Brandt's OSTPOLITIK
Abstract
A review of Chancellor Willy Brandt's approach to West Germany's national security strategy reveals two principal impressions. First, his "ostpolitik" (eastern policy or, more specifically, an incremental conciliation with the then-communist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union) make him appear a prescient catalyst or at least a visionary. Unless one takes a deterministic view of history, Brandt's policy appears to have fostered conditions conducive to subsequent events, including: East-West rapprochement, the Soviet Union's radical foreign policy reorientation under Gorbachev, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and Germany's reunification on West Germany's terms. Second, Brandt's dogged, energetic diplomacy in the service of clear objectives showed that he, like all skilled diplomats, knew that good play could enhance the value of his cards. Brandt's conception of Germany's security interests and environment were explicit and precise. Perhaps key is the term "German" -- as opposed to "West German." The transfixing reality for Brandt was the continuing postwar division of Europe, seen most acutely for him as the division of the German nation into two states and the division of Berlin into two cities. These divisions were not simply painful in human and psychological terms. In Brandt's view, only with German reunification and the resolution of Europe's unnatural schism could the physical security and economic prosperity of German be assured.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 20, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA437165
Entities
People
- Julien Lebourgeois
Organizations
- National War College