Shaping the Future:
A Holistic Approach to Planning

Wayne M. Hall
March 1992
National War College

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
MAR 1992	**N/A**	**-**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Shaping the Future: A Holistic Approach to Planning	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **National Defense University National War College Fort McNair, Washington, DC 20319**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**UU**	**37**	

SHAPING THE FUTURE:
A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO PLANNING

THE QUEST FOR COHERENCY, COMBINATION, AND CONTINUITY

The winds of change blow strong and aberrant, fragmenting what they caress. They shift constantly, shaping our destiny and disturbing our *status quo*. Yet, even with all the apparent chaos that fragmentation creates, nature coalesces the fragments into new wholes. We humans beings, unfortunately, tend to notice the chaotic results of change, not the coalescing effects of nature. With a negative view of change, a specter of chaos-induced mental paralysis haunts us.

Because of the maelstrom of change affecting the world, America finds itself at a propitious moment in history. Revolutionary changes affect the world's political, economic, and security systems. Because of these changes, the opportunity exists to shape the world. Rarely has our country been so delicately balanced on a precipice of choice. Clearly, we must now choose between allowing change to paralyze our thinking, cause us to muddle through, or vigorously attempt to shape the future.

Change causes macro-economic, social, political, and security systems to grow more complex rapidly. Even as people know more about these systems, confusion increases. The world's economic systems, for example, interweave tightly resembling a seamless, constantly interacting web of national and international trade and finance. The sheer magnitude of this tapestry's complexity causes confusion. The complexity in such a system suggests that we should think more about wholes and relationships.

Planning provides the means to cope with complexity and the bewilderment of rapid change. But the question remains: Can our country's leaders and planners overcome the

numbing effects of complexity and the themes rapid change brings and actually shape the world by muddling along?

As members of societal organizations, our past methods of planning arguably resulted in tremendous advances in technology and standards of living. Our planning forte has been short-term, analysis-driven, reactive planning. We haven't done as well in long-term, synthesis-driven, active planning.[1] The complex environment and the demands of change suggest modification of current methods of planning. To cope with complexity and change, plans must seek relationship, relevance, and synergy. Plans must also relate to the future. Since some types of planning have been successful, we need to retain successful methods and combine them with a synthesis-driven, holistic approach to planning. Holistic planning's precepts avoid paralysis and eschews muddling along. Holistic planning provides a path to shape the future.

Holistic planning is nothing new; it approaches reality in a slightly different way than usual. Holistic planning involves combining entities. It uses detailed analysis but goes another step and synthesizes the results of analyses into wholes. To understand holistic planning, leaders and planners first have to appreciate current planning procedures then recognize existing problems -- the first two parts of the paper explore these subjects. Because theory provides the underpinnings of holistic planning, the paper briefly discusses it. The paper then discusses the tenets of holistic planning: coherency, combination, and continuity. Enlightened use of these tenets provides the conditions for holistic planning to succeed. The last portion of the paper provides some concrete ways to develop holistic planners.

CURRENT STATE OF THE ART

Effective planning turns chaos into order. Order and its principal side-effect, stability, provide people a way to cope with a bewilderingly complex environment -- their

real world. To be effective, planning has to relate to the real world. Tightly interwoven, interrelated tapestries of reality make up our world. This relatedness is everywhere -- in nature, domestic and international affairs, and, especially for the purposes of this paper, in military and security matters. Today, for example, the United States' national security relates to domestic politics, global trade and finance, and international politics. No element of the international political system exists in isolation; all relate to each other. A holistic thinker would go so far as to say that the interrelationships of the international political, economic, and security systems closely resembles interrelated patterns of nature. Thus, planning could mirror nature's relatedness and man's constructed environment.

Let's look briefly at what a plan is and what needs improvement in our current methods of planning. A working definition of a plan is, "a method of achieving something, a way of carrying out a design."[2] An expert in corporate planning says planning is, "the design of a desired future and of effective ways of bringing it about."[3] A plan provides a means of orienting the future -- it's a path or design to accomplish goals, objectives, or end-states.

The words 'path' and 'design' suggest thinking; planning can't occur without thought, but it can occur, and often does occur, with substandard thinking. So the issue quickly becomes, what is good thinking? Typically, thinking almost exclusively involves analysis, "a separation or breaking up of a whole into its fundamental elements or component parts."[4] Atypically, thinking involves synthesis, which is, "the combining of often varied and diverse ideas, forces, or factors into one coherent or consistent complex."[5] Because decision-makers and planners usually analyze better than they synthesize, they have trouble pulling together fragments of the future, embedded in the present and past, into a coherent whole.[6] Our national problems with antiquated industrial capital and crumbling infrastructures provide testimonial to this assertion.

Typically, decision-makers and planners seem fascinated with statistics and numbers, with *knowing* but not necessarily *understanding*. They seldom combine the results of analysis with searching for broader meanings, discovering relationships, and achieving coherency. Typically, thinking orients on the short-range. Often needs of the moment, emergencies, and requirements for immediate success or profit influence thinking and planning. Atypically, thinking involves a broader perspective and long-range focus. Typically, thinking flows linearly, uses analogy, and extrapolates from historical trends. Atypically, thinking involves creativity, "...the quality of originality that leads to new ways of seeing and novel ideas. It is a thinking process associated with imagination, insight, invention, innovation, ingenuity, intuition, inspiration, and illumination."[7]

How can plans shape the future? Planners can combine opposites into wholes -- analysis and synthesis, short- and long-range thinking, and linear and creative thinking. Combinations of wholes create a force greater than any separate whole. Combinations like these create synergy, "the action of two or more substances, organs, or organisms to achieve an effect of which each is individually incapable."[8] With the potential power of synergy, planners can shape the future instead of reacting to the ephemeral nature of change. Managerial expert Peter Drucker captures the implication of this thought:

> But tomorrow always arrives. It is always different. And then even the mightiest company is in trouble if it has not worked on the future.... It will neither control nor understand what is happening. Not having dared to take the risk of *making the new happen* [italics mine], it perforce took the much greater risk of being surprised by what did happen.[9]

THE FLAWS OF TRADITIONAL PLANNING

A flaw with current thinking and planning involves reductionism: "a procedure or theory of reducing complex data or phenomena to simple terms."[10] Reductionism, the handmaiden of narrow, analytic thinking, results in isolated analyses. When facts become ends unto themselves, without relationships and relevancy, reductionist thinking occurs.

There's nothing inherently wrong with analytical thinking unless it occurs in isolation and fails to seek meaning and relationship. Analytical thinking finds facts and increases knowledge. But a piece to the puzzle of thought remains missing -- planners need to *combine* the results of analysis into a whole, find meaning and relevance, and use analysis to complement a form of thinking critical to creativity: synthesis.

Two principal reasons make reductionism a dangerous side-effect of analytical thinking. First, reductionist thinking leads to reducing a phenomenon into its simplest state. Simple views though, can lead to simplistic thinking and ineffective planning. Second, reductionist thinking causes planners to concentrate on means to attain ends instead of focusing on the end-state. Reductionist thinking causes the *process* to become the end-state. Dostoevsky explains why man seems to emphasize processes over goals:

> ...man is a frivolous and incongruous creature, and perhaps, like a chess player, loves the process of the game, not the end of it. And who knows...perhaps the only goal on earth to which mankind is striving lies in this incessant process of attaining, in other words, in life itself, and not in the thing to be attained, which must always be expressed as a formula....[11]

A historian says reductionism used by air power enthusiasts in World War II caused,

> ...a pattern of looking at the parts of the problem at the expense of the whole...leading to a concentration on means rather than ends, running parallel with a tendency to confuse destruction with control, and at the same time reducing strategy to a targeting problem....[12]

Reductionist planning typically takes a short-term focus at the expense of long-term effects. Problems with our economy provide an example. Offered solutions yield short-term results at best. Long-term solutions that involve investing in capital machinery, investing in research and development, repairing our infrastructures, and developing education that will make us competitive in the future must dominate. Because political expediency obsesses planning, the long-term effects leaders sacrifice for short-term expediency could reduce competitiveness.

When planning in a reductionist, short-term fashion, three debilitating results occur. First, today's plans have little continuity with future plans. Reductionist, short-term plans don't deal with the process of perpetual change. Change causes turbulence and chaos, which, in turn, cause incoherence. Thus, plans often fail. Rather than develop plans flexible enough to adjust, planners wait, then react to change. They rely on taking advantage of opportunities rather than creating them.

Second, plans fail because of perturbations stemming from variables and surprise. Without synthesizing the results of analysis into wholes, searching for relationships between wholes, and using the energy of change, planners inevitably react to perturbations. Then confusion and paralysis rule, wielding great influence.

Last, reductionist planning is rigid. Over-simplification contributes to rigidity. Over-simplified plans often don't have feedback mechanisms for adjustment because the ends and means appear very simple -- expediency and regimens obscure complex relationships. Japanese military planners in World War II's Burma Theater, for example, provide a good example of inflexibility. Once their forces started enacting a plan, they didn't react well to friction or variables. The original plan often dogmatically ruled even when the situation warranted change.[13]

A reductionist plan often promotes discontinuity, susceptibility to surprise and variables, and rigidity. Initiative, a vital part of any plan, proves difficult to seize and retain under such circumstances. When initiative expires, paralysis evolves as its replacement. Once paralysis sets in, difficulty arises in overcoming its stultifying effects. Instead of moving on a path to the end-state, momentum grinds to a halt and events dominate the action. When reaction dominates, the end-state loses its preeminence. Initiative quickly moves to our opponents. Philosophers as diverse as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu, and operators such as Napoleon and Slim[14] deplore the loss of initiative and

argue for its seizure. Thus, planners must search for a way to seize and retain the initiative; methods of holistic planning provide the way to embrace initiative.

When initiative migrates to the opponent, decision-makers develop a sense of helplessness, even paralysis. The Nazi invasion of France in May, 1940, illustrates this thought. The Germans did the unexpected -- they attacked with heavy armor through the Ardennes, terrain that French planners thought impenetrable. The German speed of advancement, especially when coupled with surprise, caused information overload. Consequently, French command and control slowed and eventually ceased functioning. The French couldn't adapt to the variables and rapid succession of surprises. Their planning, decision-making, and execution of operations stopped functioning. The French engaged in reductionism by failing to see battlefield linkages, failing to understand the whole composed of the moral and physical domains of war, failing to anticipate the opponent's attempts to seize the initiative through surprise, and oversimplifying an extraordinarily complex situation.

Current methods of planning often result in a curious lack of continuity with the future, as if plans were ends in themselves instead of connecting with an evolving future. Developing sequels, or follow-on activities to end-states, could solve this problem. But when a plan remains a separate entity, without relationship with other things, plans, or futures, planning sequels becomes difficult, even for the masters of warfare. Napoleon, for instance, occasionally had trouble planning sequels, concentrating instead on enacting a plan. He lost some opportunities because he didn't plan for what he might do after he defeated his enemies.[15]

One problem with not achieving continuity with the future is that discontinuous plans suggest definite ends in a world where ends aren't final. After accomplishing an end-state in a discontinuous plan, stasis sets in, and planners have to start the planning

process anew. When definiteness dominates our thinking, we lose opportunities to shape the future by using the process of change.

The last problem with current planning involves coherence. Coherence is "an orderly or logical relation of parts that affords comprehension or recognition."[16] Analytic, reductionist thinking neither searches for relation of parts nor focuses on combining thoughts or entities into wholes. Synthesis does; yet it too can be intellectually empty without the knowledge gained through analysis. Thus, planners can achieve coherency only through combining analysis and synthesis.

Germany's operation Barbarossa serves as an example of strategic incoherence. One reason Hitler failed in his attack into the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was that he didn't have a coherent strategic vision. As supreme strategist, he oscillated his strategic focus between military, economic, and political end-states, thereby fragmenting his means to achieve desired ends. Hitler's best strategic military thinker, Erich von Manstein, explains the effect of strategic incoherence from his perspective as a corps commander attacking the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941,

> We still failed to find any real satisfaction in these achievements [the stupendous opening Nazi victories in the early days of Barbarossa], yet, for no one was clear any longer what the actual aim of our strategy was or what higher purpose all these battles were supposed to serve.[17]

Fortunately for the world, Hitler's inability to form a good strategic vision, failure to create effective combinations of wholes, and tendency to engage in over-simplified, reductionist thinking, helped cause his failure.

THEORY: FOUNDATIONS OF HOLISTIC PLANNING

There is a natural order and unity in all things.[18] Take, for instance, a simple hologram. If a scientist illuminates part of a hologram, it represents the whole from which it emanates. The part, however, isn't as clear or representative of the whole as the whole itself.[19] One author explains the relationship between holograms, nature, and human

physiology as, "It [hologram] is nature's way of storing information...our brains store information in holographic form."[20] Thus, the hologram helps us comprehend unity, how to study pieces of wholes to understand a larger whole, and how to combine pieces of a whole in ascending levels of clarity and coherence in relationship to a larger whole.

The order and unity of nature serve as underpinnings of holistic planning. A shift to the theoretical provides us a glimpse into the unity and interworkings of nature,

> In the heaven of Indra, there is said to be a network of pearls, so arranged that if you look at one you see all the others reflected in it. In the same way each object in the world is not merely itself but involves every other object and in fact is everything else....[21]

The ordinary cobweb also serves as a useful example of unity and relationship in nature. We can call a cobweb's constituent parts cells; cells connect and relate to each other physically and abstractly. Each cell contributes to the purpose of the whole web. If a cell breaks, the cobweb loses its coherence and strength. If cells remain combined, the cobweb has strength -- much more together than a single cell or the simple sum of cells. This metaphor suggests the importance of discovering links, or relationships, between wholes in holistic planning.

Links connecting wholes, oddly enough, form an interacting whole of strengths and vulnerabilities. Links identify relationships between wholes and offer insights into combination, making them a critical component of any holistic plan. On the other hand, opponents can attack our carefully crafted wholes by attacking links. Links identify conduits for the effects of surprise, variables, or friction (chance events). Since nature consists of webs of relationships, linkages, and patterns such as cobwebs, planning should emulate nature and use its natural coherency, and strength.

Simple and complex patterns of interrelated wholes make up the universe. We can reduce wholes until we come to what the philosopher Leibniz calls the monad, or simple substance without parts. In a theoretical sense though, even monads relate to other monads bound by the bonds of physical reality and conceptual meaning.[22] We can combine simple

substances with other substances to form ascending aggregates of wholes.[23] Nature itself is a hierarchical series of interrelated wholes we can view as webs of illusion and reality.

What are wholes? Wholes are constructs -- mental and physical. Wholes represent things (physical) and ideas (mental). Wholes compose smaller wholes and comprise larger wholes. Wholes nest within each other and unfold, much the way paper dolls do, each separate yet connected, when we cut them out of a newspaper for our children. Wholes aren't simple, discrete entities; they always either relate to or connect with other entities. Sometimes these connections or relationships are hard to find, but they exist. Wholes make up systems of wholes that transcend the mere sum of wholes. They enable us to understand the tremendously complex and relational series of entities of our world.

The universe continually actuates and changes. This process occurs through the interaction of two opposites -- fragmentation and coalescence. Nature continuously changes through fragmentation. Fragmentation causes chaos, which we perceive to be dysfunctional. But within chaos wisdom exists as potential. Chaos causes dissonance, which aids synthesizing fragments into meaning. Meaning leads to wisdom.

Uncomfortable with confusion and dissonance, a human mind strives to put bits and pieces of information into wholes and to combine those wholes with other wholes. We humans attempt to make sense out of chaos by searching for patterns and developing understandable combinations. We consciously and subconsciously strive to coalesce fragmented pieces into wholes in a never-ending cycle.

The Chinese call this process the *interaction of opposites*. They theorize that everything has contradiction within it -- the seeds of its opposite. Because of continuous change interaction creates, contradictions become apparent, enabling the opposite to rise to preeminence. Once an opposite becomes preeminent, its opposite ascends. This is the wonderful dance of energy that nature uses to ensure that living things never stagnate -- the interplay of yin (light, male, known, logical) and yang (dark, female, unknown,

intuitive). Sun Tzu brought the interaction of opposites to the art of war as the interaction between the normal and extraordinary forces,

> In battle there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are mutually reproductive, their interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings.[24]

Planners create shapes by combining wholes, synthesizing pieces of wholes into aggregates, and causing the shapes to work together to reach the end-state. The Chinese believe that discernable shapes make up the flow and change inherent in nature.[25] In our western way of thinking, planners have to learn to understand these shapes by searching for their existence or creating them.

Another theorist of war, Clausewitz, provides additional insight into holistic planning and combining wholes with larger wholes. Clausewitz thought the battlefield forms a whole composed of numerous engagements.[26] Closely related to his notion of battlefield wholes, Clausewitz suggested that defense and offense form a whole. As such, Clausewitz postulated that the defense was the stronger form of war though it had a negative aim. But the defense relates to the offense. The offense and the defense interact in the battlefield whole. While a defender, with the negative force, gains strength through recoiling like a spring and conserving energy, the attacker, with the positive force, loses strength through expending resources while attacking.

Clausewitz's trinity of war -- hatred and passion, rationality, and chance and creativity -- forms an abstract whole of war, each part interdependent with the others. Clausewitz postulates that each aspect of the trinity must balance with other aspects, otherwise war can end differently from what it was intended.[27] If balance doesn't occur, the three elements can become chaotically asymmetrical, with one aspect dominating either or both of the others. The predominance of military means over political ends in World War I shows how chaos reigns when parts of the trinity tilt toward imbalance. The trinity of war provides clues about wholes compose of tangibles and intangibles. The trinity also

provides insight into what planners need to understand, how wholes relate to each other, and how wholes should combine to achieve maximum power and coherence.

COHERENCY

Coherency provides meaning and harmony among interacting parts of a plan. Coherency begins with vision, a leader's or planner's mental sketch of an end-state. Intent, which flows from the vision, defines and frames the end-state. From vision, intent, and criteria for the plan's success, combinations evolve for shaping the future. Thus, a lucid and well-thought through vision is the *sine qua non* of holistic planning,

> It is by means of strategic vision that the statesman shapes and controls projected change instead of simply reacting to the forces and trends that swirl without direction into the future. He accomplishes this by dint of imagination and creativity and by balancing idealism with realism.[28]

Each plan's end-state links with a future end-state -- a whole interacting with a larger whole. Vision sketches an image of the desired end-state, assisting the planner's mind in seeing possible combinations. To be coherent, a vision extends from the present to the future. In an abstract way, the planner always peers beyond the final curtain of the end-state to form follow-on activities or end-states. These end-states must relate to other end-states and shape conditions for coherency.

Holistic planners understand that vision enables parts to come together at the right time and right place to achieve desired effects. Effects influence conditions and eventually the end-state. Understanding, which emanates centrifugally from the creator of the vision, cements a plan's elements. In the American Civil War, General Grant understood better than any other general how actions in different theaters should complement each other. We can more fully understand Grant's strategic vision and its relation to coherency and the theory of wholes with help from historian James McPherson,

> Perhaps Grant's greatest qualities as a commander were his wide strategic vision and his fixity of purpose....Grant's perspective embraced

> the whole scope of the twin theaters of war, and he was never deflected by purely geographical objectives from his main purpose of destroying the Confederate armies.[29]

Coherency helps design conditions for achieving the desired end-state. To Clausewitz the battle was the essential element of war, but his thoughts about structuring conditions for a successful battle add a note of applicability to coherency,

> ...there is then no factor in war that rivals the battle in importance; and the greatest strategic skill will be displaced in *creating the right conditions* [italics mine] for it, choosing the right place, time and line of advance, and making the fullest use of its results.[30]

Coherent conditions take advantage of the moral and physical domains of planning. Deception, for example, shapes images in the minds of opponents; it provides a framework for surprise, and it helps keep the enemy unbalanced, fearing treachery. Planners create physical conditions too -- marshalling, combining, and putting resources in place. Planners must anticipate an opponent's capabilities to inflict harm or to stop the plan.

COMBINATION

Holistic plans use combinations to produce effects, shape conditions, and reach the end-state. Combining parts or wholes of resources constitutes art in holistic planning, developing a collage of combinations the spark of creativity brings to life. The collage acts out its life, full of sound and fury, on the stage of strife. Sir William Slim, a World War II high-level British commander, had some thoughts about combinations,

> ...a painter's effect and style do not depend on how many tubes of colors he has, the number of his brushes, or the size of his canvas, but on how he blends his colours and handles his brushes against the canvas.[31]

But he also strongly argued for the absolute importance of timing, without which even the greatest combinations and synthesis of combinations fail.[32]

To combine effectively, we must first fragment existing wholes, ours and the enemy's. We have to know and understand the highly interactive strengths, weaknesses,

and characteristics of both sides in a competition. We can then combine the fragments into aggregates that help us reach our envisioned end-state or that provide a comprehensive understanding of interlocking wholes stretching into the future. We also can imagine the steps we must take to reach the initial end-state and its subsequent relationship with the future. Clausewitz helps us understand the concept of combination:

> The strategist must...define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.[33]

An example of a macro end-state could be a drug-free America. A drug-free America involves interacting economic, social, political, and psychological wholes. A holistic planner would fragment these wholes to search for relationships, knowledge, and understanding. The planner would then synthesize knowledge, understanding, and obvious and disparate relationships into combinations of wholes. This combination would give insight into the composition of the end-state and suggest strategies for achieving it.

Holistic planners also assess the means to accomplish the desired end-state and search for wholes or combinations. They analyze each tool, be it diplomatic, political, social, economic, psychological, or military to know, understand, and search for more relationships. Planners do the same for the opposition that inhibits our movement toward the end-state. Following this analysis, they combine parts or wholes of each tool, and sequence them to achieve desired effects. Planners realize that environmental, political, physical, and intellectual constraints have definite influence on choices of combinations, aggregates, and sequencing. Accordingly, knowing the wholes that comprise the end-state and the means we select to reach the end-state merges with a need of equal importance. Planners have to synthesize knowledge into meaning, relationship, and relevancy. Analysis and synthesis thus form an interactive whole.[34] Through this whole, planners form

combinations of resources capable of structuring conditions and creating effects conducive to the desired end-state.

What are some examples of successful combinations? The Marshall Plan immediately comes to mind. To combat an expansionist communism, the Marshall Plan combined diplomatic, economic, military, and social tools. At times, planners and policy makers used portions of each of these tools, or smaller wholes, to form new wholes. Through combination, military, economic, and political support formed a whole far more powerful than any single resource.

The theory of containment also illustrates combination in holistic planning. Containment was the basis for our post-World War II foreign policy to thwart Soviet expansionist tendencies. Containment espoused combining resources to stop the Soviet expansion; national leaders enacted those combinations, but strategic vision, perseverance and will, and a long-term perspective held the combinations together.

The father of containment, George Kennan, had an extraordinary way of thinking, a strategic vision, "...that knack for seeing relationships between objectives and capabilities, aspirations and interests, long-term and short-term priorities."[35] Kennan's theory of containment involved combinations of political, military, economic, and psychological wholes. The policy postulated that combining tools of diplomacy or resources would, over the long-term, persuade the Soviets to be less aggressive and to join the world as a peaceful nation. Using combinations of resources to satisfy a long-term end-state (the containment of Soviet expansionism) allowed the United States to use its strengths to act on Soviet weaknesses and to shore up its own weaknesses.

CONTINUITY

Plans have no end; they're only parts of larger wholes -- parts of the future. Because plans aren't ends in themselves, the planner's job never finishes, though planners

feel compelled to seek closure. Planners create sequels through the planning process. The underlying premise, *a priori*, is that change continues into infinity.

Continuity couples thoughts and actions and links them with future thoughts and actions. With continuity, comes a continuous flow of energy and motion. Continuity relates to momentum, which relates to initiative.

Continuity links our actions with the future. Continuity also couples activities and wholes working together within the enactment of a plan. Planners aggressively seek continuity to exploit relationships between wholes, combine wholes, develop relationships (connections) between wholes, and to know how and when to sequence aggregates. End-states relate to future end-states. Long-term effects of a plan, in reality, build bridges to follow-on plans, bridges to the future. Thus, while working toward something that appears permanent, holistic planners recognize the temporary nature of any end-state.

While process toward an end-state occurs, holistic planners create sequels based on feedback from enacting the current plan, new leadership desires, and information about effects. As the new plan unfolds, planners again strive to build coherency through strategic vision. To this end, they create conditions nurturing the sought-after end-state, maintaining momentum, developing combinations that make the best use of resources, and searching for combinations that create synergy. As a plan unfolds, planners adjust to changes in the environment and think about sequels.

Flexibility closely relates to continuity. At the simplest level of abstraction, planners can anticipate how to reach an end-state in many ways. An end-state resembles a floating cube -- the sides of the cube show part of the same whole, but when rotated, its sides present slightly different views. Planners, therefore, seek variety in combinations so that movement toward the end-state doesn't stop because of either an incomplete view or an impediment to one's viewing.

When attempting to maintain continuity, the end-state can't be sacrosanct. If situational variables warrant, the end-state should change. When a force initiates violence against an opponent, for example, unexpected effects often cause unexpected outcomes.[36] These outcomes provide opportunists with ways to adjust the end-state or reevaluate goals. Typically, outcomes lack rigidity. Too many variables and too much friction exist to allow a plan to proceed perfectly. Furthermore, in every plan an opponent will try to stop us. When faced with an unpredictable opponent, political variables, and normal friction, either surprise or obstacles will surface. If planners anticipated alternatives, or branches, that allow progress toward the end-state despite unforseen events and have planned to adjust the end-state, the plan is adaptive and effective. If planners haven't anticipated surprise or impediments to motion, the plan is reactive and ineffective. Military theorist Liddell Hart succinctly captures the need for flexibility by stating,

> In any problem where an opposing force exists, and cannot be regulated, one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. Adaptability is the law which governs survival in war....[37]

A holistic planner also has to think about linkages within a plan's framework. The planner has to create combinations of wholes, aggregates of partial wholes, their linkages, their activation, and their sequencing to promote continuity of movement toward the end-state and subsequent end-states. We can use war planning to explain this continuity of linkages,

> If we do not learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements each leading to the next, but instead succumb to the idea that the capture of certain geographical points or the seizure of undefended provinces are of *value in themselves* [italics mine], we are liable to regard them as windfall profits.... By looking on each engagement as a part of a series, at least insofar as events are predictable, the commander is always on the high road to his goal.[38]

Good combinations promote continuity. Combinations provide the power to create effects and shape conditions for continuous movement toward our desired end. But the

holistic planner must harmonize these combinations and link them with other combinations in time and space to maximize effects on continuity. These activities take place at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.[39] These levels of war link to form powerful relationships, the only differences involving resources to create combinations, temporal arrangements, and scope or breadth of activities. Tactical activities nest within operational activities, which nest within strategic activities. Thus, our quest for continuity starts at the tactical level and proceeds through the operational and strategic levels of war.

In summary, as a critical aspect of holistic planning, continuity enables a force to gain and retain the initiative, achieve momentum, respond positively to change, and most importantly, to maintain momentum. To this end General Grant,

> ...developed a highly uncommon ability to rise above the fortunes of a single battle and to master the flow of a long series of events, almost to the point of making any outcome of a single battle, victory, draw, or even defeat, serve his eventual purpose equally well.[40]

A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF HOLISTIC PLANNING

History could judge the Gulf War of 1991 to be such an aberration that it presents few planning lessons. Pundits will argue that coalition forces weren't faced with the constraint of time, a hostile host nation from which to stage forces, a worthy foe, and neither significant variable influence nor friction. Yet, even if historians judge the Gulf War to be an aberration, the war serves to illustrate holistic planning because planners, at all levels, developed and used well two of three tenets of holistic planning -- coherency and combination. The third tenet, continuity, proved inadequate. If the Gulf War was an aberration, its successful planning provides a standard to help people learn to plan holistically. If the Gulf War was the way we typically do things during a major crisis, the war should serve as a planning model for all societal planners to emulate.

Gulf War leaders had a clear vision of the end-state. This vision provided a remarkable continuity that influenced use of all instruments of diplomacy, including use of violence. In the realm of violence, coherency permeated the entire fighting force, even though the forces were different in terms of function and nationality. Vision, as leaders articulated in their concepts of operation, enabled planners, using wholes in the system of wholes, to focus and constrain violence, limit objectives, develop proper combinations, and sequence violence.

Coherency enabled planners to synthesize parts of wholes and entire wholes thereby creating synergy. Using complementary ground, air, and naval forces in the last stages of the war exemplifies the synergistic effects coherency first created. Coherency enables parts of the whole to come together at the right time and place, and helps leaders create effects for developing conditions to accomplish the end-state. For instance, air power created conditions for success of ground forces, and ground forces created conditions for success of air power by providing protection for air bases. In turn, coalition ground forces rapidly advanced, with support from air power thereby creating conditions for a rapid withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the Iraqi capitulation. Coherency enabled air and ground forces to form a symbiotic relationship. From this relationship, a whole formed, creating a tremendous synergy.

Gulf War planners at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war effectively used combinations. Shortly after Saddam Hussein's forces subjugated Kuwait, the United States started combining economic, political, and military resources to liberate Kuwait and protect the world's access to oil. Generally, world leaders opposed Saddam's aggression through unified efforts to impose an embargo on Iraq; they issued the strongest political and diplomatic protests and threats. Moreover, they enacted stiff economic sanctions. Through the United Nations, President Bush dispatched elements of the U.S. armed forces. Thus, even in the earliest stages of the crisis, strategic planners used and sequenced

combinations of political, economic, and military activities to reach the end-states: expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait and continued access to oil.

When President Bush dispatched U.S. forces to deter further aggression, he didn't dispatch a single service. Instead, joint planners looked at available resources and developed combinations of Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy, and started sequencing these combinations to the Persian Gulf. Planners also formed combinations of logistics, intelligence, air defense, medical, communications, and fighting forces and sequenced them to the Persian Gulf. Planners strived to maintain symmetry, the quintessential aspect of combination, between fighting forces and the combat support they needed.

While Gulf War leaders effectively planned for continuity at the tactical and operational levels of war, they didn't plan adequately for continuity between the operational and strategic levels of war. For the purposes of continuity, as ground and air forces prepared to attack Saddam Hussein's army in Kuwait, macro-level planners should have been planning political and economic sequels to follow the military instrument. In fact, planning for conditions of peace should have occurred before combatants fired the first shots. Because of uncertainty of outcomes in war planners must recommend and decision-makers modify our political objectives and constraints on violence. Otherwise they will always have trouble maintaining continuity with a rapidly changing future.

In execution, swift military successes set the stage for coalition forces to change the desired political end-state and incorporate Saddam's abdication. Coalition forces annihilated Iraq's Kuwait Theater of Operations totally and quickly. Since war is, as Clausewitz postulates, "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," coalition leaders had the leverage to force Saddam to abdicate. For example, coalition forces occupied his territory, destroyed his means to maintain power, and controlled Iraq's economy. Clear communication, threatening increased violence, followed by demonstrations of commitment would have forced Saddam to comply. But because

coalition objectives were inflexible, the objectives didn't change with changes in the situation. Continuity thus broke between the operational levels of war and the future.

ENLARGING DIMENSIONS OF MINDS: SHAPING THE FUTURE

What can we, as leaders and potential planners, do to enlarge the dimensions of our minds and learn analysis and synthesis to plan holistically? We must learn, in a philosophical sense, several things. First, change can help us shape the future. Second, when change becomes a positive instead of a negative force, its exploitation comes naturally. Change should cause neither paralysis nor muddling. Change can help us adapt to the environment and accomplish goals. The process of change provides great energy to fuel goal accomplishment. Third, as human beings, we need to change our *weltanschauung*. This change will be dramatic but as physicist David Bohm explains,

> ...man's general way of thinking of the totality...is crucial for overall order of the human mind itself. If he thinks of the totality as constituted of independent fragments then that is how his mind will tend to operate, but if he can include everything coherently and harmoniously in an overall whole that is undivided, unbroken...then his mind will tend to move in a similar way, and from this will flow an orderly action within the whole.[41]

As members of organizations, we'll always be involved with planning. Thus we have to adjust our habitual way of thinking. Instead of concentrating only on analysis, analysis and synthesis must merge to create a new, higher order of thought. We also have to think about opposites, wholes, and end-states from our perspective and from that of an opponent. Thinking about opposites will always be difficult; most people don't normally think dialectically. Yet, through dialectic thinking, we can attain the type of creativity we need to use holistic planning.[42]

In our organizations, inter-disciplinary groups could help holistic planning. Each member of the group would have a particular functional expertise; however, each would work toward accomplishing a planning goal that transcends either personal goals or the

goals of their parent organization. Having senior leadership appoint a synthesizer responsible for developing the plan highlights a critical aspect of this process. Synthesizers would search for relationships, identify linkages, and pull together fragments into wholes. To reach the end-state, the synthesizer would encourage group members to engage in higher-level thinking by searching for coherency, combinations, and continuity. The synthesizer would foster integration by requiring planners to participate in process reviews and would ask planners questions to promote synthesis. The synthesizer would help find meaning, relevancy, and short- and long-term effects in planner's intellectual energy.

In government and industry training programs for senior leaders, instructors shouldn't teach method, procedure, or fact without helping students learn relevancy and relationships to other methods, procedures, or facts. Instructors must continuously ask students: So what? Why? What does it mean? How does it relate to other things? How can we combine things to create synergy? Examinations, presentations, and papers can't be simple regurgitation of facts -- students must relate facts to other things, display synthesis, and create, evaluate, adjust, and criticize combinations.

Whether in government or industry, history and military theory can help leaders learn to plan. History and theory provide a way to examine and gain perspective of critical elements of holistic planning, e.g., strategic vision, coherency, definition of end-states, combinations of wholes, and continuity.

Planning sessions should promote thinking about holistic planning. Leaders should confront planners and challenge them to rise above analysis and reductionism, think at high levels, and search for combinations, relevancy, and meaning. They should subtly promote synthesis, the key thinking skill in holistic planning, by searching for coherency and closure after each planning session. When faced with such challenges, planners will learn to synthesize.

Throughout government and industry, planners need formal courses in high-level planning where they have to deal with a volatile future and work with complicated resources and end-states that appear unrelated. Planners should engage in a level of thought in which they deal with long-term effects, and social, economic, political, and military instruments of power to affect change and reach end-states. Instructors should require planners to combine parts of instruments of statecraft and synthesize facts analysis produces into coherent, linked wholes. Of particular importance, planners should think through relationships combining economic, political, social, and military resources.

After developing holistic plans, corporate and government student planners should design ways to defeat their plans, concentrating on relationships and links between wholes, and destroying coherence. Then, from the results of this conceptual assault, the student planner should design alternative end-states, branches and sequels, and conditions for peace. Planners also should show proficiency in seeking and designing ways to exploit patterns and shapes through whole fragmentation and aggregate development.

We need to find creative thinkers and involve them in developing holistic plans to shape the future. Creative people seem to enjoy developing new ideas, seeking relationships, and searching for unorthodox solutions. I don't, however, advocate complete reliance on creative thinkers. Instead, we need to combine the mental capabilities of creative thinkers with those of analytic, pragmatic thinkers to produce a new whole. In this whole, opposites would interact to produce fresh, creative ideas tempered by realism.

Our most treasured asset, mental capability, also has its negative side. The negative side can lead to seeing things in isolation, to being solipsistic, to succumbing to passivity, to sublimating positive will to negative fatalism, and to adhering slavishly to the status quo. Simply put, the negative side of our minds contests with the positive side for dominance. If the negative side dominates, people will be susceptible to viewing change negatively. If the positive side dominates, people will be susceptible to excessive optimism

about the opportunities change provides. Taking the argument further, on one hand, our minds need the balance the negative side provides. On the other hand, the negative side shouldn't dominate the whole of our mental capability. The negative must interact with the positive to create a delicate equilibrium. Reducing the contest to its simplest state, failure to balance and exploit the wholeness of our minds means that change could cause reactive behavior, a philosophy of the righteousness of muddling along, or the deadly stultifying effects of mental paralysis.

Through these subtle yet real interactions of opposites -- the negative and positive sides of our minds -- a new synthesis can emerge. A planner's greatest challenge remains controlling the mind's negative side and enabling the positive side to spring forth. This extraordinary interaction of opposites provides the brilliant ideas needed for creation and the pragmatism for these ideas to survive.

NOTES

[1] Paul Bracken, Strategic Planning for National Security: Lessons from Business Experience (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1990) 4-5.

[2] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (Springfield: G&C Merrian Company, Publishers, 1968) 1729.

[3] Russell L. Ackoff, A Concept of Corporate Planning (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970) 1.

[4] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 77.

[5] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2321.

[6] Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (London: William Collins, 1980) 456.

[7] Jane Henry, Creative Management, ed. Jane Henry (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) 3.

[8] Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984) 1174.

[9] Peter F. Drucker, Managing for Results (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964) 191.

[10] Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1905.

[11] Fyodor Dostoevsky, "Notes From Underground," Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975) 77.

[12] David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 635.

[13] William Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London England: Cassell and Company LTD, 1956) 311, 537.

[14] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 600, 601, 625. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) 65, 69, 89, 91. David G. Chandler, The Military Maxims of Napoleon (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987) 61-62. Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, trans. Captain W.P. Craighill (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1862) 167-169. Slim 292.

[15] Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Great Captains (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1968) 192.

[16] Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 279.

[17] Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982) 202.

[18] David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) 172.

[19] Fritjof Capra, The Tao of Physics (New York: Bantam Books, 1975) 310.

[20] Itzhak Bentov, Stalking The Wild Pendulum (New York: Bantam Books, 1977) 24.

[21] C. Eliot, Japanese Buddhism (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969) 109-110.

[22] Gottfried Leibniz, "Monadology," Classics in Western Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahns (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, Inc., 1977) 60.

[23] Leibniz 609.

[24] Sun Tzu 92.

[25] Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters (New York: Bantam Books, 1979) 95.

[26] Clausewitz 177.

[27] Clausewitz 89.

[28] David Jablonsky, "Strategic Vision and Presidential Authority in the Post-Cold War Era," Parameters XXI, No.4(1991): 3.

[29] James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 722.

[30] Clausewitz 261.

[31] Slim 535.

[32] Slim 294.

[33] Clausewitz 177.

[34] William James, Psychology, ed. G. Allport (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961) 120.

[35] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 27.

[36] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) 75.

[37] B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967) 343.

[38] Clausewitz 182.

[39] The Army's field manual, FM 100-5 Operations, May 1986, discusses the levels of war and their relationships. Each level relates to the other and is a microcosm of its higher order. Each level of war comprises a whole that is composed of smaller wholes. Interestingly though, large wholes enfold smaller wholes. For example, the strategic level of war enfolds the operational level and the operational level enfolds the tactical level. Similar to the hologram, the tactical level forms a part of the operational level as the operational level forms a part of the strategic level of war. Using these relationships, we can expand Clausewitz's notion that only engagements make up the whole of the battlefield. Instead engagements, battles, and campaigns link and constitute the whole of the battlefield. Additionally, military forces fight engagements at the tactical level, and battles, major military operations, and campaigns, at the operational level of war. National strategy, national military strategy, and theater of war strategy flow from the strategic level of war.

[40] Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) 139.

[41] Bohm xi.

[42] Albert Hofstadter, "On The Dialectical Phenomenology of Creativity," ed. Stanley Rosner and Lawrence E. Abt, Essays in Creativity (Croton-On-Hudson: North River Press, Inc. 1974). Hofstadter writes on page 116 in this superb article about creativity, "The essence of dialectical thinking is to find in each case what are the oppositions, conflicts, contrasts, contradictions, the othernesses, estrangements, alienations, that are possible in the context and to find the notion that unifies them by incorporating and using rather than destroying their tension, a notion that brings them together to belong with one another in a mutual ownness, so that for the first time they can attain to a truth of being that is open to them."

HOW SADDAM COULD HAVE SUCCEEDED IN KUWAIT:

Lessons From Mao Tse-Tung

David E. Servinsky, Ph.D.
NWC
November 1991

How Saddam Could Have Succeeded in Kuwait: Lessons From Mao Tse-Tung

This is an essay in alternatives. It ponders the question, "What could Iraq have done differently to change the outcome of the Persian Gulf War from devastating defeat to strategic victory?" I propose the answer is found in the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung. Interestingly, Mao himself preferred to analyze this sort of question. He devoted little time to analysis of successes in war. He found the study of failures more rewarding. In that regard, Mao might have drawn the same conclusions as General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: Saddam Hussein is neither a military strategist nor a proficient tactician.

Saddam's Strategy. Saddam's political objective was the annexation of Kuwait. His military strategy was to attack Kuwait with a decisive military force and win a quick military victory. It proved to be a tactical success. In the final analysis, it was a strategic failure. His failure to look beyond immediate victory over Kuwait and to understand fully how his actions would be interpreted by the world community ultimately resulted in disaster. His blatant disregard for international law and total miscalculation of U.S. and world resolve ultimately denied him control of Kuwait. His blundering lessened his relative position as the dominant power in the Middle East and nearly knocked him from power. From Mao's perspective, what are the lessons to be learned?

Lesson 1: "Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning." Mao teaches that above all a Commander must be **flexible**. In the face of overwhelming military superiority by the U.S. and Coalition Forces, Saddam failed to alter his plan.

The nature of war is ceaseless change; operations require continuous review and readjustment. Mao writes:

> The process of knowing the situation goes on not only before but also after the formulation of a military plan. The carrying out of a plan, from its very beginning to the conclusion of an operation, is another process of knowing the situation....There is need to examine anew whether the plan mapped out in the earlier process corresponds with the actualities. If the plan does not correspond...we must, according to fresh knowledge, form new judgments and make new decisions....There are partial modifications in almost every operation, and sometimes even a complete change. A hothead who does not know how to change his plan, or is unwilling to change it but acts blindly, will inevitably run his head against a brick wall.[1]

Clearly, Saddam's strategy ran into a brick wall! His direct approach to invade and capture Kuwait was doomed. It lacked sophistication and foresight. It disregarded history. Saddam miscalculated, believing that his grounds for invading Kuwait would withstand world-wide scrutiny. Iraq has always laid claim to Kuwait. In 1961, Iraq made a political move in the international arena, contending that before British intervention, Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman Empire under Iraqi suzerainty. Though no formal agreement was reached between Iraq and Kuwait, the United Nations recognized Kuwait's sovereignty and rejected Iraq's claim. Nevertheless, he didn't anticipate that his ultimate enemy would be the U.N., the U.S. and a multi-national coalition. He fought a battle he could not win.[2]

Lesson 2: "On Protracted War". What strategy could gain Saddam control of Kuwait yet avoid a direct confrontation with superior

---

[1] Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, pp. 185-186.

[2] Mao's Red Army was teased for its proficiency in running away. Perhaps it's the only lesson Saddam learned from Mao!

forces? Let's examine that question as Mao might have.

Mao was strongly influenced by Sun Tzu's teachings. He wrote:

> We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military expert of ancient China, 'Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.'[3]

I believe that Mao would recognize several enemies. He'd call the Kuwaiti government his enemy since it "occupied" Iraqi land, similar to Japan occupying China. The Kuwaiti government is an enemy Iraq could defeat. However, the "other enemies" -- the nations that back the colonially established Kuwaiti government -- would defeat Iraq if they joined in the fight. The question then is: How could Saddam fight Kuwait and avoid uniting the enemy coalition force that eventually defeated him?

Mao, in my opinion, would have suggested a significantly more sophisticated strategy than the one Saddam employed. According to Mao, man emerges as the decisive factor in war. Weapons are important but not decisive. **It is man's directing intelligence which counts most.** Mao says, "The wise general is circumspect; he prefers to succeed by strategy."

I believe Mao would have designed a workable "microwave" version of a protracted war for Saddam. (He'd have known Saddam to be impatient and would not wait for all three stages of protracted war to play out.) Therefore, Mao might have recommended instigating a revolution and "directing" a protracted war within Kuwait with the objective of overthrowing the government and replacing it with a government that was supportive (a puppet) of Iraq.

---

[3] Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, p. 187.

In Mao's scenario, Iraq could use the same political rules used in East-West intervention in the Third World during the Cold War. He'd recommend sophisticated "legalistic" tactics such as providing "training forces verses combat forces" to aid Kuwaiti insurgents. He'd provide training bases, equipment, logistics, refuge and money in support of a Kuwaiti insurgency. To start, Mao would need a basis from which to initiate a revolutionary effort.

Conditions to Exploit: Mao understood power. He would have recognized several critical elements of latent power that exist in Kuwait. These are the conditions conducive to a successful revolution: 1) people, 2) government, and 3) geography.

The People of Kuwait are primarily Arab in origin, but only 40% are indigenous. Many Arabs from nearby states have taken up residency in Kuwait, especially since oil production brought prosperity in the late 1940s. Expatriates, mostly fellow Arabs, are afforded certain rights, but are never awarded citizenship. They don't have "cradle to grave" rights of the Kuwaitis. They aren't guaranteed employment or higher education like Kuwaitis. In fact, they are restricted in where they can live, which schools they can attend, where they can get medical care. They are relegated to secondary status. Kuwait is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but Kuwaitis, a minority, enjoy a relatively greater share of the wealth. Expatriates, many of whom are employed in unskilled and semiskilled jobs, remain in the country only with a work visa. Renewal is based upon Kuwait's discretion. Children of expatiates born in Kuwait are not recognized as Kuwaiti citizens. This system has created is a class of people who, by

western standards, are discriminated against. These are the people that make up 60% of Kuwait's population. These are also the people that make up the backbone of a potential insurgency. Mao said: "The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them."[4]

Robert Moss[5] wrote in his classic work Urban Guerrilla Warfare that a critical precondition for insurrection is not simple deprivation. Rather, it is the sense of **relative** deprivation. He said, "Men do not rebel because they are deprived, but because they are conscious that they are deprived." Given that Kuwait has a high literacy rate for a Third World nation (71%), means such as underground newspapers could be effective to heighten the awareness of Kuwaiti expatriates to their "relative plight."

The Iraqi people share a common heritage with Kuwaitis. There's an ethnic majority of Arabs in both countries -- 75% in Iraq and 84% in Kuwait. They also share a common religious heritage: Islam is the state religion of both countries. Kuwait is 85% Islamic (100% of Kuwaitis); Iraq is 95% Islamic. It is natural that Iraq should take an interest in securing equality for fellow Arabs and Moslems.

The government does not allow political parties to exist in Kuwait. Suffrage is only for adult males who resided in Kuwait before 1920 and their male descendants -- although the elected legislative body, the National Assembly, was suspended for the second time in 1987 when it again became a forum for frictions over

---

[4] Mao Tse-Tung's Quotations: The Red Guard's Handbook, p. 88.

[5] Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, p. 8.

inter-Arab tensions and domestic policy. Kuwait is ruled by the Amir, His Highness Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, and his family. He is a descendant of the royal family first placed in power by the British government. His legitimacy to rule is therefore linked to earlier colonial rule.

Iraq is ruled by a Revolutionary Command Council, headed by President Hussein, who is the elected head of state. He is also secretary of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. In Iraq, the party organized the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, and from 1959 to 1963 it fought against the dictatorship of President Kassem, which it overthrew in 1973. The party is opposed to imperialism and remnants of colonialism. Its three main aims are unity, freedom, and socialism for the Arab nation. It is the pan-Arab party and has regional links to Lebanon and Syria. It supports all liberation movements. The party's long-term strategy is Arab unity. The Baath party presents a legitimate platform from which to oppose the government of Kuwait. It enables Iraq to sponsor an insurgency in Kuwait, yet keep it at a regional level, thereby negating U.S. entry into the conflict.

The lever by which Mao moved China was the power of the peasant masses. The force behind the lever was hatred, which Mao turned to his use. In Kuwait, the majority of people are well-off financially. However, they are also expatriates. They present a vast pool of potentially angry, frustrated people because of their relative position in Kuwait. They are a ready breeding ground for any group that claims to represent the hopes and aspirations of the people, is led by the people, and can claim that it knows how to

change the system to bring them equality.

The Amir retains power in part through his much hated and feared secret police, known as the Mukhabarat. They keep a tight rein on expatriates and will deport anyone suspected of disloyalty to the Amir or to the policies of Kuwait. Therefore, it's quite difficult to initiate an opposition effort from within Kuwait.

The geography of Iraq is uniquely situated to sponsor an insurgency in Kuwait. It shares a long, common border with Kuwait. Uniquely located, Iraq can easily establish base camps, training facilities, logistical support, and refuge for a Kuwaiti insurgency. Mao's revolutionary power base was in the rural areas because the majority of China's population lived in the country. By contrast, the majority of Kuwait's population is in the cities; two thirds of the entire population is in Kuwait City alone. (Only 1% of Kuwait is cultivated land and less than 2% of the work force are in agriculture and fishing. In China, about two thirds work in agriculture.) Before the advent of tremendous oil revenues, most Kuwaitis relied on traditional livelihoods such as nomadic herding. Such occupations are now followed by a very small and dwindling segment of the population. Therefore, to reach the masses, Mao would recommend an urban guerrilla insurrection.

Lesson 3: Tactics. Mao could not fight in Kuwait the type of war he fought in China because the conditions in Kuwait are different. Modern Maoist groups (in Latin America and India) broadened their tactics to include urban guerrilla techniques which were impeded by original Maoist ideology.

Mao preached against unnecessary killing; but he also said

that "political power flows from the barrel of a gun." He was acutely aware of the moral dilemmas involved in the systematic use of political violence. Through carefully crafted acts of terror, directed against the power centers (e.g., government, royal family and the military) and wealth of the nation, he would wage war on the government. The aim is to discredit the government and gain the moral support of Kuwait's expatriates. These acts are designed to weaken support of the Kuwaiti government and to rally the common cause of the expatriates.

Conclusions: Conditions are ripe to spawn a revolution within the cities of Kuwait. Iraq could have been the catalyst to bring about a successful insurgency in Kuwait. This sort of intervention by Iraq would have discouraged others outside the region from intervening. (Post-Vietnam syndrome would have kept the U.S. out of a civil war in Kuwait even if Iraqi complicity was known.) Iraq could have effectively gained control of Kuwait by stepping in to back a new government in Kuwait after staging a coupe by the insurgents. The new government would be a facade. Iraq would not have lost much of her military might from a war she should never have fought. She could have continued to develop weapons of mass destruction to be used as a bargaining chip in future dealings with the U.S. or Israel. In the final analysis, I feel certain Mao would have pointed Saddam down another path and would have turned strategic theory into victory.