The U.S. Anti-Satellite Program: A Case Study in Decision-Making
Abstract
Today we are further away from having an operational anti- satellite (ASAT) weapon than we were four years ago. This is the case despite strong and unwavering support from the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and Unified and Specified Commanders-in-Chief. Unfortunately, this situation is not the result of a bilateral, negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union (which happens to possess operational ASAT's). Rather, it is primarily the result of Congressional pressure to kill (or at least torture to death) the Air Force's nearly operational Air Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV) ASAT. Today, the Army and the Navy are vying to develop and produce ASAT's not too dissimilar from what the Air Force recently cancelled. Logic does not appear to be driving the decision roaming process; bureaucratic politics has played a major role in getting us to where we are today. In this paper I will address two salient questions which, on the surface, would not have to be asked if simple logic prevailed: Why did the Air Force cancel its ASAT program and thus apparently abdicate a mission area which it must feel responsible for? Why do the Army and Navy think they can succeed in developing ASAT's while the Air Force did not?
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA437214
Entities
People
- Daniel L. Burkett Ii
Organizations
- National War College