Operation Desert Storm and the Theories of B.H. Liddell Hart
Abstract
Operation Desert Storm lasted little more than a thousand hours, but the lessons it holds for strategists will be remembered as long as there are military historians who chronicle the glories of the Armed Forces of the United States. Operation Desert Storm will be remembered by many historians as a classic example of the use of the indirect approach, and as a further validation of the theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart, who saw a generation of British, French, and German soldiers meet a bloody and pointless end at the battles of the Somme and elsewhere on the Western Front in World War I, is generally remembered as the strategist who inspired the great generals of tank warfare in World War II. General George S. Patton, for example, said that Liddell Hart's books on strategy had nourished him for 20 years. Generals Guderian and Rommel called themselves his pupils. Consciously or unconsciously, Liddell Hart's strategic teachings were reflected equally well in Operation Desert Storm, and in the decisions made by American commanders in the field, in the Pentagon, and in the White House. The core of Liddell Hart's strategic theory boils down to 10 maxims. This paper analyzes the conduct of Operation Desert Storm in terms of each of these maxims, and assesses how closely actual operations paralleled Liddell Hart's theories. Emphasis will be placed on military strategy at the operational level (or the strategic level, as Liddell Hart calls it), but some mention also will be made of the political, economic, and diplomatic decisions that dictated the terms of battle, which Liddell Hart assigns to "Grand Strategy."
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 08, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA437398
Entities
People
- James Schumaker
Organizations
- National War College