

The War Against International Islamic Terrorism:

Who is the Enemy? How Can It Be Defeated?

A Monograph
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Abstract

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In order to evaluate the GWOT, this monograph examines several questions about the terrorist threat. First, what is the nature of the enemy? Should the terror groups be defined as “criminal” or as representative of a larger disenfranchised population? Second, what is the enemy’s desired endstate and how does it impact western interests? Finally, how should the elements of national power be applied against the threat?

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INTRODUCTION

*I will send my terror before you, and will throw into confusion
all the people*

Exodus 23:27

*Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our
enemies, justice will be done.*

President George W. Bush

Since September 11, 2001, the United States government has concentrated many of its resources on combating international terrorism. Deemed the greatest threat to our way of life, Islamic extremist organizations and their supporters have been the primary targets of the overarching Global War on Terror (GWOT). Military operations have taken place in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to destroy terrorist networks, eliminate weapons, or discourage states from supporting terror organizations and their goals. Many nations have cooperated with the US in order to identify and eliminate sources of funding for malicious groups. Coalition countries have used their assets in Afghanistan and Iraq to destroy terrorists and create institutions of responsible government. In general, the concept of pursuing and destroying terrorist groups and their support networks has been viewed favorably.

Yet, despite the apparent success of the GWOT, some critics have questioned the direction of the current strategy. The operations have required and, if pursued at its current pace, will continue to require significant resources from participating nations – especially the United States. In the absence of additional devastating terror attacks, many commentators and then politicians will demand a reduction of attention and resources towards an apparently defeated threat. Opponents have already mused that the threat has been exaggerated for political gain.

Given these concerns, it is important to analyze several aspects of GWOT. First, what is the nature of the enemy? Is he an organized and truly international threat? Should the terror groups be defined as “criminal” or as representative of a larger disenfranchised population? Depending on how one answers these questions will determine the scope of the response.

Another important question concerns the goals of the enemy. Each side in this conflict has a vision of what they hope to achieve. Understanding the enemy’s desired endstate and how it impacts western interests is critical to developing the proper elements of a campaign to counter such a threat. Finally, once we understand the enemy and his goals, it is possible to develop a clearer analysis of how different elements of national power can be employed to defeat the enemy, protect our forces and interests, and properly match resources to those efforts. Some writers have addressed different aspects of the above questions, however, what is lacking is a comprehensive strategic-level investigation that adequately portrays the complex nature of the threat and his desired endstate and then deduces from those elements a vision of how to defeat the threat.

In order to address this shortfall, the following analysis will address four important areas. First, it will analyze the enemy, his situation, and his vision. Second, it will show desired endstates and identify potential centers of gravity (CGs) that support that endstate. Third, it will offer an analysis of the enemy and friendly CGs and their critical vulnerabilities (CV). Finally, it will address some of the implications of the preceding analysis as it relates to the current strategy against terrorism.

Ultimately, this monograph will conclude that the enemy should be defined as the Islamic international terror groups – not terrorism as a whole - that cooperate as a larger radical movement. Furthermore, the conflict should be viewed as a struggle between the visions of two diametrically opposed strategic endstates: a puritanical Islamic state free from Western influence; and a more representative Middle East that is friendly or neutral toward the West. Finally, it will

conclude that the present campaign against terrorists must improve its information campaign and perception of legitimacy if friendly forces are to be successful in this contest.

THE “TRUE BELIEVERS” OF INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

No mastery of command can substitute for an intelligent comprehension of the economic goals, the political impulses, the spiritual aspirations, that move tens of millions of people.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

One of the most complicated aspects of the GWOT is defining the problem. Many commentators, historians and political scientists have offered their opinions concerning this question. Their views should be evaluated because they may provide insight into the strategic environment.

One popular description of the post Cold War world was issued by Samuel Huntington in *Clash of Civilizations*. In this work Huntington depicts a contemporary world that is divided between seven or eight civilizations and, without the bipolar construct, as more likely to engage in inter-civilizational conflict. Presumably, Huntington would conclude now that the GWOT represents a clash between the Islamic and Western cultures.¹ The principal weakness with that world-view is that it assumes civilizations are monolithic and do not experience internal debates and conflicts.

Another dismal view of the world was offered in *The Coming Anarchy*. Robert Kaplan argues that conflict over resources and the environment will eventually erode international stability. As the population increases and resources become scarce, people will resort to violence and lawlessness in order to meet their needs. Ultimately, there will be anarchy because the

¹. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 20-21, 217. Historian Bernard Lewis was actually the first to characterize the conflict between Western and Muslim nations as a “clash of civilizations” in his 1990 article, “The Roots of the Muslim Rage.”

contemporary institutions of the nation-state will not be able to cope with these problems. Transnational terrorism is one sign of this borderless, lawless future.² Kaplan's depiction of non-nation-state actors challenging the existing international structure is useful in an analysis of Islamic terror groups. However, the radical ideology proposed a future of very distinct borders – borders that will block the influence of Western culture.

In a slightly different approach, Bard O'Neill offers a framework to understand insurgency. He defines the phenomenon as "a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources...and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."³ In this light, al Qaeda might be considered the "nonruling group" contesting western hegemony (ruling group) and, therefore, it could be argued that radical Islam is an insurgency on a global scale. O'Neill's ideas are useful, however, because his book was intended to provide a larger framework with which to analyze insurgencies in general, it does not explain the unique and complex evolution of radical Islam.

The official view of the U.S. government, as outlined in the 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, presents the problem in simple terms of good and evil – a "clash between civilization and those who would destroy it."⁴ However, the current problem of terrorism is complex and demands further illumination. Not all terrorist are the same and their organizations and motivations should be considered in their proper context.

This examination of the enemy will use a different approach than those used by the works discussed above. First, this study will define the enemy as "radical international Islamic terrorism" because, it is that threat against which most American power has been wielded and it is

² Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000), 7-24, 44-47.

³ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles: VA: , 1990), 13.

⁴ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), 29.

the only threat that has the will and the means to attack American presence and interests around the world. Second, the Islamic terror threat will be analyzed using Eric Hoffer's model of mass movements. Based on his knowledge of the French and Russian Revolutions as well as his observations of the fascist movements of the 20th century, the author outlines common characteristics of people who can be labeled "fanatics." He illustrates different kinds of mass movements; some are used for good and others for evil. Whatever the cause or ideology, people who join mass movements share similar characteristics and experiences. Furthermore, Hoffer argues that mass movements can be viewed as consisting of three phases: discredit the old order, active change, and consolidation.

Hoffer's model may appear as inappropriate for analyzing a contemporary phenomenon. The term "mass movements" suggests a Marxist or communist worldview – the oppressed lower classes will struggle against the status quo forces in an attempt to overthrow the old order – and conveys a sense of broad unity that, after further study, seldom exists. However, while the reader should be aware of these issues, Hoffer's framework can still provide valuable insight to the problem of radical Islamists who are willing to use violence to achieve their goals. By thinking of the development of radical Islamism as a mass movement, one can better understand al Qaeda and its appeal to some young Muslims. Also, Hoffer's three phases can instruct us on the current status of the movement as well as its potential future. Finally, because Hoffer addresses the common requirements, characteristics, and vulnerabilities of mass movements, it is possible to ascertain possible enemy and friendly CGs.

In Hoffer's first phase, "men of words" articulate criticism of the old order and develop an ideology and vision for a new order. These men are naturally analytical and they routinely question the assumptions and status quo in which they live. Hoffer identifies men such as Karl Marx and Martin Luther as the "men of words" for Communism and the Protestant Reformation respectively. Those men provided a critique of the institutions of their time and a proposal of how the order could be reformed or reconstructed. Their role was imperative because, as Hoffer

argues, movements do not result solely from the mistakes of the powerful. Movements require an intellectual foundation around which groups form and pursue change.⁵

Early signs of an Islamic fundamentalist movement, which surfaced in the nineteenth century, can be viewed as the foundations of a mass movement. Ottoman religious scholars and some reform groups argued persuasively for a return to traditional values. They believed that the empire had faced humiliating military defeat and economic decline in the face of European power because Muslims had failed to follow God's commands. Turning away from the *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and embracing secular institutions during the period of the Tanzimat reforms had caused further degradation of Ottoman dignity. In response to this challenge, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) rejected previous reforms and reasserted traditional Islamic policies. He also tried to convince his people that they should consider themselves "Muslims" instead of "Ottomans" who, by then, were tainted by their collaboration with the West.⁶

Rejection of the West intensified in the twentieth century when traditional Islamic ideology was clearly expressed by "men of words." Activist writers and speakers such as Sayyid Abu 'Ala Maududi (1903-79) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) articulated for Muslims the challenges presented by Western imperialism, corrupt governments, and explained why the present order was unacceptable. These men also offered a vision of an Islamic state free of foreign meddling. Their vision provided hope for many Muslims who might otherwise not have considered the possibility of changing the status quo.

⁵ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), 130-2.

⁶ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 117-119. It is difficult to judge the traditionalist policies of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. First, he was particularly authoritarian and repressive which probably negated any potential benefits to a return to traditional Islam. Second, while he officially pursued traditionalism, he quietly continued Westernization. Finally, the empire had been in decline since the early 16th century and the only reason it still existed was because European governments, which believed that an Ottoman presence preserved the greater balance of power, exerted significant economic and political power in Ottoman internal affairs.

This vision of an Islamic state was most profoundly articulated by Sayyid Abu ‘Ala Maududi - considered the “intellectual father of modern Islamism.” He founded Jama‘at-I-Islami in 1941 with the aim of preventing the newly-independent Muslim state of Pakistan from becoming a secular state. Maududi observed that communism and fascism had the extraordinary power to mobilize masses toward a particular end. He sought to generate similar energy for an Islamic movement with the aim of establishing a “theodemocracy.” In the “theodemocracy,” there would be a legislature and men could vote but only for the purpose of reaffirming the *Shari’a*. However, the strength behind this system would be the leader. Unlike leaders of communist and fascist states, such as Josef Stalin or Adolf Hitler, Islamic leaders would be virtuous. Furthermore, because this system depended on the purity of Islamic leaders, independent political or bureaucratic institutions would not be necessary. Finally, Maududi believed that Islam should not be confined to certain regions or peoples. It was a religion for all of humankind and *jihad* (struggle; sometimes interpreted as holy war) was the way to achieve the endstate of universal acceptance.⁷

Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb would echo for the Arab world much of what Maududi had trumpeted for Pakistan. Qutb was raised a devout Muslim and had early misgivings about Western culture. However, it was not until he lived in the United States where he attended the University of Colorado and saw at its worst the harmful effects of Western culture that he became especially radical. Upon his return to Egypt in 1951, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and became the editor of the organization’s journal. During his imprisonment from 1954 to 1966 Qutb became a radical revolutionary. *In the Shade of the Qur’an* expressed the belief that revolutionary struggle and even martyrdom was necessary to obtain truth. He warned his readers that the Western tradition of separating church and state and then relegating religion to the private sphere of human activity corrupted and degraded society. Such “hideous schizophrenia,” he insisted,

⁷ Malise Ruthven, *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* (London: Granta Books, 2002), 68-70.

could never be allowed in the Muslim community.⁸ In *Signposts on the Road*, Qutb argued that governments were supposed to follow and enforce the tenets of true Islam. If it failed in that obligation, then Muslims were obligated to disobey and overthrow the regime. He identified Egypt's Gamal Abd al Nasser (1918-1970) as such a leader against whom *jihad* must be waged.⁹

Although critical to the beginnings of a movement, writers who articulate the ideology of a movement are generally not the ones who actually enact change. At some point, led by fanatics, a mass movement transitions to an active phase when a complete dismantling of the old order takes place. It is really on this phase that Hoffer offers the most insight. He describes the types of people who lead this dynamic period. Leaders do not need to be intelligent or noble, but they must be audacious, have an iron will, believe they possess the truth, have faith in their destiny, have determination to prevail, possess the capacity to hate, appreciate human nature, and command intense loyalty from their most devoted followers.¹⁰

The radical Islamic movement can be considered as presently engaged in an "active phase" and led by men who possess many of the characteristics listed by Hoffer. Groups such as al Qaeda use violence in hopes that they will destroy the current world order so that a new order can be constructed. Since the 1960s various Islamic groups have used terrorism as a way to achieve their aims whether political or ideological. Some of them have limited their attacks to targets within one country to influence national policy. However, others have a broader goal of changing international policy and, therefore, had to *internationalize* their cause. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its terrorist groups used airline hijackings and other dramatic attacks to achieve worldwide attention - especially from the major powers - and eventually more

⁸ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (London: W.W. Norton and Co, 2003), 60-67, 76-79. Interestingly, Sayyid's younger brother Muhammad fled to Saudi Arabia where he taught Islamic studies. One of his students was Usama bin Laden.

⁹ Cleveland, 432.

¹⁰ Hoffer, 114.

political leverage against Israel.¹¹ This achievement set an example for other groups to use terror as a way to enact change.

Events of 1979 reinvigorated violent Islamic movements in the Middle East. In January, the Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) led a revolution in Iran that toppled the corrupt, pro-American, Shah Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980). In March, the governments of Egypt and Israel signed a peace accord for which President Sadat (1918-1981) was vilified by many radicals in the Arab world. Finally, in December, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Each of these events motivated disgruntled Muslims for different reasons, but the last event was particularly influential for Usama bin Laden who would later be instrumental in the “active phase” of the extremist movement.

Usama bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia to a rich Yemeni father and Syrian mother. It is unclear how religious the family was but bin Laden was exposed to many Islamic scholars, including those of fundamentalist tendencies. One particularly influential Egyptian radical was Muhammad Abdel Salam al Farag. Maududi and Qutb provided a philosophical rationale for rebellion and the creation of an Islamic state, but Farag urged *armed* struggle. In *The Neglected Duty* he wrote that jihad must first be waged against internal enemies – the governments of Muslim states who have betrayed Islam – and then against its external enemies – the United States.¹² Farag’s notoriety peaked in 1982 when he was executed for his role in the assassination of President Sadat.

The confluence of Farag’s writings and the invasion of Afghanistan shaped bin Laden’s future. Bin Laden heard the calling to go to Afghanistan and defend Muslims against the infidel superpower. His organizational skills and wealth enabled him to successfully recruit, process, train and employ Arab fighters from around the world for *jihad* against the Soviets. In 1988, he

¹¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 68-69.

¹² Ahmed S. Hashim, "The World According to Usama Bin Laden," *Naval War College Review* Autumn 2001; available from <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Autumn/aut1-au1.htm> Internet. Accessed 15 December 2003.

realized that he needed to create a more formal structure that could unify and lead the different groups operating in Afghanistan. And, in the words of Abdullah Azzam, the ideological mentor of bin Laden, a movement required a “vanguard.” Al Qaeda (the base) would be that vanguard.¹³

While he concurs with Farag’s argument for armed struggle, bin Laden does not consider current Muslim governments as the initial targets of his attacks. Instead, he believes that the governments such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan are only in power because they are puppets of the United States. Thus, if the United States can be forced from its role, the internal enemies of Islam will collapse.¹⁴

Understanding the motivations of individual leaders such as bin Laden is straightforward compared to grasping the attraction of a violent movement to hundreds or thousands of followers. *True Believer* offers thoughts on common characteristics and experiences of recruits of different causes and explains why particular mass movements have appeal. Some of the more intriguing aspects of Hoffer’s description include: a follower’s loathing of the present and past and a follower’s rejection of his role as an individual.

Hoffer describes potential followers as frustrated with their present condition because of their financial, social or political status. In order to appeal to that frustration, mass movements first discredit the past (represented by institutions and those in power) and then show its continuity with the present. Next, because potential followers already detest the present, the movement must then provide a hopeful vision of the future. Religious movements can be particularly effective in portraying “the present is a place of exile, a vale of tears leading to a heavenly kingdom.” Therefore, potential followers begin to view their present condition as unacceptable and become willing to dedicate themselves to changing it.¹⁵

¹³ Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda* (New York: I.B. Tauris and Company, 2003), 7-8.

¹⁴ Hashim, 18.

¹⁵ Hoffer, 68-70.

In addition to rejecting the present, the potential convert must also reject his role as an individual in society. A person who is comfortable with his individualism will normally accept his surroundings. However, a person who feels alone and insecure is vulnerable to messages that promote unity and change.¹⁶ Thus, a mass movement must first and foremost offer security through a sense of community or identity. In fact, Hoffer argues that imparting a sense of corporateness is far more important for attracting recruits than is the feasibility of the movement's message.¹⁷

Rejecting the present and needing community are just part of a satisfactory explanation for mass movement appeal. Some policy-makers assert that the most critical component of understanding why people join revolutionary groups is related to economic conditions. Poverty creates revolutionaries and, therefore, if the problem of poverty can be solved, there will be no more uprisings. In the case of Islamic terrorists, those policy-makers would argue that if the economic conditions of various Middle East states can be improved, then they will not serve as breeding grounds for suicide bombers. However, many terrorists come from wealthy backgrounds, have been educated in western countries, and from an economic perspective, should have no complaints about the status quo. Usama bin Laden, many of his top lieutenants, and numerous Palestinian suicide bombers are examples of activists who contradict the economic determinist argument. Clearly, economic conditions are important variables when considering the causes behind a mass movement, but they must be balanced with other reasons for discontent.

In *Why Men Rebel*, Ted Robert Gurr agrees that deprivation alone does not lead to violence. He argues that rebellions are better explained using the relationship between expectations - whether social, political, or economic - and reality. It is the *perception of relative deprivation* that causes frustration. The greater the perceived deprivation, the deeper the

¹⁶ Ibid., 83-85.

¹⁷ Ibid., 41-43.

frustration. If the frustration can be effectively politicized, then people can be convinced to turn their frustration against the existing political system.¹⁸

Karen Armstrong offers relevant insight into religious fundamentalist movements in general. Whether Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, religious fundamentalists fear that secularists threaten the fabric of society. If limited to the private sphere of human activity, religious values can no longer guide a community. Fundamentalists then try to reverse their decline in social and political influence. An internal struggle between fundamentalists and secularist ensues. If secularization prevails, fundamentalists withdraw from mainstream society and become more activist thus politicizing the cause and sometimes even internationalizing it. If backed into a corner, some fundamentalists become more radical and resort to violence.¹⁹

The works of Hoffer, Gurr and Armstrong can help the analyst to better understand why certain Arab Muslims are attracted to the radical Islamic movement in general and to organizations like al Qaeda in particular. In turn, this understanding can foster a more sophisticated assessment of the enemy. First, the intellectual foundation laid by “men of words” such as Maududi and Qutb created an ideology with which frustrated Muslims could identify. They described the Islamic world as becoming corrupt from foreign influence and economic exploitation. They condemned Western individualism and warned that it was disrupting the Muslim community. They argued for the creation of a pure Islamic state that included all true Muslims.²⁰ Hence, from the beginning of the movement, the doctrine addressed two principal concerns of frustrated Muslims: the present state of Middle East society and the need for community. These ideas were incorporated into the agendas of numerous organizations with differing visions. They were able to appeal to a wide range of frustrations including economic,

¹⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 8-15.

¹⁹ Karen Armstrong, "Muslims and the West," in *Inside Islam: The Faith, The People, and the Conflicts of the World's Fastest-Growing Religion*, ed. Miller, John and Aaron Kenedi (New York: Marlowe and Company, 2002), 182-184.

²⁰ Ruthven, 68-71.

social, religious and political discontent, but they were consistent in their hatred of the West. Such messages resonate within a burgeoning population of Muslims in the post-colonial era that perceives general inequality and corruption in the current world order.

The more important question is, why do these Muslims commit terrorism to fulfill the active phase of the movement? *True Believers* contends that the same tendencies and circumstances that cause people to join a mass movement also cause them to sacrifice their lives for the sake of that movement. Hoffer describes the process as “separating the individual from his flesh-and-blood self.” That separation is accomplished by reinforcing a loathing for the present, portraying hope for the future, providing a sense of corporateness, and articulating a doctrine that draws attention away from reason.²¹ Gurr’s articulation of the process of politicizing relative deprivation and harnessing collective frustration explains how people can be energized to commit acts of violence against the perceived cause of their misfortune. Finally, Armstrong demonstrates that all religious fundamentalist groups share a fear of secularist agendas. Some, especially those confronting a political environment that prohibits political dialogue, will become more radical and may resort to violence.

According to Hoffer, once change has been achieved, the movement must transition to a final phase of consolidation. He contends that this transition is very difficult because fanatics will want to retain power and push the movement to be more and more extreme. Therefore, strong “men of action” must gain control and concentrate on establishing stability. In this phase, leaders must establish the impression that the present is now new and good and not something to be loathed. Hoffer says that the energy from the dynamic phase must be “sanctified” and

²¹ Hoffer, 60-61. In the prelude to this portion of *True Believers* the author admits that he may exaggerate the characteristics of someone who is willing to die for a mass movement. However, he argues that in order to reveal a new approach to the subject, exaggeration is inevitable. He also differentiates between those who sacrifice themselves for an unachievable, Utopian dream and those who are willing to die to defend an *established* order. See pages 88-89.

“embalmed” in order to create unity. The followers should view the new order as the rightful consolidation of all of their efforts in the active phase.²²

Hoffer adds that the length of the active phase will affect the nature of the final phase. The longer the second phase persists, the less creative the consolidation phase will be. Hoffer contends that such a situation results in a “dark age” because the society is not innovative or adaptive to its environment. In contrast, a movement that moves quickly to the final phase can result in a highly productive and energized society. Furthermore, the author warns that a movement guided by a vision of an ideal society rather than a limited objective has greater potential to linger in the active phase because there is no obvious transition.²³

The difficulty in transitioning to a consolidation phase is precisely the problem faced by the international Islamic movement. There are numerous groups who share a common anger toward the West but do not share a common strategy or leader. While many of them may use similar tactics, they rarely cooperate against a larger target. Following a terror incident one group claims responsibility for itself rather than for a larger cause. Competition between the groups prevents them from achieving a common goal and keeps the movement divided.

The lack of unity in the radical Islamic movement may appear to be an argument against its portrayal as a mass movement in the way that Hoffer describes. However, as outlined at the beginning of this discussion, the value of *True Believers* is that it can provide a framework for understanding the complex and diverse, yet broadly resonating, Muslim challenge to Western institutions, culture and policies. Furthermore, understanding Hoffer’s depiction of a generic unified movement reminds planners and decision-makers that the more cohesive a movement becomes, the more dangerous the threat.

Based on the discussion of mass movements, it is possible to view the current conflict with international terrorists as a campaign against a mass movement currently positioned in the

²² Ibid., 153-155.

²³ Ibid., 154,157.

“active phase.” It has an established intellectual foundation that was articulated by “men of words” in the first half of the twentieth century. It has transitioned to an active phase wherein fanatics have embraced the radical Islamist doctrine and are appealing to disenfranchised and frustrated Muslims who become willing to sacrifice themselves. The movement employs international terrorism to force the United States out of the Muslim world or compel it to “come out and fight.” Once it achieves that objective, it will move to a final phase of consolidation – the establishment of a puritanical Islamic state or some version of that goal. It is to the subject of the final phase that we must now turn our attention.

THE ENDSTATE AND CENTERS OF GRAVITY

Dwell not upon thy weariness, thy strength shall be according to the measure of thy desire.

Arab Proverb

The last phase of a mass movement is one of consolidation and stability. It should be led by “men of action” and not the leaders of the active phase because the latter cannot control their fanaticism or that of their loyal followers. Hoffer argues that the nature of the leadership and course of the active phase will determine if the final phase will be creative and constructive or brutal and totalitarian. The aftermath of the American Revolution is an example of a constructive outcome whereas the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin is an example of a destructive consolidation of a mass movement. This begs the question, in the last phase of a radical Islamic mass movement – if it were to reach that point – will there be a period of creativity or dysfunction?

Hoffer contends that extremists are unwilling to negotiate or compromise their beliefs because their passion, which provides energy to force change in the active phase, becomes habit and part of their identity. This extremism is evident in the rhetoric of al Qaeda. It espouses a vision of a pure and strict Islamic state completely void of Western influence. But in this time of increasing globalization, it is difficult to see how such an endstate can be achieved unless Western influence is significantly reduced or disabled. With a vision that is probably unachievable, fanatical groups such as al Qaeda will attempt to lead the movement in the active phase and eventually the consolidation phase. Therefore, Phase III of this movement will tend to be destructive and stagnant. If the movement does not transition to the final phase, then it will remain in the active phase whereby international Islamic terrorism will probably persist. Neither outcome is acceptable.

So, what should the U.S. and its allies seek as an endstate in the battle against Islamic terrorists? It is an important question because without a clearly defined vision of what the strategy is supposed to achieve, it will be difficult to focus the nation's resources or measure the progress of various initiatives. There are many different questions concerning potential endstates. Should it be limited to the immediate threat of international terrorists? Should it address the wider ring of support that terrorist organizations enjoy? Should it also offer a grander vision of reform in places of the world where radical Islamist ideology has the most appeal? This paper will argue that because of the extremism of our enemy, and the level of destruction it can wield against US territory and interests, the endstate must include a long-term, comprehensive plan that will destroy the perpetrators of violence as well as deny them sources of support.

The radical Islamists' desired endstate is a puritanical theocracy that is not integrated with the rest of the international system. Of course, there are varying degrees of this view within the movement. Bin Laden has specifically declared this extreme vision, but the wider "movement" has proposed similar ideas. Their anger has been fueled by the corruption of Islam – by internal and external forces – and they believe that the way to revive their society is to eradicate the bad influences. Such a program mandates the end of Western cultural and political pervasiveness. Given the structure and integration of the international order, their proposals would leave their states – or whatever political entity they propose – detached from a large part of the global community. In order to achieve that endstate, the enemy is willing to cause enormous harm and does not feel bound by any international conventions on conflict. This endstate threatens the West's interests around the world and its way of life. Applying the model of mass movements, the aim of American strategy must be to stop the radical Islamic movement, led by fanatical organizations such as al Qaeda, as soon as possible while it is in the active phase, and prevent it from achieving its version of Phase III. In other words, the desired endstate of this war must include the destruction of the terror networks and the establishment of a Middle East composed of reformed governments that will not sponsor terrorist organizations, develop and

provide WMD to those organizations, or allow conditions that cause their people to look to radical Islam for change. No doubt, such an endstate seems lofty and ambitious. However, the challenge presented by the extremist groups demands a comprehensive and long-term vision if the campaign is to ultimately succeed.

With the friendly endstate in mind, it is possible to identify the friendly and enemy centers-of-gravity (CGs). The nineteenth century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz articulated the importance of identifying a single enemy center of gravity and then concentrating resources against that point.²⁴ It is sometimes argued that Clausewitz's notion of a CG is outdated because his proposal addressed large field armies in the context of Napoleonic warfare. However, despite that context, identifying enemy and friendly primary sources of strength is a useful process toward framing a campaign. Even so, there is considerable debate as to what constitutes a CG and what selection criteria should be used.

One important contribution to the CG debate is "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity," by James Schneider and Lawrence Izzo. In that article, they dispute the notion that any strength or source of strength can be a CG. They are particularly critical of the 1986 edition of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, for its treatment of this issue. The manual suggests key terrain, boundaries, command and control centers, and lines of communications as possible CGs. Yet, the authors remind the reader that Clausewitz described war as a physical collision between armed forces. Victory and defeat are decided when there is a confrontation between centers of gravity – where each side concentrates his forces most densely.²⁵ Thus, Schneider and Izzo conclude that only physical forces constitute a CG.

Doctor Joe Strange (USMC War College) and Colonel Richard Iron (UK Army) also recognized the continuing uncertainty over CGs and offered their thoughtful analysis of the

²⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 619.

²⁵ James Schneider and Lawrence Izzo, "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity," *Parameters* (September 1987): 56.

problem. In “Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities” the authors highlight Joint and Naval Doctrine as examples of how American concepts of centers of gravity continue to perpetuate confusion over Clausewitz’s idea. They highlight the guidance found in *Joint Publication 5.0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* and *Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1*, “Centers of gravity are the characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”²⁶ Like that quoted from FM 100-5 by Schneider and Izzo, the Joint Publication (JP) definition leads one to believe that almost anything can be considered a center of gravity. Logistics or command and control centers would certainly meet the criteria of the JP’s guidance. The problem with such definitions is that they lack clarity and increase the confusion over identifying centers of gravity. Strange and Iron conclude that CGs are not characteristics, capabilities or locations. Rather, they are “dynamic and powerful physical or moral agents of action or influence that possess certain characteristics and capabilities, and benefit from a given location or terrain.”²⁷

However, Strange and Iron disagree with Schneider and Izzo over the latter’s strict limitation of CGs to physical armed forces. It is Strange and Iron’s contention that at the strategic level, there can be a physical CG but there will almost always be a moral one as well. This view is most persuasive when considering the fight against Islamic terrorism in light of the earlier assessment of the enemy situation as a mass movement. The struggle between Western states and extreme Islamic groups is one between people, their motivations, and their dreams. Therefore, in any discussion of the terror threat, strategic physical and moral CGs should be considered.

²⁶ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations* (February 2002), ; JFSC Pub 1, *Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1*, as cited in Joe Strange and Richard Iron, “Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” in *Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities*, (Quantico: Marine Corps War College, 2001), 9.

²⁷ Joe Strange and Richard Iron, “Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity,” in *Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities*, (Quantico: Marine Corps War College, 2001), 16.

Despite the controversy surrounding the “true” definition of CGs, it is still important to consider primary sources of power at the strategic level. Contrary to the assertions of some critics, proposing such ideas does not necessarily mean that other sources of power are any less relevant or that they should be ignored. Instead, the process of deciding what is the “center” of power fosters discussion of many variables that contribute to motivation, command and control, and ultimately helps planners and decision-makers to frame a strategy. Without a hierarchical framework, all enablers appear as equally influential and demand equal attention. Thus, while the discussion of CGs is time-consuming and appears to be counter-productive, the process is useful at the strategic level.

The first step in determining the primary sources of strength is to choose the measures of selection. For purposes of this analysis, a CG will be selected if it meets all of the following criteria. First, it must be a *dominant* source of power. Forces, terrain, or people should not be considered as a CG just because they are important: they must be vital. Second, a CG must have an *adversarial* relationship with the enemy: it must be a source of power based on what it can wield against the strengths of a specific opponent.²⁸ Third, a source of power will be considered a CG if the destruction or diversion of that strength would result in an adjustment of the desired endstate.

Using these criteria, a strategic-level analysis reveals three CGs. The first one to be discussed is a source of strength for both the enemy and friendly causes: the Muslim population. It meets the first criteria of dominant strength because it is the Muslim population that contributes the necessary active and passive support to extreme movements. Usama bin Laden and the larger extremist movement must achieve a certain degree of popularity if the current Middle East

²⁸ Doctor Strange and Colonel Iron's discussion was useful when determining this criteria. A strength or source of strength should have a relationship with an opponent, not be a strength independent of other forces. As an example, the authors argue that the Iraqi Republican Guard was a CG in 1991 not just because it was Saddam Hussein's elite force but rather because of the potential threat it posed to US VII Corps.

governments are going to be successfully overthrown and a strict Islamic state is to be realized. It meets the adversarial test because of its relationship to the enemy. The Islamic movement needs this source of strength for its own cause in order to resist its opponent's desire to reduce passive and active support for terrorism. It meets the third criteria because if the radical movement loses popular support, then achieving its endstate will not be realized. Some degree of popular support is necessary to build the foundations for a viable political entity. Without this source of support, the endstate must be adjusted.

Interestingly, the Muslim population also meets the CG tests when considered as a friendly source of strength. It is dominant because the West needs popular support to assist in the reform of autocratic and corrupt states. The Muslim population meets the adversarial criteria because its strength is needed for the friendly cause in order to counter the actions of terrorists. Finally, if the support of the Muslim population is destroyed by friendly actions or intimidated by enemy actions, then the United States and its allies will have to adjust their desired endstate defined as a region of representative governments agreeable to western interests. While it has been and would be possible to form political alliances with governments that do not have the support of their population, such a scenario is not the *desired* endstate because it contains long-term risks. Internally unpopular regimes can and do survive, but they can also serve as breeding grounds for anti-western sentiment. The cases of Usama bin Laden and the Iranian revolutionaries illustrate that it is not enough merely to establish political relationships with governments that support American interests. Therefore, without the support of the Muslim populations, the desired endstate would have to be adjusted to reflect less-than-ideal conditions.

Considering the Muslim population as both an enemy and friendly CG is also useful because it portrays not only a struggle by two sides for potential strength but also an ongoing internal struggle for its own future. In contrast to Samuel Huntington's depiction of a world composed of monolithic civilizations, the Muslim world is far from unified. There are many opinions concerning the future of the Muslim state and especially on the role of religion in

society. Reformists support efforts to work within the existing system to increase political participation, improve economic conditions, and integrate religious law and practices into modern society. In contrast, revolutionaries insist that the present system must be overthrown and a new Islamic order rebuilt.²⁹ Turkey and Saudi Arabia are examples of the diverse political systems that already exist in the Muslim Middle East. Turkey's political and social pattern is based on secularism while Saudi Arabia's is founded on strict Wahhabism.³⁰ The other Muslim nations fall somewhere in between these examples. Most Muslims do not embrace the increasing radicalism of groups such as Al Qaeda: nor do they accept unbridled Western-style democracy, capitalism, and secularism. Therefore, any approach to ending the radical Islamic threat must address the internal struggle over the future of the Muslim world.

Also meeting the three criteria for strategic CG is the American president. The leader of the most powerful nation in the world can bring *dominant* influence and resources to any war effort. The American president certainly meets the adversarial test because the direction of the resistance depends on him and he can command the resources in that resistance. Finally, if the President were defeated in an election or if he could not maintain a reasonable degree of support from the American people, then his policy would change along with the endstate linked to that policy. Thus, the American leader is a friendly CG that the enemy must weaken if he wants to affect change in the direction of the war.

Finally, the terror groups must also be considered an enemy strategic CG. Gaining the support of the Muslim population is imperative but it will take time. By providing the forces and will to directly or indirectly attack friendly targets, they are critical to the larger goal of eliminating western influence. They certainly meet the adversarial test because their purpose is to

²⁹ Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 100.

³⁰ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 228-232.

intimidate a specific enemy. If the war neutralizes or destroys these groups, then the vision of extreme Islamists remains nothing more than a dream and a new endstate will have to be defined.

In the course of this analysis, other potential CGs were considered but rejected because they did not meet the three criteria. Three of those candidates will be briefly discussed because it will illustrate how CGs should be selected and why the process of CG selection helps planners and decision-makers to focus their efforts. Furthermore, the rejected CGs will emerge in later discussion of critical requirements, thus illustrating differences between the two terms.

One proposal for CG is the radical Islamic ideology itself, but it was rejected because it failed to meet two criteria. As discussed earlier, the ideology provided the intellectual foundation for a widespread challenge to western influence and internal corruption. However, the ideology has become diffused over time in order to adjust to changing circumstances and different agendas. Thus, an ideology is no longer *dominant* unless one considers resentment of the West as an ideology. Ideology also fails to meet the third test as it links to a desired endstate. Assuming for now that it is possible to attack radical Islamic ideology as articulated by Maududi and Qutb, how would its defeat force the change of desired endstate? By this time in the course of the movement, the ideology has been infused with different political and social goals so its “defeat” would not force a change in endstate.

There are other problems with ideology as a CG. An ideology can contribute moral strength to a movement, but it is the *people* who decide whether they believe in radical Islam or something else. It would be very difficult to decide *which* ideology or *what* parts of it should be attacked. And, should a belief system be the central target of a war? Or should the focus be on the causes for and motivations behind the attraction to a destructive belief system? If we choose the latter, then it naturally leads us to design a comprehensive, long-term solution to the threat. Otherwise, if we only defeat or replace “radical Islamic fundamental ideology,” but allow the conditions that caused its popularity to persist, have we really solved the problem?

Another candidate for CG is the support of the international community.³¹ However, this idea was rejected for several reasons. First, if the desired endstate includes the transformation of a region's political system and, in turn, offers hope for its people, then the approach of broad international consensus is questionable. Many countries object to the traditional American vision of spreading liberal ideology or other Western values. Furthermore, other governments who prefer a balance of power rather than an international system consisting of one superpower, might view attempts to lead dramatic change as a threat to their own interests.³² Dramatic change requires forceful and persuasive action. Therefore, while many nations will cooperate to destroy the terror networks, only a few will support an initiative to foster comprehensive and internal change. Second, the international community seems peripheral when compared to the will of a country or region. The transformation, while assisted by external diplomatic, informational, military and economic policies, will ultimately succeed only with the support of the people who live there. Because extensive compromise is required to maintain traditional notions of international consensus, then consensus should not be considered a primary source of *strength* in its own right nor as it relates to the enemy.³³ Finally, if the endstate is dependent on broad

³¹ Such consideration for international mandates and consensus as a CG is often influenced by one's view of the larger issue. For different views on international consensus and mandates see *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives*, edited by David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong; "Why the Security Council Failed," by Michael J. Glennon in *Foreign Affairs*; *US Intervention Policy for the Post-Cold War World*, edited by Arnold Kanter and Linton Brooks; and *Law and Force in the New International Order*, edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer.

³² French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine articulated this concern in 2000 when he declared that France "cannot accept a politically unipolar world, nor a culturally uniform world, nor the unilateralism of a single hyperpower." As quoted in Philip Gordon's article, "The French Position" from *The National Interest*. The article can be accessed at www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/gordon/2000Fall_NI.htm.

³³ An example of this reality is the broad coalition that was formed by President George Bush in 1990 to oppose Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Because of international pressure and because the endstate depended on cooperation of a wide range of coalition partners, the endstate had to be adjusted. Yet, by leaving Saddam Husayn in power and pursuing a policy of containment through the next decade, the underlying problems were merely exacerbated. Containment of Saddam required American military presence in the region and in the lands of the Muslim holy sites. Containment necessitated economic sanctions in an effort to prevent Husayn from continuing his weapons programs and rebuilding his military. Both of these developments caused greater resentment of the United States and directly contributed to Usama bin Laden's vitriolic condemnation of America. Usama bin Muhammad Bin Laden, *Declaration of*

international consensus, then it is vulnerable to enemy attacks on its cohesion. If the attacks are successful and international cohesion is neutralized as a friendly source of strength, the endstate would have to change. Therefore, from the beginning, the success of a policy should not depend on broad international consensus, and thus it is rejected as a CG.

Usama bin Laden might also be considered as a CG. He is an important symbolic figure and he played a critical role in founding and directing al Qaeda so, at least for some time, bin Laden appeared as a dominant source of strength. However, he has many lieutenants who perform critical functions and he has deliberately divided the organization so that the defeat of a cell or even his own capture would not result in the end of al Qaeda. Therefore, it is questionable that bin Laden as a CG passes the first test. He definitely passes the adversarial test because his activities are specifically aimed at America interests and territory. However, al Qaeda's activities would continue if bin Laden could no longer command. The targets might change but it is doubtful that the broader desired endstate of radical Islamists would be altered. Therefore, the terror groups represent a better CG than does Usama bin Laden.

CG-CC-CR-CV ANALYSIS

It is not possible to fight beyond your strength even if you strive.

Homer, (800BC-700BC)

With the three strategic CGs in mind, it is possible to analyze further how the enemy should be attacked so that his CG will be weakened and eventually defeated. Likewise, more analysis will inform friendly forces as to what should be protected so that its CGs will not be compromised. Doctor Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV construct will be used to complete this process.

Every CG has some ability that makes it a dominant strength. That ability should be considered a Critical Capability (CC). To determine the CC, the planner should ask himself/herself, what is it about the CG that gives it such strength? What makes the CG a threat to friendly forces? Once the CC is determined, then the planner should ask, what is required of the CG to achieve its CC? Any conditions, resources and means necessary for a CC is a Critical Requirement (CR). Those requirements can be concrete and easy to quantify, or they can be intangibles. From the CRs, the planner can determine Critical Vulnerabilities (CV). In order to identify those critical weaknesses, the planner should ask, what CR or aspect of a CR, if effectively attacked, would make or help make the CG fail in realizing its CC? If properly analyzed, the planner can clearly visualize and articulate the linkages between the CGs – enemy and friendly – and their vulnerabilities that must be attacked (enemy) or protected (friendly) to attain success.³⁴

³⁴ Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities," in

As already identified, one of the strategic CGs in the GWOT is the Muslim population. In essence, both friendly and enemy forces are struggling to attract portions of that population to their causes. The CC of that population for extremist Islamic groups is the support, active or passive, it lends to the enemy. That support can be manifested through financial contributions, recruits, physical protection or maintaining secrecy. On the other side, the CC of the Muslim population for friendly forces is the support and resources needed to confront extremist movements and reform the region. (see Figure 1)




Figure 1

There are five CRs necessary for the CG to achieve the enemy's CC (support from the Muslim population), and from each of those CRs, a CV can be identified. First, the extremist groups require state sponsors to allow the former's presence and operations within respective geographic boundaries. That CR's vulnerability is revealed when the international community, through sophisticated technology, intelligence and diplomatic pressure can either disable a network or convince a state to expel the extremist groups.

The second CR is economic resources necessary for groups such as al Qaeda to generate propaganda aimed at, provide material assistance to, and recruit from, the Muslim population. Financial support is a requirement if the CG (Muslim population) is to give the enemy its CC (passive and active support). This CR must be protected from the technology that international police and intelligence organizations can employ to track the money trail.

Another CR is the intellectual message developed by Sayyid Abu 'Ala Maududi and Sayyid Qutb and acted upon by figures such as bin Laden. The ideology, however foreign or irrational to Westerners, provides a vision for potential recruits in the broader Muslim population and the justification for actions normally considered immoral or illegal. This CR is vulnerable when a government enacts reform, which in turn can present a competing vision to the extreme one offered by terror organizations. And despite the impression shaped by the popular media, there are other, more moderate ideologies in the Middle East that offer a vision of peaceful and tolerant change.

Two of those traditions of Islamic reform emerged in the nineteenth century in response to the increasingly imperialist policies of the West. One school represented by 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, Taha Husayn, and Muhammad Husayn Haykal, advocated liberalism and secularization and called for the rejection of the authoritarian caliphate and complete adoption of Westernization. Jamal al Din al Afghani and Muhammad Rashid Rida offered a different response. They called for the absorption of Western institutions and achievements into the Islamic model. There was disagreement as to how that was to be achieved: whether through revolution or

the establishment of a constitutional monarch. Later, Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938) argued for the integration of Islamic ideals with Western modern institutions.³⁵

These ideas were not confined to intellectual debate. The moderate proposals were attempted in several Muslim countries in the twentieth century. Following the 1906 Iranian Revolution, the Shah accepted nationalist demands to establish a constitution and representative body, or *majlis*. Both initiatives were rendered ineffective when Great Britain and Russia divided Iran into spheres in 1907 and gained political and economic influence over the country's internal affairs. In 1919 Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, prevented British moves to create a British protectorate out of Anatolia and forged an independent modern Muslim nation-state that was both secular and liberal.³⁶ In 1922, Egyptian reformers wrote a constitution based on the Belgian model and, a year later, elections were held. The Wafd nationalist party won most of the seats in the parliament as they would do seventeen times between 1923 and 1952. However, the Wafd was prevented from exercising actual power because Great Britain and France sensed a potential threat to their vital interests in the region.³⁷

Thus, the Muslim world has produced moderate ideologies that have inspired attempts at Western liberal institutions and practices. Moderate Islamic organizations and thinkers continue to argue their ideas about reforming their societies. Much of their efforts are hidden from view either because authoritarian governments fear that democratic reform will mean an end to power or because extremist activities capture the attention of the media. However, an ideological foundation for reform and democracy exists, some liberal experiments have been attempted, and there is no reason to assume that democracy cannot succeed or that most Muslims do not want to

³⁵ Ahmad S. Moussalli, *The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001), 11-14.

³⁶ Arthur Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 184-185.

³⁷ Armstrong, 177.

try.³⁸ This historical precedent highlights the vulnerability faced by promoters of radical Islamic ideology.

The fourth CR is a body of people who spread the ideology in different corners of the Muslim world: those who teach the radical message in certain *madrassas* - Islamic schools. Only a few of the *madrassas* actively perpetuate Maududi's and Qutb's vision but the role of those few schools is vital to establishing in the minds of young students the rationale, justification and intellectual foundation necessary to create support for an anti-Western movement within the broader population. This CR is vulnerable when national governments either reform or are pressured to close the schools and prosecute the teachers for fomenting revolutionary feeling. Of course, harsh crackdowns such as those undertaken intermittently by the Egyptian government between 1960 and the present can backfire and create additional sympathy for the radical movement. Nonetheless, the radical *madrassas* and their teachers are necessary for setting the conditions within the Muslim population for supporting extreme movements.

Getting a sufficient number of recruits is also a CR if the terror organizations are to achieve their goals. Not only are people needed to plan and carry out terror plots, but also a broader support network is needed to organize and manage the financial, training, administrative, technological and propaganda functions in the organizations. Without a sufficient recruiting and replacement pool, the organizations will wither away as followers are arrested or killed. The CR of recruits is vulnerable in the same way that the *madrassas* and the vision itself are. If governments reform and moderate Muslim leaders and citizens can change the environment from which frustrated followers have emerged, then the radical vision, the schools in which it is taught and ultimately the recruiting pool itself, will be threatened.

There are at least three CRs necessary for the CG to achieve the friendly CC of support from the Muslim population. The first CR is the support of the international community. The

³⁸ Abdulaziz Sachedina, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 137; Moussalli, 17-18,33, 158-161.

police and intelligence resources of a larger alliance are critical to tracking financial transactions, communications between terror suspects, and other activities of radical organizations. Terror cells exist in multiple countries that have the legal mechanisms to address criminal activity within their own borders. Furthermore, they can share information to which the United States would not otherwise have access. However, the CR is critically vulnerable because of conflicting national interests. While success in the fight against Islamic terrorists may be considered imperative to American survival and well-being, it is not considered vital to other nations. Furthermore, even with an alliance that shares a sense of urgency toward international Islamic terrorism, it is unlikely that its members will completely agree on an endstate or the means to achieve that endstate.

Another CR necessary to achieve the friendly CC is American leadership. Participation by the United States in a conflict against terrorism is absolutely necessary. Nations around the world constantly look to America in times of crisis for leadership, influence, coercion and resources. No single nation in the world is held in such regard, albeit sometimes negative. However, this CR has a profound potential weakness – the will of the American people. Twentieth century history is replete with examples of US reluctance to persevere except in cases when national survival is at stake. In the decades since the conflict in Vietnam, American will to commit forces and accept casualties has been called into question. The enemy knows this and will take advantage of it.³⁹

The final CR needed in this CG is a positive, or at least a neutral, perception of the West. Admittedly, this CR is probably the most difficult to achieve and is the most vulnerable. Muslims

³⁹ In fact, bin Laden has already perceived American lack of resolve. He said in his 1996 declaration of war, "Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place in 1983?...And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you leave Aden in less than twenty-four hours! But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where...when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you...You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew. The extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear." Declaration is available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html.

are raised hearing about the Western crusades against Islamic lands between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. The slaughter of innocent Muslims, Jews and a few Christians in Jerusalem in 1099 is considered Islam's first encounter with the Christian West.⁴⁰ Additional crusades were launched throughout the Middle Ages in support of the long-standing papal policy of defending the Holy Land against Islam. Christian and Muslim armies continued to fight over the next several centuries as kings and sultans struggled to gain territory from their opponent. Nineteenth century relations were marked by increasing European (including Russian) involvement in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire. All of the Great Powers had competing interests in the declining empire but, if the balance of power was to be maintained, then no one country could be allowed too much influence. Thus, the Ottoman empire survived until 1918 only because its continued existence was in the interests of outside powers.⁴¹ Following the defeat of the Central Powers and the collapse of the Ottomans, new sources of resentment emerged. Despite agreements made to Arab representatives during the war, Britain did not honor its promise to support the formation of an independent Arab kingdom. Instead, Britain and France, under the auspices of the League of Nations, divided the former Ottoman territories into Mandates and "supervised" their development toward self-government.⁴²

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 became a source of even greater frustration in the Muslim world. The 1948, 1956, and especially the 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars are remembered as humiliating defeats at the hands of a Western-backed Jewish state. The Cold War prism led the United States to support Israel because the latter served as a "pillar of democracy" in the Middle East intended to block the spread of communism. Sadat's success in 1973 raised

⁴⁰ Goldschmidt, 92. Accounts of the scene in Jerusalem following the slaughter indicate that the streets flowed knee-deep with blood. Victims were tortured, beheaded and burned at the stake. The Muslim Dome of the Rock was stripped of all valuables and converted into a church.

⁴¹ Norman Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy 1814-1914* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1992), 47, 121-122.

⁴² Emory C. Bogle, *The Modern Middle East: From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 128-129, 144-145.

Arab morale but it was dampened when the Egyptian President agreed to sign a peace agreement with Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Further aggravating relations was the Palestinian movement which, though few Arab countries showed any substantive support of the Palestinian cause, served as a rallying cry against Israel and the Western weapons systems that increased the effectiveness of the Israeli Defense Forces.⁴³

Usama bin Laden can and does offer substantial anecdotal evidence of Western aggression against Islam. He repeatedly uses the term “crusaders” and blames them for the ills of the Muslim world. Like state leaders before him, bin Laden claims that he is a champion of the Palestinian cause. He asserts that 600,000 Iraqi children have died as the result of sanctions enforced by the United States.⁴⁴ He argues that the only reason corrupt governments have been allowed to thrive is because it is in the interests of the United States.

Only powerful and visionary leadership can counter international Islamic terrorism and the resentment that fuels the movement. As a friendly CG, the office of the American presidency can wield the CC of command of U.S. national policy and resources against the enemy. (see Figure 2) There are four CRs associated with achieving that CC. First, the president requires accurate and timely intelligence if he is to make decisions that will be effective against the terrorists. However, this CR is weak because the US lacks sufficient human intelligence of the terror networks and those who harbor them. Training and employing agents and convincing an insider to help friendly forces will take time and, until accomplished, will remain a glaring vulnerability.

As a leader elected by a democratic process, the president requires domestic support to execute his policies in the GWOT. As has already been mentioned, the people of the US present a potential vulnerability if they lose interest in the war or if they deem the conflict not worth the lives of servicemen and women.

⁴³ Cleveland, 336-358, 364-384.

⁴⁴ Hashim, "The World According to Usama Bin Laden," Internet. Accessed 15 December 2003.

Friendly forces also need bases in the theater of operations in order to launch operations against terror groups. However, this CR is vulnerable because the use of those bases depends on some Islamic states and powerful countries such as Russia to accept the presence of American military forces on their soil or nearby.

Finally, the President requires international support to most efficiently attack the enemy CVs. The US is a superpower, but the international community can assist in areas of intelligence gathering and analysis, financial operations, and legitimacy. This CR is weakened by the conflict between the interests of different nations. Not all countries will agree on the vision or means to achieve that vision. The enemy knows this and can try to prevent close cooperation of the international community.




Figure 2

The Middle East terror groups such as al Qaeda qualify as an enemy CG because they can wield their CC of terror to intimidate and eventually force the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from Muslim lands and cause the collapse of pro-Western or secular governments. The CRs for this CG are the same as those already identified under the CG. They require state sponsors, radical religious teachers, recruits, a vision and ideology, and economic resources. Likewise, these CRs have the same vulnerabilities as already discussed. Their potential weaknesses are sustained international cooperation with the U.S. and its allies, moderate Muslim leaders and citizens, reforming governments, and a traceable money trail. (see Figure 3)




Figure 3

The CG-CC-CR-CV construct provides a means to approach a very complex challenge. It is not definitive, but at the strategic level, it can frame the central themes for designing a strategy. In the case of the radical Islamic mass movement, the preceding analysis highlighted the

necessity of realizing that because the struggle is a contest for Muslim popular support, a successful strategy must concentrate on how to win that support.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people.

William Butler Yeats (1865-1939)

Wars teach us not to love our enemies, but to hate our allies.

W. L. George (1882-1926)

The preceding analysis of the enemy, its endstate, and its strengths and weaknesses highlights several areas in which the U.S. and its allies must improve if they are to be successful in the war against Islamic terrorism. While current efforts appear to have been mostly successful – no catastrophic attacks on American soil, the successful removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the disruption of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines – there remains critical shortcomings that will ultimately hamper efforts to achieve the desired endstate. These shortcomings can be divided into three categories: defining the enemy, the information campaign, and establishing legitimacy.

As discussed earlier, President Bush's *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* defines the enemy as those who wish to destroy the civilized world. From this perspective, all subversive groups are combined under a common label: terrorists. Their characteristics are described using a pyramid. At the base of the pyramid is the "underlying conditions" that create an environment conducive to criminal activities. Above that foundation is the "international environment" which allows the groups to communicate, travel and operate across borders. The end of the Cold War and the advance of technology are two trends that fostered this international environment favorable to the terrorists. States that intentionally or unintentionally support terror groups with bases or other capabilities is the next level on the pyramid. Once safe harbor is established then the organizations can gather and manage resources and plan their attacks with

impunity. Finally, the leadership sits at the top of the structure and provides direction and strategy.⁴⁵

This perspective is further revealed in the term “Global War on Terror.” This term mandates that all terrorists are potential targets of the war effort. Yet, American actions since September 11, 2001 suggest otherwise. For the most part, it is the radical Islamic threat that has been the focus of the war. Such a focus is appropriate considering the identities of those who perpetrated recent attacks against American interests and territories. However, the general failure or reluctance to provide nuanced in official statements regarding the problem and the enemy calls into question the aim of the strategy itself.

Therefore, the enemy must be clearly defined. A “good versus evil” world view is far too simplistic and clouds sophisticated discussion of terrorism in general and Islamic terrorism in particular. Such a simplistic approach lumps together all groups that use terror tactics and defines them as criminal and illegitimate. Clearly, attacks designed to instill fear and terror in a civilian population in order to force change defy international customs and norms. However, putting all groups into one category and describing their common traits rather than highlighting their differences fails to provide direction for the war effort. An analysis of international Islamic terrorism using a framework such as Hoffer’s is one way to convey the complex problem that confronts friendly forces.

A more sophisticated analysis of the radical Islamic problem reveals that a successful information campaign is vital for enemy and friendly forces. Each side must convince the Muslim population of the value of a particular endstate. Radical Islamic ideology envisions a theocratic state free of corruption and foreign influence. Using a combination of coercion, propaganda and incentives, terrorist groups try to recruit active participants as well as passive supporters for their cause. They blame current autocratic regimes and continuous imperialism for the problems faced

⁴⁵ Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, 6.

by Muslim societies. While many Muslims do not support the violent activities of these extremist groups, they remain convinced of the underlying message.

On the other side of this struggle, the U.S. must present a favorable view of representative institutions that govern responsible states integrated with the rest of the world. The U.S. and its allies use military force to defeat terror groups, thus preventing attacks on friendly interests but also demonstrating the futility of violent methods. However, success against terror groups does not necessarily translate into support for a reformed and representative Muslim world friendly to the West.

The lack of a comprehensive information campaign at all levels remains the glaring weakness of the U.S. effort. The enemy has a significant advantage in this area and it has to be countered. To combat this problem, the American government must continuously articulate its message to the region rather than wait for the local media to communicate it for them. Different forms of media – print, radio, television and the internet – must be used to gain access to all parts of the Muslim world. Furthermore, that effort should be integrated across the spectrum of national power. State Department, intelligence, and military officials must work together with the common goal of convincing a foreign population to support reform and modernization efforts.

Related to the information campaign is the legitimacy campaign. The earlier analysis firmly denied international consensus as a center of gravity but the such consensus emerged as a critical requirement for friendly CGs and a critical vulnerability for enemy CGs. This does not mean that every nation must support coalition goals. It does not mean that the United Nations has the authority to dictate the terms of the war against terror. However, it does mean that every effort must be made to achieve the greatest possible degree of cooperation without compromising the important goals of the war.

The most critical targets of the legitimacy campaign must be the people of the Muslim world. If meaningful transformation is to take place in Muslim countries, it is the people of the region who must perceive the legitimacy of American and coalition efforts. At the strategic level,

American foreign policies must be altered to address the concerns of the Muslim world. While Israel is not the cause of all of the problems in the Middle East, its presence has given Muslim leaders and extremists a scapegoat on which to direct hate and blame. Unfortunately, for numerous reasons that will not be discussed here, the U.S. has routinely supported many Israeli policies that have unnecessarily antagonized its Arab neighbors. The U.S.-Israeli relationship has provided anti-American groups with additional fodder to discredit U.S. values and ideas.

The American support for corrupt Middle East regimes also provides propaganda material to extremists. There are many justifications for supporting such regimes – oil, the threat of communism, vital waterways – but each time such justifications are used to support questionable policies, the Muslim population is told that America is hypocritical.

While the current fight against Islamic terror groups appears to be successful, the achievement of the desired endstate remains in question. Military success alone in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Iraq will not obtain the support of the populations for comprehensive reform and rejection of violent Islamic ideology. If the long-term goals are to be realized, then the campaign must focus more attention on winning the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim populations as well as achieving greater moral and actual support from the international community.

CONCLUSION

Power consists in one's capacity to link his will with the purpose of others, to lead by reason and a gift of cooperation.

President Woodrow Wilson

The U.S. remains the most powerful and influential nation in the post-Cold War world. It has the ability to project overwhelming military strength to any region on the globe in response to, or in anticipation of, a variety of threats. This ability gives the American government enormous flexibility in shaping its foreign policy. However, military strength, though vital, addresses only one aspect of American security. In the face of American military strength, enemies will continue to resort to terror tactics. Defeating that threat will require military means, but in the long term the best response demands a more sophisticated strategy.

Of course, the American government routinely employs the full spectrum of national power around the world. However, its use is not well-integrated into a comprehensive program meant to address the underlying causes of terrorism in general and radical Islamic terrorism in particular. Rather than including the radical Islamic challenge under a generic label of “terrorism,” the movement should be addressed in terms of its unique and distinct characteristics. It certainly employs methods that are in violation of the law – international and domestic – and the perpetrators, like any other criminal group, should be dealt with using military and police capabilities. Thus, the terrorist groups themselves are legitimate and appropriate targets. But, the terrorist groups are merely one part of the larger problem of the radical Islamic challenge. The anti-western, radical Islamic movement did not surface as a new threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has deeply entrenched roots, a religious foundation, a sophisticated ideology, decades of grievances, and considerable appeal in the Muslim population around the world.

Therefore, to defeat this radical movement, the challenge for America and its allies is to convince the Muslim population that representative government, religious tolerance, open societies, and responsible economic policies, not radical Islamism, that will provide the solutions to social, cultural, political and economic problems. To win that argument, the information and legitimacy campaigns must become the priority efforts.

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