Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries
Abstract
Pseudo operations, in which government forces and guerrilla defectors portray themselves as insurgent units, have been used very successfully in several counterinsurgency campaigns. However, their use in offensive missions and psychological operations campaigns has, at times, been counterproductive. Their main value is as human intelligence collectors, particularly for long-term background intelligence or for identifying guerrilla groups that are then assaulted by conventional forces. Care must be taken in running these operations both to avoid going too far in acting like guerrillas, and in resisting involvement in human rights abuses. Just who should control pseudo operations has been somewhat contentious, but the teams typically have worked for police services or intelligence agencies. This has been largely a result of weaknesses in the military intelligence system. Ideally, strengthening military intelligence structures to support pseudo operations would be the best solution since it would provide better connectivity between the pseudo teams and response forces. Several factors have marked successful pseudo operations. The first has been a system of incentives for insurgents to defect to the government. These incentives can be positive, usually monetary rewards for surrendering; or negative, causing insurgents to cooperate to avoid severe punishment. A critical environmental factor enabling pseudo team success is weakness in insurgent command and communications systems. Pseudo forces can thrive in environments in which guerrilla forces have problems in their communications. The final critical element of these operations is the effectiveness of the response to the intelligence the teams collect, and coordination with other government forces. This monograph reviews the lessons learned from pseudo operations used in the Philippines (Huk Insurrection, 1946-55), Malaya, Kenya (Mau Mau), Indochina, Algeria, and Rhodesia.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA435396
Entities
People
- Lawrence E. Cline
Organizations
- United States Army War College