Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik
Abstract
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, embarked in 1969 upon a policy of Ostpolitik: improved relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Soviet Union. Brandt held two ministerial-level consultations with representatives of the GDR in the spring of 1970. Following subsequent negotiations at lower levels, several bilateral agreements -- signed in 1971 and 1972 -- increased the volume of cultural and economic traffic across the Inter-German Border and formalized mutual recognition of each state's political legitimacy. Ostpolitik also contributed to the conclusion of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, which clarified the political and economic links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. By Brandt's own account, his policy was only partially successful, as much as he underestimated the resistance his initiatives would face. Yet, others often recall Ostpolitik as the successful catalyst that ushered in the decade of superpower detente. Following in the footsteps of Brandt's policy, the United States and the Soviet Union reached numerous agreements during the 1970s that stabilized, if not reduced, the intensity of the deadlocked ideological and military confrontation between East and West. Today, with that confrontation ail but moot, one might question whether Ostpolitik was a landmark foreign policy with broad general implications, or instead, simply an historical artifact of the Cold War. After reviewing the ends Brandt sought and the means he chose to accomplish them, this paper argues that Brandt's Ostpolitik contains relevant "lessons" for contemporary American policy makers, and that his policy is one of long-standing significance.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 20, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA437399
Entities
Organizations
- National War College