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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

Title: The Soviet Counterpropaganda Campaign

Author: Thomas S. Zysk, Commander, USN

Date: March 1985

This study addresses the current Soviet counterpropaganda campaign. Soviet emphasis on counterpropaganda has been intensified by the leaders of the Soviet Union in the eighties. Counterpropaganda is used by the Soviets to counter foreign influence on the internal affairs of the Soviet Union but more importantly it is used to lay blame elsewhere for a host of societal and systemic problems. In reviewing the current counterpropaganda campaign we develop an appreciation for the internal problems which are most worrisome to the leadership of the Soviet Union. The issues of nationalism, language, religion, contact with foreigners, and youth are problems which have motivated the Soviets to intensify this campaign. These problematic issues are examined in light of how they are dealt with in counterpropaganda terms. In addition, the means which western influence penetrates Soviet society will be discussed with Soviet concerns in this regard.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander Thomas S. Zysk, USN , is a Navy surface warfare officer with a specialty code in anti-submarine warfare. Commander Zysk is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1970 and has served aboard four surface ships. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Post Graduate school where he received a masters of science degree in systems engineering. His Masters thesis dealt with over the horizon damage assessment by analysis of acoustic transients. Commander Zysk is a graduate of the National War College class of 1985.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Soviet Counterpropaganda Campaign

Since the early nineteen eighties the Soviet leadership has directed a stepped up counterpropaganda campaign to counter western influence on their society. By studying this counterpropaganda campaign we learn more than the extent of western influence on Soviet society. We gain an appreciation for societal and systemic problems from the prospective of their leadership. Counterpropaganda is often used to lay the blame on external sources for societal problems as well as an ideological scapegoat for systemic problems.

The Soviets speak in their literature of counterpropaganda as a psychological war to counter subversive propaganda originating from the west. These efforts follow two basic principles. One is the unmasking or disclosing the motivations behind western propaganda and the other is to build an ideological immunity to western influence.

The Soviets address several major issues in their counterpropaganda campaign. One is the diverse ethnic nationalities and languages that are a hurdle to the "internationalization" of their society. Western influence is

linked to various forms of nationalistic identity in the counterpropaganda campaign. The next issue is religion. Because of an official policy of atheism, the Soviets feel assaulted on the religious front. Catholicism, Zionism, Islam, etc. are undesirable forces in the Soviet Union. Counterpropaganda is used to combat their spread. As a result of the counterpropaganda campaign the Soviets have payed closer attention to contacts with foreigners who are another source of unwanted intrusion on their society. The last issue is the major concern. The susceptibility of youth to undesired influence. There is a real fascination by younger Russians with youth culture in the west. The youth issue is the most pervasive in counterpropaganda writing; however, it also appears to be the least effective among youth, therefore the greatest concern.

The Soviets see foreign influence in society being channeled through emigrant connections, subversive literature, foreign contacts and electronic media. Radio is the greatest source of intrusion.

By studying the direction of the counterpropaganda one gets a feeling for the raw nerves of the Soviet leadership. It becomes obvious that a convenient way for the Soviet leadership to deal with societal problems is to assail the United States, capitalism and western standards.

INTRODUCTION

The word counterpropaganda has resounded in the Soviet lexicon in recent years defining a focus on issues of concern within the Soviet Union. Counterpropaganda is the reinterpretation of Western influence on Soviet society. The purpose of this paper will be to examine the current Soviet counterpropaganda campaign and the areas to which counterpropaganda is applied. It will provide quotes from Soviet literature to give the reader the flavor of Soviet counterpropaganda statements. By examining counterpropaganda we hopefully will gain an appreciation for those influences on Soviet society which concern the Soviet leadership.

The word propaganda is utilized more in the Catholic sense in the Soviet Union as a means for educating people in a doctrine. For this reason it is helpful to examine how the Soviets define propaganda.

A Soviet local dictionary defines counterpropaganda in terms of countering the "...dream of the West about 'the destruction of Soviet power'". Under conditions of approximate military parity between the USSR and USA, they evermore actively use for these purposes means of ideology

and above all propaganda.

By its content and forms, counterpropaganda inside the country is an organic part of the ideological, political, labor, moral, and patriotic training. In the process of counterpropaganda work is achieved the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, scientific socialism, the practice of real socialism, its achievements and also its superiorities as compared to capitalism, the unmasking of the reactionary content of anti-communism of the forms and methods of the undermining activity of imperialist propaganda centers.

The goals and tasks of counterpropaganda are to develop habits and the ability to carry out an active struggle against the penetration of harmful ideology and propaganda into Soviet society; and develop among Soviet people a demand for an interest in the ideological struggle against antagonistic ideology and practice and any negative phenomena in our reality.

The basic function of counterpropaganda is the daily propaganda of the success and achievements of socialism, its superiority over capitalism. The means of mass information literature and art, by methods accessible to all, carry out propaganda of the Soviet way of life by strengthening in the consciousness of Soviet peoples fidelity to the ideas of communism and by developing in them communist conviction. At the same time the task of propaganda is to unmask the reactionary essence of imperialism and the bourgeois way of life."

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The current emphasis in counterpropaganda was instituted at the November 1981 Central Committee Plenum of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union by Yuri Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko reiterated the need for counterpropaganda work by focusing increased attention on the subject. Chernenko noted in his address at the June 1983 Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Plenum "that imperialist 'hawks' whose class hatred of socialism outweighs their sense of reality, and sometimes common sense as well, are refusing to abandon their intentions of meddling in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, in hopes of doing damage to their societal system. Information-propaganda intervention by imperialism against world socialism pursues the task of providing a pseudosociological foundation under the policy of expansionism in the military-strategic, political, and economic domains.... It is necessary to extend broadly the offensive counterpropaganda work. The party committee must be completely aware of what the opponent is attempting to insinuate in our society, in what form and by what channels and to give a prompt and conclusive rebuff to his efforts." Chernenko cited decisions to create a "unified system of counterpropaganda on a nationwide scale", an "all-union center to study public opinion" and an "all union institute to raise the skills of press workers and to create additional television news programs and special counterpropaganda programs aimed at youth."

Chernenko's words precipitated a host of actions throughout Soviet society. With the introduction of counterpropaganda, offices and programs have been established in all segments of society. Organizational changes at the republic, oblast and rayons have been made to incorporate counterpropaganda and the military has been quick to implement organizational structures down to the unit levels. It is important to examine this latest Soviet campaign for two reasons. First, to examine those societal problems which the Soviet leadership believes are major ones, and have instituted a national campaign against. Second, to help judge the effectiveness of the western world to penetrate this closed society. This paper will explore the issue of Soviet counterpropaganda from the standpoint of its motivations and the reasons that it is receiving substantial attention in the Soviet Union. It will also examine the theory of counterpropaganda and the methodology with which this campaign is being pursued. Particular issues of concern for the Soviet counterpropaganda campaign will be discussed including national ethnic minorities (bourgeois national countering religious influence, contact with foreigners, and Soviet youth. These issues were chosen because they are the predominant themes uncovered in my readings of Soviet literature and their

Counterpropaganda THEMES AND THEORY

Counterpropaganda efforts in the Soviet Union address a host of internal problems within the society. The Soviets lay the blame on external sources for every malady in their system even to classify influences as psychological war. In evoking this war scare, Ye. A. Nozhia, professor at the Department of ideological Work, Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, states "Psychological warfare is intended to undermine the moral and political unity of the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries to undermine our economic development, to discredit socialism as a political system. Counterpropaganda is the uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology and subversive propaganda."⁴

The Soviets proclaim that to look for a basis for the counterpropaganda campaign goes beyond efforts to counter the stepped-up psychological war initiated by the Reagan administration. An editorial in the Soviet journal *Kommunist* states that the counterpropaganda campaign will offset "the changes in internationalism's ideological struggle

which came after the rise to power in the U.S. of R. Reagan and his 'accomplices'. The military-industrial complex and the California monopolist mafia support him as an obedient apostle of big business and an out-and-out anticommunist and chauvinist."

The theme of blaming the Reagan administration plays to the paranoia and insecurity of the Soviet populace and provides a convenient scapegoat for the leadership of the Soviet system to lay the blame for internal problems and focus attention away from problems created by the system and its leadership. This transfer of blame is intended to strengthen the peoples resolve and provide a basis for ideological justifications of internal problems. Apparently the leadership of the Soviet Union sees these problems as real threats to the system and their own position in the power structure. This conclusion seems justified by the vast attention that the counterpropaganda campaign is receiving and the high levels of the officials promoting it. In its most obsessed form this counterpropaganda program becomes a hate America campaign. The most radical themes in this literature are that Soviet patriot or requires hatred for the enemy.... one cannot truly love the Soviet homeland without hating its opponents....our hatred

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is sacred. Soviet ideological writers create convoluted
written gyrations to explain the existing problems and
difficulties alien to socialism and to evade the possibility
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that they are the product of the socialist system itself.
Ideology in theory is supposed to determine the building of
socialism and communism, to give direction for invariably
correct policies of the state, and to organize and rally the
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masses. Counterpropaganda fills some holes in an
ideological system that does not readily account for some of
the endemic problems that persist in Soviet society.

The counterpropaganda campaign follows the propaganda
theory to which the Soviets adhere. In fact the word
propaganda is a commonly used word denoting a positive
effect of spreading or propagandizing the communist word.
However, one must not overlook the public wariness
concerning all official pronouncements. It is common
knowledge that the Soviet public is accustomed to look for
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real meaning and intent behind official propaganda.

Counterpropaganda campaigns follow two basic
principles. One is the principle of unmasking (discussing
the real motivations behind propaganda) and the other is

anticipatory counterpropaganda (building an immunity). Professor Nozhin in an article titled TO THE AGITATOR ON COUNTER PROPAGANDA states "In counterpropaganda one sees the combination of the ability of the ideological cadres to wage well argued polemics against bourgeois concepts and views (theoretical struggle) and the ability to give a firm rebuff to unabashed anti-communist and anti-sovietism, to disrupt any ideological subversion being carried out by the class enemy. The goal of counterpropaganda is to indoctrinate in people an ideological immunity, a sense of class irreconcilability with respect to bourgeois propaganda."¹⁰

Counterpropaganda has become a main concern for the Soviet armed forces, primarily because of the high ratio of youth in the services and the susceptibility of youth to western influence which will be discussed in detail in a later section. Additionally, the Soviet military after receives broader exposure to contacts in the free world as well as a broader range of Soviet society with its range of cultures and backgrounds.

Major General N. P. [redacted], deputy chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy's

main Political Directorate, lists five interrelated tasks for counterpropaganda guidance. Since counterpropaganda offices have been set up throughout the military establishment this guidance gives us a direction for military efforts.

First General Shaplin states that "The task of counterpropaganda work is to tirelessly and effectively develop ideological staunchness and class implacability toward socialism's 'enemies' and to develop a durable immunity to hostile ideas and views. Second, the counterpropaganda worker is called upon quickly to expose the designs of imperialist propaganda. Third, General Shaplin states that conducting offensive counterpropaganda work means not confining yourself to rebutting certain specific acts of bourgeois propaganda. It means being generally active in exposing imperialism, its blood thirsty history, its ideology and policy, and its reactionary nature. It is necessary to extensively criticize the bourgeois way of life and the misanthropic nature of American imperialism as the real focus of all the evils and vices of the present day bourgeois society and to show the true faces of the American Army and its personnel--those hired butchers and suppressors of freedom. We must arm our servicemen with concrete knowledge about the class enemy and educate them in spirit of devout hatred of the enemies of the motherland of the cause and peace, freedom, and progress. Fourth Shaplin pronounces that a constant and particularly crucial topic in all propaganda and counterpropaganda work in the Army and Navy at present is the minute, in-depth interpretation of the present-day international and military-political situation in close linkage with the armed struggle. Fifth, He says that it is an important task of counterpropaganda not to allow the actions of those who sometimes knowingly or unknowingly are using someone else's tune as to speak, spreading all kinds of practice and rumors

NATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE

We have looked at some of the theoretical implications of the current Soviet counterpropaganda campaign. Next we will be looking at some of the issues upon which this campaign is focused and get an increased feeling for what the Soviet leadership has determined as the perceived threat.

Presently, the overwhelming majority of key leadership positions in government, the Communist party, and the Soviet military are held by Slavic Russians. The ethnicity issue in the Soviet Union is one which is receiving significant treatment in the Soviet counterpropaganda campaign. National ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union will soon outnumber Slavic Russians. This demographic change in the Soviet Union has been a matter of concern for the Slavic leadership. The Soviet Union comprises over one-hundred nationality groups some of which were at one time independent. Citizens rarely migrate with the exception of Slavic Russians who have been encouraged to emigrate from their home region. Slavic Russians are the best educated,

motivated, and more willing to travel to new construction and industrial sites to undertake new projects. These policies and mobility factors have placed Slavs in control of the best and most important jobs in outer lying regions. This control of key leadership positions is most evident in the Soviet military. High priority units such as the Strategic Rocket Forces contain almost all Slavs. Other units contain high percentages of consolidated ethnic groups but the leadership still remains in the hands of the slavic

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Russians.

Military experience is often thought to bring a homogenization of ethnic backgrounds but this phenomenon may be reversed in the Soviet system. With control of key leadership positions predominantly in the hands of the Slavs and the language problems among the ranks, the military experience may magnify ethnic differences in the military and stimulate ethnic animosities.

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The ethnicity issue in the Soviet Union is termed bourgeois nationalism. The Soviets classify western influence as the greatest hurdle to overcome in the "internationalization" of Soviet society as presented in recent counterpropaganda literature.

The Riga Conference of 1982 on Countering Bourgeois Nationalism provided guidance for dealing with this issue. The conference proclaimed that "foreign nationalistic propaganda particularly under present-day conditions, with its sharp exacerbation of international tension accompanied by a deepening of the ideological struggle on the international scene, is a means of ideological subversion against the USSR and the world socialist commonwealth. It has as its goal the weakening of unity of the world's progressive forces and primarily the unity of the socialist states. One of the main areas of anti-communist, anti-soviet propaganda is the efforts of the bourgeois disinformation machine focused against the principle of internationalism."¹⁴

Traditionally, since Lenin, Soviet leaders have pronounced the diverse ethnic character of the Soviet nation as advantageous. Soviet leaders have officially viewed the non-Russian nationalities as a vehicle for spreading socialism to many peoples, including those outside the Soviet borders, and as a source of economic, military, demographic and cultural assets.¹⁵ Bringing the ethnicity issue into their counterpropaganda campaigns is a sign of change in this view

and a public admission that nationality problems are very real concerns. Some experts in the field even go so far as to say that ethnicity is a threat to the legitimacy of the Soviet state and to the stability of the Soviet regime.¹⁵ However, the Soviets themselves rarely mentioned the negative aspects of their multinational society prior to the counterpropaganda initiatives. Western studies on Soviet nationalism may over dramatize the issue; however, the fact that they have focused on nationalism as an issue for counterpropaganda work says something about their fears and concerns.

Related to the whole nationality problem is the language diversity of the Soviet Union. Although Russian is the official language and language of command in the military, the percentage of people with knowledge of the Russian language outside Russia's central regions declines and in some regions is limited. High priority units with high percentages of slavic members have little problem with language but lower priority units with a majority of other ethnics have extreme difficulty with the mother tongue.¹⁷ Use of other languages is often restricted and all official writing, libraries, and training is in Russian. The infiltration of free world radio transmissions and

literature in ethnic languages ,is very attractive to non-Russian speaking members. Soviet counterpropaganda efforts attempt to unmask the 'deceitful" purposes behind these intrusions. V.L. Somolyanskiy from the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences states "The process of the internationalization of the socialist way of life is, as is known, expressed in the ever-broader use of Russian by the peoples of our nation as a language of international intercourse. For this reason, the ideologists of anticommunism have directed their arrows against this, without going beyond the vulgar versions of
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'russification'."

RELIGION

Religion in the Soviet Union is another target for the increased counterpropaganda campaign. Despite sixty-seven years of official atheism, the Soviet Union still contains a large population of religious believers. Signs of revivalist tendencies are appearing in parts of the society as people seek some other dimension beyond the government's scientific materialism. To many this concept has worn hollow. Even Soviet studies suggest that attendance in church or religious gatherings is higher than in some Western countries. To counter this reported religious upsurge the Soviets have raised their ideological guard.

A state of total atheism is the goal of the Soviet state and Soviet rhetoric to counter religious beliefs. An article by Major Ostreyko and Senior Lieutenant Gutsulyak states "Our constitution guarantees freedom of conscience. This does not mean, however, that we will be indifferent to the fates of people who have been intellectually numbed by religion. So much the more must it be said that we do not

have the right to remain passive when we see the persistence and ingenuity some believers frequently demonstrate in their efforts to introduce one young man or another to

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religion." To the Soviets, mankind will advance beyond the need for religion. Armed with Marxist-Leninist philosophy their scientifically oriented thinking will obviate the need for religion. Ostreyko and Gutsulyak state "Individuals so oriented are not going to fall for Bible fairy tales or
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allow themselves to be taken in by the 'fishers of men'."

In the military, antireligious counterpropaganda has some special features and dilemmas. The fact that the military services have such a large population of youth who are newly separated from family structure is seen as an opportune time to promote atheism. Thus religious counterpropaganda in military efforts centers on the youth. A dilemma often arises in the military and Soviet society on the religious issue. This occurs because those with a religious belief often have a strong work ethic. They excel in a professional capacity and are promoted. In effect they fly in the face of antireligious propaganda. Religion is not a condoned practice. It is considered alien to morale and discipline. An article in the Soviet journal *Kommunist* by Captain V. Gavrilin explains "Thus religion objectively

hinders the molding, in the believers, of the consciousness of Soviet military duty and hampers its accomplishments, and it pushes individual youths who are guided by the Christian commandments: 'Love thine enemies', 'Thou shalt not kill', 'thou shalt not swear', and so forth towards a crime against the motherland...toward refusal to serve in the

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Soviet Army and take the oath." Because religious belief is not legitimate in the Soviet system all religious influence in society is depicted as having foreign origins. The entire anti-religious campaign fits nicely with the counterpropaganda rhetoric.

Counterpropaganda writings focus on two means of influence which are affecting Soviet society. First is the emigre connection. Having left the security of mother Russia, emigres are depicted as turning to religion. The Soviets see their communications with relations in the Soviet Union as the primary sources for religious influx. A Soviet book by A. A. Afanas'as states "Reactionary emigre political intriguers always play at religion. Such centers as the Vatican, Brooklyn Center For Jehovahs Witnesses, the so called 'Evangelical Church in the Communist Countries', 'Light in the East', 'Russian Church Abroad' and others are especially 'zealous' in these efforts. All of them coordinate their actions to one degree or another with the

organs of bourgeois propaganda. The hostile emigre clerics are trying even harder to malign even the activity of religious associations in our country. The political dead men from the anti-soviet emigre camp have truly black souls and dark intentions ,covered in a religious guise."

The second source of influence originates from religious centers outside the Soviet Union attempting to export religion to the Russian people. The radio broadcasts and intrusion of religious literature are the evil doings of the forces of Catholicism, Zionism and Islam. Soviets speak of the role of the Pope in initiating the cold war, the Vatican as a major anticommunist center and the crusade against communism. They accuse Vatican radio and newspapers of subversively distorting the foreign and domestic policies of

the Soviet Union.²⁴ They speak of the traditional prejudice against communism of the Islamic community, the pan-Islamic propagandizing of the world Islamic state promoted by

conservative Muslim monarch regimes.²⁵ Zionism is portrayed as a main weapon of imperialism against the U.S.S.R., espousing chauvinism, racism, anti-communism, and anti-sovietism. Anti-soviet propaganda in Zionist circles make constant appeal to the "Jewish Question". The Soviets call for the unmasking of the ideological and political

feel threatened and assaulted on all fronts of the religious issues, although writings on Islamic concerns appear to be more subdued. This could be because the Soviet Muslim population is Sunni and by and large quiescent or it could be in deference to the large size of the Muslim population. The paranoia of the leadership in the Soviet Union is touched by all the major religions of the world.

FOREIGN CONTACTS

Contacts with foreigners is another area of concern in the counterpropaganda campaign. In this area the fear of foreign influence to internal security goes beyond propaganda rhetoric and has resulted in additional restrictions on rights and changes in the Soviet criminal code. Ideological writings are aimed at increasing the vigilance of sailors, border guards and others who have frequent contact with westerners. Soviets are cautioned that every word or act of foreigners must be considered with some deceitful purpose in mind. Viktor Sysko from the Russian port of Nakhodka describes the western approach; "foreign seamen arrange so-called tests of the vigilance of border troops. They make use of the whole arsenal of forms of ideological struggle. (Attractively ?) Packaged chewing gum, other gifts, literature with no artistic content; in certain cases foreign seamen even go as far as to offer spirits to the border troops, all kinds of cigarette lighters, picture posters. By these means they try to make their acquaintance. In these cases, the border troops should reply with high ideological staunchness".

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Navy units visiting overseas ports have never been allowed free association with host countries. Shore parties consist of a small group of men accompanied by and under close scrutiny of an officer and senior enlisted man. In witnessing a Soviet ship visit to Tunisia I observed Soviet contacts with locals being kept to a bare minimum. Infrequent visits to town by Soviet seamen combined with daily ideological lectures seemed to leave little room for the individual seamen to judge or interpret the value of other cultures by these experiences.

Interest in contact with foreigners is driven by many reasons, one of which is the interest in the availability of consumer goods. This is a sensitive subject to the leadership. The Soviets comment that "another scandalous cliché is constantly present in the poisonous arsenal of anti-sovietism...expatations about 'forgetting the needs of the consumer' in the USSR. Here as well the falsifiers display their total impotence. The entire world knows that our party's highest program goal has been and continues to be a steady rise in the material and cultural living standards of the Soviet people."

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In efforts to perpetuate the paranoia about contact with

foreigners new Soviet legislation restricts rights for all soviet citizens as well as foreigners visiting the Soviet Union. "The U.S.S.R. law on 'state crimes' as amended in January 1984 has placed sweeping powers in the hands of the authorities. Its provisions have broadened the definition of treason to include acts threatening 'state security' and the definition of 'state secret' to include the concept of 'work related secret'. Now Soviet citizens face the possibility of criminal charges if they provide virtually any kind of information to a foreigner without official authorization. Enforcement of these could place in jeopardy all Soviet citizens who engage in unofficial contacts with foreigners and also place in jeopardy travelers to the U.S.S.R. as tourists, businessmen ,exchange programs ,or those involved in academic activities there." 29

All these laws and procedures in the Soviet system leave a great latitude of interpretation up to enforcing officials. The level of enforcement can directly relate to the current state of international relations. Soviet society can be likened to a tortoise withdrawing into its shell during times of increased displeasure by the leadership with foreign relations. The laws and procedures are all in place to control the relations of the populace with the outside world.

YOUTH

The most consistent and frequently mentioned topic among Soviet counterpropaganda writings deals with the vulnerability of youth. The susceptibility of youth is a thread that runs through all topics of the counterpropaganda campaign. However, it is most often referred to in topics of consumerism (fascination with abundant luxury and trappings of the West) as well as with the fads and youth culture of the West. Richard Tempest in an article titled YOUTH SOVIET STYLE concluded by saying that "the ideological walls of the Soviet state might more easily be breached by pop music and

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pizzas than by Zionism and Solzhenitsyn." The youth culture of the Soviet Union has adapted fads from the West almost entirely. For example music is mentioned as a frequent culprit. The Soviets comment; "Take as an example something that seems most 'harmless'--music. It has been transformed by the enemy into a weapon in the struggle for

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the spirits of the young." This has prompted a great deal of concern among the Soviet leadership which is one of the reasons why youth issues are so frequently addressed.

One dilemma arises when the Soviets attempt to strengthen the ideological defenses of the youth. Attempting to unmask the frivolity and absurdity of Western youth culture often leads to an increased fascination and desire of Soviet youth to know more about the Western world.

The other factor that may trouble Soviet leadership is the lack of Russian historical perspective of the youth. Soviets frequently relive the struggles of the World War Two conflict. This has been a subject which touches the emotions of Soviet society. Surviving the invasion of the German Army and suffering twenty million casualties is a gruesome experience which has played a major role in shaping the character and thoughts of the Soviet population. The problem exists with the younger Soviets who cannot relate to this struggle for survival and for whom the replaying of the World War Two themes is not nearly as meaningful. If one adds to these factors the natural proclivity of youth to challenge and question authority we have the basis for a serious problem for Soviet leadership.

The problem of alienation of Soviet youth from the

Communist regime was spelled out in Chernenko's remarks during an All Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol organizations and these fears have reverberated throughout

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the Soviet press. Disenchantment with youth is not a new issue by any means but the level of attention it is receiving particularly in the counterpropaganda campaign is a new indication of important concerns.

The counterpropaganda campaign directed toward youth is particularly applicable to the military for two reasons. The first reason is that the military has such a large number of youths and, secondly there are concerns about dissent among youth. This is evident among those who have taken part in the Afghanistan invasion. This particular issue was discussed with a Soviet defector who indicated he frequently listened to Western radio broadcasts from the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Company. However, he considered these reports as being as much propaganda as Soviet newspapers and radio broadcasts. It was not until his personal experience in Afghanistan that he had first hand experience with which to analyze the veracity of the news reports he was hearing.

Exposing the western propaganda threat to Soviet youth

is one way that the Soviet leadership has attempted to deal with this serious problem. Colonel General Viktor Chebrikov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB places youth counterpropaganda issues in four categories. Chebrikov calls for the need to counter revisionism. This is the suggestion to youth that the older generation is badly building a new society. He calls for counterpropaganda to deal with the bourgeois propaganda that is driving a wedge between the generations. Bourgeois nationalism is the planting of nationalist cravings in youth that could pit Soviet nationalities against each other. Consumerism is the next area of major concern. Consumerism is the encouragement in youth of the idea that life in the west is much better than in the U.S.S.R., to inculcate a negative attitude towards socialism. Finally, he calls for counterpropaganda to deal with provocation, i.e., attempts to compromise Soviet citizens to leave them open for recruitment by espionage agents.

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These themes are prominent in many counterpropaganda pieces. Soviet leadership stresses improving ideological work oriented toward youth, and acquainting students with the need for criticizing falsifiers of communism. Measures of preventive counterpropaganda are called for. The Soviets say that they must strengthen the ability of youth to have

well-argued facts and necessary practical skills to propagandize the achievements of the world socialist system and the advantage of socialism in the Soviet way of life. It is the same issue of attempting to develop a sense of participation of youth in the ideological struggle which tends to backfire when the youthful fascination with western culture comes to play. I. Gurinovichin in an article in Sovetskaya Belorussiya said that "taking advantage of the popularity that rock 'n' roll and disco music has among young people, the enemy uses the air waves and smuggling in to our country the seeds of an alien culture, and an alien way of life".³⁴ In response, the youth of the Soviet Union is craving more of the forbidden fruit.

Youth is an issue which surfaces in every previously mentioned area of counterpropaganda. Whether it is the vulnerability of youth to nationalistic feelings or the susceptibility of youth to religious influence, or the declining ability of youth to speak the mother tongue (Based on larger birth rates in non-Slavic regions), the youth issue is pervasive. Counterpropaganda appears to be the least effective among youth, which creates another concern to the leadership.

VEHICLES OF INTRUSION

Having discussed the themes of Soviet counterpropaganda issues it is fitting to discuss how the Soviets view the vehicles of intrusion into their society. It is conceivable that by studying counterpropaganda we might develop a sense of success or measure of effectiveness for Western efforts to penetrate the closed Soviet society. This can be done but only with a sense of caution. Counterpropaganda gives us an indication of what Soviet leaders fear within their society. Western propaganda is only capitalizing on problems which already exist in Soviet society and is not the prime motivator for these problems.

The Soviets ward off the infection of Western propaganda spreading via mail, via contact with Russian emigrants, via foreign visitors to the Soviet Union, via the now suspended direct-dial phone service with the West, and by subversive literature smuggled into the country or printed by unauthorized means in the Soviet Union. However, the broadcast media is the greatest culprit source of propaganda intrusion on the Russian people. Television as a vehicle

for propaganda is technically limited to border areas because of the limited range of ground broadcast signals. It is, nevertheless, believed that Finnish news coverage of the Polish Solidarity labor movement motivated Russian Estonian workers to attempt to form a noncommunist labor movement which was squelched through an extensive effort by the KGB. It has also been reported that the KGB has conducted raids to confiscate video recorders that have been used to show western programming. The television threat is viewed as a potential future problem with denouncements of the threat of direct broadcast television into all areas of the Soviet Union.

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The most often mentioned target in the counterpropaganda campaign is the radio broadcast media. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, British Broadcasting Corporation and Vatican Radio are the sources that are the most available and must be considered the most effective in penetrating the Iron Curtain. The jamming of these broadcasts is an obvious sign of the Soviet fear of intrusion; however, the fear that these sources have captured an audience of more educated and sophisticated people in the Soviet Union is an even greater concern.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the study of the Soviet Union's counterpropaganda campaign allows us to view Soviet society from the perspective of their leadership. Counterpropaganda is often used to lay the blame on external sources for every malady in the Soviet system, an ideological scapegoat for systemic problems. Ideology provides the thread which holds the Soviet system together and empowers the leadership. Various societal problems such as ethnicity, language and religion should have long been outgrown by strict interpretation of Marxist-Lenist ideology. Laying blame on external sources then becomes ideologically convenient for the Soviet leadership to justify the continuing nature of these problems. By studying the direction of the counterpropaganda one gets a feeling for the raw nerves of the Soviet leadership.

The issues of this campaign involve Soviet society generally, as well as the Soviet military. The problems addressed by military authors are similar and in some cases exacerbated by the military structure. The many

nationalities of the Soviet state have proven to be a resource of disharmony as well as a source of diversification. This concern is accentuated in the military particularly when one considers the language diversity in the Soviet military and the problem this creates for the command structure. Religious influence is still alive after many years of state proclaimed atheism. Catholicism, Zionism, and Islam are all forces that are threatening to the Soviet leadership. The last issue discussed was Soviet youth. It is the issue that encompasses all the other concerns and is potentially the most serious to the Soviet leadership. The Soviets continually mention the susceptibility of youth to foreign propaganda. The culture and lifestyles of the West are provocative to the younger generations and yet the efforts of the Soviets to ideologically strengthen and isolate the youth only seem to enhance the desire and magnify the interest of youth in Western ways.

Conclusions about the behavior and attitudes of people in a closed society are not always easy; however, the actions of the most recent Soviet leaders have shown a definite concern on their part for these issues. It appears obvious from their own pronouncements that it has become easier to explain Soviet societal problems by assailing the

United States, capitalism and Western standards.

Lastly we looked at the reported vehicles of propaganda intrusion into Soviet society for measure of effectiveness of western ideas to hurdle the iron curtain. Television is the fear of the future but radio is the major culprit of the present.

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