

Defining Admission Requirements for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School

**A Monograph
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AY 04-05

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 074-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 052605	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Monograph		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Defining Admission Requirements for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major James Sturgeon				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) has admission requirements that do not allow the school to meet its stated mission goals. JAWS is a new school at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFCS) that awards Joint Professional Military Education phase one (JPME I), JPME phase two (JPME II), and Intermediate College (ILC) credit all in ten months of education and training. Additionally, JAWS awards a Master's degree and is considered equivalent to service Advanced Warfighting Schools, such as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). However, according to the <i>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy(OPMEP)</i> , the only requirements for admission are service competency and Intermediate Level College (ILC) eligibility. Traditionally, an officer attended ILC, AWS, and JPME II to gain the same qualifications and develop the required competencies. "The JAWS mission is to produce graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative." This mission requires the development of a particular set of leader competencies.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Education			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 45	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT U	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE U	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT U	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT none	

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Defining Admission Requirements for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School

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Abstract

Defining Admission Requirements for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School by MAJOR James G. Sturgeon, USAF, 45 pages.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) has admission requirements that do not allow the school to meet its stated mission goals. JAWS is a new school at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFCS) that awards Joint Professional Military Education phase one (JPME I), JPME phase two (JPME II), and Intermediate College (ILC) credit all in ten months of education and training. Additionally, JAWS awards a Master's degree and is considered equivalent to service Advanced Warfighting Schools, such as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). However, according to the *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy(OPMEP)*, the only requirements for admission are service competency and Intermediate Level College (ILC) eligibility. Traditionally, an officer attended ILC, AWS, and JPME II to gain the same qualifications and develop the required competencies.

“The JAWS mission is to produce graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative.” This mission requires the development of a particular set of leader competencies. To discover what those competencies should be, leader development frameworks, competency models, and competency-based curriculum development were explored. Once a competency model that fit the mission requirements for JAWS was determined, competencies developed over the course of JAWS were subjectively measured, along with the competencies developed over the course of ILC, AWS, and JPME II. The results formed the admission requirements.

Along with a competency model, Joint Learning Areas/Objectives (JLA) had to be explored. The OPMEP dictates the JLAs for ILC, the Joint Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), and JAWS. Service ILCs, teach JPME I and JCWS teaches JPME II JLAs. These were compared to the JAWS JLAs. The comparison revealed that most of the JAWS JLAs require the same to slightly higher levels of learning as JPME II JLAs. From a cognitive development standpoint this means that JPME I and JPME II levels of learning must be achieved before students are ready to go on to higher levels of learning. The higher JLA learning levels at JAWS means added admission requirements in the desired competencies.

JAWS does not develop operational expertise from a service perspective, as required by JPME I. That competency is only taught at service ILCs. Additionally, it was discovered that JAWS could not achieve the desired levels of learning for students because JPME I and JPME II levels of learning had to be developed before moving on to advanced concepts taught at JAWS. Therefore, the admission requirements should include completion of ILC.

Including ILC in the admission requirements allows for the development of service operational expertise as well as achievement of JPME I and some JPME II levels of learning. Additionally, JAWS should conduct its own screening of potential applicants to ensure the right officer attends JAWS prepared to study advanced concepts and graduate to a planning position on the joint or combatant commander staff. JAWS has great potential to develop expert joint planners as long as admission requirements ensure service expertise, minimum joint education, and appropriate cognitive capacity in the student.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2002, General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directed the Joint Staff J-7 Division to examine Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as a method of developing joint leaders who are comfortable in the joint, inter-agency, and multinational environment and more capable of integrating service capabilities into coherent joint plans.¹ In response, the J-7 and National Defense University (NDU) created the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS). The school was designed to educate and train expert joint planners who will meet the needs of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands. The Joint Forces Staff College (JFCS) was given the task of administering and designing the curriculum of the school.

In August of 2004, JFCS admitted twenty-four field grade officers to the first JAWS class. In a ten month academic period, these officers, in the grades of O-4 and O-5, receive certification for Intermediate Level College (ILC) or Senior Level College (SLC), and garner JPME phase one and phase two (JPME I and II) credit. JAWS is consider the equivalent of a service Advanced Warfighting School (AWS), such as the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and has been accredited to award Masters degrees. Traditionally, it takes twenty-five months of education and training to gain all of these qualifications (ILC, AWS, and JPME II). Accomplishing all of this in ten months demands officers, particularly O-4s, with certain pre-requisites. So what are the attendance requirements for JAWS?

Currently, the only pre-requisites for O-4s are "service-proficiency"² and ILC eligibility. For each service, ILC eligibility can mean different things. For instance, the Army is currently using a 100% attendance model, while the Air Force still selects those officers who are eligible for resident education through a promotion board process. The concept of service-proficiency is

¹Davis, Jon M., Kelvin C. Bowen, Lee W. Schonenberg. "Joint Advanced Warfighting School." (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, Feb 2003). 1.

²United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). E-H-1

also not very well defined. Therefore, this monograph will research and recommend O-4 admission criteria for JAWS.

Admissions requirements help identify those students who are more likely to complete a course of instruction. Universities around the world have admissions requirements, and some of the more prestigious schools have stringent requirements due to the rigor of their curriculum. Requirements ensure that students have the skills and knowledge needed to graduate from that college or university. Admissions requirements for JAWS are especially important as these officers make the first impressions on the joint community. The criteria for admission requirements can be found in the goals of JAWS.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) states, “The JAWS mission is to produce graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, plan for the employment of all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and be creative, conceptual, adaptive and innovative. JAWS is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and combatant commands with officers expertise in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations. Students must be capable of synergistically combining existing and emerging capabilities in time, space and purpose to accomplish operational or strategic objectives.”³ In order to fulfill that mission, students must have the requisite foundation of cognitive, leadership, and warfighter competencies.

A competency is an “underlying characteristic related to effective or superior performance”⁴, and is usually defined by a set of skills, knowledge, and attributes that combine to produce desired behaviors. The services and the joint staff have done extensive work on a strategic joint leader competency model that is reflected by the desired goals of JAWS. Within

³ Ibid. E-H-1.

⁴ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-2

this model, levels of competency, which can be subjectively measured and compared, are affected by the education, training, and experience of an officer. This study will compare the level of competency in a JAWS graduate to a graduate of what will be referred to as the “long course”.

The long course is a student who has been through JPME I, JPME II, and an AWS. The reason for using JPME I and JPME II is that these represent the qualifications a JAWS student obtains from the course. An AWS graduate is used because that JAWS claims to be the equivalent of an AWS. Comparing the competencies present in a long course graduate to the anticipated JAWS graduate will identify required competencies of a JAWS candidate. Those required competencies can be translated into knowledge (education and experience), skills (training), and abilities (education, training, and experience) required for JAWS attendance.

To form the foundation for the comparison, this study examines service specific leader development, competency models, and competency based curriculum. Leader development helps identify the competency level of an ILC/JAWS candidate. Competency models highlight those areas that are most important to future joint leaders, while competency based curriculum defines educational goals and objectives as well as methods of evaluation for the development of competencies. With this foundation in the development and use of competencies, specific curriculum is analyzed for competency development.

Competencies are developed through education, training, and experience. Goals and objectives of an educational experienced are expressed in the curriculum of a school. Once delivered, curriculum attempts to build specific competencies in the students. The curricula of each type of school (JAWS, ILC, AWS, and JPME II) are evaluated to determine what competencies are developed, and if they are developed to the required level. This is important to designing pre-requisites for JAWS.

JAWS is a concept that has great significance for the joint community, and its success will have great impact on the quality of future combat operations. That means that lead planners who graduate from JAWS will affect the lives of soldiers, sailor, airmen, and marines. That is

why it is vitally important to make sure the right officer is selected to attend. The current requirements for JAWS candidates are not adequate enough to produce expert joint planners. Therefore, education, training, and experience requirements must be defined if JAWS is going to educate the same quality planners that are produced by the service AWS. Education and training led the way in making the military a truly joint organization and that process must continue in order to meet future demands. Now is the time for change that will result in competent joint leaders to lead our military into the future.

II. LEADER EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Leader development programs across the services include education, training and experience. In order to do that each service has developed some sort of framework to guide the growth of officers. Competency frameworks define what services strive to develop in a leader through education and training. These frameworks have been translated into educational goals through competency-based curriculum development. The Army and the Air Force have done extensive work in this area and recently remolded their leader development constructs to meet the future demand.

According to the new *Field Manual 1, The Army (FM-1)*, “Leadership is the most dynamic element of combat power; therefore, growing leaders is our stock-in-trade.”⁵ Army leader development revolves around three domains, institutional education and training, operational assignments, and self-development. *Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force (FM 7-0)*, states, “Leader development is achieved through the life-long synthesis of knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self-development.”⁶ Institutional education and training occurs at formal schools of the Army from pre-commissioning through the general officer level and are

⁵ Department of the Army. *Field Manual 1-0, The Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). 29.

⁶ Department of the Army. *Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002). 1-7.

focused around transitions from one level of leadership to the next. For instance, Command and General Staff College is focused on preparing the field grade officer for transition from the tactical level to the operational level. This education is then reinforced with operational assignments.

Operational assignments are where education is put to the test. It is in the field where concepts and theory are used in practical application and as a result either reinforced or forgotten. That is one reason why developmental schools usually precede the transition from one level of leadership to the next. The experience at school prepares officers for the next assignment and reinforces those lessons learned in the academic environment. But learning in the field doesn't happen in a vacuum. There must be a system for feedback in order to make the most of leader development opportunities. Once again, *FM 7-0* recognizes this and states, "Commanders play the key role in leader development that ideally produces tactically and technically competent, confident, and adaptive leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, complex situations to execute mission type orders achieving the commander's intent."⁷ It is also the role of the commander then to encourage his subordinate leaders through honest feedback and advocate continued self-development.

Self-development is not just the Chief of Staff of the Army's reading list, but many other tools as well. 360-degree feedback and pursuit of advanced academic degrees contribute to the process of developing leaders. According to *Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, The Enduring Legacy, Leader Development for America's Army*, "Self-development is a planned, competency-based, progressive, and sequential process individual leaders use to enhance previously acquired skills and experience, and to enhance readiness and potential of progressively more complex and higher-level assignments."⁸ This model of institutional education and

⁷ Ibid. 1-7

⁸ Department of the Army. *Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for America's Army*. (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994). 14

training, operational assignments, and self-development is not much different than the Air Force's Force development concept.

Force development is the construct used by the Air Force to develop leaders. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development (AFDD 1-1), says, "Force development is a series of experiences and challenges, combined with education and training opportunities that are directed at producing Airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions."⁹ The framework is very similar to the Army's, in that it emphasizes education and training to prepare leaders for assignment experience and that those experiences contribute overall to the development of the Airman. "Education and training are critical components of the force development construct. Education and training represents a large investment of resources and are the primary tools in developing Airmen."¹⁰ The Air Force also recognizes that there is a difference between education and training and tries to clarify that in its doctrine.

AFDD 1-1 states, "Education provides critical thinking skills, encouraging exploration into unknown areas and creative problem solving. Its greatest benefit comes in unknown situations or new challenges. Thus, education prepares the individual for unpredictable scenarios. Conversely, training is focused on a structured skill set, and the results of training performance should be consistent. Thus, training provides the individual with skill expertise."¹¹ Skills gained through training, when placed in the operational environment, produce consistent results, but education helps officers understand when, where, and how those skills apply. It is those experiences that teach leadership lessons.

In a survey conducted by the Army Personnel Survey Office in 2000, Active Component Army Competitive Category Officers reported that they felt that they learned more from their

⁹ Headquarters Air Force. *Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, Leadership and Force Development*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004). 14

¹⁰ Ibid. 25.

¹¹ Ibid. 25.

operational assignments than any other source. In fact, 76.9% said that the greatest contribution to their development as a leader was from operational assignments.¹² David Kolb actually defines learning in the context of experience when he states, “Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.”¹³ However, this does not negate the need for leader education and training. Rather, it highlights the importance of getting the proper education and training in conjunction with assignment experiences such that an officer has the knowledge necessary to make the most of the operational assignment. Renowned educational researcher Dr. John Dewey had much to say about this in his book *Education and Experience*.

Dewey recognized the validity of learning by experience as early as 1938. When examining the two schools of thought, the traditional method of teaching versus the “new school” of progressive education (experiential), he realized that there must be a link between the two.¹⁴ The link between formal education and experiential learning is that formal education provides the knowledge base and framework for new learning gained through experience. If this is true, then preparatory education is a valid concept for the development of officers as they progress in rank, fill assignments at the operational and strategic levels of war, and develop competencies that help them be effective commanders. Competency frameworks are created to guide the maturation of officers into effective commanders.

According to the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), a competency is an “underlying characteristic related to effective or superior performance.”¹⁵ Successful corporations such as AT&T use a competency framework to develop and identify leaders for succession in the company. The Joint Staff, the Army, the Air Force, Dr. Leonard Wong and

¹²US Army Research Institute. “Ratings of Greatest Contributions to Development as a Leader By Active Component Army Competitive Category Officers: From the Survey on Officer Careers 2000.” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 Oct 2000).

¹³ Kolb, David A. *Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development*. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984). 38.

¹⁴ Dewey, John. *Experience and Education*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, Feb 1938) 11.

¹⁵ Department of the Army. *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army*. OS-2

students from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), and the Office of Force Transformation, have been studying competency framework designed to grow future joint leaders. In order to provide a common base for comparison of JAWS to the long course, it is necessary to identify a competency framework relevant to the development of future joint leaders. Each of these organizations, the Army, Air Force, Dr. Wong and USAWC students, and the Office of Force Transformation, conducted extensive research on competency models that contribute to the development of a joint leader model.

Army FM 22-100 defines a leader across three levels of leadership; direct, organizational, and strategic. At each level, skills, knowledge, and abilities and attributes define what a leader should “Be, Know, and Do”.¹⁶ In the categories of “Know” and “Do” are sub-categories of skills and actions. The necessary leader skills, as defined by the field manual, are interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical. According to doctrine, influencing, operating, and improving describe leader actions. The list of competencies required in the “Know” and “Do” categories is fairly short to begin with, but each competency is broken down into more subcategories of skills that define the competency and those skills are defined with more definitive skills that support the previous level. At the strategic level, the list is extensive. Dr. Leonard Wong, a professor at the Army War College, points out in his study that, “. . . long comprehensive lists are problematic. At the individual level, it is difficult to assess one’s leadership ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must ‘Be, Know, and Do’ just about everything.”¹⁷ But the competencies discussed are helpful in that they provide a framework under which leaders can be developed.

The ATLDP suggested that, due to the increasing complexity and ambiguity in the current operating environment, the Army must focus on developing the “enduring competencies”

¹⁶ Department of the Army. *Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999). 1-3

¹⁷ Wong, Leonard, Stephen Gerras, William Kidd, Robert Pricone, Richard Swengros. “Strategic Leader Competencies.” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 5.

of self-awareness and adaptability.¹⁸ The panel describes these as meta-competencies and explains that one cannot exist without the other. “Self-awareness without adaptability is a leader who cannot learn to accept change and modify behavior brought about by changes to his environment. Adaptability without self-awareness is irrationally changing for change sake, not understanding the relationship between abilities, duties, and the environment.”¹⁹ Dr. Wong and a group of U.S. Army War College (USAWC) students studied FM 22-100 and recommendations from the ATLDP and developed six meta-competencies for strategic level leaders.²⁰

A meta-competency is a set of knowledge, skills and attributes that can be grouped under one descriptive word or phrase that captures the essence of the set. The advantage of using meta-competencies is that they facilitate leader development efforts to produce strategic leader capability and yet allow for easier self-assessment. The disadvantage is that a meta-competency label does not explicitly describe some skills and abilities. However, it is important to remember that, “The concepts behind the labels, not the labels themselves, are the focal points for leader development and assessment.”²¹ According to the USAWC study, six strategic leadership meta-competencies can be derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness.²²

Identity includes the concept of self-awareness but goes much deeper than just that. Beyond just understanding one’s strengths and weaknesses, it, “also includes an understanding of one’s values and how they match the values of the Army.”²³ An officer’s concept of identity changes as he develops over his career. It moves from self-esteem based on their own

¹⁸ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-3.

¹⁹ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-3.

²⁰ Wong, Leonard, “Strategic Leader Competencies.” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 1

²¹ Ibid. 5.

²² Ibid. 5.

²³ Ibid. 6.

contributions to the organization to valuing and esteeming the contributions of subordinates.

Therefore identity is a meta-competency that is developed throughout an officer's career.

Mental agility implies that a leader is adaptable. The ATLD defines adaptability as "the ability to recognize changes in the environment; to determine what is new, what must be learned to be effective, and includes the learning process that follows that determination, all performed to standard and with feedback."²⁴ In short, a leader with mental agility can take in and process relevant information, understand what is important about the situation, detect trends, and develop creative solutions from a systems perspective. What is more is that these mentally agile leaders are comfortable making decisions in complex environments that lack sufficient information. They can challenge assumptions, are not adverse to constructive dissent and are not afraid to admit when they are wrong. In other words they possess critical and creative thinking skills, can apply them to problem solving and are not so proud that they can't admit when they are wrong. This meta-competency is extremely important to strategic leaders and planners alike.

Cross-cultural savvy involves the ability to work within a joint, coalition, and inter-agency environment. Rarely will the U.S. ever employ troops without the aid of coalition partners. Therefore, an awareness of world coalition partner cultures as well as service and agency cultures is vitally important. Interpersonal maturity goes hand in hand with this cross-cultural savvy because they both involve the ability to communicate effectively. Interaction with different cultures requires different forms of communication while the art of persuasion enables a leader to successfully negotiate and build consensus with coalition partners, sister services, and external agencies. Interpersonal maturity also involves a willingness change the organization's culture to meet the demands of the strategic environment and develop the leaders of tomorrow.

The technical and tactical expertise required of a strategic leader can be summed up in the meta-competency of world-class warrior. This ability is something that is developed throughout an officer's career. It involves a depth of technical and tactical knowledge as well as

²⁴ Ibid. 6.

breadth of operational and strategic wisdom. The world-class warrior is one who has the professional astuteness to understand his roll as a leader in the Army and acts in accordance with those actions that are best for the organization. Leaders with this kind of professional, selfless approach are needed across all the services.

The Air Force's approach focuses on developing enduring leadership competencies throughout an officer's career, while providing specific skill sets and occupational competencies when required by assignment. This view recognizes that the levels of leadership (tactical, operational, and strategic) are related but separate from the levels of warfare and that within those levels there are three categories of enduring leadership competencies. The categories recognized by the Air Force are personal leadership, people/team leadership, and institutional leadership. The competencies required at each of the levels are the same but differ in degree depending on the level at which a leader is operating.²⁵

Personal leadership emphasizes technical and tactical competence while looking to develop problem solving, and interpersonal skills. As Airmen move into the operational level, more interpersonal skills are required in order to effectively provide people/team leadership. Technical and tactical competence is focused on synchronizing systems and organizations, while problem-solving skills must tackle more complex situations. Finally, institutional leadership, predominantly at the strategic level, requires "skill sets that include technical competence on force structure and integration; on unified, joint, multinational, and interagency operations; on resource allocation; and on management of complex systems; in addition to conceptual competence in creating policy and vision and interpersonal skills emphasizing consensus building and influencing peers and other policy makers – both internal and external to the organization."²⁶

This move to enduring competencies accompanies the Air Force's shift to the concept of Force Development within its assignment system. Under this system, leaders are developed

²⁵ Headquarters Air Force. *AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004) 8.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 9.

through education, training, and experience with the idea that as an officer progresses, he/she will gain breadth through a developmental assignment. The direction the Air Force has chosen to go with leader development emphasizes providing leaders a depth of knowledge in their specialty and, after intermediate level education, a breadth of knowledge outside their expertise to prepare them for assignments at the operational level of war. Air Force leader development then aims at widening an officer's breadth of knowledge for service at the strategic level. Mr. Garstka of the Office of Force Transformation has focused his efforts at the strategic level as well.

Mr. Garstka's leadership materiel came from the Wye River Senior Leader Learning Workshop conducted in August of 2003. He asserts that as we develop the next generation of leaders, the move from the industrial age to the information age will require less of a leader from the physical domain, but more from the social, informational, and cognitive domains²⁷. Additionally, he asserts that organizational success will be achieved through adaptability and agility. Increased requirements from the cognitive domain of leaders as well as improved adaptability and agility can only be developed through and greater emphasis on education and training.

The J-9 presented a model similar to Mr. Garstka's at the Joint Leader Competencies Symposium on 24 March 2004. This competency model was developed from a top-down and bottom up approach and focused on the joint senior leader (O-6). The top down approach developed a framework of joint competencies based on research completed by the previously mentioned organizations and individuals. The bottom up approach derived sets of knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAA). The KSAA were grouped and compared to the research

²⁷Garstka, John J. "Integrating Innovation, Leadership, and Cultural Change." (Washington D.C.: Office of Joint Transformation, 21 October, 2003). Power Point Briefing. Slide 12.

developed competencies. The initial framework adapted to accommodate critical KSAA. The result of this process was seven competencies and 25 sub-competencies (figure 1).²⁸




Figure 1-Joint Senior Leader Competencies

This set of joint leader competencies was developed to solve a perceived problem that saw leaders as the key to transformation efforts and the future joint force, but not prepared to meet the demands of the Joint Operational Environment (JOE). In a brief to the Joint Leader Competencies Symposium, Mr. Bill Newlon defined the problem as, “Today’s competencies for joint commanders and staffs are not adequate to support the future joint force construct. Commanders and staffs must have a global, holistic view, and be educated and trained to lead/operate effectively in a networked world where complexity and collaboration are the norm and operations transcend space, time and organizational boundaries.”²⁹ Therefore, his task was

²⁸ Newlon, Bill. “Human Resource System: Competencies, Selection and Experience, LeaderDevelopment & Learning Project Process and Approach to Way Ahead. For Leader Competencies Symposium” (Washington D.C.:JFCOM, J-9, 24 March 2004). Power Point Briefing. Slide 24

²⁹ ibid. Slide 12.

to, “Identify the competencies (individual and team) required for commanders and staff to plan, execute and assess within a complex battlespace, which includes asymmetric threats, using a parallel, adaptable, dynamic decision-making process that supports timely and quality decisions, and speed of command.”³⁰ The result was the Joint Senior Leader Competency model whose competency areas were used to develop the curriculum for JAWS.

One of the most difficult tasks for educators is developing a curriculum that produces the desired learning by the end of the course or school. According to Benjamin Bloom, a curriculum developer must keep in mind the educational objectives of the school or course, the learning experiences that will attain those goals, the sequence of the curriculum for continuity, and finally the type of evaluation to use in order to assess the effectiveness of the curriculum.³¹

Competency-based planning, which focuses upon the desired behavioral outcomes to derive educational goals and objectives is one method of curriculum development. A second method focuses on developing objectives that meet changing demands of the current environment. Even though the models may seem very different, they both focus on officer professional development.

Professional schools across the country use competency-based learning models to develop their curriculum. They use these models in order to develop practitioners with the appropriate skills, knowledge, and attributes. Competencies provide the foundation for professional development and must be tailored to meet the needs of the profession while being integrated into the learning continuum (education, training, experience, and self-development). Desired behaviors, derived from competencies, are observable and measurable and therefore lend themselves to evaluation criteria. The evaluation of student behavior drives the learning intervention method and curriculum development. This approach has been successfully employed in medical schools and according to Richard Dollace, the Brown University School of Medicine was able to use this approach to produce better practitioners in the field of medicine.

³⁰ *ibid.* Slide 12.

³¹ Bloom, Benjamin S. *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*. (New York: Longman, 1956). 25.

The success came from their ability to shift their teaching focus away from knowledge alone toward the development of the skills necessary to apply that knowledge.³²

According to Dr. Donald Schon, part of professional practice is art, and educating for artistry does not focus completely on knowledge, but on the application of knowledge in a manner that cannot necessarily be taught. Artistry, however, can be coached. Coaching is appropriate at times of practical experience and guides the student to learn lessons about judgment and evaluation. Schon says, “Perhaps, then, learning all forms of professional artistry depends, at least in part, on conditions similar to those created in the studios and conservatories: freedom to learn by doing in a setting relatively low in risk, with access to coaches who initiate students into the ‘traditions of the calling’ and help them, by ‘the right kind of telling,’ to see on their own behalf and in their own way what they need most to see.”³³

Therefore, applying Schon to the art of war, professional military education curriculum should include exercises or some sort of experience that allow for instructor coaching such that students learn how to apply previously taught knowledge. Although this is a learning intervention method, it is appropriate to discuss during the development of curriculum that will teach future leaders about operational art. Schon’s “reflective practicum”³⁴ helps develop those competencies required by a competency-based curriculum.

The competency-based approach to curriculum design is a very hierarchical model that provides definitive constructs for the growth of leaders and uses the desired leader competencies to define course goals. The skills that make up those competencies become the objectives of the block or module, while supporting performance requirements define the objectives of each lesson within that block or module. The standard for achieving the lesson objectives are defined in

³² Dollase, Richard, and Stephen R. Smith. “AMEE Guide No. 14: Outcome-Based Education: Part2 – Planning, Implementing and Evaluating a Competency-Based Curriculum.” (*Medical Teacher*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1999:). 15-22.

³³ Schon, Donald A. *Educating the Reflective Practitioner*. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1987). 17.

³⁴ Ibid. 18.

terms of desired behaviors. Thus, since the course goal, block, module, and lessons are derived from the competencies, the standard behavior is what should be observed as the result of instruction (figure 2.³⁵). The standard behaviors are defined in terms of Bloom's taxonomy.




Figure 2-Competency Integration

Taxonomy is a system of classification. Bloom's taxonomy of cognitive educational behaviors is a method of classifying intended behaviors of students as a result of some course of instruction. It is important to note that it is not classifying the actual behaviors of the students. Nothing really can predict actual student behaviors. Through the educational process, it is the intent of the instructor to develop the necessary change in the student such that they display the intended behavior through written, verbal, or observable actions. That is why the taxonomy includes methods of testing for each level of learning. Dr. Bloom's states, "As we have defined them, the objectives in one class are likely to make use of and be built on the behaviors found in the preceding classes in the list."³⁶ This means that the taxonomy is structured from the least to the most complex cognitive behaviors such that a higher-level behavior includes behaviors from

³⁵ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. "U.S. Army Command and General Staff College" (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 March 2004) Slide 11.

³⁶ Bloom, Benjamin S. *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*. (New York: Longman, 1956). 18.

previous levels. The categories of behaviors are knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.

The importance of developing taxonomy for cognitive levels of learning lies in the fact that as an individual matures within a body of knowledge, he or she must develop the ability to apply that knowledge and solve problems. If given knowledge alone, that individual is left with only data of previous experiences with which to compare the problem to and may find that the problem does not fit previous solutions. If cognitive skills are developed within the educational curriculum, students acquire the ability to think through the problem and identify new solutions. Bloom states, “Thus it is expected that when the student encounters a new problem or situation, he will select an appropriate technique for attacking it and will bring to bear the necessary information, both facts and principles. This has been labeled ‘critical thinking’ by some, ‘reflective thinking’ by Dewey and others, and ‘problem solving’ by still others. In the taxonomy we have used the term ‘intellectual abilities and skills.’”³⁷

Without intellectual abilities and skills, students either change the problem to fit previous examples or don’t approach the problem at all. In today’s world, it is imperative that people have cognitive skills that allow them to approach problems with the idea that the solution may not be one that has been used before. Dr. Bloom’s view of the world almost fifty years ago is similar to the way many see the world today, and he recognized the utility of intellectual abilities and skills in coping with that dynamic. He states, “Whatever the case in the past, it is very clear that the middle of the 20th century we find ourselves in a rapidly changing and unpredictable culture. It seems almost impossible to foresee the particular ways in which it will change in the near future or the particular problems which will be paramount in five or ten years. Under these conditions, much emphasis must be placed on the development of generalized ways of attacking problems and on knowledge which can be applied to a wide range of new situations.”³⁸ So, Bloom’s

³⁷ Ibid. 38.

³⁸ Ibid. 40.

taxonomy lends itself to measurement of learning as well as educational goal setting in curriculum development. However, in this rapidly changing world, some think that the competency-based model is too slow to adapt to the changing demands.

Another method of developing goals and objectives for curriculum development in professional military education comes from a group of current and recent United States Army War College (USAWC) faculty members who expressed their reservations to competency-based curriculum development. In their objections they state, “When carried to the extent of detailed crosswalks to learning objectives, competency mapping represents an over-engineered approach to leadership development and education that is more bureaucratic than professional.”³⁹ They argue that the military is more apt to use such an approach because it provides a list of competencies “that is both definable and measurable.”⁴⁰ The danger is that these extensive lists of competencies become self-serving rather than a tool for leader development and lack the ability to adapt quickly enough to the changing environment.

In order to develop leaders in a manner that prepares them for an uncertain future, the authors suggest the use of an alternative collaborative leadership development framework. This framework is much more responsive than the current system that can take up to several years to affect any significant change. Rather, by a system of continuous assessment and curriculum updates as they relate to the joint community and the specific school, curricular emphasis can be shifted to meet the demands of the current environment. Ideally, all the Service and joint schools are linked and collaborate in a common environment that easily allows for the exchange of ideas and emerging concepts.⁴¹ This approach argues against detailed competency-based curriculum but does not negate the concept of educating leaders to develop certain competencies. It

³⁹ Bullis, Craig, Ruth Collins, Christopher Paparone, and George Reed. “Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead.” *Parameters*. (Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, Autumn 2004: 46-60.). 48.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 51.

⁴¹ Ibid. 57.

advocates looking at leadership education and training from many different perspectives and adapting as necessary to meet the goal of developing future leaders.

Therefore, curriculum development should aim at developing skills, knowledge, and attributes useful to a leader throughout his or her career. Additionally, a system of continuous assessment and curriculum updates should be developed in order to meet the demands of the current operating environment as it pertains to education and training of new concepts and skills. The result will be officers educated to develop relevant enduring competencies as well as knowledge required to operate effectively in the current operating environment. This will help lay the right foundation upon which experience can build competent joint leaders.

Developing leaders with the right competencies at the right time is the goal of leader development programs. Leader development is accomplished through education, training, operational experience, and honest feedback to produce self-improvement. After looking at several models, it appears that for joint senior leaders, the J-9's competency model best describes those competencies required for success in the dynamic contemporary operating environment. However, as Dr. Wong pointed out, this long list can be over burdensome especially when it comes to curriculum development. Focusing on two or three enduring competencies and reviewing them constantly for relevance seems likely to develop more depth in each competency, while the curriculum adjusts as required produce leaders equipped for future joint military action.

Of seven Joint Strategic Leader Competencies, those that matter most for future leaders are conceptual skills, personal leadership, interpersonal maturity, and world-class warfighter. Conceptual skills are summed up in Dr. Wong's concept of mental agility, while personal leadership encompasses identity and professional astuteness. Interpersonal maturity includes the ability to communicate effectively and the concept of cross-cultural savvy. Finally, world-class warfighting refers to the technical and tactical knowledge and skills required at each level of war. These competencies are useful in for the comparison of current curricula but should be evaluated for future relevance.

III. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CURRICULUM

Up until the advent of *The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, otherwise known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), professional military education was under the purview of the individual services. The intent of the act was to improve military advice to the President and produce a truly joint force rather than one that just cooperated when needed and deconflicted from one another when appropriate. As was the case in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, deconfliction rather than a blending of capabilities characterized joint operations. Since that time, the United States Military has evolved into a joint force that fights as one team, but the same cannot be said about the services' educational institutions.

The GNA gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the responsibility of oversight of professional military education⁴², but it has served more to deconflict rather than coordinate the actions of service schools. The contemporary operating environment dictates that officers operate comfortably in the joint, coalition, and interagency realms and thus the educational system should reflect that requirement. However, the services covet their institutions and resist any move to create a more joint academic environment for fear of losing control over the education of their officers. As a result, institutions develop their curriculum to fulfill the needs of the service and then add joint requirements as an afterthought. Most service institutions add the joint requirements so that they may receive JPME certification.

The purpose of the OPMEP is to distribute the policies, procedures, objectives and responsibilities for PME and JPME. The OPMEP includes the chairman's vision for JPME and its role in leader preparation.⁴³ It provides guidance for each institution in terms of purpose, mission, and focus. Regardless of the method used to develop curriculum objectives, each level of PME must include these objectives in the course of instruction to receive JPME

⁴² Antis, Robert M., Claudia H. Clark. "Creating a New Path for Joint Education." (*Joint Forces Quarterly*. Spring 2002: 74-81). 75.

⁴³ United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). 1.

accreditation.⁴⁴ The services' educational institutions are then free to work within these bounds as long as they comply with the OPMEP standards and joint learning objectives/areas (JLAs).

The OPMEP JLAs use Bloom's taxonomy of the cognitive domain to describe the desired behavior for each learning objective. Just as each level of Bloom's taxonomy builds upon the previous level of learning, the OPMEP JLAs do the same from pre-commissioning to Primary PME, from Primary to Intermediate, from Intermediate to Senior Level, and from Senior Level to General Officer Level. At the intermediate level, JPME II builds upon the foundation of knowledge gained during JPME I. New JLAs are added for JAWS.

When comparing these JLAs, there is a definite progression in desired levels of learning from JPME I to JPME II, and progression in one area from JPME II to JAWS. The JAWS JLAs cover the same areas as JPME I and JPME II, but add joint leadership and joint procurement strategy. JPME I and JPME II do not address joint leadership development, but leave it to the services to address. The OPMEP also adds Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) as additional guidance for PME institutions.

The Chairman's SAEs are reviewed and approved by the MECC and must be incorporated into each service school curriculum.⁴⁵ In spite of the short notice of new SAEs, schools manage to fit them into their curriculum in order to meet accreditation standards. The curriculum, instructional method, and classroom environment of a service school demonstrates how the services attempt to develop its leaders through education. Therefore it is important to analyze the curricula of JAWS, an ILC, an AWS, and JPME II for comparison.

According to the Joint Forces Staff College, "JAWS produces graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, employ all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and commanders and be creative, conceptual,

⁴⁴ Ibid. F-1.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 3.

adaptive and innovative.”⁴⁶ The concept of the school has been around since 1991 but only recently resurfaced. When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Meyer gave the direction to build such a program, the J-7 Division reincarnated the idea of the JAWS program to fill a need for additional planners who are comfortable in a joint, multinational, inter-agency environment and possess the education and training to creatively develop joint operational plans.⁴⁷ The concept moved quickly from development to implementation. Possibly as an oversight, there are few pre-requisites other than service proficiency and eligibility for ILC.⁴⁸

Currently, each service selects their own officers for attendance but no further requirements have been added. As mentioned, JAWS requires that an O-4 or O-5 eligible for either ILC or SLC be available for assignment as a joint planner on a Combatant Commander’s Staff or the Joint Staff, have a Top Secret/Special Compartmentalized Information security clearance and be capable of rigorous academic study.⁴⁹ The OPMEP also requires student be “service-competent”⁵⁰ but provides no guidance as to what that means.

The school is divided into two seminars of twelve students with four Army, four Air Force, three Navy, and one Marine Corps students in each seminar. The seminars are balanced according to service, grade, specialty and experience. According to the JFSC, classes are “. . . conducted in a collaborative learning and collaborative information environment with current information technology tools available at student desktops in the classrooms.”⁵¹ The focus of the school is at the strategic/operational level and the curriculum emphasizes the ‘high end’ of operational art.

⁴⁶ http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/school_programs/jaws/overview.htm

⁴⁷ National Defense University. “Joint Advanced Warfighting School Concept” (Brief by NDU to CJCS. 12 Mar 04)

⁴⁸ United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). 1.

⁴⁹ http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/school_programs/jaws/overview.htm

⁵⁰ United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). 1.

⁵¹ http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/school_programs/jaws/overview.htm.

The curriculum seeks to strike a “balance between strategic and operational studies, and between warfighting and war preparation.”⁵² To accomplish this, the course begins with Foundations in Theory of War to provide a baseline for the remainder of the course. Methods of instruction during this phase include case studies, guided discussions, and guest speakers. Strategic Foundations studies the theories of government and diplomacy as well as the complex nature of the joint, inter-agency, and multi-national environment that exists today.⁵³ The Operational Art and Campaigning block is designed to provide rigorous training through exercises, simulations, and war games while emphasizing decision-making, problem solving, and planning processes. This curriculum evolved from a standard already set at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), Joint Senior Leader Competencies, and OPMEP Learning Areas designed specifically for JAWS. Some of the curriculum also followed the lead of the already successful Service AWS programs such as SAMS, SAASS, and SAW.

The methodology of JAWS is very similar to that of the Service AWS programs, which emphasize rigorous study in the areas of theory, history, and doctrine. The course is designed to develop critical thinkers through guided discussions of the subject materiel and reinforces the academic study with exercises designed to train planning procedures. Research visits to various governmental agencies and joint commands provide valuable insight to operational/strategic considerations and allow students to meet and network with people in key planning positions⁵⁴. Additionally, like the Service schools, JAWS employs a rigorous writing program to develop officers’ communication skills, a vital requirement for staff work. JAWS is focused on the operational/strategic level of war and has clearly defined OPMEP learning areas.

The OPMEP directs six learning areas for JAWS. These learning areas cover the same general topics as the JLAs for JPME I and II but require a higher level of learning. The cognitive

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ *ibid.*

⁵⁴ United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). 1E-H-1.

learning requirements for the JAWS JLAs fall in the cognitive levels of “analyze”, “synthesize” and “evaluate”. All of these cognitive areas are at the higher echelon of the Bloom’s Taxonomy. However, O-4s coming to the JAWS program are not required to possess any experience nor education concerning JPME I and II JLA requirements. JPME I and II JLAs have lower cognitive levels of learning associated with them and are the building blocks for attaining higher cognitive levels. The additional JLA for JAWS concerns leader development.

According to the JFSC, the curriculum was designed with Joint Senior Leader Competencies in mind (figure 1).⁵⁵ Although specific competency based learning requirements are not identified in the curriculum, it appears the curriculum supports development of the seven Joint Senior Leader Competencies. Most of the curriculum supports the world-class warrior, technical, and conceptual competencies through the study of theory, history, and doctrine. The “Operational Art and Campaigning” block of instruction emphasizes the world-class warrior, technical, and conceptual competency areas and supports their development with experiential learning in the form of exercises. These competencies are further developed through exercises and research visits to the Joint Staff and interagency organizations.

The training portion of the curriculum builds from the JCWS exercise program. It is conducted in an entirely U.S. only environment, allowing for the use of classified materiel and the same technology used by the Joint Staff and combatant commands. Simulations designed to produce realistic training in an academic environment provide timely feedback on decisions made during the planning process. Learning opportunities are created through exercise design and debriefed to gain important lessons learned. In ten months, the JAWS student completes a rigorous course of study designed to produce ILC credit for O-4s, JPME I and II certification, and a Master’s degree.

⁵⁵ National Defense University. “Joint Advanced Warfighting School Concept” (Brief by NDU to CJCS, 12 Mar 04).

By graduation, students will have spent 128 hours studying military theory and history in the Foundations in the Theory of War block, 176.5 hours in the Strategic Foundations block, and 388.5 hours in the Operational Art and Campaign Planning block of instruction. All together, students spent 693 hours in the classroom and countless more hours preparing for each lesson, researching a thesis, and meeting writing requirements.⁵⁶ The plan is for a proficient joint planner to emerge. This is also the plan for the long course graduate, and that process begins with ILC.

Attendance of ILC marks the start of an officer's transition from the tactical level to the operational. The transition begins with education and is reinforced by follow-on assignments. To affect this transition the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College developed a completely new curriculum in 2002 to effectively prepare Army officers for service at the operational level of war while simultaneously equipping Majors for branch qualifying jobs as battalion or brigade operations officer (S-3) or executive officer (XO). The newly developed curriculum separates the JPME I requirement into an intermediate level qualifying course, identified as Intermediate Level Education (ILE), from the Army's tactical focus in the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC).

ILE developed from the recommendation of the ATLD Panel Report that CGSC provide a quality "common core of Army operational instruction and career field, branch, or functional area training tailored to prepare them for their future service in the Army."⁵⁷ The desired product of ILE is, "Majors with a common Warfighting knowledge of division, corps, and joint operations and who possess a better understanding of their career field's contribution to warfighting."⁵⁸ The resultant curriculum is a focused program of study that aims to fully develop leaders at the tactical and operational levels of war while introducing the strategic level of war.

⁵⁶ Joint Forces Staff College. "Joint Advanced Warfighting School". Brief to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 12 May, 2004

⁵⁷ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-13.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

The mission of CGSC “is to educate leaders in the values and practice of the profession of arms, to act as the executive agent for the Army’s Leader Development Program, to develop doctrine that guides the Army, and to promote and support the advancement of military art and science.”⁵⁹ Supporting that mission requires a curriculum that is well balanced and focused on developing leader skills, knowledge, and attributes. The ILE and AOWC courses of instruction are designed to weave leadership and history lessons into the doctrinal lesson in a fashion that links one to the other. This is accomplished by focusing on the development of leader competencies.

The CGSC curriculum is linked to the development of seven competencies that comprise Army leadership doctrine. Those competencies come from the Army Leadership doctrine document FM 22-100 and are Interpersonal, Conceptual, Technical, Tactical, Influencing, Operating, and Improving. In other words, these are the “Know” and “Do” of the leadership doctrine. Supporting each of these competencies are skills and associated behaviors. As discussed earlier, competencies provide the foundation and focus for development of the curriculum as well as a method of determining the outcome.

Instruction in CGSC is conducted around small groups, usually about sixteen in number, and combines guided discussion, lecture, case study, and practical exercises to deliver educational content. ILE and the three AOWC blocks of instruction end in exercises, starting at the Joint Task Force level and ending at the Brigade level. This methodology meets the competency development requirements of the curriculum and the OPMEP requirements.

When CGSC developed a new curriculum for the 2002/2003 academic year, the school decided to pursue not only JPME I requirements of the OPMEP, but JPME II requirements as well. This course of action came from a recommendation by the ATLD Panel in order to better prepare selected officers for service in joint billets on Combatant Command staffs or the Joint Staff. The problem was that officers were not getting the appropriate JPME II education prior to

⁵⁹ US Army Command and General Staff College Advanced Operations Warfighting Course. P. 37

their assignment to a joint billet and did not feel adequately prepared⁶⁰. Accordingly, AOWC block I instruction was designed to meet some of the JPME II requirements and a separate course of study was developed to meet the remaining JPME II OPMEP learning areas for selected officers. The course was designated Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies. To date, the Army has sought but not received legislative authority to conduct JPME II at CGSC or receive JPME II credit for this course of study.⁶¹

All together, ILE and AOWC account for 742.5 hours⁶² of contact time, cover JPME I and some JPME II requirements, and seven leader competencies. The school's approach and integration of recommendations from ATLD Panel set conditions to prepare officers to serve at the operational level while equipping them to serve successfully in key positions at the tactical level.⁶³ The integration of History, Leadership, and Warfighting concepts as well as doctrine provided coherent course of education and training that creates and identifies critical and creative thinkers for the AWSs.

Advanced programs such as SAMS, SAW, and SAASS, are designed to produce operational/tactical level planners for their respective services as well as prepare them for future joint assignments. The strength of these advanced schools is in their focus on developing critical and creative thinkers who are able to identify and solve complex problems. Post Vietnam, as the Air Land Battle Concept developed, the Army realized that its field grade officers where not equipped to think, plan, and fight at the operational level of war. The need for operational planners drove the creation of the School of Advanced Military Studies and the school provided the blueprint for the other Services' advanced schools.

⁶⁰ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-12.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Various CGSOC ILE and AOWC curriculum documents published by CGSC

⁶³ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). OS-12.

The current mission of SAMS states, “The School of Advanced Military Studies educates and trains officers at the graduate level in military art and science to develop commanders and General Staff officers with the abilities to solve complex military problems in peace and war.”⁶⁴ This mission statement reflects guidance provided by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker, in June of 2004.⁶⁵ General Schoomaker understood and articulated that SAMS is more about education than training. It is about education to develop officers who can think broadly with strategic understanding, comprehend that wars are won at the operational/strategic level, never look at the world the same way, and win wars of the future. This guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army drove several changes to the configuration and curriculum of SAMS.

SAMS is structured around six small seminars with twelve to fourteen students made up of personnel from different branch or functional area, an Air Force officer, a Navy or Marine Corp officer, and one international officer. The primary instructor is a second year fellow who works and instructs in coordination with a PhD professor. Each student has their own computer workstation with collaborative planning and briefing tools available. Additionally, each room has video teleconference and recording capability for after-action review feedback. This structure facilitates learning through academic and training modules throughout the curriculum.

The 2004/2005 SAMS curriculum is linked to the Joint Operating Environment and seeks to develop planners who think beyond kinetic solutions. Instead, the course forces students to think more on the operational/strategic level and consider elements of national power in the design of campaign plans.⁶⁶ The basics of the academic curriculum fall on the three pillars of theory, history, and doctrine. These pillars form the foundation for practical application in exercises designed to further develop students’ planning skills. The curriculum accomplishes this through six modules over 47 weeks.

⁶⁴ School of Advanced Military Studies. “AMSP Strategic Plan AY 2004/2005.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: Power Point Presentation to Col Kevin Benson, Director, SAMS. 2004.

⁶⁵ School of Advanced Military Studies. “SAMS Strategic Plan Review Update.” Fort Leavenworth, KS: Power Point Presentation to Col Kevin Benson, Director, SAMS. 2004.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

The Advanced Warfighting module creates a baseline by conducting an exercise designed to assess the student's planning competence at this stage in their career. It also provides team building opportunities and familiarization with collaborative planning tools. The Advanced concepts in Military Art & Science for Commanders and Staff takes a critical look at military theory and its purpose, explores the Joint Operational Environment (JOE), and develops an understanding of operational design and operational art.⁶⁷ The next module, Elements of Operational Design and Campaign Planning covers elements of the threat environment, operational design, and the strategic setting. Additionally, this module studies emerging concepts such as Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and application of information operations.

The Execution of Campaign Design module is designed to give the students the ability to apply Joint and Service doctrine as well as integrate service enablers. A capstone exercise at the end of the block gives students an opportunity to apply these skills in a realistic scenario. The Futures/Strategic module takes a closer examination of political science, coalition, inter-agency, and information operations and integration. It also considers the role of non-governmental and private-volunteer organizations and their impact in the theater of operations. Finally, the Futures/Strategic module considers the impact of Transformation and the future of DoD. The final phase is preparation for comprehensive exams and deployment to the next duty station with the necessary skills for success as planners and leaders.

The SAMS curriculum development intended to produce planners and leaders with a particular set of skills knowledge and attributes. In particular, over the course of approximately 850 hours of education and training, SAMS sought to produce officers who, "Possess a thorough knowledge of military history, theory, and doctrine."⁶⁸ In terms of FM 22-100, the competencies developed include the seven mentioned above for CGSC. The emphasis by the SAMS

⁶⁷ School of Advanced Military Studies. "AMSP Strategic Plan AY 2004/2005." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Power Point Presentation to Col Kevin Benson, Director, SAMS. 2004.

⁶⁸ School of Advanced Military Studies. "SAMS Strategic Plan Review Update." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Power Point Presentation to Col Kevin Benson, Director, SAMS. 2004.

curriculum is on critical and creative problem solving skills and therefore the conceptual competency of officers are more developed. Although the curriculum is not obligated to cover OPMEP JLAs, it covers many of the JPME II JLAs in the Campaign Design module.

All of the AWS programs do not tie themselves to the OPMEP JLAs when they develop their curriculum, which gives them a little more freedom to develop officers for their specific needs. That is not to say that they do not meet some of the requirements of JLA for JPME II, but they do not specifically develop their curriculum to do so. As a result, officers assigned to a joint planning billet, must complete JPME II in order to receive joint tour credit.

The JCWS conducts JPME II training for the Department of Defense. The only other method of receiving credit for JPME II is through JAWS or one of the War Colleges. The mission of JCWS is, “To educate military officers and other national security leaders in joint, multinational, and interagency operational-level planning and warfighting, to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational, and interagency teamwork, attitudes and perspectives.”⁶⁹ The school incorporates joint operational concepts and lessons learned into an academic and training program that meets all of the designated OPMEP objectives for JPME II.

The objective of the JCWS curriculum is develop greater knowledge and understanding in areas related to students’ assigned joint billets in order to prepare them for joint duty. The curriculum is divided into five courses: Strategy, Operational Capabilities and Functions, Contemporary Operating Environment, Joint Planning Process, and Wargaming.⁷⁰ The strategy courses focuses on the Unified Combatant Commander and his role in executing the national security strategy through the military element of national power while the Operational Capabilities and Functions course highlights the capabilities and limitations of all services, SOF, and Reserves as it relates to their employment in operational campaign design. The course on the

04. ⁶⁹ www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/course_materials/curriculum.asp accessed on 1 Dec

04. ⁷⁰ www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/course_materials/curriculum.asp accessed on 1 Dec

Contemporary Operating Environment familiarizes students with the environment of today and highlights the need to understand the environment in which they might operate.

The Joint Planning Process module brings together those concepts studied in previous courses and puts them into the context of developing joint plans. The adaptive planning process and crisis action planning are covered in this block in detail such that students are able to apply the necessary concepts upon graduation. The Wargaming course includes training modules designed to reinforce lessons learned in the academic blocks. It focuses on the joint planning procedures and the production of executable plans. The course develops officers who understand their role on the planning staff and are prepared to contribute to the process. In terms of joint leader competencies, the course is designed to develop a world-class warfighter, technical competence, conceptual astuteness, interpersonal maturity, and personal leadership.

The development of curriculum in professional military education has two important inputs. One input is competencies via the competency-based curriculum development process and the other input is the OPMEP JLAs. The inputs shape the curriculum of joint and service schools as they develop leaders capable of operating in a complex, joint, coalition, and interagency environment. The curriculum of the school also points to the development of its students. Where JAWS, ILCs, and JCWS have to comply with OPMEP requirements, AWSs are free to focus their efforts toward particular competencies. SAMS focuses on the development of critical and creative thinking, complex problem solving, and operational art. These areas are what JAWS attempts to do as well, but because JPME I and II levels of learning must be accomplished first, the school falls short of its goals.

IV. ANALYSIS

In order to define admission requirements for JAWS, the long course and JAWS were compared to one another. The long course produces a joint planner in 25 months while JAWS takes only ten months. The comparison shows that service related areas of expertise are not

developed in the JAWS student. Additionally, JAWS allows less time to build the knowledge base needed for higher levels of learning as required by the OPMEP JLAs. The result is a gap in a level of some competencies as shown in the comparison. The comparison itself required the establishment of a model that reflects the ILC candidate. Once built, the student at other levels could be modeled and compared for the development of competencies.

In order to make an equal comparison, a baseline was established as well as common language. That means that competency frameworks had to be translated into one framework. Likewise, the OPMEP JLAs had to be aligned to show similar areas of learning. The joint senior leader competency framework was condensed into four competency areas as discussed previously. Those four competency areas are conceptual, personal leadership, interpersonal maturity, and world-class warfighter. These four competencies from the joint framework include concepts from the other competency models, which are easily adapted to the new joint framework. Figure three shows how the seven competency areas were combined into four (parenthesis indicates that sub-competency's previous competency catagorie), and figure four shows a cross walk between these four joint senior leader competencies and the other models. What is interesting is that the new joint senior leader competencies align closely to the six meta-competencies Dr. Wong and the USAWC students discovered through their study. Once the framework was established for the comparison, the OPMEP JLAs had to be addressed.



Figure 3-Condensed Joint Senior Leader Competencies

Joint Strategic Leader Competencies	Army Leader Competencies	Air Force Leader Competencies	USAWC and Dr. Wong
Conceptual	Conceptual	Personal Leadership	Mental Agility
Personal Leadership	Influencing/Improving	Personal Leadership	Professional Astuteness/Identity
Interpersonal maturity	Interpersonal/Improving	Leading People and Teams	Interpersonal Maturity/Cross-cultural Savvy
World Class Warfighter	Operating/Tactical	Leading People and Teams	World Class Warrior

Figure 4-Service Competency Crosswalk

	Joint Learning Area and Objectives for ILC		Joint Learning Areas for JPME Phase II		Joint Learning Areas for JAWS
JLA 1	National Military Capabilities and Command Structure	JLA II 1	National Strategic Security Systems and Guidance and Command Structures	JLA 1	National Security Strategy, Systems, Processes and Capabilities
JLA 2	Joint Doctrine and Concepts			JLA 2	Defense Strategy, Military Strategy, and the Joint Operations Concepts
JLA 3	Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War	JLA II 2	Joint, Interagency and Multinational Capabilities	JLA 3	Theater Strategy and Campaigning with Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Assets
JLA 4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes	JLA II 4	Joint Planning	JLA 4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes (Pre-conflict Through Post-Conflict)
JLA 5	Information Operations, Command and Control and Battlespace Awareness	JLA II 3	Information Operations		
				JLA 5	Characteristics and conduct of the Future Joint Force
				JLA 6	Joint Strategic Leader Development

Figure 5-JLA Crosswalk

The OPMEP JLAs easily translate because of the way they build upon the previous level. Figure 5 shows the general JLAs and how they relate to one another. In appendix B, the full set of JLAs are correlated by subject and highlighted by level of learning required. For the most part, each JLA for ILC, JPME II, and JAWS address the same material with the exception of two areas specifically designed for JAWS. One of those two areas addresses leader development, which is taught at the ILCs and AWSs. The other additional JLA examines the future joint force. This area is a strategic level concept that studies joint vision, future joint concepts, and procurement strategies. ILCs usually address the service's procurement system, but not the development of future force constructs and procurement strategies. While the broad categories of the JLAs are similar, cognitive levels of learning required of ILC students are lower.

As mentioned before, the level of learning for JPME I at the ILCs are limited mostly to the comprehension area. This comprehension is developed over the course of ten or eleven

months of study. Generally, the desired level of learning for JPME II is to analyze material with the exception of one area requiring students to synthesize data. JLAs for JAWS generally require a slightly higher level of learning than JPME II JLAs. According to the taxonomy, each level builds upon the previous. That means that for a student to analyze a particular area, he must garner the appropriate knowledge, be able to comprehend the concepts behind that subject, and apply that subject to given situations. Thus, possessing a knowledge or comprehension level of cognition for a JLA is helpful to the development a higher desired level of learning.

Since JAWS students have not attended an ILC and have not received JPME I education, they must build a JPME I level of learning before gaining a JPME II level of learning, all in a ten month period. While this is not impossible to achieve, it appears that it would detract from the overall academic experience, taking time to build the required knowledge, leaving less time for study and reflection over more advanced concepts, relevant theories, history, and doctrine. ILC needs to be a pre-qualification requirement for JAWS to develop the required levels of learning for the study of advanced concepts.

In order to understand necessary pre-qualifications for a JAWS student, this study has built models (figure 6) that reflect the competence of an officer at the indicated level of education. Knowledge is built through experience, education, and training. Competencies are sets of skills, knowledge and attributes. Practical exercises professional coaching, as described by Schon, help build a level of competence above knowledge only. Each curriculum discussed includes training exercises designed to develop professional competence. Thus, the models reflect the four new joint senior leader competencies identified previously and are depicted as columns on a percentage scale.

Each column within figure 6 represents a percentage of that particular competency developed by the end of the course of instruction. The warfighter (shorthand for world class warfighter) competency is broken out into operational, strategic, and joint competence. In this case the operational column alone represents service operational competence while the joint

column represents joint operational competence. The strategic column represents overall strategic competence. This assumes that the tactical level competence remains the same throughout the model and does not significantly impact the comparison. The models begin with the ILC candidate on the far left. The ILC candidate is the basis of the model and represents 100% competence (The total of all competencies equals 100%). The other models go beyond 100% to represent the growth of competencies beyond the baseline total that is accomplished through education and training. This equates to additional time spent in school.




Figure 6-Competency Comparison

The ILC candidate has mostly tactical level service competence and very little joint experience. AFDD 1-1 outlines an Airman's focus and education at the tactical level. Prior to ILC, an officer's focus is on developing expert knowledge in his or her specialty while learning to

lead people and follow others⁷¹. As for education, the OPMEP says, “The curricula are predominantly Service oriented, primarily addressing the tactical level of war.”⁷² Overall, the ILC candidate has mostly tactical level expertise with limited joint and operational knowledge. He or she has become solid direct level leaders, but are still developing leadership and cognitive skills. The next step in this officer’s education is ILC.

At ILC, an officer builds upon tactical foundations and learns the operational level of war from a service perspective. In the case of a CGSC student, he or she is taught strategic, operational, and tactical concepts over the course of 325 hours of instruction⁷³ known as ILE. During that course of instruction all required OPMEP areas for JPME I are taught. In the course of the next 417 hours nearly all JPME II learning areas are covered and in the case of students that continue in the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies track, JPME II learning areas are covered in greater detail and a higher level of learning is attained.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies track at CGSC may be an isolated case where JPME II JLAs are taught but all ILCs must teach JPME I JLAs in order to receive joint education certification.⁷⁴ It follows then that after graduation from an ILC, the officer has acquired a broad operational view of his/her own service as well as that of joint operations. Additionally, that officer has built up to a cognitive level of learning almost equal to that of JPME II requirements. Personal leadership and interpersonal maturity is developed by the leadership curriculum and interaction with sister service and coalition officers on a daily basis. Accordingly, the ILC graduate would look something like something like what is shown figure 5 in terms of skills, knowledge, and attributes. An ILC graduate who goes on to study at an AWS continues to build upon these competencies.

⁷¹ Headquarters Air Force. *AFDD 1-1*. 6.

⁷² Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). AA-3.

⁷³ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. “CGSOC Course Design Review” (Briefing Mar 2003. Development and Assessment Division).

⁷⁴ Department of the Army. *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to the Army*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003). AA-3.

Although AWSs do not specifically adhere to OPMEP standards for JPME II, operational concepts are inherently joint and as discussed previously, the AWSs focus on the operational level of war in effort to teach operational art. Saying that operational concepts are inherently joint is not contradictory to a service perspective of operations for two reasons. First, each service brings capabilities to the combatant commander, a joint commander, for employment. These capabilities entail more than just warfighting capability. Support organizations of each service are as important to the fight as those in direct contact with the enemy. Combat support is normally a service responsibility coordinated and executed at the operational level. It is during ILC that Majors begin to understand the full capabilities of some of their own service's battlefield operating systems and how they fit together at the operational level of war. Second, each service must understand its roles and responsibilities and how they fit into joint operations. As long as AWSs continue to educate and train officers in operational art they must continue to study joint concepts and capabilities.

Therefore, the AWS programs build upon that operational foundation laid in the ILCs. In essence, the AWS programs do several important things that produce operational artist. First, AWS programs mentally challenge officers forcing them to reflect and critically evaluate information that is valid and useful to identifying the source of complex problems as well as possible solutions. Secondly, through the study of theory, history, and doctrine, officers are forced to stretch their cognitive capacity and ability. Figuratively, this study gives them a larger tool kit in order to find the right tool to use for the job, or in the theme of artistry, they are given ability to mix the right colors that produce great works of art. Additionally, AWS programs take the student further down the road of understanding, applying and analyzing joint operational concepts.

The AWS educational experience focuses on a slightly different set of skills, knowledge, attributes, and a greater ability in a particular set of skills. In the illustration (figure 5), the growth in cognitive ability represents the focus of the AWS on producing critical and creative

thinking officers. To depict the fact that much of the year is spent at the operational level of war covering joint concepts, there is growth in the joint column. This is also reflected in the operational column in that a larger portion of service competencies now reflects a greater ability to conduct operational art. But there is still one more step in the development of the Long Course Graduate.

The last step in the Long Course Graduate development is the inclusion of JCWS for JPME II education. Focusing only on joint operations, the JCWS course gives the AWS graduate a better appreciation for service and interagency contributions to joint campaign planning. Additionally, the AWS graduate gains more exposure to the operational/strategic level of campaign planning and linking operational objectives to strategic guidance. Finally, because JCWS is truly joint in its composition of students, the AWS graduate gains a better appreciation for his joint partner's view and is able to begin networking outside his own service. The Long Course Graduate is more joint than an AWS graduate, but still service centric, and essentially the same in all other areas.

The JAWS student spends the entire ten months in a joint environment and therefore develops a keen awareness of joint operational issues and a joint perspective to combat operations. The purpose of JAWS is to create officers who approach and solve problems from a joint perspective rather than a service perspective. Just like the AWSs, JAWS educates to develop a critical and creative thinking nature within the students. This critical thinking nature lends itself to identification of complex problems. Likewise, with a required depth of knowledge, AWS students are able to provide creative solutions to complex problems. Although the program's rigor is similar to an AWS, JAWS students are not afforded the same amount of time to develop critical thinking skills as an AWS student who is in his second year of academics. The result is that the JAWS graduate may not have the same level of cognitive skills as an AWS graduate. Using the chart depiction, the JAWS graduate has joint than service competencies when compared to the long course graduate, but there is another difference.

In that portion of operational column, which represents service operational competence, there exists an imbalance between the long course graduate and the JAWS graduate. The ILC candidate has spent most of his time at the tactical level and has had very little exposure to the operational level of his service. The JAWS curriculum spends a little time on service capabilities, but not enough for students to become their service's expert at the operational level of war. As a result, there is a lack of understanding of the services' approach and contribution to the operational level of war. This competence at the joint operational/strategic level is what produces executable war plans.

In summary, JAWS graduates do not have a foundation in their own service's approach to joint operational planning and capabilities. Additionally, the need to develop JPME I levels of learning while achieving JAWS JLAs detracts from time required to develop critical thinking, creative problem solving techniques and key operational concepts for use in a follow-on assignment. In spite of these shortcomings, JAWS has great potential to produce outstanding joint leaders and planners for the Joint Staff and combatant commands provided a few changes are made.

V. CONCLUSIONS

CJCSI 1800.01B OPMEP clearly states that JAWS candidates must be service proficient.⁷⁵ However, the OPMEP gives no indication of what that entails and leaves the definition up to each service. JAWS is a program that has great potential in the development of future joint planners at the operational/strategic level, but to meet the stated mission goals, admission requirements must be changed. The service competent officer must be an expert for his or her service, understanding their service's approach to joint operations and their contribution

⁷⁵ United States. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington D.C: J-7, Pentagon, 2004). 1E-H-1

to the joint team. The only way to accomplish this is to require JAWS candidates to have ILC completed.

Identified in the previous chapter was the fact that the JAWS graduate lacks expertise in the operational level of his service. This is due to an immersion of the officer in the tactical level (which is appropriate) with very little exposure if any to the operational level of war. This imbalance between the service tactical and operational skills is not corrected by the JAWS curriculum because it is focused on joint operational concepts and doctrine. The lack of service operational competence still exists in the JAWS graduate. But this is not the only shortfall.

The mission of nearly all AWS programs is to produce officers who think critically and have the ability to solve problems creatively. The development of critical and creative thinking in students takes time. Most educational taxonomies understand that there is an inherent hierarchy in the cognitive domain and behaviors that lend themselves to creative problem solving reside at the higher levels of cognition. Since there is a hierarchal structure to the development of creative thought, it intuitively takes more time to develop the higher cognitive behaviors. That is the advantage of a second year AWS. The extra year of education provides students more opportunity upon which to reflect and develop creative behaviors.

ILC curriculum meet JPME I requirements and there is ample opportunity for service ILCs to meet JPME II requirements as outlined in the OPMEP. This would allow JAWS to focus its efforts on advanced concepts, theory, history, and doctrine in order to produce AWS quality joint planners who are creative problem solvers. This is possible with the right curriculum and instructional method in place throughout the officer PME system.

A competency-based approach to curriculum development is a very industrial method of developing a curriculum that provides well-defined goals and objectives that are designed to produce desired behaviors. This assumes that the competency model is correct and the instructional method produces the desired results. In order to stay current, a system of evaluation, internal and external, must be employed to ensure the relevancy and accuracy of the competency

model upon which the curriculum is built. Additionally, Schon's "reflective practicum" method of instruction should be explored for inclusion in curriculum delivery in order to produce competent practitioners in the profession of arms.

The current requirements for JAWS candidates are not adequate to produce the quality planners envisioned by those who developed the School. The shortfall is the foundation in service expertise developed at ILC. As a result, JAWS does not serve as an advanced course because it must build the students level of knowledge before moving on to advanced concepts. Additionally, competency based curriculum and competency models are not updated frequently enough to ensure continued relevancy and correctness. This can be corrected by an annual evaluation system that receives internal as well as external feedback and makes updates to curricular material as appropriate. Finally, as a profession of arms, the education system must produce competent practitioners. Schon's method of instruction should be considered as officers study operational and strategic art.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The service-proficient JAWS candidate is an officer that is firmly grounded in tactical expertise and possesses an understanding of his service's approach to the operational level of war. The current method of preparing Majors and Lieutenant Commanders for the transition to the operational level is to send them to ILC. At ILC the tactically proficient O-4 gains knowledge and skills appropriate for the operational level. They gain an understanding of joint issues by fulfilling JPME I requirements and understanding how their service interacts with and contributes to the joint force. Therefore, the primary pre-requisite for JAWS must be completion of ILC. This requisite has several effects.

Attending ILC prior to JAWS gives officers a better underpinning for advanced study. By meeting JPME I requirements at ILC, the knowledge foundation is established for achieving higher levels of learning at JAWS. However, the question that is raised is whether or not ten

additional months of academics are required to provide the proper foundation. ILE is that course of instruction at CGSOC that focuses on JPME I requirements and requires approximately four months to complete. Therefore the answer is no, it does not require ten months to provide the proper foundation for JAWS graduates, but it allows time for the services to further educate their leaders in service competencies and presents another opportunity.

The service ILCs have the opportunity to adjust their curriculum to meet JPME I and II requirements. A CGSC, the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies covers many of the JPME II requirements. It is possible for ILCs to teach JPME I and II requirements and meet service educational goals simultaneously. If this were to happen, service ILCs would graduate officers fully qualified for duty as a joint specialty officers. This is a time and cost saving measure that would nearly eliminate the need to send officers to an additional three month school at the JFSC for JPME II certification. This would require some adjustments to the current PME system.

First the OPMEP would have to be more directive as apposed to suggestive when it comes to PME requirements and the Joint Staff to would have to provide oversight much in the way it does now for JPME I certification. Secondly, the percentage of officers from different services at each school would have to increase. This would help to create a more joint environment in which to learn. An increase in sister service students would also mean an increase in sister-service instructors such that service specific educational requirements could be met regardless of the ILC attended. In this manner, an officer selected to attend AWS could have JPME I, JPME II, and service requirements met prior to the advanced study.

A screening process for JAWS should also be in place to select the most qualified officers for the school. Screening criteria affords the service AWSs the opportunity to select the appropriate officers for each school. Besides completion of ILC, most schools require some sort of writing evaluation, academic record review, and an interview. The schools then select those officers they believe will succeed as operational level planners. These students would probably be good planners without the additional education, but will more likely excel as planners because

of it. A selection board could to hand-pick students for JAWS who have the potential to succeed as joint operational planners based upon the their performance and experience. As these students proceed through the academic and training environment, they become better prepared for follow on assignments as joint planners.

According to the OPMEP, JAWS candidates must be available for a follow on assignment on either the Joint Staff or on a regional combatant commander's staff. The screening process ensures that individuals chosen for the school are able to serve in a joint planning position post graduation. Service requirements sometimes interfere with an officer's ability to serve a full thirty-six month joint tour. For example, the Army Majors must become branch qualified for promotion and command opportunities. In that case those who are already branch qualified may be selected or those who are still junior majors and have time prior to branch qualification. A screening and selection process plays a significant part in working out those cases and serves to fulfill the mission of the school as it works to develop relevant officer competencies.

Currently, the competency framework used in the development of the JAWS curriculum is a conglomeration of service frameworks and is not useful in the development of the future joint leader. The framework has become another long list of things to be and do which is, as pointed out by Dr. Wong, problematic.⁷⁶ The competency list must be shorter, and focus on leader competencies that will cause growth for the future, and adapt to a changing environment. The skills developed through education and training must be continuously evaluated and changed to meet the demands of the surrounding environment through a process continuous internal and external feedback and input.

The ATLDP identified two enduring meta-competencies, self-awareness and adaptability, as key to future leader development. Their argument was that these two meta-competencies allowed a leader to adjust appropriately to the changing environment and make timely informed

⁷⁶ Wong, Leonard, "Strategic Leader Competencies." (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003). 1

decisions. Dr. Wong and the USAWC students suggested six meta-competencies, three of which have enduring qualities. Identity, mental agility, and cross-cultural savvy are three meta-competencies developed by Dr. Wong that have enduring qualities and contribute the most to preparing leaders to meet future challenges. Identity goes deeper than self-awareness and produces leaders who are comfortable with who they are and what they do. Mental agility allows leaders to adapt to changing environments and situations while cross-cultural savvy allows them to work and effectively communicate with international and inter-agency groups. Along with these enduring competencies, particular skills applicable to conducting operational planning must be developed.

The Air Force's force development model leans on the premise that enduring competencies are developed over time through a very deliberate educational process while specific skills sets are trained when needed. Using this model, the education provided at an AWS develops the enduring competencies while the training sessions provide the skills necessary for work as a planner. Over time, planning techniques and procedures may change due to changes in the environment. Using double loop-learning, JAWS, ILCs and AWSs could make appropriate curricular changes when necessary. This keeps the JPME system on the leading edge of leader education and training for the joint community.

Education is vital to the future of the U.S. Armed Forces because it prepares tomorrow's leaders to meet the challenges of the future. As DoD proceeds down the road of transformation, the force is becoming more reliant on capabilities that lie outside one's own service. Therefore, joint, coalition, and interagency operations are vital to the success and survival of the men and women in uniform. This means that experts in operational art will be in high demand in the future. JAWS is a great way to educate those future leaders, but adjustments must be made to better prepare graduating officers. Requiring ILC completion and hand selecting candidates are just two of the requirements that will make JAWS a truly premiere Advanced Warfighting School.

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¹ www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/course_materials/curriculum.asp accessed on 1 Dec 04.

APPENDIX A

	Joint Learning Area and Objectives for ILC		Joint Learning Areas for JPME Phase II		Joint Learning Areas for JAWS
JLA 1	National Military Capabilities and Command Structure	JLA 1	National Strategic Security Systems and Guidance and Command Structures	JLA 1	National Security Strategy, Systems, Processes and Capabilities
1A	Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces	1A	Apply appropriate strategic security policies and guidance used in developing joint operational plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.	1A	Analyze the strategic art to include developing, applying, and coordination the political, informational, military, social, and economic elements of national power.
1B	Comprehend the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.	1B	Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives. Focus on the proper employment of the military instrument of national power at the joint force level both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument.	1B	Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process in the joint operational environment.
1C	Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions and relationships of the President and the Secretary of Defense, NSC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), Service component commanders			1C	Analyze the ends-ways-means interrelationships for achieving national security objectives.
1D	Comprehend how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.				
1E	Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, interagency and multinational operations.				
JLA 2	Joint Doctrine and Concepts	JLA 2	Joint, Interagency and Multinational Capabilities	JLA 2	Defense Strategy, Military Strategy, and the Joint Operations Concepts
2A	Comprehend current joint doctrine	2A	Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other Services -- to include SOF) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint operations.	2A	Analyze the nature of war and its evolving character and conduct past, present, and future.

2B	Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.	2B	Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.	2B	Analyze the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives in a changing security environment.
2C	Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.	2C	Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the interagency processes in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint operational plans.	2C	Evaluate the organization, responsibilities and capabilities of the Military Services (and related organizations) and the process by which operational forces and capabilities are integrated by combatant commanders.
2D	Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.	2D	Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.		
		2E	Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined, interagency efforts and teamwork.		
JLA 3	Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War	JLA 3	Information Operations	JLA 3	Theater Strategy and Campaigning with Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Assets
3A	Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.	3A	Analyze the principles, capabilities and limitations of information operations across the range of military operations and plans – both in preparation and execution phases.	3A	Analyze joint operational art, emerging joint operational concepts and how full spectrum dominance is attained to achieve desired end-state at the least cost in lives and national treasure.
3B	Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war.	3B	Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of national security threats.	3B	Comprehend Service, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and how these capabilities can be best integrated to attain national security objectives.
3C	Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.				
3D	Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns and operations.				
3E	Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.				

3F	Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.				
JLA 4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes	JLA 4	Joint Planning	JLA 4	Joint Planning and Execution Processes (Pre-conflict Through Post-Conflict)
4A	Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by joint planning processes.	4A	Synthesize examples of campaign/theater planning and operations. Focus on the use of planning concepts, techniques and procedures as well as integration of battlespace support systems.	4A	Apply contemporary and emerging planning concepts, techniques and procedures (Joint Operations concepts, Homeland Security, Effects Based Operations, Collaborative Information Environment, etc.) for integrating battlespace support systems into campaign/th
4B	Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes and political development on the planning process.	4B	Analyze complex contingency operations for use of appropriate planning principles.	4B	Comprehend collaborative systems and processes employed to operationalize strategic guidance with the systematic, on-demand creation and revision of executable plans with up-to-date options in real time.
4C	Comprehend how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.	4C	Apply current technology, modeling, simulation and wargaming to accomplish the synchronization, employment, support and transportation planning of the joint force.		
4D	Comprehend how national, joint and Service intelligence organizations support JFCs and their Service component commanders.	4D	Analyze the appropriate mix of battlespace support systems and functions to develop joint operational plans		
4E	Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.				
JLA 5	Information Operations, Command and Control and Battlespace Awareness.			JLA 5	Characteristics and conduct of the Future Joint Force
5A	Comprehend how information operations are integrated in support of national and military strategies.			5A	Comprehend the attributes and emerging concepts of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.

5B	Comprehend how information operations are incorporated into both deliberate and crisis-action planning processes at the operational and JTF levels.			5B	Analyze and evaluate techniques for leading strategic change and building consensus among key constituencies, including Service, interagency, and multinational partners, given the changing nature of conflict and national security.
5C	Know how C2 and battlespace awareness apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.				
5D	Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.				
				JLA 6	Joint Strategic Leader Development
				6A	Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment
				6B	Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment

APPENDIX B

