Defining Doctrine for Transitions, a Case Study in Post-MCO Security
Abstract
Phase III Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown the U.S. military's propensity to focus on major combat operations (MCO), often at the expense of post-MCO security and reconstruction. Without clear doctrinal guidance on how to establish effective security in a post-MCO environment, small unit leaders are forced to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures on the spot, thus leaving little time to plan and procure the resources and measures necessary to establish a fully secure environment. This monograph examines what basic security requirements are necessary to effectively transition from a MCO to a post-MCO environment. Historical analysis can greatly assist in identifying positive and negative trends in post-MCO environments across the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information spectrum. Specifically, Post World War II Germany and Japan, Panama, and Kosovo show trends that are inevitable, but can be leveraged if foreseen and prepared for. The trends identified through historical analysis can then be compared to existing U.S. Army doctrine to see if they can affect these trends in a favorable way. Detailed examination identifies gaps between post-MCO requirements and current security doctrine. A security framework addressing these shortfalls provides an effective construct for additional doctrinal research. This monograph recommends specific additions to the current U.S. Army doctrine that can be easily implemented.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 28, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA436142
Entities
People
- David L. Raugh
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College