The F-14D: A Case Study in Decision-Making
Abstract
In April 1989, the new Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, forwarded to Congress a revised defense budget proposal for fiscal year (FY) 1990. One of the primary objectives of the new budget proposal was to establish levels of defense spending that would keep the overall budget within the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction guidelines. Part of the proposed defense budget was a decision to eliminate 12 new production F-14D Tomcat fighters from the Navy budget and to terminate the program. As the year progressed and Congress undertook to thrash out the final federal budget, the Senate and House split on the decision to eliminate F-14D production. The Senate favored elimination while the House voted to support the original 12 proposed aircraft. The issue was decided in a House-Senate Conference Committee. In the end, Congress did not eliminate F-14D production. Nor did it vote to support the House's proposal to produce 12. Instead, Congress voted for the production of 18 F-14D aircraft in FY 90! Though the final outcome appears absurd and is the type of story that makes Congress look incompetent, it was much more involved than it appeared and illustrates much of what goes into the decision-making process of the U.S. Government. How this decision came about is the subject of this paper. The author examines the major participants in the decision-making process as it pertained to the F-14D and attempts to draw some conclusions as to why the process worked as it did.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA436987
Entities
People
- Scott P. Van Cleef
Organizations
- National War College