The Impact of Misunderstanding the Enemy's Will to Fight in OIF
Abstract
The United States' miscalculation of Iraqis' "will to fight" during the planning of Operation Iraqi Freedom contributed to post-conflict operational problems. The specific nature of these problems were foreseen and could have been avoided by adjusting the timing of the campaign and force structure in place prior to the beginning of the conflict. "Will" is not defined in U.S. joint doctrine. This lack of attention to the concept of "will" has contributed to the situation faced by American and Coalition forces fighting in Iraq. Accordingly, the following definition is suggested as a starting point for understanding "will": the combination of multiple components that coalesce into a collective desire of a group, or groups, to initiate or continue actions to achieve a desired goal. When American decision makers confined their view of the Iraqi "will to fight" to Hussein and his governmental apparatus, they jeopardized their own ability to achieve their strategic goals. The American military's understanding of how an enemy's will to resist changes the calculus of planning and executing military campaigns is incomplete. Understanding "will" involves trying to understand and predict complex human interactions that generate outcomes that are as likely to defy logic as bow to it. Sections address the following topics: defining "will," historical perspective on "will," Operation Court of Justice and the attack on Verdun in World War I, Germany's 1917 decision for unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I, Japan's decision to initiate war with the United States by attacking Pearl Harbor, the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan, significant factors influencing the understanding of the enemy's "will," U.S. doctrinal review and analysis, linking strategic goals to operational objectives, incorporating "will" into operational planning, and Operation Iraqi Freedom and the "will" of the enemy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 26, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA436238
Entities
People
- Scott A. Sparks
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College