North Korea's Strategic Intentions
Abstract
This monograph analyzes North Korea's strategic intentions and motivations. First, the views of leading analysts of North Korea regarding Pyongyang's strategic intentions are surveyed and examined. All of the analysts concur on a number of conclusions: (1) that the North Korean regime is not irrational; (2) this rationality leaves North Korea's leadership with a heightened sense of insecurity; (3) North Korea's rulers-or at least some of them-appear to be acutely aware of the reform dilemma they face. This third conclusion is particularly significant. Because North Korea's leaders fear that they would be undermining their positions if the regime adopts comprehensive reforms, they are reluctant to move down this slippery slope. However, without significant reform, North Korea's leaders realize they are probably condemning their regime to the ash heap of history. Pyongyang is probably more fearful of initiating change that it fears will spiral out of control than it is of doing little or nothing. Three alternative packages of Korean strategic intentions are identified: (1) the modest aim of regime survival; (2) a driving desire to maintain a strong, independent, and autonomous North Korea; (3) an ambitious and extremely aggressive goal-unification on North Korea's terms. In the final analysis, there are insufficient data to say with absolute certainty what North Korea's strategic intentions are. Any one of these three "packages" outlined is plausible, or intentions could conceivably fluctuate among the three, depending on how the regime assesses the situation at any particular point.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA437174
Entities
People
- Andres Scobell
Organizations
- United States Army War College