

Toward A New National Defense Strategy:
Policing the Battlefields
of the Cold War

A National War College Research Project
by

Earl E. Keel, Jr.

23 April 1992

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 23 APR 1992		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Toward a New National Defense Strategy Policing the Battlefields of the Cold War				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University National War College Fort McNair Washington, DC 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 33	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY: POLICING THE BATTLEFIELDS OF THE COLD WAR

Introduction

As the drama of the Second Russian Revolution continues to unfold, the chorus of demands for a new national strategy to deal with the "new world order" reaches ever higher crescendos. (1)

Stunned by the speed of these changes and preoccupied by the Persian Gulf and other regional flash points, the development of U.S. national strategy has thus far been slow to respond. A "strategy gap" has developed. To date, our public national strategy has progressed little beyond the "New Defense Strategy" first announced by President Bush at the Aspen Conference of August 2, 1990.(2) This strategy recognized the collapse of the bipolar world order, predicted the replacement of the East-West confrontation with a proliferation of regional conflicts, and promised "a strong and engaged America."

How, where, and why America would be engaged was not defined. The strategy essentially proclaimed the U.S. to be in favor of the status quo (at least as far as it affects U.S. national interests) and that we were prepared to fight, if necessary, to maintain it. This, of course, is a threat not a strategy. The most charitable interpretation of this formulation is that it was crafted to buy time as a "wait and see" policy, an eminently sensible response to a world undergoing cataclysmic change, but one that has been profoundly unsatisfying to media pundits and aspiring politicians.

It is also noteworthy that in the Bush administration's two annual "National Defense Strategies" that have been offered since the Aspen Conference (3), little is said about timetables, without which all strategy is meaningless. The distinctions between near-term, intermediate-term, and long-term strategies

have been blurred. Because strategic planning is always oriented toward the future, long-term strategies tend to monopolize these formulations. This paper addresses the opposite end of the strategy spectrum. Rather than attempting a long-term global strategy, a task far beyond the vision of this author, this paper addresses a more modest topic: the immediate post-Cold War transition period. Its aim is to suggest directions (and caveats) for a rational "war termination phase" for the Cold War, one aimed at laying a foundation favorable for the creation of a just and lasting peace.

The premise of this study is that the vestiges of the Cold War still represent formidable -- and greatly underestimated -- obstacles to such a peace. It is submitted that all successive intermediate- and long-term strategies will be shaped by how we manage the immediate post-Cold War transition period.

Nature and Urgency of the Task

The arrested development of post-Cold War strategy is no accident. It has very real psychological antecedents that make coming to grips with the ending of the Cold War profoundly difficult. And until meaningful closure with these psychological dimensions is achieved, this national trend toward procrastination in our strategic thinking will continue to inhibit development of a truly effective post-Cold War national strategy.

In many respects the Cold War was as much a state of mind as a state of war, and as a psychological phenomenon it has had enormous impact. The powerful confrontation of East and West has been so pervasive for so long that it has thoroughly permeated the very thought processes that we use in dealing with international relations. First, because of the awesome risks of this confrontation, our attention was fixated on the East-West axis of the global arena. Secondly, to manage the high risks of confrontation and nuclear escalation, both East and West were forced

to adopt restrictive and artificial paradigms for dealing with the world that tended to reduce every problem of international relations to the common denominators of its implications to the bipolar equation. And thirdly, irreconcilable ideological differences tended to force both East and West to define our differences in moralistic terms. Both sides saw the Cold War as a struggle between "good and evil." (4) Such thought processes are far too ingrained (and perhaps even too convenient) to be easily eradicated.

Another psychological aspect of the problem that makes it difficult for policy makers to come to grips with post-Cold War strategy is that it reveals a profound identity crisis for this nation. America's greatness as a superpower was to a large extent a function of the threats that it overcame, particularly Soviet nuclear and conventional military threats. With the disappearance of the primary threat, U.S. power is diminished both in relative as well as in absolute terms. (5) Reconciling the goals of a "strong and engaged America" with one that is severely limited in military reach and capacity presents understandable difficulties for the current generation of strategic planners.

Thus, the first objective of the transition strategy is closure with these psychological issues. Time is the enemy of this goal: the more the passage of time obscures the origins of these biases, the harder it will be to recognize them for what they are and to effectively deal with them.

The second element of this strategy of transition is the reconstruction of our institutions and instruments of statescraft, which is closely related to the closure issue. It requires acceptance of a fundamentally changed world order. And like the issue of closure, post-Cold War restructuring will also be inhibited by serious underestimations of the magnitude of the task. Notwithstanding the very considerable efforts of the present

administration to accommodate the new international realities in the form of bureaucratic downsizing and reorganizing, little has been done to fundamentally alter our institutions and instruments of statescraft. The basic approach has been to fit the old paradigms on to a federal bureaucracy (especially its military establishment), which, although smaller, remains essentially unchanged in missions and functions.

The relevance of our internal bureaucratic mechanisms to the new geopolitical environment must be thoroughly and critically reassessed and, where appropriate, modified. The changed requirements for our instruments of foreign policy -- particularly the military instruments -- must be revalidated and relearned.

Our foreign policy assumptions and premises must also be reassessed. For the past half-century, virtually every U.S. foreign relationship has been shaded, and in many cases, painted in vivid colors, by the hues of the East-West confrontation. The imperatives of the Strategy of Containment imposed a template on all relationships that tended to predetermine their nature as to friend or foe. Decades of hostility, suspicion and intrigue on our part and on the part of our Cold War adversaries and allies (and their adversaries and allies) have thoroughly permeated our foreign policy and national security bureaucracies and they will continue to influence our thoughts and actions well into the future.

To leave behind this baggage would require a thorough and critical reassessment of our basic national interests and goals and a zero-based review of our relationships with virtually every country, region, and alliance in the world. Such a comprehensive foreign policy review could provide not only a valid basis for a new understanding of our true interests and real threats, but it could also yield a new basis for a more rational restructuring of our military requirements and capabilities. Lacking such a

reassessment, our foreign policies will continue to be influenced by Cold War legacies. They will introduce flaws in our national security policies and they will arrest the development of coherent national security strategies. And they will rob the institutions and people responsible for implementing these strategies of a sense of mission and purpose, severely undermining morale and effectiveness.

The third element of this strategy of transition addresses the need to get our national house in order. This applies to both the underlying foundations of our strength as a superpower -- especially our declining economic capabilities -- as well as to the definition of our self-identity in the new world order. Is America to play the role of the unipolar hegemon, a multipolar balance-of-power arbitrator, or yet another role?

These are all urgent tasks. The suddenness and completeness of the ending of the Cold War itself is partly responsible for this urgency. It has thrust upon us a unique opportunity to make bold new strategies that will be accepted if implemented now, while the situation is ripe for change.

The Russian Issue

The litmus test for a post-Cold War transition strategy will be its effectiveness in dealing with the successor states to the Soviet Union.

Great uncertainties complicate this test. Since the self-destruction of the Soviet government last December, the states of the former Soviet Union are in political, social and economic freefall. And they have not yet reached terminal velocity.

The severity of the problems facing these new republics defy comprehension. The limited resources of many of the independent republics, the flimsy integration of the "commonwealth" structure, the resurgence of powerful nationalist forces and the

rapid disintegration of the instruments of political and economic control all suggest little hope for success of the current governmental system. There is little doubt that Russia is just beginning a process of metamorphosis that will ultimately transform it into a country of a very different nature. And to get there it is entirely conceivable that the people of the former Soviet Union may have to again endure a prolonged period of intense suffering and social upheaval.

The ultimate form of government that will emerge from this process may look very different from the institutions that now seem to be developing. Precisely because of the severity of the problems facing these republics, it is very possible that the end result may more closely resemble the severely authoritarian and centrally directed governmental systems that were discarded than those that seem to be now developing. As much as we would like to see them succeed, democratic political processes and market economics simply may not be able to cope with the monumental economic, social and political challenges that now confront the Russian and non-Russian people of the former Soviet Union.

Although arguments based on "national character" always invite skepticism, during times of desperation it will be extremely hard for the Russians to turn away from what has been their historical response to national Times of Troubles. Such crises evoke calls for strong, authoritarian leadership, and the voices advocating such government can already be heard. Democratic processes remain alien to the Soviet and prerevolutionary experience. As the situation becomes more desperate, these experiments are likely to be quickly discarded. Experiments with market economy institutions may also be abandoned as irrelevant to the struggles for survival that lie ahead.

It is also important to remember that the ingrained Cold War responses that complicate our own foreign policy institutions and ideals are mirrored in Russian political culture. And

superimposed on these responses is a uniquely Soviet and Russian mix of ethnocentricity, xenophobia and paranoia. It will be even harder for the Russians to surmount these historic and cultural biases than it will be for our us to come to grips with our own biases. We, moreover, have the luxury of time to confront these problems; the Russians do not. We can develop strategies and plans for dealing with these issues on our own terms. They must deal with them while struggling for their very survival.

In formulating a transitional strategy for dealing with these problems, it is vital that we recognize the realities of the situation and the limitations of our abilities to change these realities. And -- most importantly -- it is essential that we keep the end game firmly in mind. The defining, unifying objective of all of our strategies, regardless of whether they are transitional in nature or are aimed for the intermediate or long terms, must be the ultimate nature of our relations with what will be potentially one of the most powerful nations on the face of the earth.

Russia is a country of enormous natural and human resources. Its energy and industrial capacity ensure that it will eventually take its place as a major player in future global relations. The nature of its relations with the other world powers, most especially the U.S., will be much more important than its particular form of government and the nature of its economic system. And the way we manage this current period of transition will largely determine whether Russia emerges from this period willing and able to build constructive, friendly relations with the West.

This situation suggests the need for a transitional strategy that is flexible, cautious, and above all tolerant. The scale and severity of the economic problems on Russia's horizon demand that the primary objectives of the strategy should be humanitarian. Efforts to "shape" economic, social and political

institutions to our specifications should be approached with great caution. Aside from the practical obstacles to such efforts, they are at great risk of backfiring either in execution or in retrospect as their gains are swept away by the tides of further social and political changes.

Without sacrificing humanitarian and relief efforts, we must avoid tying our fortunes to any particular social or political system, regardless of its attractiveness or similarity to our own values. The First Russian Revolution of 1917 provides ample lessons of the futility and political stupidity of Western intervention (especially military intervention!) in the maelstrom of civil war. Although the American, British and French military expeditions to the Kola Peninsula and the Maritime Provinces during 1917-1921 made scant impressions on Western history, their impact on subsequent Soviet history was bitter and lasting.

The end game must not be the restructuring of the Russian and non-Russian states in our own image, but the reduction of their long-term threat to global and regional security. The paramount aim of our strategy should be a massive reduction of the global strategic nuclear threat. For the first time in modern history this new geopolitical landscape provides an opportunity to pursue that goal. This opportunity, however, will be brief, and to take advantage of it our post-Cold War transition strategy must focus sharply on these issues.

The first priority of this strategy must be to counter the effects of political instability on the loss of control of weapons of mass destruction. The present risk of massive political instability is very great, and much that is being done by the U.S. and other countries directly addresses this problem. The President's 27 September announcement of the unilateral disarmament of theater and sea-going tactical nuclear weapons, which generated equally substantial Soviet (and subsequent CIS) reciprocal moves, was a landmark step in this direction. It is

-

crucial that these initiatives continue while the internal political situation is still sufficiently stable to ensure that this technology can be neutralized in a safe and expeditious manner.

Key to the success of such efforts will be the cooperation of the CIS centralized military establishment, which itself faces a very uncertain future. An important part of our transition strategy should be the broadening of our contracts with the former Soviet military establishment while it still exists as a unified military entity. The US-USSR Convention on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities could provide a valuable framework for extending military-military contacts in this area. Later this mechanism could be further expanded to the other former Soviet republics, and ultimately these procedures and protocols can be extended by having the United Nations take over their administration. They could then be further extended into a global mechanism for enhancing communications aimed at preventing military accidents and dangerous escalating situations.

For the reasons cited above, the military-to-military cooperation requires particularly close monitoring and control. The appearance of interference in internal matters must be avoided at all costs, and planning for such operations must place a high premium on rapid disengagement should the political situation so dictate.

While doing this, we must ensure that we take every possible opportunity to prevent proliferation of other, non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical and biological weapons. The revolution in biotechnical technologies during the past two decades has made the proliferation of biological weapons particularly more dangerous and likely. Modern laboratory techniques, particularly gene-splicing methods, allow the

combination of different toxic features with different agents in ways that suggest frightening new military potential. (6) Such techniques are becoming increasingly accessible to Third World countries, and with the assistance of biochemists from the former Soviet Union, this technology could enjoy a much more rapid expansion.

Thus, the very legitimate fear of a potential diaspora of nuclear researchers and weapons scientists represents only one dimension of this problem. Efforts to contain the exodus of "nuclear mercenaries" should certainly continue to receive priority in this transition strategy, but not to the exclusion of efforts to control other technologies (particularly biochemical technologies) of mass destruction.

The second -- and ultimately much more important -- priority of this strategy aims at accelerating the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. As we took the lead with tactical nuclear weapons, so we must seize the initiative with strategic weapons. The unilateral strategic arms reductions announced by the President in his State of the Union address on 28 January was crucial in starting this process. Thus far, however, these moves have been justified as reactive measures, i.e., they have "reflected the changes of the new era." "Reacting to the threat" is a Cold War response that, in the present situation, is simply anachronistic. At this time we have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to shape the nature of the global nuclear threat.

The fundamentally and irreversibly altered situations of Russia and the other three "nuclear republics" of the former Soviet Union allow nuclear retrenchment far beyond these measures. The potential for doing so has been demonstrated by President Yeltsin's ready responses to the State of the Union proposals, which he surpassed in terms of overall warhead and launcher reductions in every instance.

What is urgently needed is U.S. leadership in a global forum --- preferably in the United Nations -- to redefine the nuclear environment and "rules of engagement" of the post-Cold War era. The goal is not proportional reduction, but a massive overall reduction of nuclear weaponry both by the states of the former Soviet Union, ourselves, and our former Cold War allies. If we take advantage of the momentum now building, this is an achievable goal.

Among the possible obstacles to the realization of this goal is the very real danger that this process will become entangled with other post-Cold War complications, particularly economic aid and humanitarian relief. Much has been written about the use of economic "leverage" in accelerating the pace of Russian demilitarization. This is a dangerous trap, very likely to backfire. As alluded to above, below the surface of Russian statescraft run powerful forces of a national character that is deeply suspicious of foreign motives and that will be quick to identify efforts at economic blackmail. If this trap is sprung, the republics of the former Soviet Union may well play along with us for their own purposes, but this will not lead to fundamental restructuring.

The far greater obstacles to this process, however, will be those that originate from within our own borders. As this process begins, powerful forces will gather momentum to retard its acceleration. Domestic politics and military-industrial economic considerations will combine with sheer bureaucratic inertia to retard the realization of these goals. Issues of national pride and "great power hegemony" will be raised. Behind all of these problems will remain a hidden Cold War agenda that will assume that regardless of the outcome of the reordering of national interests and borders in the former Soviet Union, Russia will ultimately emerge as a strategic nuclear power, with the U.S. as its primary enemy.

Thus, the issue of closure with the ending of the Cold War

again assumes paramount importance. It is an absolute prerequisite if we are to be able to assure the Russians, the world, and ourselves that we have the opportunity and the will to shape a different kind of world in the Twenty-first Century.

The New Foreign Agenda

It is also clear that the management of change with Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union will have to be conducted within an entirely changed international context. For all of its contradictions and enormous costs, the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations brought with it a disintegration of a complex network of interdependent relationships that yielded a modicum of international stability (at least as far as East-West relations were concerned).

As the President predicted in 1990 (2), the post-Cold War new world order is proving to be infinitely "more complicated, more volatile and less predictable." Many of our long-standing national security requirements, institutions and strategies have been rendered totally obsolete, and all have been thrown into a state of profound turmoil.

In this "new world order" the old formulas for distinguishing friend from foe will not always work. And, as noted above, our relationships with the world community have been deeply distorted by a half-century of Cold War polarization and are not likely to be easily realigned. Future alliances and coalitions will be complex and volatile. New economic imperatives will add further instability. Supportive relationships with allies will weaken as the threat that bound them to us recedes into memory. Previously unquestioned assumptions will suddenly prove invalid, and new alliances with unlikely partners loosely bound by ephemeral causes will materialize out of nowhere. (7)

Stripped of the enforced stability of the Cold War, a global

resurgence of powerful ethnic, religious and irredentist forces will also immensely complicate future statescraft and strategies. And, as conflict erupts, the potential for uncontrolled escalation will be greatly increased by the intensity of violence of modern warfare. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the increasing lethality of conventional munitions have made the penalties for mistakes and miscalculations less acceptable than ever before.

The Persian Gulf Conflict provided several intimations of the dangers of this new geopolitical environment. Only in retrospect have we learned how close Iraq was to developing a nuclear weapon. And the potential for that conflict's escalation with conventional weapons alone was enormous. Suppose, for example, that the vagaries of ballistics caused a single Iraqi conventionally armed SCUD warhead to impact on a densely populated facility (a hospital or university) in Tel Aviv. Israel's entry into the war would have been unavoidable. This development could have led to a general Middle East war with drastically reconfigured alliances on both sides. The loss of Persian Gulf oil supplies inevitable from such a conflict could have further widened the conflict beyond the Arabian Peninsula.

Dealing with this new environment will severely test the capabilities of our instruments and strategies of statescraft. Especially during the immediate transitional period, our foreign policy bureaucracy will be engaged in global issues with an intensity never before experienced in the history of American foreign affairs. Entirely new strategies will have to be quickly developed and effectively implemented. New organizations, new talent, and new thinking will be needed to insure that we do not fall into the trap of trying to apply familiar, but obsolete Cold War paradigms to these new situations, and this particularly applies to the use of strategies of containment and isolation.

The euphoria of "winning" the Cold War should not lead us to

draw the wrong lessons from the that experience. It is crucial that we recognize that the strategy of containment used against the Soviet Union and its allies, was forced upon us by circumstances beyond our control, and although its outcome was ultimately successful, the strategy was inherently flawed. It arrested the development of our statescraft and diplomacy, reducing them to simplistic, almost binary formulas, that in turn rendered many of our potentially most valuable instruments of diplomacy (such as the United Nations) utterly useless. It generated an arms race that neither superpower could afford, and led to the development of new weapons of mass destruction that both could control only with great difficulty. It was, in short, a reactive, simplistic strategy that "contained" our own foreign strategies as much as it did our enemies.

Instead of containing adversaries, we need to develop effective strategies aimed at engaging them and shaping the development of their foreign and military policies along lines favorable to our own. We must recognize that, regardless of the apparent justification, the tactic of applying "minicontainments" of hostile, recalcitrant, or otherwise difficult nations is ultimately counterproductive. By avoiding the engagement of issues, containment avoids opportunities for conflict resolution and within the targeted nation it sets into motion irrational and perhaps irreversible forces that may be costly to our long-term strategic objectives. A small nation, feeling its survival threatened by a large, powerful nation, for example, may intensify its effort to develop weapons of mass destruction, terrorist capabilities, etc.

Rejecting the "bunker mentality" of the Cold War implies the need for a much more creative and dynamic foreign policy. It also implies a willingness to play a more active, responsible role in global and regional affairs, including forsaking the

security of bilateral relationships for the more risky, but ultimately more productive multilateral arena. The new potential that the United Nations has shown as an effective forum for conducting new strategies, especially dating from the Persian Gulf crisis, could be an important element of that equation.

It may be argued that U.S. foreign policy has already stepped forward to these challenges, and examples can be cited to show that this is the case. Certainly, our relations with China provide a good example of a more flexible, realistic strategy that has been working successfully for several decades. Despite setbacks in the wake of the Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989, U.S.-Chinese relations have seen gradual, but steady improvement. This improvement has been hard fought and fairly won despite obstacles of irreconcilable ideological differences and vast disparities in our economies, systems of government and social values. Without a great deal of fanfare, a fundamental exception to the strategy of containment, as it pertained to China, was tacitly accepted, and both parties have benefited from it.

The outcome of this strategy remains an open issue. The collapse of Soviet Communism and relations with the New Russia will unquestionably generate serious internal debates in China, which could lead to significant changes in leadership, policy and strategy as the PRC redefines its vital national interests. These changes may well inspire internal pressures, particularly pressures for human rights and democratic reforms, which could force cataclysmic changes to China's present institutions and form of government. On the other hand, the collapse of "revisionist" Soviet Communism, leaving China as the uncontested, sole surviving leader of the Third World Marxist revolution, may merely reinforce China's Marxist-Leninist imperatives, leading to a new Cultural Revolution, a hardening of reactionary, right-wing political elements, and a drastic deterioration of U.S.-Chinese relationships.

In other words, even when executed effectively, a more flexible post-Cold War strategy has no guarantee of success. And there are other regions where greater flexibility may incur risks that at this time may be unacceptable.

North Korea falls in that category. Despite recent stirrings of rapprochement on the Korean peninsula, friendly overtures by North Korea, without evidence of internal political or social change, should be viewed with great suspicion. By including North Korea among the vanquished nations of the Cold War (with corollary assumptions about the requirement for a reduced U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula), we may make a grave mistake that is likely to have costly consequences, perhaps in the very near future. The current atmosphere of optimism and goodwill, combined with a very confused and unstable international environment, while conducive to genuine rapprochement and the forging of entirely new relationships, also provides unique opportunities for deception and the masking of traditional aggressive designs under peace overtures. At this time we must continue to be especially alert to the possibilities of deception on the part of potential enemies.

Such caveats notwithstanding, great opportunities exist for a more flexible strategy to improve post-Cold War relationships. In the Middle East, for example, the disappearance of the Soviet threat means that we should be able to create a more objective and even-handed approach in that region. Many (although by no means all) of the compelling reasons that held our Middle East strategies hostage to those of Israel no longer exist. We should be prepared to help Israel accept these new realities, and we must seize every available opportunity to forge a balanced regional policy. In so doing we must also develop a better way of dealing with the issue of "Islamic Fundamentalism," which threatens to polarize our relationships with most of the nations of the Middle East. The deep-seated biases that color our

relations with the Moslem world owe much to our Cold War tradition of "black and white" statesmanship.

A better example, in our own hemisphere, of the potential for a more flexible post-Cold War strategy to restructure our foreign relations is provided by Cuba. Cuba is a prime example of the degree to which we are still influenced by anachronistic Cold War strategies. Stripped of her former economic and ideological supporters, saddled with bankrupt economic and political systems, it is time that we reassess our foreign policy toward this nation. Simply put, without her Soviet backers, Cuba is no longer a worthy enemy. Our traditional "minicontainment" of this nation simply serves no further purpose other than retaining a hostile and difficult neighbor. A more appropriate policy to the new era would be to drop all embargoes and trade restrictions, and seek maximum penetration of Cuban economic, social and political institutions. Given Cuba's pitiful economic situation, Castro would be powerless to turn aside a diplomatic and economic blitz that in a decade or less could totally integrate Cuba into our own economic and political spheres of interest on our own terms.

In short, the suddenness of the end of the Cold War provides a unique, once-in-a-generation opportunity to break free of the outmoded premises of our past strategies and to proclaim a new era of American foreign policy. The basis of this policy should be an objective, unbiased reassessment of every bilateral and multilateral relationship in our diplomatic portfolio. This would require extraordinary leadership, discipline and statesmanship. It would essentially stop our foreign policy mechanisms in mid-stride long enough for us to redefine the world in new, more realistic terms.

And to be credible it must be done soon. The more time we allow to intervene between the collapse of the bipolar world

order and the establishment of a new basis for international relations, the more our motives and intentions will be suspect. And the more unhealthy baggage we will pick up along the way.

Defense Implications

The new foreign agenda has great implications for defense planning. By facilitating reassessment of our new defense requirements on the basis of true interests and real threats, it aids more rational resizing and restructuring of our military capabilities.

The strength of this approach is that it recognizes new roles for the instruments of power in the new world order. It also allows us to more easily sort out the assets and liabilities from the military instruments remaining from the Cold War. Many of the tools of military statescraft, for example, were originally designed for very different applications than they will see in the future. Every weapons system in our inventory -- from the M16 rifle to the B-2 bomber -- was originally designed with a specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat in mind. A "zero-based" functional review of our military assets would suggest approaches for minimizing the liabilities of specific military capabilities (or at least reducing their more destabilizing elements) and creating a strategic and theater force structure that is more suitable for protecting U.S. national interests; one that is smaller, more responsive and better controlled.

It may be argued that this restructuring has already been in progress for several years and that plans for major changes are well under way. I would submit, however, that despite the changes that have occurred in the international order during the past 2-3 years, the Cold War military establishment, although bloodied by budgetary and personnel cuts, base closures, and program losses, remains functionally intact and in the main unaffected.

Failure to make an effective transition to the realities of the changed world order is not only misdirected and wasteful; it is counterproductive. It threatens to destroy the very opportunities needed to make changes in today's world. By continuing to maintain a defense establishment that is sized, structured, and equipped for traditional Cold War tasks, we continue to be influenced by obsolete Cold War paradigms, which both cripples our effectiveness militarily and arrests the development of truly effective post-Cold War military capabilities. Its very existence will cast doubt on our motives and arouse unjustified suspicion in the international arena, and it restricts our opportunities for multilateral actions. Worse of all, an anachronistic military posture is likely to fail to satisfy crucial future military requirements.

The dilemma facing current military planners is that massive restructuring can not be done without unacceptable economic dislocations and the "hollowing" of contingency forces that are still essential. In the short term, massive downsizing, restructuring and re-equipping simply is not possible. That is why a transitional strategy is needed to selectively focus on the elements of the military establishment that are most anachronistic and counterproductive, to begin to phase in new capabilities, and to start the development of new missions, functions, and roles.

The most destabilizing element of our post-Cold War military inventory and the first that must be addressed is the strategic nuclear deterrent. Clearly, both East and West realize that the end of the utility of these forces is fast approaching, if indeed it is not already here. As indicated above, efforts by the U.S. and the former Soviet republics to draw down the strategic arsenals must not lose momentum. And we must make every effort to include our allies in this process as well. But the leadership for this effort must come from the U.S., and the example that our

actions set. At this instant of history it is crucial that we recognize that our strategic inventory is no longer part of the solution to world peace. It is a major component of the problem. As long as this inventory is maintained in anywhere near its present levels, our motives for retaining these weapons will be suspect and efforts to reduce the worldwide inventories of strategic nuclear weapons will be hindered.

For the same reasons it is equally important that the worldwide inventories of tactical nuclear weapons be drastically reduced. Our inventories of these weapons far exceeds any foreseeable future requirement. Toward this end, the President's 27 September announcement of the unilateral reductions of theater and sea-going tactical nuclear weapons was an extremely timely and appropriate measure. This is not, however, intended to suggest that total "denuclearization" should be a national strategic goal. As long as worldwide nuclear proliferation remains a fact of life, a credible tactical nuclear deterrent (with airborne delivery systems capable of reliably penetrating high-threat SAM and AAM environments) will continue to be necessary. As the "strategic nuclear umbrella," with its promise of mutual assured destruction effectively nullified the possibility of global nuclear war for the last half-century, the possibility of the use of theater tactical nuclear weapons may well restrain future conflict. As terrible as these weapons are, their alternative (a "world made safe for conventional warfare") (8) does not seem to represent a change for the better.

Reducing strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles could have a highly beneficial impact on the global nuclear proliferation problem. It would not only remove materials and devices from circulation (and, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union, possible loss), but it could open new possibilities for multilateral cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation. By reducing the great disparities between the developed nuclear

powers and emerging nuclear nations, it could provide a new impetus to motivate additional participation in the nonproliferation treaty mechanism.

As far as conventional forces are concerned, new requirements for flexibility and mobility (particularly strategic lift requirements) have been well elaborated in current national defense strategies, both by the administration in Congress, and will not be further treated in this paper. Absent from these strategies, however, is the treatment of roles and missions for these forces. The following illustrative examples are offered to suggest possible directions that redefined roles and missions debate could take.

The uncertain, rapidly changing geopolitical environment will significantly change the roles and missions of the Army. In addition to the Army's standing requirements to respond to regional contingencies, the future roles of U.S. Special Operations Forces will be especially affected. For example, although the overall levels of political change, both by peaceful and violent means, is likely to significantly increase in the future, the need for SOF counterinsurgency reactions to such changes may well decrease. The removal of bipolar confrontation as a setting for these crises, significantly changes the counterinsurgency equation. Absent ideological overtones (e.g., of a "communist-inspired takeover" or a "surrogate-backed insurgency"), the overall requirement for U.S. intervention or assistance is greatly reduced, especially if the regime in difficulty is truly deserving of social or political change.

Rather than trying to stop political change that may be in the long-run inevitable, if not in the short-term desirable, it would seem much more sensible to put our efforts into trying to remove the underlying causes of social and political unrest. The unique qualifications of Special Operations Forces for civic

action efforts, which already comprises a very large part of the existing SOF mission, could be a valuable resource for this work. SOF-executed civic action programs, humanitarian efforts, and security assistance missions could play an extremely important role in extending U.S. influence and military presence in a non-provocative and highly constructive manner. It would seem reasonable at this time to re-emphasize the importance of these missions.

The Air Force would play a critical supporting role in these efforts. Current programs aimed at increasing strategic airlift capabilities (e.g., the C-17) would be vital to their success. Air operations in the Persian Gulf Conflict also demonstrated the necessity of robust and capable tactical and theater power projection capabilities. Less obvious is the continued need for further development of new-generation (i.e., B-2) strategic bombing capabilities.

The most dramatic changes in post-Cold War Air Force missions will occur in space. Traditionally, the Air Force has claimed a far-reaching and dynamic "war in space" mission, aimed at countering hostile efforts to interfere with U.S. spacecraft and establishing "space superiority" for friendly spaceborne platforms. Absent a creditable opponent in space, much -- if not all -- of this mission is now clearly obsolete, and it should be scrapped. Indeed, were it not for the continuing efforts by the administration to fund such efforts, it would appear superfluous to urge elimination of our offensive and defensive capabilities in space at this time. A far more cost-effective and far-sighted approach would be to shift our emphasis to diplomatic initiatives aimed at promoting greater international interdependency of space efforts and more effective controls over offensive military activities in space.

Particularly in need of rethinking is the administration's position on follow-on projects to the Strategic Defense Initia-

tive, namely the GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) system. The continuing momentum for such programs is another triumph of Cold War inertia over logic. Although a "thin" ABM capability has definite advantages to offer Eurasian nations threatened by the continuing proliferation of short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, only the weakest cost-effectiveness arguments can be made for a North American ballistic missile defense role for this system. Rather than serving as an instrument of national security, this system has far greater significance as an instrument of global, or at least regional, security. A Eurasian "ABM umbrella" could be a significant stabilizing force and a powerful disincentive for nations considering the acquisition of ballistic missile systems. But such a system, were it to be developed, should be paid for by those most likely to benefit from it, not by the U.S. taxpayer. GPALS is an excellent example of a space issue that should be moved from the national to the international arena.

The changing role of the Navy also deserves special treatment. This role is particularly affected by the elimination of shipborne tactical nuclear weapons. By removing a major impediment to the Navy's free access to ports and world oceans (e.g., particularly in Southeast Asia) the loss of these weapons is compensated by significant enhancements to some of the most crucial attributes of naval power: freedom of movement and global range. Such access could conceivably greatly enhance the Navy's traditional SLOC protection and power projection roles.

The challenge to future maritime strategy will be to develop ways to exploit such access in a world that perceives a greatly reduced need for a U.S. presence and that will continue to be deeply suspicious of U.S. "interventionist tendencies." To maintain a creditable global presence, one that includes forward deployment capabilities and basing rights, new roles and new functions for our naval assets will have to be found.

U.S. naval power has unique capabilities to address many of the most critical and ultimately most threatening of the true threats to our long-term national security. Earth is an ocean planet. Our national security is ultimately intimately bound to the health of the oceanic environment, which is being pillaged and polluted on a global scale. U.S. naval power has enormous potential to assist in global environmental problems. Maritime resources, including intelligence resources, have unique capabilities to aid in the collection and study of oceanographic and meteorologic data. Under an international (i.e., United Nations) mandate, the Navy could play a major role in protecting the global marine environment. As part of that effort the Navy could also significantly extend the range of our efforts to control the movement of illegal drugs, particularly in Southeast Asian waters where our presence is becoming increasingly problematic.

It is true that these are all functions that are now performed (on a much smaller scale) by the U.S. Coast Guard. However, to be effective on a global scale would require the far greater range and sustainability capabilities that only the Navy could bring to bear.

The advantage of this new maritime role is that it would keep our forces engaged, forward deployed and ready to play a role in regional conflicts in such a manner that not only will be seen as being unprovocative, but as being positive, responsible and constructive in a way that is commensurate with our role as a global power. (9) Consistent with this role, the Navy should place new emphasis on humanitarian, diplomatic and even economic development missions. Rapid deployment of appropriate units for goodwill port visits, especially those that bring aid to areas impacted by natural disasters, health problems and economic disasters, should be encouraged. Such missions should be

coordinated by State and A.I.D. authorities to achieve the maximum political and humanitarian benefit.

It will be argued that such efforts to create a "kinder, gentler Navy" will be difficult to justify during a period of fiscal austerity likely to cut deeply into the muscle of our military capabilities. If, however, the U.S. Navy is to remain relevant and in a position to be able to perform its vital traditional national security functions, it must find a new formula for remaining engaged and postured for future contingencies.

Regardless of the ultimate form that the military establishment takes, the new international environment will place new, much more stringent demands on mechanisms of command and control. Because of the more fluid international environment, combined with the increasing lethality of modern weapons systems, the potential for conflict escalation is much greater than any time in modern history and the penalties for loss of control under these conditions are much more severe. Great stress will be put on positive command and control mechanisms to ensure that military options are precisely and effectively applied.

To ensure more positive control, serious consideration should be given to reassessing the theater command role. Recent history, especially since the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (which completed the process of removing the Chairman of the JCS, the service chiefs, and the Joint Staff itself from the operational chain of command), has seen the assumption of an enormous amount of operational control by the CinC's of the unified commands. It is submitted that the degree of autonomy that these commanders now enjoy may not be suitable for the highly volatile and interdependent international environment of the future.

Not only will positive mechanisms of national and theater

command and control have to be perfected, but considerable resources will have to be dedicated to rethinking contingency planning. Cold War-conditioned responses within the military establishment may contribute major destabilizing elements. Standard Operating Procedures and Rules of Engagement developed for bygone eras will remain in the military repertoire, with a high potential for automatically injecting dysfunctional responses into future crises.

The military planning process may also contribute to potential destabilization. Contingency plans based on obsolete premises undoubtedly remain on the shelves and readily available at national and theater headquarters. At the moment of crisis they may inject powerful biases toward options that are no longer relevant or appropriate.(10) This can happen for many reasons. First, there simply has not been enough time and resources to adequately address this problem, particularly in the light of other more pressing planning crises. Secondly, the crisis situation may not wholly conform to the planning scenario. Crises rarely unfold exactly according to plan. Finally, the planning process itself may be flawed. Military operational planning is notable for its lack of involvement of any outside organization. It normally takes place exclusively in the Joint Staff and at unified command headquarters. Thus, the plans are made based on local interpretation of national strategies and national interests, often without essential inputs from outside players (e.g., diplomatic and intelligence functions). They may contain unrealistic assumptions about the capabilities of outside agencies to support the plan or obsolete geopolitical assumptions.(11)

Finally, effective control also implies the need for better intelligence. This insight will be crucial in the fluid and uncertain future international environment. Not only will more and better intelligence be required, but timeliness requirements

will be much more stringent. As our forward-deployed forces are reduced, intelligence must provide increased warning times necessary for more demanding mobilization and logistics requirements. The vagaries of the post-Cold War environment also demand changes in intelligence methodologies. Our Indications and Warning analytic methods must complete a transition from those that are capabilities-based (appropriate to a single threat with a reasonably well-known set of offensive capabilities) to ones that are intentions-based (directed against multiple, global threats with military forces that do not always generate unambiguous threat indicators). Clearly the role of "low-tech" human intelligence (HUMINT) will be critical to meeting these requirements.

However, these increased requirements will be levied against increasing austere resources as intelligence resources continue to shrink. To maximize the effectiveness of intelligence investments, it is essential that the national strategic requirements for intelligence be well formulated and articulated. Unless the underlying national strategy objectives are well designed and well understood, the management of intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and reporting efforts will suffer. Even operating with optimum efficiency, the requirements of the new geopolitical environment will still exceed national capabilities. Greater reliance on multilateral intelligence "burden-sharing" will be necessary. New methods of cultivating and enlisting Third World capabilities (particularly HUMINT capabilities) in acquiring, processing and assimilating intelligence must be found, especially against low-priority intelligence targets that suddenly become crisis focal points.

In short, our military capabilities, like our foreign relations instruments and institutions, must be subjected to thorough, zero-based assessment of new missions and new capabilities. The intent is to create a force structure that is

both relevant to current military and political requirements and that is fiscally sustainable.

The urgency of this task can not be over-emphasized. Deep cuts of our military capabilities are already in progress, and without a plan firmly grounded in the realities of the new world order, it is likely (perhaps inevitable) that the mindless rationalizations of percentage decrements, "fair-share" salami-cutting, and program eliminations will seriously flaw military capabilities no longer needed for Cold War requirements, but absolutely essential for post-containment missions.

Summary and Conclusions

The basic issue addressed by this paper is the management of change. The thesis of this paper is that our past national strategies, in particular the strategy of containment of communism, have ill prepared us to recognize the challenges and imperatives of change now that it is upon us. In many respects we have been held hostage by the Cold War, by its strategies, by our enemies, by our alliances and even by our own weapons.

There are compelling reasons for our slowness to react. First, the sheer power of bureaucratic inertia is a mighty force. Over forty years of doing business the same way digs deep ruts. Secondly, a full appreciation of the end of the Cold War would require an accounting of its costs, in terms of its economic and human sacrifices, that would not be helpful to the present situation. Recriminations by former adversaries would be to neither side's advantage. Thirdly, and most significantly, the post-Cold War strategic conceptual environment is much more complex and interdependent than any that our present leaders have ever faced before. For nearly a half-century, the strategic environment (with few brief exceptions) was marvelously simple compared to the one that we face today. The rules of engagement of East-West confrontation were set well in advance, easily

understood by all, and relatively simple to follow.

Now, with the abrupt end of the Cold War, we are like a hostage unexpectedly freed. Abandoned by our captors we stand at the door of our cell, disoriented and uncertain. Lest we lose this brief opportunity for freedom, we must seize the initiative and begin to build the world order that we have paid for so dearly with blood and treasure.

To accomplish these goals this essay has attempted to establish the need for a post-Cold War transitional strategy. It is a strategy that has an internal, not an external focus. It argues that the logical transition from the strategy of containment is first to a strategy of "self-containment," not to one of "engagement." A major premise of this essay is that until America has redefined its place in the "new world order" and has reshaped its diplomatic and military instruments accordingly, our external affairs will be profoundly, perhaps fatally, distorted by Cold War legacies.

To recapitulate, the strategy calls for a zero-based review of our foreign relations. It implies a willingness to completely reassess 40 years of Cold War relations with friends and enemies alike. It also implies the need to fully analyze the impact of the Cold War on our thought processes and institutions in order to rebuild a solid foundation for subsequent strategic thinking.

The strategy also requires restructuring of our military institutions in ways that profoundly exceed current attempts to scale down the U.S. military establishment to post-war levels. Neither the Base Force calculations of the administration nor the "bottom-up" resizing by Congress is adequate for this task. What this strategy advocates is a fundamental reassessment of the roles and missions of the U.S. military establishment in the post-Cold War order. Its aim is to create a military capability (that includes a tactical nuclear deterrent) that is ready,

relevant and -- more often than not -- welcome on the world arena.

The outcome of this process will have a profound impact on on future role in global relations. America has received more than its fair share of world approbation as an imperialistic and interventionist nation. What we do as a military power in the immediate future will either convince or disabuse the world of the validity of these stereotypes. Key to the identity that emerges will be the role that we take as the world leader in exploiting the opportunities of this instant in history to dramatically reduce, if not eliminate, the threat of global nuclear holocaust.

The most crucial element of this strategy, and the element that is absolutely essential to any part of its success, is the need both at the policy as well as at the public level for a consensus on America's role in the new world order. To break the old habits of thought and action, a new sense of national purpose and shared vision is urgently needed.

If this thesis has any significance whatsoever, it is that of a call for leadership. Events have placed a historic opportunity at our feet. Fortune has even provided a national forum to launch this strategy: the presidential and Congressional election process. Absent only is the vision and the leadership to recognize the potential of this historic opportunity, to broaden the discussion of the substantive issues of current world affairs, and to forge a new national consensus on America's role in the world.

NOTES

1. For representative criticism see: David Gergen, "America's Missed Opportunities," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No.1, 1992, pp.1-19; and, Terry L. Deibel, "Bush's Foreign Policy: Mastery and Inaction," Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991, pp. 3-23.
2. "In Defense of Defense," President George Bush's Speech to the Aspen Institute Symposium, 2 August 1990. (As quoted in the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, U.S. GPO, January 1991.
3. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington D.C., The White House), August 1991; Gen. Colin L. Powell, The National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C., The Pentagon), January 1992.
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski "selective Global Commitment" Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991. p.2.
5. Paul A. Goble, "Misreading Russia: The Risks for America," The Washington Post, January 19, 1992, p. C4.
6. Stephen Rose, "Hard Choices About Chemical Weapons," Essays on Strategy VII, Ed. Thomas C. Gill (National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C.) pp.11-16.
7. For an extremely lucid and succinct treatment of this issue see: Samuel P. Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests, Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1, January-February 1991, pp. 5-8.
8. Zbigniew Brzezinski, as quoted in John J.Fialka and Frederick Kempe, "U.S. Welcomes Soviet Arms Plan, but Dismisses Part as Propaganda," Wall Street Journal, Jan.17,1986. (Quoted in Out of the cold), p.176
9. Clearly unproductive to these goals are provocative naval

activities near the territorial waters of the former Soviet republics. Notwithstanding their tactical value, USN submarine missions near Russian naval facilities (such as that of the USS Baton Rouge, involved in a collision with a C.I.S. submarine in mid-February) should be sharply curtailed.

10. Alexander L. George, "Crisis Management: The Interaction of Political and Military Considerations, Survival Vol. XXVI, Number 10 (September/October 1984): 227.

11. Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security (New York: Macmillan, Inc. 1988) 45,46.