharted intangible nature of European integration.³¹ Some of the Europeans are tempted to define ESDP in opposition to a unilateralist and hegemonic United States with accompanying

unproductive rhetoric. The United States, on the other hand, is tempted to either rely on the inertia of a bureaucracy unwilling to accept a more balanced relationship, or pack its bags and return to traditional isolationism. Clearly neither of these inclinations is productive, yet their management and packaging is crucial to the success of ESDP.

Frequently the development of a counterweight to US dominance is used as a motivator for further European integration and ESDP. Several past and present European leaders couch the development of a more cohesive European voice in world affairs as a balance to concerns of American unilateralism. One of the most outspoken is French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine: “We cannot accept either a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower.”³² In many cases the rhetoric takes on a cruder undercurrent of anti-Americanism from judgements against US manipulation of NATO in Kosovo to industrial espionage allegations of the Echelon surveillance system in the European Union.³³

Clearly the end of the Cold War has freed the inhibitions of some critics and raised concerns with others about the unbridled effects of American power. “There is a great deal of fear out there that the strength of America’s economy will impose not only economic changes but social changes as well. What they see is an America that has the ability to impose its values and they are not values that the Europeans believe in.”³⁴ America’s critics abroad highlight disagreements on a number of issues from social welfare to the death penalty, at times by countries traditionally much more restrained in their criticism. Michael Steiner, chief diplomatic adviser to German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, declared during the controversy over the managing director for the International Monetary Fund (IMF): “We have discovered that the superpower sees its global role not only in the military area but also in setting the rules of globalization through the IMF.”³⁵

The United States has at times inflamed European concerns and fears through condescending behavior in the international arena. The continual proclamations that the United States is the “indispensable nation” only add fuel to the fire. Americans frequently transpose their policies internationally under the umbrella that what is good for the US is good for the world, a sentiment not universally appreciated. Some of America’s controversial policies such as sanctions against Cuba and Iran, and US efforts to impose them internationally, grate on the allies. America’s current effort in the development of a National Missile Defense, however limited in its intended scope, is fueling European concerns about decoupling and the threat of a renewed nuclear arms race.

What has developed in some sense is an American concern about decoupling with respect to ESDP, and European concerns about decoupling with respect to NMD. Some Americans are concerned that the development of a viable European defense pillar will weaken the transatlantic link. Some Europeans are concerned that NMD development will remove the strategic nuclear threat from the United States and therefore decouple the US nuclear guarantee for Europe. However as Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, notes:

The accusations flying across the Atlantic these days suggest a crisis atmosphere reminiscent of the one that beset NATO in the late 1970s and 1980s. Yet, the current “crisis” is more apparent than real. It feeds on worst-case fears about what might happen many years from now and ignores the underlying solidity of the transatlantic relationship. On every important European security issue today—from wanting to encourage Russian reform, to the promotion of democratization and economic prosperity throughout Europe, and the opposition against gross human rights violations throughout the world—Europe and America share a deep-seated perspective in common. That is the current reality that the worry about decoupling now being heard through the transatlantic echo chamber

ignores.³⁶

These differences are not roadblocks to the success of ESDP; they are simply speed bumps. As such their management from both sides of the Atlantic is crucial. In Europe, a certain level of competition and frustration with the United States and its international dominance is expected. However, official rhetoric must balance the requirements to play to domestic audiences with the unintended results of American vilification. From the American perspective, it is prudent to accept a new environment in which suspicions and frustrations are high. Balanced reactions and restrained and diplomatic responses will ensure continued good relations on a substantive level.

The Focus on Capabilities

European NATO partners currently have more military personnel, more combat divisions, more combat aircraft and more warships than the United States.³⁷ However, this force for the most part is designed on a mobilization system to confront a non-existent Soviet threat, and only about twenty percent of that force is available in a reasonable timeframe.

The situation is even worse in the areas highlighted by the Kosovo air campaign such as C4ISR, precision munitions, strategic lift, electronic warfare, and aerial refueling. As Francois Heisbourg, the French expert who chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, has pointed out:

With defence spending close to 60 percent of America's, the Europeans could in theory be expected to achieve 60 percent of US capabilities. They are probably below 10 percent in the realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C4ISR, and substantially less than 20 percent in airlift capacity (by volume or tonnage), and possibly at less than 10 percent in terms of precision guided air-deliverable ordnance.³⁸

Broad-brush assessments of a capability gap fail to incorporate the multitude of variables that have led to these differences. The United States has traditionally maintained an expeditionary focus and through

NATO encouraged the role specialization that resulted in the current capability gap. “The challenge for the Europeans, therefore, has been to turn their large, static, and defensive force structures into leaner armies that are better able to “project power” beyond their borders.”³⁹

From this base the European Union has established the “headline goal” of 60,000 troops, deployable within sixty days for up to a year, and capable of handling the full range of Petersberg tasks, all before 2003. Although a good start, this “headline goal” is unlikely to be able to handle the upper end of the conflict spectrum. As demonstrated in Kosovo, high intensity conflict requires C4ISR, all weather precision guided munitions, aerial refueling and electronic warfare. European nations on the whole do not possess the political will to support the development of such a power projection force at this time.

However, the European perspective on crisis reaction is intended to integrate all elements of peacekeeping and enforcement, from humanitarian assistance to actual military operations.⁴⁰ In this arena the Europeans have a distinct advantage over the traditional high-intensity focus of the US military. Members of the European Union such as the Swedes and Finns provide extensive peacekeeping experience and low-end capabilities such as police forces that are essential to current efforts and clearly in short supply. The performance of the European forces on the ground in Kosovo, as in Bosnia, does not pale in comparison to the Americans. Quite the contrary, in many instances European peacekeepers have proved more flexible and adaptable, better able to understand what is happening on the ground and less obsessed with self protection.⁴¹ As the Europeans transform their forces to meet the crisis response requirements of the future, it is important not to dismiss the value added to European security of the lower-end capabilities of EU members.

Although they are beginning to convert to more mobile forces,

European nations are not prepared to join the United States in the current revolution in military affairs (RMA). The United States is cultivating a force designed to confront more advanced opponents, possibly with weapons of mass destruction, which threaten interests outside of Europe which are often as vital to Europe as to the United States. However, it is likely that Europe will continue to rely on the United States in this high-intensity realm indefinitely.

Resources are the clearest challenge to ESDP and a viable European autonomous defense capability. European nations on the whole are much more reluctant to dedicate resources to defense, ironically in some respects, due to the security traditionally provided by US forces. Economic conditions in Europe do not currently allow for the surpluses presently envisioned here in the United States, and solidifying the future viability of European social welfare systems is the primary focus of most treasuries, especially in light of demographic trends highlighted by the aging European population.

Moreover, ESDP proponents argue that as a part of continued European integration, resources are more likely to develop to support the next logical step of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and its supporting military arm. There may be value in European initiatives that are not perceived as dictated by the United States. The European Union has gone to great lengths to differentiate ESDP from the NATO agreed Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), a similar US led effort to increase European capabilities.⁴² The underlying EU premise is that as a European initiative, ESDP can garner the momentum of peer review which was so successful with the development of the EMU and overcome the recognized stagnation within NATO Europe with respect to capability improvements. As one European Defense Official noted, "I expect that the Italian Defense Minister will have more success requesting increased resources for the common European Security and Defense Policy than for

DCI.”⁴³

Yet beyond the rhetoric there appears to be a reluctance of European leaders to place a priority on developments in Europe as a whole. In addition, it does not appear that the climate in Europe supports a greater focus on security. It is unlikely that leaders in the ministries of defense and foreign offices will be able to convince their treasuries, or for that matter their populace, that a “safe and secure” Europe needs to devote more resources to defense.⁴⁴

With reduced prospects for more resources, proponents of greater European defense capabilities focus on more efficient expenditures. One expected windfall area stems from the trend away from conscription towards a more professional military force. Defense leaders are also hoping a more consolidated defense effort will reduce the duplication and waste of parallel industrial development. In addition, each defense ministry makes claims about streamlining processes and outsourcing for increased efficiencies.

Yet claimed efficiencies appear at times to be political cover for further cuts. It is unlikely after over a decade of defense cuts and continual reorganization that much more substantive gains can be wrought from additional restructuring. It is unclear at this point that professional forces will result in reduced resource expenditures as the financial challenges of recruiting and retention highlight. Additionally, it is unlikely that Germany, a critical resource provider for future ESDP development, will quickly surrender its tradition of conscription.

Although progress has been made in the area of European industrial defense consolidation, military leaders at this point are not comfortable promoting the pooling of resources or specialization required for substantive gains in efficiency. European militaries already trail the United States in the critical defense technologies prevalent in the current

revolution in military affairs. This gap is only likely to increase due to insufficient European investment and American dominance of information technology. In addition, American controls on the export of technology and an accompanying growing European reluctance to rely on American military hardware inhibit the construction of the common technological base required for interoperability in the future.

The US military has determined to garner the developments of information technology for decisive advantage, and has committed resources to pursue this information dominance. European militaries on the whole do not share the urgency of the requirement or the luxury of the resources to match US investments. What is developing is a divergence of forces that potentially will undermine the alliance.

These differences are likely to keep US forces on the forefront of high-intensity operations, while its allies will handle the implementation of cease-fire agreements and peacekeeping. This will create unwanted tiers within the alliance, to the chagrin of European leaders. An ally on a lower tier will have little say in the development of a strategy to deal with a conflict. Furthermore, these gaps will highlight US military forces as visible terrorist targets for reactions to interventions, undermining US domestic support for the Alliance because of the appearance of inequitable burden sharing.

This capabilities gap will create potential interoperability problems that must be addressed by both sides of the Atlantic. The United States must remain cognizant of the need to maintain legacy systems in order to continue the capability to work with its allies, while promoting greater technology transfer and transatlantic industrial partnerships. Congress is reluctant to widen defense procurement outside domestic sources and reducing the technological barriers will be problematic. Nevertheless, if America fails to provide a more balanced field for European defense development, and to include its allies in RMA

developments on the procurement side, they are unlikely to keep pace.

From the European perspective, a more difficult paradigm shift is required to accept a greater share of the burden throughout the spectrum of conflict. Without such a shift, the political will and accompanying resource commitment required to parallel US military developments will be absent. Europeans and Americans spend money on security in very different ways because they are less likely to deal with a shared threat in the same manner.⁴⁵ Europeans focus much more on the soft side and are reluctant to project hard power, but they are slowly changing.

What is most likely in the near term is that ESDP efforts will concentrate on basic improvements in the mobility and sustainability of European military forces. By American standards these improvements will not be drastic. However, from the European perspective, the transformation from fixed territorial defense to crisis response will be quite significant. In the near term the United States will be required to shoulder much of the burden with respect to the execution phase of high intensity operations. European forces will focus on the implementation phase with respect to crisis response. This limitation will certainly restrict European flexibility in operations when the alliance as a whole is not engaged.

Nonetheless, European nations will work to transform their militaries to more flexible forces in order to meet the “headline goal.” To deploy a long-term fielded force of 60,000 troops, a pool of at least 180,000 is required. For the foreseeable future, most of the contributions to this force will come from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The development of adequate headquarters units will be more problematic, but as the Eurocorps takeover of the Kosovo operation indicates, these efforts are in full swing.

Air and sealift collaboration efforts are ongoing. Combined

with a dedicated procurement effort it is likely that the European nations will meet their sustainability goals within their assigned timeframe. Combat aircraft should not present a difficulty. Although European navies have a clear shortage of amphibious shipping, sophisticated air-defense frigates, and command frigates, it is unclear that these shortages would markedly affect crisis operations on the low end of the spectrum.

US policymakers will be tempted to judge European efforts with respect to ESDP on specific delivered capability improvements. Europeans are just as likely to expect a more equal seat at the table after dedicating efforts to improve capabilities. Without demonstrated improved capabilities, the European nations will not be provided much of a say, especially if a conflict similar to Kosovo arises. It is likely that both sides will be disappointed and the management of these expectations will be crucial in the maintenance of the strong transatlantic link.

American expectations will center on Euro-improvements in the areas of deficiency identified during the Kosovo air campaign: (1) all weather delivery of precision guided munitions, (2) electronic warfare support and attack, (3) aerial refueling, (4) strategic lift, and perhaps most importantly, (5) C4ISR. Moreover, much focus from the American perspective will come from the broad scope of requirements delineated in the DCI. Aside from limited individual improvements in the United Kingdom and France, it is unlikely that ESDP as a whole will show marked improvement in any of these areas in the near term. Therefore, US leaders will feel pressured to condemn European efforts as a failure and are unlikely to support European efforts for greater input in security matters.

However, in the interest of European security, the United States should demonstrate an unprecedented level of patience as the European Union nations slowly develop their defense capabilities. Although European developments will not address the broad scope of sub-points

specified in the DCI, their limited efforts will move in the prescribed direction of improved flexibility, mobility and sustainability. There is a greater recognition in the United States that there may be value in European efforts to focus their improvements and package their efforts in a more European context. It will take at least ten years for the Europeans to develop a minimal credible autonomous defense capability. This timeline may be beyond US levels of patience, but Americans must recognize European limitations and patiently allow them to pursue what in the long run will benefit the alliance.

Institution Building

*The European Union prefers compromise to confrontation, and norms to force. It has no tradition of power politics or energetic political actions. Its civil service is void of military or strategic culture, and is notably lax at protecting the security of the information it handles. So the EU is not the obvious institution in which to develop a military organisation.*⁴⁶

In March 1999, the European Union established three interim bodies in support of ESDP. The existing Political Committee was given a permanent standing with resident ambassadors to take on the ever-present security aspect of the CFSP (known as COPS by its French acronym). A Military Committee much like NATO's military committee was established, and for many countries the representatives are dual hatted (sit on both committees). In addition, a European joint military staff will help the Military Committee to commission elaborate strategic options. The challenge of these new organizations is the development of more permanent institutions that meet a myriad of requirements. These challenges include: (1) allaying the concerns about transparency and adequate input from non-EU members of NATO (United States, Canada, Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland); (2) balancing the requirements of the non-NATO members of the EU who are traditionally more neutral in security matters (Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Austria); (3) and maintaining the autonomy of

decisionmaking required for an organization separate from NATO and cherished by the only non-integrated military member of NATO (France).

The European Union, unlike NATO, is not a security institution. As it transitions to an entity with security aspects, it will experience tremendous internal change and stress upon established EU principles. In conjunction with incorporating the Western European Union (WEU) security organ, let alone efforts to incorporate new members into the EU, the enormity of this task is often overlooked. It is likely that these adjustments will require treaty changes and the ensuing cumbersome ratification process entailed therein.

The treaty change requirements are most likely to derive from the complexity of incorporating WEU into the EU. Traditionally neutral non-NATO members of the EU have no interest in turning the EU into a collective defense organization like NATO. These countries are reluctant to take on the collective defense obligations resident in the WEU charter (the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, as amended in 1954) and will therefore require some form of relief from that commitment. In addition, the EU will need to formalize a decisionmaking regimen that could account for the interests of both the neutral EU members who may want to abstain, and the non-EU NATO members who may want to contribute to an operation. The December 1999 Helsinki Presidency report provides preliminary guidelines for decisionmaking and consultation which are being refined and formalized.

It is with this backdrop that the EU interaction with NATO is developing. There is a clear need to maintain a level of transparency for non-EU members of NATO who are most likely to provide forces in support of EU-led operations. The exact level of this transparency and the timing and sequence of consultation are creating the biggest challenge for the institutional development of ESDP.

Initially termed the “right of first refusal,” this principle was

framed in US Senate resolution 208: "the European Union would undertake an autonomous mission... only after NATO had declined to undertake the mission."⁴⁷ For the United States the clear concern is that somehow US forces would be dragged into some quagmire against their will by an overly ambitious or misguided European led force. American concerns have been subdued by statements such as from French Minister of Defense, Mr. Alain Richard: "Can one seriously imagine that the Europeans acting within the EU would consider getting involved in a politico-military operation while keeping the US in the dark or ignoring its advice and not seeking its support and participation?"⁴⁸ The establishment of the four NATO-EU working groups in the summer of 2000, and the various agreements reached at the end of that year, left most American policymakers reasonably satisfied on the issue of NATO's relationship with the EU.⁴⁹

However, the European non-EU NATO members are much less subdued in their reaction to current ESDP developments. On the whole these six nations (Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Norway, and Iceland) are much less interested in the development of a more autonomous defense capability and much more interested in collective defense and the vital role the United States plays as a strategic balance to a resurgent Russian threat. They are concerned about aspects of ESDP that are threatening the vital transatlantic link. Nonetheless, as long as the United States is comfortable with ESDP developments, these members (with the exception of Turkey) are likely to follow the American lead.

The Turks are the most vociferous in their opposition to the current formula for the consultation and involvement of non-EU NATO members. They have vetoed the arrangements which would allow the EU, in normal circumstances, "assured access" to NATO planning. Even a personal phone call from President Clinton to Bulent Ecevit, the

Turkish Prime Minister, could not persuade the Turks to lift their veto.⁵⁰ Turkey was still not happy with the role it had been offered in the EU's new defense arrangements. The Turkish position would in essence provide NATO with a veto on EU decisions. The Turks have indicated they will work against ESDP within NATO if they continue to be excluded.

It is difficult to determine the justification for Turkey's hard line in this respect. They certainly perceive a reduced voice in European Security if ESDP moves to the forefront and they are not part of the process. Within NATO they enjoy a privileged position as a strategic ally of the United States, a luxury that they would not share within the European Union.

The newer Central European members of NATO (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) find themselves in a difficult dilemma as aspirants to join the European Union. As members of NATO, their security is to a degree assured by the United States, and their relationship with the US is of vital importance. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has voiced concerns that these newer members of NATO could serve as a "US Trojan Horse," subverting French and German aspirations to make the union a proud and effective rival to the United States.⁵¹ With NATO membership in hand, these three countries are forced to drift towards EU positions as their economic challenges are at the forefront.⁵²

Other nations such as Norway are concerned about being left out of the ESDP institutional development. They also have concerns about disrupting the transatlantic relationship. Norwegians are more accommodating to EU positions as they have chosen to remain outside the EU and feel no economic pressure at this time to join. They recognize the complicated dynamic of the institutional formula and the fact that the Turks and the French are at loggerheads. According to a senior Norwegian diplomat: "The French will never accept a formal

hierarchy with NATO first and the EU second. We may need some constructive ambiguity. NATO will continue to be the main instrument. We would see that as reality, but we wouldn't insist on formulating that reality.”⁵³

From the French perspective, it is a balance between the requirements for consultation and transparency against the requirements to retain an autonomous decisionmaking process within the EU. The French fear not just preemption within the European Union from a NATO or US inspired veto, but the complex management of the potential Greek veto on Turkish participation. From the French perspective (but not only the French), the EU is an infantile organization with respect to security matters. Prior to delineating hard and fast external relationships with NATO, it must mature internally.

Clearly the French have no interest in developing an institution that like NATO is dominated by the United States. Although not alone in this position, once again the French are probably the most vocal. ESDP should be a European institution. There is certainly widespread interest in improving upon existing relationships and institutions currently dominating European security. This is a difficult challenge as a force planning mechanism must be developed which: (1) incorporates the French, who do not presently participate in the NATO collective defense planning process, (2) improves current NATO force planning, and (3) does not require a duplication or deviation unacceptable to the remainder of the alliance. The French are concerned about options that are too close to current NATO efforts without marked improvement. Most NATO allies are quite comfortable with the current system and reluctant to change tracks. This is an important obstacle that will require an imaginative solution by developers of ESDP.

ESDP will certainly require a strategic planning capability that the military staff should provide. C4ISR capabilities will be inferior to

those of the United States in the near term, but the commitment is there for future development, and the US will fill the gap in the interim. Operational planning will reside with NATO in an effort to avoid duplication, with agreed procedures for requests from the EU. This should provide a reassuring level of transparency as all NATO members will take part in the planning options for any contingency, and therefore influence decisions and provide feedback at a lower level.

Institutional development of ESDP will remain one of the more controversial aspects challenging the defense initiative. The rapid pace of development combined with the daunting task of integrating European security structures will push the limits of transatlantic diplomacy. Capability developments will be limited and slow, requiring expectation management by skilled leaders. No matter what the rhetoric, there is much that binds the alliance, and measured consultations are the key to its continuation.

US POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons. The one is that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy. The second is that, in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide to be followed.⁵⁴

In formulating policy, the leadership in the United States has continually ignored the sage advice of James Madison (quoted above) on the value of consultation. At a time when American power faces no relative challenger, the temptation is even greater to forge ahead unilaterally. However, the United States will not succeed as it ventures forth without the support of its allies. In the particular circumstance of ESDP, this will require surrendering considerable input on this European initiative, and

patiently anticipating the long-term benefits from a stronger European partner.

Unfortunately, not everyone is entirely convinced that a stronger Europe will be a better partner for the US. Owen Harries expresses the reluctance of some to give up US influence and concern about the intentions of a more unified Europe.

If one believes, as I do, that there is a lot of accumulated but suppressed resentment in Europe of its subordination to and dependence on the United States over the last half a century, then one would expect the expression of that pent-up resentment to be a cardinal feature of the new superpower's behavior—certainly in the form of an assertion of independence and difference; probably in the form of competition, obstruction, and rivalry; possibly in the form of outright hostility.⁵⁵

Certain aspects of behavior exhibited by Europeans fit this description and feed the fires of skepticism in the United States.

It is difficult to produce definitive evidence for those skeptics that a Unified Europe will not become a superpower competitor that America will live to regret. Those who embrace a stronger partner in Europe accept a level of risk. This risk is considered quite limited by those who recall the shared goals and work of the last half century as an indication of great potential for the future. It is in the US interest to embrace European integration, because it is a process that will proceed with or without the United States. Together the allies can build a stronger, more balanced alliance.

One method to prevent the development of an anti-hegemonic European counterbalance to American power is to temper what Samuel Huntington has called a foreign policy of “rhetoric and retreat” and the growing US reputation of acting as a “hollow hegemon.”⁵⁶ Frequent threats of military intervention often followed by tardy and ineffectual shows of force have seriously challenged the credibility of the military

arm of diplomacy. From the numerous idle threats of military action in Bosnia through the disastrous withdrawal from Somalia, to the policy failures in Iraq, the post-Cold War displays of military force have on the whole been ineffectual. Even the “successful” military operation in Kosovo was marred by numerous shortcomings.

With the abundance of US sanctions targeted at dictators around the world, which more than often punish the countries’ populace and are haphazardly and often unilaterally enforced, the United States is becoming to some the “rogue superpower.”⁵⁷ Benign hegemony is a figment of the American imagination. The rest of the world is quite concerned with some of America’s policies and has no interest in allowing America to act as the world’s policeman. The United States can encourage a more cooperative partner in Europe by humbly demonstrating an interest in working together as equals. “Healthy cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom.”⁵⁸

In developing the basis for a more effective policy it is important to recognize the backdrop for current US failures. Without a clearly defined threat, increased apathy with respect to foreign policy amongst the electorate provided an atmosphere ripe for divisiveness and inattention. Rather than capitalizing on a position of strength,

The post-cold-war generation of American leaders (whether graduated from the protest movements or business schools) finds it possible to imagine that foreign policy consists of merely instructing the rest of the world. This turns diplomacy into nothing more than demands for compliance with an American agenda. When vast economic and military power is coupled with condescension and righteousness, dominance grows grating and leadership comes to be perceived as hegemony.⁵⁹

Few would question the requirement for the United States to take the leadership role in transatlantic security affairs. Much of what

has been discussed indicates it is unlikely that the United States will face a security equal across the Atlantic. However, this reality does not justify the level of condescension that is prevalent in US reactions to ESDP. Although it is clear that developments will not meet expectations, the most constructive US policy is one that encourages a stronger partner through consultation and support.

Force Structure Implications

Clearly the limited advances in capabilities expected with ESDP will not allow the Europeans to take on any of the major burdens borne predominately by the United States as part of NATO. Arguments supporting a near-term withdrawal of US forces from Europe fail to account for the reality of a more globalized world. Europe is a major trading partner and operations base for billions of dollars of US investment. Americans are not willing to withdraw completely from the European stage and sacrifice the leadership position of the United States in world affairs. That will require continued presence of US military forces in the European Theater for regional influence and as a base for operations in other theaters.

As it is likely that US forces will remain at their current levels in Europe and that ESDP will not provide any substantive relief, US force planning in the region will not change markedly. The Kosovo conflict highlighted deficiencies in the areas of C4ISR, power projection, electronic attack and aerial refueling for the non-US NATO forces. The Europeans recognized the dire shortfall and some will make efforts in these areas, but due to their current inferior position and limited resources progress will be slow. Without any near-term contributions from the Europeans in these areas, US forces will continue to bear the full burden of operations.

The Europeans may progress more rapidly in the arena of strategic lift. Concrete plans for a European airlift command are

underway along with more tentative plans for a similar sealift cooperative effort. European forces on the whole have not structured their forces for mobility, resulting in a dwarfed strategic lift capability when compared to US forces.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, intra-theater lift is an area where US forces may experience relief in the short term from more efficient European lift capabilities.

Implementation forces are the expected areas of greatest improvement for European forces. It is likely that in the next few years the Europeans will be able to provide the entire contingent of ground troops to support current NATO operations in the Balkans. Although the United States will likely continue to provide C4ISR support in the near term, the US contributions may become more significant in supporting roles. This transition should provide a level of flexibility to US forces in the region and become a highlighted important first step in European efforts to share more of the burden of their regional security.

For the United States Air Force (USAF) ESDP developments will have a minimal effect on its force planning. It will continue to bear the brunt of power projection capabilities, most specifically all weather precision guided munitions and aerial refueling. The USAF integral role in C4ISR during high-intensity operations will certainly continue for the near term. However, the Air Force may experience some relief in the area of intra-theater lift.

It is unlikely the United States Navy (USN) will be able to incorporate European contributions into its force planning efforts. As the Navy concentrates on power projection in the form of Tomahawk cruise missiles and aircraft carrier tactical aviation, the Europeans will continue to provide only symbolic force levels in these areas. Although European navies contribute substantial assets in the support areas of undersea warfare, mine clearing operations, and maritime interdiction, these

contributions have already been incorporated into USN perspectives on European deployments.

The United States Army is the most likely beneficiary of ESDP developments. As European forces consolidate to develop a mobile, sustainable force of 60,000 troops, the US Army is likely to reduce its peacekeeping force commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo. This should provide a welcome relief for a commitment that has strained unit readiness and challenged the patience of congressional leaders. It should be welcomed as an important first step in the right direction for Europe.

Nonetheless, the force structure implications of ESDP highlight an important challenge to European security and transatlantic relations. Kosovo highlighted the gap between European and US forces with respect to RMA. This situation will only worsen in the near term challenging allied interoperability at the core. As US forces continue to bear the brunt of peace making and execution activities while European forces focus on peacekeeping and implementation, the military forces will divide more markedly into separate tiers. They will be less able to work together as a synergistic force, and the US will bear a larger share of the criticism that accompanies its powerful military role. This will only stoke congressional criticism of unsustainable inequitable burden sharing in the US while igniting further European frustration with their

dependence on the United States. The challenge for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic is to take steps to ensure these risks are averted.

CONCLUSION

Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

--Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State⁶¹

As we attempt to determine the proper course for American policy with respect to ESDP, Kissinger's comments from an earlier crisis endured by the Atlantic Alliance are germane. Indeed, as he argued 35 years ago, America has grown accustomed to its hegemony and the belief that its views represent the general interest. Maybe this time around the United States can accept that "the assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is important for us as well."⁶²

Kosovo has highlighted an underlying problem in transatlantic relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, in conjunction with its European partners, has provided an extensive security blanket for West European development over the last fifty years. The program has for the most part been successful, and recently Europe has taken declaratory and organizational steps to carry a greater share of the burden. However, due to the success of previous security efforts, Europeans feel secure and are unwilling to dedicate large resources to defense.

For ESDP to come to fruition, it must be sold as supporting a growing role for the EU in world affairs. United States leaders are reluctant to sacrifice their dominance of European security affairs, especially when prospects for substantive capability improvements are remote. Without US support ESDP is unlikely to succeed in the long run, and this might entail disastrous results for the transatlantic alliance.

United States leadership must delicately balance expectations at home and allow the Europeans to slowly develop their capability and lever their initial momentum.

ESDP is a delicate balancing act for both the European Union and the United States. Its failure might damage transatlantic relations and threaten tenuous congressional support for American security burdens in Europe. Its success might raise the specter of an American withdrawal under the justification that US forces would no longer be needed in Europe. It is important for US policy and transatlantic relations as a whole that a middle ground be achieved in this effort.

More equitable transatlantic relations best serve European security interests. This will require Europeans to shake the complacency of fifty years of American dependence and move forward with substantial capability improvements. In turn, the United States will have to accept a more balanced position in the area of European security. It will be a difficult road for both sides.

In the near term, little will change with respect to US requirements in Europe. This continued burden would place a strain on ESDP development. American leaders will need to accept that ESDP is indeed a “European” development and allow it to take its course with measured support. US relations will benefit from a stronger partner in Europe. Although it may take a decade to achieve greater capabilities, patience on the US side will reap its reward. The United States is a committed European partner. It does not have the option to withdraw from European affairs.

US interests are best served through encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability. It is unrealistic to expect the US to continue to dominate European security efforts indefinitely. The EU nations recognize this reality and expect

greater success in their collective efforts to develop improved capabilities on the basis of European integration. A more capable European partner will provide flexibility and strength to the transatlantic security relationship. A sustainable and viable security relationship with the EU nations will remain the cornerstone of US peace and stability efforts worldwide. The US cannot withdraw from Europe and cannot expect to sustain the current imbalance with respect to security. EU efforts to develop a more autonomous defense capability may be the best avenue to solidify the crucial transatlantic security link.

ENDNOTES

¹Richard Perle, former senior defense official in the Reagan administration and advisor for then presidential candidate George W. Bush, quoted by Jeff Gedmin, *Washington Times*, 8 December 1999.

²The specifics of the EU's "headline goal" for improved military capabilities (from the European Union Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999) are: To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of "Petersberg tasks" as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 troops). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces. Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport... They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go in that direction: 1) to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means; 2) to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; 3) to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces; 4) to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command; 5) to increase the number of readily deployable troops; [and] 6) to enhance

strategic sea lift capacity.

³The titles and acronyms associated with the development of a stronger European defense pillar are ripe for confusion. In accordance with Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999, this paper will refer to the common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). NATO documents continue to refer to the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which, depending on one's perspective, could be the same development. Nonetheless, as the relationship between the EU and NATO is not clearly defined, and the initiative is focused in the EU, the author chose ESDP as the appropriate term.

⁴Mainly due to resource constraints, interviews focused on defense officials in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Clearly this focus omits important perspectives from the rest of Europe. However, every effort has been made to include the viewpoints of countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece; the non-EU NATO allies Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; and the non-NATO EU nations Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria.

⁵William Wallace and Jan Ziolkonka, "Misunderstanding Europe," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1998), in Steven Everts, *The Impact of the Euro on Transatlantic Relations* (London: Centre for European Reform, 1999), 51.

⁶Elizabeth Pond, "Come Together," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2000), 10-11.

⁷Prime Minister Blair, 1997 Amsterdam Summit, quoted by Yves Boyer, "France and the European Project: Internal and External Issues," in Kjell A. Eliassen, ed., *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union* (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 105.

⁸British-French Summit, St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998, Declaration on European Defence.

⁹"[Gordon Brown] may formally be a mere chancellor of the exchequer but in practice often seems to act as prime minister to Mr. Blair's president," *Economist*, 25 March 2000, 18.

¹⁰*Economist*, 11 March 2000, 64.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²John Keegan, "The US Is Not Amused By Our Redundant Military Gestures," *London Daily Telegraph*, 6 December 1999.

¹³The Eurocorps is an embryonic army drawn from five nations in the European Union (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg). When the Eurocorps took over KFOR command in April 2000 they were only able to provide about 350 of the 1200 person headquarters. Nonetheless, this was an important initial step in the development of an ESDP. Joseph Fitchett, "Eurocorps to Command Peacekeepers in Kosovo," *International Herald Tribune*, 29-30 January 2000, 1.

¹⁴The French are planning to launch an additional optical satellite (Helios II) in 2003 with possible Italian and Spanish participation. In addition, the Germans are planning to purchase a radar satellite on the commercial market capable of looking through clouds. Both countries are not as comfortable as the British in relying on US intelligence. Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, March 2001).

¹⁵The Commission on Common Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr, chaired by former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, is composed not primarily of defense experts but of representatives from a wide spectrum of social groups and forces. Its main mission is to prepare the ground for a new consensus on defense across party lines, generations, and differing experiences after the revolutionary changes since 1989. Klaus Becher, Senior Fellow for European Security, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London submitted—on an individual basis—to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Sub-Committee C (Common Foreign and Security Policy), 12 April 2000.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸ *Europe's Military Revolution*, 14.

¹⁹ Ibid, 32.

²⁰Joe Murphy, "US Launches Attack on Euro Army," *London Sunday Telegraph*, 18 March 2001, 1.

²¹Stephen M. Walt, "The Clinton Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2000), 68.

²²Ibid.

²³David R. Sands, "Bid To Create EU Army Stalled," *Washington Times*, 9 January 2000, C11.

²⁴Quoted in David R. Sands and Betsy Pisik, "Europeans

Warned To Support NATO Forces In Kosovo,” *Washington Times*, 3 February 2000, 11.

²⁵Jane Perlez, “Kosovo’s Unquenched Violence Dividing US and NATO Allies,” *New York Times*, 12 March 2000, 1. Warner was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee until June 2001, when the defection of Senator Jeffords (Republican, now Independent-Vermont) gave control of the Senate to the Democrats.

²⁶Robert C. Byrd, “Europe’s Turn To Keep The Peace,” *New York Times*, 20 March 2000.

²⁷Ron Laurenzo, “In House, Bipartisan Suspensions About European Defense Plan,” *Defense Week*, 22 February 2000, 5.

²⁸James Kitfield, “European Doughboys,” *National Journal*, 26 February 2000, 610. The acronym used in this quote, ESDI—European Security and Defense Identity, has now been replaced with ESDP per my explanation in note 3.

²⁹The national security bureaucracy in Washington is accustomed to an obedient alliance and jealous of its prerogatives. Research attributes this tendency mostly to the State Department and its continual insistence that ESDP be developed within NATO (hence under US purview), a concept which is a complete anathema to the Europeans. The Department of Defense and the Clinton Administration are much more flexible on this issue. See William Pfaff, “Falling Out Over European Defense,” *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April 2000; Joseph Fitchett, “Eurocorps to Command Peacekeepers in Kosovo,” *International Herald Tribune*, 29-30 January 2000, 1; and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Marc Grossman, “Building A New US-European Partnership for the 21st Century” (West Point, New York: US Military Academy, 14 September 1999).

³⁰Some of the biggest critics of ESDP are close observers, and in the past, active participants in the transatlantic relationship. See Casper W. Weinburger, “The EU’s Separate Defense—A Bad Idea,” *Forbes*, 3 April 2000, 49; Peter W. Rodman, “EU Defense Plan: Proceed With Caution,” *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 28 December 1999; and Henry Kissinger, “The End of NATO as We Know It?” *Washington Post*, 15 August 1999, B7.

³¹Peter W. Rodman, *Drifting Apart? Trends in US-European Relations* (Washington, D.C: The Nixon Center, June 1999), 6.

³²Védrine quoted in, Craig Whitney, “France Presses for A Power Independent of the US,” *New York Times*, 7 November 1999. By “hyperpower,” another author states that the French Foreign Minister

argues that America's simultaneous economic, military, technological and cultural dominance has rendered it so and he warns that the US trend toward unilateralism requires some form of counterbalancing. See John Vincour, "France Has a Hard Sill to Reign In US Power," *International Herald Tribune*, 6 February 1999.

³³See Joshua Muravchik, "How to Wreck NATO," *Commentary* 107 (April 1999), 30-32; Rodman, *Drifting Apart?* 55-57; and Suzanne Daley, "An Electronic Spy Scare Is Alarming Europe," *New York Times*, 24 February 2000, 1.

³⁴Stéphane Rozés, Director General of CSA Opinion, quoted in Suzanne Daley, "More Vehemently Than Ever, Europe Is Scorning the US," *New York Times*, 9 April 2000, 1.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 8.

³⁶Ivo H. Daalder, "Europe and America Aren't Divorcing," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 10 December 1999.

³⁷Several aspects of the following analysis of European military capabilities are taken from a paper presented by a senior European military analyst during a non-attribution seminar on European Security and Trans-Atlantic relations co-sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States and the National Defense University (NDU) conducted at NDU, 14 February 2000.

³⁸François Heisbourg, "Emerging European Projection Capabilities," paper presented at the Joint RAND and GCSP Workshop, "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East," Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, available online at www.gcsp.ch, and in David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival* 42 (Winter 2000-01), 99.

³⁹*Europe's Military Revolution*, 54.

⁴⁰The discussion on the broader scope of capabilities presented by ESDP crisis response was drawn from correspondence with Christopher Makins, President of the Atlantic Council, on 14 May 2000.

⁴¹According to a senior European commander, nearly half the US contingent is pinned down by its self-protection mission, leaving only the other half available for actual peacekeeping duties. *Europe's Military Revolution*, 58.

⁴²At the Washington Summit in April 1999, The NATO Heads of State and Government launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). DCI focuses on interoperability, deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability and effective engagement, and command and

control information systems. Since last April NATO has identified 58 sub-points that require improvement, 30 of which have stagnated in NATO circles for years.

⁴³"The Void in Europe," *The Economist*, 20 May 2000, 22.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ *Europe's Military Revolution*, 75.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 39.

⁴⁷ Senate Resolution 208, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 8 November 1999.

⁴⁸ Mr. Alain Richard, French Minister of Defense, "European Defense and the Transatlantic Link," speech at Georgetown University, 23 February 2000.

⁴⁹ *Europe's Military Revolution*, 32.

⁵⁰ *Europe's Military Revolution*, 29.

⁵¹ Joshua Muravchik and Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Western Europe Tells the East: Keep Quiet," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 3 April 2000.

⁵² See Gábor Papp, *NATO Enlargement: The Hungarian Case* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, February 2000), 35-42.

⁵³ Peter Finn, "Six in NATO Upset Over EU Corps Plan," *Washington Post*, 9 April 2000, A16.

⁵⁴ James Madison in *The Federalist*, No. 63, quoted in Garry Wills, "Bully of the Free World," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (March/April 1999), 53.

⁵⁵ Owen Harries, "America and the Euro Gamble," *National Interest* (Fall 1998), 127.

⁵⁶ Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1999), 40.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 40.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 48.

⁵⁹ Henry Kissinger, "The Long Shadow of Vietnam," *Newsweek*, 1 May 2000.

⁶⁰ US forces have had an expeditionary focus for over a century, whereas European forces were designed to "fight in place" during the Cold War.

⁶¹Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), 234.

⁶²Ibid.