The F-14 Decision and the Policy Making Process
Abstract
Does America need more F-14 Navy fighter jets? After 5 months of debate in Congress, the question may finally be answered by a conference committee of the House and Senate members. But the future of the aircraft, assembled on Long Island by Grumman Corporation, is likely to be decided more by old-fashioned politics than by the loftier issue of national defense needs. The hottest issue in the just-concluded fiscal 1990 defense authorization conference was whether to cancel the Navy's Long Island-produced F-14D, nicknamed "Tomcat." Conferees settled on a final buy of 18 jets for $1.6 billion, with the proviso that no more of the Grumman Corporation fighters would ever, ever, ever be built. "In my roughly 20 years involved in this, I've never seen such forceful, if not ruthless, lobbying," John W. Warner of Virginia, ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, griped to reporters after the conference. "We've nicknamed the termination clause the poison pill,' and hope it sticks." How did the U.S. Navy arrive at a final buy of 18 new jets when the House Appropriations Committee favored 12 and the Senate favored canceling the program all together? Representative John M. Spratt (D-S.C.) stated, "Well, you just don't understand how we do math around here!" The decision to purchase new F-14Ds offers an interesting and somewhat representative insight into the bureaucratic process. The author starts with the background of, and current issues surrounding, the procurement of the F-14D and then takes a look at the major players -- the Department of Defense, Grumman Corporation, and the Long Island Congressional Delegation -- and how each affected the outcome of the F-14D decision.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA436985
Entities
People
- Robert H. Meyers
Organizations
- National War College