Naval Arms Control - Can the United States Continue to Just Say No?
Abstract
We live in a world of change unmatched since World War II. Yesterday's impossible obstacle is today's accomplishment. Communist governments are dropping like fall leaves--with communism, as we know it, in desperate trouble, even in the Soviet Union. We are very close to reaching agreement on major strategic arms reduction and European conventional force treaties and are already witnessing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Amidst the obvious lessening of tensions and reductions in forces, the Soviet Union presses for discussions on naval arms control. At every turn the United States replies, "No!" The question is clear: Is this stance, which flies in the face of obvious trends, .justifiable and in the United States' best interest? Naval arms control, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The United States Navy intends to maintain its preeminence. Shipbuilders fear reduction or elimination of business. Ecologists see an opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons at sea. For budgeteers there is a chance to increase the "peace dividend," while diplomats hope to reduce world tensions and the chance of war. Although the views of each group requires consideration, our decision on naval arms control--a little, a lot, or none--should be based on the strategic interests of the United States. Just what is this "sea power" that we're considering limiting?Sea power is simply a measure of a country's ability to use the sea. It is not about the direct military effect of fighting ships, which is the realm of tactics; it is about the use of maritime lines of communication for the effective interconnection, organization, and purposeful application of the economic and war making potential of many lands.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 02, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA437582
Entities
People
- Ray C. Pilcher Jr
Organizations
- National War College