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**THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

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THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The East European revolution of 1989 has generated a broad debate over Europe's future -- a future in which all of Europe, whole and free, is to share. The terms of the debate, however, and some of the integrative processes underway have themselves created unintended obstacles to full European integration, the union of East and West. The speed and certainty with which the East European nations can return to a united Europe are in question.

The debate over Europe's future actually addresses three separate, but closely related issues: European defense, European security, and the more theoretical concept of a European identity. The first is primarily a debate about institutions - - the redefinition of old and creation of new -- to address more accurately the concrete defense needs of a Europe transformed by the massive and unilateral withdrawal of potential enemy forces. The second debate, concerning broader security issues, goes beyond specific defensive mechanisms and encompasses more ephemeral issues of confidence building, political crisis management, and the construction of a shared dependence on long-term stability. The third debate, over the question of European identity, is for now couched in traditional terms long articulated in the dialogue between the Europeanists and nationalists. For West Europeans, this aspect of the debate has not yet fully encompassed the problems of uniting a whole Europe. For East Europeans, the

definition of a European identity is the real issue. They want to return to Europe.

On both sides of the region the debate over a European identity, although cast in different terms, has been given new vitality by the various processes of European integration, particularly the march toward "Europe '92." But arguably the most potent new impetus in this aspect of the debate over Europe's future is the perception that the division of Europe has ended, although real unity has not yet been accomplished. It is profoundly ironic that in many important ways, the process of European integration and the terms of the debate over Europe's future may actually be serving to perpetuate the division of Europe, rather than unite it. The on-going processes of European integration in the West may actually serve to continue the exclusion of the East.

I. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

To construct a lasting and comprehensive European security system, it will be necessary to include the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe while taking care not to create a new threat to legitimate Soviet security interests. On the surface it may be easiest simply to focus on West European security needs, seeing Soviet abandonment of Eastern Europe as a purely positive development. Eastern Europe would become, then, a neutral but

pro-western buffer between a more easily defendable Western Europe and the Soviet Union. However, leaving Eastern Europe in a security vacuum is not in the long-term security interests of the West and, it can be argued, will pose new security threats. This should not be seen as a simplistic argument that East European states should simply be brought into NATO or some other European defense or security structure; it is an argument that comprehensive integration of Europe -- economically, politically, and militarily -- will be required to address European security needs. The continuing bifurcation of Europe threatens the future of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, and thereby threatens the security of Europe as a whole.

For the United States also the future of Eastern Europe impacts on our security interests just as the region did when it harbored Soviet garrisons. As in the past, the impact is indirect, leading through Moscow. The new democrats of Eastern Europe, particularly the Poles, have acknowledged that their radical political and economic experiments are perceived by Moscow to be shadows of Soviet destiny. Eastern Europe's future, either chaos or stability, catastrophic poverty or gradual prosperity, may establish a pattern for future Soviet developments; at least the region's future will inspire either hope or fear among the Soviet reformers. The subsequent linkage between Soviet reform efforts and European -- and American -- interests is clear. In this indirect manner, processes of European integration that enhance

economic and political stability in the region serve broad and compelling security interests.

In a more direct way too, East European developments will impact on European security interests. Exclusion of Eastern Europe from West European defense structures, security arrangements, and, importantly, widely shared concepts of European identity, may aggravate the potential for instability and conflict. German leaders have already articulated their interest in a stable and gradually more prosperous Eastern Europe. They explicitly recognize more negative developments in the region as deeply threatening to their vital security interests. An impoverished, newly nationalistic, isolated, and hostile Polish neighbor, or waves of East European immigrants fleeing economic hardship and new forms of authoritarianism are examples of how German interests could be threatened by failure to integrate Europe creatively and proactively.

It is significant that East European leaders have, at the top of their agenda, the "return" of the East European nations to their European home. They maintain an emotional self-identification as Europeans who, moreover, have been disadvantaged by history. From the beginning of the revolution in 1989, these East Europeans desired and expected to be received warmly by their European brothers with both rhetoric and more concrete manifestations of support. Many East European leaders have been disappointed by the

"Marshall Plan of Advice" and a reluctance to engage them fully in the ongoing processes of European integration. Exclusion leading to disappointment, leading to possible hostility is a chain that could be broken by a more vigorous effort toward genuine European integration.

II. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION

A. Economic Bifurcation:

Eastern Europe's most pressing needs are clearly economic. Forty years of socialist "management" of the East European economies have resulted in enormous obstacles to rationalization and modernization of the systems. Even Poland's dramatic efforts to restructure that nation's economy have so far failed to generate the pace and depth of changes that will be required. At the same time, West European and American resources available to address these problems are shrinking while competing and compelling needs elsewhere are proliferating. European engagement in a search for solutions will be limited. The division of Europe on economic lines may actually deepen in the future despite the rejection of systemic differences.

East European leaders see the long-range answer as the inclusion of their states in the West European economic institutions. No one sees this as possible any time soon. In the

meantime, the processes of West European economic integration actually have accelerated toward a climax in 1992. Thus, the most advanced process of European integration serves most dramatically to deepen -- rather than bridge -- the division of Europe.

A further irony comes with the available means of contributing to East European recovery: direct foreign investment. Although the East Europeans recognize -- indeed are driven by -- the necessity of soliciting foreign investment, they are nevertheless agonized by the vision of selling their national patrimony to foreigners, especially, it must be acknowledged, traditional enemies. Poles in particular are deeply ambivalent about German investment in their country. It is investment targeted primarily in the former German territories and in enterprises where the German investors can take advantage of Poland's only business resource, cheap labor. The more nationalistic and antagonistic Poles argue that German economic domination threatens to accomplish Hitler's objectives by other means: the subjugation of Eastern Europe to German economic demands and the region's utilization as a source of "slave" labor.

It is this xenophobia and hostility, fueled by economic disadvantage, that threaten to deepen the division of Europe in a way that poses threats to European security and stability.

B. Persistence of Divided Europe Concept:

Regionalism in Europe now has such a long heritage that it will be very difficult to weaken concepts of a divided Europe. Although this problem may be primarily a result of institutions -- those in Western Europe that have long excluded the East -- it is above all now an issue of attitude. It should be the new center of the debate over European identity. The contemporary debate is still too traditional and has not yet come to terms with the concept of a whole Europe. In the past the issue was whether a Frenchman was first of all French or European; today it should be whether Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia belong to the real Europe or not.

Although the answer might seem obvious to many -- dictated by geography -- the full socialization of future unity will be difficult and time consuming. Institutionalization of a united Europe will be very difficult because, aside from CSCE, there is no common institution. The competing institutional framework, one which includes only Western Europe, is far stronger and less likely to adapt to attitudinal change, and actually inhibits that change.

A further irony in this tension between West European integration and the perpetuation of European bifurcation is the institutional response so far of the East Europeans themselves. The Czechoslovaks, among others, have proposed new institutions or

cooperative arrangements with their East European neighbors designed to identify common approaches to common problems, thus serving common interests. On the surface, this approach may seem logical. But those actually involved in these cooperative efforts, e.g. the "troika" of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, have had difficulty identifying the common factors that allegedly should be so obvious. In practice, the steps they have taken, such as opening borders once again and facilitating trade, are parts of normal relations among non-Communist states and perhaps can be served as adequately by bilateral arrangements. The real detriment of such regional arrangements comes when they guide or circumscribe developing relations between the West as a group and the East as a group. Such new regional initiatives may serve to perpetuate both the mentality and structures of a bifurcated Europe.

C. Inaccurate Threat Assessment:

Related to the attitudinal problem of a divided Europe is the West's reluctance to adapt fully to the new nature of the nations in Eastern Europe. Policy makers refer to the "emerging" democracies in the region and discuss in an encouraging and complementary way the processes that are leading those nations from their totalitarian past toward a democratic and capitalist future. In the meantime, there is a persistent implication that those nations in the region and their regimes are not yet stable and not yet quite to be trusted. The West's eagerness to provide

"training" in democratic practices and institutions (rather than more material assistance) is at the same time patronizing and by implication distrustful. All of this leads to a reluctance to accept fully the new nature of these states, and to discard finally the guarded suspicion that continues to guide our cautious response to the revolution.

Aggravating our suspicion about Eastern Europe's future is the linkage we perceive between that future and the Soviet Union. Whereas many policy makers are slow to recognize how Eastern Europe's future will influence developments in the Soviet Union, (as mentioned above) many assume that future Soviet developments will determine the future face of Eastern Europe. This, of course, is the traditional relationship, but it is incorrect to assume that it will continue. Those who point to disturbing developments in the Soviet Union and suggest that they threaten the permanence of the East European revolution are making a mistake. Importantly for this discussion, this assumed linkage serves to inhibit creative solutions to problems of European integration, particularly in areas of security and defense.

The revolution of 1989 was successful because the Soviet Union was forced to choose between re-imposing its will in Eastern Europe in traditional ways or pursuing its own domestic needs. Perhaps the most dramatic redefinition of a nation's security interests in modern times was forced on the Soviet leaders by the primacy and

compelling urgency of their domestic needs. Now, those needs are even greater and re-imposition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe is even less likely, probably impossible.

The continuing debate about Soviet threat assessment and the pressing question of the Soviet Union's strategic intentions unfortunately misguides our perception of Eastern Europe. Among the concrete manifestations of this continuing mistrust, American intelligence organizations continue to treat East European states as high threat posts and their nationals as security risks. American military planners continue to regard the former East-West divide as the front line in Europe's hypothetical future battlefield. There is a distinct bureaucratic inertia in the U.S. Government, and presumably in West European governments as well, that inhibits development of a new attitude and new treatment of East Europeans, and the process of integration.

D. Outdated Strategic and Arms Control Concepts:

Our problems with accurate threat assessment in the new world where intentions are less clear than ever have led to a related failure to respond to the objective changes in the threat equation as defined by capabilities. This in turn leads to institutional preoccupations, particularly by Americans, that inhibit more creative approaches to collective European security. Consequently, the search for a redefinition of NATO, for example, is not

responsive to the colossal changes in the erstwhile opposing alliance, and that rigidity leaves little room for creative engagement of the East Europeans in a dialogue that will define their future security.

The inevitable removal of Soviet troops from the former German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; combined with the removal by those countries of their own forces from the ranks of the West's potential adversaries, means that, in all, more than one million potential enemy troops will have been removed from the West's security equation. This is the true scope of military change in Europe, not the comparatively less dramatic changes mandated by the military equipment arrangements of the CFE treaty. The Soviets' redefinition of their security needs in Europe and the resulting removal of, in effect, a million-man army has challenged the West to respond with a redefinition of its own. The anticipated changes to NATO and a much less significant force draw-down is not an adequate response, clearly non-proportional with the changes in the East. The need for change, the need to adapt more thoroughly, should be seen as an opportunity to reconfigure both defense and security arrangements in order to draw the East European democracies into the protective umbrella.

We have responded on the contrary, while loudly maintaining that the CFE draft treaty, created after protracted and difficult negotiations, has defined the new security environment. Not only

was that treaty overtaken by the political events thundering around the negotiators in the final days of the process, but the resulting document does much to perpetuate the bifurcated Europe. It is a treaty between military blocs concluded at the time when the future of one of those blocs was in doubt. Within the terms of the draft treaty, Europe remains divided along security lines. Even though the East's military alliance has been formally abandoned, the division is perpetuated by an agreement that the West advertises as the fundamental document on which to devise Europe's future security. Conceptually and institutionally, the treaty is counterproductive and harmful to European integration while failing to reflect adequately the new objective conditions in European military relationships.

E. American Domination:

Moving from the controversial to the more controversial, it is necessary to examine the role of the United States in the process of European integration and the definition of Europe's new security structures. America will always contribute mightily to European security, not least because U.S. interests are so inextricably intertwined with European interests. Further, our contribution has been that of a clear leader, the only leader capable of meeting the enormous challenges of interdependent security requirements. In the past, America has assumed leadership in Europe and elsewhere because of both our capabilities and the conviction that our vital

security needs required us to assume European -- and global -- leadership. The linkage between security and leadership was dictated by the global confrontation with the Soviet Union in which only a superpower's resources, applied with forcefulness and purpose, could meet the security threats.

Our leadership position in Europe, unless we willingly relinquish it, leads us to rely on the one European security institution in which we can participate, indeed lead. As long as we insist upon leadership in Europe, our exclusive reliance on NATO as the only acceptable security institution will be maintained. Similarly, our distrust of alternative security arrangements, including the WEU or CSCE or something yet to emerge, will drive our policy. The Europeans, particularly the Germans and French, are now seeking to forge multiple security structures. In their view, multiple, possibly overlapping or even redundant structures, can be mutually reinforcing and complementary. At the same time, some will be able to make room for East European states now or in the future. Many Europeans see this multiplicity as an institutional approach to European integration, while at the same time not critically weakening NATO.

The United States sees it differently. We view multiple relationships as a bigamous marriage; the various other partners do not strengthen the original union, they weaken it. America is suspicious of European reliance on alternative structures because we expect it will weaken their reliance on NATO, and thus on our

leadership. Our attitude -- our insistence on American leadership of European security arrangements -- becomes an obstacle to arrangements that could more easily make room for European integration. It is not NATO itself that is the obstacle; it is our insistence on the exclusivity of NATO.

III. U.S. POLICY RESPONSE

A. Leadership By Proxy:

Beginning in reverse order of the obstacles mentioned in the above section, we should first examine the American attitude toward Europe and the American leadership role. The essential link between U.S. security interests and dominant leadership, valid in the past, is not compelling in the future. The global adversary has been withdrawn at least as someone to be engaged as a regional hostile force. The global strategic threat -- as defined by capabilities -- of course remains and our global strategic response is still valid. Also, particular enemies emerging in particular areas of the world, e.g., the Persian Gulf, may require American leadership to mount a realistic response. The point here, however, is that particular threats can be assessed individually and the U.S. response tailored accordingly based on particular U.S. interests in the region. We should no longer feel compelled to take a position of leadership everywhere in all conflicts because they are all part of the great Global Confrontation with the Soviet

Union.

The former linkage between American security interests and American leadership should also be reassessed in Europe. This is not an argument for American withdrawal or some new form of isolationism. On the contrary, it is an argument for a more enlightened form of engagement in which we can recognize first, that regional interests, including security interests, can be addressed more effectively by the regional powers involved, and second, that the "regionalization" of the quest for solution just might be the best way to serve American interests.

European security needs should be addressed primarily by Europeans. While not abandoning Europe or NATO, the United States should acquiesce in a European effort to construct other arrangements that, in their view, could enhance both security and European integration. At the same time, full U.S. engagement in the process should encourage the Europeans to recognize the pressing need for integration of Eastern Europe into these new structures. We should stop viewing the WEU as a European caucus group undermining NATO transatlantic unity; we should stop viewing the CSCE as a cumbersome mechanism mismatched with real security needs. We should assist and press Europeans to find European solutions while providing consistent assurances that this change in attitude does not constitute an American withdrawal. In these ways, and in those mentioned below, the U.S. could construct a new

style of leadership in which our global prestige and military power would seek to be supportive and encouraging, rather than dominant and forcing. Such a change in attitude would not be generated by modesty or false humility. Rather, it should be seen as a more effective if less direct way of pursuing our self interests; interests which would be served by genuine European integration.

B. A New CFE:

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet maneuvers to resubordinate troops and equipment as "naval infantry" provide both a need and an opportunity to renegotiate the treaty specifically to the advantage of European integration. For the Russians, the process could offer an opportunity to recast the terms of the treaty to reflect the political realities that disadvantage them. For the Americans and the Europeans, a renegotiation would force the Soviets to give up their efforts at cheating and would result in a treaty more acceptable to the ratifying bodies. For the East Europeans, a renegotiation would offer the opportunity to eliminate the erroneous codification of a divided Europe. Most importantly, it would give the West the chance to redefine in security terms just where the East European states are, what threats they must fear, and what assurances they may rely on. Eastern Europe's true security status could perhaps be most clearly articulated by a new CFE treaty. Politically and emotionally, such redefinition would contribute importantly to real

European integration.

C. Accurate Threat Assessment:

Simply preparing for new treaty negotiations in which the East European states would have a new status would force the American policy makers, intelligence bureaucrats, and military planners to adapt to Eastern Europe's new reality. The perceived linkage between possible disruption and dictatorial or military rule in the Soviet Union and threats to East European democracies must be broken. Although future political developments in Eastern Europe, possibly driven by the immense strain of systemic change, may lead to some form of authoritarian alternative, these formerly communist states are firmly and permanently in the Western camp. However we come to assess the future of the Soviet threat, strategic and otherwise, this should not guide or inhibit our efforts to integrate the former satellites fully into Europe.

D. Multiple Linkages to Bridge the Divide:

Once we have fully acknowledged the new nature of the East European states, the United States should encourage and participate in as many creative mechanisms as possible to link East and West. These linkages should include educational, labor, economic, cultural, and importantly military exchanges. There are initiatives even now -- firmly rejected so far -- within the U.S.

Government to begin training East European diplomats and exchange military personnel for training. Such relationships, particularly if they are institutionalized, frequent and continuing, and involve defense and security issues, would help fill the security vacuum in which Eastern Europe now finds itself. They would reinforce the identification with the West which is at the root of European integration.

In relations between or among states, the current urge toward East European regionalism should be quietly discouraged by the West. Bilateral linkages or multilateral arrangements that are not along former Bloc lines would help weaken the persistent perception of a divided Europe. For example, Czechoslovakia's initiative to create the "troika" of three East European states is, for this purpose, less useful than that country's initiative in forming a loose alliance of "the five" (i.e. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia.)

E. Economic Bifurcation - the Toughest Nut to Crack:

Before President Bush returned to Poland in the summer of 1989, just weeks after the Communists had given up power, he had created a veritable cargo cult among the new Polish democrats. These heroic Poles had expected that the U.S. would respond to their successful challenge to Communist rule in the heart of Europe with massive economic assistance. They were very disappointed. In

subsequent months the Poles have seen how meager are American resources available for foreign aid and how more meager is the political will to generate more resources. It has become painfully obvious that the East Europeans will have to bail themselves out of their pressing difficulties without truly significant assistance from the U.S. or Europe. To argue that it should be otherwise -- to argue that the United States should respond to this historic strategic windfall in some more generous way -- is to support an unrealistic and untenable solution (even more so than the renegotiation of the CFE treaty.)

Although an analysis of Eastern Europe's economic problems is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that those problems lead to the economic division of Europe and constitute one of the principal obstacles to European integration. Generally speaking, the problems are two: overwhelming foreign debt, and the need to privatize former state holdings. As an early example of leadership by persuasion, or "leadership by proxy", the United States has been successful in urging the major creditor countries to grant substantial debt forgiveness to East European states, even though the U.S. itself is relatively a minor creditor. Debt forgiveness must remain one of the principal ways in which the West can address the European division on economic grounds. The other is a creative approach to privatization. German efforts to form private and public consortium to purchase East European assets offer creative possible solutions which deserve American

examination, encouragement and possible participation. Multilateral European consortium in particular might serve not only to contribute toward the privatization campaign, but in some ways also bind East European interests with West European interests in mechanisms less threatening than simple purchase for pure profit motives.

The long-term objectives of any West European initiatives to engage in East European restructuring must be more than simple profit. The U.S. should have a role in encouraging the West Europeans to see their long-term advantages in East European economies restructured to permit their eventual integration into the EC and other mechanisms. Although in the new world a Marshall Plan of direct assistance may not be possible, alternative plans of shared interests must surely exist given a sufficiently long-term perspective. The U.S. might be able to lead in providing the "vision thing."

IV. THE SOVIET RESPONSE

At the beginning of this analysis, it was acknowledged that the process of European integration must be accomplished without posing a critical threat to Soviet security interests. After all, the new opportunities in Europe exist largely because the Soviets were driven to redefine their security interests in a manner that made European unification possible. If an abrupt and hostile

challenge to those newly-defined interests were to emerge, the potential for European instability would perhaps be greater than ever. This then is the other half of the integration challenge.

The Soviet Union must be persuaded that new security arrangements that accompany a full integration of Eastern Europe into Europe are designed to stabilize, rather than destabilize, the region. They must be convinced that the new arrangements actually weaken the traditional intra-bloc rivalry and hostility, and that the Soviet Union is no longer the OBJECT of European security structures. All of this means that the Soviet Union will have to be a participant in some structures, e.g., real, concrete, and specific CSCE security structures, while an observer of others, e.g., NATO defense structures. There must be new confidence building mechanisms throughout, including some form of limited engagement with NATO, including but going beyond observance of military exercises.

Two of the principal ways in which Soviet security anxieties could possibly be assuaged are by significant drawdown of European force levels and by the voluntary retreat from U.S. dominance as argued above. The first is almost certainly going to be driven by budgetary requirements in any case and should be viewed as an appropriate response to the more dramatic changes in the East. The second could clear the ground for a multifaceted Europeanized system focused more on security than on defense. That is, the more

hostile-appearing defensive structures, which presume an enemy without, would be only a part of more benign security structures with emphasis on common interests.

CONCLUSION:

The inhibitions to genuine European integration, and the limited means available to remove them, show how difficult it will be to construct a new Europe. In most circles, the current debates are about institutions -- the adaptation of the old and construction of new -- to meet both Europe's defense and security needs. The third challenge, i.e., to define a new European identity encompassing the new East European democracies, remains largely ignored. Yet the difficulties evident in the first two debates actually emerge from a failure to address the third. Institutional adaptation must have a political direction; a comprehensive vision of a new and integrated Europe generated by common interests.

Neither West Europeans nor Americans yet have a comprehensive political strategy for Europe, nor yet a strategy for forging a political concept of a fully integrated Europe. Thus, the military strategy -- in this context, the adaptation of defense and security institutions -- cannot yet be articulated. The institutional transformation of NATO into something more consistent with the new security needs of the new Europe must await this political

direction. As long as Eastern Europe is left in a security vacuum -- or treated again as a cordon sanitaire -- there will be no political vision of an integrated Europe and no political objective guiding the defense and security debates.