

PERSEREC



Technical Report 05-08
April 2005

Screening for Potential Terrorists in the Enlisted Military Accessions Process

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Defense Personnel Security Research Center

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Director

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14. ABSTRACT In early 2004, PERSEREC was tasked and sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The authors (a) reviewed recent literature and intelligence reports to identify and understand active anti-American groups of concern for military enlistment, (b) reviewed all relevant executive orders, DoD directives, and Armed Forces instructions and regulations, and (c) visited recruiting and military entrance processing facilities across the U.S., interviewing personnel at each. The report focuses primarily on individuals joining the enlisted ranks rather than on those entering the U.S. Army's 09L Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), officers, and direct commissions (chaplains, nurses, lawyers, engineers, etc.). In many ways, however, findings from the study bear on these other groups as well. Findings in the report are presented within the following areas: arriving at a working definition of a terrorist; characterizing the threat; suspicion indicators of potential terrorist allegiances; policies; screening procedures; suspicious incident reporting procedures; and training and education. The research found some evidence of small numbers of persons enlisting in the Armed Forces who are sympathetic to or participants in terrorist groups. At the same, the Armed Forces have implemented many policies and practices designed to specifically, or by default, enable detection of and response to such individuals. Recommendations are made for improving information exchange between DoD, law enforcement, and the intelligence community and for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of relevant DoD accessions policies and					
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Preface

In early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort, reflecting a comprehensive approach to many dimensions of personnel screening in the Armed Forces enlistment process.

The report also provides recommendations for additional steps that could be taken to make enlistment screening either more efficient or effective. Some of these bear directly on counterterrorism issues. Others are recommendations formulated as by-products of the study's intensive review of military enlistment procedures.

All findings and recommendations have been vetted with Armed Forces Recruiting Commands, United States Military Entrance Processing Command, and basic training personnel throughout the life of the project. In fact, many of the findings and recommendations were provided by the Recruiting Commands and the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), who have been a great source of expertise in this effort.

James A. Riedel
Director

Acknowledgements

Facilities

The following locations facilitated our visits by making staff available for interviews, providing facility tours, or providing some other form of assistance that deserves special recognition. This study could not have been accomplished without the cooperation and expert contributions of the leadership and staff at all of these facilities.

Recruiting Stations (RS)

Air Force, Capitola, CA
Air Force, Salinas, CA
Coast Guard, San Jose, CA
Marine Corps, Boulder, CO
Marine Corps, Denver, CO
Navy, Capitola, CA
Navy, Daly City, CA
Navy, Lakewood, CO
Navy, Salinas, CA

Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS)

Albany, NY
Albuquerque, NM
Brooklyn, NY
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Fort Dix, NJ
Honolulu, HI
Los Angeles, CA
Portland, OR
Raleigh, NC¹
Sacramento, CA
San Antonio, TX
San Diego, CA
San Jose, CA
Seattle, WA
Syracuse, NY

Recruiting Commands

Air Force, San Antonio, TX
Army, Louisville, KY
Marine Corps, Quantico, VA
Navy, Millington, TN

Army Battalions

Albany, NY
Brooklyn, NY
Syracuse, NY

Navy Districts

Denver, CO
Seattle, WA

Air Force Squadrons

313 Syracuse, NY
361 McChord AFB, WA

Additional Facilities

Marine Corps Recruiter's School, San Diego, CA
Navy Recruiting Area 1, Scotia, NY
Navy Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, IL
United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), Great Lakes, IL

¹ Telephonic interview with MEPS personnel

Contributing Experts

The following individuals deserve special recognition for accommodating our visits, sharing expert advice, and for providing technical information during the course of our interviews. We sincerely regret if we have failed to recognize any individual's contribution to this body of work. We greatly appreciate the time and information offered by every person with whom we spoke.

Army

Captain Tomiko Ballard
Major Thomas Battles
Mr. Blane
Mr. Clark
Sergeant Dance
Major Thomas M. W. Downs
Mr. Paul Drebitke
Major Mark Entwisle
Lt Col John W. Gillette
Captain Grossman
Major Bill Gumm
Lt Col Timothy Kiely
Major Mahaney
Sergeant Melendez
Sergeant Michael
Major Hugo Morales
Colonel James Palermo
Major Todd Parker
Sergeant First Class (Ret.) Kelly Parsons
First Sergeant Dave Pickering
Mr. Polk
Master Sergeant Sanocki
Frank Shaffery
John J. Sheehy
Captain Ray Shetzline
Errol Smith
Sheila Stewart
Diana Svab
Sergeant First Class Thomas
Alexander "Sasha" Vorobiov
Captain Mark Winkler
Captain Woods

Army National Guard

Sergeant First Class Julio Apodaca Sr.
Master Sergeant Carl Clark
Sergeant First Class Edward Correa III

Sergeant First Class Dave Foland
Staff Sergeant Carol A. Harrell
Staff Sergeant Crystal J. Kim
Sergeant First Class Phillip A. Maas
Sergeant First Class Timothy J. McCool
Master Sergeant Garnet J. Tyrell
Sergeant First Class Drew Williams

Navy

CDR Annie Andrews
John K. Austin
CDR Layne Boone
PNCS(SW/AW) Dee Budzinsky
EPDS Joel Chewing
LCDR Russ Delany
Mr. Sylvester "Sly" Gaston, III
FC1 Dan Hebert
LCDR Ralita Hildebrande
Mr. Ed Kearl
CDR James Knapp
Terry Laque
CDR Donald Leingang
CDR Ray Lewis
LCDR Theresa Lewis
Deputy Bill Lovejoy
Chief Charles Montoya
Ms. Kathy Morris
Command Master Chief Denver Navarrete
Lt. Newhalfen
LCDR Richard Preston
LCDR Ann H. Rennie
Lt Jared Chiu-Rourman
EPDS Jerry Scott
LCDR Alison Tanaka
Deputy CDR John Tomkovitch
Lt Lori C. Works
CAPT Ray Wynne

Air Force

Staff Sergeant Stephanie Coffee
Lt Col Glen F. Copeland
Colonel Bob East
Lt Col Susan Emala
Lt Col Laura Feldman
Major Thomas Fredericks
Staff Sergeant Thomas George
Staff Sergeant Jason M. Gossman
Staff Sergeant Christian Granda
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Major Tangela Spencer
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Mr. Michael J. Styka
LtCol Ken Thompson
Captain Whited
Mr. Steve Wittle
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Coast Guard

Carlos R. Rosario
Petty Officer Val Teixeira

USMEPCOM

Captain Judith Ackerson
Colonel John M. Atkins
Mr. David O’Brien
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Mr. Kevin D. Moore, Sr.
Major Ted Newman
Mr. Dale Ostrowski
Colonel Rocky Swearengin
Ms. Dorothy Thomas
Colonel Daniel C. Weaver
Colonel Lon Yeary

Military Law Enforcement & Intelligence

Dave Gilbert, AFOSI
Fallon Procter, Army INSCOM
Personnel at IACP from CID, OSI, and
NCIS

Executive Summary

Purpose of the Study

In early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlistment process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort.

The report identifies the many steps in the enlisted accessions process that have been implemented to help identify individuals who belong to or are sympathetic of groups that are disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Overall, USMEPCOM and the Services have implemented many effective policies and screening procedures while respecting and protecting applicants' rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association. Building on the steps that have already been taken, additional measures are recommended that may improve the efficiency and/or effectiveness of the current screening process.

Methodology

An extensive review was conducted of Department of Defense (DoD), Armed Forces, and United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) policies and procedures pertaining to the enlistment process. The objective was to identify components that would serve the purpose of helping to screen for potential terrorists. Reviews of these literatures were supplemented with visits and interviews at recruiting stations (RS), military entrance processing stations (MEPS), military Recruiting Commands, military training commands, and USMEPCOM. For a list of sites visited, refer to the acknowledgements section. Interviews were conducted in each of these locations and relevant documents were collected.

The report focuses on individuals joining the enlisted ranks, excluding those entering the U.S. Army's 09L Military Occupational Specialty (MOS²), officers, and direct commissions (chaplains, nurses, lawyers, engineers, etc.). Nonetheless, many of

² Enlistment of translators was an issue in most visits to MEPS. Many RS and MEPS personnel indicated they were "uncomfortable" with the idea of some of the people they were enlisting as 09L Translators/Aides. At the same time, personnel in these MOS are subjected to more stringent enlistment standards, with the exception of ASVAB scores and possibly age thresholds. In taking the Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB), they must process through MEPS and cannot use Mobile Examination Team (MET) sites. They are all subjected to National Agency Checks and Local Agency Checks (NACLC), must meet citizenship requirements of AR 601-20, and cannot be granted waivers above the minor nontraffic level. They cannot be processed on Saturdays, Service mission day, or extended hours processing support days – all times when they may not be subjected to the utmost scrutiny. They also undergo an Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI). Applicants enlisting in the 09L program enter under the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. (USAREC Operation Order 3-0007). The extra measures reflect that, in the current climate, the Armed Forces recognize this is a higher risk group for potentially enlisting persons who are hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government. In this climate, translators are in high demand, however, and we trust the military commands have good reason for assuming more risk in order to meet their needs for people who speak the languages of people with whom we are in conflict.

the issues discussed in this report would apply to vetting of other than new enlisted rank personnel.

To understand the terrorist threat, contemporary literatures on groups associated with the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, were reviewed as well as literature pertaining to domestic terrorist groups. Military criminal investigations personnel were consulted and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), state, local, and military law enforcement intelligence reports were monitored throughout the project to identify indications of terrorist activity by U.S. military enlisted personnel.

Definition of Terrorist

In our meetings with recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel, we found it effective to conceptually frame the “terrorist” in “screening for terrorists” as anyone who was sympathetic to, or a member of, a group that could be characterized as both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Effectively, anyone who is antagonistic toward the U.S. government and who would be willing in any way to support the efforts of a specific group in working against the U.S. government, its citizens, and entities would qualify as someone whom we are interested in detecting and excluding from military service and from possible access to sensitive information and facilities.

Characterizing the Threat

This section briefly describes the main foreign (Militant Jihadists) and domestic groups (White Supremacists, White Nationalists, and domestic militias) whose past and recent actions and current ideologies render them particularly hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Several data sources were consulted and Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and military law enforcement personnel were interviewed to surface indications of attempted or actual enlistment of disloyal and hostile persons.

The sources accessed for this report did surface some currently or formerly enlisted persons with terrorist or extremist group associations. While their presence in the military is significant in its own right, the actual numbers are extremely small relative to the denominator representing the millions of personnel who have been enlisted in the Armed Forces. Smaller still is the number of personnel who enlisted specifically for purposes of furthering their extremist causes. Most intelligence, information, and history of events suggest that more significant is the threat from outsiders waging attacks against military personnel, some of whom may be employed at RS and MEPS. Additionally, the fact that the insider cases we did find were documented is indicative of the diligence the Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM have towards these issues.

To the extent there is an insider threat, the opinion of active duty personnel and counterterrorism and counterintelligence experts and the evidence from case studies examined for this report suggest that it is not from new recruits. Rather, the threat derives from active duty persons being recruited or converting to radical ideologies out of religious conviction or after becoming disaffected with a commander, a fellow soldier, an

assignment, or military service in general (Mintz & Vistica, 2003). Or, the threat could be manifest in individuals who engage in bad conduct for purely self-interested reasons such as money, ego, addiction, or revenge and then attempt to dignify their actions, after the fact, as being motivated by some higher religious value.

While the number of active duty personnel who can be categorized as insider threats or terrorists is believed to be nearly infinitesimal once the denominator of millions of military personnel is taken into account, the means available to persons who would, were all things known, be disqualified from enlisting are the same means that terrorists could use to enlist. In the enlistment process, this effectively boils down to how one represents one's identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions. To the extent that optimal procedures are not in place to detect problems in how applicants represent their personal identifiers, background, abilities, associations, and intentions, terrorists and nonterrorists alike can exploit the weaknesses.

Policies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service

The U.S. government, DoD, and the Armed Forces have established numerous policies defining and restricting participation in extremist organizations and activities, which would include participation in terrorist groups and activities. The DoD and Armed Forces have also established policies regarding how to define and respond to persons and activities that appear to be inconsistent with defense of national security. This section lists these policies, along with key components of them that directly and indirectly define and regulate participation of and response to military personnel in extremist and terrorist groups and activities.

Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. Government

The Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM have implemented many screening procedures that have the effect of detecting and deterring applicants and recruits who are enlisting with disloyal and hostile intentions. These procedures include identification checking and verification, criminal background checks, checks of the FBI's terrorist file (and thus checks of the Terrorist Screening Center databases), extremist tattoo screening, numerous questionnaires and interviews, credit checks, and, when appropriate, security clearance background checks.

Policies and Procedures for Reporting and Documenting Suspicious Persons or Activities

Under current procedures, observations of suspicious persons are often first reported through recruiting chains of command to commanders who are authorized to determine whether the information should be forwarded to law enforcement, force protection services, or antiterrorism officers. More formal means for reporting and sharing suspicious person and incident information that have also been implemented are being developed.

Training and Education

All of the military services provide extremist group detection and response training to some segments of their services. This section provides information on military personnel training and education that address extremism, hate, discrimination, and conflict resolution. Other courses are listed that may indirectly address issues related to terrorism and extremism.

Recruiting, MEPS, and training personnel were asked at every location visited whether they received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Based on their responses, it is clear that equal opportunity training is well understood and valued. Military Services also consistently receive force protection briefings and training for dealing with external threats.

It was also found, however, that recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel do not appear to be aware of receiving systematic, up-to-date training on recognizing and reporting possible insider threats. USMEPCOM authorities confirmed this at least for their personnel, and would value more information in this area. For recruiting and basic training personnel, insider threat training may be in place, but the people we talked to did not recognize that they had received it. This suggests that if training is available, the intended message may not be clearly understood by the personnel who receive it.

Recommendations

We have observed aspects of the enlistment process that could contribute to acceptance of persons whom the military would prefer not to enlist, if all things were known at the time they were processing them. The vulnerabilities in the enlistment process that otherwise disqualified people could intentionally use, or unintentionally benefit from, are the same vulnerabilities that terrorists could use to elude detection and infiltrate the military. Therefore, by addressing these vulnerabilities, the enlistment community will strengthen its screening against terrorists. In addition to making recommendations to address the effectiveness of screening practices, we also observed a few opportunities for improving the efficiency of existing screening practices.

This section presents recommendations that were developed over the course of the project. Some were derived from interviews with enlistment personnel. Others were the result of the authors' observations, based on their knowledge of personnel security systems.

USD(P&R) should work with the Intelligence community and federal and local law enforcement to improve exchange of information between these entities and DoD regarding recruits who may be members of or have associations with extremist groups.

When the DoD submits fingerprints for checks of the FBI's criminal record files, a check of the FBI's Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is also conducted. The VGTOF file is updated regularly with consolidated files of the Terrorist Screening Center. Hits on this file are not returned to the Recruiting Commands, however, but rather go to the submitting agency of the record found. It is at the discretion of these agencies to notify the Recruiting Commands that a person in VGTOF is attempting to enlist. Recruiting Commands do not report being notified nor would the law enforcement agencies aware of the case know whom to notify. Agreements need to be made for more effective and timely exchange of this information in a way that does not compromise the investigations of law enforcement.

USD(P&R) should work with other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Social Security Administration (SSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to clarify and simplify procedures for USMEPCOM and Recruiting Command personnel to report suspicious persons and incidents.

USMEPCOM personnel have noted that it is not a simple matter to communicate suspicious persons or incidents to appropriate federal agencies outside of DoD. The networks of communication are not always user-friendly and it can be difficult to identify which government agencies, such as FBI, DHS, SSA, or USCIS, to notify. Even more difficult is knowing whom to contact within any of these agencies.

USD(P&R) should support development and/or implementation of training materials for recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel in the detection and response to individuals with potential terrorist and extremist group associations.

As mentioned above, recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel interviewed during this study were not aware of having received systematic training on recognizing and responding to possible terrorists who try to enlist. Instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section should take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD.

USD(P&R) should support USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands in developing and training on optimal DoD information sharing systems for suspicious persons and incidents.

Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and basic training personnel need clear and easily implemented instructions for aggregating and sharing information about persons they detect who may have terrorist or extremist group associations. Intelligence sharing among these groups does not appear to occur, and because of this, military personnel cannot evaluate the full extent to which problematic persons associated with particular groups are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.

- Ensure Recruiting and MEPS personnel, recruits, and basic training personnel know when, how, and to whom within DoD to report suspicions of extremist associations of applicants, recruits, and other military personnel.
- Continue and accelerate development of the joint suspicious incident database via Area Security Coordinators or some other means for aggregating information about suspicious incidents and persons.
- Ensure suspicious incident and person reporting is integrated to include all entities involved in the accessions process from recruiting stations through basic military training.

USD(P&R) should improve methods for preventing, detecting, and responding to identification fraud.

Misrepresentations of identity are common tactics of terrorists trying to gain entry where they would otherwise be prohibited. In the military enlistment context, extremists may attempt to show documents, such as alien registration cards or birth certificates, which meet eligibility requirements. Or they may present identification documents that dissociate them from military, criminal, or watch list records that would disqualify them from enlistment. USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands currently do not have systematic resources or procedures for protecting their organizations from this kind of fraud.

- USD(P&R) and USD(I) should work together to develop and provide comprehensive document fraud recognition training.
- USD(P&R) should continue and accelerate support for USMEPCOM and recruiting command progress toward paperless processing, which will enhance automated evaluation of identification information.
- USD(P&R) should implement policy and procedures to increase the likelihood that law enforcement detains and investigates applicants who engage in identification fraud.

- USD(P&R) should continue development and implementation of USMEPCOM's e-Signature and e-Security initiatives. Until these systems are in place, require recruiting station, MEPS, recruiting liaison, and basic training personnel all to review and validate original identification documents.
- USD(P&R) should support and promote implementation of checks of the FBI civil fingerprint file for all fingerprint submissions.
- USD(P&R) should ensure that all identification information that can be validated against databases is appropriately requested and documented.

USD(P&R) should ensure MEPS-type quality assurance is applied to all overseas recruits

MEPS personnel play an important role in providing quality assurance to applicants for military service. Currently, with the exception of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), Recruiting Commands are not subjecting overseas applicants to the same quality assurance procedures used for domestic applicants. As such, enlistment via recruiting stations in non-U.S. countries would be a softer target for someone wanting to infiltrate the U.S. military. In fact, this may be one of the most vulnerable points for allowing hostile foreign nationals to infiltrate our military. Providing extra layers of screening beyond the recruiter, who has conflicting demands to recruit individuals, will provide a harder target for someone wanting to enlist for purposes of undermining or attacking the U.S. government.

USD(P&R) and DUSD(CI&S) should review policy and procedures to identify the best means for improving the completeness and accuracy of information used to populate security clearance applications (SF 86 / EPSQ / E-QIP, etc.).

Currently, the "SF 86: Questionnaire for National Security Positions" is completed by every applicant for military service in the United States. Its purpose is to collect information for background investigations of persons applying for security clearances. For military accessions and security clearance vetting, the SF 86 is the primary questionnaire for documenting potential indicators of hostile and disloyal associations and histories. The importance of the SF 86 may not be sufficiently understood or respected by some recruiting personnel. Recruiters often help applicants fill out the SF 86, sometimes incompletely and inaccurately, to meet paperwork requirements for enlistment. This same SF 86 is then also submitted as part of security clearance applications. As the DoD moves toward automated adjudication of security clearances, based to some extent on automated processing of information on the SF 86, without better quality, the military recruiting process will be responsible for infusing vulnerability into national security by contributing to clearance of individuals who pose a risk.

USD(P&R), DUSD(CI&S), the FBI, and OPM should work together to ensure DoD is receiving full advantage of statutory authorizations to receive applicants' criminal history for national security clearance and military acceptance and retention purposes when appropriate.

We initially recommended that the USD(P&R) review procedures being used to assign the FBI purpose code to fingerprint submissions for FBI criminal record checks. USMEPCOM quickly and correctly determined that they do not have any control over how OPM forwards record check requests to the FBI. To restore the level of access to information enjoyed by DoD prior to the transfer of the PSI from DSS to OPM, the FBI, OPM, and the DoD will need to meet to determine how to submit criminal record checks from DoD for national security purposes and enlistment or retention in the military as authorized by USC Title 5, section 9101 (SCIA). According to the FBI, record checks for national security purposes may result in return of juvenile records and sealed records from states queried through FBI checks. Since the enlistment population has a much higher probability of having committed any crimes as juveniles and because juvenile records are often sealed, access to records as authorized by SCIA should be ensured.

USD(P&R) should support increased use of and training on the intelligence value in credit reports to validate information provided by applicants

With the exception of Army, currently, credit reports are being run on every applicant. The Army is expected to obtain credit reports on every applicant beginning in October 2005. Information was not available to indicate whether or how enlistment personnel are benefiting from the intelligence available in credit reports. For example, credit reports can provide the following types of information:

- Unlisted aliases
- Amount and types of information inconsistent with age of applicant
- Unlisted residences
- Evidence of problematic finances

USD(P&R) should identify how this information can most effectively be made available to decision makers in the accessions process who are determining whether individuals applying for military service are who they say they are and whether they should resolve financial issues before applying for security clearances.

The military Recruiting Commands should work together and with law enforcement to develop a joint services Digital and Searchable Tattoo Assessment Tool (TAT).

Tattoo screening was one of the most frequent practices that recruiting personnel indicated they used to identify individuals with indications of possible hostile and disloyal associations and intentions toward the U.S. government. Recruiting and basic training personnel consistently indicated concern with the completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility of intelligence for screening tattoos. The efficiency and

effectiveness of information available in tattoo screening can be improved through development and implementation of a joint digital and searchable tattoo assessment tool (TAT).

USD(P&R) should update policies and procedures pertaining to prohibiting and detecting extremist association manifest in Internet behavior.

The Internet has greatly expanded opportunities for people who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government to meet each other, share information, and plan. In our study, the Internet provided the strongest evidence of active duty military personnel participating in extremist groups. The DoD and the Recruiting Commands should clarify prohibited participation in Web sites and Web forums that are sponsored by or are online gathering places for terrorists and extremist groups. The DoD should also consider establishing procedures and assigning responsibility for monitoring extremist Web sites and forums for participation by members of the Armed Forces.

USD(P&R) should standardize and implement question strategies that are more likely to engage applicants in conversations about potentially problematic associations.

As discussed earlier, indications are that questions currently being asked of applicants regarding associations with extremist groups do not yield many affirmative responses. This may be because, in actuality, virtually none of the persons filling out the SF 86 have had associations with extremist groups.

At the same time, the questions asked may not effectively open discussions about the kinds of behaviors and attitudes that indicate sympathy for or involvement in extremist groups. Based on interviews with enlistment personnel, reviews of their questionnaires, and reviews of answers to the SF 86, we feel that a better set of questions could be made available to enlistment personnel to probe pertinent issues with applicants. They would specifically address the ways applicants and recruits can act to support groups hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, to include Internet behavior. The proposed questions are as follows:

The following questions pertain to your participation in extremist and terrorist organizations and activities.

Note: First, define for each applicant what “extremist or terrorist organizations or activities” mean: People who support or agree with extremist organizations think it is OK to use force or violence or to discriminate against other people based on their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, or support for U.S. government policy. Or they may try to disrupt, sabotage, overthrow, or commit espionage or terrorism against the U.S. government, or any of its State or local governments.

- a. Have you ever advocated or practiced discrimination or committed acts of violence or terrorism against individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or loyalty to the U.S. government? (YES/NO)
- b. Have you posted or distributed literature or participated in public demonstrations to show your allegiance to or to promote an extremist organization or philosophy? (YES/NO)
- c. Have you ever provided labor, money, or other resources to extremist individuals or organizations? (YES/NO)
- d. Have you ever received training from or recruited or provided training for extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)
- e. Have you ever attended any meetings, participated in any Web sites or on-line discussions, or exchanged information in any way with individuals involved in extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)
- f. Are there any groups (such as countries, political groups, or religious groups) who you would feel obligated to defend if they claimed they were under attack by the United States Government? (YES/NO)

If you answered “yes” to any of question (a) through (f) above, please explain.

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Introduction

In early 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Accession Policy Directorate asked the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) to identify what the Armed Forces are doing to screen for terrorists in the enlisted accessions process. The purpose of this report is to present the results of that effort.

The report focuses on individuals joining the enlisted ranks, excluding those entering the 09L Military Occupation Specialty (MOS)³, and officer, chaplain, and professional positions. Nonetheless, many of the issues discussed in this report would apply to vetting of those types of personnel.

At the heart of the research effort was a review of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine regulations pertaining to activities conducted by recruiting stations (RS) and Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Reviews of these regulations were supplemented with visits to RS, MEPS, Recruiting Commands, and training facilities across the nation (see acknowledgements).

As a result of this work, we developed detailed flow charts of every step in the accessions process from the recruiting station through the end of basic training that involved an exchange of written, verbal, or visual information between military enlistment personnel⁴ and applicants. These information exchanges were then reviewed in light of whether they could constitute a screen for terrorists. Steps in the process that serve the purpose of screening for terrorists are summarized in the section detailing “Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. government.”

Before assessing the value of each point of information exchange in screening for terrorists, however, we had to arrive at a working definition of the types of persons who

³ Enlistment of translators was an issue in most of our visits to MEPS. Many RS and MEPS personnel indicated they were “uncomfortable” with the idea of some of the people they were enlisting as 09L Translators/Aides. At the same time, personnel in these MOS are subjected to more stringent enlistment standards, with the exception of [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery](#) (ASVAB) scores and possibly age thresholds. In taking the ASVAB, they must process through MEPS and cannot use Mobile Examination Team (MET) sites. They are all subjected to National Agency and Local Agency Checks (NACLC), must meet citizenship requirements of AR 601-20, and cannot be granted waivers above the minor nontraffic level. They cannot be processed on Saturdays, Service mission day, or extended hours processing support days – all times when they may not be subjected to the utmost scrutiny. They also undergo an Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI). Applicants enlisting in the 09L program enter under the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program. (USAREC Operation Order 3-0007). The extra measures reflect that, in the current climate, the military services recognize this is a higher risk group for potentially enlisting persons who are hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government. This same climate entails acute demands for translators, however, and we trust the military commands have good reason for assuming more risk in order to meet their needs for people who speak the languages of people with whom we are in conflict.

⁴ The term “enlistment personnel” refers to the following: all personnel under the commands of the Armed Forces Recruiting Commands, all personnel under the command of the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM), and basic training personnel for all Services.

may be trying to enlist in the military who could be categorized as “terrorists.” As one will see in reviewing the section on “Arriving at a Working Definition of Terrorism,” applying a very literal definition of “terrorist” and “terrorism” was not realistic. Instead, we focused on aspects of the screening process that could surface indicators consistent with the identities or tactics of groups who have shown themselves to be disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. These types of groups are described in the section on “Characterizing the Threat.”

When these indicators surface in the accessions process, it does not mean that the applicants with whom they are associated are necessarily disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. They are simply cues to accessions and security personnel to be alert, ask more questions, and act as much as possible and permissible to dispel any suspicion that the indicator at issue is in any way related to hostile intentions toward the U.S. government.

The conditions of possibility and permissibility referenced in the preceding sentence are very important to understanding the accessions process. Enlistment personnel are extremely vigilant of the civil rights and liberties of the individuals whom they are working to enlist. They have guidance on objective behavioral criteria that can be used to disqualify applicants. At the same time, these decisions are made in a climate that is respectful of individuals’ fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of speech, association, and religion. Once one moves from disqualifying applicants based on clear criteria such as low test scores, poor medical health, impermissible tattoos, or serious criminal conduct to having to make decisions based on extremist intentions and associations, the task gets much tougher. Nonetheless, the Armed Forces have dealt effectively with these issues, and the results of their efforts are reviewed in the section on “Policies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service.”

Policies pertaining to extremism are ineffective unless individuals are aware of them, have common understandings of them, and actually implement them in the course of daily business. Therefore, as part of this research effort, we reviewed what is being done to train and educate enlistment personnel, new recruits, and their instructors to detect and respond to applicants and recruits who may be disloyal and hostile toward U.S. government.

Finally, we conclude with some recommendations of what we feel could be added or strengthened in the accessions process to increase the chances that individuals who are both disloyal and hostile toward U.S. government could be detected. Many of these recommendations do not reflect inadequacies in current systems; rather, they are prospects for enhancing systems to increase the likelihood of detecting persons who are engaging in deception in the accessions process, as terrorists would have to do in order to be enlisted.

Arriving at a Working Definition of Terrorism

In a project with the purpose of identifying what is being done to “screen for terrorists” in the enlisted military accessions process, working from any one official definition or one of the many available unofficial definitions of “terrorists” and “terrorism” was problematic, particularly with the frame of reference being enlisted military personnel. What do enlisted terrorists look like? What have they done or what do they intend to do that qualifies them as terrorists?

Definitions from the U.S. Code, the Department of Homeland Security, the European Union, the Department of Defense (DoD), and Web sites of terrorism experts were culled. The resulting compendium of terms and conditions used in definitions of terrorism is shown in Table 1. This list shows an array of dimensions according to individuals’ affiliations, their intentions, their targets, and characteristics of their real or possible acts.

Table 1
Compendium of Concepts Used in Definitions of Terrorism and Terrorist

• premeditated • politically motivated violence • perpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents • usually intended to influence an audience • calculated to terrorize the public or a particular section of it • includes threats as well as actual violence • randomly selects targets in order to terrorize the public at large • excludes attacks on soldiers, which would be warfare • targets noncombatants, which can include civilians and off-duty servicemen or on-duty servicemen not actively engaged in hostilities • excludes states from being perpetrators of terrorism; states can only be sponsors of terrorism • engaged in any violent revolutionary activity • intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people • has the aim of intimidating one or more countries, their institutions or people • has the aim of seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of countries • calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear • intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological • entails destruction of people or property by people not acting on behalf of an established government • committed for purpose of redressing a real or imaginary injustice attributed to an established government • aimed directly or indirectly at an established government
--

In holding ourselves to a literal interpretation of “screening for terrorists,” we would effectively be trying to identify policies and procedures in the enlistment process that reveal when the dimensions in Figure 1 are associated with applicants. For example, we would be attempting to identify how the Armed Forces are screening for individuals or members of subnational groups who are enlisting for the purpose of engaging in ideologically motivated violence or threats of violence against randomly selected targets that represent a particular government with the aim of intimidating or coercing the noncombatant population of that government, which includes off-duty soldiers and on-duty soldiers not engaged in hostile actions. Putting the words to print shows the absurdity of taking the term “terrorist” literally when referring to policies and procedures to “screen for terrorists” in the enlistment process.

In our meetings with recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel, we found it effective to conceptually frame the “terrorist” in “screening for terrorists” as anyone who was sympathetic to, or a member of, a group that could be characterized as both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. Effectively, anyone who is antagonistic toward the U.S. government and who would be willing in any way to support the efforts of a specific group in working against the U.S. government, citizens, or entities would qualify as someone whom we are interested in detecting and excluding from military service and possible access to sensitive information and facilities.

The advantage of this definition is that it enables us to take into account both domestic and foreign antagonists. It also allows us to rule out criminal gang associations that are not necessarily disloyal to the U.S. government. Someone can be a drug dealer or a gang member and have no desire to carry out an ideologically motivated agenda for committing or supporting violence against the government. The definition also excludes from being classified as terrorists those foreign nationals who enlist in the Armed Forces to learn military training, with the intention of returning to their home countries and our allies to use that training on behalf of their nations’ defense and military actions. This is not an uncommon scenario in our military. The key with these soldiers, however, is that while not necessarily being loyal to the U.S. government, they are not hostile toward it either. Thus, we arrived at the following as the object of our analysis of “what’s being done to screen for terrorists” in the enlisted accessions process: ***a person who has sympathy for, or is a member of, a group that is both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government.***

Characterizing the Threat

With disloyalty and hostility toward the U.S. government as the standard for excluding some applicants and recruits, it is possible to think strategically about groups who are active at this time and who meet both these criteria. In this section, the main foreign and domestic groups who would pose the greatest threat if they are attempting to infiltrate the military are described. Evidence is provided of their recent actions and current ideologies that render them hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government.

Following this section, evidence of any involvement by these groups in the military at the time of enlistment is discussed. Not all extremist groups are specifically referenced in this section. The focus is on those that were active at the time this report was prepared and whose ideology is anti-U.S. government and who advocate denying U.S. citizens their civil rights. Thereafter, steps in the accessions process that screen for possible members of these groups are listed.

Recent Groups Who Have Demonstrated Disloyalty and Hostility Toward U.S. Government

Militant Jihadists

What we are calling “Militant Jihadists” are often referenced as Islamists, Islamic extremists, Jihadists, al-Qaeda, and other names that represent similar groups that are engaged in violence against the U.S. and its allies. These groups have been waging violence against U.S. assets and interests for decades, though they gained a prominent and permanent place in the U.S. public’s consciousness with the 2001 hijacking and crashing of United and American Airlines flights in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Over time, variants of these groups dissolve and reassemble under different names. Their purposes, as described below, remain constant. For a recent list and description of these types of groups, one can refer to the Department of Homeland Security Terrorist Organization Reference Guide (2004) and the Department of State’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Militant Jihadists engage in violence under the guises of avenging injustice against Muslims and/or instituting extremist Islamic Law, or Shari’ah Law, as defined by extremist Muslim religious leaders, in place of existing non-Islamic and/or democratic regimes (see, e.g., Al-Khilafa Publications, 1999). Due to the sensitivity of the topic in light of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights, one cannot begin a discussion of Militant Jihadists and their relationship to Islam without clarifying that the term Militant Jihadism is not used to represent the religion of Islam. At most, it is a subset within a larger population representing all of the Islamic faith. Many Muslims, however, would disagree that Militant Jihadists belong in the same field as people of the Muslim faith. It is not the purpose of this report to address the place of Militant Jihadists in the religion of Islam. It is important for the reader to understand that references to Militant Jihadists in no way bear on the legitimacy, rights, divine guidance, and propriety of the Muslim faith in general.

The U.S. government needs to clearly establish the point that Militant Jihadism is a political ideology that often happens to be communicated using the rhetoric of religion. Militant Jihadism does not make a distinction between church and state. In fact, a fundamental tenet of the Militant Jihadist philosophy is that it would be a sin to purposefully in any way establish a separation of church and state. Democratic laws are illegitimate and evil because they are “man-made” laws expressing the will of the electorate rather than God. For the Militant Islamist, the State, in all things, should operate as a manifestation of and in obedience to Allah. Thus:

“At first glance, militant Islam appears to present a challenge unprecedented in the U.S. experience. The U.S. government – a determinedly secular entity – cannot formulate a policy toward a religion. But a closer look at militant Islam reveals the solution. Yes, Islam is indeed a faith, but its militant variant is a form of political ideology. Formulating a policy toward it is akin to a policy toward fascism or Marxism-Leninism.” (Pipes, 2003)

Militant Jihadists are openly hostile toward the United States and western values and mores. For many, their ultimate goal is to replace non-Islamist political systems with a Khilafa, i.e., Islamic State (e.g., see Al-Khilafa Publications, 1999). Western society especially is the enemy of Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini declared war on the west in 1979, and Militant Jihadists have engaged in anti-Western violence since at least 1983.

The political ideology of the Militant Jihadist is totalitarian. Islamism is a ruling system, not a matter of personal faith. For example, it prescribes conduct in law, medicine, economics, engineering, social and family relations, and education. Militant Jihadism prescribes a complete program for regulating the day-to-day activities of everyday life. Militant Jihadists are anti-democratic (e.g., see Bin Abdul Aziz, n.d.), anti-capitalist (Mariam & Nawaz, 2003), anti-communist, and anti-socialist. At least national, and for some global, domination is a political objective. They are not willing to tolerate integrated, co-existence of Western and Militant Jihadist values and mores.

For the reasons listed above, the allegiance to the U.S. and the willingness to defend its Constitution must be questioned of anyone who materially supports or ideologically advocates the legitimacy of Militant Jihadism. As such, any involvement in anything pertaining to Militant Jihadism should be subject to question in military service, security clearance screening, and continuing evaluation. As stated by one author:

Most Muslims, like everyone else, want to live their lives in peace. But that fact doesn't change or mitigate another fact: that terrorists and militants around the world today are using the Qur'an and the teachings of Islam to recruit and motivate terrorists, making principal use of the doctrines surrounding the concept of jihad (Spencer, 2003: xiii).

Determination of participation in or support or advocacy of Militant Jihadist groups and their ideologies should be grounds for denial of acceptance into the Armed

Forces of the U.S. and denial of access to classified or sensitive information. The challenge comes in trying to explore these issues and establish these grounds without unconstitutional discrimination based on religion. The issues also need to be addressed without creating a basis for filing of civil rights and equal employment opportunity complaints against the U.S. government in the civil courts.

Militant Jihadism as an Insider or Outsider Threat

Available evidence suggests that the nature of Militant Jihadism as described above is such that adherents would be more likely to opt to attack the U.S. and its allies from the outside rather than through infiltration. As stated in one Fatwah found on the Web:

....we warn the Muslims wherever they are, particularly those Muslims in Iraq, not to offer any support, morally or financially or militarily or physically in their onslaught against Islam and Muslims in the region, though they attempt to take the Muslims onto their side. But Allah (swt)⁵ designated people in this Ummah that will direct others that go astray, and May Allah protect us all...Therefore we warn the Muslims wherever they are, particularly those Muslims in Iraq, not to offer any support, morally or financially or militarily or physically in their onslaught against Islam and Muslims in the region, though they attempt to take the Muslims onto their side. But Allah (swt) designated people in this Ummah that will direct others that go astray, and May Allah protect us all. (FATWA RELEASED BY THE SHARI'AH COURT OF THE UK, September 11, 2003)

In May of 2004, the following message appeared on the Web:

The torture of Muslim prisoners in Iraq in the "rape rooms" at the American Abu Ghraib prison confirms that the so-called American war on terror is really a war on Islam. George Bush has created a global gulag network of extra-legal and secret U.S. prisons with thousands of inmates. This Gulag stretches from Afghanistan to Iraq, to Guantanamo and secret CIA prisons around the world. This Gulag exclusively holds Muslim prisoners. In light of these revelations, Al-Masakin would like to take this opportunity to remind the American Muslim Mujahedin, and our allies in the revolutionary and anti-Imperialist left, that ROTC buildings, armed service recruiting centers, individual military personnel, and police officers are "military targets." These institutions must be violently and covertly attacked. In fact, there are thousands of unarmed military targets walking around all over the U.S.. Outraged American citizens and American Muslims should have little difficulty making violent contact with recruits, cadets, marines, etc. We strongly recommend that such contact be made with a very sharp knife,

⁵ "swt" is an acronym used by many Muslims following their written references to God to show respect. It stands for "Subhanahu wa ta'ala" meaning "Allah is pure of having partners and He is exalted from having a son" or "be He glorified and exalted."

pepper spray, brass knuckles, baseball bats, firearms, explosives, or the bumper of a full sized automobile, truck or SUV. (Found in an FBI Law Enforcement Online BOLO and in Amant, 2004).

In August of 2004, Recruiting Commands were targeted for retaliatory action for the war in Iraq. In an August 18th memo, Colonel Blakely (first name unknown) sent the following message to Army recruiting station chiefs:

All - we have received a credible FBI report on a plan to possibly attack military recruiting stations across CONUS. This is based on information from a credible source and indicated that the planning may have taken place over the last 30 days. The motivation for the attacks is based on anger about the war in Iraq, and the plan called for the attackers to enter the station and shoot anyone that was inside the station. These attacks were planned over the next two months. Immediate action: Notify each recruiting station within your brigade today of this possible threat.

The above incidents reflect Militant Jihadists as an external rather than internal threat. The logic of the situation of joining the military in the enlisted ranks would also lead one to reasonably believe that terrorists are more likely to pose an external rather than internal threat. The Militant Jihadists operating today plan and conduct missions in ways that maximize their control over when, where, and how their attacks occur. Enlistment in the military would not only subject them to great scrutiny from military peers and commanders, but would also present enormous uncertainty in when, where, and how they could support or carry out attacks against the U.S. government, its population, or allies.

Recruits in the enlisted ranks often spend several years obtaining training to qualify for more sensitive duties. Their ability to meet qualification standards is uncertain. The amount of time it would take them to get into a position that would be of value for someone of a terrorist mind-set is uncertain. The continuity and existence of groups or support systems on whose behalf terrorists enlist in the military cannot be ensured over the span of time required for new recruits to use U.S. military resources to carry out terrorist missions or to get in positions to have information that would not otherwise be available.

Some persons interviewed for this report felt terrorists would want to enlist to gain access to weapons and training on how to use them. The fact of the matter is that, especially for international terrorists, weapons and weapons training are available through more efficient means than a tour of duty with the U.S. military. Additionally, bribing active-duty military members for weapons or information would be a more efficient and effective means than serving a tour of enlistment to obtain these resources. In light of the multitude of contingencies that come with military service and the prevalence of alternatives for carrying out objectives, enlistment in the military for purposes of pursuing a terrorist agenda against the U.S. government does not seem logical.

U.S. Domestic Terrorists

The largest and most active domestic terrorist groups who are specifically anti-U.S. government are often characterized as white supremacists, white nationalists, and right-wing militias. These groups are likely to pose a greater threat through infiltration of the U.S. military than are Militant Jihadists (Axtman, 2003). Many of these domestic extremist groups operating today and their ideologies were well described in an earlier study that looked at screening for extremists in the military (Flacks & Wiskoff, 1998). The essential ideologies of these groups have not changed since 1998, and the reader is encouraged to review Flacks and Wiskoff's work. The following excerpt, taken from a Web site, characterizes the extremist components of the White Nationalist ideology (for the full excerpt, refer to Appendix A):

The problem, as any White Nationalist knows, isn't in the Black Nationalists, who are really potential allies, but rather in the corrupt criminal regimeists [sic], who are the real enemies. Given their criminal nature, it is a waste of time to negotiate with them for our freedom, just as it is undesirable for us to leave them alive to corrupt our future White Nationalist nations. These regime criminals have usefully segregated themselves into professions such as lawyers, politicians, bankers, police. So now that they have made themselves known as oppressors to the people by their conduct, it is an easy thing to identify them for justice (see full excerpt from Lindstedt Web posting in Appendix A).

Similar sentiments to the above statement can be found in more recent postings on white supremacist Web sites. The following demonstrates the threat from the right-wing militia types in the U.S.:

Mr. [X], a 38-year-old who last made a living renting out snowmobiles here in this spectacularly beautiful nook of northwestern Montana had a terror plan that made Osama bin Laden's look kinky-dink. Not content merely to kill a few thousand people, Mr. [X]'s nine-member militia was planning a violent revolution and civil war to overthrow the entire U.S. government. The plan, according to Sheriff James Dupont, was for the militia to use its machine guns, pipe bombs and 30,000 rounds of ammunition to assassinate 26 local officials (including Mr. Dupont), and then wipe out the National Guard when it arrived. After the panicked authorities sent in NATO troops, true American patriots would rise up, a ferocious war would ensue, and the U.S. would end up back in the hands of white Christians (Kristof, 2002).

The above news excerpt captures the essence of the right-wing militia movement in the U.S.; many of its supporters overlap with White Nationalists and Supremacists. Some members of these groups act on their beliefs merely through personal separatism, a benign form of protest. Other militia members have been indicted and convicted for planning to bomb federal buildings, attacking military bases, robbing armories, and

igniting propane storage facilities. In Florida, a militia planned to destroy a nuclear power plant. Enlistment of individuals with these ambitions is justifiably of concern to the Armed Forces.

The common denominator in the Militant Jihadists and the above domestic groups is their advocacy of violence to achieve their anti-U.S. government ideological ends. As one author states:

In fact, militia members and Al-Qaeda members are remarkably similar. Both are galvanized by religious extremism (America's militias overlap with the Christian Identity movement, which preaches that Jews are the children of Satan and that people of color are sub-human), both see the U.S. government as utterly evil, and both are empowered by the information revolution that enables them to create networks, recruit disciples and trade recipes for bio- and chemical weapons (Nikols, 2002)

Other Militant Activists

Other militant activists such as the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF), the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Animal Rights Foundation (ARF), and anarchists engage in violence to achieve their particular objectives. For animal rights activists, common targets include factory farms, cosmetic manufacturers, and labs that use animals in scientific experiments. Anarchists may target Wal-Mart and other big chain stores. Environmental activists have been known to sabotage land developments and vandalize car dealerships and personal SUVs. The disqualifiers for military service for militants described in this paragraph would be their propensity for or history of criminal conduct, not their disloyalty and hostility toward the U.S. government. Since these groups are not targeting the U.S. government per se, they are not considered further in this report.

Evidence Indicating Prevalence of Involvement of Hostile and Disloyal Groups in the Military at the Time of Enlistment

To find evidence of involvement of hostile and disloyal groups in the military at the time of enlistment, the following sources were consulted: open-source digital newspaper articles, law enforcement sensitive intelligence reports available on the FBI's LEO-Online, postings on electronic message boards hosted by extremist groups, decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, "yes" responses to associations-related questions on the SF 86/EPsQ, reports of investigation (ROIs) for subjects under the age of 35 undergoing initial security clearance investigations, leadership in each of the Recruiting Commands, and personnel from the Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Navy Criminal Investigation Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The following describes the findings from these sources.

Restricted Access Intelligence Reports, Open Source News Articles, and Court Decisions

After culling the sources referenced in intelligence reports, open source news articles, and court decisions, 13 cases occurring after September 11, 2001, were identified and no fewer than seven cases prior to September 11, 2001, were identified that indicate the enlistment of personnel with possible ties to organizations and ideologies that are definitely or possibly both disloyal and hostile toward the U.S. government. In the cases that are only deemed possibly relevant, the actions or alleged associations of individuals were consistent with what we understand to be indicative of problematic involvements and allegiances.

A few additional cases were also evident in a study of domestic terrorism and its relation to the U.S. military (Presley, 1996). Due to the age of the articles referenced in the Presley article, however, they could not be retrieved electronically. There are certain to be other cases that have not been included. Their numbers do not change the overall impression that, relative to the denominator representing the millions of persons in the military over the last decade, the U.S. military does not have a marked pattern of terrorists infiltrating its ranks.

Of the 13 cases post September 11, 2001, only eight were unambiguous cases of active or reserve duty military personnel engaging in actions that were specifically associated with groups and ideologies that are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Of the remaining five cases, one involved a naturalized civilian interpreter for U.S. military forces at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another case demonstrated the recruiting efforts targeted at active duty military personnel to support anti-American groups. The remaining three cases were individuals who had alleged ties to problematic groups or engaged in crimes that were of the same type engaged in by anti-American groups.

In none of the above cases was there clear evidence that the persons involved enlisted for the first time in the military for the express purpose of carrying out an anti-American agenda.

Message Boards

Message board searches using terms associated with extremist groups and military enlistees yielded some of the strongest evidence of disloyal and hostile persons enlisting in the military, and, in some cases, possibly for the express purpose of carrying out an anti-American agenda. Almost all of these were white supremacists or nationalists, and most were found in www.stormfront.org forums. For a cross-section of the kind of rhetoric demonstrating both presence and intolerability of potentially disloyal and hostile persons in the accessions process, refer to Appendix A.

Relative to the population of military enlistees, the numbers suggest the involvement of a handful of isolated cases, or at most, very small cadres. The presence of

these individuals in the military does not necessarily indicate, however, grave deficiencies in the enlistment screening system process. It more likely reflects the ability of some individuals without derogatory records to both satisfy enlistment standards and withhold information about extremist ideologies and associations throughout the process. For example, the responses of some message board members to white supremacists contemplating enlistment indicate that some do enlist, but that many are separated once their white supremacist or white nationalist loyalties become known.

Additionally, as seen in Appendix A, the relatively larger number of message board postings warning new recruits from revealing their extremist group associations exemplifies the presence of both military policy and action to disallow such activities in the Armed Forces. Effectively, the military has a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy pertaining to extremism. If individuals can perform satisfactorily, without making their extremist opinions overt through words or actions that violate policy, reflect poorly on the Armed Forces, or disrupt the effectiveness and order of their units, they are likely to be able to complete their contracts. This reality demonstrates the balance the Armed Forces have achieved between screening for extremists while respecting privacy and preserving federally protected rights to freedom of speech, religion, and association.

“Yes” Responses to Association Questions on the SF 86/EPsQ

To identify other sources of evidence of potentially anti-American individuals enlisting in the military, we reviewed answers to questions about problematic associations for approximately 1.5 million SF 86: Questionnaires for National Security Positions (SF 86) completed between 1999 and 2003. The two questions as stated on the SF 86 are as follows:

30. Your Association Record

a. Have you been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such activities? (YES/NO)

b. Have you ever knowingly engaged in any acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. Government by force? (YES/NO)

If you answered “Yes” to a or b, explain in the space below:

Out of these approximate 1.5 million questionnaires, we identified 28 respondents who appeared to intentionally answer “yes” to the above questions. While other respondents answered “yes,” the nature of their remarks indicated their responses were data entry errors and that they thought they were answering “yes” to different questions than the ones listed above.

Of the 28 legitimate “yes” responses, only five were submitted by applicants under the age of 35. This indicates that most yes responders were not recent military enlistees. Of the five younger applicants, only three appeared to be military applicants, and only two of these appeared to be new applicants, as the third was applying for a Secret-Periodic Reinvestigation (PR).

Of the two potential military enlistees, one indicated he at one time had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan; the other indicated only that “my school went on stike [sic].” For a full listing of “yes” responses to the SF 86 associations questions, regardless of military enlistment status, refer to Appendix B.

The dearth of valid yes responses to the above SF 86/EPsQ questions may say less about the prevalence of enlistment of persons with extremist intentions than it does about the quality of the questions that are being asked. Later, we make recommendations for alternate questions that could be asked.

Reports of Investigation (ROIs) for Subjects Under the Age of 35 Undergoing Initial Security Clearance Investigations

All ROIs stored in the Defense Security Service (DSS) Case Control Management System (CCMS) from 1999 through 2003 (approximating a million and a half cases) were searched for presence of terms that indicated that issues pertaining to extremism had surfaced in DoD security clearance background investigations. Examples of terms that yielded relevant cases are as follows:

neo-nazi	anti-american	anti-establishment
anti-government	arabic	aryan
Bigot	blacks	brainwash
confederate flag	conspiracy theories	converted
david koresh	disloyal	extremist
Fanatic	forged driver	fundamentalist
hates the U.S.	hitler	islam
jews	KKK	Militant
mosque	muslim	Nazi
[racial slur]	right wing	Sabotage
semitic	Skin head	Skinhead
supremacy	Swastika	to forge
ultra conservative	Vengeance	

None of the terms was case-sensitive. All cases containing these terms that pertained to military subjects under the age of 35 who were undergoing an initial security clearance were reviewed. Whether these soldiers were officers or enlisted personnel was not known. Data were also not available to indicate how long subjects of these cases had been in the military. Nonetheless, they give some approximation of the extent, or lack of extent, of extremists in the military.

It is important to note that the fact that these cases were documented indicates the seriousness with which these issues are addressed by security clearance investigators. In other words, while these cases represent possible enlistment of extremists, they also demonstrate that screening policies and procedures are in place to detect them.

The review found 131 cases where subjects or their references indicated that subjects had some association with or sympathy for extremist groups. Most of these were white supremacists, though there are some interesting cases of possible Militant Jihadist sympathizers. Appendix B provides summaries of issues in all relevant cases found.

Interviews

In further efforts to surface any anecdotes of applicants or recruits who were specifically identified as being both hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, we made e-mail, phone, and in person queries with representatives of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). In addition, we interviewed personnel from each of the MEPS and Recruiting Commands that we visited.

Criminal investigations personnel could not provide any information about cases over the last few years of known anti-American persons attempting to join the military in the enlisted ranks. It is not known if this is an indication of the lack of such cases or the unwillingness of criminal investigations personnel to share information.

In several out of dozens of visits at RS and MEPS, personnel reported that they had contact with suspicious persons. In only a few cases, however, was information about these applicants forwarded to law enforcement for investigation. In most cases, the suspicious individuals departed without attempting to actually enlist. Further, if these individuals were hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government, they could have as likely been casing the facilities for possible future attack rather than actually trying to enlist. In most of the cases where recruiters or MEPS personnel initially had suspicion, further screening alleviated any suspicions. Over all visits, we saw no indication of any widespread efforts to join the enlisted ranks by persons hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government.

Conclusions about the Threat of Terrorists Infiltrating the Military through the Enlisted Accessions Process

This section briefly describes the main foreign (Militant Jihadists) and domestic groups (White Supremacists, White Nationalists, and domestic militias) whose past and recent actions and current ideologies render them particularly hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Several data sources were consulted and Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and military law enforcement personnel were interviewed to surface indications of attempted or actual enlistment of disloyal and hostile persons.

The sources accessed for this report did surface some currently or formerly enlisted persons with terrorist or extremist group associations. While their presence in the military is significant in its own right, the actual numbers are extremely small relative to the denominator representing the millions of personnel who have been enlisted in the Armed Forces. Smaller still is the number of personnel who enlisted specifically for purposes of furthering their extremist causes. Most intelligence, information, and history of events suggest that more significant is the threat from outsiders waging attacks against military personnel, some of whom may be employed at RS and MEPS.

To the extent there is an insider threat, the opinion of active duty personnel and counterterrorism and counterintelligence experts and the evidence from case studies described in this report suggest that it is not from new recruits. Rather, the threat derives from active duty persons being recruited or converting to radical ideologies out of religious conviction or after becoming disaffected with a commander, a fellow soldier, an assignment, or military service in general (Mintz & Vistica, 2003). Or, the threat could be manifest in individuals who engage in bad conduct for purely self-interested reasons such as money, ego, addiction, or revenge and then attempt to dignify their actions, after the fact, as being motivated by some higher religious value.

While the number of active duty personnel who can be categorized as insider threats or terrorists is believed to be nearly infinitesimal once the denominator of millions of military personnel is taken into account, the means available to persons who would, were all things known, be disqualified from enlisting are the same means that terrorists could use to enlist. In the enlistment process, this effectively boils down to how one represents one's identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions. To the extent that optimal procedures are not in place to detect problems in how applicants represent their personal identifiers, background, abilities, associations, and intentions, terrorists and nonterrorists alike can exploit the weaknesses.

The following section examines how indications of misrepresentation of identity, background, abilities, associations, and intentions may be manifest in the accessions process in a way to justify suspicion by recruiting, MEPS, and initial training personnel. Then, we identify the steps in the enlisted accessions process that directly or indirectly bear on the detection of these qualities.

Policies and Regulations Restricting Extremism in Military Service

The establishment of policy is a strong indication that an organization is acting to address a problem. Policies set the standards against which behavior is evaluated and authorize official response to misconduct. The U.S. government, DoD and the Armed Forces have established numerous policies defining and restricting participation in extremist organizations and activities, which would include terrorist groups and activities. For example, the Army contracted for a review and redesign of its policies pertaining to extremism several years ago (for a review, see Hudson, 1999). This section lists DoD and Armed Service policies, along with key components of them that directly and indirectly define and regulate participation of military personnel in extremist and terrorist groups and activities.

Federal Law

U.S. Bill of Rights

All Recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel who contributed to this research effort emphasized the value they place on the Constitution and the civil liberty protections that it provides. Their decisions to exclude individuals from military service on the grounds of potentially extremist orientations are weighed carefully against the freedom of association and freedom of religion provisions of the First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Privacy Act of 1974 (Implemented with DoD Directive 5400.11; DoD Privacy Program; December 13, 1999)

The Privacy Act of 1974, among other things, constrains the Armed Forces in the types of information they can legally request from applicants. That is, enlistment process policies for obtaining and storing information must be defensible as to their relevance and necessity for accomplishing the purpose of enlisting applicants into the military. Many enlistment personnel interpret this aspect of the Privacy Act as constraining the questions that can be asked about such things as ideology and religion.

U.S.C. Title 18

This portion of the code defines Federal criminal conduct, including acts of the kind that may be committed by persons who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. U.S.C. Title 18 establishes authorization for detaining and prosecuting individuals. Among the offenses of greatest relevance to this report are:

Chapter 67, Military and Navy,

Sec. 1381.- Enticing desertion and harboring deserters

Chapter 105, Sabotage

Sec. 2152. - Fortifications, harbor defenses, or defensive sea areas

Sec. 2153. - Destruction of war material, war premises, or war utilities

Sec. 2154. - Production of defective war material, war premises, or war utilities

Sec. 2155. - Destruction of national-defense materials, national-defense premises, or national-defense utilities

Sec. 2156. - Production of defective national-defense material, national-defense premises, or national-defense utilities

Chapter 113B, Terrorism

Sec. 2332a. - Use of certain weapons of mass destruction

Sec. 2332d. - Financial transactions

Sec. 2339. - Harboring or concealing terrorists

Sec. 2339A. - Providing material support to terrorists

Sec. 2339B. - Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations

Chapter 115 - Treason, Sedition, and Subversive Activities

Sec. 2381. Treason

Sec. 2382. Misprision of treason

Sec. 2383. Rebellion or insurrection

Sec. 2384. Seditious conspiracy

Sec. 2385. Advocating overthrow of Government

Sec. 2386. Registration of certain organizations

Sec. 2387. Activities affecting armed forces generally

Sec. 2388. Activities affecting armed forces during war

Sec. 2389. Recruiting for service against U.S.

Sec. 2390. Enlistment to serve against U.S.

Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)

Listed below are the offenses defined in the UCMJ that could be indications of soldiers who are hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government:

883. Art. 83. Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation

884. Art. 84. Unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation

885. Art. 85. Desertion

886. Art. 86. Absence without leave

894. Art. 94. Mutiny or sedition

904. Art. 104. Aiding the enemy

906. Art. 106. Spies

906a. Art. 106a. Espionage

907. Art. 107. False statements

- 908. Art. 108. Military property of United States-loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition
- 916. Art. 116. Riot or breach of peace
- 917. Art. 117. Provoking speeches or gestures
- 923. Art. 123. Forgery
- 932. Art. 132. Frauds against the United States

Executive Orders and DoD Directives

Executive Order 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employment; April 27, 1953.

Executive Order 10450 authorizes and requires investigation of applicants for employment in the departments and agencies of the government. The standard is that they should be “reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the U.S.” If information is developed indicating that employment of any person is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security, then further investigation is required sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether employment or retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.

E.O. 10450 assigns responsibility to the head of each department and agency of the government to ensure that employment and retention of any employee is clearly within the interests of the national security. The scope of the investigation is based on “the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security.” It requires heads of any department or agency to designate as sensitive positions all those for which the occupant could “bring about, by nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security.” Sensitive positions require full field investigations.

Relevant considerations in making determinations of whether employment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security include the following:

- Any behavior, activities, or associations that tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
- Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.
- Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, sexual perversion.
- Any facts that furnish reason to believe that the individual may be vulnerable to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act in a manner contrary to the best interests of the national security.
- Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with, or aiding or

abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

- Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the U.S., or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the U.S. or the alteration of the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means.
- Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the U.S., or of the alteration of the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means.
- Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) that unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the U.S. or of any state, or which seeks to overthrow the government of the U.S. or any state or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
- Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the U.S..

**DoD Directive 1334.1, “Wearing of the Uniform,” August 11, 1969,
ASD(M&RA); Certified Current as of November 21, 2003**

DoDD 1334.1 prescribes limitations on wearing of the uniform by active duty and former members of the Armed Forces. Active duty members of the Armed Forces (including retired members and members of Reserve components) are prohibited from wearing the uniform at any meeting or demonstration that is a function of, or sponsored by an organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons that the Attorney General of the U.S. has designated, pursuant to E.O. 10450, as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the U.S., or as seeking to alter the form of government of the U.S. by unconstitutional means.

In general, members of the armed forces are prohibited from wearing the uniform in connection with any political, private, or commercial activities outside of official military functions when an inference of official sponsorship or sanction for the activity or interest could be drawn. Wearing of the uniform is further prohibited when it would tend to bring discredit upon the armed forces.

Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” December 4, 1981

E.O. 12333 defines goals, direction, duties, and responsibilities with respect to the National Intelligence Effort, articulates the conduct of intelligence activities, and provides for congressional oversight. Its scope is “the protection of U.S. national interests from foreign security threats.” For example, one of the provisions is that special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the U.S. government, or U. S. corporations, establishments, or persons.

DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, “Personnel Security Program”

The 5200.2-R effectively serves as a set of mandatory instructions for the DoD personnel security program, to include acceptance and retention of DoD military, civilian, consultant, and contractor personnel and of granting such persons access to classified information or assignment to sensitive positions. Heads of DoD components are authorized to issue supplementary instructions whenever necessary to provide for internal administration of the 5200.2-R within their respective components.

DoDD 5200.2-R defines the standards used in determining eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties and for enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces. Eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is based on the Clearance and Sensitive Position Standard: “whether, based on all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” For enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces, the Military Service standard applies: “based on all available information, there is no reasonable basis for doubting the person's loyalty to the government of the United States.” The ultimate determination for granting access, assignments to sensitive duties, or enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces must be “an overall common sense determination based upon all available facts.”

Criteria used in determining eligibility for access to classified information, assignment to sensitive duties, or enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces that pertain to terrorism and extremism include, but are not limited to the following:

- Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereof or preparation therefore, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.
- Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the

United States or to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

- Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
- Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations), which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or which seeks to overthrow the government of the United States or any state or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
- Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by statute, executive order, or regulation.
- Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in reference to the interests of the United States.
- Disregard of public law, statutes, executive orders, or regulations including violation of security regulations or practices.
- Criminal or dishonest conduct.
- Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness.
- Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be:
 - The presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States; or
 - Any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
 - Any knowing and willful falsification, cover up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by the Department of Defense or any other federal agency.
 - Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.

Information discovered in the course of screening that may be indicative of possible subversion is in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the Military Departments or the FBI. All allegations of this nature are to be referred immediately to either the FBI or to a Military Department counterintelligence agency as appropriate.

DoD Directive 1304.26, “Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction,” December 21, 1993. (Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, March 4, 1994)

This directive establishes basic entrance qualification standards for enlistment, appointment, and induction into the Armed Forces. It establishes the age, citizenship, education, aptitude, physical fitness, dependency status, moral character, and other disqualifying conditions that are causes for rejection for military service, and authorizes prescription of other standards in the event of mobilization or national emergency. It “sets standards designed to ensure that individuals under consideration for enlistment, appointment, or induction are able to perform military duties successfully, and to select those who are the most trainable and adaptable to Service life.”

DoD policy pertaining to qualification standards for enlistment, induction, and retention in the Armed Forces is to apply standards while avoiding inconsistencies and inequities based on gender, race, religion, or ethnicity in their application. The suitability of Service members is to be based on their adaptability, potential to perform, and conduct.

Executive Order 12968, “Access to Classified Information,” August 2, 1995

This order establishes eligibility standards for access to classified information. Except as provided for special circumstances, eligibility is to be granted only to employees who are U.S. citizens who have undergone an appropriate investigation and whose personal and professional history demonstrates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment. Additionally, they cannot show conflicting allegiances or potential for coercion. They must demonstrate willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted by adjudicators who determine whether facts and circumstances presented from an investigation indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the U.S. government. The U.S. government does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in granting access to classified information.

DoD Directive 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces," October 1, 1996

This directive establishes policy prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination and requires commanders to take action in such cases. The action commanders take is at their discretion based on their perceptions of the impact of prohibited conduct on their units. Commanders are authorized to take action in the following circumstances:

- Actual or intended distribution through unofficial channels of publications that pose a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of their units.
- Visiting establishments that have been deemed off limits because activities taking place there may include counseling members to refuse to perform duty or to desert; pose a significant adverse effect on Service members' health, morale, or welfare; or otherwise present a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of a member or military unit.
- Publishing underground newspapers during duty hours or using U.S. government property or publishing publications off-duty that contain language punishable under federal law.
- Demonstration or activity on the installation or facility that could result in interference with or prevention of orderly accomplishment of the mission of the installation or facility, or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale of the troops.
- Participation in off-post demonstrations when soldiers are on-duty, in a foreign country, when their activities constitute a breach of law and order, when violence is likely to result, or when they are in uniform in violation of DoD Directive 1334.1 (reference (d)).
- Participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, religion, or national origin; advocate the use of force or violence; or otherwise engage in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. Active participation, such as publicly demonstrating or rallying, fund raising, recruiting and training members, organizing or leading such organizations, or otherwise engaging in activities in relation to such organizations or in furtherance of the objectives of such organizations that are viewed by command to be detrimental to the good order, discipline, or mission accomplishment of the unit, is incompatible with military service, and is, therefore, prohibited. Commanders have authority to employ the full range of administrative procedures, including separation or appropriate disciplinary action, against military personnel who actively participate in such groups. Functions of command include vigilance about the existence of such activities; active use of investigative authority to include a prompt and fair complaint process; and use of administrative powers, such as counseling, reprimands, orders, and performance evaluations to deter such activities. Military departments shall ensure that this policy on

prohibited activities is included in initial active duty training, precommissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate service training programs.

DoDI 5240.6, Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness and Briefing Program

DoD personnel are required to report any contact information or circumstances that could pose a threat to the security of U.S. personnel, DoD or other U.S. resources, and classified national security information, or controlled unclassified information under E.O. 12958, DoD Directive 5230.24, DoD Directive 5400.7-R, and DoD Directive 5210.83.

DoD personnel are required to receive periodic briefings on the threats posed by foreign intelligence services, international terrorists, computer intruders, unauthorized disclosures, and individual reporting responsibilities.

U.S. Army Regulations

Prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination

Army Regulation 525-13 Antiterrorism: “Individuals must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual’s allegiance to the United States.”

Army Regulation 600-20 and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-15: The purpose of this pamphlet is to disseminate information pertaining to the Army’s stance on extremist organizations and activities: “...Participation in extremist organizations or activities is inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service. Military personnel must reject extremism.” Activities considered extremist are identified, strategies for reducing extremist behavior are provided, and possible sanctions for participating in extremist groups and activities, training ideas, and solutions are outlined.

Affirmative action/equal opportunity

Army Regulation 690-12: The purpose of this regulation is to develop, implement, and evaluate affirmative action programs for minorities, women, and the disabled.

Army Regulation 690-600: This regulation sets forth the “policy, responsibilities, and procedures for counseling, filing, processing, investigating, settling, deciding, and acting on equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints.”

U.S. Navy Instructions

Prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination

OPNAVINST 1620.1B, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities. This instruction implements DoD Directive 1325.6.

Commanders are provided with direction on how to maintain order and discipline while respecting Navy service members' constitutional rights. Participation in groups or activities that advocate the use of violence or discrimination is prohibited, however membership in such groups is not necessarily prohibited.

U.S.S CUSHING (DD-985) Command Policy on Extremist/Hate Groups. The purpose of this memorandum is to reiterate Navy policy prohibiting participation in groups or activities that advocate hate crime violence. Examples of actively supporting an extremist or hate group include: engaging in public demonstrations or rallies, fund raising activities, recruiting or training members, gaining or maintaining membership, distributing literature or information, and leading or organizing of groups seeking to deny basic Constitutional rights.

MILPERSMAN 1910-160, Separation by reason of supremacist or extremist conduct: Members may be separated for any substantiated incident or misconduct resulting from participation in supremacist or extremist activities. Separations are processed under misconduct – commission of a serious offense or best interest of the service (BIOTS). Separations for supremacist or extremist conduct will usually involve at least one UCMJ violation.

Equal Opportunity

OPNAV Instruction 5354.1e, Navy E.O. Policy. This instruction prohibits unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment. Guidelines are provided for addressing and sanctioning equal opportunity violations. In addition, Navy personnel are prohibited from participating in organizations that advocate supremacist causes, violence, or depriving individuals of their civil rights.

Personal Appearance Policy

NAVPERS 15665 U. S. Navy Uniform Regulations. Navy personal appearance policies prohibit tattoos, body art, or brands that are prejudicial to good order, discipline, and morale or bring discredit upon the Navy. The Navy prohibits tattoos, body art, or brands that advocate or symbolize supremacist or extremist groups or discrimination based on sex, gender,

racial, religious, ethnic, or national origin. The Navy defines extremists as persons who espouse supremacist causes; attempt to create illegal discrimination based on race, color, creed, sex, religion, or national origin; or advocate the use of force or violence, or otherwise engages in efforts to deprive individuals of their civil rights. The Navy defines supremacists as persons who maintain the ideology, quality, state of being, or position of being superior to all others in something.

U.S. Air Force Instructions

Prohibiting participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination

Air Force Instruction 51-903, Dissident and protest activities. This instruction implements DoD Directive 1325.6. Air Force commanders are assigned authority for taking action to maintain good order and discipline, to include prohibiting active participation extremist and supremacist groups. Air force members are prohibited from possession or distribution of prints materials advocating terrorist or supremacist groups. Mere membership per se is not prohibited, but can be used in evaluations of personnel.

AFI 36-2701, Social Actions Operating Procedures. The USAF requires a work environment that is free from unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment. Equal opportunity is to be made available to all service members regardless of age, sex, race, color, national origin, ethnicity, religion or gender. In order to achieve these objectives, methods for dealing with discrimination and inequality are to be developed; lines of communication are to be made available to members so they can lodge complaints without threat of retaliation; and when complaints are substantiated, commanders are required to remove the source of the complaint or face disciplinary action.

AFI 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems. This Instruction sets forth policies for those evaluating service members' work performance. Subjects of evaluations must be informed of expectations of them, whether or not they are meeting these expectations, and ways in which they can improve their performance. Evaluators are expected to pay special attention to equal opportunity and treatment. "The expectation is fair and equal treatment of all enforcement of the same behavior in subordinates." Evaluators must reflect when a service member has participated in serious or multiple instances of harassment or discrimination. Evaluators are also encouraged to record known cases of membership in groups that advocate discrimination and violence.

AFJI 31-213. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards and Off-Installation Liaison and Operations. This instruction authorizes Air Force commanders to declare establishments “off limits” if they are known to facilitate or advocate participation in terrorist or extremist activities or organizations.

Equal opportunity

AFI 36-2706, Military Equal Opportunity(MEO) and Maltreatment Program. Air Force policy prohibits unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment in the military and civilian workforce. The purpose of the MEO Program is to provide USAF personnel with a work environment “free from personal, social, or institutional barriers,” so that personnel can achieve unencumbered success. In order to achieve this objective, the MEO program opens lines of communication for reporting discrimination and harassment and impartial processing of complaints.

In addition, MEO provides installation commanders with the authority to prohibit organizations that discriminate with access to the installation.

U.S. Marine Corps Orders

Orders that prohibit participation in organizations that espouse supremacist causes or illegal discrimination:

MCO 5370.4, Guidelines for handling dissident and protest activities. The purpose of this Order is to implement DoD Directive 1325.6. Commanders are provided with direction on how to maintain order and discipline while respecting USMC service members’ constitutional rights. Participation in groups or activities that advocate the use of violence or discrimination is prohibited, however membership in such groups is not.

MCO 5370.7B, Political activities. The purpose of this Order is to outline prohibited political activities for active duty service members. Members are prohibited from using their official authority for soliciting votes or campaign contributions; interfering with any aspect of an election; participate in political campaigns or conventions; or make financial contributions to another member of the Armed Forces or a federal government employee. In addition, restrictions are placed on running for an elected office or being appointed to a civil office.

MP White Letter NO. 15-95 from Commandant of the Marine Corps: Hate Groups. This white paper reiterates USMC policy prohibiting participation in groups or activities that advocate hate crime violence. USMC leaders are called upon to review DoD Directive 1325.6 and MCO 5370.4A and to use this information to evaluate their commands.

Orders that protect equal opportunity

MCO 5354.1D. MCO 5354.1D sets forth equal opportunity policies and standards under which all USMC personnel will be held accountable to. The USMC equal opportunity policy states that all military members will be treated equally and will be provided with the same opportunities to obtain success. Merit, fitness and ability are the only elements to be evaluated.

The goal of this order is to achieve a combat ready force which is free from the effects of discrimination and prejudice. The following guidelines have been established in effort to achieve this goal:

- Commanders will monitor all events that suggest conflict among service members
- Commanders will disseminate the USMC equal opportunity policy to all service members
- Commanders will engage in an active campaign in the military and civilian communities which highlights historical and cultural events, and recognizes achievements in equal opportunity
- All military service members are to receive training in equal opportunity, human relations, and sexual harassment
- Military justice and administrative separation actions will occur without threat of discrimination
- Commanders will investigate all instances of suspected discrimination
- Commanders will follow guidelines set forth in this order when racial incidents do occur
- Military service members must reject participation in groups that promote racial intolerance or discrimination; or encourage the use of violence

Screening Procedures that Help Detect Enlistees Who May be Disloyal and Hostile Toward the U.S. Government

Establishing Identity

In the enlisted accessions process, review of identity documents is primarily the responsibility of recruiters and service liaisons. MEPS personnel are responsible for conducting some quality assurance, to include verifying social security numbers (SSNs) and alien registration numbers (ARNs) submitted by applicants via recruiters. In the case of problematic verification by MEPS, they refer the cases back to Recruiting Commands for resolution.

Recruiters

Review of Identification Documents. Recruiters ask applicants to provide the following identification documents, if available.

- Driver's license
- State-issued identification card
- Social security card
- Birth certificate
- High school identification card
- Passport
- I-551 Card: Alien Registration

Signature Verification. Recruiters can compare signatures on SSN cards, driver's licenses, and state issued identification cards with signatures on military service forms, which ensures that the person at the recruiting station is the same person who obtained the identification documents being presented. Recruiters do not determine whether the identification documents presented were legitimately obtained.

Personal contact/recognition. The ongoing contact recruiters have with applicants helps them establish and validate the identity of the applicants. Examples of ongoing contact include visiting applicants at home, work, or school, driving them to MEPS for processing or shipping, monthly face-to-face contact and weekly telephonic contact during DEP.

ASVAB Administrators

Administrators review applicants' signatures on testing documents and ask for a valid form of identification. If a valid identification cannot be presented, then a print of the right thumb is taken. This print is available to MEPS personnel for identity verification if needed.

MEPS Personnel

MEPS personnel at the MEPS operation desks may require new arrivals to show picture identification. It is not a requirement, but it is a practice at many.

At the very least, MEPS personnel confirm that persons arriving at the MEPS are on lists of persons scheduled to arrive. This provides some assurance of continuity of the identity of the person trying to enlist. They may also review applicants' current signatures with signatures on documents that were previously completed. MEPS liaisons or guidance counselors review all enlistment documents and may conduct a secondary review of the following source documents:

- Driver's license
- State issued identification card
- Social security card
- Birth certificate (may be a photocopy)
- High school identification card
- Passport (may be a photocopy)
- I-551 Card: Alien Registration

Boot Camp Personnel

Upon arrival at boot camp, recruits' enlistment packages are reviewed to ensure that all enlistment forms have been completed. Either original or photocopied source documents are also reviewed. These document reviews are not necessarily geared toward detection of identity fraud, but to some extent do ensure continuity of the documentation provided by recruits.

USMEPCOM

USMEPCOM has launched important initiatives to prevent and detect identification fraud in the accessions process. These initiatives include e-Security and e-Signature projects. The e-Security and e-Signature projects will provide enlistment personnel with means to positively identify applicants who provide inconsistent or deceptive personal information during the process of enlistment, or who attempt to have different persons attempt to complete accessions processing steps for them. Once applicants' electronic identity is established, enlistment personnel will be able to track them throughout the process through electronic fingerprint and signature verification.

Establishing Employment Eligibility

Only those applicants who are eligible for employment in the United States may enlist in the Armed Forces. Eligibility extends to U.S. citizens, aliens with permanent residence, nationals of the United States, and citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palua, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). The following documents must be provided by applicants in order to prove employment eligibility:

U.S. Citizens

- Birth certificate
- Social Security Card
- Naturalization certificate (only for naturalized U.S. citizens)

U.S. Nationals, Citizens of FSM, Palua, and RMI

- Birth certificate
- Social Security Card

Aliens with Permanent Residence

- Birth certificate
- Social security card
- Forms I-9 or OMB No. 1115-0136, Employment Eligibility Verification
- Alien Registration Receipt Card (I-551)
- Foreign passport stamped with “Processed for I-551” or attached I-94 card indicating unexpired employment authorization

Note: The Air Force has instituted a strict policy on I-551 card standards. The card must have at least a 10-year expiration, cards with childhood photographs are not acceptable, and applicants who have been issued a card which has been lost or stolen must apply for a new card and cannot process until the new card has been received.

Automated Database Checks

All recruits entering into the Armed Forces are required to have no less than National Agency Check (NAC) investigations. Increasingly, all recruits are required to undergo National Agency Checks, Local Agency Checks, and Credit Checks (NACLC) investigations. These investigations include checks of national databases as well as criminal record checks of state and/or local agencies, where the choice between the latter depends on the availability of information from particular agencies. Checks that are conducted are described below.

Social Security Administration (SSA)

Applicants’ social security numbers (SSN) are sent through the Department of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to SSA for verification. The response time from SSA to the MEPS is about 48 hours. In the event of a “Social Security Number (SSN) not found” response, recruiting personnel cannot project, further process, enlist, or ship this applicant until specific source documentation has been verified by the MEPS and cleared. In the event of an “SSN mismatch” response, all processing must stop until the mismatch is cleared by the MEPS Liaison.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

Alien registration numbers (ARNs) are sent to USCIS where the numbers are verified as authentic. Additionally, applicants' names and other personally identifying information are compared against ARN cardholders' names to verify that they match. ARNs are validated within 48 hours of projection for enlistment or immediately after enlistment.

FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and National Crime Information Center (NCIC)

Electronic fingerprint images are submitted by MEPS to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM submits the prints to the FBI's Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) for checks of criminal records. Files checked for every fingerprint submission include fingerprint-supported records accessed via the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and name checks of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to include wants and warrants.

Name checks of the NCIC now also include checks of the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF). According to FBI personnel interviewed, these checks are currently only searching the terrorist portion of VGTOF, which is updated daily from the Terrorist Screening Center. Information regarding positive matches with names in the VGTOF are returned to the Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit of the FBI or the Terrorist Screening Center, rather than USMEPCOM or the Recruiting Commands. The FBI reviews information and notifies the Recruiting Commands if appropriate.

Currently these prints are being submitted with an "S" code, which signifies to the FBI that the prints are authorized to be submitted for "Non-criminal justice employment." Because all Navy, Air Force, and Marines undergo a National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks (NACLAC) investigation, these checks could possibly be submitted with an "X" code, i.e., under the authority of the Security Clearance Information Act, which would provide the Recruiting Commands with criminal history records equivalent to what law enforcement can receive. Army applicants will all receive NACLACs beginning in 2005, at which time they also should submit all electronic fingerprints using the "X" code. In the interim, only those prints submitted for NACLAC investigations should use the "X" code. CJIS personnel who were interviewed indicated that X code checks would yield more information than S code checks.

FBI Electronic Civil Fingerprint File

As of 2003, the FBI's electronic Civil File contained about 5 million noncriminal fingerprint records. The number grows every day. These fingerprint records are submitted by applicants for federal employment and military service and for alien registration and naturalization purposes. At least 2 million of the records in the Civil File pertain to military applicants (Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard), DoD civilians, and

contractors applying for security clearances. (For more information, see Woodward, 2004).

Searches of the Civil File will enable detection of identification fraud by individuals who do not have criminal records but who have civil fingerprints on file. Their fingerprint checks will come back either as showing at least two sets of personal identifiers being associated with one set of fingerprints or at least two sets of fingerprints being associated with one set of personal identifiers. For example, a soldier dishonorably discharged but without a fingerprint-supported criminal record could reenlist using new identification documents. Individuals who at one time were registered aliens in the country could attempt to enlist using fraudulent documentation showing them to be U.S. citizens. Checks of the Civil File will help detect these and many other types of persons who are attempting to commit identification fraud.

Search capability of Civil File fingerprints is currently being piloted using fingerprints taken at the Los Angeles MEPS. These searches will help detect persons who are attempting to gain access to DoD security clearances or military appointments using assumed identities.

OPM Suitability Investigations Index (SII) Database

The SII contains records of all non-DoD Federal investigations conducted by OPM or other agencies other than the DoD. Data is limited to the last 15 years for favorable investigations and 25 years for investigations that contain derogatory information.

Defense Manpower Database Center (DMDC) Databases

DMDC collects and analyzes personnel data in an effort to support OUSD(P&R) and other DoD entities. The following databases can be found at DMDC and are used for screening purposes.

- ***Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII)***

This file contains information on subjects with prior DoD security or criminal incidents.

- ***Active Duty Military Personnel Master File***

This file contains data on all individuals currently on active duty with the exception of reservists. Historical data is available as well. Types of information include name, date of birth, SSN, dependent information, termination date, etc. A search of this database allows military personnel to compare applicants against current and prior service members' identifying information (i.e., name, SSN, ARN, etc.), which can reveal attempts to enlist under assumed identities.

- ***Reserve Duty Military Personnel File***

This file is similar to the Active Duty File as described above, but contains data on reservists.

- ***Prior Service Military Address File***

This file contains data on all prior service members who have separated from military service within the last five years. Demographic, service history, separation, and address data are located in this file. A search of this database can detect individuals attempting to enlist with someone else's personal identifying information.

USAF Fraud file

The USAF fraud file is used to identify applicants who have been denied enlistment, commissioning, or appointment in the Air Force. Applicants are entered into the file when they receive disapproved exceptions, receive an unfavorable eligibility determination, or have their waivers for moral violations, drugs, or dependency status rejected.

State and Local Criminal History Checks

- ***State Agency Checks.*** To the extent that state repositories are available, state criminal record repository checks may be conducted for subjects who admit to criminal conduct or who are submitted for NACLCs. For applicants undergoing NACLCs, state repositories may be checked in all states where they have lived, worked, or gone to school for 6 months or more.
- ***Local Agency Checks.*** If subjects admit to criminal conduct, or federal or state criminal repository checks find records, record checks of local law enforcement agencies are conducted. The locations of the local checks are specific to where offenses are known to be committed for subjects not undergoing NACLCs. For NACLCs, the checks are conducted wherever the applicants have lived, worked, or gone to school for six months or more.

Tattoo Screening

All branches of the Armed Forces rely on tattoo screening to detect indications that applicants may have extremist group ties. Tattooed applicants are subject to greater scrutiny in an effort to determine if the tattoos fall within the parameters of acceptable body art. Tattoos require recruiting command review and approval. Procedures for screening tattoos include the following:

Pre-screening oral interview with recruiter

- Do you have any tattoos?
- Where are the tattoos located?
- What do the tattoos mean to you?
- When were you tattooed?
- Why did you get a tattoo?

United States Army Recruiting Command Tattoo Screening Form

- Mark tattoo/brand on body diagram.
- Describe tattoo meaning.

United States Navy Tattoo Screening Certificate

- The Navy asks the same tattoo screening questions as the Marine Corps.

Air Force Tattoo Screening

- The Air Force does not use an official tattoo screening form.
- Data about applicants' tattoos are annotated in the DD 1966, Record of Military Processing – Armed Forces of the United States.

Marine Corps Tattoo Screening Form

In addition to some of the questions listed above, this form also asks:

- Does the applicant have more than four body markings?
- Are any of the tattoos, brands, or body ornamentations representative of a gang membership, advocating racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, depicting sexism (express nudity), drug-related, obscene or are prejudicial to good order, discipline and morale or are of a nature to bring discredit upon the Marine Corps?
- Are any of the tattoos a result of a specific activity (i.e., specifically an illegal activity, or a result of any violation of the law(s))?
- Has the applicant ever had a tattoo, brand, or body ornamentation removed?

Documentation of tattoos by medical personnel at MEPS

- Medical personnel at MEPS annotate tattoos on medical form DD-2808, Report of Medical Examination. This annotation consists of a description of the tattoo (size, location, color, type). The MEPS medical section makes no determination as to the acceptable or unacceptable nature of the tattoo. Medical personnel have not been provided with a formal or standard process to notify Recruiting Command personnel of any tattoos they consider

suspicious, nor do they receive training on the nature of suspicious tattoos. The Recruiting Commands have the responsibility of reviewing the medical documents to determine if applicants' tattoos violate Service policy.

Medical screening at Basic Training Centers

- During the course of a medical review, recruits are screened for new or unnoticed tattoos. Applicants with such tattoos are interviewed by the Commanding Officer and are separated if their tattoos are deemed unacceptable.

Additional screening, all services

- Applicants with problematic tattoos or body markings are interviewed, and their files are reviewed by Battalion, Squadron, and District commanders.

Resources available to recruiting personnel for interpreting tattoos include:

- Unauthorized or Inappropriate Tattoos and Symbols, a Navy briefing on tattoos by ENCS (SW) Darrell C. Nolan. This briefing is often used to educate screening personnel about the historical meanings of tattoos and how to think about the meaning of tattoos.
- A Marine Corps hard copy binder of black and white photocopies of photographs of tattoos. Possible group affiliations or meanings associated with different tattoos are sometimes noted. The notebook can be found nationwide in recruiting stations and MEPS.
- Recruiting Commands have access to varying state and local law enforcement CD-ROMS and Web-based resources. Some of these resources include:
 - Basic Criminal Street Gang Identification (v 1.0). A resource CD-ROM.
 - Gang Tattoos CD-ROM published by the Texas Department of Corrections and the National Major Gang Task Force
 - United States Department of Justice National Hate Crime Training
 - Alaska State Troopers' Russian Criminal Tattoo Database
 - Special Crimes Service - Texas Department Of Public Safety's Security Group Threat on Tattoos
 - XVIII ABN CORPS and FORT BRAGG, Office of the Provost Marshal: Military Police Investigations Section's Newcomer's Brief on Gangs, Extremists, and AFDDB
 - Arizona Department of Corrections, Security Threats Groups: <http://www.adc.state.az.us/STG/Tattoos.htm>

- North Carolina Gang Investigators Web sites:
<http://www.ncgangcops.org/tattoos.htm> and <http://www.scdps.org/cja/csr-tattoo.htm>
- Virginia Gang Investigators Web sites: <http://www.vgia.org/graffiti.html>,
<http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~tamamail/tattoo.html>, and
<http://www.mgia.org/resources/default.htm>
- The following Web sites have been accessed by MEPS and recruiting personnel during the course of tattoo evaluation:
 - A Visual Database of Extremist Symbols, Logos and Tattoos, by the Anti-Defamation League: http://www.adl.org/hate_symbols/
 - Occult tattoos links and resources, by Tim Boucher, Occult Investigator: http://www.timboucher.com/tattoos/occult_tattoo_links.html#satani
 - Tattoos: Recognition and Interpretation, by Sergeant Ken Whitley: <http://www.convictsandcops.com/tattoo.htm>
 - Gang Tattoos: <http://www.gangtattoos.com>

Questionnaires and Interviews

Recruiters Initial Interview

Recruiters conduct informal screening upon first contact with potential applicants. Recruiters evaluate the overall appearance of the applicants, attending to both verbal and nonverbal cues. In addition, recruiters engage potential applicants in an informal interview in order to glean background information. Applicants' responses to these questions provide recruiters with a general idea of potential security risks that may preclude them from receiving a security clearance, and also provide recruiters with a general sense of applicants' motivations for enlisting. Recruiters use DoD and service forms to guide their oral interview, and some recruiters we have encountered also incorporate their own line of questioning to help elicit the most truthful and accurate responses. The following are a list of questions that have been asked during the course of the initial interview.

Army (USAREC Regulation 601-96, Guidance Counselor Procedures)

- Have you ever been arrested?
- Have you ever been detained?
- Have you ever been issued a summons, citation, or ticket by any law enforcement official?
- Have you ever been on probation?
- Have you ever appeared in court as the accused?
- Do you have any unpaid traffic tickets to include parking tickets?
- Do you or have you ever had any offense expunged, set aside, or sealed by the court? Has anyone told you not to reveal this fact?

- Do you or have you ever in your lifetime been cited, arrested, or charged for any crime as a juvenile?
- Is there anything that you would like to discuss with me pertaining to your past criminal, juvenile, motor vehicle, or civil record?
- Have you ever been issued a restraining order or been detained for domestic violence or abuse?

Navy (SF 86 and DD 1966)

- Is any family member a non-U.S. citizen?
- Are you a U.S. citizen by birth or naturalization?

Air Force (Form SF 86, DD Form 1966, DD Form 369, AETC 1408, Job Screening Worksheet)

- What is your citizenship?
- Where were you born?
- Have you ever been fingerprinted?
- Have you ever been involved with the police?
- Please describe your credit history.

Marines (USMC Prospect Applicant card)

- Where were you born?
- Have you ever lived in a country deemed hostile to the U.S.?
- Have you ever visited a country deemed hostile to the U.S.?
- Do you have friends or family who reside in a country deemed hostile to the U.S.?

Recruiters Questionnaires

Once applicants have successfully passed the prescreening interview, they are asked to complete service-specific and DoD questionnaires. The following questionnaires gather biographical, educational, and criminal data, as well as information on foreign associations and allegiances. The information asked of applicants can help illuminate inconsistencies within applicants' backgrounds by highlighting gaps in employment, education, and residences. Interviews are also used to fill in missing information that most young Americans would likely possess (i.e., parents' names and addresses, SSN or ARN, date and place of birth, etc.). In addition, these forms may reveal problematic finances, or finances and credit that are inconsistent with the applicants' job status or age.

Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF 86)

The SF 86 is completed by all applicants in all branches of the Armed Forces. It serves two purposes in the accessions process. It provides a de facto standard procedure for recording information about applicants and interviewing them during the application process. Its second, though original, function is to provide investigators who conduct security clearance investigations with leads that will help them obtain information about the background, moral character, foreign influence, and overall security risk of the person requesting a security clearance. The following screening questions can be found on this form:

- Name
- Social security number
- Current address
- Previous addresses
- Citizenship
- Country of origin
- Were you born abroad of U.S. citizens?
- Naturalization or Citizenship Certificate Number
- Citizenship of relatives and associates?
- Are you now or were you a dual citizen of the U.S. and another country?
- Do you currently hold or did you previously hold a U.S. passport?
- If you are not a U.S. citizen, list:
 - Mother's maiden name
 - Alien Registration Number
 - Date you entered the United States
 - City and state where you entered the United States
 - Country of citizenship
- Education
- Employment activities
- Have you ever been charged with or convicted of any felony offense?
- Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a firearms or explosives offense?
- Are there currently any charges pending against you for any offense?
- Have you ever been charged with or convicted of any offense(s) related to alcohol or drugs?
- In the last 7 years, have you been subject to court martial or other disciplinary proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?
- In the last 7 years, have you been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of any offense(s) not listed above?

- Do you have foreign property, business connections, or financial interests?
- Are you now or have you ever been employed by or acted as a consultant for a foreign government or agency?
- Have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments (embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the United States, other than official U.S. government business? (Does not include routine visa applications and border crossing contacts.)
- Foreign countries visited
- Have you ever been an officer or a member or made a contribution to an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United States Government and which engages in illegal activities to that end, knowing that the organization engages in such activities with the specific intent to further such actions?
- Have you ever knowingly engaged in any acts or activities designed to overthrow the United States government by force?

DD Form 1966, Record of Military Processing – Armed Forces of the United States

The purpose of the DD 1966 is to standardize all information collected by the Armed Forces during the course of enlistment. In addition, the DD 1966 serves to collect and document necessary data to determine enlistment and program eligibility.

- Citizenship
- Social security number
- Date of birth
- Data verification checklist: original source documents were reviewed by recruiter

DD Form 369, Police Record Check

Police record checks are sent to police or juvenile agencies in order to determine the extent of applicants' criminal histories. However, not every applicant is subject to such a check. The policy on when to run a record check on an applicant varies from service to service. The Navy and Marine Corps' policy on record checks varies from district to district. For example, Navy recruiters in Salinas, CA, run police record checks only on those applicants who admit to a criminal record during the course of the prescreening interview, while Navy recruiters in Brooklyn, NY, run these checks on all applicants. Air Force and Army policies require all applicants to have record checks conducted in the city, county, or state of residence at time of enlistment, regardless of charges revealed.

When record checks are conducted at local law enforcement agencies, the following information is requested:

- Does the applicant have a police or juvenile record?
- Is the applicant undergoing court action of any kind?

DD Form 370, Request for Reference

Applicants provide the name and addresses of at least three individuals who are prepared to write a letter of reference for them. These reference checks afford an opportunity to surface any suspicions that applicants may have extremist or terrorist group loyalties. Questions asked of references include the following:

- Dates of school attendance
- Dates of employment
- Does the applicant possess the maturity, intellect, and moral qualifications needed to be successful in the Armed Forces?
- Are there any reasons why you would not recommend this person?

DD Form 372, Request for Verification of Birth

Regardless of service, applicants will not be processed without proper documentation of birth. Therefore, applicants who are unable to produce a valid birth certificate or other official birth document must send for a “Request for Verification of Birth” to their birth state’s office of Vital Statistics. Furthermore, some recruiting regions require this form be completed on all applicants, even if applicants are in possession of appropriate birth documentation.

- Name
- Date of birth
- Place of birth
- Gender

U.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)

MASS is a computer administered security questionnaire designed to prescreen Navy and Marine Corps applicants who are seeking a Navy SCI rating. Applicants whose responses generate red flags are counseled and prevented from entering into certain sensitive fields. Questions associated with extremist or foreign group association are listed below. “Yes” responses to any of these questions would be cause for suspicion about the possibility of enlisting terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.

“Yes” responses to foreign association questions combined with current significant financial problems should also raise suspicion of the possibility of applicants having motivation for acting in support of terrorist causes. MASS also asks about financial problems covering seven years. These questions have not been repeated here, with the exception of questions about taxes. Questions about failure to pay taxes have been included because tax protests are one tactic used by anti-U.S. government entities.

For each “yes” answer, applicants are requested to provide detail about no more than the two most recent incidents. Appendix C contains the questions showing the detail. In this section, only the main questions are listed.

- Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?
- Have you ever engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States on your own initiative (i.e., without being ordered or directed to do so)?
- Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to give or sell any unclassified information that they were not authorized to receive?
- Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?
- Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications, or donating money?
- Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member of an organization or group that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., but who did hold these views?
- Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views)?
- Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?
- Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member an organization or group, that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), but who did hold these views?
- Are any of your immediate family or associates citizens of another country (INCLUDING your spouse, parents, parents-in-law, guardians, brothers, sisters, children plus other persons with whom you are bound by affection, influence or obligation)?

- Have you ever worked or received compensation from a business that is foreign owned or controlled?
- Have you ever had a business relationship with anyone who is a citizen of a foreign country?
- Have you ever owned foreign property (INCLUDING bank accounts) or had other financial interests in a foreign country?
- Have you ever served in the armed forces of another country?
- Have you ever given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign government (EXCLUDING military service)?
- Have you ever had contact with a foreign government INCLUDING embassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service or volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?
- Have you ever received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of a foreign country or from a foreign government?
- Do you have a financial or other obligation to a citizen of a foreign country?
- Are you married to or do you have any intent to marry a citizen of a foreign country?
- Have you ever had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a foreign country (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiancé(e))?
- Do you share living quarters with a citizen of a foreign country?
- Have you ever sponsored the entry of an alien into the U.S.?
- Have you ever failed to pay your taxes or failed to file your federal or state income tax forms when required to by law?
- Have you ever had any trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax agencies that resulted in you having to pay additional taxes or a penalty?

United States Navy Illicit Behavior Screening Certificate (Addendum to DD Form 1966/4)

The Illicit Behavior Screening Form is used to determine enlistment eligibility by gathering information on applicants' documented and undocumented previous illegal or morally questionable actions.

- I have been/am now a member of an organization that advocated the degradation of cultures or human races other than my own
- I have participated in violent acts against a person of another race
- I have been/am now a member of a gang
- I have participated in an initiation to gain acceptance to a group or gang
- I have committed illegal acts to gain acceptance to a group or a gang

AETC Form 1408, U.S. Air Force Job Screening Worksheet

The Job Screening Worksheet is completed by applicants in order to collect demographic information, determine eligibility to serve in the Air Force, and assess any potential threat the applicant may pose to national security.

- Are you a non-U.S. citizen?
- Do you claim dual citizenship?
- Is any member of your immediate family employed by or representing the foreign government, associated with any employee of the foreign intelligence service, have a financial interest in any foreign owned or operated business or engaged in any conduct that could make you vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure by a foreign government?

Air Force Enlisted Processing Worksheet⁶

This form is used to determine enlistment eligibility by collecting demographic, criminal, foreign influence, education, and employment data. The following questions may be considered screening for terrorists:

- SSN
- Citizenship
- Where have you lived?
- Where have you gone to school?
- Employment activities?
- Give full name, date of birth, place of birth, and citizenship for your immediate relatives, living or dead.
- Citizenship of your relatives and associates
- Alien registration number of relatives and associates
- Naturalization certificate number of relatives and associates
- Foreign countries visited?
- Purpose of visit to foreign countries?
- People who know you well and are willing to provide a reference for you

U.S. Marine Corps Prospect Applicant Card

The purpose of the Prospect Applicant Card is to gather demographic information on prospective applicants, determine if the applicant is eligible for enlistment in the Marine Corps, and assess any potential obstacles that may bar applicants from enlistment if they are not resolved.

- SSN
- What is your citizenship?

⁶ This worksheet was created by the 364 Air Force Recruiting Squadron. As far as we know, it is not being used by any other recruiting squadron.

- When and where were you born?
- Social security number
- Criminal background
- Parents name and address
- Birth certificate and social security card verification

U.S. Marine Corps NAVMC 5002, Age Certificate

The Age Certificate is used to establish applicants' age when no appropriate documentation is available to support applicants' assertion of date of birth. Secondary evidence must be provided, which includes:

- Hospital records
- Primary school records
- Family bible entries
- Newspaper files

DA 3072, Monthly Financial Statement; U.S.N Financial Statement; AETC 1325, Financial Statement; USMC Financial Statement

All services require these forms be completed by applicants. However, the Army requires this information from only those applicants who must acquire a security clearance of secret or higher.

- Applicants must state monthly income and monthly bills

MEPS Human Resources Assistants (HRA)

HRAs review all service and DoD documents to ensure data are consistent from document to document. In addition, HRAs conduct one-on-one and group interviews with the applicants in order to obtain the most accurate and up-to-date information. A complete description of these interviews follows.

Pre-Enlistment Interview Script

This interview is conducted one-on-one in a private or semi-private environment. The following questions asked during the course of this interview that can be considered screening for terrorists include:

- When and where were you born?
- Did someone assist you in taking the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test by giving you any answers to the test questions?
- Did anyone ever take the ASVAB for you?
- Have you ever had any problems of any kind with a law enforcement agency?
- Have you ever been arrested?
- Have you ever been to court?

- Do you have any court cases pending?
- Has anyone told you to hide information or to lie about anything?

USMEPCOM Form 601-23-5-R-E, Introductory Pre-Accession Interview

Applicants participate in a group interview where they are asked to complete the Pre-Accession form. Questions require a response of “Yes” or “No,” but applicants have the option of checking a “Let’s Discuss” box. When this box is checked, the HRA will privately discuss the question (s) at hand with the applicant. Questions found on this form that are relevant to screening for terrorists include:

- Have you told your service counselor everything about any problems you have had with law enforcement agencies?
- Did anyone tell you to hide any information or lie about traffic tickets, juvenile or adult convictions, police records (sealed or stricken)?
- Review UCMJ Article 83 on fraudulent enlistment

USMEPCOM Form 601-23-4-E, Restrictions on Personal Conduct in the Armed Forces

This form notifies new recruits that members of the Armed Forces may be involuntarily separated before their term of service ends for various reasons established by law and military regulations, such as:

- A member may be separated for a pattern of disciplinary infractions, a pattern of misconduct, commission of a serious offense, or a civilian conviction.
- A member may be separated for harassment or violence against another service member.

Pre-Oath Briefing

Applicants are provided with a copy of UCMJ Article 83 – Fraudulent Enlistment, Article 85 – Desertion, and Article 86 – Absent Without Leave. Applicants are informed that this is their final opportunity prior to official enlistment to reveal any derogatory information. They are told that if any information they should have reported but did not surfaces after the pre-oath briefing, they may be prosecuted under the military justice system, particularly Article 83, Fraudulent Enlistment of the UCMJ, which may include a \$10,000 fine, discharge from the military and possible imprisonment.

MEPS Recruiting Command Security Interviewers

Security interviewers conduct one-on-one interviews with applicants who require a security clearance for their specific job in the military. Security interviewers use the SF 86 as the primary source of their questioning; however, some security interviewers have

created their own questions to get at truthful answers. During the course of our interviews we uncovered the following additional questions that are asked of some applicants:⁷

- Air Force, Albany, NY
 - Have you ever been in handcuffs?
 - Have you ever been in the back of a police car?
- Army, Albany, NY
 - Why do you want to join the military?
 - How much do you earn at your current job?
 - Will you be taking a cut in pay by joining the Army?
 - Do you want to continue on to higher education?
- Army, Syracuse, NY
 - When you are in your country, with whom do you associate?
 - Who do you associate with in this country that is from your country of origin?
 - Have you ever lived outside of the United States?
 - Do you have a passport from a country other than the United States?
 - Where have you traveled to?
 - Why did you travel to {X} country?
 - How long were you there for?

MEPS Recruiting Command Security Interviewers Questionnaires

U.S. Army TAPE-EPMD Form 169-R, Security Screening Questionnaire

The 169-R is completed by applicants while meeting with the security interviewer at MEPS. The purpose of the form is to collect information for determining if applicants qualify for enlistment and for access to classified materials. The screening questions found on this form ask about citizenship, foreign travel, foreign influence, financial difficulties, and organizational affiliations. For a more complete look at these questions, refer to Appendix D.

U.S. Army TAPE-EPMD Form 189-R, Personnel Reliability Program Screening Questionnaire

The 189-R is completed by Army applicants who are applying for a MOS within the field of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this form is to determine if applicants have shown “unswerving loyalty, integrity, trustworthiness and discretion of the highest order.” Only those applicants who can demonstrate the above characteristics will be

⁷ Reviewers requested that we emphasize that these questions are not standardized by the United States Army.

admitted into a nuclear MOS. The relevant screening questions on this form ask about factors pertaining to loyalty, financial difficulties and law violations. The 189-R does not, however, contain any questions pertaining to loyalty or extremist group associations. For a more complete look at these questions, refer to Appendix E.

U.S. Army Recruiting Command Form 1227, Security Clearance Questionnaire

This form is completed by applicants who will be entering into a MOS that requires a secret security clearance or by applicants entering into the O9L Translator Aide Program. The purpose of the form is to gather information that will help the Army's security interviewer determine whether applicants meet basic qualifications to be granted a security clearance.

- Are you a U.S. citizen?
- Do you hold dual citizenship or allegiance to any country other than the U.S.? (If yes, do you maintain a foreign passport?)
- Have you ever had anything repossessed or turned over to a collection agency?
- Have you ever filed for bankruptcy? If yes, what steps are you taking to show a good faith effort?
- Are you currently behind on any bills? If yes, what steps are you taking to show a good faith effort?
- Have you ever had any charge-offs or bad debts? If yes, what steps are you taking to show a good faith effort?
- Do you have anything else financially that may be a problem for you in trying to obtain a clearance?
- Have you ever had any criminal conduct (moving or nonmoving violations, shoplifting, DUIs, theft, or any other violation or warning from the police)? Please list all violations.

Boot Camp Personnel

When recruits arrive at boot camp, they are subject to additional screening that may include personal searches, additional forms to complete, and ability assessments. Recruits primarily interact with their training instructors who conduct the personal searches and assessments. During the first week of training, recruits interact with human resource specialists (civilian and military) who will ask them to complete additional forms pertaining to payroll and benefits.

Initial search of persons and personal belongings, and regular dorm inspections with the intent to find the following:

- Contraband (i.e., gum, candy, cigarettes)
- Drugs
- Racist or hate group materials

Assessment of mental health and general abilities

- Mental health issues: Training instructors who suspect adjustment problems in recruits will first counsel them and, failing improvement, send them for counseling or evaluation.
 - Is the recruit a loner?
 - Is the recruit progressing the way s/he should be?
 - Is the recruit a disciplinary problem?
 - Does the recruit get along with other recruits?
- Command of the English language
 - U.S. Army: Personal interaction and conversation are used to determine if the recruit has English deficiencies. Those with deficiencies participate in ESL courses.

Moment of Truth

The Moment of Truth occurs immediately prior to shipping to basic training or during basic training inprocessing soon after arrival. The Moment of Truth is the last opportunity to divulge required information they may have withheld in prior interviews and questionnaires. If they "come clean" at this point about anything they lied about or failed to disclose, they are not likely to face criminal prosecution (court-martial), although they still may be discharged. Prior to swearing in and shipping, recruits are counseled about the moment of truth and sign a document indicating that they are aware of penalties for withholding required information.

DA Form 4986: Record of Personal Property.

Taking inventory of recruits' property affords an opportunity to screen for literature, flags, or other symbols of support for extremist or terrorist groups.

DD Form 1172, Application for Uniformed Services Identification Card.

Information provided for this form should be compared with information provided in earlier forms to ensure continuity of the information used to identify the recruit. Information collected includes name, address, SSN, and any dependents' demographic data.

DD For 1172-2, Application For Department of Defense Common Access Card.

As with the DD Form 1172, information provided for this form should be compared with information provided in earlier forms to ensure continuity of the information used to identify the recruit. Information collected includes name, address, SSN, and any dependents' demographic data.

DD Form 577, Signature Card.

This form establishes a means for military personnel to compare subsequent signed documents from the enlisted personnel against a signature provided at initial training. This serves as a protection against unauthorized persons assuming the identity of active or reserve duty personnel. Information collected includes name and signature.

Credit Checks

Credit history checks provide information on applicants' financial background, have the potential of providing additional information that applicants did not share with their recruiters, and may serve as a source of data corroboration. The following information may surface when credit checks are conducted:

- Aliases
- Problematic credit and finances
- Unlisted residences
- More extensive criminal record checks

Security Clearance Restrictions

Restricted to U.S. Citizens

Non-U.S. citizens are not eligible for a security clearance and are therefore restricted to nonsensitive positions within the Armed Forces. Consequently, non-U.S. citizens are also not subjected to an indepth background investigation.

Adjudicated at a Central Adjudication Facility According to Adjudicative Guidelines

The adjudicative guidelines require all individuals seeking a security clearance be subject to a background examination in an effort to determine potential security risks. A number of personal factors are taken into consideration when determining clearance eligibility but in the end, a whole-person concept is applied. Unfavorable information may not be disqualifying because mitigating factors can be considered. With respect to screening for terrorists, the following guidelines are applicable:

Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States. "An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard

classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.”

Guideline B: Foreign Influence. “A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.”

Guideline C: Foreign Preference. “When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”

Aptitude Testing

Aptitude testing serves purposes other than determining applicants’ mental abilities. With respect to screening for terrorists, this process is yet another way to establish continuity of applicants’ identity.

At testing, applicants are asked to present identification and if they cannot produce such identification they are required to leave a print of their right thumb. USMEPCOM noted, however, that no specific action is taken with these thumbprints. No comparisons are made with the thumbprints taken at testing with prints taken when applicants process at MEPS.

USMEPCOM is aggressively working to address this issue, with plans to institute digital signature and digital fingerprint verification systems. In the mean time, MEPS personnel do rely on comparisons of applicants’ hardcopy signatures provided in front of testing administrators (TA) at test sessions and then in front of operations personnel at MEPS. On numerous occasions, signature comparison has caught individuals who had other individuals (ringers) take tests for them. The implementation of digital and biometric-based identity authentication systems (e-Security and e-Signature) will virtually eliminate the possibility of ringers taking part in processing.

Aptitude testing also serves as a terrorist screening mechanism because it screens out individuals who have little command of the English language. While we recognize that most nonnative English speakers are not terrorists, the standard ASVAB score requirements would screen out foreign, disloyal and hostile people who were trying to enlist in the military without being open about their lack of English language abilities.

Policies and Procedures for Reporting and Documenting Suspicious Persons or Activities

Recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel need effective mechanisms for reporting their suspicions that individuals may be extremists or terrorists if the military and the nation are to optimally protect themselves. Information about attempted or successful enlistment of extremists is needed to enable (1) all personnel to understand the characteristics of extremist persons who try to enlist so that they can recognize them and be vigilant screeners, (2) law enforcement to intervene as needed to apprehend or monitor extremists, (3) Recruiting Commands and policy directors to analyze trends, patterns, or prevalence in order to tailor regulations and instructions to counteract them.

Combining reports of suspicious persons and incidents into a common database is important for enabling personnel to evaluate the extent to which problematic persons are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Without reporting of information and combining of this information into a shared database, personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.

Under current procedures, observations of suspicious persons are most often reported up enlistment personnel's chains of command until they arrive at the desks of commanders who determine whether the information should be forwarded to law enforcement, force protection services, or anti-terrorism officers. Some more formal means for reporting and sharing information about suspicious persons and incidents are available or under development. These are described below.

Federal Department of Homeland Security System

At one time, Department of Homeland Safety encouraged individuals to report suspicious or criminal activity to law enforcement or to DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection watch offices. A Web link to this information now points to a site, however, that happens only to be used for reporting computer security breaches such as attempts (either failed or successful) to gain unauthorized access to a system or its data, unwanted disruption or denial of service, the unauthorized use of a system for the processing or storage of data, changes to system hardware, firmware, or software characteristics without the owner's knowledge, instruction, or consent.

USMEPCOM Station Advisory Reporting Network (STARNET)

STARNET is an internal command communication network that enables rapid and efficient dissemination of important information to MEPS across the nation. Suspicious incidents and other types of reports could be shared among MEPS.

Armed Forces Recruiting Stations Operational Security Manual Procedures

The Air Force is working on a joint operational security plan for recruiting stations. As part of this plan, the Armed Forces will be working together to develop a joint suspicious incident database, with information populated by Area Security Coordinators (ASC). ASCs are appointed by each recruiting command and are the designated recipients of all suspicious activity reports (Section 4.6.9). If recruiters believe the suspicious activity is terrorism-related, they are also to submit reports to their Command Anti-Terrorism Officer (Section 4.8.2). This joint database will enable Recruiting Commands to recognize and analyze any patterns of potential enlistment by extremists.

Army Regulations

Army Regulation 600-37: Prescribes when and how to document unfavorable information in a service member's personnel file

Army Regulation 381-20: Suspicious Incident Information Sharing. These pertain to Army Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) provided to a HQ INSCOM designated point of contact upon observation of types of events listed below. Personnel are advised to make reports, even when in doubt. If time is of the essence, personnel are instructed to notify the FBI or local law enforcement immediately, with the IIR to be written later. Types of events to be reported:

- Apparent surveillance of military installations
- Theft of U.S. military uniforms and identification cards
- Cash offers to purchase DoD registered, privately owned vehicles
- Questioning by strangers of recruiting station and MEPS personnel concerning their activities, operations, and plans

Training and Education

In order for counterterror screening policies and procedures to be effective, training and education on these issues must occur. All service members, regardless of rank, must understand what constitutes an extremist group, what constitutes “active” participation, the penalties associated with such activities, and what one’s responsibilities are upon detection of possible extremist associations or activities in their units.

To identify training resources, Web searches were conducted. Recruiting, MEPS, and training personnel were also asked at every location visited whether they received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government.

All of the military services provide extremist group detection and response training to some segments of their populations. This section provides information on military personnel training and education that address extremism, hate, discrimination, and conflict resolution. Other courses are also listed that may indirectly address issues related to terrorism and extremism.

U.S. Army

Basic Training. Basic training introduces recruits to skills such as physical training and marksmanship. In addition to these subjects, recruits are given instruction on the Army’s core values, ethics and race relations.

Basic Recruiter Course. In this course, recruiters learn who and how to recruit. The following topics are covered that may provide recruiters with the knowledge and ability to screen for terrorists:

- Extremist group awareness
- Applicant screening and enlistment eligibility
- Moral waiver criteria

Guidance Counselor Procedures. This course focuses on applicant requirements and processing. Specific topics covered include:

- Accuracy and completeness of enlistment packet
- SF 86: Updating and validating data
- Waiver criteria
- Enlistment standards

Guidance Counselor/Operations course, Phase I Non-resident Training Packet. This sub-course focuses on two areas, Guidance Counselor and Operation’s NCO functions. Topics covered in this course that serve the purpose of screening for terrorists include:

- Applicant screening: Includes information on applicant standards and how to assess if the applicant meets these standards
- How to conduct a security interview

Fort Benning Drill Sergeant School. The courses taught in this school are designed to teach incoming drill instructors performance-oriented training, methods of recruit training, marksmanship and interpersonal courses such as:

- Army values and warrior ethos
- Leadership
- Human relations
- Counseling

Officer Advanced Course; Warrant Officer Advanced Course; First Sergeant Course. This course includes instruction and training on the Army's EO/EEO programs and extremism for unit leaders. Specifically, unit leaders are instructed to teach their soldiers that the ideologies and actions of extremist organizations and hate groups are inconsistent with Army values. Participation or membership in such groups is prohibited. Participants are informed of their obligation to uphold the Constitution and to enforce Army policies regarding discrimination or actions that advocate supremacist causes or encourage the use of violence to deprive others of their civil rights (Army Training Support Package 121-A-8032).

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-20: Unit Equal Opportunity Training Guide. This pamphlet addresses issues pertaining to sexual harassment, cultural awareness, equal opportunity, and discrimination, as well as procedural issues on filing complaints and appropriately addressing complaints with both the victim and the offender. In addition lesson plans on the following topics are provided:

- Cultural awareness
- Discrimination based on race, gender, national origin, skin color and religion
- Equal opportunity violations subject to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice
- Enforcement of equal opportunity policy
- Tools to assess the equal opportunity climate within the Army
- Equal opportunity training techniques for leaders
- Identification of Army equal opportunity issues

Fort George G. Meade Consideration of Others Program. This is a three-tiered program that focuses on education, enforcement, and ownership. The format of this course includes small group discussions that focus on racism, gender, diversity, power and discrimination, and extremism. If necessary, the instructor will address additional relevant topics raised by members of the class. The overall goal of this program is to aid soldiers and command in recognizing and responding to all forms of discrimination.

The Consideration of Others Program handbook contains lesson plans on course topics. Lesson Plan 8 instructs soldiers on whom and what constitute extremist groups and ideologies, prohibitions on participation, and the impact these groups have on the unit and the mission.

Special Emphasis Program. This is an add-on course to the *Consideration of Others Program*, with the goal of providing cultural and educational events to enhance cultural awareness and interest among those in the military community.

Fort Lewis Gang and Extremist Group Training for Company Commanders and First Sergeants. This training includes information on local area gangs and extremist/hate groups, as well as instruction on how to recognize gang and extremist group tattoos, ideologies, and attire.

Military Justice Initial Entry Training. This course reviews standards of conduct for Armed Forces personnel, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, homosexual behavior, victim/witness assistance, and extremist activities and organizations. With respect to the latter topic, definitions as to what constitutes extremist groups and activities are identified, and prohibitions on extremist and dissent activities are outlined.

Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 600-4. This pamphlet is the IET Soldier's Handbook and includes the following information for incoming recruits:

- Army core values
- Uniformed Code of Military Justice with special mention of Article 15 – a nonjudicial punishment imposed by a commanding officer for a minor offense
- Standards of Conduct while on and off duty
- Equal opportunity
- Terrorism: the soldier as the target

U.S. Navy

Navy Recruit Training. This is this basic training for incoming recruits who learn about seamanship. Swimming, water survival, and physical fitness. In addition to these fundamental subjects, recruits also receive training on:

- UCMJ
- Navy core values and ethics
- Equal opportunity
- Terrorism preparedness
 - Keep a low profile
 - Be unpredictable
 - Stay alert
 - Specific instructions on threat conditions and security measures

Enlisted Navy Recruiter Training Orientation. This introductory training is designed to teach the basics on enlistment requirements, enlistment procedures, ethical behavior, applicant screening, and other recruiting methods. After completion of this training, a new recruiter should be able to identify both qualified and nonqualified applicants, and determine if nonqualified applicants are eligible for waivers.

Recruiter-in-Charge Field Management Training. This training is intended to instruct experienced recruiters on how to manage and mentor junior level recruiters. A brief refresher on previous subjects covered in the Recruiter Training Orientation is also provided.

Enlisted Processing Division Supervisor (EPDS) Training. This is the basic course for newly appointed EPDS. The primary focus of this training is on applicant processing. The following topics are covered that may screen for terrorists:

- Interpersonal relationships
- Eligibility requirements

Recruit Division Commander. This is the basic course for incoming drill instructors. At this time, there is no indication of education on extremism, Equal Employment Opportunity, or human relations.

Personal Applied Skills Screening. This is a one-week training and mentoring session. It focuses on anger management and social skill development with emphasis on racial, cultural and gender diversity. Only those recruits who display a lack of coping skills or present anger-related issues are placed in this program.

Command Manage Equal Opportunity (CMEO) Manager's Course (A-500-0009). The CMEO program is designed to help disseminate the Navy's policy on equal opportunity, and assist all Navy personnel in recognizing equal opportunity issues. The purpose of this course is to provide program managers with the basic tools for administering and managing the CMEO program. Therefore, there are a number of topics covered in this training. Some of these topics include:

- Extremist activities
- Diversity
- General policies and regulations
- Formal and informal resolutions

Equal Opportunity Correspondence Course. This online course is intended to enhance awareness and understanding of equal opportunity and diversity. The class is available to all Navy service members. Topics include:

- Valuing diversity
- Equal opportunity

- Fraternization
- Sexual harassment

Command Training Team Indoctrination Course (CTTIC A-050-0001):
Navy Rights and Responsibilities (NR&R) workshop on Naval Citizenship. This course focuses on both Navy core values and equal opportunity with the goal of enhancing the Navy's Command training Team knowledge and skills in these areas. The following topics are covered:

- Valuing diversity
- Fraternization
- Sexual harassment
- Grievance procedures

U.S. Air Force

Air Force Instruction 51-903, Dissident and Protest Activities. This instruction outlines appropriate and inappropriate activities by Air Force personnel. The following are components of the instruction:

- Limits distribution of printed materials on an Air Force installation, other than official government publications or base-regulated activity notices without prior approval from the installation's commander
- Allows for installation commanders to designate establishments as off-limits when the conduct occurring in such establishments creates harmful effects on the health, welfare and moral of military personnel
- Prohibits participation in groups that advocate discrimination or violence
- Prohibits demonstrations or any other activity that can interfere with mission, or affects loyalty, discipline, or morale of military personnel
- Requires policy on prohibited activities to be included in initial active duty training, precommissioning training, professional military education, commander training, and other appropriate Air Force programs

Air Force Recruiter School. Air Force recruiters are responsible for the quality of new recruits, and are the first line of defense against terrorists enlisting in the military. Recruiter school provides introductory training on subjects such as enlistment standards, applicant screening, enlistment procedures, waiver requirements, and other relevant processes. Protecting the military community from an enlisted terrorist is dependent upon the recruiter's training enhancing his awareness of possible threats.

Basic Military Training (BMT). New recruits are taught basic skills such as physical conditioning, obeying commands and orders, learning core values, and drill. In addition to these training areas, instruction has been developed to discuss the Air Force's policies and procedures pertaining to:

- Human relations and Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) and treatment
- Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination
- Unlawful discrimination
- Dissident and Protest Activities (See AFI 51-903)
- Roles and responsibilities of the MEO program

Military Training Instructor (MTI). This course is designed to teach newly appointed training instructors methods of recruit training at BMT. In addition to the fundamental training areas of physical conditioning, soldiering, and instilling core values, the following topics that may help screen for terrorists are covered:

- Identify nonprior service recruits who are incapable or not suited for military service
- Counseling individuals with training issues
- Questioning techniques
- Group dynamics

Judge Advocate Staff Officer Course. This course is designed to teach judge advocates the roles and responsibilities of their profession. Participants complete three areas of concentration which include civil law, operations and international law, and military justice. The following subtopics, which pertain to limiting and defending service member activity, are covered in this course:

- Limits imposed on a military member with regard to political expression
- Limits imposed on a military member with regard to membership in groups, associations, or other organizations that discriminate on the basis of race, ethnic origin, religion, etc.
- Defend limits imposed on a military member with regard to personal expression, including:
 - Tattoos
 - Words or phrases on clothing
 - Posters on walls in barracks
- Class participants are briefed on extremist organizational activity at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI).

Protecting Your Community. This course focuses on terrorism awareness and provides participants with information on recognizing terrorist threats. Components include the following:

- Disadvantages of being a terrorist:
 - Having to live among Americans without looking or acting suspiciously.
 - Terrorists require training and supplies that may be detected and arouse suspicion.

- Overcoming stereotypes: Do not identify terrorists based on their looks, where they are from or what they eat.
- Recognizing suspicious activities, such as unusual requests for information, unusual or excessive interest in high risk or symbolic targets, overdressed for the weather, people in places where they do not belong, or other atypical behavior.
- Recognizing documents that are fraudulently reproduced such as driver's licenses and birth certificates.
- Providing an accurate report: Be accurate and timely and do not delay in reporting suspicious activity.

U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)

USMC Recruit Depot Training. This training is provided to new recruits and includes fundamental courses on physical fitness, combat training, and weaponry. In addition recruits are briefed on the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), core values and ethics, and race relations.

USMC Recruiters School. The purpose of this course is to acquaint future recruiters with the enlistment process which includes standards for eligibility, the waiver process, interviewing techniques, and other relevant procedures. The following courses provide recruiters with the necessary tools for enlisting only the most qualified applicants:

- Education Qualification
 - Purpose of education screening is to ensure enlistment of qualified applicants
 - Review education credential
 - Establishing contact with applicants' educational institutions in order to verify credentials
- Determine Prospect/Applicant Identity
 - Enlistment requires the use of applicants' legal names
 - Names that appear differently on legal documents such as the social security card, birth certificate, naturalization certificate, or education documents require applicants to apply for a replacement document through the appropriate agency.
 - Verifying name and age
 - Verifying citizenship
 - Verifying alien status
- Moral screening
 - Purpose is to ensure only the most qualified applicants enlist, to screen out potential disciplinary problems, and individuals who pose a threat to the USMC, and to ensure other enlistees that they are not amongst criminals

- Question and interview procedures
- Explanation of penalties for lying or intentionally withholding pertinent information

First Sergeants Training Course. This course provides instruction on current issues pertaining to gangs and hate groups, as well as the impact such groups have on the USMC. Additionally, this course covers the USMC policies on such groups and suggests solutions for reducing USMC service members' participation in such groups.

- USMC policies
- Affiliations not consistent with core values
- How to stay alert on indicators of gang and hate group affiliation
- How to address extremist and hate group issues when they arise

USMC Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps, Leadership & Ethics: Senior Seminar Lesson: 12B. This course covers the following equal opportunity topics:

- Definition, policy, and programs on equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and fraternization
- Definitions of minority, prejudice, discrimination, institutional discrimination, affirmative action, goals/milestones, and cultural diversity

Drill Instructor School. This is the basic course for new drill instructors. Primary focus is on recruit training; however, topics that may assist in screening for terrorists can be found within the section *General Military Subjects*. These topics include:

- Equal opportunity
- Core values of the USMC
- Personal and professional values

All Services and the Security Community

Counterintelligence (CI) Force Protection Countersubversion Training. This training has been developed by the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA) and DSSA.

Comment on Implementation of Training

This section on training and education has shown that the DoD and the Armed Forces have produced many training components that are designed to educate personnel about extremist groups, unlawful discrimination, and terrorist threats. Recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel at every location visited for the study were asked whether they received training on the recognition and reporting of individuals who may be hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government. Based on their responses, it is clear that equal opportunity training is well understood and valued. Personnel also consistently receive force protection briefings and training for dealing with external threats.

It was also found, however, that recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel do not appear to be receiving systematic, up-to-date training on recognizing and reporting possible insider threats. USMEPCOM authorities confirmed that observation at least for their personnel, and report that they would value more information in this area. For recruiting command and basic training personnel, insider threat training may be in place, but the people we talked to did not recognize that they had received it. This suggests that if training is available, the intended message may not be clearly understood by the personnel who receive it.

It is hoped that instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section will take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD.

Recommendations

Earlier in this report, we noted that we have observed aspects of the enlistment process that can contribute to acceptance of persons whom the military would prefer not to enlist, if all things were known at the outset. Very few of these persons would qualify as terrorists. Yet, the vulnerabilities that ineligible non-terrorists could intentionally use to enlist, or unintentionally benefit from, are the same vulnerabilities that terrorists could use to elude detection and infiltrate the military. Therefore, by addressing these vulnerabilities, the accessions community will strengthen its screening against terrorists.

This section presents recommendations that have been developed over the course of the project. Some were derived from interviews with enlistment personnel. Others were the result of the authors' observations, based on their knowledge of personnel security systems. All recommendations have been vetted with the Recruiting Commands and USMEPCOM.

USD(P&R) should work with the Intel community and federal and local law enforcement to improve exchange of information between these entities and DoD regarding recruits who may be members of or have associations with extremist groups.

When the DoD submits fingerprints for checks of the FBI's criminal record files, a check of the FBI's Violent Gangs and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) is also conducted. The VGTOF file is updated regularly with consolidated files of the Terrorist Screening Center. Hits on this file are not returned to the Recruiting Commands, however, but rather go to the submitting agency of the record found. It is at the discretion of these agencies to notify the Recruiting Commands that a person in VGTOF is attempting to enlist. Recruiting Commands do not report being notified nor would the law enforcement agencies aware of the case know whom to notify. Agreements need to be made for more effective and timely exchange of this information in a way that does not compromise the investigations of law enforcement.

USD(P&R) should work with other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Social Security Administration (SSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to clarify and simplify procedures for USMEPCOM and Recruiting Command personnel to report suspicious persons and incidents.

USMEPCOM personnel have noted that it is not a simple matter to communicate suspicious persons or incidents to appropriate federal agencies outside of DoD. The networks of communication are not always user friendly and it can be difficult to identify which government agencies, such as FBI, DHS, SSA, or USCIS, to notify. Even more difficult is knowing whom to contact within any of these agencies.

USD(P&R) should support development of training materials for recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel in the detection and response to individuals with potential terrorist and extremist group associations.

As mentioned above, recruiting and USMEPCOM personnel interviewed during this study were not aware of having received systematic training on recognizing and responding to possible terrorists who try to enlist. Instructors and course developers assigned to address the subject matter reflected in this section should take advantage of information in this document and our efforts to catalogue relevant courses. The information provided should make it easier for them to locate and integrate into their classes relevant information and course materials being used in other instruction venues across the DoD.

USD(P&R) should support USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands in developing and training on optimal DoD information sharing systems regarding suspicious persons and incidents.

Recruiting Commands, MEPS, and basic training personnel need clear and easily implemented instructions for aggregating and sharing information about persons they detect who may have terrorist or extremist group associations. Intelligence sharing among these groups does not appear to occur, and because of this, military personnel cannot evaluate the full extent to which problematic persons associated with particular groups are trying to enlist in the military and their apparent strategies for doing so. Personnel are unlikely to be able to detect anything beyond what would appear to be isolated incidents.

- Ensure Recruiting and MEPS personnel, recruits, and basic training personnel know when, how, and to whom within DoD to report suspicions of extremist associations of applicants, recruits, and other military personnel.
- Continue and accelerate development of the joint suspicious incident database via Area Security Coordinators or some other means for aggregating information about suspicious incidents and persons.
- Ensure suspicious incident and person reporting is integrated to include all entities involved in the accessions process from recruiting stations through basic military training.

USD(P&R) should improve methods for preventing, detecting, and responding to identification fraud.

USD(P&R) and USD(I) should work together to develop and provide comprehensive document fraud recognition training.

Department of Motor Vehicle employees and law enforcement across the nation are beginning to receive document fraud recognition training. The settings in which these personnel review identity documents often afford less time for fraud detection than Recruiting and MEPS personnel have to process applicants. Because Recruiting, MEPS, and basic training personnel all need to review identification, their commands should

collectively develop training to avoid redundant and thereby inefficient efforts. Furthermore, the types of training offered should be appropriate for the unique identification screening demands placed on different personnel. For example, enlistment personnel in states on national borders may need more training on fraudulent international documents than would enlistment personnel in Nebraska.

USD(P&R) should continue and accelerate support for USMEPCOM and recruiting command progress toward paperless processing.

Currently, much of the onus of verifying and validating consistency and completeness of information rests on humans. Automated systems will enable more reliable and comprehensive validation. To the extent that automated systems are in place, USMEPCOM and the Recruiting Commands should build automated document fraud recognition logic into automated information verification systems.

USD(P&R) should implement policy and procedures to increase the likelihood that law enforcement detains and investigates applicants who engage in identification fraud.

Currently, when recruiting and MEPS personnel detect that individuals are attempting to provide fraudulent identification documents, they do not consistently maintain control of the documents and are unlikely to summon law enforcement to investigate. Policy and procedures should be implemented to increase the likelihood that law enforcement will have the opportunity to investigate persons suspected of engaging in identification fraud.

Implementing such policy can serve at least two purposes. First, it would enable law enforcement to close avenues to fraudulent documentation. These avenues undermine national security not only for the military community, but also for organizations and systems nationwide. Second, publicizing the policy of having identification fraud investigated and potentially prosecuted should have the effect of deterring individuals who otherwise have little incentive not to engage in identification fraud. Signs should be placed on walls, desks, and front doors. Recruiters and MEPS operations personnel should verbally warn applicants of consequences for presenting fraudulent documents. When individuals are caught presenting fraudulent documents, these instances should be recorded and publicized. All of this should have the effect of hardening the military entrance process against document fraud.

P&R should continue development and implementation of USMEPCOM's e-Signature and e-Security initiatives. Until these systems are in place, require recruiting station, MEPS, recruiting liaison, and basic training personnel all to review and validate original identification documents.

At present, systems are not in place to ensure that a person who shows up at the recruiting station is the same person who processes through MEPS, who in turn is the same person who shows up for military training. Furthermore, under current procedures,

the primary responsibility for review of identification documents is placed on recruiters. Until biometrics are collected and then used to verify that the same individual is participating in every stage of the accessions process, more care should be taken to review identification documents at MEPS and initial training.

USMPECOM and the Recruiting Commands should continue to participate in the civil fingerprint check pilot initiative with the FBI to enable detection of identity fraud.

The Los Angeles MEPS has been participating with PERSEREC, the DoD Biometrics Office (DoD BMO), and the FBI to enable searches of the FBI's civil fingerprint file using electronic fingerprint submissions heretofore submitted for criminal record checks. These checks are being run at no additional cost to DoD. They will enable detection of individuals who do not have criminal records but who have submitted either the same fingerprints or personal identifier information (name, SSN, date of birth) to the FBI in the past. If individuals, such as persons dishonorably discharged or immigrants trying to infiltrate the military as U.S. citizens, attempt to change their identity following the initial submissions of prints, they would be detected by these checks.

P&R and CI&S should ensure that all identification information that can be validated against databases is appropriately requested and documented.

As the DoD moves toward electronic processing, it needs to ensure that the information collected supports optimal automated verification of information. Currently, the SF 86 questionnaire does not document important identification information, such as birth certificate, driver's license, state identification data, or in most cases, passports. Applicants may be asked to show these documents, but the numbers and codes on these documents that can be used to detect fraud are not recorded. Driver's license, passport, and state identification numbers can be evaluated by applying validation rules based on the unique systems that are used to generate the numbers. Likewise, if someone presents a birth certificate that indicates he or she was born on Tuesday, December 21, 1963, processors would have reason to suspect fraud or data entry error since December 21, 1963, did not fall on a Tuesday. Important identification documents should be reviewed and all possible information that can signify authenticity should be documented in DoD systems.

USD(P&R) should ensure MEPS quality assurance is applied to all overseas recruits

MEPS personnel play an important role in providing quality assurance to applicants for military service. Currently, with the exception of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), Recruiting Commands are not subjecting overseas applicants to the same quality assurance procedures used for domestic applicants. As such, enlistment via recruiting stations in non-U.S. countries would be a softer target for someone wanting to infiltrate the U.S. military. In fact, this may be one of the most vulnerable points for allowing hostile foreign nationals to infiltrate our military. Providing extra layers of screening beyond the recruiter, who has conflicting demands to recruit individuals, will

provide a harder target for someone wanting to enlist for purposes of undermining or attacking the U.S. government.

USD(P&R) and DUSD(CI&S) should review policy and procedures to identify the best means for improving the completeness and accuracy of information used to populate security clearance applications (SF 86 / EPSQ / E-QIP, etc.).

Currently, the “SF 86: Questionnaire for National Security Positions” is completed by every applicant for military service in the United States. Its purpose is to collect information for background investigations of persons applying for security clearances. For military accessions and security clearance vetting, the SF 86 is the primary questionnaire for documenting potential indicators of hostile and disloyal associations and histories.

The importance of the SF 86 may not be sufficiently understood or respected by some recruiting personnel. They might see it as an administrative or bureaucratic nuisance in the process of getting applicants to commit to contracts. Recruiters often help applicants fill out the SF 86, sometimes incompletely and inaccurately, to meet paperwork requirements for enlistment. This same SF 86 is then also submitted as part of security clearance applications. As the DoD moves toward automated adjudication of security clearances, based to some extent on automated processing of information on the SF 86, without better quality, the military recruiting process will be responsible for infusing vulnerability into national security by contributing to clearance of individuals who pose a risk. Possible means for addressing this problem include:

- USD(P&R) and the Recruiting Commands should stress the significance of the SF 86 as the cornerstone of the security clearance system. RS and MEPS personnel need to be continuously drilled on the importance of accuracy. These personnel need to be continuously informed of the role of the SF 86 in vetting people who may have access to the nation’s secrets.
- Recruits should be held solely accountable for the information on their own SF 86.
- Most recruits spend significant time in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP). Consider having them complete the SF 86 via OPM’s e-QIP during this time. MEPS personnel, MEPS liaisons, or OPM personnel could be available to answer recruits’ questions.
- The Recruiting Commands, USMEPCOM, DUSD(CI&S), and OPM should work together to improve information collection, validation, and quality assurance standards and procedures for the SF 86. For example, if applicants indicate foreign travel to countries that require passports for entry, they should also be required to provide information about the passport they used to gain entry. Currently, passport information is only required for U.S. citizens who were not born in the U.S. DoD and the Armed Forces should seek to have all passport information for all applicants with passports documented and validated. As another example, if applicants possess alien registration

numbers (ARNs), or are naturalized citizens with relatives in other countries, they should be expected to provide a reasonable amount of information about their friends, family, and other associates. Applicants should also do what is required to completely and accurately document personal reference, employment, and education contact information.

- If needed to communicate the extent of the problem, request a study of the quality and completeness of information provided by military service applicants on the SF 86. For example, compare the accuracy and completeness for the military enlistment population with that of civilian and contractor populations.

USD(P&R), DUSD(CI&S), the FBI, and OPM should work together to ensure DoD is receiving full advantage of statutory authorizations to receive applicants' criminal history for national security clearance and military acceptance and retention purposes when appropriate.

We initially recommended that the USD(P&R) review procedures being used to assign the FBI purpose code to fingerprint submissions for FBI criminal record checks. USMEPCOM quickly and correctly determined that they do not have any control over how OPM forwards record check requests to the FBI. To restore the level of access to information enjoyed by DoD prior to the transfer of the PSI from DSS to OPM, the FBI, OPM, and the DoD will need to meet to determine how to submit criminal record checks from DoD for national security purposes and enlistment or retention in the military as authorized by USC Title 5, section 9101 (SCIA). According to the FBI, record checks for national security purposes may result in return of juvenile records and sealed records from states queried through FBI checks. Since the enlistment population has a much higher probability of having committed any crimes as juveniles and because juvenile records are often sealed, access to records as authorized by SCIA should be ensured.

USD(P&R) should support increased use of and training on the intelligence value in credit reports to validate information provided by applicants.

With the exception of Army, currently, credit reports are being run on every applicant. The Army is expected to obtain credit reports on every applicant beginning in October 2005. Information was not available to indicate whether or how enlistment personnel are benefiting from the intelligence available in credit reports. For example, credit reports can provide the following types of information:

- Unlisted aliases
- Amount and types of information inconsistent with age of applicant
- Unlisted residences
- Evidence of problematic finances

USD(P&R) should identify how this information can most effectively be made available to decision makers in the accessions process who are determining whether

individuals applying for military service are who they say they are and whether they should resolve financial issues before applying for security clearances.

The military Recruiting Commands should work together and with law enforcement to develop a joint services Digital and Searchable Tattoo Assessment Tool (TAT).

Tattoo screening was one of the most frequent practices that recruiting personnel indicated they used to identify individuals with indications of possible hostile and disloyal associations and intentions toward the U.S. government. Recruiting and basic training personnel consistently indicated concern with the completeness, accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility of intelligence for screening tattoos. The efficiency and effectiveness of information available in tattoo screening can be improved.

PERSEREC recommends that the Recruiting Commands participate in the development of a joint digital and searchable tattoo assessment tool (TAT). This recommendation echoes earlier recommendations from Flacks and Wiskoff (1998). The TAT database could be populated with existing photos and information stored in files on recruiting personnel's computers and be supplemented with photos and information available from law enforcement and Anti-Defamation League resources. These photos and information would be searchable using key words that describe prominent features of the tattoos.

TAT could be kept up to date by designing procedures and instructions for recruiting personnel to add information about meanings of tattoos or uploading recent photos of new tattoos. TAT could also be accessible to law enforcement who could update the database with their tattoo intelligence as it becomes available. Integration of Armed Forces tattoo detection with law enforcement intelligence could be accomplished through a joint initiative coordinated through the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).

USD(P&R) should update policies and procedures pertaining to prohibiting and detecting extremist association manifest in Internet behavior.

The Internet has greatly expanded opportunities for people who are hostile and disloyal toward the U.S. government to meet each other, share information, and plan. In our study, the Internet provided the strongest evidence of active duty military personnel participating in extremist groups. The DoD and the Recruiting Commands should clarify prohibited participation in Web sites and Web forums that are sponsored by or are online gathering places for terrorists and extremist groups. The DoD should also consider establishing procedures and assigning responsibility for monitoring extremist Web sites and forums for participation by members of the Armed Forces.

USD(P&R) should standardize and implement question strategies that are more likely to engage applicants in conversations about potentially problematic associations.

As discussed earlier, indications are that questions currently being asked of applicants regarding associations with extremist groups do not yield many affirmative responses. This may be because, in actuality, virtually none of the persons filling out the SF 86 have had associations with extremist groups.

At the same time, the questions asked may not effectively open discussions about the kinds of behaviors and attitudes that indicate sympathy for or involvement in extremist groups. Based on interviews with enlistment personnel, reviews of their questionnaires, and reviews of answers to the SF 86, we feel that a better set of questions could be made available to enlistment personnel to probe pertinent issues with applicants. They would specifically address the ways applicants and recruits can act to support groups hostile and disloyal to the U.S. government, to include Internet behavior. The proposed questions are as follows:

The following questions pertain to your participation in extremist and terrorist organizations and activities.

Note: First, define for each applicant what “extremist or terrorist organizations or activities” mean: People who support or agree with extremist organizations think it is OK to use force or violence or to discriminate against other people based on their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, national origin, or support for U.S. government policy. Or, they may try to disrupt, sabotage, overthrow, or commit espionage or terrorism against the United States Government, or any of its State or local governments.

- a. Have you ever advocated or practiced discrimination or committed acts of violence or terrorism against individuals based on their religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or loyalty to the U.S. government? (YES/NO)
- b. Have you posted or distributed literature or participated in public demonstrations to show your allegiance to or to promote an extremist organization or philosophy? (YES/NO)
- c. Have you ever provided labor, money, or other resources to extremist individuals or organizations? (YES/NO)
- d. Have you ever received training from or recruited or provided training for extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)

e. Have you ever attended any meetings, participated in any Web sites or on-line discussions, or exchanged information in any way with individuals involved in extremist organizations or causes? (YES/NO)

f. Are there any groups (such as countries, political groups, or religious groups) who you would feel obligated to defend if they claimed they were under attack by the United States Government? (YES/NO)

If you answered “yes” to any of question (a) through (f) above, please explain.

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Appendix A

Examples of White Extremists in the Military on the Web

From Martin Lindstedt, Former Specialist Four, 1981-83, C Battery, 2/42 Field Artillery (Lance):

This is why I find any "Black Dawn" element among the Marines to be a foolish rumor. First of all, it is the wrong branch of the military to form any such White Nationalist element. Marines are an adjunct of the Navy. The current Navy is divided into carrier forces and nuclear submarines, in which the Marines act as ground forces for foreign overseas missions. Thus the Marines have no mission beyond their bases less than 75 miles away from the ocean. The Army/Air Force is related in the same way as the Navy/Marines. The Air Force used to be the Army Air Force until 1947 or thereabouts. The Air Force, with its high proportion of officers and the demands it makes for intelligent forces, is typically the 'whitest' of all the branches of services. Yet it is not the military service which will be all-important in the coming total civil war, but rather the Air Force will be engaged in service to the Regular Army forces, supposing that the racial nationalist guerrilla forces hang around in large enough numbers to justify an air strike.

It is the Army/National Guard which is the service of importance when this civil war heats up. It will be the Army which will be called upon by the criminal regime for counter-insurgency once the police are unable to maintain things, as happened in the LA riots. However, due to the necessity to keep the Army loyal, or at least neutral, the criminal regime is justly paranoid as to the loyalty of its white combat troops, few of which come from Washington or New York or even the state capitals across the land. The blacks are likely to become effective Black Nationalists who know how to use small arms. Even the Puerto Ricans are suspect as to tendencies toward racial nationalism. There is not much racial integration among groups eating in mess halls unless the soldiers are lifers or dopers. So given the likelihood of racial nationalists using their skills learned in the Army to subvert the Army's loyalty to the criminal regimeists, the CID (Criminal Investigation Division -- the Army's detectives) is always on the lookout for the dreaded White Nationalists forming cohesive groups. This is especially the case today, far more so than in the 1970s and 1980s. Even so, the loyalty of the Army cannot be assured. Given a racial civil war, white units cannot be counted on to fire on white civilians, blacks cannot be counted upon to fire on blacks, hispanics cannot be counted to fire upon hispanics. Given this reality, is it any wonder that the white criminal regimeists have cut down on the Army, trying to gauge its loyalty through UN 'peace-keeping missions'?

So it is extremely stupid to form an overt White Nationalist or Resistance group while in the Army, just as it is useful to have the sell-out Clinton generals seeing an armed-&-dangerous skinhead in every white recruit. It is useful to have young white men in the Army learning useful skills, such as how to fire an assault rifle, lay down a stream of machine-gun fire, dig a foxhole, learn how to use communications and gather

intelligence on an enemy force. The better element will learn to despise the criminal regimeist Army careerists who give them senseless orders while at the same time learning soldier skills implanted in basic infantry training. Some will learn military realities, learn what is capable with the armed forces and what is not. The Army has trained its opposing forces very very well. It behooves the White Resistance to take advantage of this useful military training. --Martin Lindstedt, Former Specialist Four, 1981-83, C Battery, 2/42 Field Artillery (Lance)

From David Duke on Stormfront.org:

“Salute to Stormfront Army, Navy, Air Force & Marines:” At a minimum several hundred Stormfront members are now in the armed forces. Many of those are in the Middle East right now. Although White Nationalists oppose any misuse of the American military by Zionist manipulators like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz.....White Nationalists also support their kinsmen, wherever they are, including in the U. S. armed forces. I think that it would be a good idea to offer a thread that **SALUTES OUR WHITE KINSMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES** and thanks them for some of what they have accomplished, in spite of the attempt by ZOGsters to use the American military.

From a Stormfront.org message from Forum member O’Brien, a Marine, May 2004 (found with search on “I joined the Marines”):

Mr. Duke, What do you think of the military's new standards on tattoos. [sic] When I joined the Marines they told me I would be automatically disqualified [sic] if I had any rebel flag tattoos. However I was lucky enough not to have any. They did however question my Celtic Tribal tattoo and I've heard that they also wont [sic] allow people in who have celtic crosses. In my mind this is outrages that you can't have any form of tattoo that represnts [sic] your people or your heritage. I also can't believe that the military of all people would fall for such liberal lies that the south represented only the action of slavery and racism. To me it looks as if the Military is now basicaly [sic] stating that any tatoo [sic] that is white culture in general will be automaticaly [sic] qualified as a racist tattoo and to me this is unbelievable I can't believe in a republic such as our which stresses democracy can some how not only be ignorant to the facts but also be racist against white culture. I just dont [sic] understand how our military with in the past 5 years has been infected so much with liberalism and Jewish influence. I always saw the military as a more of a conservative organization. thanks for your time, John

Subsequent posting by Mr. O'Brien:

Re: Small city in Florida fighting hard to abolish MLK Street name

Yes I was there as well the whole show was quite disgusting. It was good to know however that a few white patriots still stood up against the onslaught of uncivilized Negroes whose chants were simplistic and showing numerous forms of hostility. My friend and I who are National Alliance members were there to see what would be the final verdict in the battle to glorify this communist Negro. We wanted to show our appreciation for Mrs. King in her vote against keeping the sign but the media took up all her time with simplistic questions. My favorite speaker was the women who went on about her Jew loving mother who name was so honorably put on a road sign as well which had absolutely nothing to do with the problem at hand. If you live in the Zephyrhills area maybe you would like to meet up with us and help pass out Martin Luther King flyers we also have NA meetings once a month for our Tampa Chapter. If you would like to participate maybe we could set up a meeting. We will be getting a list of all those who spoke against the changing of the sign back to Martin Luther King Blvd. Such as the man with the American flag shirt. These few brave souls will receive some information from our organization. To reach me e-mail me at celticsaints21@netscape.net

From a Stormfront.org Open Forum in Stormfront from 1488usmc2b:

Question for any WP Marines: Oi White Brothers and Sisters, I just enlisted in the Marine Corps and I was wondering if any Marines go to any of the WP meetings in NC or CA? Just checking before I go to them.
14/88 2056

Casper writes: I'd be wary of openly sharing your White Nationalist beliefs or attending events so early on in your enlistment. Could easily result in a Administrative Separation or if you have less than 180 days Entry Level Separation...Not even after basic. They'll view it as incompatibility with Military service; Warranting counseling in which case you can forget any increase in rate or responsibility; and depending on the circumstance be transferred to some stink hole. What's worse is suffering the indignity of carrying this mark permanently on your service record irregardless of future evaluations.

Troy writes: Don't know your story, your age, or why you enlisted, but if you at all care about your service career use caution. The services do NOT look kindly on White Nationalists, so keep your views to yourself. That's not to say be a coward and don't do anything to advance our cause, but be very discrete. Openly trying to recruit other service members is not a good career move and may very well get you booted.

10stsoul writes: Yes. Most recruiters will discharge you in a second if they know your beliefs. Keep it quiet for those first 180 days as someone else mentioned. When you go to boot, you will have a lot of minorities in your platoon and probably one or two minority drill instructors. Be prepared.

From Kiyth: I just finished a six year enlistment in the Navy and openly claiming to be a White Nationalist would bring your career to an abrupt halt(Court Martial for being a racist). The waivers for tattoos are for people that have visible ones, such as on the neck or hands(mostly gang related), not for racist ones.

Saxon_Man: The U.S. military is the last place you want the least amount of wn [white nationalists] in! The country will fall apart someday. When it does, we want our guys in there running deep: rank and file! Same goes with the police force. Suck it up, do your service, and create dissident within the ranks -- just like how SFC Steve Barry, U.S.A (Ret) did in the 90's with the SFU and their publication "The Resister." You can still be active -- just use your head.....

Davey Crockett: I agree with this post and the one after this one that makes the point that we cannot afford to let our military be taken over by those not in our interests. Our government today is filled with minorities that are intent on looting what is left of the white race, I know, I work in the area of "civil wrongs." I wonder if I am the only wn that works for a civil rights organization?

From AryanKingdom: When my group is formed, I will require that all persons fit for duty join the National Guard. Why you may ask... well that's simple national guardsmen are the first people they call in to fight an up rising i.e.... us. Second that two hundred dollars a month plus the training and the schooling goes a long way. If they go for lets say the medical field they can be an emergancy medical technition almost as soon as they get home from there training and earn a good wage. Or perhaps the go into the National Guard to become police officers we could use many more white and proud police officers and women. And if all goes well you enlistment is up you have a four year degree and you never had to go over seas. I would suggest joining in a state that is white like WY or some such other state. Please contact me if you have any other questions.

Note: Another Stormfront string with comparable dialogue was found by searching on an offensive racial slur and the phrase "I'm in the army."

Appendix B

Indications of Extremists in Security Clearance Investigations

Indications of Possible or Definite Extremist Group Associations or Sympathies from Initial Security Clearance Investigations of Military Personnel Under the Age of 35 (N=131)

- Arab subject with discrepancies in address possesses NJ driver's license, despite living in NY
- Arab subject with strong Arab ties fails to list significant associations
- Developed reference reports subject has neo-Nazi tattoo and dog named Adolf
- FBI agent indicates subject is a member of white supremacist group
- Investigator made a CI note re: subject's attendance of AZ mosque
- Iranian subject claimed to know associates of bin Laden; reference questions subject's loyalty to the U.S.
- Reference alleged subject was a member of the Aryan nation
- Reference concerned whether subject can reconcile Muslim faith with military service
- Reference describes pro-Arab, anti-U.S. attitudes of subject
- Reference describes subject as militant type person
- Reference had subject as student, described him as mean and nasty, associated him criminal conduct. Subject member of MSA; subject had unreported travel
- Reference heard subject refer to self as Nazi, but later also say that calling self Nazi was stupid
- Reference heard subject saying he didn't believe in this government
- Reference indicates subject expresses anti-American sentiments; Subject terminates clearance when confronted with allegations of being anti-government
- Reference indicates subject had expressed anti-American sentiments
- Reference indicates subject is ultra-conservative and home schools his children
- Reference not sure how subject would feel about going to war against other Muslims
- Reference questions Islamic subject's loyalty to the U.S. (2)
- Reference reports subject could possibly have conflict between loyalty to U.S. and Muslim faith
- Reference reports subject drew Nazi symbol on another student's art work; Reference reports subject getting involved in white supremacy; Subject admits to drawing white supremacist symbols but denies involvement in groups; Subject suspended for possessing neo-Nazi painting
- Reference reports subject sent anti-U.S. pro-Muslim emails
- Reference reports subject traveled to Kuwait; strict Muslim who did not integrate with peers; Reference describes Muslim subject moving from Tampa FL to Rochester NY
- Reference reports subject sympathizes with Islamic terrorists; Subject reported to EEO for racist comments
- Reference saw subject in a picture with a Nazi flag; Subject says photo with Nazi flag relevant only to history of flag; subject not white supremacist or Nazi
- Reference says subject involved in white supremacist group
- Reference who is fellow soldier reports subject has extremist literature and has been heard making racist comments; subject brags about having friends in Oregon militia groups; other reference reports subject shows interest in extremist groups
- Reference will not recommend subject for position of trust; uses claims of being Muslim not to work on Fridays; "something about him"
- References believe subject possesses a KKK membership card
- References report subject is involved with white supremacist skinhead organization
- Subject accused of using N word (21 subjects)
- Subject admires Rommel
- Subject associated with confederate flag and hacking, at least through bragging, not necessarily action
- Subject associated with white supremacist groups
- Subject believed to be susceptible to recruitment by KKK or other hate group
- Subject believed to be ultra-conservative and racist; Subjected showed racism in ROTC

- Subject brainwashed growing up in a cult
- Subject burned powder shaped like swastika
- Subject described as angry and anti-semitic
- Subject described as racist and was heard using N word
- Subject discovered after enlistment as having skinhead group tattoos, bumper stickers; shaved head in violation of military policy; subject was assigned to be a recruiter!
- Subject dismissed for taunting recruit with anti-semitic comments
- Subject displayed neo-Nazi banners and posters
- Subject dressed like skinhead or militia
- Subject drew swastika when autographing a girl's shirt
- Subject employed by supremacist
- Subject expressed sympathy and admiration for bin Laden
- Subject fails to disclose Arabic alias; potentially suspicious travel
- Subject fired and later issued Article 15 for use of N word
- Subject fired for racist slurs
- Subject had confederate flag tattoo covered up
- Subject had forged bank notes
- Subject has pending Article 15 for racist statement against white
- Subject has rebel flag on chest
- Subject has swastika tattoo; admits to being in white supremacist group several years before interview
- Subject has unlisted Arabic alias (2)
- Subject helped stuff envelopes for right-wing "The Cause" Organization, of which her father was a member
- Subject hung out with FMLN
- Subject hung out with KKK members without realizing it
- Subject implicated in racial slur vandalism
- Subject is member of anti-American Muslim sect; attempting to be discharged from Army to join mother in Saudi Arabia
- Subject is member of racially motivated militant group known as American Freedom Fighters
- Subject is skinhead with knuckles tattooed with "skinhead"
- Subject known to build pipe bombs
- Subject known to have attended KKK meetings, but didn't join
- Subject listed residence at a KKK camp
- Subject loyal to Puerto Rico; hates the U.S.
- Subject made comment "we had it coming" in response to 9-11 attacks
- Subject used a racial slur
- Subject observed by police officer at KKK rally
- Subject on mailing list of NSDAP
- Subject posted racist comments on Web site and accused of using N word
- Subject prayed at mosque also frequented by Muslims of America, a group actively recruited for militants to fight against U.S.; subject worked with FBI to identify extremists
- Subject put up racist Web site
- Subject perceived as racist (2)
- Subject received applications for KKK membership from a marine
- Subject received Article 15 for distributing extremist literature
- Subject received KKK materials from family member
- Subject received unsolicited mailing from KKK
- Subject reluctant to fight fellow Muslims
- Subject reported to Army CID for visiting extremist Web sites on the Internet

- Subject reported to EEO for shaving head like a skinhead. Subject indicates head shaved because he was going bald; no observed racism
- Subject self-professed to being in KKK
- Subject skinhead racist and member of Church of the Creator
- Subject spoke out against government; Subject extreme anti-establishment
- Subject surfed Nazi skinhead website but does not subscribe to philosophy
- Subject suspected of sabotaging computers with viruses, may have only bragged about it.
- Subject suspected of sabotaging Navy plane
- Subject sympathizes with McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber
- Subject visited anti-American web site
- Subject visited anti-government anarchy website
- Subject was a nonviolent skinhead 12 to 13 years before interview
- Subject was approached to join KKK at amusement park; didn't join
- Subject was member of skinhead group
- Subject was militia member and Hitler sympathizer
- Subject associated with Nazi skinhead James Burmeister
- Subject wore Nazi costume as part of a film project
- Subject worked for Nation of Islam security services
- Subject wrote email talking about how to sabotage his plant; contained third reich references
- Subject wrote Nazi and ant-semitic words and drew Nazi symbols in multiple classes
- Subject, an Egyptian citizen, making new Arabic friends; receiving money from Arab women; "prepared" friend to go to Egypt
- Subject's section leader tried to give him materials on KKK
- Subject's use of n word reported to brigade commander
- Three references indicate subject was either or both a militia member and admirer of Hitler
- Three sources reports subject was observed carving KKK on desk; said to have done worse on behalf of KKK outside of school; believed to be a member
- Two references feel Muslim subject is showing signs of extremism and putting religious loyalty over loyalty to military
- Two references indicate subject is anti-American; observed wearing anti-American clothing

Appendix C

U.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)

U.S. Navy Military Applicant Security Screening (MASS)

MASS is a computer administered security questionnaire designed to prescreen applicants who are seeking an SCI rating. Applicants whose responses generate red flags are counseled and prevented from entering into certain sensitive fields. Questions associated with extremist or foreign group association are listed below. “Yes” responses to any of these questions would be cause for suspicion about the possibility of enlisting terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.

“Yes” responses to foreign association questions combined with current significant financial problems should also raise suspicion of the possibility of applicants having motivation for acting in support of terrorist causes. MASS also asks about financial problems covering 7 years. These questions have not been repeated here, with the exception of questions about taxes. Questions about failure to pay taxes have been included because tax protests are one tactic used by anti-U.S. government entities.

For each “yes” answer, applicants are requested to provide details about no more than the two most recent incidents.

- **Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?**
 - How many times have you been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?
 - When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - What country did the person who approached you represent?
 - Did you agree to engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States?
 - Describe exactly what you agreed to do.
 - Did you subsequently perform this action?
 - Did you report the incident?
 - To whom did you report the incident?
- **Have you ever engaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism against the United States on your own initiative (i.e., without being ordered or directed to do so)?**
 - When did you engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - What was the reason(s) that you engaged in espionage or sabotage?
 - Describe exactly what you did.

- **Have you ever been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to give or sell any unclassified information which they were not authorized to receive?**
 - How many times have you been approached by agents or representatives of a foreign government to give or sell unclassified information which they were not authorized to receive?
 - When did you engage in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - What country did the person who approached you represent?
 - Did you provide any unclassified material?
 - What type of information did you provide?
 - Did you report the incident?
 - To whom did you report the incident?
- **Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?**
 - In how many such organizations or groups have you been a member?
 - What was the name of the organization?
 - Why did you decide to become a member?
 - When did you become a member (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Are you still a member?
 - When did you end your membership (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you decide to end your membership?
 - Have you engaged in any activities which involved espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence?
 - How many times have you engaged in activities which involved espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence?
 - What was the period of time during which you engaged in these activities (approximately)?
 - From: Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Until: Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Describe exactly what you did.

- **Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?**
 - How many of these types of organizations or groups have you supported?
 - What was the name of the organization?
 - What was your reason(s) for giving your support?
 - When did you begin supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Do you still support this organization?
 - When did you stop supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you decide to cease your support?
- **Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member of an organization or group, that advocated espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S., but who did hold these views?**
 - With how many such individuals have you been associated?
 - What is or was the nature of your association with this person?
 - When did you begin to associate with this person (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Have you, at any time, shared this person's viewpoint concerning the commission of espionage, sabotage, or terrorism, or the use of force or violence to overthrow the U.S. government or to act against the interests of the U.S.?
 - Do you still share this person's viewpoint?
 - Do you still associate with this person?
 - What was your reason for associating with this person?
 - Do you still associate with this person?
 - When did you stop associating with this person (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you stop associating with this person?

- **Have you ever been a member of an organization or group that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views)?**
 - In how many such organizations or groups have you been a member?
 - What was the name of the organization?
 - Why did you decide to become a member?
 - When did you become a member (approximately)?
 - Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Are you still a member?
 - When did you end your membership (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you decide to end your membership?
 - Have you engaged in any activities which involved sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence?
 - How many times have you engaged in activities which involved sabotage, terrorism, or the use of force or violence?
 - What was the period of time during which you engaged in these activities (approximately)?
 - From: Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Until: Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Describe exactly what you did.
- **Have you ever supported such an organization or group (without being a member), that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), by attending their meetings, subscribing to their publications or donating money?**
 - How many of these types of organizations or groups have you supported?
 - What was the name of the organization?
 - What was your reason(s) for giving your support?
 - When did you begin supporting this organization (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Do you still support this organization?

- When did you stop supporting this organization (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you decide to cease your support?
- **Have you ever associated with any individual who was not a member an organization or group, that advocated sabotage, terrorism, or the use of illegal force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect their own constitutional rights (INCLUDING those with anti-Semitic or racist views), but who did hold these views?**
 - With how many such individuals have you been associated?
 - What is or was the nature of your association with this person?
 - When did you begin to associate with this person (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Have you, at any time, shared this person's viewpoint concerning the commission of sabotage, or terrorism, or the use of force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights or to protect your own constitutional rights?
 - Do you still share this person's viewpoint?
 - Do you still associate with this person?
 - What was your reason for associating with this person?
 - Do you still associate with this person?
 - When did you stop associating with this person (approximately)? Year:
Month: (1-12)
 - Why did you stop associating with this person?
- **Are any of your immediate family or associates citizens of another country (INCLUDING your spouse, parents, parents-in-law, guardians, brothers, sisters, children plus other persons with whom you are bound by affection, influence or obligation)?**
 - How many of your immediate family members or associates are citizens of another country?
 - What is this person's relationship to you?
 - Of what country is this person a citizen?
- **Have you ever worked or received compensation from a business that is foreign owned or controlled?**
 - How many businesses that are foreign owned or controlled have you worked for or received compensation from?

- o What was the name of the business?
- o In what country was this business headquartered?
- o What type of work did you perform?
- o For what period of time did you work for or receive compensation from this business (approximately)?
- o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
- o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever had a business relationship with anyone who is a citizen of a foreign country?**
 - With how many citizens of foreign countries have you had a business relationship?
 - o Of what country is this person a citizen?
 - o What type of work does this person perform?
 - o For what period of time have you had contact with this person (approximately)?
 - o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever owned foreign property (INCLUDING bank accounts) or had other financial interests in a foreign country?**
 - In how many countries have you owned property or had other financial interests?
 - o What was the country in which you established a financial interest?
 - o What type of financial interest or property did you own?
 - o For what period of time (approximately) did you have this financial interest or property?
 - o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever served in the armed forces of another country?**
 - o In what country's armed forces did you serve?
 - o What was the period of time that you served (approximately)?
 - o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)

- o Would you be willing to support an armed conflict against that country?
 - o Why would you be unwilling to support an armed conflict against that country?
- **Have you ever given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign government (EXCLUDING military service)?**
 - How many times have you given volunteer service or been employed by a foreign government (EXCLUDING military service)?
 - o What was the country that you gave volunteer service to or were employed by?
 - o Was your service or work performed for an intelligence agency of that government or its military?
 - o What type of service or work did you perform?
 - o What was the period of time (approximately)?
 - o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Do you still have contact with anyone from that government?
 - o What type of work does this person perform?
 - o When did you meet this person (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever had contact with a foreign government INCLUDING embassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service or volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?**
 - With how many foreign governments have you had contact INCLUDING embassies, consulates, or representatives (EXCLUDING foreign military service or volunteer service or employment for a foreign government, or obtaining a visa)?
 - o With what country's government did you have contact?
 - o What was the reason for the contact?
 - o For what period of time did you have contact with this government (approximately)?
 - o From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - o Until... Year: Month: (1-12)

- **Have you ever received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of a foreign country or from a foreign government?**
 - How many times have you received benefits, financial assistance from a citizen of a foreign country or from a foreign government?
 - ** For the following questions, the person will be asked about the two most recent times.
 - From what country did you receive benefits, assistance, etc.?
 - What type of benefits, assistance, etc., did you receive?
 - What was the reason that these benefits, assistance, etc., were given to you?
 - When did you receive these benefits, assistance, etc. (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Do you have a financial or other obligation to a citizen of a foreign country?**
 - With how many citizens of foreign countries do you correspond, maintain friendship or have an obligation?
 - Of what country is this person a citizen?
 - How long have you known this person?
 - How did you become acquainted with this person?
 - Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are serving in the military?
- **Are you married to or do you have any intent to marry a citizen of a foreign country?**
 - Of what country is your spouse or future spouse a citizen?
 - How did you become acquainted with your spouse or future spouse?
 - When did you meet your spouse or future spouse (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a foreign country (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiancé(e))?**
 - With how many citizens of foreign countries have you had a close personal relationship (EXCLUDING your current spouse or fiancé(e))?
 - Of what country is this person a citizen?
 - How did you become acquainted with this person?
 - What was the period of time for this relationship (approximately)?

- From... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Until... Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Do you still have contact with this person?
 - Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are serving in the military?
- **Do you share living quarters with a citizen of a foreign country?**
 - With how many citizens of foreign countries are you sharing living quarters?
 - Of what country is this person a citizen?
 - How did you become acquainted with this person?
 - When did you meet this person (approximately)?
 - Year: Month: (1-12)
- **Have you ever sponsored the entry of an alien into the U.S.?**
 - How many aliens have you sponsored for entry into the U.S.?
 - Of what country was this person a citizen at the time you sponsored him or her for entry into the U.S.?
 - How did you become acquainted with this person?
 - When did you meet this person (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - When did you last have contact with this person (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - Is this person now a U.S. citizen?
 - Do you still have contact with this person?
 - Would you be willing to break off contact with this person while you are serving in the military?
- **Have you, within the past seven years, had a lien placed on your property for failing to pay taxes or a creditor?**
 - How many times have you had a lien placed upon your property for failing to pay taxes or a creditor?
 - When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - What was the reason that you failed to pay taxes or the creditor?
 - What was the total amount that you owed which resulted in the lien?
 - Has the lien been removed?
- **Have you ever failed to pay your taxes or failed to file your federal or state income tax forms when required to by law?**

- In what years did you fail to pay your taxes or fail to file your federal or state income tax forms when required by law?
- Why did you fail to pay your taxes or file your tax returns?
- **Have you ever had any trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax agencies that resulted in you having to pay additional taxes and/or a penalty?**
 - How many times have you had trouble with federal (IRS) or state income tax agencies that resulted in you having to pay additional taxes and/or a penalty?
 - When did this occur (approximately)? Year: Month: (1-12)
 - What was the nature of the problem?
 - What was the total you had to pay in additional taxes, interest, and/or penalty?

Appendix D

U.S. Army, TAPE-EPMD Form 169-R, Security Screening Questionnaire

- **What is the status of your citizenship?**
- **Are you married or engaged to someone who is not a U.S. citizen?**
- **Are one or more of your close relatives or associates:**
 - Current citizens of a foreign country?
 - Naturalized citizens?
 - Former citizens of a foreign country?
- **In the last seven years, have you or one or more of your close relatives or associates:**
 - Traveled outside of the U.S.?
 - Lived outside of the U.S.?
 - Corresponded with, had a friendship with or had an obligation to someone in a foreign country?
 - Do you have any foreign business contacts, financial interests or ownership of foreign property (including bank accounts)?
 - Have you ever been a representative, consultant or employee of a foreign government?
 - Have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its embassies or consulates, or its representatives, or any reason other than via inquiries?
 - In the last seven years, have you had a passport issued by a foreign government?
 - Have you ever dated or had a close personal relationship with a citizen of a foreign country?
 - Of what country is this person a citizen?
 - What was the period of the relationship?
 - Do you still have a close association or strong feelings for this person?
 - Have you ever received financial assistance, gifts or cash from a citizen, foundation, or a corporation of a foreign country or from the government of a foreign country?
- **In the last seven years:**
 - Have you ever had anything repossessed?
 - Have you been sued by a creditor, had a judgment against you or had money involuntarily taken directly from your paycheck (garnishment) to repay a debt?
 - Have you had any bills turned over to a collection agency?
 - Have you been refused credit?

- Have you filed for bankruptcy?
- Have you had a credit card recalled because you were not living up to the contract?
- Have you had any checks returned for insufficient funds?
- Have you been evicted from a residence for failure to pay rent?
- Have you left a residence owing money for utilities, rent or damages?
- Have you been engaged in compulsive or habitual gambling?
- **Indicate whether any of the following apply to you or to one or more of your close relatives or associates:**
 - Ever been a member of an organization that advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow or alter the Constitutional form of Government?
 - Ever established a sympathetic association with a spy, traitor, anarchist, terrorist, espionage or secret agent or representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be contrary to the interests of the United States or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow or alter the Constitutional form of government of the United States?
 - Ever knowingly been a member of or established a sympathetic association with a member of an organization or group which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or overthrow or alter the form of government of the United States?
 - Ever contributed money, services or support to an organization or group described above?

Appendix E

U.S. Army, TAPE-EPMD Form 189-R, Personnel Reliability Program Screening Questionnaire

- Have you ever been detained, arrested, cited, convicted or accused by law enforcement officials for any of the following offenses, or have you ever committed any of the following offenses without being caught for which you may be arrested at some future time if the offense becomes known:
 - Moving/nonmoving (traffic) violations?
 - Operating an improperly licensed/registered/inspected or unsafe vehicle or driving without a license?
 - Driving while intoxicated (DWI), driving under the influence (DUI), open container violation or any alcohol/drug related violation involving a vehicle?
 - Minor property offenses such as: vandalism, trespassing, malicious mischief, poaching, shoplifting, bad checks?
 - Major property offenses, such as: grand theft, arson, breaking and entering?
 - Income tax evasion?
 - False report to police?
 - Conspiracy to commit a crime?
 - Disorderly conduct, such as: public intoxication, drunk and disorderly, disturbing the peace?
 - Illegal or violent demonstrations?
 - Minor sex-related offenses, such as: indecent exposure, lewd behavior, sex acts in public, voyeurism or “window peeping?”
 - Prostitution, soliciting for a prostitute or paying a prostitute?
 - Other major sex- related offenses, such as: rape, statutory rape, child molestation?
 - Fighting, assault, battery, child/spouse abuse or any other offense involving physical violence?
 - Attempted homicide?
 - Homicide?
 - Any felony or misdemeanor not described above?
- Have you ever had anything repossessed?
- Have you been sued by a creditor, had a judgment against you or had money involuntarily taken directly from your paycheck (garnishment) to repay a debt?
- Have you had any bills turned over to a collection agency?
- Have you been refused credit?
- Do you have any outstanding debts or bills that are late?
- Have you filed for bankruptcy?
- Within the last three years, have you had any checks returned for insufficient funds?

- Have you been evicted from a residence for failure to pay rent or mortgage?
- Have you engaged in compulsive or habitual gambling?
- List all of your current financial obligations (include car payment, student loans and unpaid checks)