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JTF - WMD Elimination

An Operational Architecture for Future Contingencies

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ABSTRACT

When the U.S. military initiated the attack into Iraq to begin OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in the spring of 2003, one of the main objectives was to find, exploit and eliminate Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and capabilities. However, as forces sped north across the Kuwaiti border, they did so with an ad hoc organization that was hastily assembled and marginally trained to accomplish this task. Despite having approximately 1.5 million men and women on active duty, the U.S. military does not have a standing force trained and prepared to execute the WMD exploitation and elimination mission. The purpose of this paper is to review the organizations that were developed and assigned this mission for OIF, and determine how the Department of Defense should organize to accomplish this task in future operations. Based upon lessons learned from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and the ongoing threat of WMD proliferation among state and non-state actors, the author proposes that a standing Joint Task Force is needed to execute this mission to provide for U.S national security and strategic interests. A recommended organizational structure, operational concept, employment scenarios and required resources are provided.

NOTATION

During the ramp up to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM the author was assigned to the Office for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). While assigned to OSD, he worked on the WMD exploitation project with staff officers from OSD, Joint Staff, Central Command, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Services, and the National Security Council. In April 2003, he deployed to Kuwait to assist the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in supporting this mission. In Kuwait he worked with the planning and future operations staffs of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (3rd Army). In April 2003, he deployed into Iraq and worked initially with the 75th Exploitation Task Force and then the Iraq Survey Group. While assigned to the Iraq Survey Group he served as the Chief of Current Operations and Plans until July 2003. The information contained within this document, where not cited, is largely a result of the author's experience and informal discussions with colleagues from many of the organizations identified within this paper. Additionally, the author drew heavily upon informal lessons learned and judgments that have been identified by the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University. The author is indebted to the Center and to all those officers dedicated to improving the Department of Defense's (DoD) ability to execute this strategically critical mission.

THE RESEARCH QUESTION

By the beginning of 2003, the President of the United States believed that he had exhausted all practical means of disarming Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass Destruction program. Since the end of the first Gulf War, the United States had implemented the diplomatic, military, economic and informational instruments of national power to eliminate this threat. The President decided that military action was required to achieve at least two objectives: remove Saddam Hussein from power, and capture, gain control and begin to eliminate Iraq's WMD capability. For decades, U.S. military forces have developed specialized forces and trained conventional forces to attack or seize a high value target such as Saddam. But the U.S. military had never trained, organized or prepared forces to seize, exploit and eliminate a nation's WMD program. In the ramp-up to OIF, planners realized that the U.S. military did not have a unit to assign to this mission. To address this operational and tactical shortfall that had strategic implications, the DoD would assemble two ad hoc organizations: the 75th Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group. Based upon the global environment and trends of WMD proliferation, it is expected that the mission of WMD elimination will be a requirement for U.S. forces in future contingencies. Therefore, it is imperative that DoD conducts a mission area analysis and develops the capabilities needed to execute this mission. The purpose of this research effort is to review the WMD Exploitation and Elimination force that was assembled for OIF, outline future employment scenarios and requirements, and propose a force structure to assist the Department in addressing this shortfall.

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PART I: OIF LESSONS LEARNED

WMD Elimination: Capability Shortfall with Strategic Implications

In the winter of 2002, as the United States ramped up toward OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, senior officials and planners within the DoD soberly realized that the United States military did not have trained and ready forces that could locate, exploit and eliminate Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The DoD had spent years planning how to invade and defeat Iraq, and prepared to counter a potential Iraqi chemical and biological attack on the battlefield or at a fixed base in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. However, virtually no planning or serious consideration had been given to what U.S. forces would actually do once they found and uncovered Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. While most maneuver commanders recognized chemical or biological ammunition caches would need to be secured, they had had no established tactics, techniques, or procedures for collecting intelligence and disposing of material found at chemical or biological storage sites, biological laboratories, suspected dual-use industrial production facilities, or similar processing capabilities for Iraq's suspected re-energized nuclear program.

In November 2002, the Deputy Undersecretary for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), established a working group to address this shortcoming. This group included action officers representing the following activities:

- Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC)
- United States Central Command (CENTCOM)

- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
- United States Army
- National Defense University (NDU)

By late December of 2003, this working group developed a force structure proposal that would be able to locate, exploit, and begin to disable Iraq's WMD capabilities during combat operations. Fortunately, each of these partnering organizations had recent experiences in providing specialized force packages in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The proposed force structure for Iraq was much larger and was named the "Exploitation Task Force" or "XTF." It represented an unprecedented integration of subject matter experts, specialized WMD intelligence collection teams, and WMD operational assets designed to render safe WMD munitions and disable WMD production facilities.

Exploitation Task Force – From Concept to Capability

In staffing the proposal among the OSD, Joint Staff, and CENTCOM in late December 2002, significant considerations emerged. First, the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) sequence had already been initiated. Additions or changes to the TPFDD would need to be approved by the Commander, USCENTCOM. Second, there was not full agreement among staff officers on whether this force would be required during combat operations or post-conflict operations. Third, the Exploitation Task Force was only a Power Point proposal. While the Army, Navy, and Combat Support Agencies had certain capabilities, they had never been integrated to the extent outlined in the XTF concept of operations.

An argument of when the XTF would be employed was paramount. Advocates for early deployment of the XTF thought the organization would be used during ground combat operations. They envisioned the XTF being called when maneuver forces uncovered a WMD sensitive site. The XTF would send forward specialized WMD teams to collect samples and exploit materials for intelligence value. Further, specialized teams would provide expert advice to maneuver commanders on securing materials and disabling munitions and facilities. These actions would ensure the integrity of evidence that Iraq had violated contested United Nations Security Resolutions. It would also ensure that discovered WMD munitions and production capabilities would be properly secured and controlled. Thus captured material would not be smuggled to Iraqi army holdouts, insurgents, or materials transferred outside of Iraq to neighboring countries such as Syria or to terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. A greater proliferation threat than smuggled munitions, the transfer of small amounts of a biological seed stock, processing equipment, and WMD production plans to a terrorist group could undermine the whole purpose for going to war.

Others held that the majority of XTF tasks would be accomplished during the post-conflict phase. They argued that during ground operations, commanders would need to focus on security operations. Once areas were cleared and secured, a number of specialized forces including intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics, would be able to move forward and conduct operations. These proponents viewed the WMD disablement mission, and certainly the WMD destruction mission to be a post-conflict task and recommended these forces be pushed back in the TPFDD. In the end, the Commander of Central Command decided that the XTF was needed during ground combat operations

and ordered that it be interjected into the deployment sequence. He directed that the Exploitation Task Force headquarters and available teams be put on the ground in Kuwait before initiation of combat and the remainder of its capabilities be deployed into theater as soon as possible.

This decision and the hard copy request for forces from a combatant commander forced Pentagon planners to quickly identify and source the XTF. Because this organization needed a command structure, the JCS tasked the Army to provide a headquarters with supporting assets. The Army tasked an artillery brigade headquarters: 75th Field Artillery from III Corps, to deploy in January 2003 and command the XTF. Attached to the XTF was a myriad of joint intelligence and WMD operational assets. DTRA designed and provided Site Assessment Teams to conduct surveys and assessments of suspected WMD sites. DTRA sourced Mobile Exploitation Teams that would conduct follow-up analysis and collection of sites identified and triaged by Site Survey Teams. DIA provided capabilities such as the Chemical Biological Intelligence Support Team (CBIST) and chemical/biological confirmatory laboratories. The Army provided subject matter experts and specialized teams from the Technical Escort Unit (TEU) that would render safe munitions and escort CBRN samples within theater and back to laboratories in the continental United States (CONUS).

OSD and the JCS continued to lead the effort in sourcing follow-on capabilities. DTRA and the Army worked jointly to develop capabilities for WMD disablement and long-term elimination operations. The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) developed a Nuclear Disablement Team. The Army's Technical Escort Unit developed the concept, trained and prepared Chemical Biological

Disablement Teams. DTRA began to identify long-term elimination requirements based upon lessons learned from cooperative reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union and the U.S. Army's stateside chemical stockpile demilitarization program.

OSD and the JCS also sent requests for civilian subject matter experts including: former UNSCOM inspectors, Biological and Chemical weapons production experts, missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle experts, chemical industrial engineers, pharmaceutical and biological technology production specialists, and Arabic linguists. These calls went out within the DoD to the Services, Combat Support Agencies, and outside DoD to the Department of Energy, the National Laboratories, and to select individuals who were former military or had past weapons inspections expertise.

To assist maneuver forces, DTRA developed pocket-sized WMD Elimination handbook for troop leaders. This handbook was intended for the small unit leader and provided pictures and graphics on what Iraqi WMD munitions, storage, processing equipment and potential dual-use facilities would look like. It also provided recommended first steps for forces to take to secure a sensitive site in order to prevent munitions and capabilities falling into the hands of adversaries or posing health threats to U.S. forces.

The end result of these efforts was that by the beginning of the war in March 2003, the 75th XTF force that was on the ground in Kuwait had about two thirds of its eventual force structure. The 75th XTF was organized as a Major Subordinate Command under the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). Additional Site Survey Teams, Chemical/Biological, Nuclear and Missile Disablement teams were rapidly being

assembled in CONUS. These teams were being sourced by the Services, Combat Support Agencies, and a variety of government agencies or contractors.

When the Commander of the 75th Exploitation Task Force, COL Rich McPhee, crossed the Kuwaiti-Iraq border in early April he led a task force that was made of joint and multi-national assets, had rapidly been assembled and shipped to Kuwait, had never trained together, didn't share a common doctrine, and whose mission and procedures were not widely understood by maneuver commanders and battle staffs. But most importantly, this unit had been assigned arguably the most important task of the war besides capturing or killing Saddam Hussein: find, exploit, and begin to disable Iraq's WMD program. There are perhaps few instances in American military history where a unit was given such a strategically important task and yet so hastily organized and pieced together.

In The Fight - 75th XTF

In order to best execute its mission during the ground offensive, the 75th XTF task-organized teams to support the scheme of maneuver. As terrain was cleared of large formations of enemy forces, the 75th XTF coordinated missions with respective maneuver forces to inspect "targets". The targets were sites that had been identified and prioritized by intelligence and operational planners at both CENTCOM and CFLCC. To facilitate this process, CFLCC had a dedicated staff section in the C5 Future Operations section called the Sensitive Site Exploitation Cell. This section used a targeting methodology and daily targeting board that served to synchronize target packages and mission orders.

To best support the operational scheme of maneuver, a Site Survey Team or a Mobile Exploitation Team was attached to each Army and Marine Division. The United

Kingdom had its own WMD survey capability in their zone. By early April 2003, WMD disablement capabilities were deployed to Kuwait, organized under “Task Force Disablement/Elimination (TF D/E)” and deployed forward to Baghdad to collocate with the 75th XTF and be prepared to render safe and begin to disable Iraq’s WMD program. The forces assigned to the 75th XTF and Task Force D/E eventually numbered about 900 personnel.

The 75th XTF would eventually survey over two hundred planned or ad hoc WMD sites. Ad hoc sites were those that were identified by an intelligence source such as an informant who claimed that WMD was hidden (usually buried) at a location. As is well documented, the overwhelming majority of these sites provided little intelligence on Iraq’s WMD program and operators referred to these as “dry holes.” The majority of sites visited had been either looted or probably sanitized by regime authorities at the end of hostilities. All along the chain of command, from CENTCOM through CFLCC to the 75th XTF, leaders conducting After Action Reviews began to realize that a “site centric” approach was not going to gather the intelligence needed to unravel the emerging WMD riddle.

Evolution into the Iraq Survey Group

Based upon results from the 75th XTF, by April 2003, the DoD recognized that a long-termed intelligence and WMD operational capability would be needed to assume the WMD mission. To meet this objective, the Defense Intelligence Agency developed the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). Like the XTF, the ISG was a new organization and rapidly assembled. The unit would be under operational control of CENTCOM, commanded by Major General Keith Dayton, and under the strategic direction of CIA representative, Dr.

David Kay. The ISG had a robust joint staff with requisite WMD and intelligence subject matter experts. It integrated the chemical/biological, nuclear, and support capabilities of the 75th XTF and Task Force Disablement/Elimination. It realigned the site survey teams and mobile exploitation teams into mobile collection teams. And most importantly, the ISG changed the operational focus of the WMD hunt from a site centric approach to a multi-disciplined one using human intelligence, interrogations, data and document exploitation, and captured material exploitation as well as retaining the ability to survey and assess sites. Initially planners assumed that the ISG would be operating in a permissive environment (Phase IV, Post Hostility Operations). This would allow ISG operators to move freely about Iraq often wearing civilian clothes and driving civilian vehicles. This approach would lower operator's profile with Iraqi nationals. However, the reality of insurgent attacks forced the ISG to operate largely like the 75th XTF, every mission had a military security component.

By June 2003, the 75th XTF conducted a battle handover with the ISG and redeployed back to Fort Sill to reorganize and retrain for its artillery mission. The 75th XTF Commander and staff transferred plans, tactics, techniques and procedures and lessons learned to the ISG. At the same time, CENTCOM and CFLCC headquarters were redeploying and transferring operational control to the V Corps headquarters, known as Combined Joint Task Force – 7. With these three battle handovers occurring simultaneously, there was a large amount of inefficiency that resulted in an initial decline in operational effectiveness. So for the second time in five months, the DoD established a new organization to meet the mission of locating, finding and destroying Iraq's WMD. Only this time, the new organization was stood up in the middle of a combat zone, under

hostile fire conditions, and tasked to find materials and people that were probably long gone.

Despite Heroic Efforts – Serious Shortcomings

The efforts of military and civilian planners and operators in establishing these two organizations designed to exploit and eliminate Iraq's WMD program were heroic and showed tremendous agility on the part of DoD to develop capabilities to meet a critical requirement. In particular, the Commander of the 75th XTF demonstrated superior leadership skill in building a coherent team out of diverse assets under extremely arduous circumstances. Personal efforts aside, the fact that the DoD went to such extraordinary lengths to assemble these forces indicates a failure to prioritize and resource this mission area. In twelve years of war planning, it appears that serious thought was never given as to how U.S. forces would actually handle Iraq's or any other nation's WMD. It appeared that we collectively and casually put the WMD elimination mission into the "Post Conflict" phase of planning.

Back in Washington, in May 2003, the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research held its annual symposium. The symposium's theme was WMD elimination and it focused on ongoing operations and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. In speaking about DoD's lack of a WMD elimination capability, the keynote speaker, Deputy Secretary for Defense, Paul Wolfowitz hit the nail on the head:

"The elimination capability that we put together in the months before OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM will need to be retained, enhanced and institutionalized. Accomplishing this will be an integral part of the effort to re-balance and re-allocate our force structure that I referenced earlier. [In future conflicts we should not end up playing "pickup games" when we are trying to put together forces for eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction in the aftermath of a conflict.] We must ensure that there are sufficient forces in peacetime, adequately trained, organized and equipped for that mission."ⁱ

Informal lessons learned and observations show there were serious shortcomings with this ad-hoc approach:

- Deployed forces were not sufficiently trained. The XTF had never trained together in CONUS to certify teams or validate concepts in a realistic scenario such as the Joint or National Training Center. While the Army attempts to send mobilized reserve component units through collective “train ups” prior to a deployment, there was no time for the 75th XTF to do so
- When combat operations began in March 2003, only about two thirds of what would eventually comprise the 75th XTF and TF D/E was actually in Kuwait. The rest of the units were being assembled in CONUS. Personnel were being pulled out of existing positions and equipment was being purchased often using commercially available products off the shelf. A number of supporting assets, such as the 415th Chemical Brigade and the 450th Chemical Battalion, received notice they were assigned the WMD elimination mission literally during their deployment to Kuwait
- Most maneuver unit commanders had never heard of a “Site Assessment Team” or Mobile Collection Team” or factored them into their scheme of maneuver until they arrived in Kuwait. Much learning, through rehearsals and training occurred on the ground. Fortunately, the 75th XTF was able to conduct a rehearsal with CFLCC units prior to the initiation of ground operations with maneuver staffs to review tactical procedures and areas of responsibility

- Doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures were not widely shared or understood. Few operational planners were even familiar with the mission term “Sensitive Site Exploitation”
- There were challenges with command and control, execution, and mission synchronization. There were instances where WMD teams from different units attacked the same target at the same time
- Valuable time and effort was lost due to organizing efforts. The 75th XTF lost valuable time teaching staffs and developing internal and external SOPs. The time lost to the battle hand-over between the ISG and the 75th XTF at the beginning of the “Post Conflict” phase was non-recoverable.

WMD Elimination Requirements

In a National Security Presidential Directiveⁱⁱ and in various speeches and policy statements, most recently made at the National Defense University in February 2003ⁱⁱⁱ, President Bush has consistently identified Weapons of Mass Destruction as one of the greatest threats to the security of the United States. The United States, especially since September 11, 2001, has gone to great lengths to deter the development of WMD and improve our homeland defenses against their use. These activities range from non-proliferation efforts using treaties and conventions, to shoring up homeland defense and consequence management capabilities, to improving our military’s abilities to interdict and defend against their use. A key activity in this regard has been the cooperative threat reduction activities that the United States is currently engaged with Russia and most recently with Libya. In these instances, the nation on the other side of the armament table is cooperating in the WMD elimination effort with the United States and an international

body. Clearly, Iraq presented an uncooperative case where combat operations were needed to eliminate the perceived WMD threat.

How does the DoD prepare to meet this mission area for future contingencies? What organization is assigned this mission during peacetime, conflict, and post-conflict phases? Is there a requirement for a standing capability that routinely trains, plans, and exercises this mission in support of geographic commanders? Is this a Joint, Service or Combat Support Agency requirement? Should we dedicate resources to this effort or rather tackle the next WMD mission with another ad hoc pickup team?

In the summer and fall of 2003 the Counterproliferation Research Center at the National Defense University conducted a series of informal seminars on WMD Elimination. The purpose of these seminars was to gather lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, the Center developed and proposed useful definitions to assist in thinking through this mission area. WMD elimination is an umbrella term incorporating three broad areas: exploitation, destruction, and monitoring and redirection:

- WMD Elimination: The systematic control, removal, or destruction of a hostile nation's or organization's capability to research, develop, test, produce, store, transfer, disperse, deploy, or employ nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons, including programs, infrastructure, and technical expertise
- Exploitation: Locate, characterize, secure, and render safe the adversary's WMD material, weapons, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. Develop appropriate forensic evidence

- Destruction: Destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer or otherwise safely and verifiably dispose of the adversary's WMD material, weapons, equipment and infrastructure to include designated dual-use assets, infrastructure and capabilities
- Monitoring and Redirection: Monitor, inspect and redirect/convert to prevent transfer, reconstitution and misuse of residual dual use capabilities.^{iv}

At a conference in February 2004, at the National Defense University, the Counterproliferation Center offered the following key judgments regarding WMD elimination:

- WMD elimination is a likely requirement for future contingencies
- Clear and standardized doctrine is needed for the WMD elimination mission
- A standing peacetime WMD elimination organization is needed with a clear, established command and control structure, trained personnel, a combination of pre-identified and dedicated assets, and an accountable general officer in command
- This organization must be capable of operating during all phases of conflict
- WMD elimination must be fully integrated into the deliberate planning process and reflected in all major base plans, the strategic planning guidance, contingency planning guidance and the budget development process.^v

These judgments indicate that the Department of Defense needs to establish a WMD elimination capability designed to locate, identify, exploit and destroy an adversary's WMD capability (munitions, programs and production facilities). This mission area is too important to our national security to approach it using a pickup team method. Like

the call for “no more Task Force Smith’s” after the initial engagements of the Korean War, a lesson learned from OIF should be “no more WMD Pick Up Teams.” Measures of merit for this organization could be:

- Command and control joint, service, interagency and multinational capabilities along the full spectrum of conflict
- Deploy rapidly with/or attach pre-identified, multi-disciplined WMD capability intelligence and operational assets
- Support Combatant Commander’s WMD contingency planning efforts, crisis operations, and joint/multi-national exercises
- Become DoD’s focal point for WMD exploitation and elimination doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures.

There are a number of scenarios, both in peacetime and wartime, that a WMD Elimination capability would be used. Potential scenarios are:

- Non-permissive/combat operations like OEF and OIF where the U.S. military, either in a multi-national or unilateral manner, replaces a regime that has a WMD capability. Possible scenarios could be in Syria or North Korea
- Non-permissive/counter proliferation mission, possibly in support of the Proliferation Support Initiative where a nation or non-state actor such as Al Qaeda’s WMD capability is the target of military operations. If this mission were a short-term operation, then it would be assigned to SOCOM. However, a WMD Elimination force could provide teams or subject matter experts in support of SOCOM

- Permissive/Crisis regime leadership collapse of a WMD power. For example, if North Korea imploded or if the leader of a nuclear power such as Pakistan or India was deposed, the immediate control of WMD capabilities would be critical to U.S. security
- Permissive/International Cooperative. In an instance where a WMD capable nation such as Libya decides to change its policy, a WMD elimination force could provide experts and capabilities to assess, implement controls and begin destruction operations.

PART II: KEY COMPONENTS OF JTF WMD ELIMINATION

JTF WMD Elimination – Mission Focus and Essential Tasks

The author proposes that the Department of Defense establishes a Joint Task Force assigned the mission of WMD Elimination in order to address this shortcoming. The future trends are clear. WMD will continue to proliferate among nation states and non-state actors. These capabilities threaten U.S. national security. In a post 9/11 security environment, the U.S. will take action, to include military preemption if necessary, to eliminate this threat. The WMD elimination task is complex and may be conducted in permissive and non-permissive environments and during both combat and post-conflict phases. The U.S. military needs a capability to train and prepare to accomplish this task – the author proposes that Joint Task Force WMD elimination is the most appropriate solution. The remainder of this paper will propose an organizational framework for this JTF, the rationale for it being Joint, assignment options, and discuss implementation issues. The proposed mission statement for this JTF is:

On order, deploy to an area of operations to conduct WMD exploitation and initiate destruction operations against an adversary's WMD (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Missile) capabilities in support of a Joint Force Commander. Plan and coordinate follow-on monitoring, destruction or re-direction operations. During peacetime, provide expertise to support national and international WMD exploitation and elimination requirements as directed by the SECDEF.

In order to focus training and prioritize efforts, the JTF would need a Mission Essential Task List. A proposal is:

- Deploy/re-deploy to an area of operations
- Establish operations in support of a Joint Force Commander
- Conduct and plan force protection operations
- Command and control assigned forces
- Sustain the force
- Conduct WMD exploitation operations
- Conduct WMD destruction operations
- Plan WMD monitoring and re-directing operations
- Support interagency and international WMD elimination operations.

JTF-WMD Elimination would need to focus peacetime efforts on planning, training and building the interagency and interdepartmental relationships needed when assigned the mission to eliminate an adversary's WMD capability. Because of the complex nature of this mission and the wide range of coordination and required planning, this unit should be assigned only the WMD elimination mission. There are currently a number of organizations within the DoD tasked to prepare the homeland and our war fighters against the threat of WMD. These include JTF-Civil Support under Northern Command, the creation of National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams and the ongoing development

of the Army's Guardian Brigade. These organizations, while certainly related to the elimination mission, do not have the intelligence and operational capabilities to execute a WMD elimination mission. The WMD elimination mission area is separate and distinct, and the Department must avoid the temptation to make this organization the "WMD Everything Command." Therefore this organization should not be assigned lead responsibility for missions such as: Consequence Management in support of Homeland Defense or OCONUS, traditional NBC defense, or WMD interdiction.

Why A Joint Task Force?

There are compelling reasons for making this organization Joint:

- The mission will usually have strategic priority with national level direction and interest
- The environment in which the organization will operate will often be interagency, multi-national, and theater
- The capabilities that may be attached to this organization may be from joint, service, special operations, combat support agency, interagency and multi national sources

These requirements compel the force structure designer to construct an organization that has a high degree of subject matter expertise and is able to support operations at the theater and interagency level. During OIF, the 75th XTF, essentially a joint organization, was a major subordinate command under the Combined Forces Land Component Commander. The 75th XTF coordinated missions with CFLCC and Central Command. The ISG was under the operational control of the Commander, U.S. Central Command and coordinated operations with Combined Joint Task Force -7 (V Corps). In addition,

the ISG routinely worked actions with national level and DoD assets, such as the CIA, DIA and DTRA in the United States for reach back expertise and mission support. Clearly, a highly skilled and joint staff is required to interface with these organizations.

A second reason for the organization to be Joint is to integrate and leverage WMD expertise available among the Services and Combat Support Agencies. The Army has the Chemical Corps and the Army Technical Escort Unit, US Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, USA Medical Research for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) and military intelligence and support capabilities. Currently, the Army is considering a plan to consolidate many of its assets into an integrated Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High Yield Explosive Command (CBRNE CMD).^{vi} The Air Force has experts in radiological hazards, missile production technology, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. The Navy has chemical/biological laboratory capabilities and personnel resident in the Naval Medical Research Institute. The Navy also has experts in nuclear power engineering. Both the Air Force and Navy have experts in nuclear weapon technology. Over the last decade, the Marines have developed a corps of WMD experts who have been assigned to the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) – principally a homeland consequence management asset.

Combat Support Agencies such as DIA, DTRA, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have military and civilian experts in WMD intelligence and operations. Additionally, there are a number of retired military or civilians in the private sector who have hands-on experience with UNSCOM or the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Convention.

In Iraq, representatives of nearly every organization mentioned above were attached to either the 75th XTF or the ISG. While most if not all WMD elimination operation will occur in the ground domain of the battle space, no one Service or Agency has the DoD market on WMD intelligence and operational expertise. The DoD should leverage and integrate expertise across the Department into one joint organization.

A third reason for the command being Joint is to facilitate interoperability with exercises and planning efforts with the Combatant Commands. A JTF naturally fits into joint exercises and operations. A JTF organization under a functional command such as Joint Forces Command or Special Operations Command can easily schedule exercises and support planning efforts with geographic combatant commands. Once supporting plans are developed, it would be reasonable for JTF WMD Elimination to support at least one major exercise per year with each Combatant Command.


A Standing Capability?

The Secretary of Defense can direct the establishment of a standing Joint Task Force or a unified commander can establish a Joint Task Force to meet a certain contingency or mission. A relevant and recent example is the SECDEF directing that the Chairman establish Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) in 1999^{vii}. JTF-CS was established to provide a joint command structure to coordinate DoD's support to civil authorities responding to a domestic WMD event. Initially the JTF was established under Joint Forces Command but was realigned to Northern Command (NOTRHCOC) when that command was established. There are also a number of standing JTF's that are organized and assigned under functional combatant commands. Because of its worldwide mission support to geographic commands, ability to conduct warfighting experimentation,

develop joint doctrine, and support joint exercises, the author recommends that JTF WMD Elimination be assigned to Joint Forces Command. Lastly, while elements of the JTF could be Reserve Component, core elements should be Active Component due to the ongoing nature of operations and exercises. These topics will be reviewed later in this paper.

JTF Organizational Structure

A proposed structure for this JTF is portrayed below:



This organizational structure represents a combination of functional elements from the Exploitation Task Force, Task Force Disablement/Elimination, the Iraq Survey Group and a Joint Special Operation Task Forces support structure. The headquarters is designed to plan WMD elimination operations, coordinate with supported and supporting

units, integrate capabilities, and monitor operations. Specialized multi-disciplined teams will move to and assess the target, collect samples, material and information.

Information collected will be analyzed and processed into actionable intelligence by WMD intelligence experts on the headquarters staff. WMD response teams will assist in the exploitation effort and be able to render munitions safe, disable production facilities, and provide guidance on securing WMD munitions and facilities until long term destruction operations can be implemented. The organization also has a support capability that sustains, maintains, and provides limited security for the JTF in permissive or non-permissive environments. The baseline number of personnel in this organization would be approximately 700. Below is a possible breakdown of personnel requirements:

- Headquarters and Staff: 150 personnel
- Mobile Collection Teams: 22 per team (Four teams each)
- Joint Document Exploitation Center: 10 personnel for core planning, expands upon mission
- Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center: 10 personnel for core planning, expands upon mission
- Joint Detention and Interrogation Center: 10 personnel for planning, expands upon mission
- Laboratory: 10 personnel
- Chemical/Biological Response Team: 20 personnel (More teams added depending upon mission)
- Nuclear Response Team: 20 personnel (More teams added depending upon mission)

- Missile Response Team: 20 personnel (More teams added depending upon mission)
- Technical Escort Team: 10 personnel
- Long Term Destruction Team: 10 personnel for planning, expands upon mission
- Forward Support Company: 140 personnel
- Signal platoon: 40 personnel
- Security company: 120 personnel
- EOD Detachment: 30 personnel

In addition to the above list, the JTF would need to establish habitual relationships with the Services, Combat Support Agencies such as DIA, DTRA, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and interagency assets such as the CIA and Department of Energy (DOE). These could be either formal memorandums of agreement or informal relationships. This is important for a number of reasons. When conducting operations, the JTF may need to access reach-back capabilities and experts to assist in the intelligence or operational task. Second, the JTF may need to be augmented by specialized teams or experts that reside in these agencies. Lastly, because the WMD area is so diverse and scientifically based, the personnel assigned to this JTF need to remain current in threat trends and technological advancements. Relationships with agencies that are outside of a Service or the DoD, is critical to maintaining proficiency in these areas.

The JTF Commander

The Commander of this unit should be a General Officer/Flag Officer. A General Officer is required because of the complex mission, synchronization of joint, interagency and multi-national capabilities, and the strategic-operational environment in which this


JTF will operate. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 75th XTF was a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) under the CFLCC. This unit was most likely the only MSC not commanded by a general officer. In all stages of planning and coordination, the 75th XTF Commander routinely interacted with two and three star general officers. While the 75th XTF Commander was a dynamic and forceful leader, he was clearly at a disadvantage when interacting with superiors and MSC peers. When the DIA established the ISG, they correctly chose a two star general to command the unit. This was appropriate because the ISG was ultimately placed under operational control of USCENTCOM (a four star command) and conducted daily planning and battlefield coordination with V Corps (a three star command).

Besides the external coordination, internal requirements justify a flag officer as commander. The JTF is comprised of highly specialized joint capabilities such as mobile collection teams, laboratories, and WMD subject matter experts. During an operation this unit could be augmented with a number of external capabilities including multi-national, interagency, and joint forces. It is expected that this JTF will routinely conduct deliberate planning and support exercises with each of the geographic combatant commanders and the functional commands of SOCOM and STRATCOM. A general officer has the expertise to lead the organization in these efforts and provides the credibility to represent the JTF at the planning table. Using this rationale, the commanding officer of Joint Task Force – Civil Support is a Brigadier.

The Commander will need a robust staff to conduct planning, monitor operations, communicate, and sustain the JTF. The officers, Non Commissioned Officers, enlisted, and civilians assigned to this staff should be from all Services and where appropriate

have the highest degree of WMD intelligence and operational expertise. The proposed headquarters structure for this JTF is depicted below:

JTF WMD Elimination Headquarters



JTF WMD Headquarters

This staff structure provides the basic doctrinal capabilities for the JTF to operate in a wartime and peacetime environment.^{viii} Additionally, many of the functional elements of the Iraq Survey Group have been included in this proposal. Critical elements of the staff include:

- Special Staff. Includes staff officers and assistants for Public Affairs, Safety, Chaplain, Judge Advocate, and the Surgeon

- WMD Liaison Team. This team is sent to higher headquarters to assist in mission planning. These teams may also be sent as an advanced party to assist in integration and reception of the JTF
- J-1 Personnel. Performs manpower management, formulation of personnel policies and administration
- J-2. Monitors current intelligence operations and performs supporting intelligence functions. Establishes a Joint Intelligence Support Element that processes and exploits captured material.^{ix} Oversees the collection management, production and dissemination of products. Coordinates with Theater and National level intelligence assets. Augments operations with subject matter experts from National Intelligence Support Team and supporting Agencies. Develops target folders and plans future intelligence operations. Has a robust WMD threat assessment section that is staffed with experts in Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Missile weapons production and delivery capabilities. Maintains reach-back with national level intelligence organizations
- J-3. Monitors current operations and plans future operations. Coordinates missions with ground and supporting forces. Establishes a Joint Operations Center and augments with liaison officers.^x Conducts WMD operational assessments. Plans force protection. Plans future operations including long-term destruction and monitoring operations. During peacetime, coordinates and plans training and exercises with combatant commands and aligned forces

- J-4. Formulates logistics plans and coordinates supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, procurement, host-nation support and contracts related to sustainment and WMD destruction operations
- J-5. Develops long-range plans and coordinates policy with Theater and National level elements
- J-6. Coordinates and plans full range of communications support for the force using organic and attached supporting elements
- J-7. Develops forces modernization actions for the force. Coordinates with science and technology centers to ensure that the JTF has the most current technologies available for WMD exploitation and elimination missions.

WMD Assessment and Collection Capabilities

Once intelligence has identified a priority target, the staff prepares a target folder package and mission operations order. The JTF then employs a Mobile Collection Team to conduct an assessment and collect intelligence on the target. The Mobile Collection Teams are multi-disciplined and will evaluate potential WMD sites for CBRN samples, personnel, documents, and equipment. The proposed structure of a Mobile Collection Team as depicted is similar to the 75th XTF's Site Survey Teams and the ISG's Mobile Collection Teams. This team serves as the "scout" for the JTF to move forward, assess and collect WMD intelligence. These teams can be attached to maneuver forces for decentralized execution or kept at the JTF WMD for centralized planning and execution.

Mobile Collection Team

<u>Position</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Team Leader/Asst	2
CBRN Sample Tm	4
CBRN Weapon Spec	2
HUMINT Tm	2
Linguist	2
Document Spec	2
Security/Driver	4
Commo	1
Medic	1
<u>EOD</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	22

Intelligence Processing and Exploitation

CBRN samples, documents, computers, processing equipment, individuals, and supporting material are either exploited on site or brought back for further analysis at exploitation centers. These intelligence centers are staffed with subject matter experts.^{xi} Their review of material confirms or denies the significance of the material and site, and forwards this information back to the staff for further exploitation and disposition. Subject matter experts can be tasked organized onto a Mobile Collection Team to conduct first hand analysis at the target location. Specific capabilities are:

- Joint Document Exploitation Center. This center maintains and secures captured documents relating to an adversary's WMD program. The center is augmented with WMD experts and linguists who are able to review and identify relevant material that support a WMD research and development program. In addition to

hard copy documents, this center is also responsible to review computers and associated technology for WMD supporting material

- Joint Captured Material Exploitation Center. This center is staffed with WMD weapons experts and production experts who can analyze captured processing equipment and delivery systems. This center is responsible for storing and securing captured material
- Joint Interrogation and Detention Center. This center is responsible for interrogating captured WMD experts or those national or military leaders/experts suspected of participating in the WMD program
- Confirmatory Laboratory. This laboratory can conduct a full range of chemical, biological, and nuclear analysis to provide verifiable analysis of captured CBRN samples.

WMD Response Capabilities

Once a Mobile Collection Team has identified a probable CBRN site and/or the exploitation centers or laboratory have confirmed capability, the JTF can send response teams forward to the target area. These response teams can perform a number of tasks based upon the situation: they can assist in the exploitation effort, perform render safe operations, conduct safe movement and transfer of munitions, provide guidance to maneuver forces on how to secure and maintain safety on the site, and conduct initial disablement or destruction at a production facility to preclude adversarial use. Based upon the threat situation, these teams can deploy independently to the target or may require security augmentation. Additionally, elements of these teams can be task-

organized to a Mobile Collection Team to provide expertise on the initial site assessment mission. Specific capabilities are:

- Chemical/Biological Response Teams. These teams conduct limited destruction of chemical/biological munitions as well as identify chemical/biological processing equipment and facilities. They conduct limited facility disablement and provide recommendations to maneuver commanders for site security and hazardous materials safety or disposition
- Nuclear Response Teams. These teams conduct site assessment of nuclear and radiological processing and storage facilities. They can identify radiological sources and assist in the storage and disposition of these hazardous materials. These teams can be augmented with subject matter experts from agencies such as the Department of Energy in order to conduct render-safe operations
- Missile Response Teams. These teams conduct assessment, exploitation and battlefield disablement of CBRN warheads, missile delivery systems and UAV's. They can disable missiles and provide recommendations on safe storage of missiles and rocket fuels. They also disable missile production facilities to limit adversarial use
- Technical Escort Teams. These teams provide technical and verifiable escort of chemical or biological samples from the theater back to confirmatory laboratories in the United States
- Long Term Destruction Capabilities. These capabilities are follow-on assets that would normally deploy in post-hostility environments to begin the long-term destruction of an adversary's WMD program. They would also provide expertise

for follow on re-direction or monitoring programs that could support from DTRA, the U.S. Army Chemical Management Agency or international agencies such as the United Nations or International Atomic Energy Agency.

JTF Support Capabilities

Logistical planning and service support are critical to the WMD elimination mission. Because this organization must be able to deploy and operate in a variety of environments, it must have a flexible and independent support structure. The unit must be able to sustain operations in an austere environment with the required amount of supply, maintenance, services, medical, signal and transportation support. If WMD transport, storage, security, and destruction operations are initiated then this will require a dedicated logistical plan. The following areas are required:

- Services. A forward support company provides the routine service support including maintenance, services, medical, transportation, and classes of supply to the force. This company is similar in organization to those employed by Special Operations Command^{xii}
- Signal. A signal platoon provides signal support for the JTF to communicate on the battlefield and back to CONUS for reach-back planning and requirements
- Security. A security element provides force protection while in base camp, during movement to/from targets, and coordinate security of consolidated equipment/munitions storage areas
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal. Provides EOD support to Mobile Collection Teams while on site and expertise at storage/consolidation areas


JTF – WMD Elimination Operational Concept

At the strategic level, once the decision is made to employ JTF-WMD, the unit would be assigned operational control to the geographic or functional combatant commander. Based upon the scenario, a force package would be developed to meet the mission. The JTF may need additional specialized experts and capabilities. OSD and JCS must be able to coordinate personnel requests including translators, chemists, microbiologists, nuclear and missile experts, chemical and biological production experts, from a variety of sources within the DoD, the interagency, civilian industry, and the international community. Lastly, based upon the strategic operating environment, portions of the JTF may need to be retained for operations in a secondary theater.

At the operational level, JTF-WMD may need to be augmented with specialized forces and capabilities. For example, if the scenario involved nuclear materials, then the JTF would potentially be augmented with nuclear experts and teams from the DOE and International Atomic Energy Agency. If the environment were non-permissive additional security forces would be needed. Additional WMD intelligence analysts and subject matter experts may be employed in operational and tactical situations. For example, if a nation had a suspected dual use biological industry, then civilian pharmaceutical production specialists or microbiologists could be used in determining capabilities. Lastly, as has been discussed before, it is expected that JTF –WMD Elimination would operate in support of a Joint Force or Land Component Commander. This would enable the JTF to coordinate and plan missions at the appropriate level and with the Joint Force Commander. This provides the CJCS and SECDEF the visibility needed on the elimination mission.

An overview of how this organization would operate at the tactical level is depicted below. Once the command receives a mission from higher headquarters, the staff conducts a mission analysis and produces a target folder and a mission order that is briefed to the Mobile Collection Team. Based upon Mission Enemy Terrain, Time Troops (METT-T), the Mobile Collection Team task organizes capabilities and conducts a site assessment on the target to gather CBRN samples, interrogates individuals, captures equipment, documents, or materials considered valuable to the WMD mission. If the Mobile Collection Team decides the target is important, it may stay on site and request backup from a Response Team. Materials are brought back to the command's base camp for further processing and analysis by the confirmatory laboratory or the document, interrogation, or captured material exploitation centers. If WMD agents are confirmed, then the staff conducts another mission analysis to decide the appropriate response based upon METT-T. Possible follow-on actions could include securing material, moving it to a storage site, or disabling portions of the facility or destroying munitions.

Operational Concept



Resourcing Challenges and Issues

There are clearly resource challenges associated with establishing this organization. Many of the supporting assets for the JTF are specialized capabilities that are spread throughout the DoD. Currently, these teams and experts reside in the Services or Combat Support Agency structures. Removing them could result in a loss of readiness and proficiency. Additionally, while many Washington policymakers point to WMD as being the most serious threat to our national security, resources to support counterproliferation efforts are limited and must compete with other programs. Additionally, Joint billets are difficult to come by. In order to create new joint billets, old positions need to be deleted or the Services must agree to fill the requirements with existing authorizations. These resource issues require further analysis and review outside of this paper.

In addition to these questions, there are fundamental implementation issues that will be reviewed below:

- Can the command be other than Joint?
- Where should this command be assigned?
- How much of the organization can be Active/Reserve Component?
- Should this organization be established separately, thereby duplicating existing capabilities or should existing forces be formally aligned with this JTF through contingency plans and memorandums of agreement?

PART III: ESTABLISHING THE JTF

Other Than A Joint Asset?

As discussed earlier, there are compelling reasons for making this organization a Joint asset but clearly other options are available. Doing so would require assigning responsibility and proponentcy to either a Service or a Combat Support Agency. The Army would be the most logical Service based upon the fact it has the preponderance of WMD operational capabilities. Additionally, nearly all WMD elimination operations and scenarios, with the exception of some interdiction operations, will be conducted on the ground vice in an air or sea environment. The Army is currently establishing the CBRNE command and this asset could be assigned the WMD Elimination mission. However, doing so would expand the scope of the unit's mission and would require a significant expansion of the intelligence staff and the addition of mobile collection capabilities. Additionally, as it is being conceptualized, the CBRNE Command will support the Army's role in overseas consequence management and homeland defense^{xiii}. Assigning this command the WMD elimination mission would result in dilution of mission focus.

Additionally, the resulting force would remain “green” and DoD would not be able to integrate and leverage WMD experts and capabilities across the Department.

Another assignment option would be to develop a command and place it under either the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The advantage in doing so is that both agencies have the expertise to provide subject matter experts and state-of-the-art technologies. Both agencies routinely support combatant commanders and can interface at the strategic and operational levels. However, these agencies are not structured to organize, train, and deploy large units – they routinely deploy individuals or teams. So, having an organization like JTF-WMD Elimination assigned to an agency would require a significant plus up of the agency in order to train, deploy, equip, man, and equip a subordinate JTF.

Where to Assign?

This JTF needs to be responsive to all of the geographic combatant commanders and SOCOM. For this reason, the JTF needs to be assigned to a functional combatant command. The three possible candidates are: Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Listed below is rationale for and against assignment to these commands:

- **JFCOM**. This command coordinates and provides forces for all combatant commands. Additionally, it is the organization within the Joint community that specializes on joint doctrine, experimentation and joint exercises. Because JTF-WMD Elimination will need a significant effort in organizational design, doctrinal development, and joint exercise support, JFCOM is a strong candidate. A drawback to assigning JTF-WMD to

JFCOM is that this command does not maintain or deploy organic forces.

However, a precedent was set with the establishment of JTF-Civil Support.

This JTF, with a similar mission and structure was initially established under JFCOM

- SOCOM. Counterproliferation (interdiction operations) is a principal mission area for SOCOM. SOCOM already possesses well-trained WMD intelligence and operational capabilities but in limited numbers. It also maintains formal alignments with organizations mentioned above to accomplish its counterproliferation mission. SOCOM forces are “early deployers” and it is assumed that SOCOM forces will be part of any contingency and on the ground before WMD Elimination forces arrives. There is a real linkage and leveraging of capabilities and operations between SOCOM and JTF WMD Elimination. The argument against adding this mission area to SOCOM would be that this mission could result in a dilution of focus for SOCOM from its core mission areas especially if the task requires a long-term commitment of critical assets
- STRATCOM. STRATCOM has the mission of commanding forces capable of delivering strategic weapons and supports all the geographic combatant commands. It has a robust command center and communicates globally with supporting forces. However, STRATCOM does not routinely deploy organic assets for long-term missions. Assigning a force like this to STRATCOM would be real departure from the command’s current operational status.

Given the above discussion, the author recommends that JTF WMD Elimination be established under Joint Forces Command. This would enable the DoD to establish the organization and begin to identify the joint doctrine, experimentation, and training required to best develop this organization in a joint context. After the command is established, serious consideration should be given to aligning capabilities with those in SOCOM and potentially placing this organization under SOCOM. This would be very similar to the establishment of JTF-CS and its eventual evolution and alignment under NORTHCOM.

How Much is Active or Reserve Component?

A critical question is how much of the organization could be filled with active or reserve duty? Obviously the more active duty members, the more responsive this organization is to current operations and exercise support. But there is clearly a role for reserve component forces. Reserve component personnel could be used to augment the staff as well as comprise the collection teams and WMD response elements. For example, if four Mobile Collection Teams were required, the first two could be active component and the remaining two reserves. Likewise, a core group of intelligence experts in the Joint Document Exploitation Center could be active duty and the remainder could come from the Reserve Component. The core element of the command and staff and operational elements should be active component but supporting and redundant capabilities can be reserve component as long as operational responsiveness is not hampered.

Stand Alone or Matrixed Organization?

In a resource-constrained environment, an attractive approach to establishing this organization would be to link existing capabilities through memorandums of agreement and deliberate plans. For example, many of the assets described above such as chemical/biological response teams, nuclear response teams, and laboratories could remain with the Army and be formally aligned for tasking and training with the JTF. Likewise an argument could be made that security elements and support elements readiness would be better if retained with their Service. The disadvantage with a matrixed organization is responsiveness and organizational focus. It is difficult to serve two masters. So, while this approach may be adequate for some elements within the JTF, it would not be appropriate in all circumstances.

Recommendation

Based upon the above discussion and the analysis in this paper, the following recommendations are made:

- OSD and the JCS should task JFCOM to conduct a mission area analysis to determine the feasibility of a JTF – WMD Elimination
- This concept should be further and evaluated through a Joint Warfighting Experiment process
- Participants in this process should include: OSD, JCS, the Services, SOCOM, JFCOM, DIA and DTRA
- This analysis should include a review of lessons learned from OIF, the strategic mission requirements associated with the proliferation and threat of WMD, DoD's current ability to exploit and eliminate an adversary's WMD program,

and how a standing organization like the one described in this paper would be able to meet this threat.

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the WMD controversy from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, some may argue that a WMD elimination force is not required. They would posit that “we didn’t find anything in Iraq” so why bother? This is similar to those who argued against improving NBC defenses in the aftermath of DESERT STORM because chemical or biological agents were not used against U.S. forces. We still do not know if WMD capabilities and munitions were destroyed by the Iraqis, were moved out of Iraq during the early days of the war, or if it is still hidden. But we cannot escape the fact that the U.S. military was not fully prepared to meet the mission of WMD elimination. It is prudent that the DoD take the time to think through this mission area and deliberately develop the capabilities needed to execute this task. We cannot knowingly execute another WMD elimination operation with an ad hoc force. If WMD is indeed one of the most serious threats facing America, then DoD must take the appropriate steps to be able to effectively eliminate this threat.

ⁱ National Defense University Counterproliferation Policy Research Center, Annual Symposium, May 2003, Washington, DC.

ⁱⁱ National Security to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, December 2002.

ⁱⁱⁱ Speech on WMD Proliferation at the National Defense University, February 11, 2004.

^{iv} Disarming the Adversary: Lessons and Key Judgments, Counterproliferation Research Center, National Defense University, February 2004.

^v Ibid.

^{vi} Concept Briefing on CBRNE Structure, FORSCOM, March 2004.

^{vii} Northern Command website, Joint Task Force – Civil Support, March 2004.

^{viii} Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 Jan 1999.

^{ix} Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 9 March 2000.

^x Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, 13 Jan 1999.

^{xi} Joint Publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 9 March 2000.

^{xii} Command Briefing, USA Special Operations Support Command, Ft. Bragg, NC, March 2004.

^{xiii} Concept Briefing on CBRNE Structure, FORSCOM, March 2004.