Developing Army Leaders Through CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP

A Monograph

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The complexity of today's battlefield is perhaps the greatest an officer in the Army has ever witnessed in its 229 year history. The expectations of success for today's officer are no different than those of other generations. How the Army prepares its officers to deal with the complexities of the battlefield is the purpose of this monograph. Specifically, this monograph will take a focused look at two distinct arms of the institutional training domain; the command and General Staff Officer's Course and the Advanced Military Studies Program and the Battle Command Training Program. To better analyze and subsequently make judgments and recommendations on the substance offered in these institutions, I have attempted to describe and explain numerous stimuli that an officer will have to contend with as he serves in the Army formations of today and tomorrow. These stimuli have been broken down into two distinct areas; enemy and friendly. The enemy situation is comprised of such categories as the current environment, potential threats, the use of asymmetry, and cultural awareness. Focus areas for the friendly situation includes discussion on guidance from civilian and military leaders, joint, inter-agency, and multinational operations, operational net assessment, effects based operations, organizational change, Army culture, and leadership.

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Abstract

Developing Army Leaders Through CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP by Major William T. Beck, Army, 56 pages.

The complexity of today's battlefield is perhaps the greatest an officer in the Army has ever witnessed in its 229 year history. The expectations of success for today's officer are no different than those of other generations. How the Army prepares its officers to deal with the complexities of the battlefield is the purpose of this monograph. Specifically, this monograph will take a focused look at two distinct arms of the institutional training domain; the command and General Staff Officer's Course and the Advanced Military Studies Program and the Battle Command Training Program.

To better analyze and subsequently make judgments and recommendations on the substance offered in these institutions, I have attempted to describe and explain numerous stimuli that an officer will have to contend with as he serves in the Army formations of today and tomorrow. These stimuli have been broken down into two distinct areas; enemy and friendly. The enemy situation is comprised of such categories as the current environment, potential threats, the use of asymmetry, and cultural awareness. Focus areas for the friendly situation includes discussion on guidance from civilian and military leaders, joint, inter-agency, and multinational operations, operational net assessment, effects based operations, organizational change, Army culture, and leadership. Clearly, I have identified but a handful of stimuli that an officer must be proficient in, and I highly recommend to other researchers to develop a list of their own and conduct a similar review of these institutions.

These two components are then filtered through the specific organizations mentioned above to see if the Army has indeed considered these challenges and opportunities and ensured our Army officers are educated and trained to operate in the current environment. This monograph provides an assessment on the Army's performance at these institutions and provides recommendations for improving them as well. The conclusion finds that the Army is doing a credible job in the training and education and makes the assertion that it is up to each individual officer to take ownership of his own development to ensure proficiency on the battlefield.

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CHAPTER ONE

"We must continue to prepare Soldiers for the hardships, rigors, ambiguities, and ugliness of combat – by achieving a proper balance between training and education programs. *Training* prepares Soldiers and leaders to operate in relatively certain conditions, focusing on "what to think". Conversely, *education* prepares soldiers and leaders to operate in uncertain conditions, focusing more on "how to think". In light of uncertain irregular environments in which we will operate, we must emphasize innovative educational experiences, and shift our training-education balance accordingly"[1] – GEN Peter Schoomaker.

Introduction

It can be argued that the generation our Army is currently serving is the most complex, challenging, and important era in its 228-year history. The question this monograph seeks to answer is two-fold: What are the stimuli that effect the current operating environment and does the Army need to change the way it develops its officers to conduct operations in this current and future environment? The environment the Army currently operates in finds a military fully committed in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Perhaps more importantly, the entire military, not just the Army, is in the midst of unprecedented transformation. Because of these two factors, the Army finds itself in perhaps its most difficult position ever; how to meet today's challenges while transforming to better meet tomorrow's. These times clearly require a change in the leader development of the United States Army officer. This development incorporates two distinct components that GEN Schoomaker addressed in the opening quotation of this monograph, training and education.

To answer the question posed in this monograph, it is necessary to outline exactly where we currently stand as an Army as well as the path the Army needs to take to meet the challenges inherent in the research question. An overarching theme from both of these realms is the ability to perform successfully in a joint, inter-agency, and multinational environment. This framework is composed of three specific factors. First, the Army must constantly maintain and disseminate its view of the adversaries and threats that will face our formations during the fight against

[1] Fiscal Year 2005 Game Plan, (1 NOV 04), 6.

terrorism. These threats are one component what is called the contemporary operating environment (COE). Second, the Army must strengthen its institutional training base to facilitate the development of our officers to meet these threats. Finally, for the Army, along with the Department of Defense (DoD), to successfully transform it must do so within the intent of its civilian and military leadership

Within this framework there are a host of challenges and opportunities faced by the Army. One challenge is a constantly changing threat that seeks to pursue its goals through non-conventional or asymmetrical means.[2] Concurrently, the Army is struggling to find the right force structure and capability to operate effectively in post conflict operations.[3] More challenges arrive as the Department of Defense (DoD) has been in the midst of transforming to an organization based on Network Centric Warfare (NCW), and shifting from a "threat based to a capability based force."[4] The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) GEN Peter Schoomaker has contributed to these challenges (*and opportunities*) by undertaking an extremely bold and aggressive change in its formational structure in an effort to provide stabilization and predictability to Army soldiers and their families. His analogy of "rather having five $20 bills in his wallet instead of one $100 bill to pay the Army's bills" is an effort to reach a force structure more flexible and versatile than the current fixed organizations from Brigade to Army level.[5]

All of these challenges have to be faced in order to turn them into opportunities for the Army. In this light, it is imperative that the Army provides its leaders with the most complete, effective training and education possible.

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[2] Joint Forces Command. *Joint Operating Environment – Into the Future*, (JOE) (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 5 MAR 04), 3.

[3] A common theme addressed at the Combat Studies Institute Seminar on Post Conflict Operations held at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14-16 SEP 04.

[4] JOE, 3.

[5] CSA brief to the CGSOC class of '03-'04, OCT 04.

This leads us to the way the Army currently conducts the leader development to meet these challenges and opportunities. To focus this effort, the first place we must look to ensure we have the appropriate training strategy is to the guidance from our civilian and military leaders. Documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) are but three of numerous, significant planning documents the Army have used to nest its training strategies with its higher headquarters. This guidance is in turn focused through the Army's existing training and education system.

This training and education system is encapsulated in FM 7-0, *Training the Force.* It addresses the three domains the Army applies to train its force: institutional, operational, and self-development.[6] The institutional domain applies to Army schools and combat training centers (CTCs), the operational domain consists of soldier, leader, and collective training within a particular unit, and the self-development domain includes such aspects as mentoring, on-line learning, and advanced civil schooling. For purposes of this monograph I intend to focus primarily at the institutional domain although it will be evident when the other two domains could be affected. One of the outcomes of this monograph will show a certain lack of synergy amongst these domains; there just isn't a unifying, synchronizing body that is coordinating these three separate axis on a common identifiable end state. In my concluding chapter I will offer my recommendations of the operational and self-development legs that must be further developed to assist in the training and education needs of our officers.

Within the institutional domain, there will be requirements for changing the way leaders are trained and educated to serve in the organizations that are in the midst of transformation. Tasks that were being conducted at specific levels (Army, Corps, or Division) will now be conducted across new levels of organizations within the Army; this new organizational change is

[6] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7-0, *Training the Force*, (HQ, USDA, 2001), 1-7 to 1-12.

but one of the stimuli affecting leader development within the Army. The status quo of leader development is certainly at question. There is a common theme that Army officers will adapt and be flexible to serve in these new units and automatically be successful. This assumption is simply flawed. To set our officers up for success (in turn making the new Army formations successful) should be a primary concern for senior Army leaders and those organizations responsible for training and education programs. Chapter three will highlight the new training challenges posed by the organizational changes being pursued by the Army.

Besides the training manual, the Army focuses on the leader development aspect as outlined in its leadership field manual, FM 22-100. The themes in this manual consist of the Army core values; what the leader must be, know, and do; direct leadership, and organizational leadership. It is interesting to note that the final appendix in the manual is the United States Constitution; reinforcing the Army's commitment of its officers and their oath of allegiance to the Constitution vice any single governmental entity. These chapters will be expanded on in chapter three and evaluated against the development offered by CGSOC / SAMS and BCTP in chapters four and five respectively.

It is my belief that the Officer Education System (OES) and combat training centers (CTCs) must evolve to support the emerging doctrinal and organizational changes the Army is undertaking. It would be fruitful to analyze the requirements at each level of the OES system – from pre-commissioning, entry-level basic course, Captain's Career Course (CCC), Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) and Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), and the Army War College (AWC). In this monograph, I will focus specifically at the CGSOC / AMSP level, otherwise called Military Education Level 4 (MEL 4). This will include a detailed analysis of the current development offered in these courses in comparison with the topics outlined in chapters two and three, and the recommendations for additions and deletions where appropriate.

Similarly, the Army must assess the training opportunities offered by the four CTCs; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Polk, LA, the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, CA, the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hoenfels, Germany, and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. The CTC system is simply the best collective training tool in the world. It is logical to focus this monograph on BCTP, since its current mission focuses its training on the current force structure of active duty Corps and Divisions and National Guard Divisions and Brigades; the primary focus of organizational transformational change. BCTP also has an Operations Group whose primary mission is to observe and evaluate joint exercises, which address our leaders', civilian and military alike, concerns for joint proficiency.

This monograph will evaluate BCTP's ability to serve as a training tool for the Unit of Employment, X (UEx) and the Unit of Employment, Y (UEy) commander and staff – organizations that will be fully explained later in this monograph. These units are the cornerstone of the Army's organizational re-structuring, and will be fully outlined in chapter three. Additionally, it will look to see if BCTP's training program addresses the stimuli identified in chapters two and three. It will address areas where BCTP will need to evolve in maintaining its relevance in training the higher echelon headquarters in our Army, and the development of the officers serving in them.

Summary.

The Army is in the midst of a profound transformational change. It has found that the operational environment has evolved greatly since the end of the Cold War 15 years ago. As adversaries continue to use asymmetrical means to promote their ideologies, the Army finds itself without a truly conventional foe for the near to mid term. The aftermath of 9/11 and the drastic change in strategic policy to that of prevention finds the Army fully committed in fighting the war on terrorism. With the increased Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), GEN Schoomaker has

chartered a course to develop more combat units in an attempt to develop stabilization and predictability. This course of action has led to developments of different organizations from battalion to army level. These new organizations, coupled with the Army's participation in the DoD's own transformation to NCW, has created a vacuum in training and education for officers designated to serve in these new types of units.

Chapter Two of this monograph will attempt to describe and analyze the operational environment that the officer will serve in for the next 10 years or so. This paper will also analyze the work put forth in numerous works by DoD and academia alike in an attempt to define the current operating environment. It will provide a brief description of the post Cold War environment and how the Army performed since the end of the Cold War. Some factors in the operating environment include asymmetry, cultural bias, and the moral domain. Unless our officers are aware of the factors considered by our enemies, it would be almost impossible to develop courses of actions to defeat them. Development of our officers on the history, motivation, and will of the adversary is critical if our Army will remain effective in defeating him. As Sun Tzu so simply stated in his classical treatise, know your enemy and know yourself![7]

The environment is not all about potential threats. Chapter Three will attempt to identify main themes encountered in our environment that are of our own making. This environment is shaped by guidance from our civilian and military leadership. By reviewing their guidance and constructing our leader development system to support it, we ensure such development will be nested and focused within its execution. Because of this, this chapter will also include the friction points faced within our own camps, and an assessment of potential generational gaps between junior and senior leaders.

There are multiple points of view on where transformation needs to go. There are two discussions going on involving which roads the Army need to take. One such point of discussion

[7] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 84.

is the hypothesis that traditional "phase IV" reconstruction operations are now the decisive operation versus the "phase III", major combat operations (MCO). The other major theme is whether or not the Army needs to embark on the NCW espoused by DoD transformation czar, VADM (R) Czebrowski. His mindset is a complete transformation to a military that uses the informational, computer-centric in deference to the traditional approach of boots (and vehicles!) on the ground. Frederick Kagan writes, "As the new head of the DoD's transformation effort, Cebrowski enshrined NCW as the goal of that effort and has repeatedly declared that transformation programs in the service will be judged by the extent to which they approach the NCW ideal".[8]

It is obvious that the transformational path the Army is currently undertaking is not just organizational; it covers how we plan and execute as well as our reliance on technological innovation. Topics such as joint, inter-agency, and multinational training and operations, and cultural awareness must also find its way into the training and education of officers. Other subjects needing description and more importantly analysis of when they should be presented to our officers are fledgling concepts such as Operational Net Assessment (ONA) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO).

Chapter Four addresses in the current OES, specifically at the CGSOC / AMSP level. GEN Schoomaker stated that training is based on certainty, and education is the process for addressing uncertainty in the Army.[9] This chapter will analyze the curriculum being offered officers at the junior field grade level as the Army prepares them for their next 8-10 years of service. If these courses do not address the uncertainty of the operational environment as well as the certainty of its own formations, where will the officer get the training and education he needs to serve in today's Army?

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[8] Frederick W. Kagan, *War and Aftermath* (on line publication: Policy Review, No. 120), 3.
[9] CSA remark at numerous public addresses.

Chapter Five will look at the opportunities available to the Army from BCTP to assist in training the UEx and UEy. This is another vital tool in the development of our officers. By establishing a realistic training exercise for Army formations, BCTP performs its function of the development of the officers that serve in these formations. Because of the current lack of synchronization provided by the OES in CGSOC and AMSP in the development of our junior field grade officers, our CTCs become that much more important in addressing the shortfall and shoring up these developmental deficiencies. If not done here, where will officers and units be able to train on its ability to synchronize joint and Army capabilities?

This chapter will include a brief history of BCTP since its inception in 1986 and how it has surged to help the Army in times of major combat operations (MCO). It will also describe and analyze the change in its paradigm to meet the needs of today's battlefield. The chapter will include how effective BCTP is in leader development against the evaluation criteria outlined in chapters two and three.

The concluding chapter will summarize the key points outlined within the monograph. It will prove my contention that although the effort put forth by OES and BCTP does lend to the type of leader development needed in for officers serving in today's Army, there are indeed points at which can be improved upon, added to, or simply deleted from the curriculum or program. Additionally, the current structure is not capable of as capturing all of the disparate, complex subjects outlined in chapters two and three that make up our operational environment. Questions need to be asked to see if other areas within the OES need to evolve as well.

Does the Army need to change the requirements in its CGSOC / AMSP courses or simply stay with the status quo? Should there be a shift in focus to culture and problem solving? The Army cannot wait to see where the UEx and UEy formational structure will lead us. It must act now to incorporate effective development strategies into the curriculums of CGSOC and AMSP as well as the training methodology within BCTP, or thousands of officers will be without the necessary tools to best serve our Army in this time of war.

The final chapter will also contain my recommendations for the Army in regards to the development of its officers. All three domains, institutional, organizational, and self-development must be properly updated to address the current environment our officers will operate in. All three must be appropriately complementing with each other in order to provide the most synchronized development possible. Here is but one basic example. If effects based operations are not addressed at CGSOC, which it has not been as of this publication, there must be a plan to ensure a leader will get the required education either when he gets to his unit or by means of self-development. Unless guidance is given from some regulatory body such as Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Human Resources Command (HRC), or at the Major Command (MACOM) level to ensure each officer successfully completes the appropriate development, there will continue to be this delta of development for our officers.

Methodology.

One purpose of this monograph is to highlight how the institutional Army develops leaders at CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP. Before any development can occur, there must be a clear understanding of our operational environment. The second purpose is to attempt to develop a common understanding of all of the inputs that comprise this environment. This environment has many factors that must be considered before an approach to leader development can be begun. A basic assumption I have made is that the Army is quite competent in its ability to fight and win conventional wars. Operation Desert Storm and MCO from Operation Iraqi Freedom prove this point. The thesis question I put forward in the initial paragraph has more to do with current threats, expanding concepts, ideas, and doctrine, as well as guidance from civilian and military leaders that bound the problem. How will all of these themes be addressed in the current institutional setting? To answer this question, I have chosen a specific lens from which to examine leader development; CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP.

It is important that we be able to identify as many of the numerous inputs into the conditions that will shape the battlefield. There is no set formula that says that there are just so many stimuli in any particular environment. We are operating in an open system, one that is constantly in flux. Additionally, there is no way to discern if the definition or capability we place on a certain condition is completely accurate. The focus areas described in chapters two and three are an attempt to explain just a fraction of inputs that an officer will be expected to recognize, define, analyze, and make decisions on the battlefield.

Although CGSOC and AMSP have different mission statements and resultant expectations of their graduates, it is fruitful to examine both courses for the purpose of this monograph. As a collective group, one builds upon the other and prepares officers for their next assignments as well as the rest of their careers. They are similar in three distinct areas. First, they are a collection of officers from all across the operational Army. Officers attending these courses come from all branches with extremely diverse assignment histories. Brought together, they allow for a broader learning experience that could not be possible if this level of education was purely branch specific. Secondly, the educational experience encompasses members of other Services in an attempt to address the reality of the joint battlefield of today and tomorrow. Finally, and most importantly, this will be the last institutional education an officer will complete until after he commands a battalion or squadron and is fortunate enough to be selected for the War College. Because of this, it is extremely important that the OES provides the broadest, deepest education available at this level.

There is a time gap in institutional development of Army officers between CGSOC / AMSP and the AWC that could be from six to eight years, which is quite alarming. This period of time shows the importance of identifying the necessity and linkage within the institutional domain, OES and CTCs, as well as the other two domains as well. Unless an officer goes through a CTC rotation like BCTP after graduation, there is no other way the institutional domain can effect the officer's development. It is the responsibility of the Army to develop the most

comprehensive leader development possible in order to provide the tools needed by our officers on today and tomorrow's battlefield.

Environment (Threat Capability)

"By intelligence we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, or our own plans and operations. If we consider the actual basis of this information, how unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins."[10]- Carl von Clauswitz

Chapter Overview.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the effects posed by potential adversaries in today's battlefield. As Clausewitz cited above, the more we can find out about the enemy, the less a chance there is for our "collapse and ruin". The first factor is the summarization of the current operational environment. This includes a brief overview of the road the Army has taken since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. It also includes a description and analysis of the current threat. The second factor is the emergence and application of asymmetry against United States forces and interests. Third, the emergence of the importance of cultural awareness on Army and Joint operations must be addressed in the development of our officers. This cultural awareness is not limited to just potential enemies, but to the multiple cultures within the Army and DoD itself. Hence, a similar description and analysis of culture within our own country will be introduced in Chapter Three. These four topics provide evaluation criteria in conjunction with those identified in Chapter Three for the OES and BCTP.

The Current Situation.

Most discourses on what we call the operational environment start with the U.S.-led victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War almost 15 years ago. The force that was restructured after its experience in Vietnam proved its worth in "warm" wars as well, as

[10] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 136.

successful operations in both Panama and Kuwait showed in 1989 and 1991 respectively. Basking in the glow of its victories, the U.S. military suddenly found itself short of potential enemies. One factor was the "downsizing" of its forces with a drastic reduction in defense spending due to the nation's interest in the "peace dividend" expected after the Cold War victory. Another primary factor was the re-emergence of "small wars", to include military operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and Kosovo. The Army has since wrestled to determine exactly what to focus its mission on; large conventional conflicts or smaller, less conventional ones.

Killing people and breaking things was no longer in vogue. People joined the Army to be involved in something adventurous and exciting, not to patrol streets in unpronounceable cities in countries not many Americans could even find on the map. One of the biggest problems for the Army was to realize that these types of missions, the "small wars" of Max Boot fame, had been the norm whereas the big fight was the exception.[11] Army leaders, as well as its soldiers, seemed to have turned their back on this fact, which still has effects on our Army today. This is evidenced in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.

In the mid-90s, the Army participated in numerous military operations other than war (MOOTW). Of the four mentioned in the initial paragraph of this chapter, none can be considered total strategic victories for the United States. The United States soon withdrew from Somalia after the debacle of the 3-4 OCT 93 firefight. This incident tarnished the United States' image internationally, and sent the message that the U.S. citizens do not have the stomach for military casualties. In Haiti, after short-term success and successful transition to the Haitian government, the U.S. and United Nations still find themselves involved in attempts at stabilization. The Balkans has been ongoing for almost a decade and there is no evidence that the

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11 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002 , introduction.

peace will last after a United States / United Nations withdrawal. Even Kosovo, the Air War, continues over five years later, with the same concerns for success as the Balkans.

This is not saying these operations did not have immediate positive impact on the parties involved. By focusing on training and education, our force has been able to use these experiences to develop individuals and units to these types of operations. It is highly probable that current field grade officers serving in the ongoing GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq "earned their spurs" in one or more of these operations. Additionally, "senior" officers, those serving in command and staff positions at Brigade to Corps level, grew up with this evolution in types of "war fighting".

MOOTW is just one of a variety of changes in the operational environment. The introductory chapter mentions the use of non-conventional means by adversaries against the U.S. We are simply not going to be able to win a war by crushing the enemy's conventional land forces. We saw this in both Gulf Wars; we are still fighting the same war 13 years after we crossed the line of departure. This factor was highlighted almost 200 years earlier in German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz's statements, "In war the result is never final….the defeated state often considers the outcome merely a transitory evil".[12]

One concern is that this fact seems so troubling, surprising, or even new to those in the military realm. Returning to Boot's treatise, our Army has been involved in these types of operations for two millennia. Even our successes in some of these "wars", the Philippines in 1902 and Nicaragua in 1915, for example, were primarily because the enemy chose to fight us conventionally instead of sticking to insurgency operations. You could argue both enemy commanders did not have the fortune of reading Mao, Che, or Sun-Tzu; something that our future enemies will be no doubt be potentially well indoctrinated in. The bottom line is that the Army still must retain its versatility through the full range of military operations: conventional large-scale operations as well as smaller scope unconventional operations.

[12] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

Threat.

The Army, DoD, and academia alike have put Herculean efforts into identifying the composition of potential threats the U.S. will face on today and tomorrow's battlefields. Highlighted here are the perceptions of other countries of potential U.S. operations, a brief description of the conditions that make up the operational environment, and the critical variables resident in the operational environment that significantly impact operations.

It is necessary to look at the adversarial perception of the U.S. in an attempt to possibly identify potential adversary information operational actions. First, it is perceived that the U.S has become more emboldened to take military action in support of its objectives. Second, the U.S. has leaned more to technological and information superiority vice reliance on the presence of combat troops. Third, the U.S. recognizes the importance of leveraging public opinion, both domestic and foreign, and puts energy into developing coherent a public relations initiative. Fourth, the U.S. will act unilaterally if it feels it is required and is no longer dependent on international approval or authorization. Fifth, the U.S. tends to lack long-term commitment and are affected greatly sensitive to collateral damage.[13]

These perceptions are leverage points that potential adversaries can focus on as they develop courses of action against the U.S. By developing leaders to be aware of threat considerations, the Army provides its forces with the means to act before their adversaries, and develop courses of action that can defeat any threat. Without this type of education, the Army will find itself vulnerable on the battlefield and find itself in a reactive mode.

Asymmetry.

Interestingly enough, just as cultural awareness is not found in DoD or joint definitions or doctrine, asymmetry is also absent. However, we do find its mention in the Coordinating Draft

[13] JOE, 73-74.

of the Joint Operational Environment – Into the Future (JOE) and in the current Operations manual for the Army, FM 3-0. The JOE defines asymmetric warfare as "focuses whatever may be one side's comparative advantage against an enemy inability to see or defend against actions of that nature".[14] FM 3-0 states, "Asymmetry concerns dissimilarities in organization, equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and values between other armed forces and U.S. forces".[15] Both of these definitions lead to us to infer our enemies will continue this method of war into the future.

Asymmetric means have been the cornerstone of offensive action against the United States since the end of the Korean War. Yes, the U.S. did have opportunities to fight symmetric type engagements and battles with the North Vietnamese Army, but one of the reasons for the failure of our military was not being able to counter the asymmetric methods that the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong employed during the first years of the conflict. More recent incidents of asymmetric actions against the U.S. include, but certainly not limited to, the attack of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the attack on Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the USS Cole incident in 2000, and most notably the two World Trade Center events (1993 and 9/11). Easily seen is the absence of conventional forces in the enemy's continued aggression against United States citizens throughout the globe. Major General (R) Robert Scales address to Congress accentuated the significance of such tactics. "This approach allows the weaker to take on the stronger and has proven effective against western style armies", he also adds the successes to this approach versus a conventional one, "Islamic armies are 0 and 7 when fighting western style and 5 and 0 when fighting unconventionally".[16]

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[14] JOE, 99.
[15] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, (HQ, USDA, 2001), 4-31.
[16] MG (R) Robert Scales testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 15 JUL 04, 2.

Cultural Awareness.

A term that has emerged in the wake of the changing environment is that of cultural awareness. There is significance in noting that cultural awareness is not addressed in DoD or joint publications in term of a coherent definition. A brief attempt at defining the term follows; the identification of diverse points of view in the areas of culture, religion, ethnicity, language and demographics that allow the military officer to better understand the area he and his unit will be operating in. In short, viewing matters outside of our own culture or comfort zone would lead to a more thorough understanding of an area and potential problems.

Scales made an impassioned plea to Congress this past summer focused on this term, "the intimate knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method and cultural environment has proven to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft and expansive bandwidth. Success rests with the ability of leaders to think and adapt faster than the enemy and for soldiers to thrive in an environment of uncertainty, ambiguity and unfamiliar cultural circumstances".[17] The second sentence offers two distinct points; decision-making and culture specific. The latter point not only includes understanding cultures outside of the United States. It includes the many disparate cultures that make up our own government, and even the DoD as well. This "intra" cultural awareness is just as important as awareness of the cultures in our areas of operation and will be addressed in the next chapter.

Summary.

There are numerous stimuli on today' battlefield that comprise potential adversary courses of action. In an attempt to identify the post Cold War mindset and actions, current threat characteristics, the use of asymmetry as a tactic, and the complexities of culture, I have merely pointed out areas of emphasis that our institutional Army should address in its development

[17] Scales, 2.

programs. Referring to Clausewitz's comment at the opening of this chapter, this information is unreliable and transient and must constantly be updated and disseminated to its leaders for their use on the battlefield.

Environment (Friendly Situation)

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight six factors that will influence the battlefield of today and tomorrow. The first is found in guidance from our strategic and operational leaders. Second, this guidance in turn points to the increasing importance of joint, inter-agency, and multinational considerations. Third, an understanding of the effects and capabilities of the organizational change currently underway as part of the Army transformation plan to a new modular force is crucial in identifying leader development opportunities within OES and BCTP.

Fourth, the emergence of new concepts such as operational net assessment and effects based operations provide challenges and opportunities to units and leaders as they struggle to find a coherent way of incorporating emerging doctrine within transformational change. Fifth, Army culture itself can be addressed to highlight differences within its own camp on the importance of post conflict operations vice major combat operations. Finally, leadership development must be based on the tenets outlined in FM 22-100, Army Leadership. GEN (R) Shinseki "challenges its leaders to be of character and competence who lead others to excellence…America looks to you to BE, KNOW, and DO what is right"[18] These six friendly factors will be applied to the OES and BCTP to identify shortfalls and recommendations to both organizations to enhance leader development.

Guidance.

As mentioned in the initial chapter, the Army operates under both civilian and military guidance that drives the path for leader development, among other major themes as well. The purpose of analyzing our higher guidance is to determine whether or not it is properly nested, if it addresses the multiple conditions that officers will operate under, and simply to see if it all makes

[18] U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, (HQ, USDA, 1999), Foreword.

sense. As we will see, different documents focus on different themes with room for varying degrees of interpretation and subsequent implementation by subordinates.

Starting with the primary document formulated by our Commander-in-Chief, President George W. Bush, the National Security Strategy addresses many of the factors covered in this monograph as well. Within the NSS, we see emphasis on culture, multi-national efforts, threat identification, and military transformational imperatives. Highlighted here is the emphasis on "We must prepare by developing assets such as advanced remote sensing, long range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces".[19] This statement alone addresses the friction in the topics mentioned earlier such as NCW and transformational change. What will be the appropriate mix of soldiers on the ground and high tech systems espoused by VADM(R) Czebrowski? Unfortunately, the Army cannot look to the NSS for answers, let alone the next phase of guidance put forward by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Richard Meyer.

The National Military Strategy, developed after and in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy is appropriately nested with the NSS. It does a credible job in summing up the challenges within the environment, threat capabilities, the need for jointness, and the vision for future warfighting. Significant to this monograph is the brief mention of leader development. This guidance provides direction to all of the Services as it develops its training strategies, "For junior officers, incorporating joint education and training early in their careers ensures future leaders will more effectively integrate tactical operations with interagency and multinational components".[20] This specific point will be addressed later in this monograph when analyzing CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP.

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[19] The National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 13 MAY 04), 30.

[20] The National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 13 MAY 04), 23.

The Army piece of higher guidance can be found in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance: 2006-2023. The purpose of the ASPG is to "represent the Army senior leadership's vision of how the Army will fulfill its mission to provide forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the NSS and NDS".[21] The ASPG is also nested with higher guidance with an emphasis on the threat, environment, and the need for a joint and expeditionary mindset. It too mentions preparing soldiers and leaders for the future. Where soldier guidance is focused on weapons, equipment, and stabilization, leader preparation is again geared to joint and interagency type operations, "We will select leaders for key positions within joint, interagency, multinational, and Service organizations and develop and institutionalize the systems required to sustain these assignments".[22] A pattern is emerging here; the future of the U.S. military and defense will be the joint, interagency, and multinational realm.

These documents provide the baseline guidance that GEN Schoomaker and his civilian counterpart, Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee. Since his appointment as CSA, GEN Schoomaker has been very proactive in presenting his vision to the Army. Perhaps the best document he has produced was in the past Summer issue of Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly. GEN Schoomaker does a good job in bounding the problem faced by the Army today. He analyzes the direction the Army needs to go through the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leader, facilities) lens. By examining this guidance, we can see the direction where the Army needs to go.

The major themes of this document include an Army at war, a need for an expeditionary and joint mindset, and the changing of our formations to meet the threat in the current environment. This change of formations to a modular force will allow for much needed force stabilization, which is an attempt by the Army to provide a level of predictability for Army

[21] The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,14 NOV 03), 1

[22] Ibid, 6.

soldiers and their families. He completes the paper by addressing the training, education, doctrine, logistics, and installation changes that will be required to make this transformation successful.[23]

Joint, Interagency & Multinational.

The aftermath of the Cold War has brought the military to a position in which all of its operations will be conducted jointly. Examples of these types of operations include the failed Desert One operation to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, and Operation Just Cause in 1989. We have seen the use of interagency and multinational operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans as well. It is with great assuredness that we can say our future operations will include elements of interagency organizations and multinational coalitions.

To prepare its military for this joint contingency, Congress formulated and passed the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986, which addressed the area of jointness. There were many changes due to this act. Three of the most significant included the operational authority was centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as opposed to the Service Chiefs, the establishment of the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and the change of the chain of command from the President to the secretary of Defense to the unified commander. Another result of the Goldwater-Nichols '86 was the requirement for joint assignments for officers before attaining General / Flag Officer rank.[24] This requirement was intended to foster more awareness and compatibility amongst the services, and in truth has worked to some extent.

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[23] Themes derived from GEN Schoomaker and Secratery Brownlee's, *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, (Carlisle: Army War College, Parameters , Summer 2004).

[24] Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986.

According to current policy, in most cases, an officer will not serve in a joint billet until after he completes his branch qualification assignments as a field grade officer. Even then, an assignment to a high level joint billet (RCC staff, the Pentagon, etc.) truly does not make the officer "joint qualified". Add to this the broad-brush training offered at CGSOC / AMSP, which will be fully explained in the next chapter, and you can say the Army is not addressing the CSA's concern for joint training. This is even more evident in inter-agency or multi-national operations.

Interagency operations will also be the norm. How the Army prepares its officers to serve in this environment will be essential to success on the modern battlefield. Just where this development will occur in an officer's career and what level it must focus on is also a key. There are three areas to consider; the national strategic, the operational, and the tactical. For purpose of this monograph, it is imperative we look at the operational level for improvements.

Before addressing the operational level, it is necessary to see what exists at the other two levels. Strategically, there actually has been a lot of effort done to ensure effective interagency operations. National Security Presidential Directive 1 redefined interagency arrangements under policy coordination committees to manage development and implementation of national security policy.[25] This sets the stage for what is done at the operational level. The requirement for an integrated and coordinated response is outlined as: "Joint Force Commanders should ensure their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces and non-military organizations".[26] This tells us what must be done, but neglects to state how this is accomplished. One need only look at the preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom to see that existing legislation and doctrine are not enough.

At the tactical level, there is evidence that the cloud of confusion seen at the operational level does not necessarily exist. One such view is that the interagency coordination is extremely

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[25] Patrick Kelleher, *Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military*, (Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2002), 105.

[26] Ibid, 105.

effective at the tactical level. A recent Congressional delegation visit to Afghanistan in the summer of 2004 pointed out that there seemed to be effective coordination between the military and other agencies within the government.[27]

At the multinational level, I believe the Army is doing a credible job in exposing officers to members of other nations. International officer presence at all levels of the OES is a great start in understanding and building career long relationships. This generation of Army officers have had multiple opportunities to work with multinational services since ODS in 1991. The Army experiences in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have helped develop stronger bonds with other nations. More importantly perhaps is the efforts involved in training exercises that build teamwork *before* a conflict arises. Examples of such exercise include COBRA GOLD, KEEN EDGE, Partnership for Peace, and INTRINSIC ACTION, to name but a few. In my concluding chapter, I will submit my recommendations for a way ahead in regards to multinational training.

Operational Net Assessment and Effects-Based Operations.

Several of the emerging concepts within DoD transformation are operational net assessment and effects-based operations. It is not my intent to fully articulate the purpose of both concepts and their potential capabilities. However, it is necessary to understand the basic principles behind these ideas and the effects they will have on our formations and the officers that serve in them. Neither of these concepts are accepted Army doctrine right now. Yet both are expected to continue to emerge and be part of the Army and Joint community, and therefore require inclusion in our leader development programs.

The working definition for ONA is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information systems and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the

[27] Mr. Bonsell, military assistant to Senator Inhofe (R-Oklahoma), address to AMSP students at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 SEP 04.

adversary, the environment, and ourselves.[28] It is to be used at the operational level of war, specifically at the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFCQ), a full-time command and control element located in every RCC staff. The SJFHQs is another piece to the DoD transformation plan. The At first glance, it looks very similar to what the Army does now as part of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The evolution of this is the development of a System-of-Systems Analysis (SoSA). SoSA looks at the potential crisis area as a system of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII). The purpose of this is to attempt to identify potential relationships, dependencies, influences, and ultimately opportunities for us to exploit.

With ONA established in a particular region, it in turn enables EBO by providing a holistic understanding of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves. There are two similar yet different definitions put forth to describe EBO. One defines EBO as "actions that change the state of a system to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of the instruments of national power, diplomatic, informational, military, and economics (DIME)".[29] Another definition, found in a different JFCOM pamphlet defines EBO as: "Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims".[30] While not exactly identical, the main theme is clear: EBO is the use of all capabilities in our nation's arsenal, not just the military ones to engage to deter or defeat an adversary. It is clear that DoD is still finding its way in developing the appropriate doctrine to maximize the potential benefits offered by ONA and EBO.

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[28] JWFC Doctrine PAM 4, *Operational Net Assessment*, (Norfolk, VA, Government Printing Office, Joint Forces Command 24 FEB 04), 1.

[29] Ibid, 4.

[30] JWFC Doctrine PAM 7, *Operational Impacts of Effects Based Operations*, (Norfolk, VA, Government Printing Office, Joint Forces Command 17 NOV 04), 2.

Organizational Change.

The emerging concepts on the transformation Army formations are more than cosmetic. A thorough comparison of the current force structure and the creation of the one of the future force are required in order to identify areas of training and education for the officers who will serve in them. A quick summation of these differences follows. A current Army Division is structured to fight large scale, campaign-type operations. It is not equipped or trained to fight at the joint or coalition level. It is inflexible in its ability to "mix and match" subordinate units quickly. Perhaps most significant is that its size precludes it from being properly suited for smaller scale operations.[31]

The development of the UEx seeks to ameliorate these disadvantages and provide a more versatile, responsive formation to our combatant commanders. The UEx is an organization built on functionality versus branch parochialism. It will provide its own headquarters staff, not requiring augmentation from subordinate headquarters. It will be able to fight jointly and with coalition partners. Most importantly perhaps is its ability to rely on itself for such capabilities as security, communications, and sustainment. [32]

Perhaps the greatest impetus for change that has focused this transformational movement was provided by the CSA, GEN Schoomaker. Understanding his role as Service Chief during a transformational period within the DoD, GEN Schoomaker posed a significant question to his senior leaders. The question could be paraphrased as: If we make an assumption that our personnel strength is capable of handling operations in the contemporary operational environment, should we not look to the restructuring of current Army formations rather than just

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[31] Draft Modularity O&O Plan, 3 APR 04, 10.

[32] For more information on the comparisons of the UEx and current force structure, as well as the projected capabilities, you can find numerous Power Point slide presentations, to include: *TF Modularity Current Force UE Decision Brief*, 19 MAR 04; *UEy and UEx, Designing a Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities*, COCOM Brief, 8 JUL 04; *Why We are Changing the Army*, 13 MAY 04; *How the UEx Fights*, 29 MAR 04; and *The UEx White Paper, Version 3.5*, 16 JUL 04.

requesting an increase in soldiers / formations as we currently employ them?[33] This approach has since been the cornerstone of the Army Transformation Plan. It would be hard enough to complete this transformation if the Army was able to focus its efforts to this transformational idea. Add to that the Army's engagement in the Global War on Terrorism, and the task borders on the edge of chaos.

Just what are the capabilities expected of the new force construct? In short, a UEy will perform the duties of existing Armies and Corps, while a UEx will conduct missions performed today by both Divisions and Corps. At quick glance, it seems the future headquarter structures will be responsible for far more than what are expected of them now. Specifically at the UEx level, officers will be required to coordinate with all types of infantry forces as well as coalition partners. Another challenge is found in one of the presentations cited earlier. It states the UEx is a "flexible Command and Control Headquarters for joint warfighting…it is not a division…it is not a corps…"[34]. It will be essential to develop the appropriate collective / leader tasks that the UEx will be responsible for prior to deploying it to a theatre of operations. It appears it will have to perform multiple tasks not habitually associated with either a division or corps. This uncertainty must be addressed, and the appropriate training strategies at the OES and combat training centers must be developed and implemented at the earliest opportunity.

In the Draft modularity O&O plan, the UEx would be given five specific tasks / capabilities. They include the command and control of up to six maneuver brigades (but perhaps more in stability operations) and command and control based on functionality verses branch specific units. It also will conduct operations as either an Army Forces (ARFOR) or Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) Headquarters for small contingencies, command and control of joint and army capabilities in support of the RCC's campaign plan, and employment of

[33] Paraphrase from White Papers and public addresses.
[34] *How the UEx Fights*, 29 MAR 04, slide 39

sustainment and maneuver enhancement brigades in support of UEx operations.[35] This means a UEx commander and staff must be trained on the specific tasks to support these capabilities. It is evident these capabilities are beyond the "normal" tasks list required of a divisional or corps headquarters. Do we simply state these tasks are not drastically different form current requirements or admit that there is indeed a more than subtle difference in required training from the current force to the future force? Where will this training occur, and at what time in an officer's career or unit's lifecycle will the individual leader training and unit collective training be done respectively?

Army Culture.

There exist several differences within the Army that contribute to the friction of today and tomorrow's battlefield. One includes a generational difference between junior and senior officers. A second condition is the emergence of post-conflict operations as the decisive operation within a major campaign verses the traditional major combat operations. Finally, there is much discussion on the term network centric warfare and its potential to transition away from the primacy of ground combat forces.

Cultural differences can provide sticking points in the midst of transformation. One such difference is the generational concern between junior and senior officers. Junior officers believe that the senior leadership is out of touch with the real Army, or that they simply lose focus the higher they progress. An additional concern or complaint is that senior leaders simply do not take into consideration the opinions or concerns of the junior officers. A recent article in Parameters stated "elements of the Army's organizational culture inhibited innovation….many officers believed their service has a climate that is intolerant of criticism…and saw their service's culture

[35] Draft Modularity O&O Plan, 3 APR 04, 10

as an impediment to innovation.".[36] For the Army to transform together, junior officers must feel that they are part of the solution, and given forums to be heard.

Dr. Leonard Wong, a retired Army officer working at the Army War College addresses this generational concern and developed some interesting conclusions. His assessment was that there really is no difference between today's Army and that of a generation ago; pay, housing, operational tempo, pride, and camaraderie are all basically the same. Dr. Wong recommends that senior leaders need to admit that they really don't understand the younger generation and attempt to establish a relationship with their juniors in an attempt to ameliorate this difference. The more disturbing piece of Dr. Wong's study was the assessment that the Army "just doesn't do leader development".[37] The inference here is that mentoring, counseling, and face to face interaction is not fostered within the Army and must be addressed in order to close this generational gap.

A second cultural difference is the actual conduct of planning and execution for operations. There has been much debate over Operation Iraqi Freedom if the military blundered by assuming away the conditions of Iraq after the defeat of Iraqi armed forces and the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Several high-ranking guest speakers provided their inputs into this phenomenon. LTG Dave McKiernan, commander, CJFLCC, offered that his primary focus was what we call major combat operations, and that he could not afford to allocate significant resources to the post-conflict phase of the operation.[38]

The key planner for CJFLCC, COL Kevin Benson spoke on this subject at the Combat Studies Institute Seminar on post conflict operations last September. When asked by someone in the audience what he would have done differently, COL Benson answered: "I would've prevailed upon the CG (LTG McKiernan) to focus on phase IV…this did not happen…it was delegated to MG Whitley (of the United Kingdom, one of CJFLCC's deputy CGs) to plan this...he could not

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[36] Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. Fitzsimonds, *Tread-Heads or Technophiles: Army Officer Attitudes Towards Transformation*, (Carlisle: Army War College, Parameters , Summer 2004), 58 and 68.

[37] Dr.Leonard Wong's address to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 SEP 04.

focus on phase III and IV together."[39] The lesson here is clear. Without the appropriate level of focus on all of the phases, there will be poor transitions and a lack of synchronization in the overall operation.

A third cultural difference is the path of transformation away from armored-centric units and heavy reliance on technology. This rift began during GEN Shinseki's tenure as CSA when he sponsored the idea of a more mobile force capability at the expense of armored units. This paper will not debate the merits of the now-performing Stryker Brigades or the ongoing debate of NCW, but rather to identify that these two concepts are causing internal friction within the Army. Another article in Parameters addresses the success of armor units on today's battlefield; especially in urban areas. Data from Operation Iraqi Freedom indicate that U.S. tanks were relatively invulnerable to the weapons the Iraqis could bring to bear on them.[40] Additionally, as evidenced repeatedly since the first Gulf War, ground forces are critical for peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as other stability operations.[41] Simply put, current operations are confirming the need for armor formations and boots on the ground.

Leadership.

Although Army leadership regulations are seemingly outdated, the most current document, 1999's version of FM 22-100, Army Leadership, provides the required development for officers to serve on the battlefield of today and tomorrow. The Army Regulations and Department of the Army Pamphlets associated with leader development are mostly dated in the early to mid 1990s. This seems to imply that with all of the changes currently underway it is virtually impossible to regulate the changes in our leadership doctrine and training.

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[38] LTG McKiernan's address to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 30 SEP 04.

[39] COL Kevin Benson at the Combat Studies Institute Seminar on Post Conflict Operations held at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 14-16 SEP 04.

[40] John Gordan IV and Jerry Sollinger, *The Army's Dilemma* (Carlisle: Army War College, Parameters , Summer 2004), 41.

[41] Ibid, 41.

The substance of the FM 22-100 still applies today, and I foresee its application in the future. The concluding chapter of this monograph will point to the requirements of today's leader to remain the focal point in leader development vice any institutional or self-developmental domain. By adhering to the Army values; loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, integrity, and personal courage, leaders will be able to facilitate the necessary development of the future leaders in the Army. By applying the concepts of mentorship, character building, counseling, and levels of leadership (direct, organizational, and strategic), Army leaders will be armed with the knowledge and education to pass the torch and keep the military tradition of the Army alive and well and remain a relevant option for our RCCs and Commander-in-Chief.

Summary.

The purpose of this chapter was to describe and highlight several of the areas within our own camp that leaders need to be educated. It starts with the guidance of our leaders. This guidance provides the basis for the structure of our force on the battlefield. This structure will comprise a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. Within this environment, there are emerging concepts that we hope to leverage against our potential adversaries. The Army must keep up with new doctrine and educate our leaders to utilize their capabilities. Besides emerging doctrine the Army has chosen to undertake significant organizational change to meet the demands of a military fully engaged in the GWOT. To ensure the Army stays grounded with its proud lineage and history, we must ensure we address the cultural differences within our own organization, and stay focused on the vital role of its leaders. All of these stimuli will be part of the evaluation of CGSOC & SAMS and BCTP in the next two chapters respectively.

Officer Education System

"To produce leaders who reach instinctively beyond their own service for solutions to tactical and operational problems, Army leader development must routinely incorporate joint education and experience. In the end, we seek a bench of leaders able to think creatively at every level of war,

and able to operate with equal comfort in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments."[42] – GEN Schoomaker.

Overview.

As stated in the methodology of the opening chapter, the purpose of CGSOC and AMSP are comparatively different. The opportunities available at CGSOC and AMSP for leader development are world class. In short, no other country in the world can match the resources of dollars, time, and dedicated cadre of professional instructors that is available to the Army. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the curriculum offered at CGSOC and AMSP based on the evaluation criteria outlined in Chapters Two and Three. It will briefly describe the purposes of each course and a concise description of the methodology used in delivering the coursework within the curriculum as well. The analysis in this chapter will provide the basis of my recommendations in the concluding chapter.

Mission, Methodology & Evaluation.

CGSOC.

The mission statement of CGSOC reads: "The US Army Command & General Staff School educates and trains intermediate level Army Officers, International Officers, Sister Service Officers, and Interagency leaders prepared to operate in full spectrum Army, joint, interagency, and multinational environments as field grade commanders and staff officers".[43] A CGSOC graduate can expect to serve in staff positions from the battalion to division level. Because of this, the curriculum is concerned with availing the graduate a holistic education in Army functions and its relation to the sister services and multinational forces.

[42] Serving A Nation at War, 20.

[43] Command & General Staff College web site, (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/DSA/), last updated 20 SEP 04.

For this monograph, I will focus my evaluation based on the year-long course offered at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. This includes what is termed Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core that consists of 323 total hours and lasts from August until early December. At the conclusion of the Common Core, National Guard and Reserve students graduate and return to their home units. The remainder of the student body, over 90% of those that started in August, will continue with the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) and graduate in June before returning to the operational Army.

This is where we see a shortfall in the development of junior field grade officers for the Reserve Component (RC). RC graduates only get about half of the school time that their active duty counterparts receive. With the increase of RC participation in the GWOT, this seems to raise the level of operational risk to any RC unit deploying for real contingency operations. This has an exponential risk in that RC units are not working in isolation. Rather, they conduct operations with other Army, sister service, and multinational units. If they are not as well trained as their counterparts, the Army incurs a risk that almost seems unacceptable.

During the Common Core, CGSOC students receive education in the three levels of war (185 hours), History (24 hours), Leadership (33 hours), and Force Management (24 hours). This level of instruction provides the foundations necessary to meet the intent of the CGSOC mission statement. On the whole, the Common Core meets its goal of developing officers who are better prepared to serve in today's battlefield, specifically above the tactical level.

Worth noting is that students get 12 hours of education on critical reasoning and critical thinking at the beginning of the course in an attempt to develop a leader who knows how to think rather than what to think. It is my assessment after completing the course and interviewing other graduates and instructors that this is a superficial attempt and must be introduced with more rigor throughout the length of the course, not just as a stage-setter.

The AOWC portion provides instruction on Operational Warfighting (87 hours), Division Operations (131 hours), and Brigade Operations (129 hours), with more History (43 hours) and

Leadership education (28 hours). A student has the option of taking the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies (JAWS) in lieu of the first three courses mentioned above, which provides the student an additional skill identifier as a joint officer. Additionally, students must complete five electives in conjunction with the course load outlined above.

An opportunity for further education exists with the Masters of Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) program. This program is underutilized, as only 10-20% of the students participate. This is simply a wasted opportunity for development. Instead of allowing students to pursue civilian Masters degrees, mandate all students to participate in the MMAS program. This would serve several functions. First, the Army would be gaining an increase in researchers to conduct papers on matters of importance to the Army. Second, each CGSOC student would complete a relevant developmental product that would benefit him as well as the Army.

There is a distinct difference between the Common Core and the AOWC that moves away from the concept of developing an officer with the same training and education. The JAWS program for example provides a much more rigorous developmental program than those that stay in the basic AOWC model. Additionally, as students choose their five electives, they will graduate with diverse specialties or skill sets, as opposed to each graduate possessing the same areas of development.

This following example will attempt highlight my point. LTG William Wallace, Combined Arms Center Commander and Commandant of the College, stated that "We just don't appreciate the culture of the region", and added that CGSOC will add three electives on cultural awareness for AOWC.[44] Max Boot, acclaimed author on military matters added his assessment that the Army simply needs more cultural training.[45] The significance of cultural awareness is profound, yet only a fraction of the current class, and none of the RC, will benefit from this block of instruction. This adds to the complexity for units in the field as graduates return to these units

[44] LTG Wallace's comments to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 NOV 04.

from CGSOC with a lack of education on this subject. Simply put, cultural awareness must be provided to *all* CGSOC students, not just a small percentage.

AMSP.

The mission statement of AMSP includes the "education and training of officers at the graduate level in military art and science to develop commanders and General Staff officers with the abilities to solve complex military problems in peace and war".[46] The most discernable difference between the CGSOC and AMSP graduate is that AMSP graduates will now be considered military planners for the rest of their careers. This means that between required branch-qualified assignments, AMSP graduates will perform functions as military planners on division, corps, army, and joint staffs.

AMSP's curriculum has the student complete course work in history, theory, and the execution of practical exercises that promote problem-solving skills vice stated school solutions. The course looks at problem solving from both the command and staff perspective on decision-making, doctrine, and the force deployment.[47] In fact, problem-solving and critical thinking are themes incorporated throughout the length of the course and not just introduced in the beginning of the year as does CGSOC. The course includes multiple exercises at all three levels of war where students perform the role of planners. Graduation requirements and the awarding of a Master of Military Arts and Sciences is contingent on the successful completion of a 40+ page monograph on a relevant topic and the completion of a four hour comprehensive final oral exam at he end of the school year.

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[45] Max Boot address to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 16 NOV 04.

[46] Advanced Military Studies website, (http://CGSOC.leavenworth.army.mil/sams/index.asp), last updated 13 SEP 04.

[47] Ibid, http://CGSOC.leavenworth.army.mil/sams/amsp/.

Evaluation.

The purpose of this section within the framework described above is to evaluate CGSOC and AMSP on the criteria outlined in Chapters Two and Three. They have been broken down into four sub components; (1) threat, asymmetry, and culture, (2) joint, interagency, and multinational, (3) leadership and Army culture, and (4) organizational change, ONA, and EBO.

Threat, Asymmetry, and Culture.

Both in CGSOC and AMSP do an outstanding job in these areas. Both are required to read such authors as Thomas Friedman, Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler. This opportunity forces the student to depart from the micro, Army viewpoint and embrace the macro, broader view afforded by non-military writers. The development received here allows the student to use a broader mindset for problem solving when he returns to the field upon graduation. With the electives developed for cultural awareness, students will also gain a different perspective on the region that they will potentially be conducting contingency operations in.

AMSP is postured to conduct exponentially more development on these topics. Besides the authors mentioned above, AMSP conducts extensive reading and discussion on numerous, diverse authors on the Islamic faith and the Middle East. Authors like Friedman, Marina Ottaway, Karen Armstrong, Bernard Lewis, Albert Hourani, Paul Berman, and Mark Jurgensmeyer all provide unique viewpoints that are brought into discussion and able to be put in the kit bag of the student. Additionally, AMSP has a robust guest speaker program that allows time for a brief presentation and more importantly, questions and answers. Speakers for AMSP 04-05 included Kaplan, Boot, and Dr. Seyom Brown among many others.

Joint, Interagency & Multinational.

Joint.

In the current environment, one can expect an assignment to a "purple" unit every three to four years. It would be prudent to introduce realistic tasks, conditions, and standards on specific joint tasks in the OES. This should start at the pre-commissioning level in addition to the generic capability briefings each service gives at each level of war (strategic, operational, and tactical). Incorporation of these tasks with joint conditions to the practical exercises conducted in both of these courses should be done. This is simply not done at the CGSOC and AMSP level and must be addressed to enable majors going back to the force the best ability to operate effectively in a joint, inter-agency, multi-national environment.

My recommendation for CGSOC and AMSP is to actually incorporate joint aspects to performance oriented training exercises. To say that a CGSOC graduate is Phase I, joint professional military education (JPME) certified, as it is written in the latest *DA PAM 350-58 The Enduring Legacy: Leader Development For America's Army*, is almost criminal. Joint education at CGSOC consists of power point presentations conducted by the particular Service. It is a descriptive process, which lacks the benefit of a practical exercise or embeddings in the curriculum. Until a realistic, rigid approach is taken to both CGSOC and AMSP's classroom discussion and exercise design, there will continue to be wasted training opportunities at both courses.

There are positives to be found in MEL 4 in relation to joint development of officers. The most obvious is the inclusion of sister services at these courses. Both CGSOC and AMSP provide each classroom with another service member. This alone provides a different point of view in relation to the topic of classroom discussions and the conduct of exercises. However, joint participation in exercises is limited to planning; and these forces are merely scripted into the scenario versus being able to plan and execute them as part of the exercise.

Interagency.

The area of interagency development is even less effective. For CGSOC, a student will not interact with any other interagency personnel in the classroom or even undergo basic

instruction on interagency capabilities. Bringing in the Department of State and Department of Justice personnel to discuss agency capabilities and present their understanding of their role in the implementation of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economical (DIME) elements of national power would be the right first step in developing inter-agency cooperation at CGSOC. Incorporating an inter-agency aspect to CGSOC exercises would also be a start in developing an officer who is aware of capabilities and limitations of inter-agency personnel that will be encountered in the future.

AMSP does a little better. For AMSP class '04-'05, there is a member of the Defense Intelligence Agency who represents the lone interagency representative for the course. It can be argued the members of his seminar (12 students) do get the benefit of this different point of view, but the other five seminars miss out on such an opportunity, in the classroom setting anyway. There is little difference in the exercise program from CGSOC and AMSP; there is a total lack of interagency representation, scripted or otherwise. This leads to a great deal of frustration for the students trying to accomplish an assigned task. The learning point is painfully clear; AMSP graduates, as well as CGSOC, will forever more work with inter-agency personnel on today and tomorrow's battlefield.

AMSP does provide valuable information its students by bringing in multiple guest speakers and the invitation to governmental organizations to sit in on an interagency panel. One of the topics that generated much discussion was that of a centralized agency or figure to coordinate interagency effectiveness. One observation was that on Capitol Hill, there simply is no impetus for change in regards to the forwarding of legislation to overhaul the interagency process similar to that of Goldwater-Nichols '86.[48] Another view along these lines was that a lack of interagency coordination prevented the possibility of tyranny; something the founding

[48] Major General Guy Swan, Chief Legislative LNO, brief to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 15 NOV 04.

fathers of our country were very concerned with.[49] A third supporting argument was that the lack of definitive authoritarian document provided field forces the flexibility in the conduct of planning and execution of operations.[50]

This discussion is the start of necessary development for our officers as they prepare for operations throughout the world that will involve other members of our government. Goldwater-Nichols is eighteen years old, so it would not be too bold an assumption to say the Army is a good fifteen years behind when it comes to inter-agency effectiveness. This shortfall must be bridged within the next three to five years if we are going to get a chance to influence the battalion and brigade commanders of 2010 and beyond. If not done in the OES, then it must be addressed in areas such as BCTP and at the operational Army.

Multinational.

CGSOC and AMSP is missing a valuable training opportunity to develop working relationships with other countries. My recommendation is to incorporate the country of the international officer into any small group / seminar within CGSOC and AMSP respectively during practical exercises. Additionally, officers can complete training in liaison functions as well as cultural understanding with a specific country. These steps could only foster stronger international ties and give officers the confidence they need in performing with allies in the international battlefield.

At the multinational level, officers can expect to serve with soldiers from other countries as a matter of course through their cases. The international officer program is a good start in forging positive relations between our officers and those of other countries. That CGSOC / AMSP includes international officers at just lower than 10% levels is a testament that the institution is serious in developing these relationships. CGSOC / AMSP can do much more than

[49] Colonel John Prior, Central Intelligence Agency, during interagency panel discussion for AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 23 NOV 04.

this however. As is the case with the Sister Services, Multinational forces are merely "scripted" when mentioned in exercises.

Leadership and Army Culture.

CGSOC does an outstanding job in developing leaders in accordance with FM 22-100. Almost 50 total hours including practical exercises and case studies enhances the student and prepares him to assume the role of organizational and strategic leader. AMSP does not formally conduct leadership development. However, leadership is an integrated theme during exercises, classroom discussion. Both courses conduct performance counseling with the focus on how to improve upon the individual student's areas of improvement.

The schoolhouse is still moving slowly on the topic of post conflict termination as it wrestles with its importance in relation to MCO. LTG Wallace is still asking the question "what if phase IV is the decisive phase of the campaign?"[51] It does provide the means for discussion, and definitely points to the fact that post conflict operations *must be addressed* in future operations. The ability of AMSP to allow its students to attend the CSI conference on post conflict operations in September is an example of the flexibility within the organization to address developmental concerns.

Organizational change and ONA & EBO.

CGSOC and AMSP are still not embracing the change coming from the UEx and UEy transformation. Both offer electives, which again will have the effect that not all graduates will be on the same page in regards to organizational change. Both have received the Army generic slide presentation of where the Army is going and why, but nothing substantive has been done to actually develop the leader to serve in these new formations. Perhaps this is a calculated move on

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[50] Lieutenant Colonel (P) Shaw, AMSP Instructor, during interagency panel discussion for AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 23 NOV 04.

the part of the schoolhouse to wait until the drafts are finalized and the units in the field actually reorganize as the UEx and UEy. I see it as a missed opportunity to start arming our officers with as much information as possible before they graduate and then find themselves in the midst of a unit actually reorganizing as a UEx or UEy.

Just as organizational transformation is still underway, so too are the concepts of ONA and EBO. CGSOC simply does not address theses concepts. AMSP however has fully engaged in the development of the emerging doctrine. Examples of this are found in several days of classes and practical exercises being committed to solely ONA and EBO.

In addition to that, AMSP recently conducted a six-day exercise involving ONA and EBO as part of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters within a RCC. This exercise highlighted the fact that AMSP students were away from their comfort zones of IPB and the military decision making process (MDMP). However, many positives occurred because of the exercise. First, there was an increase in the culture of the region of the exercise; in this case North Africa. Second, it fostered development on communication. The construct of the exercise culminated with a brief to the Secretary of Defense (role-played by the Director of SAMS, COL Kevin Benson). Third, it provided awareness of the capabilities of ONA and EBO. Finally, the results of the exercise can now be packaged and provided to JFCOM for further analysis and development.

Summary

It is clear that the Army has developed an educational system that is competent in developing leaders to serve at the field grade level in the operational Army. Through the evaluation criteria cited above, both CGSOC and AMSP provide the environment that facilitates effective leader development. There are concerns that RC officers do not receive the same level of development as their active duty counterparts. RC students do no have the opportunity to

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[51] LTG Wallace address to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 NOV 04.

complete the MMAS as well. As outlined above there are areas that can be improved or added to increase the developmental capability of its graduates. In the end, it is up to the individual motivation of each officer to avail upon him the training and education that he missed out due to the construct of the course, the electives program, and the MMAS program.

Battle Command Training Program

"Our combat training centers drive the tactical culture of the Army. They are the linchpin of our extraordinary battlefield success over the past two decades. Given that the every Army employment presumes a joint context, we will reinforce this key condition throughout our collective training"[52] – GEN Schoomaker

The purpose of this chapter is to identify BCTP's capability to train formations and develop officers at the UEx, UEy, and BCT level on the topics identified in Chapters Two and Three. It will include a brief history of BCTP and its subsequent evolution as a tool employed by two separate CSAs to train formations and develop leaders in the Army. The chapter concludes with an assessment of BCTP's effectiveness with recommendations on areas of enhancement.

Brief History of BCTP.

In the mid-1980s, the Army began investing extensive resources to combat training centers. GEN (R) Frederick Franks provides a brief, detailed account in his book *Into the Storm* on the development of the CTCs as a "come as you are war" event for the purpose of meeting the principle of training as you fight.[53] The first two CTCs were focused at training soldiers and formations at the battalion or task force level (JRTC), and brigade level (NTC). These CTCs provided the maneuver area, the problem set consisting of an opposing force (OPFOR) modeled at the current threat of the day, the former Soviet Union, and most importantly a highly trained cadre of officers and NCOs called observer-controllers (OCs) that provided feedback to the participating unit through formal and formal after action reviews (AARs).

[52] Serving A Nation at War, 18.

With the emphasis of training and development on brigade and lower units, there existed a need to bring this high quality experience to a higher-level unit, specifically the division and corps. BCTP originated in the 1986-87 in an effort to find a way to train commanders and staffs of units larger than battalion and brigade level. The problem was how to realistically develop a training exercise that would not be too extreme in turns of dollar cost and manpower requirements. The answer was to conduct a computer driven simulation exercise that could effectively train and develop leaders and formations.

There are several key differences between BCTP and the "dirt" CTCs. Most obvious is the use of the computer simulation that enables the participating unit to "fight" its plan against a predetermined OPFOR on any geographic area in the world. Second is the location of the exercise; held at the participating unit's installation instead of a centrally located training center tto which the participating units had to deploy. A third difference is the focus of the training and development solely on the headquarters' elements vice the individual combat and support units within the organization. Perhaps most notably is the involvement of the CSA. Then Army CSA, GEN (R) Carl Vuono initiated a "senior observer-controller", retired three and four star generals that provided immediate feedback to the commanding general of the exercise unit and his staff.[54] CSA involvement has been a cornerstone ever since BCTP's origination, so much so that the previous CSA, GEN (R) Eric Shinseki called BCTP "my program" and was present for every final AAR save one during his tenure as the Army's top general.[55]

Since its inception, BCTP has played vital roles in assisting units in participation for contingency operations. In Operation Desert Shield / Storm, BCTP successfully conducted simulations and commander and staff training exercises that served as a foundation for the

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[53] Tom Clancy, with GEN Fred Franks (ret.), *Into the Storm*, (NY*:* Berkley Books, 1997), 97.
[54] Clancy, 100.
[55] BCTP slide presentation, (Kansas: Ft. Leavenworth) slide 5.

conduct of military operations.[56] Most recently, BCTP provided training and support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. BCTP executed Victory Scrimmage in Grafenwoehr, Germany in February of 2003 that enabled the V Corps Commander, LTG William Wallace to accomplish his objectives of building a cohesive team, refining standard operating procedures and rehearsing various aspects of the plan.[57] Additionally, BCTP stood up an operations group specifically to train and develop commanders and staffs of each division for urban operations in preparation for the expected outcome of street fighting in Baghdad and other urban areas within Iraq. Finally, BCTP effectively attached two of its OPS GRPS, B and D, to augment V Corps and CFLCC respectively for the planning and initial stages of the operation.

Besides developing and executing exercises for the conventional battlefield, BCTP emerged as a trainer for units operating in OOTW as well. BCTP picked up the mantle of facilitating training of National Guard units mobilized for deployment to Bosnia and Kosovo. BCTP conducted decision-making exercises (DMEs) and advanced decision-making exercises (ADMEs) to prepare commanders and staffs to operate in the conditions posed in these environments. BCTP also assisted the other CTCs in the conduct of what was now called mission rehearsal exercises (MREs); the final certification exercise for units deploying to Bosnia or Kosovo.

Description and Analysis of the Warfighter (WFX).

BCTP exercises are called WFXs and involve five distinct components. The first gate is the Battle Command Seminar (BCS). This event involves the Commander, his primary staff, and the plans group traveling to Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas where they conduct a seminar comprised of 8-10 "workshops" while participating in MDMP exercises. These workshops are focused on such

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[56] Robert Scales, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (*Pennsylvania: Government Printing Office, 1993), page 39.

[57] COL (R) Gregory Fontenot, LTC E.J. Degen, LTC David Tohn, *On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, (Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 55.

warfighting skills as targeting, air ground integration, and heavy / light operations. This event allowed the "The Command Team" to start forming its relationships and build cohesion, confidence, and competence. The second pillar is the Deployment Seminar. This seminar is conducted at the installation of the participating unit and introduces the complexity of deploying the unit from its home station to an area of operation around the world. BCTP brings in members of the deployment community to include Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC), and the Deployment Preparation Management Office (DPMO). The purpose of the deployment seminar is two-fold. First, it enables the unit to identify changes it needs to make in its deployment SOP. Second and perhaps more importantly, it facilitates relationship building between the unit and the external players with whom it will be coordinating its deployments.

The third component of a WFX is the Deployment Exercise (DEPEX) conducted several days before the WFX actually begins. The DEPEX is a short notice problem that the player unit must address through MDMP that affects force flow into the area of operations. Decisions made here in turn affect the arrival of units and may cause the unit to adjust its plan to account for the change in deployment flow. The fourth phase is the WFX itself. The WFX lasts five days for divisions and seven days for corps. During the WFX, units will exercise their plan via the simulation and conduct planning for a secondary operation. The purpose of this is to replicate as closely as possible the battle rhythm the unit will face when deployed for real world missions. The final component is the final AAR and the development of the Executive Summary that the unit can take to make any necessary changes in the way it conducts operations.

The mission statement for BCTP is "to support realistic, stressful training and leader development for ARFOR/ASCC, corps, divisions, and brigade commanders. It supports Army components participating in joint exercises to assist the (CSA) in fulfilling duty of providing trained and ready units to win decisively on the modern battlefield and to conduct contingency

operations worldwide".[58] As evidenced in the preceding few paragraphs, BCTP provided numerous opportunities for training and development of units and leaders respectively. In light of this, it is the perfect training tool at the collective level for the evolving organizational change currently underway in the Army.

Transformation.

BCTP has evolved with the times. However, it is still operating under an outdated formal regulation published in 2002 does that does not address the concepts of modularity, the ADMEs and MRXs it has started to conduct in support of Bosnia and Kosovo rotations, and the new exercise design to prepare units for deployment to Iraq. In June 2004 the commander of BCTP, COL Barry Fowler, briefed the proposed mission statement and the new path it was embarking on to meet the CSA's guidance for BCTP.

This brief includes a summary of six areas that BCTP has undertaken in transformation to a more relevant training paradigm. It has changed its focus from a "templateable" enemy to an adaptive, learning threat with difficult to discern patterns of behavior. Second, linear and sequential operations have changed to more non-contiguous, simultaneous operations. Third, there has been an emphasis to improve upon situational awareness into more situational understanding. Fourth, the scenario has evolved from defense-based to offense-based operations. Fifth, the old Warsaw Pact conventional type threat has evolved to that of full spectrum operations. Finally, the focus has been to increase proficiency in digital means of information management and decision superiority vice the old standard of analog.[59]

BCTP has effectively evolved its WFX to meet the challenges of the modern day battlefield. The MRX that a unit deploying in support of OIF must complete is as close to the real

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[58] TRADOC Regulation 350-50-3, *Training: Battle Command Training Program*, (Ft. Monroe, VA; DA, HQUSA, TRADOC, 11 SEP 2002), paragraph 1-5.

[59] BCTP slide presentation, *BCTP Commander's Overview Briefing ACTF ORE*, (Kansas: Ft. Leavenworth, JUN 04), slide 5.

thing as can possibly be constructed. The participating unit can expect an abundance of relevant conditions during the exercise. First, it is staged in the Iraq, which is a departure from the old Caspian Sea scenario in the old paradigm. The MRX involves joint, interagency, and multinational entities that the player unit must coordinate and execute operations with. There are opportunities with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media that are attempts to develop leader proficiency in dealing with theses external factors on the battlefield. Finally, full spectrum operations; conventional, low-intensity, and peace keeping operations are conducted simultaneously and in depth. In short, the player unit gets the best possible preparation that the Army can offer other than getting into the actual fight itself.[60]

Evaluation

The analyses of these actions prove that BCTP has been doing a credible job in remaining a relevant vehicle of training units and developing leaders for the Army. In this section I will look at the evaluation criteria developed in Chapters Two and Three, and assess BCTP's strengths and weaknesses. The same methodology that was used in Chapter Four will be utilized in this chapter as well. It have been broken down into four sub components; (1) threat, asymmetry, and culture, (2) joint, interagency, and multinational, (3) leadership and Army culture, (4) guidance, organizational change, ONA, and EBO.

Threat, Asymmetry and Culture.

BCTP has effectively used the contemporary operating environment developed in the late 1990s by TRADOC in its WFXs and MRXs. One needs to look at the comments made by a high ranking officer in Coalition Joint Task Force – 7, who stated the enemy threat developed by the Army proved to be right on target and substantively provided the right framework for the soldiers

[60] BCTP Commander's Overview Briefing ACTF ORE, slide 7.

of his command to operate in.[61] The World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR), a subordinate element of BCTP is responsible for developing the threat scenario with force structures, capabilities, and courses of action for each WFX and MRX. They are interconnected with units currently in the field and the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and provide the most current, up-to-date information possible for each subsequent exercise. In sum, the WCOPFOR offers first class products that the exercise unit can utilize as it prepares for its deployment.

In conjunction with WCOPFOR, BCTP ensures cultural awareness through an organization called the Green Cell. The Green Cell's purpose is to take into account all kinds of factors that can appear on the battlefield that could cause more friction to the player unit as they conduct operations during the WFX or MRX. Examples of some Green Cell events include collateral damage events, riots and demonstrations, media on the battlefield (embedded, western, and indigenous), fratricide or friendly fire, hostage snatches, and many more. The Green Cell is another tool that BCTP uses to increase player unit awareness on possible threat courses of action and the subtle nuances of the culture.

Culture as a whole is still a factor that provides much angst for leader development. Although embedded with WCOPFOR and the Green Cell, cultural awareness is still not effectively imbedded. The major problem is the absence of a simulation that effectively replicates the conditions that culture put on the battlefield. One possible solution is to add a cultural awareness seminar into the existing training and development paradigm. Similar to the deployment seminar, BCTP could host a seminar at the installation bringing in scholars, linguists, historians, and other subject matter experts. The purpose of this seminar would be to introduce thoroughly the various elements that make up a culture in a particular area of operation.

A less resource intensive course of action could be to integrate cultural awareness into the existing paradigm. Inviting some of the experts mentioned earlier to each component of the WFX

[61] Brief to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 DEC 04.

might also be beneficial. This would allow the experts to build a relationship with the player unit well before deployment, and possibly continue even after deployed into country. A third option is the creation of a cultural awareness mobile training team, similar to the one established for urban operations prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. This team could conduct seminars independent of WFXs on a rotational basis; ensuring units are kept current on potential deployment areas. Of course all of these options are short-term solutions to an Iraq / Afghanistan problem. It would be prudent to have plans to set up similar models for different cultures within the world.

I've addressed the need to ensure there is fidelity in the adversary, his use of asymmetry, and the complexity of culture in a particular area of operation. It is now necessary to identify how the Army can act in these conditions within a joint, interagency, and multinational context. The following section will highlight the BCTP's ability to operate under such conditions.

Joint, Interagency and Multinational.

Training and development opportunities for jointness abound within BCTP. As outlined above, BCTP does an extremely effective job in addressing the Army's needs for collective training and development at the higher-level headquarters and commanders. Like the schoolhouse, however, I again believe further can be done to develop our officers for the future battlefield.

Guidance was captured from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's comment on operations in Afghanistan, "Achieving jointness in wartime requires building that jointness in peacetime. We need to train like we fight and fight like we train and, too often, we don't."[62]

In the current design, BCTP's Operations Group (OPS GRP) Delta is the only "joint qualified" training resource for the Army. Team Delta was originated in 1992 in an effort to "bridge the gap in training until a joint training capability could be established…OPS GRP Delta

remained following formation of the Joint Warfare Training Center to support training Army service components within joint contexts."[63] OPS GRP D conducts exercises with current ARFOR, Army Service Component Command (ASCC), and Major Command (MACOM) units with the other Services as well. At this high level, joint training and education is successfully integrated.

Current rotations conducted by the three remaining Operations Groups (Alpha through Charlie) focus on Army-centric exercises. As it is designed, there is a training focus on working the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) coordination and execution, but little to no mention of our other two services, unless they are scripted into the exercise. More emphasis must be placed on inserting Navy or Marine Corps units into the WFX or MRX, or else player units will not receive the required training to operate with those type units during contingency operations.

On the interagency level, BCTP has long been a proponent of building relationships between player units and other governmental agencies. The DMEs and ADMEs for the rotations to Bosnia and Kosovo incorporated personnel with Department of State experience and former or current ambassadors. However, involvement of such interagency personnel would be beneficial during all components of the WFX / MRX program. Multinational training is limited to the scripting of units during an exercise or the rudimentary introduction of another nations capability. Having officers from other nations that will be operating in the proposed area of operations, BCTP would enhance player unit training and development.

Leadership and Army Culture.

BCTP does not take an active role in the development of leaders outlined in FM 22-100. The OCs focus on the skill sets required to conduct successful operations via one on one contact,

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[62] U.S. SECDEF Donald H. Rumsfeld remarks at the National Defense University, 31 JAN 02.
[63] Fontenot, *On Point*, xxiv.

informal and formal AARs. They simply do not look at leadership as a component of the WFX / MRX. This is a missed opportunity for the Army to ensure leader development occurs during this type of exercise. It would not be that hard to incorporate such an assessment into the existing exercise. OCs could execute this evaluation or BCTP could form a small leadership cell that focuses solely on the tenets outlined in FM 22-100.

BCTP is a perfect tool to address the second component of Army culture outlined in Chapter Three: the emergence of phase IV operations. BCTP is now focused on conducting MRXs in the existing conditions found in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is important to remember that BCTP must incorporate phase IV operations into its WFX paradigm as we plan for future conflicts. LTG Wallace, current Combined Arms Center Commander insists that conflict termination must be a WFX requirement in the future.[64] This is the appropriate level of emphasis and should address the concerns of the significance of post conflict operations.

Guidance, Organizational Change, ONA, and EBO.

BCTP has done an outstanding job in deriving its mission and purpose from senior leader guidance. Even without formal regulations or an Operations Order, BCTP has been able to develop its requirements through its constant dialogue with the CSA. Perhaps no other organization in the Army has such a direct link to senior Army leadership. Because of this relationship, BCTP is able to quickly adapt and change to meet the requirements of training and developing units and leaders as they prepare for contingency operations.

BCTP has done an effective job in assisting in the development of the BCTs, most recently in the 3rd Infantry Division's MRX from 14-20 MAY 04. However, like the rest of the Army, BCTP still hasn't been able to develop training scenarios for the evolving UExs or UEys. There simply isn't enough fidelity to begin developing the appropriate construct of exercise

[64] LTG William Wallace address to AMSP, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 18 NOV 04.

design. It is recommended that BCTP maintain constant contact with the authors of the UEx white paper, located on the same installation at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Another area where BCTP still needs to improve on is its incorporation of ONA and EBO into its training paradigm. OPS GRP D does observe these functions during its joint associated exercises, but the remainder of BCTP simply isn't well trained or versed in these emerging concepts. A recommendation here is that OPS GRP D hold training sessions to develop the OCs within BCTP. It is clear that Army divisions and corps do not understand these concepts as of the publication of this monograph. Officers on these staffs are not even aware that they can use the developed ONA at the RCC level to assist in their own Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and mission analysis.

Summary.

The purpose of this chapter was to highlight where BCTP stands in relation to the evaluation criteria identified in Chapters Two and Three. BCTP has successfully evolved as a training tool since its inception in 1986-87. It has continually benefited the Army through its training and developmental capability as evidenced by the performance of the units that have completed the WFX and MRX. As outlined in this chapter, there areas for improvement. On a whole however, the Army is postured to continually deploy units to successfully conduct contingency operations through the outstanding work being done by BCTP.

Conclusion

The purpose of this monograph was to identify the many stimuli that can cause friction on the battlefield. These stimuli have been broken down into two distinct areas; enemy and friendly. After a brief description and relevance to leader development, they were in turn applied to the institutional organizations of CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP. The result is clear. The bottom line on Army leader development is that it does a credible job in preparing its officers to serve in today's environment. Both CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP are vital tools in assisting this effort.

The Army has established institutions that are flexible and remain relevant to leader development. When you consider that the Army has been involved in contingency operations since the attacks of 9/11, you can see that the existing institutions still remain vital in preparing our leaders to operate in the current environment. This is true of any organization in the corporate world as well. The importance is that we can still rely on CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP to best prepare its officers to serve in an era of organizational change while fully committed to GWOT. There of course are areas where these organizations can improve, and a summary of recommended changes for CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP follow.

Summary of Recommendations

CGSOC:

a. Ensure a mechanism is in place to allow RC officers to get access to the same types of development offered to the active duty force.

b. Mandate the completion of an MMAS that focuses on warfighting skills and move away from the support of obtaining a master's degree from a civilian institution.

c. Ensure all students are given education on diverse cultures; not just those students that complete an elective during AOWC.

d. Incorporate more rigid instruction and exercises that consider the joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

e. Maintain the inclusion of the History and Leadership blocks during both the Common Core and AOWC.

f. Ensure each graduate has a clear understanding of the capabilities and challenges of the organizational change to the UEx and UEy.

g. Start to develop leaders using emerging doctrine such as ONA and EBO.

h. Ensure each graduate is educated in the importance of post conflict operations during planning and execution of contingency operations.

AMSP.

a. Formally address Leadership education as part of the curriculum.

b. Incorporate a more rigid and exercises program that realistically portrays joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

c. Continue the inclusion of diverse guest speakers that force students to look at

d. problem-solving through different perspectives.

e. Continue the intimate student to instructor ratio of two – thirteen. This ensures every student gets to develop and articulate his own thoughts several times each day.

f. Ensure each graduate has a clear understanding of the capabilities and challenges of the organizational change to the UEx and UEy.

g. Continue to develop leaders using emerging doctrine such as ONA and EBO.

h. Ensure each graduate is educated in the importance of post conflict operations during planning and execution of contingency operations.

BCTP.

a. Incorporate cultural awareness at every iteration of the WFX and MRX process.

b. Incorporate a formal leadership development program similar to those developed for JRTC and NTC.

c. Continue the search and development of a realistic simulation to effectively evaluate unit performance in non-traditional conditions such as media, information operations, and culture.

d. Continue the opportunity of relationship building among joint and interagency personnel.

e. Incorporate more use of joint training with the Marine Corps and Navy; where we are with the Air Force should be the standard we have for training with all Sister Services.

f. Develop and execute a longer WFX and MRX that ensures the participating unit plans and executes at least two missions.

g. Develop the means to simulate post-conflict operations into the existing WFX paradigm to ensure we learn our lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and the importance of including this phase in our Army training.

h. Continue the incorporation of organizational change underway into the WFX and MRX.

i. Incorporate emerging doctrine into the WFX and MRX paradigm. Even if not in its final version, concepts such as ONA and EBO must be presented to participating units at some point within the WFX rotation.

Epilogue

By applying these recommendations, CGSOC / AMSP and BCTP would make itself that much more effective as a development tool for the Army. There can be no doubt that these

institutions have considered the stimuli developed in Chapters Two and Three and have begun to tackle the difficult problem of incorporating the training and education required into the existing developmental model.

In lieu of this, it is up to the individual officer to continue to pursue development on his own as his career in the Army progresses. If an officer does not receive education on the UEx or UEy, it is incumbent upon him to proactively seek the information needed to operate in these organizations as best as possible. I submit that individual pursuit of education has been a cornerstone of the character and make-up of the Army. However, in a time of constant deployments and subsequent retraining to prepare for the next one, time is no longer a luxury as it was before 9/11. This is why the institutional Army must be proactive and creative in ensuring the best possible education reaches our officers. This is, of course, the precise reason why it was created in the first place.

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