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U.S. Forces in Europe: Where Do We Go From Here?

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29 April 1992

Abstract: One of the key post-Cold War challenges facing the United States is determining the future role of U.S. forces in Europe. This paper looks at enduring U.S. interests in Europe, emerging challenges, strategic choices, and criteria the United States should use if the security environment allows, or requires U.S. forward basing in Europe to drop below the Administration's proposed level of 150,000. The recommendations break from past assumptions and actions. How successfully the United States will achieve its goals depends largely on how well the U.S. meets its own domestic and foreign policy needs, and, perhaps equally important, by how well other nations perceive the United States will meet their future expectations and requirements.

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 29 APR 1992		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Forces in Europe: Where Do We Go From Here?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University National War College Fort McNair Washington, DC 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

INTRODUCTION

In *Forging the Alliance*, Don Cook describes the period from 1945 to 1950 as the "most crowded and decisive peacetime years of this century." For the first time, and after much debate, the United States abandoned its isolationist inhibition and aligned with West European countries to contain Soviet ideological and military expansionism.¹ Today, we are in the midst of what many might now see as the "most crowded and decisive peacetime years of this century." Once again, events, diplomacy, and politics are pushing and pulling on the United States. In response to post-Cold War events, most notably the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the U.S. is reopening the debate over future American security policy. When Mikhail Gorbachev officially disestablished the Soviet Union, he eliminated the last vestige of superpower confrontation, prompting the first serious reappraisal of America's role in Europe since NATO's creation in 1949.

Cold War paradigms that led to the U.S. "containment" strategy and NATO's "forward defense and flexible response" strategy no longer apply. Americans now view security largely in economic terms. We link opportunities to institutionalizing democracy and market-based economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. We see challenges evolving from regional economic blocs; nuclear proliferation; and intractable ethnic, national and religious frictions. And we sense vulnerabilities in our limited ability to shape the security environment.

Hence, we are now focusing much of the security debate on defining U.S. interests in post-Cold War Europe, and deciding how to tailor elements of national power to best achieve those interests. Individually, diplomacy, aid, trade, and military presence, no matter how skillfully used, can not secure United States' interests or resolve the historic disputes that permeate this region. But neither can we exclude any of these elements of national power from the debate on how to best secure our interests in Europe.

This paper seeks to advance the debate on one key factor in this security equation -- the role U.S. forces in Europe should play in contributing to our national security objectives. Specifically:

- What are the enduring American interests in the region?
- What challenges will the United States face in the European security environment?
- What are the key factors in the new security framework?
- What strategic choices does the U.S. need to make? and
- What criteria should the United States use in determining the force structure alternatives if the environment allows -- or requires -- U.S. forward basing in Europe to drop below the levels now proposed by the Administration?²

It is important to recognize what this paper is not. It is not an attempt to design the overall U.S. military force structure, establish acquisition priorities, or second-guess announced drawdown plans. It is a focus on the future of U.S. military forces in Europe -- where do we go from here?

U.S. VITAL INTERESTS




Figure 1: Enduring U.S. Interests

The enduring vital interests of the United States have been survival and preservation of our way of life, and economic well-being.³ The U.S. has treated a third interest, promoting democratic values (including human rights) as a vital interest in select cases. Normally, however, the U.S. treats it as a critical interest guiding our foreign policy.⁴

As Figure 1 shows, there is a logical decision path leading from **Interests** -- to the **Military Forces** needed to achieve those interests. The challenge is to identify, debate and gain consensus on the details on that path. A tactical decision on U.S. force presence in Europe without a strategic debate on what they are for would be fraught with danger -- military forces are only a means to an end - - not an end unto themselves.

Interests and Military Power: The United States has always given its survival interest the highest priority in absolute terms. When directly challenged, the U.S. focused elements of national power -- especially military power -- on assuring national survival. Using the military to further or preserve other interests, even vital economic interests, was always a second objective or an indirect consequence. However, even when survival was not directly threatened, the U.S. has frequently used military power to enhance economic well-being by reassuring, convincing, or coercing other nations to a position that furthered U.S. economic interests.

A brief look at U.S. history supports this contention. Because the United States is separated from other continents by vast oceans, U.S. experience, up to (and perhaps including) World War II, offers few instances in which our survival was threatened. The military's primary focus during our first 175 years was on maintaining or enhancing economic well-being. During this period we directly and indirectly used the military to provide the political leverage needed to ensure access to

markets and raw materials (e.g. the Spanish-American War, the opening of Japan, gunboat diplomacy in Latin America, and so forth).

That changed when the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability put the survival of the U.S. and our way of life at risk. For the next 40 years, we directed all elements of national power toward "containing" the Soviet Union's expansionist goals. We designed our military, created alliances, and forward-based forces primarily to deter Soviet expansionism -- economic benefits were secondary.

The most recent debates to change this policy began in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union began to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe, Germany united, and the Soviet republics held democratic elections. However, most of the debates carried Cold War "baggage." They focused on sizing and posturing the military in the Cold War context of countering direct threats to U.S. survival interests -- instead of the broader pre-Cold War context of securing survival interests and shaping the environment for economic well-being. DESERT STORM was the first significant (and perhaps non-deliberate) return to pre-Cold War policies. It was the first time since World War II the United States used large-scale military power to stabilize the world economic environment rather than counter Communist ideology.

THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO U.S. INTERESTS

In the post-Cold War world, the United States is neither at the "end of history" nor at a clean beginning. Clearly, the security environment has significantly changed. However, much remains the same, including some of the most fundamental factors that shape how nations view their security problems -- geography, resources, and different national cultures.⁵ A brief look at the past may help us better understand the pressures that will likely influence the future.

Historical Trends: Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, European security has been based on a series of complex and fluid "balance of power" alignments between major powers. Weaker countries chose sides based on their proximity to greater countries -- especially those countries with an expansionist history. Three persistent forces that shaped the "modern" balance of power framework are relevant to this assessment of the future security environment -- especially from the perspective of how smaller European nations will likely view their security.

First is the recurring dominance of German economic power on the continent. Germany became Europe's strongest economic power within 25 years of its "first" unification in 1871; again after the economic hard times of the 1920s and 30s; and a third time after the destruction of World War II. Germany's bid for economic hegemony was a principal cause of World War I and contributed to World War II. Today's policy makers, recognizing economic power is inseparable from political power, have noted Germany's ability to reverse the European Community's (EC) position on recognizing Slovenia and Croatia -- and the decision by Germany's independent central bank to raise interest rates (to curb German inflation) as France, Britain and the U.S. strove to decrease those rates to

help ease the Western recession. Europeans who see this trend will seek to balance the potential of German economic (and political) hegemony in the future.

The second significant force is the cyclical role Russia has played in European affairs. History is filled with examples of Russia alternating between being an expansionist, forceful influence and a "drain" on its European neighbors. In spite of Russia's role in WWI, WWII, and the Cold War -- this is the third time this century that Russia/Soviet Union has required massive food assistance and aid from the United States and Western Europe. Europeans who see this trend will want to hedge against the potential of future Russian influence.

The third instrumental force is the key role the U.S. has played in the European balance of power. The stalemate on the Western front in 1914-16 exemplifies the decisiveness of the U.S. when the alignment of major and minor nations produces an equilibrium in the balance of power. However, the power to make the peace was not maintained to secure the peace. Again in WWII, the United States shifted the balance of power in favor of Britain and France. This time the U.S. remained engaged in Europe to balance the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Now with the Cold War over, Europeans who see this trend will want to keep the U.S. link as an insurance policy to balance German economic and political power and the potential of Russian "forceful influence" in the future.

Emerging Challenges: With these geopolitical trends in mind, the most significant military threat to U.S. survival will continue to come from weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical). Threats could arise from a reversal to non-friendly governments in former Soviet republics; further splintering of control over Russia's nuclear weapons; or proliferation of the components, scientists, and delivery systems that make these systems "work." The U.S. can not disinvent nuclear weapons, and the number of nations that have them available for political and military leverage will increase. Therefore the U.S. should develop ways to deter, defend against, and perhaps even fight nuclear-armed terrorists or renegade nations. For example, how might the U.S. act in a future DESERT STORM if Kazakhstan provides a nuclear umbrella for Saddam Hussein in Iraq? It took decades for the U.S. and USSR to work out appropriate signals to indicate resolve and to differentiate between vital and non-vital interests. The United States may not have that luxury in the future.

The most significant economic threat will likely be disrupted economic trade resulting from violent instability or non-violent disputes over regional trading practices. While military forces have limited utility in countering most direct economic threats, they may have great utility in shaping and sustaining an environment that precludes violent instability and regional frictions -- and furthers mutual security and economic well-being.

As Figure 2 highlights, the types of post-Cold War direct military and economic threats to U.S. vital interests are similar to the Cold War challenges. The primary difference is the likelihood of significant military threats has gone down -- and the likelihood of significant economic challenges has increased. At first glance one might confine the military's role to countering the direct military

threats -- such as nuclear -- and reduce forward presence simply because the visible military threat has decreased. That is a danger associated with the Cold War's defense-oriented threat-based strategic concept. A more comprehensive assessment might also look at potential causes of the threats and challenges to vital interests -- and focus national power on addressing those causes to shape and sustain a security environment that furthers U.S. interests.

<u>Interest:</u>	<u>Threat/Challenge:</u>	<u>Cause:</u>
Survival & Way of life	Nuclear	Anarchy/Violent instability Regional conflict Political alienation Regional hegemony Proliferation
	Terrorism	Radical extremists Failed political reform
	Drugs	Radical extremists Failed political reform
Economic well-being	Loss of markets	Anarchy/Violent instability Failed economic reform Failed political reform Regional hegemony
	Disrupt world trade	Regional conflict Trade barriers Economic hegemony Overt rivalries
	Disrupt regional economic well being	Failed economic reform Economic nationalism Failed political reform Mass refugees Balance of power alliances Embargoes from outside the region Divert funds for rearmament
	Military threat	Nuclear proliferation Technology transfer Divert funds for rearmament Historic & emerging animosities Political alienation Balance of power alliances

Figure 2: Threats and Challenges

Focusing On Potential Causes: Looking at the "second tier" provides some valuable insights into the potential causes of future challenges. This is particularly important when dealing with the more elusive threats to economic well-being. Here the U.S. may find it more advantageous to address the causes of the threats rather than the threats themselves -- with the main challenges including: (1) Failure of democratic and economic reforms resulting from public frustration or military

dissatisfaction with the pace or direction of change (e.g. Soviet coup); (2) Anarchy or violent instability caused by ethnic, religious, and national differences and the breakdown in law and order (e.g. Yugoslavia, Armenia, and Georgia); (3) Regional hegemony resulting in barriers and sanctions that limit U.S. access to markets, resources, and free trade practices (e.g. Soviet control of the East Bloc); (4) Renationalization stemming from the desire to divert public attention from internal problems, restore national pride, or protect industries from the perceived domination by a major power (e.g. Italy and Germany in the 1930s); and (5) War resulting from a breakdown in the regional security system; or threatened national borders (e.g. WWI and WWII).

These "causes" could present a multitude of overlapping problems including: mass refugee movements that disrupt the economies of neighboring nations; internal unrest that could spread across national boundaries; loss of internal production; a regional trade war that could slow global economic growth; and a breakdown in the transatlantic link that could create a security vacuum. In these cases, governments might implement protectionist trade policies; divert their limited resources available from economic development to rebuilding their militaries; focus inward for their security requirements -- protecting domestic defense industries and losing efficiencies associated with a regional security structure; or form new subregional alliances to fill the security vacuum.

Hence, we can draw several lessons to guide U.S. security policy: (1) Regional and international security issues are closely intertwined; (2) There are still a number of significant threats and challenges to U.S. survival and economic interests; (3) Challenges to U.S. economic interests are more numerous -- and more likely than threats to U.S. survival interests; (4) Many of the survival challenges are deterrable -- by addressing the threats -- but not preventable; and (5) Many of the economically oriented challenges are preventable -- by addressing the causes -- but not deterrable.

Success in dealing with potential "causes" enhances the prospect for peaceful change and a growing prosperity for all. The alternative increases the risk of regional chaos, protectionist economic policies, and non-deliberate confrontation -- forcing the U.S. to remain focused on threats to our vital interests.

SECURITY FRAMEWORK

The U.S. will pursue its interests and address its challenges within an emerging security framework. This framework is being shaped by: (1) the transition from a bipolar global orientation to a regional focus; (2) changing national vulnerabilities; and (3) the increasing prominence and complexity of interdependence in the post-Cold War paradigm.

Regional Focus: The United States will likely continue to pursue security on three different levels: (1) self defense; (2) within the international system; and (3) within the regional context.⁶ While many of the emerging challenges (especially those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) will have international implications -- most will be regional in nature. As the crises in Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan highlight, those outside the region do not fully understand many

of the tensions and twisted lines to the past. For that reason, Europeans will likely attempt to address most challenges on a regional (vice global) basis.

Consequently, most issues affecting American security interests will arise in, be debated in, and be addressed in the regional context.⁷ The U.S. must work within the evolving regional security structure if we want to: (1) select and shape the issues important to our security, frame the debate, and have a meaningful voice in alliance/coalition policy determination; (2) organize collective approaches to problems; (3) act as an honest broker in sensitive regional issues involving historic differences or mistrust; and (4) link the policies between the Pacific, North American, and European regions to prevent differences from developing into chasms.

Vulnerabilities: The second factor impacting the emerging security framework is the growing awareness that changes in the security environment are exposing new vulnerabilities, and realigning the relative importance of old ones. During the Cold War, vulnerability to nuclear annihilation overshadowed all others.⁸ *What* each nation perceives as its vulnerabilities in the new environment will play an increasingly important role in future policy determinations.

With the risk of nuclear war dramatically reduced, leaders in Europe and the former Soviet republics are beginning to appreciate (and compensate for) other vulnerabilities: the fledgling democratic structures; the security vacuum in Eastern Europe; the decreased effectiveness of national military forces in former Warsaw Pact countries; the lack of economic strength in the East (including a noncompetitive industrial infrastructure and limited investment funds); the lingering sensitivities from both World Wars; delicate civil-military relations, and the inability to project military power between regions of Europe (or out-of-area) to protect economic or political interests.

U.S. policies will need to compensate for emerging U.S. vulnerabilities stemming from the diffusion of power and loss of political independence; the increasing dependence of U.S. economic well-being on international trade; the lack of economic strength needed to shape economic policies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics; and the loss of a guaranteed seat at the European security table.

Interdependence: The third factor (related to the vulnerabilities above) is the growing importance of complex interdependence on both a national and international level. On the national level, complex interdependence is *how* the U.S. intertwines economic, political, and military power to secure its interests, address its challenges and causes, and compensate for its vulnerabilities. On the international level, it is how countries weave together different avenues of influence to pursue interests and, at the same time, buffer the inevitable frictions associated with competing objectives.

For example, in the Cold War, military power provided leverage for political influence and economic access. Congress could effectively threaten lower force levels and demand greater burden-sharing because Europeans perceived U.S. military presence was vital to their security. In post-Cold War Europe, the military will still provide an avenue for U.S. political influence and economic ac-

cess -- but not the same degree of leverage. Europeans (especially West Europeans) now perceive U.S. military presence as important to their security -- but not vital. If the U.S. threatens lower force levels to get West Europeans to compromise vital economic interests (i.e. burdensharing and trade concessions), they would likely "let" the Americans go home -- reducing the depth and breadth of U.S. engagement in European security decisions that impact our interests.

Thus, important changes relating to complex interdependence in the post-Cold War security framework include: 1) the relative worth of the "tools" has changed, 2) leverage associated with U.S. military presence has shifted from the United States to Europe, and 3) elements of national power are less discrete -- between themselves, and within the U.S./Europe relationship.

STRATEGIC CHOICES

With the relative scope of interests, challenges, and the emerging security framework in mind, future U.S. policy in Europe hinges on the answers to two strategic questions: (1) how much influence does the U.S. want to maintain in Europe's security affairs (i.e. does the U.S. want to lead, follow, or get out of the way); and (2) what strategic concept will achieve that influence?

U.S. Influence: If the U.S. wants to significantly influence the debate on European security issues (as we have for the last 45 years), then the United States needs to:

- Act from within the European security structure; i.e. the U.S. needs a seat at the table;
- Size its commitments commensurate with a leadership role. These contributions should be of sufficient quantity and quality to convince other members the U.S. is both committed to European security and capable of acting on that commitment; and
- Tailor its contributions (economic, political, and military) to be an integral and critical part of the evolving European security structure.

This leadership role requires the U.S. to participate in NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); make a leadership (sizable) contribution to the forces; and tailor the U.S. participation to be an essential element of the military organization. If the U.S. contribution is essential, then the security organization will be obligated to provide the U.S. a meaningful voice in policy deliberations.

If the U.S. is willing to "follow" and marginally influence European decisions, then we only need to contribute "token" forces to the security structure. We do not need (and may not want) to provide critical capabilities. This will allow the U.S. greater latitude in selecting those security issues in which we want to participate -- and provide a wider range of force structure options from which to choose.

Finally, if the U.S. is willing to "get out of the way" and react to European security decisions (like Japan does today)⁹, then the widest range of commitment options is possible -- including no U.S. military presence in Europe at all.

This is an important "ends-means" choice. A decision to "react" to European security decisions will likely cost less money (and require fewer forces) in the short run than the decision to maintain influence in European security affairs. However, it also puts U.S. vital interests at greater risk and at the mercy of other nations' policies; it limits our ability to shape regional responses to extra-regional developments; and it restricts our ability to link policies between the Pacific, European, and North American regions.

While history does not repeat itself, three examples from the past provide insight for the U.S. to evaluate the implications of having different degrees of influence in regional affairs.

■ **The League of Nations:** After WWI, the U.S., failing to ratify the charter, deliberately extricated itself from effectively influencing its global security interests in general, and European security decisions in particular. When the Great Depression stifled international commerce; nations around the world developed protectionist economic policies, aggressive self-serving political policies, and finally sizable national military capabilities. The U.S. stood on the sidelines, unwilling and unable to affect the debate in support of its own security interests.

■ **Washington Conference (1921-1922) and the London Naval Treaty (1930):** While rejecting international commitments associated with the League, the U.S. also looked to scale back its military commitments in the Pacific. The Washington Conference and the London Naval Treaty restricted the size of various naval fleets in the Pacific region. The goals were to establish a "New World Order" in the Pacific; reduce costs associated with balancing power in the Pacific and maintaining influence for economic access; and replace the mechanism for maintaining the balance of power in the Pacific with multinational agreements repudiating expansionism.¹⁰ In spite of these agreements, a small U.S. military presence in the Pacific, and extensive trade and political contacts with Japan, neither the League of Nations nor the U.S. was able to influence Japanese actions in the 1930s. The League was politically and militarily impotent -- and the U.S. presence lacked the commitment and capability needed to influence decisions in the Pacific region -- especially when those decisions impacted other nations' vital interests.¹¹

■ **NATO:** Learning from previous examples, the U.S. made a concerted effort at the end of World War II to send clear signals of commitment and capability when it agreed to join the North Atlantic alliance. Ranging from the Berlin Airlift -- to the forward-basing of more than 300,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe -- to the link with strategic nuclear forces, the U.S. demonstrated both a firm commitment to European security and the capability to fulfill that commitment. The resulting influence paid significant dividends in many cases, such as the deployment of Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, and the exceptional host nation support Europeans provided in support of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

PRE-WORLD WAR II:**Lack of commitment**

- Europe: League of Nations
- Pacific: Washington Conference

Lack of capability

- German expansion
- Japanese expansion

Lack of Influence

- Disengaged/not sensitive to other nations' security concerns
- Minimal military presence meant limited voice in regional security decisions

COLD WAR:**Strong commitment**

- Strategic nuclear link
- Forward based forces

Operationally capable forces

- Berlin
- NATO, integrated military structure

Adequate influence

- Engaged in regional security decisions
 - German unification, AMF to Turkey
- Significant military presence gave a seat at the table: INF, CFE, CSBMs, 2+4

Chart 3: Lessons of the Past

Many of the issues and challenges surrounding today's domestic and international security environment resemble the pre-1914 and pre-1939 periods in Europe and the United States -- economic and political insecurity; ethnic, national and religious tensions; fractionalization of the Soviet Union; the rise of protectionism; the focus on arms control; and the desire by some in the U.S. to establish a "New World Order" based on self-denial rather than policing power. Considering these types of issues, President Bush established his position on what role the United States should play in future international security affairs when he stated:

A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration -- and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraordinary possibility...to build a new international system in accordance with our own values and ideals. ... For America, there can be no retreat from the world's problems. Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests, but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. We must work with others, but we must also be a leader.¹²

This strong, activist approach describes the tasks and sets the tone the President believes is the nation's role in the emerging New World Order: **Involvement ... Cooperation ... Leadership.** President Bush sets an objective with a positive purpose. One that requires the United States remain actively engaged in world affairs -- to select and shape the issues important to our security, to frame the debate, and to have a meaningful voice in alliance/coalition policy determination. With the full range of domestic and international factors impacting our security in the 1990s, this choice of national security policy -- and its attendant grand strategy -- is perhaps the most important issue facing the United States today. This choice will be debated in depth because it shapes the commitment and

sacrifice the American public must be willing to bear. However, *this paper assumes the U.S. will structure its forces to support a meaningful level of influence over its interests in Europe.*

Threat-Based or Interest-Based Strategic Concept : The second critical choice is to determine whether the U.S. should pursue a strategy -- and design its military presence in Europe to *protect* its interests -- the Cold War threat-based strategic concept; or to *further* its interests -- an interest-based strategic concept. The force sizes and structures to pursue these different strategies might appear very similar. But, in support of national interests, what these forces do, and how and why they will do it are significantly different. ¹³

During the Cold War the U.S. pursued a threat-based concept -- a strategy with a negative purpose -- a "reactive" strategy (leaving the initiative to the opposition) designed to defend territory and deny the enemies their objectives. It focused on the negative objective of "deterring" war by threatening the vital security interests of a clearly defined adversary. The threat shaped the military. As Representative Les Aspin described it, the Soviet Union "determined how big the [U.S.] defense budget was, how U.S. forces were structured and how U.S. military equipment was designed."¹⁴ The U.S. designed its force to counter Soviet sponsored aggression -- a force for global war.

<u>Threat-based</u>	<u>Interest-based</u>
• Collective defense •• Common enemy • Negative objective •• Prevent opponent from achieving their objectives •• Deterrence • Threaten opponents vital security interests •• Restrict opponent's economic opportunity •• Protects U.S. economic interests • Reactive •• Leaves initiative to others • Future peacetime force posture - Threat based - Primarily: •• U.S. based •• Heavy combat power •• Naval sea control	• Collective security •• Common security interests • Positive objective •• Assists partners in achieving their objectives •• Collective cooperation • Reinforce mutual security interests •• Promote cooperative economic opportunity •• Fosters U.S. economic interests • Anticipatory •• Retains initiative • Future peacetime force posture - Capability based - Primarily: •• U.S. & forward based •• Full range of combat power •• Naval presence

Figure 4: Future Threat/Interest Based Concept Comparison

An alternative perspective, tailored to President Bush's leadership agenda, would adopt an interest-based strategic concept. In this concept, the U.S. would *promote* its security interests by working within organizations that foster and support the mutual security interests of all concerned nations (guaranteeing border integrity, assuring regional stability necessary for economic growth, minimizing the requirement for national militaries, integrating regional crisis response, etc.). It is an

"offensive" strategy -- a strategy with a positive purpose -- a strategy that focuses on shaping the security environment -- addressing the potential causes rather than reacting to specific threats. For example, helping the Russians to dismantle their nuclear warheads is part of an interest-based concept because it's in both parties' mutual interest and it contributes to nonproliferation efforts. This concept requires the U.S. to structure its force primarily to accommodate security requirements that further the interests of the U.S. and its European partners -- a force designed to manage crisis and "secure the peace."

In reality, the issue is not black or white. Force structures have always accommodated elements of both threat-based and interest-based strategies. The main difference is one of primary focus. A threat-based concept focuses the force structure on countering specific threats with less emphasis on shaping the environment that fostered that threat. An interest-based strategic concept, on the other hand, counters threats when necessary, but focuses the force structure primarily on shaping and guiding the potential "causes" of threats to secure or further national interests. Because an interest-based concept better supports President Bush's U.S. leadership role, *the paper assumes the U.S. will design its force structures to sustain U.S. influence in Europe based on an interest-based strategic concept.*




Figure 5: U.S. Security Planning

Looking back to the emerging security framework, especially in light of American vulnerabilities and the growing importance of complex interdependence, this choice to emphasize commonalities of interests over threats will touch every aspect of U.S. security planning (Figure 5). It will place a greater importance on maintaining credible links with Europe, it will require closer integration of the elements of national power, and it will shape the size, composition, and posture of forward-based U.S. forces.

U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE




Figure 6: Security Objectives chart

With those assumptions in mind, Figure 6 highlights the general security objectives or conditions necessary to achieve U.S. security interests. The forces that led to the end of the Cold War -- especially the diffusion of power, nationalism, and independence movements -- are precisely the forces the U.S. must confront and organize peacefully to achieve a new world order.¹⁵ In a threat-based concept, the military force structure was successful if it deterred threats to U.S. survival interests. In an interest-based concept, deterrence will no longer be enough. The U.S. should measure the effectiveness of its military force structure by how well it supports all four security objectives.

The first objective, influence, translates into the authority and prestige needed for the United States to affect the development of European policy decisions. Building the foundation for sustained influence requires: (1) that Europeans want the U.S. to retain influence in European security issues; (2) a "seat at the table" in fora that address meaningful security issues; (3) the European perception the U.S. is committed to their security; and (4) the perception the U.S. is capable and willing to back up that commitment. If the Europeans don't perceive an enduring U.S. commitment to their security needs, they will meet those security requirements in other ways --including "pure European" balance of power politics (such as the proposed Franco-German Corps) or a renationalization of military forces. Both options have poor records in maintaining peace in Europe -- and both will marginalize U.S. influence in the region.

The second objective, non-threatening security environment, requires that no nation perceive an external threat to its vital interests. This environment must: (1) assure the border integrity of all countries (eliminating the need for large national armies); (2) maintain a power balance (to avoid regional hegemony); (3) address the economic concerns of all countries (to avoid large-scale economic dislocation); and (4) address the political concerns of all countries (to assure all legitimate grievances can be reconciled in a peaceful, non-military manner). Security of this depth and breadth will be the foundation of lasting peace in Europe.

The third objective, economic interdependence, focuses on keeping Europe engaged with the other two major economic regions (North America and the Pacific) in a manner that enhances global economic security and stability. With a highly integrated world economy, and with imports and exports comprising more than 20 percent of the U.S. economy, this objective is particularly important

to U.S. economic well-being.¹⁶ As the only trans-regional power, the United States' central role in most of the major regional economic, political and military security institutions will be crucial to facilitating inter-regional communication and interlocking the various political, economic, and military blocs.

The fourth objective, balance of power, means no European government can judge regional hegemony a realistic objective;¹⁷ and no European nation finds it necessary to join subregional alliances to protect its interests. To be most effective, this requires: (1) a security umbrella that accommodates the security requirements of all affected countries; (2) a security organization that eliminates any security vacuum and assures the most insecure fledgling democracies they will not be dominated economically, politically, or militarily by their neighbors to the east or west; and (3) a balance to the former Soviet republics' conventional and nuclear "mass" -- and Germany's economic and political power.

EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE

Different historical experiences produce different approaches to foreign policy. Therefore, it's useful to look at U.S. security objectives from the perspectives of all affected parties to help determine which efforts Europeans will desire most and which they will resist. This, in turn, will allow the U.S. to better posture our forward-based force structure to support our security objectives -- and at the same time, accommodate the implicit and explicit expectations other nations have for a U.S. military commitment to support **their** domestic and regional security requirements. If the U.S. chooses not to meet those requirements, these nations will look for those capabilities elsewhere -- and the U.S. may have to live with the consequences.

Western Europe: The West European view is best addressed from two perspectives. Countries in the southern region are still concerned with a potential spillover of unrest from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, as well as threats from their south. They are especially concerned about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, mass immigration, and weapons of mass destruction. Turkey will also see membership in a "U.S. led NATO" as its "doorway to the West" -- and its best bet to keep Europe engaged in Turkey's security affairs. These factors imply a continued important role for U.S. presence in the southern region.

With a less immediate military threat, countries in the central and northern regions of Western Europe, will likely sense a less direct role for U.S. military power. But, as the debate over the Franco-German corps indicates, not all countries are comfortable with a French or German-led military security structure for Europe. Therefore, as a whole, Western Europe's desire for U.S. presence will likely focus on: (1) U.S. conventional and nuclear "mass" to counter Russia's potential influence; (2) U.S. naval power to protect Mediterranean shipping; (3) U.S. "power" for crisis management; (4) U.S. commitment for a stable security environment; (5) U.S. role as an honest broker to ameliorate historic rivalries; (6) (most smaller countries will prefer) U.S. presence to counter poten-

tial German economic and political hegemony; and (7) U.S. leadership in the integrated military security structure.

Eastern Europe: In search of an "unconditional" security umbrella, East European dependence on American engagement will likely increase. Their desire for U.S. presence will likely focus on the same roles as above -- with special emphasis on countering the potential challenges Russian "mass" and German power pose to their emerging political and economic systems. Additionally, East European nations will be particularly interested in maintaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella to preclude Germany (as the dominant European power) from (breaking existing agreements and) developing nuclear weapons to counter a potential nuclear threat from North Africa, or to gain "nuclear parity" with France, Britain, or selected former Soviet republics.

Objective	U.S.	W Euro	E Euro	CIS
U.S Influence	Maximize U.S. influence	"Competition" Few: Minimize U.S. influence; Many: Balance W Euro powerhouse	"Honest Broker" Maximize to balance W Euro & CIS	"Honest Broker" Maintain to balance W Euro
Non Threat Sec Environ	Guarantee secure borders; secure economic & political environment	Same	Same	Same
Economic Interdepend	Link global trading regions; Maintain open markets.	Protect E Euro & CIS markets	Prevent W Euro dominance	Engage U.S. W Euro & Japan
Balance of Power	Prevent hegemony	Balance CIS Mass (Conv & Nuc)	Balance historic rivals in W Euro & Russia	Balance historic rivals in W Euro

Figure 7: Differing Perspectives of U.S. Security Objectives

Former Soviet Republics: The fledgling republics support U.S. engagement in European security affairs. They will depend heavily on continued American presence in Europe to guarantee border integrity, balance German power and Russian mass, and preclude any requirement for Germany to develop nuclear weapons. They also depend heavily on U.S. presence to anchor NATO as a regional security structure.

Emerging U.S. Role: All parties agree (although for different reasons) the U.S. should play an important role in assuring regional balance of power, territorial integrity, and political independence. Therefore, the unifying theme for U.S. engagement in post-Cold War Europe should shift from deterrence of an ideological and military threat -- to the shaping of a non-violent, non-threatening, non-hegemonic security environment. This may not be each nation's primary reason for U.S. engagement

in the region -- but it is the common reason that all nations have for U.S. participation. This role contributes to both U.S. and European security objectives -- and it provides an agreeable avenue for U.S. influence in shaping decisions that impact U.S. vital interests. Hence, the United States should make this the primary focus of U.S. political, economic, and military objectives for Europe.

It's worthy to note, however, West European countries generally want to minimize public visibility of U.S. presence, East Europeans want to maximize it, and the former Soviet republics want to maintain it. This factor, combined with the historic distrust between many of the European nations (especially associated with military forces on sovereign territory), leads one to conclude that multinational forces -- with little or no national identity -- would be more acceptable for peacetime stationing and transregional crisis response than large national forces stationed in -- or responding to crisis situations in other portions of the rather delicate European environment.

NATO's Role: With the security objectives of all concerned parties on the table, it's apparent that (1) European nations are interested in regional stability; (2) they agree they must quickly address the security vacuum in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics; and (3) they are interested in keeping the U.S. engaged (to varying degrees) in European security affairs.

NATO:

- | | |
|------------------------------|---|
| • Provides an Atlantic link | • Enables an integrated effort - affordability |
| • Serves as crisis manager | • Ensures against unpredictability |
| • Acts as an agent of change | • Inhibits renationalization |
| • Provides stability | • Provides a proven integrated military structure for collective security |

Figure 8: NATO - Raison D'Etre¹⁸

The debate on the long-term prospects and interrelationships of various security organizations is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for reasons highlighted in Figure 8, virtually all nations agree NATO, refocused as a collective security organization, is the only existing organization capable of simultaneously accomplishing these security tasks in the near-term. But, as this paper will later highlight, additional modifications to NATO's membership, strategy, force structure, and crisis response decision process are required to accommodate this new role. These modifications will greatly affect the size, shape, and role of U.S. forces in Europe.

U.S. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE

With those security objectives and NATO's central role in mind, the next step is to identify specific U.S. political objectives that will create the general security conditions described above.




Figure 9: Political Objectives chart

Pan European Collective Security Organization: One of the most important U.S. political objectives is to quickly accommodate the security concerns of East European countries and former Soviet republics. Therefore, the U.S. should lead NATO's transition (from a collective **defense** organization for some European countries) to a collective **security** organization that extends the security guarantee to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (including former Soviet republics). This is the most effective way to demonstrate the capability and commitment needed to establish a security environment conducive to stable economic growth, peaceful resolution of differences (including border disputes between countries), and inhibit or eliminate aggression between individual nations. Toward that end, the U.S. should lead NATO efforts to:

- Convert to a collective security organization that guarantees the physical security of all European countries;
- Focus itself primarily on the capability to respond to a variety of crises. This would require a significant increase in the number of standing multinational crisis response forces (reaction forces) with representation from all member states. This is important for demonstrating political resolve and for providing the requisite capability for crisis management.
- Quickly transition the six standing central region NATO corps from Main Defense Forces to national or multinational Augmentation Forces. The main goals are to limit the standing forces to those needed for crisis response; to create an environment that encourages fewer standing forces (because nations don't need to lead a multinational Main Defense corps for a seat at the table); and to shatter permanently the Cold War stereotype the Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics have of large NATO corps ready to move East.
- Integrate the force contributions of all member nations into multinational crisis response and functional multinational units with little or no national identity (e.g. NATO AWACS). This would reduce the innate tensions associated with foreign forces assigned on national soil and minimize the historic frictions associated with a former adversary's forces entering sovereign territory during a crisis. Members may be required to augment crisis response

forces upon NATO's request. At host nation request, NATO and the U.S. should be prepared to provide peacetime basing of non-provocative forces in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet republics.

- Assume peacetime operational command for all NATO assigned crisis response forces to include forces, logistic support, and infrastructure. This will assure a minimum peace and crisis capability, facilitate interoperability; strengthen the integrated command structure; enhance cohesion; reduce the potential of renationalization; clearly shift the crisis response role from the nations to the Alliance; and lower the national burden for standing forces.
- Establish agreements (similar to current U.S. agreements) with member nations to create a baseline capability for deploying NATO crisis response forces; (e.g. NATO CRAF for strategic airlift; NATO shipping for strategic sealift; NATO Wartime Host Nation Support for intratheater movement).

While this is an aggressive agenda, recent decisions relating to the EC and European Court of Justice appear to indicate a growing willingness to provide far-reaching authorities to regional multi-national organizations. Clearly, this dramatic change in the NATO concept will significantly affect U.S. force structure contributions -- and the U.S. will want to influence this process.

Transatlantic Link: The transatlantic link through NATO will continue to be the most widely accepted avenue for U.S. engagement in European security issues -- and the vehicle that provides the U.S. the greatest influence in shaping the security debate. Therefore, the U.S. policy objective should be to take all steps necessary to strengthen NATO's legitimacy, ensure its survival, and preserve its influence in European security matters. This means the U.S. may have to subjugate specific national decisions (to European requirements) to preserve and strengthen NATO's stature (e.g. Crotone). Eventually, CSCE may provide a complementary avenue for influence. Until that occurs, however, the political and military ties through NATO remain the most effective transatlantic link.

Commitment: Short-sighted adversaries from WWI to DESERT STORM have discounted U.S. reinforcement potential in the absence of a credible presence. In each case, the U.S. preserved its vital interests, but at great expense -- war. Therefore, from a political perspective, the U.S. needs to provide a convincing forward presence as an unambiguous symbol of U.S. commitment to Europe and its partnership in NATO -- one that can not be easily reversed. The U.S. can effectively meet this commitment if we: (1) maintain a credible nuclear deterrent; (2) maintain operationally capable air and land-based forces in all regions -- including perhaps some small "non-threatening" peacetime presence in East European countries (upon host-nation request); (3) retain a credible, full-time commitment of naval forces in the Mediterranean; (4) base a substantive portion of the assigned U.S. military personnel and their families on European soil; (5) continue to exercise with NATO forces (especially deployment and crisis response exercises); and (6) retain a militarily significant level of prepositioned stocks in Europe.

Each action is critical to confirming the U.S. commitment to European security. Europeans, watching how quickly the U.S. deployed fighters to the Gulf, may not perceive an air-based nuclear link to be an adequate sign of commitment -- unless it's accompanied by a credible land commitment and the presence of American families. Competing requirements may make it necessary to substitute an increasing number of forces on temporary duty for those assigned in Europe. But, the smaller the number of U.S. forces (and families) permanently stationed in Europe, the lesser the European perception of U.S. commitment.

Nuclear Security: As NATO's new strategic concept states, "The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces ... is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war."¹⁹ The U.S. political objective is to improve "visibility and control" of all European nuclear weapons -- especially those in the former Soviet republics -- to improve accountability, improve safety procedures, and prevent proliferation or accidental use. Recognizing the number of nuclear powers will continue to grow, NATO should keep nuclear deterrence as a credible and effective element of its security strategy. The U.S. political objective should be to maintain these weapons at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and deter coercion -- and at the same time, to continue widespread participation in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on European soil to demonstrate commitment.²⁰

Pan European Security Umbrella: European institutions such as the EC, WEU, CSCE, and NATO all have roles to play in European security. This political objective focuses on working with European nations to provide a framework for integrating the efforts of these organizations. Full integration may be years away. However, this security umbrella will substitute coordination for competition or duplication of these organizations' "roles and missions."

Flexibility to Meet Global Responsibilities: This political objective has two main goals. First, it aims to retain sufficient U.S. leverage in the European security debate to encourage "active" European participation in global or multiregional issues -- such as DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT. Second, it maintains the political flexibility to use U.S. forces and facilities located in Europe -- even those under NATO's peacetime command -- for non-NATO U.S. requirements. Forward based forces contribute to both of these goals by developing institutional relationships, personal trust, and networking needed to make difficult things happen quickly (e.g. short notice overflight rights, basing agreements, and assistance in deploying moving forces from Europe for DESERT STORM).²¹

U.S. MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE

Military objectives support political objectives, and are "what" the U.S. wants its military to achieve throughout the European Command's "area of responsibility" (which includes Europe, almost all of Africa, and part of the Middle East). In most cases, the U.S. will use its military in combination with other elements of national power, to achieve the political objectives. Therefore, mili-

tary objectives are a critical part of larger U.S. policy -- not a policy unto itself. Figure 11 highlights several key military objectives that will shape the future U.S. force presence in Europe.




Figure 11: Military Objectives chart

U.S. security requirements: This objective focuses on the military forces and infrastructure the U.S. needs in Europe to support its security requirements when it desires to operate nationally, or is unable to operate through NATO. This includes the requirement to:

- Respond to non-NATO crises (e.g. in less than one year, U.S. forces in Europe evacuated U.S. embassy personnel in several African countries; deployed one-third of its force to support DESERT STORM and PROVEN FORCE (in Turkey); deployed Patriot batteries to Israel in PATRIOT DEFENDER; and deployed forces to Iraq to resettle the Kurds in PROVIDE COMFORT);
- Secure transit and staging rights for U.S. operations in other regions (e.g. more than 15,000 aircraft sorties staged through Europe in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM)²²;
- Logistically support U.S. operations in other regions (e.g. U.S. forces in Europe repaired more than 93 percent of all Air Force engines; 90 percent of Air Force avionics; 90 percent of Army major repairs; and 85 percent of naval jet engines for DESERT STORM)²³;
- Preserve freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean (e.g. Gulf of Sidra); and
- Maintain access to key resources in Africa and the Middle East;

Benefits associated with forward based forces include the fact U.S. presence enhances allied participation in crisis; they improve interoperability, and they are "an ocean closer" to a regional crisis. Therefore they respond quicker -- deploying faster and requiring significantly fewer mobility assets than similar forces deploying from the United States. For example, in DESERT STORM the 1st Cavalry Division took one-third longer to deploy from the U.S. than the 3rd Armored Division from Europe; it also took three times the tanker support and twice as much lift to deploy an F-16 squadron

from Shaw AFB SC than from Torrejon AB Spain.²⁴ Liabilities include potential host nation demands that limit the non-NATO use of U.S. assets -- and multinational obligations that may limit their availability. These are more of a problem at lower force levels.

Regional security requirements: This military objective focuses on actively supporting NATO to sustain the health of the alliance and reinforce NATO solidarity. This includes active participation in the NATO staff; "setting" NATO readiness and training standards; and ensuring interoperability. This objective also includes using the military as a force for change; having a voice in NATO's transition to a collective security organization; shaping NATO's efforts to "rebalance" its structure away from Main Defense to crisis response forces; and guiding NATO's efforts to minimize the national identity of NATO reaction forces. Perhaps most important, this objective focuses the military on its "center stage" role in demonstrating U.S. commitment, preventing regional hegemony, and providing an avenue for U.S. influence in European security decisions.

Linchpin role in collective security organization: This objective guides the U.S. military to pursue a unique "market niche" in the European security structure -- a niche the Europeans must fill to effectively pursue their crisis response strategy. To achieve this objective, the U.S. should provide several critical capabilities that fit the following criteria: (1) the European security structure must require these capabilities to effectively respond to crises; (2) the U.S. must already have -- or plan to develop these capabilities to meet our global responsibilities; and (3) the Europeans must be unlikely to duplicate these capabilities because of their cost or complexity.

This approach will assure that the Europeans pull the U.S. into the European security debate and provide us the influence we desire.

As long as NATO retains corps-level Main Defense Forces as the "coin of the realm" (during the transition period or if the U.S. is unable to convince NATO to discontinue Main Defense Forces) the U.S. needs to retain a U.S.-led multinational corps and contribute forces to a second multinational corps (perhaps the Reaction Corps instead of the German-led corps) for our seat at the table. When NATO transitions its Main Defense Forces to multinational crisis response forces, the U.S. will be able to meet NATO requirements with less than a corps size unit. If the U.S. wants to keep a Corps in Europe to meet its non-NATO requirements, it needs to work that on a bilateral basis outside the NATO context -- or as a "forward deployed" element of the NATO Augmentation force.

Appropriate public visibility: The military must appreciate the positive and negative elements of public visibility -- it needs to be an effective force without being an obtrusive force. From a European perspective, the U.S. force should be substantive enough to confirm our commitment, yet small enough to avoid the perception of an occupying force. On the other hand, from a U.S. domestic perspective, the U.S. must size and posture its overseas force so that it's large enough to retain influence and perform its U.S. missions, yet small enough the Americans don't feel they're bearing an unfair portion of Europe's defense.²⁵

MILITARY CAPABILITIES




Figure 12: Military Capabilities

The next step is to identify the specific capabilities the U.S. forces in Europe should provide to achieve the military objectives.

• **Power Projection:** One of the foremost capabilities the U.S. force can provide is the ability to project power. This entails lift, force structure, and readiness and training levels. It is one of the great strengths the U.S. has -- and Europeans do not. For instance, when Germany deployed fighters to Turkey as part of a NATO reaction force during DESERT STORM, it had no preplanned packages of spare parts; it had to requalify its pilots for low-level flying; and U.S. airlift had to deploy German equipment that was too big to fit in German or commercial transports. Even if NATO develops a baseline capability to deploy their crisis response forces, this is a U.S. "market niche" mission area.

• **Naval Superiority in the Mediterranean:** With more than 20 crises around the Mediterranean since 1980, the U.S. and NATO will continue to depend on U.S. naval forces as an important means to project power and respond to crisis throughout southern Europe -- (and if necessary) the Middle East and Northern Africa.

• **Crisis Response:** This capability reinforces political actions and contributes to crisis management and stabilization. Crisis response puts a premium on the capability to respond quickly to unpredicted events with operationally capable forces. As DESERT STORM highlighted, forces need to be fully qualified and ready to deploy and perform their missions. The next crisis may not give NATO several weeks to get its air forces low-level qualified, or its ground forces fully trained. The smaller the

standing force and the more politically sensitive the decision to use force, the greater the requirement for highly trained active forces and fully qualified reserves to respond to short notice crises.

As we saw in DESERT STORM, the U.S. Air Force has the capability to project power quickly from the theater or the United States. Additionally, the Marines afloat in the Mediterranean and the Army's brigade set of prepositioned equipment in Italy are postured for immediate deployment wherever NATO or the U.S. needs them. The U.S. should also consider taking several unit-sets of land-based prepositioned equipment in Europe (POMCUS) and making them afloat POMCUS to improve response time in the southern flank -- and to make the equipment more useful for U.S. non-NATO requirements.

- **Nuclear:** The U.S. provides key capabilities in the nuclear arena. Europeans will want the U.S. to maintain their long-range theater nuclear capability to dissuade other European nations from developing nuclear weapons to reach parity with the French, British, or Russians. Because of the dangers associated with proliferation inside and outside NATO, this is the last capability the U.S. should withdraw from the theater.

- **High Tech role specialization:** When NATO was first created, the U.S. goal was to use high-tech role specialization to minimize U.S. presence. Europeans resisted it then for political and industrial reasons -- and they will likely resist it again. However, the confluence of several factors will likely force NATO into a great deal of role specialization: (1) the constrained military budgets for research & development and the acquisition of new equipment; (2) the inevitable European pressure to reduce national forces and the U.S. domestic pressure to minimize forward-based forces; (3) the European need for U.S. capabilities to perform their crisis response mission; (4) the reduced requirement for standing national corps; (5) the need for a substantial, credible U.S. contribution that will convince Europeans the U.S. is committed and capable; and (6) the competing U.S. domestic pressures to protect U.S. bases and training areas, and U.S.-based force structure.

These factors all point to a forward-based U.S. force structure focused on power projection; highly mobile forces, and high-tech combat multipliers organized for crisis response. Assigning additional forces in Europe to meet U.S. (vice NATO) requirements will have to be balanced with political acceptability, response requirements, other competing U.S. global responsibilities, and U.S. force structure limitations.

FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS

Figure 13 highlights the types of forces the U.S. should consider as part of its NATO contribution. The specific forces are subject to many considerations -- primarily what do European nations expect (what is an adequate signal of U.S. commitment?), what does NATO need (to effectively meet its political and military objectives?), and what does the U.S. want (or what can it afford) in Europe to meet its non-NATO requirements? In each case, the U.S. should measure each specific

force against its contribution to the original four security objectives -- the conditions necessary to achieve the vital interests.




Figure 13: Military Forces

HOW QUICKLY DO WE NEED TO ACT?

... statecraft and strategy are practical arts which require decision makers to make decisions, whether they are confident that they have adequate vision of the truth of the matter at hand.²⁶

The U.S. has "set the standards" in European security for the past 45 years with its economic strength, political will, military capability and democratic values. The demise of the Soviet Union does not change that fact. As long as it remains effectively engaged, the U.S. will continue to play a key role in shaping the European security environment with the actions it does -- and does not take. However accurate or inaccurate the perception, Europeans see the U.S. military presence as a weather vane of U.S. commitment. Therefore, the obvious question is how quickly can the U.S. transition "safely" to this post-Cold War force structure. The truthful answer is that "it depends" on: (1) How quickly NATO transitions to a theater-wide collective security organization; (2) How quickly NATO adopts its crisis response role and sheds its Main Defense role; (3) How quickly

NATO begins to assume responsibilities for peace/crisis force structure, infrastructure, and logistic support; and (4) How much it matters if we are wrong.

One could draw an analogy between events in Europe and a game of "curling." Once tossed, the European "stone" has its own momentum. The United States, recognizing it can't "control" the stone, is slightly in front trying to influence its speed and direction by removing obstacles that could slow the stone, knock it off track, or cause it to miss its mark. However, if the U.S. is too far ahead or behind the stone, it loses whatever influence it could have had.

Implications of Drawing Down Too Fast : If the U.S. draws down too fast, the Europeans could perceive the U.S. is not committed to remain engaged in European security affairs. At that point they would likely marginalize NATO and (indirectly) the U.S. in European security decisions. Another nation or organization would quickly fill that security void and assert itself to balance the regional power and set up an alternative security framework which may, or may not, integrate effectively with the security interests of North America and the Pacific regions. The U.S. would also lose some capability to respond to urgent crises beyond NATO area. However, the most serious implication of drawing down too fast is that the U.S. could lose the ability to influence issues important to its vital interests.

Implications of Drawing Down Too Slow: From a U.S. domestic perspective, too slow a drawdown could compromise Congressional support for forward-based forces. This could force an emotional debate that casts logic aside and drives U.S. force levels down to a level that undermines European confidence in U.S. capability and commitment. Therefore, proposed steps such as additional troop withdrawals and protectionist trade policies, whatever their immediate political appeal, would reduce U.S. leverage and respect abroad.²⁷ Just like drawing down too fast, the most serious implication of drawing down too slowly is that the U.S. could lose the ability to influence issues important to its vital interests. It's a very fine line between accommodating domestic sensitivities and signaling **Involvement ... Cooperation ...and Leadership.**

RECOMMENDATIONS

This analysis focused on what the forward-based force is supposed to accomplish rather than how large it should be. It began with the premise that events, diplomacy, and politics are once again pushing and pulling on the United States to choose its role in European security. It looked at how dramatically the security environment changed as a result of the Soviet Union's demise, and what stayed the same. Perhaps most importantly, this analysis pushed aside Cold War stereotypes and made recommendations on why and how the U.S. military should continue to play a role in European security. It recommends the U.S.:

- Work within the regional context to influence European security decisions that impact U.S. vital interests;

- Shift from a threat-based to an interest-based strategic concept -- with particular attention on affecting the causes of crises and compensating for vulnerabilities as we pursue our interests;
- Measure the effectiveness of the military force structure by how well it supports the national security objectives of influence, non-threatening security environment, economic interdependence, and balance of power (deterrence will no longer be enough).
- Shift the unifying theme for U.S. engagement in post-Cold War Europe from the deterrence of an ideological and military threat -- to the shaping of a non-threatening security environment;
- Lead NATO's transition from a collective defense to a collective security organization (embracing all East European nations and former Soviet republics);
- Take all steps necessary to strengthen NATO's legitimacy, ensure its survival, and retain its influence in European security issues;
- Encourage NATO to stand-up more multinational crisis response forces and stand down its Main Defense Forces. These crisis response forces should have little or no national identity to make them acceptable for peacetime stationing and transregional crisis response. At the host nations' request, NATO/U.S. should provide peacetime basing of non-provocative forces in Eastern Europe;
- Pursue a unique "market niche" in the European security structure -- a niche the Europeans must fill to effectively pursue their crisis response strategy. This points to a forward-based force structure that is focused on power projection, highly mobile forces, and high-tech combat multipliers organized for crisis response.

Clearly these recommendations are a dramatic break from the past -- but they are shaped by the realities of the new European security environment. This paper proposes one way to secure U.S. vital interests -- certainly there are others. Whichever path the United States takes, however, we should recognize that if we want to influence the direction of change -- to secure our vital interests -- the United States must remain engaged.

It's crucially important to build and sustain public understanding of the emerging security needs, and public support for a well thought out military program to serve those needs.²⁸ As Henry Kissinger stated, "the United States needs a definition of national interest that commands consensus at home while accommodating the interests of other societies."²⁹ How successful the U.S. is in achieving its goals will depend largely on how well it meets those domestic and foreign policy needs, and, perhaps equally important, by how well others perceive the United States will meet their future expectations and requirements.

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- 1 Don Cook, Forging the Alliance, Arbor House, New York, pvii-viii.
 - 2 An operationally capable corps, 3-4 fighter wings, and a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean.
 - 3 Vital interests are those interests to which the U.S. has been willing to commit military force.
 - 4 Richard Nixon, Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One Superpower World, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992, p35.
 - 5 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989, p14-15.
 - 6 Tsuneo Akaha, Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy, Asian Survey, Vol XXXI, No.4, April 1991, p325.
 - 7 Self Defense efforts relate primarily to unilateral actions (or bilateral actions with bordering nations) the U.S. will continue to take to secure its own interests. The U.S. will not want to leave its survival interests entirely in the hands of another nation or group of nations. It will act within international or regional constructs when possible -- but outside them if necessary. U.S. security efforts in the international system relate primarily to working within multiregional organizations needed to address global issues. These include the World Bank, IMF, and the United Nations. Recent successes raised hopes the UN would be able to assume a more viable role in global security matters. However, the UN can't prevent acts of aggression. Also, because it is unlikely any nation will abdicate the right to defend its vital interests, the UN will not be able to act in any conflict that puts great powers on opposite sides. Instead, the UN's greatest promise lies in addressing issues all nations benefit from such as nuclear nonproliferation, peacekeeping forces, environmental issues, population issues, and the growing gap between the haves and the have nots.
 - 8 In this case, the U.S. deliberately maintained (as opposed to compensated for) this vulnerability during the Cold War to "enhance" stability (e.g. ABM Treaty).
 - 9 Japan was chosen because it is a non-Continental nation with a strong international economy but not currently participating in the NATO alliance.
 - 10 Akira Iriye, After Imperialism, The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921-1931, Imprint Publications, Chicago, 1990, p22.
 - 11 e.g. Japan entered Manchuria in 1931 (under the pretense of defensive security) and occupied the French Spratley Islands in 1939, etc.
 - 12 National Security Strategy of the United States, pv, August 1991.
 - 13 An example from the business world may help clarify the difference. A company using a threat-based concept would use some of its earnings for advertisement (to prevent a competitor from cutting into its market), and declare the rest as short-term dividends. The same company, using an interest-based concept would still spend some of its profits on advertising (to protect its market) but invest the rest in improved productivity, new products, and building a foundation for sustained future profits.
 - 14 Les Aspin, National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces, Jan 6, 1992.
 - 15 Walt W. Rostow, Regionalism in a Global System, p4.
 - 16 Nixon, p33.
 - 17 Rostow, p7.
 - 18 Ramifications For Tomorrow, HQ USEUCOM, 10 June 1991.
 - 19 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 7 Nov 1991, p15.
 - 20 The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 7 Nov 1991, p15.
 - 21 Value of Forward Deployed Forces, HQ USEUCOM, 5 July 1991, p3.
 - 22 USEUCOM Base Force Briefing, HQ USEUCOM, 10 July 1991.
 - 23 USEUCOM Base Force Briefing, HQ USEUCOM, 10 July 1991.
 - 24 USEUCOM Base Force Briefing, HQ USEUCOM, 10 July 1991.
 - 25 Proponents favoring the return of forces to the United States frequently cite the high economic cost associated with forward deployed forces. Numerous studies, however, provide no evidence that stationing those same forces in the U.S. results in significant savings. Value of Forward Deployed Forces, HQ USEUCOM, July 15 1991, p4.
 - 26 Gray, p26.
 - 27 Richard R. Burt, "Strength and Strategy: U.S. Security in the 1990s," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1988, p7.

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- ²⁸ Andrew J. Goodpaster, "New Priorities for U.S. Security," The Atlantic Council , 1991, p11.
- ²⁹ Henry Kissinger, "What Kind of World Order?," Washington Post , Dec. 3, 1991, p A21.