Don't Forget About Dedicated Sea Mine Countermeasures
Abstract
America's reliance on the seas cannot be overstated. The U.S. depends upon the ocean as both the highway for force deployment and as the medium for global economic security. Free access to the waterways of the world determine the United States' ability to survive and prosper. The threat and the employment of sea mines are capable of interrupting the U.S. quest for national and economic security. Struggling through the Korean Conflict, the U.S. Navy began a slow improvement of MCM forces leading up to the first Gulf War where experiences led to the conclusion that a well equipped dedicated MCM force structure is essential. In the decade which followed, the Navy nurtured a dedicated MCM force that was capable of fully supporting COCOM requirements and combat proven in OIF. Ironically, prior to OIF, the U.S. Navy began to consider a future plan that features the substitution of proven, dedicated MCM forces with technology-leveraged OMCM forces. This move could leave the COCOM/JFC with a vulnerability gap that would be created by the divesting of dedicated forces prior to OMCM platforms being capable of conducting the mission. Specifically, the U.S. Navy planned organic MCM force has three weaknesses: even with advanced technology the inventory is too small, the reliance on favorable risk and intelligence analysis results is too great, and the heavy reliance on sealift for deployment is not supported by future MCM force structure. To prevent the vulnerability gap and cover the weakness, the U.S. Navy should field a robust dedicated MCM force beyond the currently planned timeline to ensure the successful mission completion of the COCOM/JFC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA436558
Entities
People
- Malcolm H. Potts
Organizations
- National Defense University