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***The Power of Persuasion: Army PSYOP Control &
Execution Entering the Third Wave***

A Thesis
Presented To
The Judge Advocate General's School
United States Army

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of either The Judge Advocate General's School, The United States Army, or any other governmental agency.

by Major Maurice A. Lescault, Jr.

United States Army

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ABSTRACT

Information is creating a revolution in our society and our military. Recognizing that conflict has its root in ideology and perception affects this ideology, military units that have the capability to modulate perceptions become critical to successfully achieving national security goals. Military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units are the only units that have this capability. Therefore, these units should be used as a true strategic asset to achieve national security objectives. To accomplish this successfully will require changes in control and execution. Enhanced control will make the routine use of military PSYOP more acceptable. Accomplishing this requires two things. First, the United States must formalize limits on the employment of PSYOP in statute and policy. Second, it must vest control of all information assets in the National Security Advisor. This consolidated control will ensure effective execution through proper integration with other activities supporting national security objectives. Efficient and effective execution will not be feasible, however, without force structure changes in military PSYOP. First, the Army should form regionalized PSYOP groups under each Regional CINC. Second, it should collocate these assets with the CINCs under their operational control. These changes in control and execution will help the United States to properly leverage information power as the Third Wave continues to change the world.

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THE POWER OF PERSUASION: ARMY PSYOP CONTROL & EXECUTION ENTERING THE THIRD WAVE

Major Maurice A. Lescault, Jr.*

I. Introduction

Information is revolutionizing American society. Access to information has steadily increased through radio, television, satellite, and computers. As the importance of information has grown in society, so it has grown in the military. This growing reliance on information is causing a revolution in the military itself. Succeeding in this revolution will require the optimal use of information assets. This thesis will examine the criticality of information to success in achieving national security objectives and proposes a strategic role for military PSYOP assets.

In section II, I define conflict between groups in terms of ideology. This ideology is necessarily informed by the perceptions of the group who holds it. This perspective underscores the critical nature of information because

* United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. Currently assigned as a student in the 44th Graduate Class, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army. Major Lescault's previous assignments include service as the Command Judge Advocate, 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne); Trial Counsel, United States Army Special Operations Command; and Trial Counsel, 2d Infantry Division Support Command. Major Lescault received his Juris Doctor Degree with Highest Honors from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 1991 and a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Military Academy in 1984. This article was prepared in partial fulfillment for the requirements of an LLM to be awarded by The Judge Advocate General's School, Army.

information is the medium by which the U.S. can alter these perceptions. One premier asset that deals in the realm of information are Psychological Operations units.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) suffer from the adverse connotations of their name.¹ In recent years, however, leaders have begun to recognize their utility in both war and operations other than war.² The explosion in information technology has served to increase the utility and potential of PSYOP. In section III, I review the current posture of PSYOP assets in the U.S. Army³ and the

¹ See Carnes Lord, *The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy*, in *POLITICAL WARFARE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: RETHINKING THE US APPROACH* 13, 22 (Frank R. Barnett & Carnes Lord eds., 1989) ("Manifest or latent in the attitudes of many Americans toward the practice of psychological-political warfare is a distaste for any sort of psychological manipulation or deception."); Raymond J. Barrett, *PSYOP: What is it? And What Should We Do About It?*, *MIL. REV.*, March 1972, at 57, 65 ("The relationship of psychological operations and freedom calls attention to another important dilemma. The concept of psychological operations has ominous overtones for a democracy. It smacks of brainwashing and thought control.").

² See General Wayne A. Downing, *Joint Special Operations in Peace and War*, *JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY*, Summer 1995, at 22, 26 (General Downing, at the time he wrote the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Special Operations Command, credits PSYOP programs with helping "to encourage 70-80 thousand enemy soldiers to desert, defect, and surrender, thereby saving countless lives on both sides." He goes on to say that "PSYOP has continued to be an important part of all major deployments.").

³ While all of the military services play an important role in PSYOP, this paper will only focus on Army assets. The reasons are two-fold. First, the majority of assets that actually conduct the analysis and planning of the PSYOP campaign are in the Army. The other services focus mostly on delivery of the desired message or action. See *Air Force Details Information Warfare Mission Structure*, *DEFENSE DAILY*, Jan. 20, 1995, available in *LEXIS*, *NEWS Library*, *ASAPII File* (Quoting Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph Ralston, Chief of Plans and Operations as saying "the Army possesses almost all the expertise for psychological operations, while the Air Force provides the aerial platforms to deliver the message, . . ."). Second, the argument that I make here can be
(Continued on Next Page)

doctrine and policies that control them. Current use of these assets is artificially limited. As the United States enters the Third Wave and becomes a more knowledge-based society, such limits are not only mistaken, but dangerous. In section IV, I argue for removing these limits and using military PSYOP as a true strategic asset to achieve national security goals.

Use of military PSYOP strategically raises several issues. I group these issues under the labels control and execution. To make the use of military PSYOP acceptable in American society requires effective control. Doing so will require legislative and executive action to formalize policies and limitations. Moreover, making control effective requires that the U.S. utilize all information assets under the strategic oversight of one executive department. In Section V, I address these issues of control and conclude arguing for strategic oversight by the National Security Advisor.

Finally, the need for effective execution dictates that the strategic use of military PSYOP be feasible. This requires additional PSYOP assets in the active component and a more effective placement of these assets relative to the Regional Combatant Commanders. Section VI addresses these issues.

(Continued)

generalized for the other services. Adding interservice roles and differences will only serve to confuse rather than clarify my argument.

The proposals in this thesis seek to ensure effective execution of information strategy, while maintaining firm controls. Doing so will empower the United States to continually improve our efficiency at achieving national security objectives by leveraging information technology. As the nation enters the Third Wave, effectively and efficiently using information power, with the support of our people engendered by effective controls, will enable us to maintain our position as a secure superpower.

II. The Information Explosion

Times have changed -- and are changing. Futurists have been wrestling with and offering answers to how these changes will affect society in general, and the military in particular. The one uniform aspect of these futurist theories is the driving force of the change -- information. Technology has placed the world's advanced societies on a spiraling mountain of information. The world is more interconnected; individuals can contact each other more quickly and can share information, products, and ideas with the touch of a button.⁴ Television screens take people to

⁴ This fact and the problems it creates was recognized relatively early in the computer revolution. See Anne W. Branscomb, *Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Transborder Data Flow in Transition*, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985 (1983). Of course, the amount of information flow and the type of transactions have increased in scope and intensity with the advent of the Internet. See, e.g., *Online Transactions To Double By 1997 -- Leading-Edge Web Sites Outgrow The "Dead Web"*, ELECTRONIC BUYERS' NEWS, March 4, 1996, at 58 (discussing the current trend of companies conducting actual business transactions over the Internet).

places that many will never set foot in⁵ and devices miles above the ground can not only tell people where they are, but can see what they are doing.⁶ These changes have far reaching implications for both the nation and its military.

But some things have not changed. The end of the Cold War brought hopes of a "New World Order"⁷ as the end of World War II and the rise of the United Nations had brought hopes of saving preceding generations from the scourge of war.⁸ Just as the United Nations has not fulfilled this

⁵ This phenomenon perhaps began during Vietnam when the war was brought into the American living room every evening. Since then, television has been credited not only with taking us to distant lands, but with shaping national policy. See, e.g., Joe Urschel, *Caution: Don't base policy on emotions*, USA TODAY, February 10, 1994, at 10A. From the military perspective, high level officials have posited that "We don't win unless CNN says we win." Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton & Lieutenant Colonel Timothy D. Vane, *Winning the Information War in Haiti*, MIL. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 3. Additionally, media affects are accounted for in our doctrine. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS 1-3 (14 June 1993) [hereinafter FM 100-5] ("In the age of instant communication, capabilities available to the media have had increasingly important impacts on military operations. . . . Dramatic visual presentations can rapidly influence public--and therefore political--opinion Strategic direction and, therefore, the range of operations and their duration, may be dramatically affected.").

⁶ See, e.g., Douglas L. Anderson, *A Military Look into Space: The Ultimate High Ground*, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1995, at 19, 20-22 (detailing the many uses of satellites in current military operations including navigation and early warning); Cynthia M. Hayward, *Remote Sensing: Terrestrial Laws For Celestial Activities*, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 157, 157-58 (1990) (discussing the rise of remote sensing, particularly to track such things as natural resources).

⁷ George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit (September 11, 1990), in 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., at 1358, available in LEXIS, Exec Library, Presdc File.

⁸ The preamble to the United Nations Charter provides that "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold (Continued on Next Page)

ultimate hope for it,⁹ the end of the Cold War has not ended conflict. Today, as in the past, conflict plagues mankind.¹⁰ These conflicts may or may not be called "wars," but they represent challenges to U.S. national interests and potential drains on its scarce resources. Situations like those in the Balkans, Sudan, and Rwanda are continual

(Continued)

sorrow to mankind, ..." U.N. CHARTER preamble [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER], reprinted in DEP'T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-24, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS VOLUME II 3-1 (1 Dec. 1976) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-24].

⁹ According to two of the most influential futurists, "in the 2,340 weeks that passed between 1945 and 1990, the earth enjoyed a grand total of only three that were truly war-free." ALVIN & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY 14 (1993).

¹⁰ See Dr. Roger Williamson, *The Contemporary Face of Conflict - Class, Colour, Culture and Confession*, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV. - Y.B., Dec. 31, 1994, at 8. Dr. Williamson reports that the following number of major conflicts occurred or continued in the year indicated:

1987	36
1988	33
1989	32
1990	31
1991	29
1992	29
1993	28
1994	28

Dr. Williamson's criteria for "major conflict" is one where more than 1000 deaths, both combatant and noncombatant, have occurred since the beginning of the conflict. The areas of conflict for 1994 were:

Europe: Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)

Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Turkey, Yemen

Asia: Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan

Africa: Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan

Central and South America: Colombia, Guatemala, Peru

reminders of this fact. History continues to prove the wisdom of Plato's axiom that only the dead have seen the end of war. In this section, I will examine the spectrum of "conflict" that continues to face the world and define its source in terms of ideology. I will then discuss how perception affects this ideology and how change, driven by information technology, is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs.¹¹ This revolution must change the conception of which "weapons" in the U.S. arsenal are the most powerful and provide the most utility for its defense dollar.¹²

A. *The Changing Nature of Military Operations*

What America expects of its Army has changed. With the loss of the global threat from the Soviet Union, the nation has begun to focus on other utilities for military units.¹³ Life for the Army during the Cold War was simpler. To

¹¹ It has become fashionable to analyze military history in terms of revolutions in military affairs. This term defies precise definition, but it describes what is essentially a fundamental change in the nature of warfare. James R. Fitzsimonds & Jan M. Van Tol, *Revolutions in Military Affairs*, JOINT FORCE Q., Spring 1994, at 24. I will discuss this concept more fully in section II.C., *infra*.

¹² According to two scholars writing on the topic of war, "[a]rms are the tools of war -- but not necessarily the most powerful. Words, ideas, and reputations, may be even more powerful." PAUL SEABURY & ANGELO CODEVILLA, *WAR: ENDS AND MEANS* 160 (1989).

¹³ Of course, throughout its history, the Army has been involved at some level in operations other than war as it participated in the building of the nation. See FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 13-0. However, a more pure defense mission had evolved earlier in this century. That perspective has now changed and operations other than war are increasing in frequency and complexity.

accomplish its mission to fight and win our nation's wars, the Army could focus on containment of communism and deterring war with our most serious adversaries.¹⁴ This view of Army operations saw two states - war and peace -- with war as a contest between nation-states.¹⁵ Avoiding war and maintaining peace were the goals. While the Army's primary mission remains the same, the end of the Cold War changes what it plans for and does most often. The Army's perspective, by necessity, has changed.

1. *The Range of Operations*

The Army's current operational doctrine sees a "range of operations" varying with the "state of the

¹⁴ During the Cold War, the military focus was solely on containment of the Soviets and deterrence of war with them. See Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Winters, *The 1994 United States National Security Strategy*, ARMY LAW., Jan. 1995, at 60 ("[U]ntil 1990[,], the United States undertook *de facto* and *de jure* military strategies to contain the Soviet threat. . . . Understandably, the United States strategy, plans, and budget myopically focused on countering and staying the course against the single most serious threat to United States security -- Soviet (and Chinese) expansionism."). For a discussion of the various theories that this strategy took, see RICHARD A. PRESTON & SYDNEY F. WISE, *MEN IN ARMS* 355-69 (4th ed., 1979).

¹⁵ This view of the Army's role was shared by scholars. The classic statement of this view, which is still relied upon, at least as a basis for discussion, is that made by L. Oppenheim. In his treatise on international law, he stated that, "[w]ar is a contention between two or more states through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases." YORAM DINSTEIN, *WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENCE* 8 (1988), quoting L. OPPENHEIM, 2 *INTERNATIONAL LAW* 202 (7th Ed., 1952). Interestingly, although Professor Dinstein goes on to modify portions of this definition, he accepts as true and correct that "war" is properly defined as being only between states and explicitly excludes intra-state wars from his discussion. *Id.* at 9-10.

environment."¹⁶ The three states it anticipates are war, conflict, and peacetime.¹⁷ In Field Manual (FM) 100-5, peacetime is defined as a period where "the US attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations."¹⁸ Conflict is the conduct of "hostilities to secure strategic objectives."¹⁹ War, on the other hand, is "the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy."²⁰

In each of these environments, the objective is different. In peace, the Army promotes peace. In conflict, it seeks to deter war and resolve conflict. In war, the Army fights and wins.²¹ The doctrine views a continuum of operations with noncombat operations spanning portions of all three environments and combat operations spanning portions of the conflict and war environments.²² "Combat" operations may occur during operations other than war, just

¹⁶ FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 2-0 - 2-1.

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.* at 2-1, Figure 2-1. This figure provides a graphic presentation of the doctrine outlined in the text. This diagram makes it clear that the states of the environment and military operations are really on a "continuum".

as noncombat operations occur during war.²³ Whether the Army considers the operation "war" or not is strictly based on the state of the environment. All operations in the peacetime and conflict states are "operations other than war" regardless of whether they require combat.²⁴ From the perspective of the conduct of actual operations, it is obvious that the three states are not truly distinct. For example, in the recent operations in Somalia, we conducted what was labeled as humanitarian/civic assistance (HCA).²⁵ HCA is one of thirteen Operations Other Than War listed in FM 100-5.²⁶ However, much of this operation had the clear feel of conflict with "technicals" mounted with automatic weapons prowling the streets.²⁷ At points, it also erupted

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.* at 2-0.

²⁵ A writer in *The New Republic* quoted President George Bush as saying, "[o]ur mission has a limited objective to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peacekeeping force to keep it moving" Fred Barnes, *White House Watch -- Operation Restore Hope*, *THE NEW REPUBLIC*, Dec. 28, 1992, at 11. Another writer categorically stated that the President had decided to send troops to Somalia "purely on humanitarian grounds." Russell Watson et al., *Troops to Somalia*, *NEWSWEEK*, Dec. 7, 1992, at 24.

²⁶ The others are noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and attacks and raids. FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 13-0.

²⁷ A "technical" in Somali parlance were "souped-up jeeps mounted with cannons or heavy caliber machine guns." Jeffrey Bartholet, *Battlefields of the Food War*, *NEWSWEEK*, Dec. 14, 1992, at 36. See also, Bruce Wallace, *Letter from Somalia: A Land of Terror*, *MACLEAN's*, Sep. 7, 1992, at 26. These vehicles and their operators were initially hired by
(Continued on Next Page)

into operations that were clearly combat, in an environment that felt like war.²⁸ Thus, it is most realistic to view these three distinct states of the environment as more of a continuum with hazy dividing lines between states and types of operations.

The doctrine does attempt to account for the artificial distinctions by cautioning commanders that all three states may exist in his strategic environment and that both types of operations (war and other than war) may be conducted in his area simultaneously.²⁹ Despite this, it has been criticized in two ways. First, the doctrine is overly rigid by defining three distinct states of the environment when the real world tends to blur these distinctions.³⁰ The

(Continued)

relief workers for protection from other roving bands in a sort of extorted security. Bartholet, *supra* at 36; Wallace, *supra* at 26. These "technicals" later became "the enemy" in operations that clearly resembled combat. In one of the largest, forty Somalis were killed near Kismayu. Robert Weil, *Somalia in Perspective: When the Saints Go Marching In*, MONTHLY REV., Mar. 1993, at 1.

²⁸ The most famous incident hastened the withdrawal of troops. In an operation to capture warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid, an Army helicopter was downed. The crash and resultant rescue operation involved the U.S. Troops in "the longest sustained fire fight American soldiers have endured since the Vietnam War." Kevin Fadarko, *Amid Disaster, Amazing Valor*, TIME, Feb. 28, 1994, at 46. The result was 18 American deaths and more than 75 wounded. *Id.* Two soldiers were recommended for (and later received) the Congressional Medal of Honor. *Id.*

²⁹ FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 2-1, Fig. 2-1.

³⁰ Robert J. Bunker, *Rethinking OOTW*, MIL. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 34, 37. Professor Bunker actually presents both of the criticisms in his article. Specifically with regard to the inability to define distinct states of the environment, he argues that "a conflict environmental state for OOTW is actually a non-Western war environmental state" *Id.*

second is that the doctrinal concept maintains a Clausewitzian nation-state view of the world and fails to recognize the unconventional challenges we often face.³¹

It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue a particular view in this debate. Moreover, the Army is in the midst of updating FM 100-5 as it transitions to Force XXI.³² The new version of the manual will attempt to better account for the changes being wrought by information.³³ Besides, a fair reading of current Army doctrine demonstrates at least some recognition that Army operations are on a continuum, despite the fact that it defines three distinct "states of the environment." Additionally, the

³¹ *Id.* at 36-37. Professor Bunker cites several scholars in support of his position including MARTIN VAN CREVELD, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR* (1991) and ALVIN & HEIDI TOFFLER, *supra* note 9. In Professor Bunker's formulation, the most serious consequence of this failure to recognize the non-nation-state view is that it ignores situations where "a state of war based on non-Western political conditions -- tribal and religious dominance or conflict between subnational and local groups--already exists. . . . Embracing the OOTW concept thus concedes the political and military initiative to the opponent, who is thereby initially permitted to conduct non-Western military operations against US forces." *Id.* at 37. Professor Bunker goes on to argue for two "politico-military" models, one for non-Western areas and the other, essentially the current Clausewitzian model, for operations in industrialized western areas. *Id.* at 39-41.

³² "Force XXI" refers to the vision, begun by former Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan, for the power projection Army of the 21st Century. See General Gordon R. Sullivan & Colonel James M. Dubik, *War in the Information Age*, MIL. REV., Apr. 1994, at 46, 54 & Fig. 2.

³³ See *id.* at 59 ("The next edition of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, will capture the variety of the information age, describe the seductively flawed distinction between war and operations other than war and flesh out the principles governing the conduct of warfare in the information age.").

Army DOES recognize that "conflict" can come from a variety of sources.³⁴ However, the Army leadership continues to miss the real power of the information revolution, even as it incorporates information into FM 100-5. The focus remains on the destruction of things rather than directly aiming at our true target -- the enemy's will.³⁵ The objective of defeating the will is a unifying concept that obviates the debate over definitions of states of the environment, nature of the enemy, and the continuum of conflict. To develop this concept, I will briefly look at the source of conflict.

2. *Why Do People Fight Anyway?*

This question has occupied many great minds and I cannot satisfactorily resolve it within the constraints of

³⁴ The Army leadership recognizes this. See *id.* at 54 (discussing the fact that "[n]ation-states do not have a monopoly on warmaking"). This is also at least fairly implied throughout the current FM 100-5. For example, in the doctrinal discussion of operations other than war, the Army highlights security. "The presence of US forces in nations around the world may provoke a wide range of responses by factions, groups or forces of an unfriendly nation. . . . [Commanders] must be ready to counter activity that might bring harm to their units or jeopardize their mission." FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 13-4.

³⁵ See Sullivan & Dubik, *supra* note 32, at 56-62. General Sullivan, as the Army's Chief of Staff, outlined his vision for information in Force XXI. He discussed the uses of information to increase intelligence, improve targeting accuracy from great distances, "see" the battlefield, know our positioning better, and improve command and control platforms. He discussed "smart" tanks, and artillery -- in short, he discussed lots of "things." Nowhere does he mention the actual use of information itself against the opposition. The leadership focus seems to be solely on the fact that information makes our things work better. We need to get beyond that to see how information itself can be used DIRECTLY against the enemy.

this paper. However, like the others, I have a view of why people fight. This view necessarily informs the recommendations for which I will argue momentarily. Consequently, it is only fair that I disclose this view.

The classic treatise about war is Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*.³⁶ Much of his work is spent on the practical aspects of warfare and some aspects of his discussion are tied to the times in which he lived and fought. But some of his insight is timeless. Clausewitz's fundamental premise is that war is simply "political intercourse, carried on by other means."³⁷ The corollary is that "[m]ilitary activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated."³⁸ Thus, "the war . . . cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's will has not been broken"³⁹ This is so because war is merely "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will."⁴⁰ In short, a group overcomes the enemy's will and supplants that will with their own.

Some criticize this view claiming that, since it only envisions war as a struggle among nation-states, the

³⁶ CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, *ON WAR* (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 1976).

³⁷ *Id.* at 87.

³⁸ *Id.* at 137.

³⁹ *Id.* at 90

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 75.

observations are limited to warfare that is a clash between organized governmental entities.⁴¹ Thus, the critics argue, this view of warfare is limiting, because it does not allow us to envision the more prevalent conflicts that we will see -- tribal warfare, conflicts between religious factions, etc.⁴² In sum, we most often see *intrastate* violence, not *interstate*.⁴³

This criticism, however, takes an overly restrictive view of what constitutes politics, and what provides the basis for a group's willingness to fight. Webster defines politics as "competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership in a government or other group . . . the total complex of relations between men in society."⁴⁴ In this broader conception of politics,

⁴¹ See JOHN KEEGAN, *A HISTORY OF WARFARE* 3 (1994) ("Clausewitz's thought is incomplete. It implies the existence of states, of state interests and of rational calculation about how to achieve them. Yet war antedates the state, diplomacy, and strategy by many millennia."); Bunker, *supra* note 30, at 36; VAN CREVELD, *supra* note 31. Professor van Crevelde labels Clausewitzian warfare as "trinitarian" and the non-nation-state warfare as "non-trinitarian." His argument is interesting because he posits that Clausewitz's conception was wrong when made and that what we see today is not a change to some new form of warfare, but a return to what warfare has always been. Professor van Crevelde cites numerous examples from history where warfare was "low intensity" or "other than war" as we now conceive of it. In van Crevelde's view, it is Clausewitz's view that is the anomaly and the true nature of warfare is simply reasserting itself.

⁴² Bunker, *supra* note 30, at 37.

⁴³ Williamson, *supra* note 10, at 8. Dr. Williamson cites the "1994 report from the UN Human Development Programme (UNDP)" which stated that "of the 82 armed conflicts counted between 1989 and 1992, only three were between states; the rest were internal." *Id.*

⁴⁴ WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 883 (1980).

there is room for consideration of intrastate, as well as interstate, struggles for control and for the struggles between groups not related to a state at all. My purpose here is not to defend a Clausewitzian view of the world. But, the logic of his premise remains valid -- war is about politics.

It is more accurate, though, to take this one step further in making the link between politics and will. In a generic sense of the word, politics are about ideology. Ideology is defined as "a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture . . . a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture . . . the integrated assertions, theories, aims that constitute a sociopolitical program."⁴⁵ Thus, politics are a reflection of an ideology -- a particular view of a group or culture and how it lives and relates to other groups or cultures. The range of things covered in an ideology is as broad as human lives: what type of organization will govern the group (if any); who are the group's leaders and how are they chosen; what territory does and should the group occupy; what god does the group worship; what ethnic background is the group; what is its position relative to other groups; and how have other groups treated the group in the past. Regardless of the subject matter, the building block of conflict is a disagreement

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 563.

over one or more elements of the ideology of two or more groups.⁴⁶ The degree to which the group reveres the ideology determines what they are willing to sacrifice to impose it on others or defend it against others. This in turn determines the amount of will they have for the fight and, from the opponent's perspective, the amount of will to overcome to win. The U.S. cannot understand the dangers or potential outcomes of any operation, be it war or other than war, if it does not understand the ideologies involved in the area.

A few historical examples will serve to illustrate this point. World War II shows ideology in the context of the nation-state. Vietnam demonstrates the advantage when one party is committed to their ideology and the other is not. The third example is the recent situation in the Balkans, which shows how ideology fuels and explains conflict between groups that are not nation-states, at least in the classic sense.

⁴⁶ Cf. QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 131-144 (1942). Professor Wright discusses a number of what he calls "drives" to war. These include food, sex, territory, adventure, self-preservation, domination, independence, and society. By society, Professor Wright means any social group, although he asserts that the political group is the most powerful. *Id.* at 142. Professor Wright also asserts that this social drive is most powerful "whenever the state is thought of not merely as a community and a population but also as an idea and a culture, the spreading of which is a blessing to those forced to receive it." *Id.* at 143. In other words, the most powerful drive to war is an ideology, particularly when another group "needs" that ideology because their's is different and, hence, wrong.

World War II is perhaps the classic struggle of differing ideologies.⁴⁷ On the one side was the ethnic ideology birthed in the mind of Adolf Hitler that the Aryan race was somehow superior to the rest of the ethnic groups in the world.⁴⁸ The argument went something like this. Since the Aryans were superior to the other ethnic groups, they could not and should not be limited to the territory Germany then possessed.⁴⁹ Additionally, they had a right to

⁴⁷ Some have framed the struggle as one of good versus evil. For example, in the opinion of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the war was a struggle where "as never before . . . the forces that stood for human good and men's rights were this time confronted by a completely evil conspiracy with which no compromise could be tolerated. Because only by the utter destruction of the Axis was a decent world possible, the war became for me a crusade in the traditional sense of that often misused word." DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, *CRUSADE IN EUROPE* 157 (1948; Re-release, 1990). Of course, the difficulty with that description is that the treatment of citizens within some of the allied nations (Stalin in Russia, for example) could be considered evil.

⁴⁸ Indeed, Hitler's writing is replete with racism in the worst sense of that word. His view of the Aryan race is as the only redeeming people in mankind. For example, he writes that

[a]ll human culture, all the results of art, science and technology that we see before us today, are almost exclusively the product of the Aryan. This very fact admits of the not unfounded inference that he alone was the founder of all higher humanity, therefore representing the prototype of all that we understand by the word "man."

WILLIAM L. SHIRER, *THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH* 86 (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1959), quoting ADOLF HITLER, *MIEN KAMPF* 290 (American ed., 1943).

⁴⁹ Hitler's aim was euphemistically called *Lebensraum*, meaning living space. To Hitler, this meant that the Reich "must hold unflinchingly to our aim . . . to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled" *Id.* at 82-83, quoting ADOLF HITLER, *MIEN KAMPF* 643, 646, & 652. (American ed., 1943)

rule over other races⁵⁰ and had only been repressed by their failed leaders who accepted the punitive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.⁵¹ Opposing this Nazi ideology were those of the allied nations.⁵² At least from the perspective of the western allies, the ideology was based on the democratic ideas that all peoples are equal; that these peoples should be free to determine how they are organized and governed; and that those who govern do so only with the consent of the people.⁵³ While this ideological struggle

⁵⁰ In Hitler's view, the existence of "lower human types" was a precondition to the emergence of higher cultures. "Hence it is no accident that the first cultures arose in places where the Aryan, in his encounters with lower peoples, subjugated them and bent them to his will . . . As long as he ruthlessly upheld the master attitude, not only did he remain master, but also the preserver and increaser of culture." *Id.* at 87, quoting HITLER, *supra* note 48, at 295-96. Thus, Hitler's view has two tenets. First, other races are worthless compared to Aryans or, in his words, "[a]ll who are not of good race in this world are chaff." *Id.*, quoting ADOLF HITLER, MIEN KAMPF 296 (American ed., 1943). Second, the Aryans needed to rule over all others in order to continue the increase of human culture.

⁵¹ One of the main points fixed in Hitler's view of the world was that "the Versailles Treaty was not only unfair but criminal." Raoul de Roussy de Sales, *Comment to ADOLF HITLER, MY NEW ORDER* 3, 10 (R. de Roussy de Sales ed., 1941). More importantly, the treaty had not resulted from the defeat of the German Army, but by the fact that the army "had been betrayed, stabbed in the back by Bolshevism, Jews, and the 'November criminals' (the Weimar Republic)." *Id.*

⁵² Of course, each group had peculiarities of ideology based on their history, ethnic origins, religion, etc. For purposes of my discussion, I will focus on the western democratic ideology with which we are most familiar.

⁵³ Thomas Jefferson wrote, arguably, the most beautiful statement of these ideas in our Declaration of Independence.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, That to secure these

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was not necessarily on the minds of the soldier in the foxhole who was struggling for his day to day survival, it was the fundamental struggle of the war.⁵⁴ The fact that the struggle is played out in physical terms -- numbers of soldiers and machines, territory and boundary lines, industrial capacity and output -- often distracts observers of war. But, the fact remains that the fuel for this immense conflict were differences in two fundamentally incompatible ideologies.

The conflict in Vietnam is significant as an example because it demonstrates the importance of being committed to an ideology in conflict. Most observers now accept Vietnam as a defeat for the United States. The interesting fact, however, is that America did not lose on the physical battlefield. It lost on the ideological battlefield because the North Vietnamese were committed to their ideological cause and America was not. North Vietnam fought a "war . .

(Continued)

rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; . . .

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in MORTIMER J. ADLER, *WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS* 165 (1987).

⁵⁴ Americans at the time were slow to recognize the real nature of the threat that faced them. But, historians have since recognized that what faced us "was no mere military threat," but a threat from "a new philosophy . . . which repudiated and warred on [our] way of life and [our] inherited values." ALLAN NEVINS & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, *A POCKET HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES* 428 (rev. ed., 1986). Thus, in the eye of history, World War II is "[t]he most titanic conflict in history, with the fate of democratic institutions in the balance, . . ." *Id.* at 434.

. against colonialism, [and] against hunger and ignorance. .
. . Many of us also believed we were fighting for the human
dignity of our people . . . a *national* and *democratic*
revolution . . . that would have insured free political and
cultural expression among the variety of ethnic groups,
religions, and regions -- and among the commonwealth of
individuals -- that make up the nation."⁵⁵ Thus, they were
fighting for an ideology that addressed the uniting of their
people (an ethnic idea), the end of colonial domination and
the establishment of a particular form of government (a
territorial/political idea), and the betterment of the
quality of life of their countrymen (an
economic/humanitarian idea). Consequently, the soldiers of
Ho Chi Minh's army fought to the death in abominable
conditions and won a war in which they rarely won a
battle.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ TRUONG NHU TANG, *A VIETCONG MEMOIR* 309-10 (1985). Of course, the communists did not live up to this ideology. Thus, Tang's memoir is dedicated to "my betrayed comrades, who believed they were sacrificing themselves for a humane liberation of their people."

⁵⁶ See STANLEY KARNOW, *VIETNAM: A HISTORY* 17-18 (1984) (Discussing the fanatical devotion of the North Vietnamese to their struggle, regardless of cost.). The most striking example of the dichotomy between physical and psychological victory is the Tet Offensive. Though the communists were soundly defeated militarily, press reports and America's already weakening stomach for the cost of the war turned "a devastating Communist military defeat . . . into a 'psychological victory.'" *Id.* at 545. The attacks undercut President Johnson's already slumping approval ratings. In the opinion of Mr. Karnow, "[t]he country's trust in his authority had evaporated. His credibility -- the key to a president's capacity to govern -- was gone." *Id.* at 546. The North Vietnamese lost big physically, but won big ideologically.

The American perspective was not so noble. The U.S. government initially rallied its soldiers and citizens around an ideology that saw America as the leader of the world who would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."⁵⁷ Thus, the halt of communism, regardless of where it was spreading, became the goal. As the price, burden, and hardship increased, however, commitment to this ideology waned among the soldiers and, more importantly, the people.⁵⁸ It was difficult to see how the falling of the Vietnam "domino" would unleash a chain of events that would reach our doorstep.⁵⁹ Consequently, our citizenry lost their stomach for the war because the cost in lives and dollars exceeded their commitment to the manifest destiny ideology that caused our involvement in the first place. Without an

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 14 (quoting President John F. Kennedy).

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 19-20. The American lack of commitment was summed up well by Bui Diem, former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States who said, "[t]he struggle for us was a matter of life or death. But, for the Americans, it was merely an unhappy chapter in their history, and they could turn the page. We were allied, yet we had different interests." *Id.* at 21.

⁵⁹ Here, I refer to the so-called "domino theory." This theory was recognized as early as 1949 and warned "that if Indochina fell to Communism, so would the other countries of Southeast Asia." *Id.* at 169. Thus, the countries would behave like the childhood game of dominoes where knocking the first domino over causes the toppling of the remaining dominoes in the line.

ideology, America lost the political will to stay the course and lost a war in which it rarely lost a battle.⁶⁰

With the fall of communism, we might suppose that the great ideological debate is over -- that self-determination has won out over tyranny. But, differing ideologies persist and ideology is not just about government. The recently ended struggle in the Balkans, for example, was about ethnicity, religion, territory, and past wrongs -- all ideological elements of the warring groups.⁶¹ So deep is

⁶⁰ STUART A. HERRINGTON, *PEACE WITH HONOR? AN AMERICAN REPORTS ON VIETNAM 1973-1975* 243 (1983). Herrington cites Colonel Harry G. Summers, a brigade commander in Vietnam, who later confronted one of his Vietcong counterparts and reminded him that the North Vietnamese had never defeated us on the battlefield. Colonel Summers recalls his response to be, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant." *Id.*, citing HARRY G. SUMMERS, *ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR* (1982).

⁶¹ See *Blood and earth. Ethnic cleansing*, *THE ECONOMIST*, Sep. 23, 1995, at 16. This article discusses the ethnic and religious faultlines in Bosnia in the course of asking the question "whether multi-ethnic countries can ever be harmonious?" The authors opine that the current peace agreement in Bosnia merely reflects the completion of ethnic cleansing in the sense that it simply moves the different ethnic/religious groups to different areas so that they are no longer intermingled. They discuss several other historical examples of what they call "partition: cut up the earth, and apportion according to the blood." *Id.* The article is interesting in that it goes on to use the melting pot of America as an example of where this ethnic diversity has, to a large degree, worked. The authors theorize that the reason is the unifying belief "that being American means something in itself: something to do with freedom, self-reliance, the rule of law, democracy and fellow feeling." *Id.* Thus, the key to resolving conflict based on ethnic, religious, and territorial ideologies may be to find the "ideas that people value as they value blood and earth." *Id.* See also, Bruce Wallace, *Sarajevo's Ghosts*, *MACLEAN'S*, Jan. 22, 1996, at 24 (Reporting that ethnic and religious hatred still runs deep, even after "peace." Serbs in the suburbs of Sarajevo were leaving their homes, burning them as they went, and taking the dead bodies of their relatives rather than leave them behind under ethnically Bosnian, religiously Muslim control.).

the devotion to their ideology, that some view the peace as a simply a lull in the killing.⁶² The use of the term "groups" in this conflict is intentional because it was based on the rupture of a single nation not a conflict between nation-states. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, the people began to align themselves not along nationalist boundaries, but along ethnic and religious lines. It is precisely because their ethnic and religious ideologies conflicted that the whole quagmire developed.

These examples, and myriad other conflicts that could be discussed, demonstrate that conflict can be seen, understood and described in ideological terms. It is this ideology and the degree of commitment to it that determines the amount of will a group will bring to a conflict. Thus, if one can target the ideology, one can undermine the will. The question becomes, how is this done?

3. *The Power of Perception*

By defining ideology in terms of the particular view of a group or culture and how it relates to other groups and

⁶² See Wallace, *supra* note 61, at 24 (Discussing the potential for renewed conflict between the Bosnians Muslims and Serbs. The Serbs feel that they won the war and should not be surrendering their homes to Bosnians. The Bosnians view the Serbs as evil war criminals who perpetrated violence against them as they sought to live in peace.). In other words, the peace agreement may have simply added fuel to a bomb that will explode when peacekeepers leave. The Serbs have reason to fight because they feel entitled to land the Bosnians control. The Bosnians feel justified in retaliating for wrongs done to them during the war.

cultures, it becomes axiomatic that such an ideology is fed by that group's perceptions of the world and others. How the group views itself; how it perceives its history, its past treatment by another group, or its relative strength all feeds into this ideology. Perception further factors into the steps the group is willing to take to support its ideology or impose that ideology on others. I call this deliberative process an "ideological calculus." By that, I mean the process by which a group evaluates all of the factors that feed into their ideology, how that ideology meshes with the groups that they potentially conflict with, the measures they see as necessary to resolve the conflict, and their chances of success at resolving the conflict in their favor. The power of perception is that it can influence all elements of this calculus, thereby influencing whether a group will act or refrain from acting.

The current changes in technology are beginning to highlight the importance of this power. By understanding a group's ideology, one can better understand the calculus that goes into their decisions and actions. This in turn can help to determine actions that one can take to alter that group's perceptions and thereby alter their actions and undercut their will. Information technology gives those who develop and use it a powerful means to "attack" these perceptions.

4. *Spanning the Range of Operations*

The power of perception is the key to spanning the operational continuum because it attacks the source of the problem -- the will of the adversary and the ideology that underlies it -- rather than just the physical trappings of the group who holds that particular view. Regardless of how one defines the continuum or whether the group one is dealing with is a nation-state, terrorists, religious ideologues, ethnic tribalism, or something, heretofore, unanticipated, the utility of controlling perceptions is critical to our operations.⁶³ The current Army doctrine demonstrates this point.⁶⁴

In the peacetime state of the environment, the Army's goal is promoting peace.⁶⁵ Operations included in this environment are disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and nation assistance.⁶⁶ Controlling perception does two things

⁶³ See Grant T. Hammond, *Paradoxes of War*, JOINT FORCE Q., Spring 1994, at 7, 11 ("[T]he perceptions of would-be adversaries are just as important as the means by which they accomplish their ends. . . . Modulating perceptions is just as critical as acquiring [physical] capabilities: they should be mutually reinforcing."). Mr. Hammond's article is an excellent conceptual piece about the future of war -- moving from a purely physical struggle to a conception of war where we win "by convincing an adversary to concede, not by destroying him through taking his pieces from the board." *Id.* at 14. In this view, "[f]ocusing directly on an enemy's perceptions and will should be the target." *Id.* at 15.

⁶⁴ See *supra*, notes 13 - 34 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the current doctrine and some of its criticism.

⁶⁵ FM 100-5, *supra* note 5, at 2-1, Fig. 2-1.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

here. First, and foremost, it prevents an operation from moving on the continuum toward the more serious actions that the Army labels conflict. The groups within the area of peacetime operations must perceive that the Army is there to help them in order to avoid protests, mob violence, etc. For this to happen, the groups must understand what help the Army is offering and how it is being delivered. Groups in the area that may view their ideology as contrary to or threatened by the U.S. role must understand the nature of security precautions taken (particularly in volatile operations like counterdrug) so as to dissuade them from acting against U.S. forces. The second beneficial role of perception in peacetime is that it can support the success of the particular actions being undertaken. For example, delivering aid successfully may rely on causing those the Army is helping to perceive their need for help, the Army's ability to meet that need, and engendering the trust within the group to receive the help.

Perception helps similarly if we are in a the conflict state of the environment. In this environment, the Army establishes deterring war and resolving the conflict as its goal.⁶⁷ The operations included in this portion of the continuum are non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peacekeeping, antiterrorism activities, support to

⁶⁷ *Id.*

insurgencies, and strikes and raids.⁶⁸ Modulating perception helps to keep the environment from moving on the continuum toward the range of activity the Army label "war" and helps us to move toward that part of the continuum it labels peacetime. In all of the operations in this category, the groups within the area of operations will be performing their ideological calculus to determine how they should respond to the U.S. presence. U.S. forces must cause these groups to perceive not only that any action against the U.S. would be futile and disastrous, but that actions in support of U.S. operations are in their best interest. Also similar to the peacetime state, the very success of the operation can also depend on controlling perception. For example, in an antiterrorist action, terrorists must perceive that the U.S. is resolved to oppose them, that future action on their part will be met with disaster, and that their use of terrorism to pursue their goals will not work. If the U.S. forces do not convince them of this, they may gain some solace from retaliating, but they will not gain the security of deterring.

Finally, in war, perception helps us to achieve our goal of fighting and winning.⁶⁹ "Winning," at least in the long term, does not involve just destroying things or gaining territory. It involves defeating the enemy's will

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ *Id.*

to fight. If he perceives that it is not in his best interests to continue to fight, the enemy will move along the operational continuum toward peace. Otherwise, he will not. For example, in the Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition declared victory because it accomplished what it had set out to do -- liberate Kuwait.⁷⁰ However, in the long-term view, it did not truly reach a state of the environment that falls in the range of conditions that the Army would label "peacetime."⁷¹ At best, the U.S. has remained somewhere in the range of the continuum labeled "conflict." The U.S. has fought the environmental terrorism of oil fires;⁷² conducted "no fly" operations to protect Kurds;⁷³ redeployed large

⁷⁰ See Bruce W. Nelan, *Ready For Action*. (Defense Secretary Dick Cheney And General Colin Powell, Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff), *TIME*, Nov. 12, 1990, at 12. The UN adopted President Bush's pledge on Nov. 29, 1990 in Security Council Resolution No. 678, "calling for the U.S. and its allies to 'use all necessary means' to liberate Kuwait if Iraq did not withdraw by Jan. 15, ..." Yevgeni Primakov, *The Inside Story Of Moscow's Quest For A Deal*. (The Gulf War), *TIME*, Mar. 4, 1991, at 40.

⁷¹ See Colonel Richard Szafranski, *Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill*, *MIL. REV.*, Nov. 1994, at 41, 43 ("If, for example, Operation Desert Storm was a success, that is, it subdued hostile will, it is difficult to explain Saddam Hussein's continuing willful behavior.").

⁷² See, e.g., Kim Murphy, *Kuwait's Oil Towns Poisoned by Blazing Wells*, *L.A. TIMES*, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1.

⁷³ Begun five years ago, we continue to maintain no fly zones in northern and southern Iraq to protect the Kurds whose uprising against Saddam Hussein was brutally crushed after the Gulf War. See *Absolute Victors Missing In Action 5 Years After Gulf War*, *SACRAMENTO BEE*, Jan. 17, 1996, at A1. We continue to send units from all parts of the armed forces to patrol the no-fly zones. See Joe Darby, *La. Guard Unit Takes Carnival Overseas*, *NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE*, Feb. 8, 1996, at A1 (Reporting that a wing from the LA National Guard would be performing a rotation in Turkey assisting with the patrol of the no-fly zone.).

scale forces based on Iraqi troop build-ups;⁷⁴ and conducted a continuing embargo to try to exact Iraqi compliance with United Nations Resolutions.⁷⁵ Though the coalition won the physical battle, it did not win the ideological battle.⁷⁶ By failing to successfully alter the perceptions of the Iraqi leadership as to what actions are in their best interests, the U.S. and others remain mired in the middle-ground of conflict which is expensive and time-consuming, taxing the nation's resources. This result demonstrates that even a crushing physical defeat is insufficient by itself to guarantee the result a nation wants -- the defeat of the adversary's hostile will.

⁷⁴ In August of 1994, Saddam Hussein prompted the deployment of tens of thousands of American Troops by massing his forces along the Kuwaiti border. See *Another Test From Saddam Hussein*, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 1994, at 12B; Robin Wright, *U.S. Back to Square One in the Gulf Mideast: Despite huge show of American force, Hussein is still in power, and the area is still vulnerable, experts say*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1994, at 24. Information continues to reach us that Saddam may have further tricks up his sleeve. See *Iraq Planned Invasions, Defector Says Saudi Arabia, Kuwait Reportedly Targeted*, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1995, at 3.

⁷⁵ The economic embargo designed to exact full Iraqi compliance with UN Resolutions has recently been continued. It has not had the desired effect, however, as Iraq continues to ignore requirements such as cooperation with weapons inspectors. See, e.g., *UN Council Maintains Embargo Against Iraq*, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1996, at 7.

⁷⁶ Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain during the Gulf War has said, "[t]here is the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, still in power. There is the president of the United States, no longer in power. There is the prime minister of Great Britain who did quite a lot to get things there, no longer in power. I wonder who won?" *Absolute Victors Missing In Action 5 Years After Gulf War*, supra note 73, at A1.

Of course, the ammunition in the battle of perception is information. Our ability to deal in this vital commodity is critical if we are to begin using the power of perception to our advantage. It may be then, that information, while revolutionizing society, is also revolutionizing military affairs.

B. The Third Wave and The Rising Tide of Information

Futurists have described the changes occurring in society, and their concomitant reflection in the military, using several metaphors. Some speak of ages,⁷⁷ others of generations.⁷⁸ Perhaps, the most widely used analogy, however, is the one put forth by Alvin and Heidi Toffler, and that is waves.⁷⁹ This metaphor is purposeful. To the

⁷⁷ See Sullivan & Dubik, *supra* note 32.

⁷⁸ See Lieutenant Commander Randall G. Bowdish, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth Generation*, MIL. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 26. Lieutenant Commander Bowdish attributes the generation metaphor to two articles, William S. Lind et al., *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*, MIL. REV., Oct. 1989, at 2-11, and Major General Vladimir Slipchenko, *A Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation*, FIELD ARTILLERY, Oct. 1993, at 38-41.

⁷⁹ TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, *passim*; ALVIN & HEIDI TOFFLER, *THE THIRD WAVE* (1980). The Tofflers apply this metaphor to a myriad of activities in society, not just warfare. Despite widespread reliance on this conceptualization, there are those who criticize this view as it relates to warfare. See Robert J. Bunker, *The Tofflerian Paradox*, MIL. REV., May-Jun. 1995, at 99. Professor Bunker criticizes the Toffler's view on two levels. First, the theory has systematic problems in that it ignores certain historical anomalies to its "super-civilization" generalizations in all three wave periods. *Id.* at 100-01. Second, the foundation of the Toffler's theory is "precarious" because it is based upon "economic production modes set at the super-civilization level" and the Tofflers have no "military history expertise." *Id.* at 101-02. In Professor Bunker's view, these problems create "a potential conceptual

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Tofflers, "[w]aves are dynamic. When waves crash in on one another, powerful crosscurrents are unleashed. When waves of history collide, whole civilizations clash. And that sheds light on much that otherwise seems senseless or random in today's world."⁸⁰ This metaphor logically fits the military because it represents two things that our continuum of operations is: fluid and dynamic. Operations are fluid because they can shift before, during and after execution as the ideological calculus⁸¹ of the participants changes. They are dynamic, because they involve many different aspects, some of them in opposition, that travel in a myriad directions, but that must be harnessed and directed if we are to achieve our national strategic goals.

In the Tofflers' view, each wave of civilization has a driving force that produced it -- in a sense, the tide that drives the wave.⁸² The First Wave was driven by and was "a product of the agricultural revolution."⁸³ Thus, First Wave societies focus on the land and the form of its society is a

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blind spot . . . within the RMA literature adopted by the Army." *Id.* at 102.

⁸⁰ TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 18.

⁸¹ See *supra* section II.A.3. for a description of what I mean by ideological calculus.

⁸² See TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 18-25. For a more detailed discussion read pages 29-85.

⁸³ *Id.* at 19. For a more detailed discussion read pages 33-37.

result of this focus. The Second Wave ushered in the industrial society. The driving force was the systemization represented in factories resulting in everything being done in mass -- "mass production, mass consumption, mass education, mass media."⁸⁴ This changed the society to one of specialized institutions that served these systems. As industry sprung up in the societies transitioning to the Second Wave, conflict inevitably arose. Factories and cities ate up land that those committed to the First Wave wanted to keep as agricultural. The world at large reflected these internal struggles. Of course, the mass-industry of the Second Wave overmatched the resources of the First Wave. While both continued to coexist, the dominant society was clearly the Second Wave.⁸⁵

We are now beginning to ride the Third Wave. Not that the other two types have disappeared. The world is moving from one based on two waves that influence ideology (agriculture and industrial), to one where three waves will be crashing simultaneously.⁸⁶ The world is becoming "sharply divided into three contrasting and competing civilizations -- the first still symbolized by the hoe; the second by the assembly line; and the third by the

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 19. For a more detailed discussion read pages 38-43.

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 19-21.

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 21-25. The Tofflers say the world is moving from being "bisected" to being "trisected." More detailed discussion on the implications of a trisected world can be found in *id.* at 213-220.

computer."⁸⁷ The driving force giving rise to this wave is knowledge.⁸⁸ And the currency of knowledge is information.⁸⁹

The rising tide, then, is a tide of information. There are a myriad aspects to the use of information being discussed in the military context. Some look to disrupting the communications systems of the enemy; others look to disrupting the computer networks that support third wave economies; still others look at defenses to these same eventualities.⁹⁰ Most of the focus, however, remains on

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 21.

⁸⁸ "[K]nowledge -- broadly defined here to include data, information, images, symbols, culture, ideology, and values -- is the central resource of the Third Wave economy." *Id.* at 58. Similarly, the changes in warfare demonstrated to some degree in the Gulf War placed "knowledge at the center of warfare as well." *Id.* at 69.

⁸⁹ The Tofflers feel that the real value of a company in a Third Wave economy "increasingly lies in their capacity for acquiring, generating, distributing, and applying knowledge strategically and operationally." *Id.* at 59. In other words, the resource -- knowledge -- produces value because we can exchange it. The way we exchange knowledge is through information and information systems. As applied to warfare, knowledge is also the "central resource of destructivity, just as it is the central resource of productivity." *Id.* at 71. Thus, the military also needs to deal in information and information technologies to "spend" this resource. See *id.* at 89-175 (Discussing a number of ways this is/could be done from space to intelligence to the media.). See also Sullivan & Dubik, *supra* note 32, at 47, Fig. 1 ("Information is the currency of command."); Peter Grier, *Information Warfare*, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Mar. 1995, at 34 ("Military officials believe that information increasingly is becoming the currency of true military and economic power.").

⁹⁰ See, e.g., James Adams, *Dawn of the cyber soldiers*, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, TTIMES File. ("The 32 students sitting in a classroom at the National Defense University are in the vanguard of a military revolution that threatens to redraw the battle lines of future conflicts. The students, roaming the Internet on their laptop computers to devise ever more chilling strategies for creating chaos, are the first generation of cyber warriors. They are part of the Pentagon's preparations for a day when . . . weapons are the
(Continued on Next Page)

information systems.⁹¹ The overlooked factor is using the information itself to our advantage. Regardless of whether we face a First, Second, or Third Wave opponent, they will base their action on what they know -- about themselves and us. More accurately, they will base decisions on what they PERCEIVE that they know. The real power, then, in the third wave is not going to be destroying information infrastructure⁹² or speeding up our information processes to

(Continued)

keyboards with which they shut down their enemies' communications, manipulate their media and devastate their finances."); *DOD Panel To Seek Solutions To Information Warfare Threat*, DEFENSE DAILY, Nov. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASAPII File ("A Defense Science Board study has been commissioned to focus on how DOD can protect information systems crucial to national security from attack by potential saboteurs, according to Pentagon and industry officials.").

⁹¹ According to the Tofflers, "much of this doctrinal discussion [about information warfare] still focuses on the details of electronic warfare--knocking out an adversary's radar, infecting his computers with viruses, using missiles to destroy his command and intelligence centers, 'spoofing' his equipment by sending false signals, and using other means to deceive him." TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 140. See also *supra* note 35, discussing the vision of the Army leadership being on the use of information to make things work better, rather than on using the information itself. The Tofflers see this view changing, however, to one where using information isn't just about breaking the enemy's systems or denying the enemy information. The new view sees information as "a powerful lever capable of altering high-level decisions by the opponent." TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 140. It is at this level that PSYOP can play a critical role.

⁹² This was the focus in Desert Storm Air Campaign where we sought to "[i]solate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 95 (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter GULF WAR REPORT]. To accomplish this, the allied forces focused on attacking command facilities, telecommunication facilities, and command, control, and communication nodes. *Id.* at 95-96. In contrast to this strategic focus in physical destruction of information infrastructure, the one military asset we had to affirmatively use information itself against the will of the leadership, PSYOP, was focused operationally on the Iraqi troops. *Id.* at 536-38.

"outflank" the enemy.⁹³ These are still limited views based on physical destruction. The real power is to use the information itself to target what we are really after -- the enemy's will.⁹⁴ We do this by controlling his perceptions.

C. *A Revolution in Military Affairs*

It has become much in vogue to discuss military changes in terms of "Revolutions in Military Affairs" or RMAs.⁹⁵ While this term defies precise definition, it has been argued to have three essential components or preconditions to the occurrence of the RMA.⁹⁶ First, there must be technological development - one or more emerging technologies that through design or accident have military application.⁹⁷ Second, doctrinal innovation must follow to incorporate the new technology into planning and training of

⁹³ See Captain Arthur S. DeGroat & David C. Nilsen, *Information and Combat Power on the Force XXI Battlefield*, MIL. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 56 (discussing "the time-information differential" and ways to reduce it to increase maneuverability and economy of force on the battlefield.).

⁹⁴ I am not saying that the means to physically destroy infrastructure are not important or necessary. However, it is an oft-quoted axiom of Sun Tzu that "[t]o subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." See, e.g., SEABURY & CODEVILLA, *supra* note 12, at 160; Szafranski, *supra* note 71, at 43, both quoting this maxim of Sun Tzu. We do not get to that pinnacle by destroying things. We get to that pinnacle by destroying the enemy's will, altering his ideological calculus, before the bullets fly.

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, *supra* note 11; Bowdish, *supra* note 78.

⁹⁶ Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, *supra* note 11, at 25.

⁹⁷ *Id.*

the military and its operations.⁹⁸ Third, there must be organizational adaptation which is both within and without the military.⁹⁹ This adaptation entails significant changes in bureaucracy, acceptance of technology, and at times even political/cultural changes to approve the use of the techniques and equipment driving the RMA.

The United States is in the midst of realizing the first of these elements with regard to information. As the tide brings in the Third Wave, information technology is changing at a pace that is virtually unprecedented. The impact and cross-currents of this wave are already beginning to reverberate across the spectrum of our activities. From government, to economics, to the military, we are faced with exciting technological developments that enable us to receive, distribute and utilize information in ways that only existed in imagination a few short years ago.¹⁰⁰

The task now is in achieving the second and third elements of this RMA. These are the more difficult ones

⁹⁸ *Id.* at 25-26.

⁹⁹ *Id.* at 26.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., Jeffrey Klein, *Our past, their future. Mother Jones' 20th Anniversary*, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1996, at 28 ("Thanks to high technology, we can communicate instantaneously and have previously unimagined amounts of information at our fingertips."); Michael Shoukat, *Criteria for LAN acquisition planning*, JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT, Oct. 1994, at 6 ("Technological advances in hardware, innovation in networked services, popularity of personal computers, affordability of information technology and the availability of practical services have increased network traffic more than could have been imagined by the designers of present generation LANs.").

because they involve human institutions and the inherent resistance to change that can sometimes bog down military organizations.¹⁰¹ To their credit, the military services have been making strides in this area.¹⁰² The remainder of this paper addresses a specific capability, psychological operations, that can take the U.S. a long way toward achieving, at least partially, the second and third elements of the Information RMA. PSYOP are one method to harness the true power of information and direct it toward achieving U.S. national strategic objectives. "Catching the Wave" on this RMA is critical because "being second best may lead to catastrophic loss in future wars."¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ See Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, *supra* note 11, at 30. ("Why some innovations succeed and others fail, and why some militaries innovate rapidly while other languish, are matters for debate. History provides no clear guidance on overcoming institutional resistance to change and no final explanations of the relative roles of civilians, military mavericks, or visionaries.").

¹⁰² For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have issued a policy memorandum on command and control warfare that incorporates PSYOP. Memorandum of Policy No. 30, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Command and Control Warfare (1st Rev., 8 Mar. 1993) [hereinafter CJCS Memo]. The Army is in the process of producing a new field manual focused on information operations. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-6, INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Draft, 2 Oct. 1995) [hereinafter FM 100-6]. The Navy has established a Naval Information Warfare Activity, Fleet Information Warfare Center, and Modeling and Simulation Office. Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, *Leading the Revolution in C⁴I*, JOINT FORCE Q., Autumn 1995, at 14, 17. The Air Force is working information operations into its overall mission planning. *Air Force Details Information Warfare Mission Structure*, *supra* note 3.

¹⁰³ Fitzsimonds and Van Tol, *supra* note 11, at 28.

III. Psychological Operations: The Purveyors of Persuasion.

In 1972, a Department of State advisor to the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center asked in the title of an article, "PSYOP: What is it? And what should we do about it?"¹⁰⁴ At some level, the notoriety of PSYOP in Operation DESERT STORM has informed people on the first question, although a number of misconceptions still abound. Twenty-four years later, however, the nation has barely scratched the surface of the second question.¹⁰⁵ One should reframe this question as, "What do we do with PSYOP?" This is the critical question as the nation enters the Third Wave. Its decision will have legal and political consequences. I propose a system of centralized control and decentralized execution that addresses legal and political issues while enabling use of military PSYOP at the strategic level in pursuit of America's national interests. Before

¹⁰⁴ Barrett, *supra* note 1, at 57.

¹⁰⁵ The vision of the potential for PSYOP was put forth over a decade ago. "In 1985, the Department of Defense responded to a presidential directive 'to revitalize DOD PSYOP and integrate it into other . . . programs of the United States Government.' The resulting 1985 PSYOP Master Plan was aimed at making DOD PSYOP 'one of the strategic instruments of national security'" Major Jay M. Parker, *Training the PSYOP Force*, SPECIAL WARFARE, Oct. 1992, at 2, 5, quoting DEP'T OF DEFENSE, 1985 PSYOP MASTER PLAN. The 1990 revision of the PSYOP Master Plan was designed to "continue the Presidentially directed revitalization." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOD PSYOP MASTER PLAN iii (March 1990) [hereinafter 1990 MASTER PLAN]. Despite this vision, PSYOP is still relegated to its conventional image of leaflets and loudspeakers in support of military operations. The true strategic use of PSYOP has not been accomplished.

proposing changes, however, a discussion of where U.S. Army PSYOP forces stand today would be helpful. Toward that end, I will answer the question of what PSYOP is, look at the units that conduct them, and then move on to the final sections of this paper which discuss my recommendations for change or, what we should do with PSYOP.

A. *PSYOP: What is it?*

Military operations involve interaction between human beings. This is a truism, but an important one, because this fact makes it axiomatic that there is a psychological element to these operations. Throughout history, astute commanders have realized the military value of working the psychological aspects of warfare to their advantage.¹⁰⁶ The capabilities of the United States Army to conduct psychological operations has been cyclic, rising and falling when faced with conflict. However, our capabilities had drastically degraded after the Vietnam War.¹⁰⁷ The

¹⁰⁶ As far back as Sun Tzu this was recognized. His oft-quoted axiom is "To subdue the enemy without fighting him is the acme of skill." See SEABURY & CODEVILLA, *supra* note 12, at 160. See also *supra* notes 2 & 36-40 and accompanying text and *infra* note 108 & 110 for references to this principle in Clausewitz's work, in the quotes of modern commanders, and in the works of commentators.

¹⁰⁷ See Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *Military Psychological Operations*, in *POLITICAL WARFARE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: RETHINKING THE US APPROACH* 45, 49 (F. Barnett & C. Lord eds., 1989) ("By the mid-1970s, however, all that remained in the active component was an understrength group at Fort Bragg with antiquated equipment -- a condition that did not improve significantly for ten years.").

revitalization of PSYOP in the 1980s and 90's has convinced military commanders, at least, that PSYOP is a critical force multiplier.¹⁰⁸

While PSYOP are in demand, they are still misunderstood and mistrusted.¹⁰⁹ Part of this is engendered by a common sense understanding of the terms that comprise the name. Unfortunately, this common sense understanding does not accurately convey what PSYOP are and how and why we conduct them. This section seeks to dispel these misconceptions.

1. *The Definition of PSYOP*

Military actions have a psychological impact. However, this psychological impact is often the unintended result of the achievement of a more conventional military objective.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ See FM 100-6, *supra* note 102, at 3-7 (quoting General John M. Shalikashvili as saying, "it is my belief that much of the success achieved during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT can be attributed to the successful integration of psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of the overall humanitarian assistance mission. . . . PSYOP is a true force-multiplier.").

¹⁰⁹ This misunderstanding is especially acute among the citizenry who have no experience with the conduct of PSYOP. For example, a citizen wrote to National Public Radio concerned about the participation of the 4th PSYOP Group in the relief effort in Florida during Hurricane Andrew. He said, "I don't know about you, but I think it's very scary [sic] the Army's Psychological Operations, or PsyOps [sic] unit, has taken charge of disaster communications in Dade County, Florida. What business does a military propaganda, disinformation and psychological warfare unit have taking charge of public communications during a time of natural disaster at home?" Letters: Andrew & Army, *All Things Considered* (NPR Radio Broadcast, Sept. 2, 1992) available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NPR File. This distrust of PSYOP and propaganda is considered by scholars as a characteristic of democracy. See also sources cited *supra* note 1.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Alexander R. Askenasy, *The Role of Psychological Operations Within the Military Mission*, in *MILITARY PROPAGANDA: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND OPERATIONS* 9, 12 (R. McLaurin ed., 1982) ("[A]ll (Continued on Next Page)

Not all of these actions are Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Rather, PSYOP are only those that are "planned to convey selected information and indicators to *foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.*"¹¹¹ Several important distinctions come out of this definition.

First, PSYOP are only those operations that are specifically planned to have psychological impact. In other words, the whole purpose for conducting the particular action is to achieve the psychological objective. It should be noted that this does not mean that PSYOP planners do, or should, ignore the psychological effects of conventional operations. To the contrary, PSYOP should emphasize these operations and maximize their effect.¹¹² Still, it is important to distinguish the two when considering the assets

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military actions can have psychological effects on perception and behavior, whether or not the commander intended such effects."); SEABURY & CODEVILLA, *supra* note 12, at 162 ("Imagine then the psychological effect of Genghis Kahn's Golden Horde, riding out of the clouds of yellow smoke generated by hundreds of pots of burning sulphur, while the great war drums sounded out doom! The enemy might as well have been focusing his mind on escape routes rather than on the impending battle.")

¹¹¹ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* I-1 (30 July 1993) (emphasis added) [hereinafter JOINT PUB. 3-53]. See also FM 100-6, *supra* note 102 at 3-6.

¹¹² For example, in the Gulf War, PSYOP leaflets worked in concert with the air campaign to induce surrender and break the Iraqi soldier's will to fight. See GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 140.

we have dedicated to PSYOP and the doctrine and policies that limit them.

Second, the U.S. directs PSYOP only at foreign audiences. Our assets contain many of the same capabilities as the civilian media, with the possible distinction being our capability to operate without established infrastructure.¹¹³ Because of these capabilities, military PSYOP assets have been used domestically for such things as disaster relief.¹¹⁴ Their role, however, was sharply circumscribed to allow only for information dissemination;¹¹⁵ there could be no intent to psychologically influence the audience. Limitations on the use of PSYOP within the United

¹¹³ This distinction is rapidly disappearing, particularly for major media outlets like CNN. Still, most civilian media rely on services such as electrical power that may not be available. PSYOP units contain organic capability to produce electrical power. See 4TH PSYOP GROUP, CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK (Booklet on file at the International & Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's School, Army. It discusses the organic power generation capability that is standard to each piece of PSYOP equipment.)

¹¹⁴ For example, PSYOP units helped bring relief to South Florida after Hurricane Andrew. See, e.g., Kirk Spitzer, *Reporter's Notebook On Hurricane Andrew*, Gannett News Service, Sept. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, GNS file (Reporting on the 4th PSYOP Group's operation of an AM radio station and conduct of loudspeaker operations to provide disaster information to residents of south Florida).

¹¹⁵ Disaster relief is doctrinally included in PSYOP's role. See DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 33-1, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 3-30 (18 Feb. 1993) [hereinafter FM 33-1]. However, the focus is on foreign disaster relief. In that context, PSYOP may "exploit these humanitarian operations by 'advertising' where the relief is coming from." *Id.* In the domestic context, the role is much more limited. There, PSYOP units may be "employed in a dissemination role only and not to project a PSYOP message." DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 33-1-1, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 2-1 (5 May 1994) [hereinafter FM 33-1-1].

States is a matter of policy and reflects our fear of the potential for abuse of this capability to gain power over our citizenry.¹¹⁶ Thus, the U.S. directs PSYOP toward foreign audiences to achieve national security objectives in foreign lands.

Third, these operations ultimately seek changes in behavior. The goal of PSYOP is not just to make people *think* something, but to make them *do* something. In wartime, the U.S. may want combatants to give up the fight and surrender.¹¹⁷ In Operations Other Than War, the U.S. may want people to turn in their weapons¹¹⁸ or refugees to enter camps to receive humanitarian aid.¹¹⁹ In the larger sense, America's military gears its entire operations toward making

¹¹⁶ See *infra* notes 223-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the current policy situation regarding U.S. Citizens. See *supra* notes 1 & 109 for sources discussing the mistrust of PSYOP by Americans.

¹¹⁷ In the Gulf War, "PSYOP focused on destroying Iraqi morale and encouraging mass surrender and desertion." GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 536.

¹¹⁸ For example, PSYOP units supported the so-called guns-for-cash program during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. See, e.g., Mark Fineman, *Guns-for-Cash Plan Runs Up Against Fear*, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 28, 1994, at 1 (reporting that U.S. Army helicopters were flying over the streets advertising the program through loudspeaker systems.).

¹¹⁹ One of the missions for PSYOP during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was to get the Kurdish refugees from the mountains into the camps being constructed for them. See, e.g., John M. Broder & James Gerstenzang, *GIs Enter Iraq to Set Up Camps Refugees: First of 10,000 American troops survey northern area for Kurdish assistance sites. Battle teams in Turkey will respond to any military threat*, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at 1 ("U.S. military psychological operations teams will circulate through the makeshift refugee camps in the mountains to inform the Kurds that the new camps are open.").

other people behave in ways that comport with or promote U.S. national objectives in the situation. What causes this behavioral shift, however, is a shift in ideology by modulating perception. Thus, PSYOP is a critical asset since it can achieve long-term behavior changes. The changes are lasting because they reflect a deeper change that is the actual result of PSYOP -- a shift in ideology and will relative to U.S. objectives.

2. *The Target of PSYOP*

One of the key elements in planning PSYOP is to determine the group who will respond to the message. This group is the target audience.¹²⁰ It is within this group that PSYOP seek to alter attitudes and ideology to achieve particular desired behaviors. PSYOP planners select the target audience based upon three criteria.¹²¹ The first criteria, power, refers to the group's ability or capacity to perform effectively in the ways desired. Second, accessibility, which measures U.S. ability to reach the audience with the media available. Third, susceptibility, which is the degree to which PSYOP can modulate the perceptions of the particular person or group.

¹²⁰ The target audience is "a collection of people who have common characteristics and vulnerabilities that may make them susceptible to the effects of a PSYOP program." FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at 6-2 - 6-3.

¹²¹ This process is called "target audience analysis." It is discussed in detail in *id.* at 6-1 - 6-10.

It should be noted that target audiences are not limited to military units.¹²² Just as our spectrum of operations is broad, so are the spectrum of people who can influence those operations for better or worse. Quite often, the general populus (or at least portions of it) can be the most susceptible to psychological influences and may have the power to act in response to that influence. For example, in Vietnam it was the demoralization of our citizenry through nightly media barrages of human carnage that ultimately undermined the war effort.¹²³

B. *PSYOP: Why do we do it?*

1. *The Mission of PSYOP*

PSYOP units are not stand-alone forces. Their "role is to support other military units or U.S. Government agencies in reaching U.S. national objectives."¹²⁴ The "PSYOP unit's mission comes from the supported unit's mission. Thus, PSYOP mission planning focuses on how to provide the most effective support to the supported unit."¹²⁵ As a

¹²² In the discussion of target audience analysis, doctrine lists a few examples of groups to consider including families, small military units, and parliaments. See *id.* at 6-3.

¹²³ Cf. KARNOW, *supra* note 56, at 523 (Describing how "years of viewing the war on television, . . . [had] transmitted the grueling reality of the struggle -- remote, repetitious, monotonous -- punctuated periodically by moments of terror.").

¹²⁴ FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 1-2.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 7-1.

consequence of this support role, the standing mission of the Army's lone active component PSYOP Group is stated in broad terms. This group

plans and conducts PSYOP activities authorized and implemented worldwide in support of all nonmobilization contingencies during crises and open hostilities short of declared war. It also develops, coordinates, and executes peacetime PSYOP activities. In addition, should war be declared, the AC PSYOP group assists in the planning and execution of strategic and operational PSYOP for the unified command CINCs.¹²⁶

The critical distinctions for purposes of this paper are first, that the view of PSYOP is as a support unit, rather than as a primary actor in operations in pursuit of foreign policy. This needs to change as the U.S. enters the Third Wave. Second, the current standing mission statement is broad enough to encompass PSYOP that are not merely supporting a military operation, but that occur as stand-alone actions in pursuit of a national security objective.

2. The Capabilities of PSYOP

PSYOP units bring a variety of capabilities to any operation that can greatly aid in achieving the national security objective at stake. The PSYOP objective that might meet the national security goal varies with the level of PSYOP the Army is conducting. However, PSYOP capabilities apply throughout the operational continuum. The following

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 4-1.

is a partial list of capabilities that underscore the potential for PSYOP's effectiveness on the ideological battlefield of the future.

First, PSYOP can inform audiences in denied areas.¹²⁷ By denied areas, I mean, areas that are receiving no information or inaccurate information. The delivery method can be whatever is required to reach the audience.¹²⁸ It may be that the PSYOP unit is serving as a replacement for damaged communication systems. They may inform the people of the intentions of our forces in the area or reassure isolated people of our support. Whatever method and message is needed, military PSYOP units may be able to reach denied audiences when others cannot.

¹²⁷ *Id.* at 1-3; FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115 at 2-2, Fig. 2-1.

¹²⁸ Of course, one of the issues when conducting the target analysis mentioned above is accessibility of the audience. It is possible that an audience cannot be reached by PSYOP units for physical or policy reasons. FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 1-3. Decision makers would have to consider applicable limitations. It is hard to imagine a situation where people could not be reached if the desire and funds were there. For example, during my assignment at the 4th PSYOP Group, the unit was involved with the conduct of the refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In order to provide reliable communication, small radios were issued in the camp. The Group then operated a radio station to broadcast needed information and entertainment to the camps. There is no reason why a similar principle could not be applied in any operation. First, supply the means to receive (by air-drop if necessary), then send the message. See ALVIN & HEIDI TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 237 ("If U.S. psychological warfare experts in the Gulf could drop 29 million leaflets on the Iraqis, could a few thousand tiny, cheap radios, tuned to a 'Peace Frequency' be dropped over the war zone so that combatants could hear something other than their own side's lies?").

Second, PSYOP is geared to exploit ethnic, cultural, religious, and economic differences.¹²⁹ PSYOP units contain cultural and language expertise that keep them in tune with the target population.¹³⁰ This enables them to project the most persuasive message possible. This capability can be used to curb violence between factions, develop programs that will appeal to certain groups, or design actions that will be particularly effective against a group based on its belief systems.¹³¹

Third, PSYOP can help project a positive view of the U.S. and our actions, whether we are in-country or not.¹³² Overcoming censorship, misinformation, or enemy propaganda can accomplish this objective. Underscoring positive U.S. programs or informing audiences of programs of which they are not aware may also work.

Finally, PSYOP can support internal groups that are favorable to U.S. policies.¹³³ These groups can be

¹²⁹ FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 1-3; FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at 2-2, Fig. 2-1.

¹³⁰ FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at 2-1 - 2-2.

¹³¹ For example, one of the objectives of strategic PSYOP is to "encourage disaffection among opponents on the part of ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements having grievances against each other." *Id.* at 2-4, fig. 2-2.

¹³² FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 1-3, FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at 2-2, Fig. 2-1.

¹³³ See FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 1-3. Listed among PSYOP capabilities are "[s]ustaining the morale of resistance fighters" and "[i]nfluencing local support for insurgents."

insurgents or resistance fighters or they might be a rival political organization. PSYOP messages can underscore our support for the group and help persuade others in that area to support them.

These are only a few of the many uses to which PSYOP can be put. These particular capabilities highlight the value of PSYOP to potential national security goals, with or without the use of other types of military units. How PSYOP is used and what capabilities are brought to bear will vary with the objectives being sought. The level of PSYOP being conducted determines which of these PSYOP objectives might accomplish the mission.

3. *PSYOP in the Operational Continuum*

The Army conducts PSYOP across the continuum of operations previously discussed. The PSYOP may be strategic, operational, tactical, or consolidation in nature.¹³⁴

Strategic PSYOP refers to operations that support the "broad or long-term aims"¹³⁵ of the nation and results will become visible in the indefinite future. At the strategic level, PSYOP seeks a variety of objectives. Chief among these is to "support and explain U.S. political policies, aims, and objectives abroad" and to relate these policies

¹³⁴ FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at 2-3.

¹³⁵ *Id.*

"to the aspirations of the target audience."¹³⁶ Other objectives include the amplification of economic and other sanctions; influencing the foreign nation's strategy; lowering the morale of the civilian populace or America's opposition; and encouraging or discouraging ethnic, social, political, economic, or religious groups that have grievances against each other where this is in the interest of the U.S.¹³⁷

Operational PSYOP "demonstrate characteristics of both Strategic and Tactical PSYOP" and serve as a "bridge" between the two.¹³⁸ These activities seek more rapid change in the target audience behavior. They are not as broad as strategic PSYOP but focus more specifically on a particular region or nation. This focus is reflected in the Operational PSYOP objectives. Principle among them is to "[p]repare [the] target country's population for the introduction of U.S. forces" and "[m]inimize civilian interference" with U.S. operations.¹³⁹ Additional objectives are countering enemy propaganda and encouraging conflict among the opponent's forces and their population.¹⁴⁰ The clear change in these objectives is a focus on military

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 2-4, Fig. 2-2.

¹³⁷ *Id.*

¹³⁸ *Id.* at 2-3.

¹³⁹ *Id.* at 2-4, Fig. 2-3.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

operations in a particular country and with particular groups as opposed to the strategic level which focuses more on the larger national security interests of the nation.

This trend toward military focus continues and is more complete at the tactical level. The Army performs these PSYOP "in direct support of military tactical operations."¹⁴¹ The objectives reflect this focus and include lowering enemy morale, deception operations, and providing information and direction to friendly elements operating in the area.¹⁴² These operations are integrated, however, since another objective is the support of Strategic PSYOP through the provision of information about enemy vulnerabilities.

The final type, consolidation PSYOP, are conducted following military operations in "newly-accessible or formally opponent-held territory."¹⁴³ The objectives here begin a move away again from the military action and focus on a return to normalcy. These objectives include promoting a favorable image of the U.S. and her allies; enlisting support among leaders and the population; and promoting the rebuilding of a local government.¹⁴⁴

In the recent past, at least, the U.S. has effectively utilized PSYOP in the operational, tactical, and

¹⁴¹ *Id.* at 2-3.

¹⁴² *Id.* at 2-5, Fig. 2-4.

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 2-3.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.* at 2-5, Fig. 2-5.

consolidation levels. However, they have not been truly integrated at the strategic level. As America continues to move into the information age and becomes a Third Wave society, it will not be able to afford to waste this valuable asset. Instead, the U.S. will need to expand its capabilities. A look at the Army's current assets will highlight this need.

C. *PSYOP Force Structure*

1. *Assets Available*

PSYOP forces are a mixture of active and reserve components. In most operations, the active force will conduct the initial deployment. Reserves will replace the active component forces as soon as the Army obtains volunteers or accomplishes a call-up.¹⁴⁵ This system has worked well due to the professionalism and patriotism of the soldiers who comprise the PSYOP units, both active and

¹⁴⁵ See Major Jack N. Summe, *Total PSYOP Integration: Reorganizing Active and Reserve-component PSYOP Forces*, SPECIAL WARFARE, Oct. 1992, at 10, 11 ("The USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis [(JMA)] has identified the requirement for U.S. PSYOP forces to be able to engage in two regional contingencies and simultaneously support other theaters. The relatively small size of the active PSYOP force means that active and reserve forces would have to be integrated to meet the JMA requirement . . . the active component would most likely deploy to theater first and be reinforced later by reserve forces."). During my tenure as the Command Judge Advocate, 4th PSYOP Group (A), this process occurred for every operation. The Group has a full-time Active-Guard/Reserve (AGR) officer who coordinates the reserve forces assigned to their operations (S3) section. Throughout this section, references to conditions at the 4th PSYOP Group, as opposed to references to official publications or doctrine, are based upon my experience with that unit from 1993-1995.

reserve. However, as the role of PSYOP increases, this method of organization will reach its breaking point.

a. *Active Component*

The only active duty PSYOP unit in the United States Army is the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.¹⁴⁶ This unit has a strength of approximately 1100 soldiers.¹⁴⁷ These soldiers are broken down into five battalions.¹⁴⁸ Three of the battalions are regionally oriented, one provides dissemination assets, and




Figure 1

the other provides tactical PSYOP support.

¹⁴⁶ See JOHN M. COLLINS, *SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT* 56-57 (1994).

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ See FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 4-2.

The Regional Support Battalions are composed of a headquarters element and one or more regional support companies.¹⁴⁹ Each regional support company is made up of a "headquarters element and two or more operational detachments."¹⁵⁰ Within these detachments are the product development sections.¹⁵¹ These sections are the heart of PSYOP. They develop, together with civilian analysts, who are experts in various countries, regions, and cultures, the themes and messages for a particular PSYOP campaign.¹⁵² These battalions also design the products which convey those themes and messages.

The Regional Support Battalion coordinates with the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB) for production and/or dissemination of PSYOP products. The PDB consists of a headquarters company and three specialized companies -- Print Company, Broadcast Company, and Signal Company.¹⁵³ The Print and Broadcast Companies contain all of the media production assets in the Group.¹⁵⁴ I will discuss the

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 4-8. Note that the three Regional Support Battalions currently at the 4th PSYOP Group each have two Regional Support Companies.

¹⁵⁰ *Id.* at 4-11.

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ *Id.* at 4-5.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.* at 4-5 & 4-7.

details of these assets below. The Signal Company contains the Group's organic communications assets and provides support to all of the Group's units.¹⁵⁵

The remaining battalion is the Tactical Support Battalion. This battalion "provides tactical support to the Army's rapid deployment units and the Special Operations Force (SOF) community."¹⁵⁶ The unit consists of three companies¹⁵⁷ that offer limited product development capability. The Tactical Support Battalion focuses on the tactical dissemination needs of the commander. There primary means to do so is through all types of loudspeaker systems -- aircraft-mounted, vehicle-mounted, and man-packed systems.¹⁵⁸

This lone active PSYOP Group is assigned to the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), a reserve command organization that is subordinate to the active component United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).¹⁵⁹ USASOC is the Army component command of the United States Special Operations

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 4-8.

¹⁵⁶ *Id.* at 4-11.

¹⁵⁷ FM 33-1 describes the organization as containing two companies. *Id.* at 4-11. However, a third company was stood up during my tenure as CJA of the 4th PSYOP Group in 1994. This additional company was activated to meet the increased need for PSYOP support.

¹⁵⁸ *See id.* at 4-12, Fig. 4-11.

¹⁵⁹ *See* COLLINS, *supra* note 146, at 54-57.

Command (USSOCOM), one of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) established by an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.¹⁶⁰ CINC, USSOCOM is responsible primarily for providing special operations support to the Regional Warfighting CINCs.¹⁶¹ In addition, however, he has roles in doctrine and funding that are more akin to a service secretary and, in fact, exercises "the functions of the head of an agency" with regard to a number of his responsibilities.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Goldwater-Nichols and its progeny are codified at 10 U.S.C. § 161-68 (Supp. 1995). USSOCOM is specifically established in 10 U.S.C. § 167 (Supp. 1995).

¹⁶¹ While CINC, USSOCOM has full command authority over those forces assigned to him, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 167 (e) (1) & 164(c), the statute establishing USSOCOM specifically provides that "a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted" unless the President or Secretary of Defense directs otherwise. 10 U.S.C. § 167(d).

¹⁶² 10 U.S.C. § 167(e) (4) (B). The areas over which he exercises this function are "development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment" and "[a]cquisition of special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services." *Id.* at § 167(e) (4) (A).

Organizational Location 4th PSYOP Group (A)




Figure 2

Army PSYOP assets have broad and powerful capabilities. However, their limited number concomitantly limits the number of operations they can support effectively. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the assets are buried beneath three levels of command hierarchy that must be dealt with to tap into the Army's PSYOP capability.

b. Reserve Component

Given the heavy weighting of assets to the reserve components, these play a significant role in the conduct of PSYOP missions world-wide. The 4th PSYOP Group (A) has a full-time Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officer in their

operations section to fully integrate and coordinate the reserve augmentation of the active component group.¹⁶³

There are three reserve component PSYOP groups which have similar capabilities to the active component group, with some variations in organization.¹⁶⁴ These assets fall under the same major command structure as the 4th PSYOP Group.¹⁶⁵ As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the Army relies heavily on reserves for PSYOP support to current operations. The normal mode of operation¹⁶⁶ is for the active component to initially deploy in order to meet the time constraints of the mission. As soon as reserve forces are activated, outfitted, and trained, however, they replace the active component asset. This allows the active component to refit and be ready for the next contingency.

While this system has worked fairly well, there are potential problems. Chief among these is the limitations placed on the use of reserve forces. For example, absent a

¹⁶³ This officer works in the Group's Operations (S3) Section and was an augmentee position specifically authorized because of the need to orchestrate reserve backfill in support of contingencies.

¹⁶⁴ See COLLINS, *supra* note 146, at 56-57 (discussing the number of reserve groups) and FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 4-13 - 4-22 (discussing the reserve organization). Probably the key addition in the Reserve Component is the PSYOP Battalion (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)/Civilian Internee (CI)) which assists in EPW/CI operations at the Corps and Theater level.

¹⁶⁵ See Figure 2, *supra*.

¹⁶⁶ This description is based upon the mode of operation that I witnessed during my assignment to the 4th PSYOP Group. This process was followed for all activities from exercises to contingencies.

Presidential call-up, the unit must rely on volunteers to come on active duty.¹⁶⁷ Additionally, Army regulations limit the justifications for activating and paying a reservist on full-time active duty.¹⁶⁸ Most of these justifications contain a time limit that the reservist can remain on active duty, usually 180 days or less.¹⁶⁹ The regulations limit the utility of the system of reserve backfill, particularly in long-term operations.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, these types of unknowns

¹⁶⁷ The President has authority to order the activation of up to 200,000 Selected Reservists for a period of 90 days. 10 U.S.C. § 673b. This authority was used for the first time since becoming law in 1976 during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 474. Absent this call-up, orders to active duty are voluntary. See DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 135-210, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES: ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY AS INDIVIDUALS DURING PEACETIME, para. 1-5 (1 Sep. 1994) [hereinafter AR 135-210]. This limitation does not, of course, affect the requirements to complete annual training. See DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 135-200, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES: ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING, ANNUAL TRAINING, AND ACTIVE DUTY FOR SPECIAL WORK OF INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, Ch. 3 (1 Sep. 1994) [hereinafter AR 135-200].

¹⁶⁸ The two primary justifications used are Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) and Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD). ADSW is for the purpose of accomplishing a mission of the Army National Guard (ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). It is NOT for training. AR 135-200, *supra* note 167, at para. 6-2. TTAD, on the other hand, is for the accomplishment of an "Active Army, a Unified or Specified Command, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), or an active force mission . . ." AR 135-210, *supra* note 167, at para. 3-2. TTAD is used most often for obvious reasons.

¹⁶⁹ The general limit on orders to active duty is 180 days. AR 135-200, *supra* note 167, at para. 1-5. This limit is applied to ADSW. TTAD, however, cannot exceed 139 days without approval from Commander, Personnel Command (PERSCOM). AR 135-210, *supra* note 167, at para. 3-3a(1). It is possible to extend a TTAD past 180 days with Commander, PERSCOM approval. *Id.* at para. 3-3a(2). In practice, I have never seen this done.

¹⁷⁰ For example, when I left the 4th PSYOP Group in June of 1995, the Group was in the process of rotating reserve soldiers assigned to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, who had reached the limits of their tours. This created some problems because the mission was almost
(Continued on Next Page)

tend to devalue the PSYOP assets in the eye of planners who need to KNOW that they will have a particular asset when they need it. Underscoring this point is a recommendation made after the Gulf War. Despite the success of PSYOP and successful reserve support, the Department of Defense recommended that the "Active and RC force mix . . . be evaluated to ensure sufficient PSYOP assets are available to provide support should more than one contingency occur."¹⁷¹

2. *Media Available*

The PSYOP assets of the Army have an impressive array of media available to them to convey the themes and messages of the PSYOP campaign. While the full technical details of these capabilities is outside the scope of this paper, and in some cases classified, a brief recitation should give a flavor for the technologically advanced nature of the equipment and the capabilities that rival civilian media outlets.

a. *Printing/Publications*

The 4th PSYOP Group has a full printing company organized within its PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB). Their capabilities include the full range of skills one

(Continued)

entirely supported by reservists at that point. Consequently, the turnover adversely affected cultural contacts and experience available in-country.

¹⁷¹ GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 538.

would expect from a small civilian printing firm. The unit divides printing assets into two capabilities -- "heavy" and "light" print.¹⁷² These both have the capability to print in multi-color, use computer-generated images and typesetting, and incorporate photographs.¹⁷³ Heavy print also has a full bindery section for the production of books, brochures, and other bound products.¹⁷⁴ This unit has produced leaflets in the millions for recent operations.¹⁷⁵ They also produce newspapers, booklets, handbills, posters, and other printed products.

b. Audio & Video

In addition to hard copy printing, the Group has a Broadcast Company also organized under the PDB. This unit has a full media production facility at Fort Bragg which produces professional video and audio products.¹⁷⁶ The capabilities of this media production center rival civilian

¹⁷² Heavy print is located at Fort Bragg and "[p]roduces, in high volume, printed products (leaflets, newspapers, magazines, books, posters) . . . to be transported to supported commands for dissemination." FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 4-7. Light print deploys world-wide using one of three light or three modular print systems. *Id.* Additionally, PSYOP printers may be deployed to operate local or host nation equipment. *Id.*

¹⁷³ See CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, *supra* note 113, at 46-54.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 50.

¹⁷⁵ Heavy print is actually able to produce millions of leaflets *per day* when required. *Id.* at 50. During the Gulf War, the unit produced Twenty-nine million leaflets containing thirty-three different messages. GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 537.

¹⁷⁶ See FM 33-1, *supra*, note 115, at 4-7.

media outlets and include use of inputs from various formats (35 mm slides, computer graphics, video tape, etc.), full computer graphics and special effects, high speed tape duplication, and frequency expanders to allow audio transmission over telephone lines.¹⁷⁷ In addition, the Broadcast Company has deployable television and radio transmitters to broadcast these products.¹⁷⁸

c. Delivery Systems

The PSYOP Group delivers PSYOP products in a variety of ways. There are various air delivery methods, such as leaflet bombs, artillery, or air drops using Air Force or Army Aircraft to distribute paper products such as leaflets, handbills, and booklets.¹⁷⁹ Additionally, the Group's Tactical Battalion can deliver these items on the ground while deployed forward with other special operations or conventional forces.

In addition to the PDB's organic broadcast capability, the Tactical Battalion's teams can play recordings through soldier, vehicle, or aircraft-mounted loudspeaker systems, or language-capable soldiers may read a script over these

¹⁷⁷ CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, *supra* note 113, at 41-43.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 32-44.

¹⁷⁹ For example, in the Gulf War, leaflets were delivered by such diverse systems as artillery, C-130 cargo planes, F-16 fighter planes, and B-52 bombers. GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 537.

same systems.¹⁸⁰ Augmenting these Group assets is the Air National Guard, which has four specially equipped C-130 aircraft known as "Commando Solo." These aircraft are equipped to broadcast radio signals as well as jam other signals.¹⁸¹ This capability of broadcasting from an aircraft allows the broadcast of messages (at least within certain ranges), without ever entering the airspace or territory of another country. In addition, repeater systems are being developed to extend the broadcast range of all radio broadcast systems.¹⁸²

Finally, video messages can be broadcast by similar means as civilian television outlets. The PDB has organic assets, augmented by Commando Solo, which are capable of full color television broadcasting and jamming. Satellite broadcast would have to be coordinated with other national agencies.

¹⁸⁰ See CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, *supra* note 113, at 20-23. See also, Downing, *supra* note 2, at 26 (discussing the loudspeaker support to operations in the Gulf War and Somalia).

¹⁸¹ See Douglas Waller, *America's Persuader In The Sky*, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 43; Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones & Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Mathews, *PSYOP Support to the Warfighting CINC*, JOINT FORCE Q., Summer 1995, at 28, 30.

¹⁸² Scott R. Gourley, *U.S. Army Special Operations Command*, ARMY, Mar. 1996, at 22, 25-26.

D. Current Doctrine & Limitations

PSYOP doctrine has greatly improved over the last decade. There is now published Joint Doctrine.¹⁸³ Among other things, this doctrine requires all commanders to consider PSYOP's value and utility in their planning.¹⁸⁴ At the operational and tactical level, commanders have begun to do a much better job of incorporating and benefiting from PSYOP's skills and expertise. However, decision makers continue to limit PSYOP's role to the military arena. I propose a true strategic role for PSYOP. As background, however, I will briefly outline the current support to the Regional CINCs, the current approval process, and several limitations in the employment of PSYOP.

1. Regionalization of U.S. Forces

One of the lessons of World War II was that parochialism between the different branches of the armed forces was a detractor to our ability to defend the nation.¹⁸⁵ In 1947, the Congress began a trend toward directing unity of effort between these branches of

¹⁸³ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at II-6.

¹⁸⁵ See NEVINS & COMMAGER, *supra* note 54, at 477-78 ("[World War II] had shown an urgent need for unification of forces and staff. . . . Unfortunately, it proved easier to devise paper plans for unification than to make them work. . . . the new department became cumbrously large, and the three forces wrangled jealously over appropriations and power.").

service.¹⁸⁶ This trend continued in 1986 when Congress passed The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.¹⁸⁷ The overall objective of this Act was to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the Department of Defense in a number of ways.¹⁸⁸ In order to accomplish this, the Act greatly strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).¹⁸⁹ It also strengthened the role of theater commands, which are now called Unified Combatant Commands.¹⁹⁰ The defense establishment refers to

¹⁸⁶ The initial legislation in this change was the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq.). As originally enacted, the Act did not contemplate the exact structure we have today, but stated as its goal to integrate the Armed forces "into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1995) (Original language reprinted in the notes to the current sections). It was this same goal which the Congress sought to further in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. See *infra* note 188.

¹⁸⁷ Pub. L. 99-433, 100 Stat. 1017 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 161 - 168 (Supp. 1995)).

¹⁸⁸ The Goldwater-Nichols Act had a number of purposes. Most important for my discussion, however, is that the bill was to: ". . . (6) enhance the warfighting capabilities of U.S. military forces by strengthening the authority of the unified and specified combatant commanders; (7) increase the decentralization of authority within the Department of Defense; (8) clarify the operational chain of command; (9) reduce and streamline the defense bureaucracy; . . . (12) provide for the more efficient use of resources; . . . and (15) amend title 10, United States Code, to make it fully consistent with the basic principles of the National Security Act of 1947." S. REP. No. 280, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2168.

¹⁸⁹ See 10 U.S.C. § 163 (Supp. 1995).

¹⁹⁰ See 10 U.S.C. §§ 164 & 166 (Supp. 1995). There are two types of combatant commands defined in the statute. "The term 'unified combatant command' means a military command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments." 10 U.S.C. § 161(c)(1) (Supp. 1995). A "specified combatant command" is defined similarly except that it "is normally composed of forces from a

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the commanders of these organizations as Commanders in Chief or CINCs.

Part of this change in the combatant commands was to strengthen their regional orientation. Goldwater-Nichols specifically directs CJCS to "review the missions, responsibilities (*including geographic boundaries*), and force structure of each combatant command; . . ."¹⁹¹ The resulting structure breaks the world into five regions. Each region is assigned a 4-Star Commander-in-Chief (CINC).¹⁹² In addition to these so-called "Regional CINCs", there are four unified combatant commands that provide some specific type of support world-wide.¹⁹³ Among these "Global CINCs" is the United States Special Operations Command.

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single military department." *Id.* at § 161(c)(2). In short, a unified combatant command is a joint command, the specified combatant commands are single service.

¹⁹¹ 10 U.S.C § 161(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).

¹⁹² These commands are the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM); United States Central Command (USCENTCOM); United States European Command (USEUCOM); United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). For a brief discussion of these commands and their functions, see INT'L & OPERATIONAL L. DIV., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 2-3 (1995) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK]. For more detail, see DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE PUBLICATION 1, THE JOINT STAFF OFFICER'S GUIDE 2-17 - 2-42 (1993) [hereinafter, JOINT GUIDE].

¹⁹³ These are the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), United States Space Command (SPACECOM), United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). For a brief discussion of these commands and their roles, see OPLAW HANDBOOK, *supra* note 192, at 2-3 - 2-4. For more detail, see JOINT GUIDE, *supra* note 192, at 2-33 - 2-42.

The Regional CINCs, while required to coordinate with the State Department and its Ambassadors, have enormous power in their region. They are to "provide strategic direction to all U.S. military operations within their designated [area of responsibility]." ¹⁹⁴ Their focus, then, is not on national security as a whole, but on U.S. national security interests within their region. To accomplish this, they should have the military assets needed to protect these interests. While they have control over substantial physical forces, their connection to ideological forces is sorely lacking.

2. *Current Support to the Regional CINCs*

CINC, USSOCOM has combatant command over all dedicated Army and Air Force PSYOP forces in CONUS. ¹⁹⁵ As part of his responsibilities, CINC, USSOCOM must support the other CINCs' PSYOP requirements "[w]ithin his capabilities." ¹⁹⁶ Thus, relative to the regional CINCs, PSYOP is a support unit commanded by another CINC. Strides have been made, however, to integrate PSYOP into the Regional CINCs' plans.

The 4th PSYOP Group, the only active component group, is now responsible for "contingency support world-wide, . .

¹⁹⁴ FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at 5-4.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at II-4.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

.¹⁹⁷ This includes "coordinating both active and reserve support to CINCs with planning in peacetime, contingency operations, and war."¹⁹⁸ To ease this process, the Group has established forward detachments at European Command (EUCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Combined Field Command (CFC) Korea headquarters.¹⁹⁹ Additionally, all unified commands except EUCOM have "permanently assigned PSYOP staff officers."²⁰⁰ These mechanisms work to provide the CINC the PSYOP support he needs. However, his support is still subject to the decisions of CINC, USSOCOM until the forces deploy to the theater.²⁰¹

PSYOP Task Forces (POTF) support contingencies. The POTF will "consist of regional, tactical and dissemination assets, ..."²⁰² The size of the POTF will vary with the

¹⁹⁷ Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 30. Note that Colonel Jones and Lieutenant Colonel Mathews are intimately familiar with the operations of the 4th PSYOP Group. Colonel Jones commanded the 8th PSYOP Battalion during the Gulf War and the 4th PSYOP Group from January 1993 through June 1995. Lieutenant Colonel Mathews has served in a variety of positions within the Group, including Group Operations Officer, Executive Officer, and Deputy Commander. Lieutenant Colonel Mathews is currently the commander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion, one of the regional support battalions in the 4th Group.

¹⁹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 31.

²⁰⁰ *Id.*

²⁰¹ See *supra* note 161 (discussing the U.S. Code provisions that give Regional CINCs command of Special Operations Forces in their regions unless the President or Secretary of Defense dictate otherwise).

²⁰² Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 30.

size of the operation. This approach provides flexibility in organization and support. However, it has some problems. First, support must be coordinated through at least three levels of command to stand up the POTF.²⁰³ If the PSYOP coordination is not made early, valuable opportunities to capitalize on ideological vulnerabilities may be lost.²⁰⁴ While this can be partially overcome by contingency plans, rapidly changing situations can change these plans. Dated information about the target audience may degrade the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan. Second, approval of the PSYOP campaign has to be coordinated up through the chain of command to the NCA. If this process is not begun quickly, or if there is not a pre-approved plan, the speed of modern operations may obviate the issue before the Army can employ PSYOP.

²⁰³ See *supra* notes 159-62 and accompanying text. See also Figure 2, *supra*.

²⁰⁴ See JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at I-3 ("Rapid exploitation of PSYOP themes is often critical."); Downing, *supra* note 2, at 26 ("PSYOP staffs must be included in initial planning to tailor products to the goals of the joint commander and the target audience.").

3. The Current Approval Process²⁰⁵

The approval process is the key to timely employment of psychological operations. It is also an indicator of the level of distrust we have toward these operations. The underlying fact supporting both of these statements is that the PSYOP campaign must be approved before the conduct of any PSYOP.²⁰⁶

In peacetime and in conflict, Regional CINCs propose PSYOP programs. CINCs plan and conduct these programs to "support . . . regional objectives, policies, interests, and theater military missions."²⁰⁷ They then forward these programs through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)²⁰⁸ to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) who coordinates them with "the National Security Council and other [United States Government] USG agencies."²⁰⁹ The USDP "reviews and approves all PSYOP programs to be conducted

²⁰⁵ The approval process in peacetime is detailed in DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE S-3321.1, OVERT PEACETIME PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE MILITARY SERVICES IN CONTINGENCIES SHORT OF DECLARED WAR (Secret). These programs are sometimes referred to as Overt Peacetime PSYOP Programs (OP³). While this document is classified, the approval process is not. It is reasonably reflected in unclassified sources. Consequently, my references will be to those sources.

²⁰⁶ FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at C-1.

²⁰⁷ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at II-3.

²⁰⁸ *Id.* at II-2.

²⁰⁹ *Id.* at II-1.

during peace or in conflict."²¹⁰ Peacetime programs are approved annually. The overall program must be approved before any specific operations are conducted.²¹¹ In a contingency, the approval is specific to that operation with "a PSYOP concept plan which is broad in scope . . . forwarded from the CINC to the Joint Staff for approval of overarching themes, objectives, and guidance."²¹² Approval of specific products remains with the CINC. All plans in peacetime must be coordinated with the appropriate officials of the Department of State who "provides overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas."²¹³ This means that the Department of

²¹⁰ *Id.* See also, Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 31 (Providing a brief outline of the whole process). Note also that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy could, and usually did, delegate his PSYOP responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD(SO/LIC)). However the organizational charter for the office of ASD (SO/LIC) has been removed from the Code of Federal Regulations, saying simply that this organization (along with several others) "had served the purpose for which they were intended and are no longer valid." 60 Fed. Reg. 18006 (1995). This change was further reflected in the FY 96 National Defense Authorization Act where Congress stated, "Section 1211(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (P.L. 100-180; 101 Stat 1155; 10 U.S.C. 167 note) is amended by striking out 'the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict' and inserting in lieu thereof 'the official designated by the Secretary of Defense to have principal responsibility for matters relating to special operations and low intensity conflict'." National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 903(f)(5), 110 Stat. 186, 402 (Feb. 10, 1996). It is unclear what impact, if any, this change will have.

²¹¹ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at IV-5.

²¹² Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 31.

²¹³ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at II-7.

State "may restrict PSYOP messages and themes" in peacetime operations or in conflict.²¹⁴

The process for a declared state of war lowers approval authority to the Unified Command CINC.²¹⁵ This can be further delegated to a JTF commander,²¹⁶ although this did not happen in the Gulf War. In peace, conflict, or war, the need for a coordinated effort to ensure effectiveness of messages makes the interagency coordination called for in the approval process critical.

The approval process has gotten mixed reviews for timeliness. In the Gulf War, approval for PSYOP was not obtained until January 1991. This represented a turnaround time of "literally months."²¹⁷ In recent operations, the process took only a few days.²¹⁸ It is unclear what made the difference in the process. However, the Department of Defense, in reviewing the Gulf War in 1992 cited "significant delays in the approval process" and called for relooking the process to employ PSYOP as early as possible.²¹⁹

²¹⁴ *Id.*

²¹⁵ FM 33-1, *supra* note 115, at C-1.

²¹⁶ *Id.*

²¹⁷ Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 31.

²¹⁸ *Id.* The authors specifically reference Operation RESTORE HOPE.

²¹⁹ GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 538.

Any revision of the approval process must address timeliness. The way to improve timeliness is by simplifying the process, reducing the number of players, and using the same players so that they gain experience and efficiency. Thus, one of the key problems to eliminate are the artificial distinctions between peace, conflict, and war that are superimposed over the process. These are unclear now and will get less clear. In the information age, it may not be possible to know when we are at war in the traditional sense.²²⁰ Consequently, we need one process that works efficiently, through people familiar with PSYOP, in a portion of the government that can see "the big picture" of our information strategy. This will provide efficient and effective control, regardless of the nature of the operation. Doing so is crucial now, and is becoming more crucial in the Third Wave. Information acts have legal and political consequences that could embroil the nation in controversy, conflict, or worse. Deciding when and how to act must be a function of the highest levels of our government.

4. *Major Policy Limitations*

The functions of DOD and limits on activities are often statutory matters.²²¹ This is not the case with PSYOP. The

²²⁰ See Commander George F. Kraus, Jr., *Information Warfare in 2015*, PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 1995, at 42.

²²¹ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at III-1.

use and conduct of PSYOP is largely policy-based.²²² For purposes of this paper, there are two key policy limitations. The first regards PSYOP conducted toward U.S. citizens. The second regards the nature of messages conveyed.

a. *U.S. Citizens and Territory*

By definition, PSYOP are directed toward foreign groups of people in foreign territory.²²³ This distinction is not solely a matter of definition. The definition is ostensibly driven by a policy decision to not direct these operations in any way toward U.S. citizens.²²⁴ This is a critical element for maintaining the trust and confidence of the American people. The problem is that this policy is only summarily mentioned or implied in planning documents.²²⁵ It is not clearly stated in directives signed by the national command authority. Thus, there are documents talking about a policy, but there does not appear to be a policy itself.

As information flow increases, controlling our messages to ensure they are not reaching US citizens will be a

²²² *Id.*

²²³ *See supra* notes 110-16 and accompanying text.

²²⁴ JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF, JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN, ANNEX D (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS) (1990) (Secret) (This document summarily states that US policy restricts virtually all use of PSYOP directed toward U.S. citizens.).

²²⁵ FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115 at 2-1 ("In domestic case, the commander must ensure PSYOP assets are being employed in a dissemination role only and not to project a PSYOP message.").

challenge. While the danger of this unintentional receipt of information should be balanced against the national security interest being pursued when deciding the amount of risk we can tolerate, the need to establish a coherent policy with planning factors to consider can only increase with our citizens' increased access to global information.

b. Truth Projection

A similar situation exists with the second major peacetime policy. Under this policy, our PSYOP forces conduct "truth projection activities intended to inform foreign groups and populations persuasively."²²⁶ In other words, we tell the truth, but in ways that support our position. Truth projection is critical to the success of PSYOP because the "effectiveness of . . . communication depends on the perception of the communicator's credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened actions."²²⁷ This policy is also a critical limit for our citizenry to understand. However, like the domestic PSYOP limitation, it is based on implication and practical rationales rather than on a clear statement of principle and policy from our national command authority.

In sum, PSYOP capabilities are formidable, but the assets to conduct them are limited. While envisioned to

²²⁶ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at I-5.

²²⁷ *Id.* at I-1.

have a major strategic role, the use of these forces have been likewise limited to the support of military missions only. As the U.S. becomes a Third Wave society, PSYOP forces can be a critical strategic asset to achieve our national security objectives.

IV. The Use of Persuasion: A Strategic Role for PSYOP Forces

Information is on the rise, both in fact and in its stature among the national establishment. Expectations are that the usefulness and power of information will only increase as America continues to become a more knowledge driven society.²²⁸ Indeed, leveraging information will become increasingly important to achieving national security goals. The United States can no longer afford to "pigeon-hole" critical information assets like its military PSYOP capabilities for "military" missions, be they war or other than war.²²⁹ It must incorporate these assets into a strategy that pursues national objectives with all of the means available.²³⁰

²²⁸ See *supra* notes 77-94 and accompanying text.

²²⁹ In JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, the military cedes the strategic PSYOP field to those "outside the military arena." *Id.* at I-1. Thankfully, however, the doctrine does reserve the ability to "utilize DOD assets and [have strategic PSYOP programs] be supported by military PSYOP." *Id.*

²³⁰ The "1985 PSYOP Master Plan was aimed at making DOD PSYOP 'one of the strategic instruments of national security policy' . . ." Parker, *supra* note 105, at 5. The 1990 Master Plan replaced the 1985 one, but "captures the values of the 1985 Plan, . . . and provides direction to continue the Presidentially directed revitalization." DEP'T OF DEFENSE, (Continued on Next Page)

A. *The Elements of National Power*

A national strategy is a way to focus the power of a nation toward particular goals. It may be defined as "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives."²³¹ Thus, the four elements of power that support the achievement of national objectives are political, economic, psychological, and military. Of the four, commentators agree that the psychological component is the least developed.²³² Early in the Reagan administration, however, there was a reemphasis on the psychological

(Continued)

DOD PSYOP MASTER PLAN iii (March 1990). Thus, according to the 1990 Plan, "DOD PSYOP [is] one of the strategic instruments of national security policy, . . ." *Id.* at 1. However, this instrument is considered limited to only those activities that are in support of military operations. In the 1990 Plan itself, at the end of the very paragraph where PSYOP is declared a strategic instrument of national security, the Plan limits the vision begun in the 1985 Plan to "melding these capabilities into *military operations* at all levels." *Id.* (emphasis added).

²³¹ DEP'T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 255 (23 Mar. 1994) [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY].

²³² See, e.g., Jeffrey B. Jones, *Theater Information Strategies*, MIL. REV., Nov. 1994, at 48 ("While the political, economic, and military elements are evident in every unified commander's overall strategy, there is seldom much discussion about the informational or psychological element -- the fourth and often overlooked element of national power."); Melvin E. Kreisel, *Psychological Operations: A Strategic Overview*, in ESSAYS ON STRATEGY 53, 55 (1985) ("The psychological component is the least developed part of US national strategy.").

component. The focus, however, was on the means to use this power -- that means is information.²³³

The use of information by groups in dealing with each other is not new.²³⁴ Neither is the use of propaganda in conflict.²³⁵ The United States did not enter this fray in any meaningful way, however, until World War II.²³⁶ Following World War II, the United States recognized that it needed to coordinate the use of its information assets to counter the undeniably effective use of information by other nations.²³⁷ In 1953, a major federal agency was formed to manage information. Somehow, however, the link between

²³³ This emphasis on information as a co-equal element of power was apparently made by National Security Advisor, William P. Clark in a speech at Georgetown University in 1982. See Richard Halloran, *Reagan Aide Tells of New Strategy on Soviet Threat*, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1982, at A1 (discussing the speech itself) and Lord, *supra* note 1, at 20 n.16 (discussing the renewed emphasis in the Reagan administration and the role of Mr. Clark's speech).

²³⁴ Indeed, "[s]ince humans first communicated, . . . they have influenced the behavior of other humans." R.D. McLaurin, *Psychological Operations and National Security*, in MILITARY PROPAGANDA: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND OPERATIONS 1, 2 (R. McLaurin ed., 1982).

²³⁵ United States psychological operations "can be dated back at least to the beginnings of the War for Independence. Even before the Declaration of Independence, patriot forces used leaflets against British troops in Boston just before the Battle of Bunker (Breed's) Hill." Stanley Sandler, *Army Psywarriors: A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations*, SPECIAL WARFARE, Oct. 1992, at 18, 18.

²³⁶ See Paddock, *supra* note 107, at 46-47.

²³⁷ McLaurin, *supra* note 234, at 3.

information and using it as a means to exercise national power was lost.²³⁸

Addressing the psychological element of national power as the informational element of power is growing among commentators.²³⁹ In many ways, this element is becoming the preeminent element of power because it pervades the others. For example, all of the military services have been increasingly focusing on information in developing technologies and doctrine -- both in using information technologies against the enemy and for their own benefit.²⁴⁰ Similarly, the U.S. economic system increasingly relies on information technologies such as computers. It is not hard to imagine the impact on the American economy if one of these systems was somehow destroyed.²⁴¹ Similarly, media

²³⁸ *Id.* The agency founded was the United States Information Agency (USIA).

²³⁹ See, e.g., George T. Raach & Ilana Kass, *National Power and the Interagency Process*, JOINT FORCE Q., Summer 1995, at 8 ("As a people, we are not entirely comfortable with using force until the other instruments of national power -- economic, diplomatic, political, and informational -- have been wielded.") (emphasis added); Jones, *supra* note 232, at 48.

²⁴⁰ See *supra* notes 90 & 102 and accompanying text.

²⁴¹ See TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 149 ("Imagine what might have occurred if some of Saddam Hussein's nuclear physicists had created for a him a crude electromagnetic pulse warhead and, during the Gulf conflict, an 'info-terrorist' had delivered it to . . . the Wall Street district. The ensuing financial chaos -- with bank transfer networks, stock and bond markets, commodity trading systems, credit card networks, telephone and data transmission lines, Quotron machines, and general commercial communications disrupted or destroyed -- would have sent a financial shock wave across the world. . . . 'An electronic Pearl Harbor is waiting to happen.'").

reports can instantaneously influence internal political processes and external diplomatic processes in the U.S.²⁴² Opinion, policy, and relationships can all turn on what is said (and not said) in the media.

Information is an influential element of power that can impact all of the others. It has been more than a decade since the Reagan Administration sought to reinvigorate this element of power. The obvious question is whether the U.S. has succeeded in using information power in pursuit of U.S. national security goals. Despite some successes at the operation and tactical levels, the U.S. has failed strategically.

B. The National Security Strategy

The focus of the U.S. national security strategy in the post-Cold War world has changed. No longer is there a simple focus on the Soviet Union and avoiding nuclear devastation.²⁴³ The strategy is now more complex, focusing

²⁴² See, e.g., *id.* at 208-09 (Discussing the influence of CNN reporting on the 1992 Presidential Election); Shelton & Vane, *supra* note 5, at 3 ("We don't win unless CNN says we win.").

²⁴³ Winters, *supra* note 14, at 60 ("[U]ntil 1990[,] the United States undertook *de facto* and *de jure* military strategies to contain the Soviet threat. Implementing Kennan's containment strategy produced assorted administration-driven monikers such as "massive retaliation" and "new look" (Eisenhower), "flexible response" (Kennedy), "detente" (Nixon), and "conventional build-up" (Reagan and Bush). Understandably, the United States strategy, plans, and budget myopically focused on countering and staying the course against the single most serious threat to United States security--Soviet (and Chinese) expansionism.").

on the needs of the many regions of the world.²⁴⁴ This regional approach requires broad cultural understanding and language sensitivities to succeed. It also needs application of the power of information.

The current strategy is titled, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement."²⁴⁵ It focuses on three major objectives: "enhancing our security[,] " "promoting prosperity at home[,] " and "promoting democracy."²⁴⁶ To accomplish these, the strategy "draws upon a range of political, military, and economic instruments, . . ." ²⁴⁷ Notable by its absence is any reference to information as an instrument to secure these objectives.²⁴⁸ Deciding whether information should be included requires more detail regarding the three objectives of the strategy.

The objective of enhancing security includes a number of subordinate goals. Three are illustrative. The first is the ability to project and maintain forces to deter and, if

²⁴⁴ See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT 35-44 (1996) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY] (Discussing the application of the general principles of the national security strategy to the major regions of the world.)

²⁴⁵ *Id.*

²⁴⁶ *Id.* at 11-12.

²⁴⁷ *Id.* at 11.

²⁴⁸ In fairness, the version I reviewed was the unclassified version. It is possible that the classified version of the strategy addresses the information component. This seems unlikely, however, since the statement in which the elements are mentioned is simply a bland list with no attempt to list specific measures which might be classified.

necessary, defeat aggression in "two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."²⁴⁹ The second is "providing a credible overseas presence."²⁵⁰ Both of these goals focus on deterring as well as defeating aggression.²⁵¹ Moreover, they both serve to demonstrate "our commitment to allies and friends, [and] regional stability."²⁵² The third goal is "contributing to multilateral peace operations."²⁵³ This means, according to the strategy, being ready to "participate in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic governments."²⁵⁴

Information power could play a critical role in all three of these goals. Credibility overseas and deterring aggression depend on other groups' perceptions of U.S. forces and commitment. Conflict arises from some perceived incompatibility between American ideology and the other group's ideology relative to the situation. While hardware can serve to reinforce American information acts, changing ideological perceptions in favor of its desired position is what the U.S. really needs to accomplish in order to diffuse

²⁴⁹ NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, *supra* note 244, at 11.

²⁵⁰ *Id.* at 13.

²⁵¹ *See id.* at 13.

²⁵² *Id.*

²⁵³ *Id.* at 13.

²⁵⁴ *Id.*

the situation and provide for a longer-term solution.²⁵⁵ Similarly, defeating aggression means the U.S. has to defeat the aggressor's will to fight.²⁵⁶ This requires more than victories on the battlefield. It requires changing perceptions to affect the opponents ideological calculus²⁵⁷ in order to eliminate the ideological conflict or convince the opposition that further resistance is futile. Inflicting pain and suffering certainly can affect this process. However, it is more efficient and effective to aim directly at the will if that is the true target. Finally, promoting peace and encouraging democracy are both ideological goals. Information is the best way to attack in this situation because the nation's actions aim for what it really wants to change -- the group's ideology. Altering this ideology by altering perceptions is the only way to achieve lasting peace.²⁵⁸ Information is at least a key element, if not the key element of national power that would enable us to meet these national security goals, yet it is ignored.

Even in the realm of promoting domestic prosperity, information is the key. For example, two of the primary

²⁵⁵ See *supra* notes 63-76 and accompanying text.

²⁵⁶ See *supra* notes 36-62 and accompanying text.

²⁵⁷ See *supra* section II.A.3 for an explanation of what I term "ideological calculus."

²⁵⁸ See *supra* notes 69-76 and accompanying text.

goals in this area are enhancing access to foreign markets and promoting sustainable development abroad.²⁵⁹ Both of these require promoting positive perceptions of the United States, its products, and its impact on the market in question. This is what marketing is all about in the business world. It may be debatable whether the government wants to commit its information power in this area for political reasons. However, it is not debatable that the use of information power could greatly enhance U.S. ability to alter perceptions in ways favorable to its national goals.

Information similarly helps to promote democracy. Democracy is an ideology reflecting a form of government (popular vote), a view of people (all people are created equal), and a view of where governing power comes from (the people).²⁶⁰ All of these reflect an ideology -- a view of a group, what it believes, and how it relates to others. Consequently, convincing people that democracy works is an ideological issue. Thus, it is an issue where information power is the most appropriate element of national power to employ.

If information power should be applied to the goals of national security, how should it be done? I propose that

²⁵⁹ NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, *supra* note 244, at 27-32.

²⁶⁰ See *supra* notes 47-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of democratic ideology in the context of World War II.

military PSYOP is one asset which can and should be utilized. To discuss this, I will use a strategic analysis model taught at the Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

C. *A Strategic Analysis Model*

The CGSC model proposes three criteria to determine whether a particular strategic course of action will be effective.²⁶¹ The first issue is whether the course of action is suitable to the strategic goal -- in other words, will it work?²⁶² The second criteria is whether the course of action is feasible. This asks whether the nation can support the action logistically.²⁶³ The final criterion is whether the course of action is acceptable. This is largely subjective, but seeks to determine whether the course of action will be acceptable to the American People and their representatives in the Congress.²⁶⁴ The course of action I propose for analysis under this model is the use of military psychological operations forces in the conduct of information operations in pursuit of all appropriate national security goals, rather than just in support of military operations.

²⁶¹ Major Robert B. Adolph, Jr., *Strategic Rationale for SOF*, MIL. REV., Apr. 1992, at 37, 45.

²⁶² *Id.* at 45-46.

²⁶³ *Id.* at 46.

²⁶⁴ *Id.*

D. *Military PSYOP in National Strategy*

The vision for military PSYOP is that it should be a true national security asset.²⁶⁵ Doctrinally, military PSYOP can legitimately have a strategic role.²⁶⁶ However, the U.S. has not used it in this role. It needs to. Military PSYOP is suitable to the pursuit of national security goals (in some cases uniquely so), it can be feasible, and, properly controlled, it will be acceptable.

PSYOP units are suitable to support operations in pursuit of national security objectives. The units have modern media capabilities that can access audiences through a variety of technologies in developed, less developed, or undeveloped areas.²⁶⁷ The soldiers have regional and language expertise that can ensure themes and products best meet the needs of the national security objective in that particular region of the world.²⁶⁸ The hardware is military in nature which means it is transportable and capable of

²⁶⁵ See sources cited *supra* note 230. See also Jones & Mathews, *supra* note 181, at 29 ("*Strategic PSYOP . . . is carried out largely by civilian agencies but may utilize or be supported by military PSYOP assets.*") (emphasis added); Paddock, *supra* note 107, at 54.

²⁶⁶ JOINT PUB. 3-53, *supra* note 111, at I-1; FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115 at 2-4.

²⁶⁷ See *supra* notes 172-82 and accompanying text.

²⁶⁸ See *supra* notes 149-52 and accompanying text. The 4th PSYOP Group runs its own language lab to supplement, improve, and maintain the language proficiency its soldiers obtain in their advanced individual training (AIT).

operation in varied environments.²⁶⁹ The psychological operators are soldiers trained to deploy to, live in, and work in sparse environments. Moreover, the soldiers are volunteers who have chosen to serve their country. Thus, they are not only ready and able, but willing to do what it takes to protect the nation's interests. All of these make PSYOP units eminently suitable to conduct operations worldwide in pursuit of national security objectives regardless of whether or not the U.S. is conducting a concurrent military operation.

It is also feasible to utilize PSYOP units in this manner. PSYOP units can deploy in small teams.²⁷⁰ Their equipment is relatively low cost to procure and maintain. The amount of assets needed to deploy PSYOP forces is considerably less than conventional military forces.²⁷¹ In terms of effectiveness for the cost, PSYOP is a bargain when compared to other operations. The only issue with regard to feasibility is the limited PSYOP assets currently in the

²⁶⁹ See CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, *supra* note 113 (discussing the various methods to deploy each piece of equipment.).

²⁷⁰ For example, the military could deploy a PSYOP Airmobile Dissemination System (PAMDIS) consisting of one non-commissioned officer and four to six enlisted soldiers. The PAMDIS fits aboard one C-141 and would have the capability to broadcast AM and FM radio, VHF and UHF television, conduct loudspeaker operations, and support leaflet operations. FM 33-1-1, *supra* note 115, at H-1.

²⁷¹ Cf. CAPABILITIES HANDBOOK, *supra* note 113 which describes the air assets needed to transport each PSYOP system.

Army.²⁷² However, the limited assets are a force structure choice, not a true limitation on PSYOP. If the U.S. chose to fund sufficient assets, it would reduce or eliminate problems of feasibility.

Acceptability to the American people is perhaps the biggest question. Americans' mistrust of propaganda and psychological techniques has been previously mentioned.²⁷³ Techniques that smack of mind-bending or overcoming the free will of other peoples seem inapposite to democratic ideals.²⁷⁴ Thus, use of these assets may raise concerns; concerns that may be aggravated by the potential legal and political consequences of information acts that are explored in the next section. However, the American people will probably support these types of operations if they are properly understood. Equally important, however, the political leadership must properly integrate PSYOP so that they are clearly supporting recognized national interests. Finally, PSYOP must be properly controlled to ease the fears of American citizens and assure them that the assets are being used within bounds that they can accept.

²⁷² See *supra* notes 145-62 and accompanying text.

²⁷³ See *supra* notes 2 & 109 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁴ See Barrett, *supra* note 1, at 65. Cf. Ladislav Bittman, *The Use of Disinformation by Democracies*, 4 INT'L J. OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 243 (1990) ("The contradictions between democratic principles and the need for secrecy in certain foreign policies continue to be debated. So does the controversy over whether *disinformation*, a technique of covert action, is a proper tool for a democratic country like the United States.").

Even so, the concerns raised when considering feasibility and acceptability in the CGSC model are legitimate and need to be addressed if the U.S. is to routinely use military PSYOP assets strategically. In the next section, I propose a revision of national controls to help alleviate fears of misuse from U.S. citizens. This system will also ensure integration of military PSYOP into an overall information strategy. Finally, it will ensure the conduct of proper PSYOP actions that will truly support national security goals set by proper constitutional authority. In the final section, I propose a change in PSYOP force structure that will ensure that these missions remain feasible, that is supportable, by the assets within the United States Army.

V. The Power of Persuasion: The Need for Effective National Control

Using PSYOP as a true strategic asset raises two issues regarding control. First, the U.S. needs to formalize the limits on the use of PSYOP so that they are clear, consolidated, and available to all conducting (or overseeing the conduct) of these operations. Second, it is critical to establish a single agency that has overall control of information operations among all agencies, including military PSYOP. This will allow full integration of PSYOP into a coherent strategy, while providing effective and efficient national control over these powerful assets. What

makes control issues critical are the political and legal ramifications of information acts.

A. *Legal Consequences of Using Information Power*

Consideration of the legality of information acts needs to begin with a reconsideration of the concepts of sovereignty and aggression that form the foundation of many international law limits. The rising tide of information will cause cross-currents impacting in both areas. These cross-currents should caution us to act advisedly. Additionally, whether or not an information act is considered aggression could have fallout in the U.S. constitutional system as to which branch of the government should be deciding to use this information power. Despite the potentially serious outcomes, the Executive should maintain control over these foreign affairs assets. However, I recommend a statute enacted by the Congress to maximize the legitimacy of the President's actions. Moreover, I recommend an executive order to clarify and consolidate the policies for the use and execution of PSYOP.

1. *Revisiting Ideas of Sovereignty & Aggression*

As previously asserted, conflict is about ideology and perception has tremendous power to shape and influence this ideology.²⁷⁵ This power of perception can be highly useful

²⁷⁵ See *supra* notes 36-76 and accompanying text.

in influencing other nations to behave in accord with U.S. wishes in order to avoid conflict, end conflict, or simply improve U.S. national security.²⁷⁶ With satellite links, computer networks, high power radios, mobile broadcast repeater stations, and other communications enhancements, this nation can now communicate its persuasive messages more easily and powerfully than ever.²⁷⁷ From a legal viewpoint, the starting point to consider whether it is a good idea for us to use this capability begins with considering how the actions fit into the concepts of sovereignty and aggression under international law.

a. *The Concept of Sovereignty*

The idea of sovereignty is one of the most jealously guarded concepts in international law.²⁷⁸ Despite the decline in truly independent sovereign action engendered by the proliferation of treaties and by technology,²⁷⁹ states

²⁷⁶ See *supra* notes 63-76 & 244-60 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁷ See *supra* notes 77-100 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁸ See WERNER LEVI, *CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION* 87-88 (1979) ("Governments . . . rely heavily upon [sovereignty.] . . . Paradoxically, powerful states rely on it to perpetuate their predominance, while weak states rely on it to protect their personality against violations by the powerful states, . . . States are unanimous in praise of sovereignty -- which hinders none from interpreting it expediently to serve political purposes.").

²⁷⁹ *Id.* at 91 & 99. See also, TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 24 & 243.

cling to the concept if for no other reason than that it is politically convenient.²⁸⁰

At its irreducible minimum, sovereignty means that a state has the "unquestioned right to exercise sovereign authority throughout the extent of its territory."²⁸¹ This being said, what exactly is meant by "territory" has generated much discussion in international law.²⁸² The control has been extended to the airspace over the physical land that the nation-state occupies.²⁸³ This right to sovereignty is also reflected in the right of control over what are called territorial seas.²⁸⁴

A violation of sovereignty in the visual sense is easy to conceptualize -- soldiers or weapons physically entering

²⁸⁰ See LEVI, *supra* note 278, at 97-99 ("The political usefulness of the institution of sovereignty in a nation-state system will guarantee its perpetuation for a long time.").

²⁸¹ GERHARD VON GLAHN, *LAW AMONG NATIONS* 367 (6th Ed. 1992).

²⁸² *Id.*

²⁸³ See Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, art. 2 & 3, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, reprinted in DA PAM. 27-24, *supra* note 8, at 3-61; VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 406 ("There can be no question today about the legal status of national airspace: states have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air above their territories. . . ."). See also Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Geraci, *Overflight, Landing Rights, Customs, and Clearances*, 37 AIR FORCE L. REV. 155 (1994) ("[I]t is a basic tenet of international law that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.").

²⁸⁴ Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 2 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in DA PAM 27-24, *supra* note 8, at 3-75. This convention went into force in the United States on September 10, 1964.

the territory (territorial seas or airspace) of another nation. What happens when a foreign state enters electronically? Is this the same thing and does it have the same effect?

When one looks past the territorial aspect of sovereignty, it becomes apparent how technological changes cause problems. Since the advent of radio, for example, broadcasts into other countries have been looked upon as implicating sovereignty.²⁸⁵ That is because the concept not only includes control over the territory, but independence of action within it.²⁸⁶ In fact, the United Nations Charter has formalized this aspect protecting both "territorial integrity" and "political independence."²⁸⁷ While the charter deals with protecting these aspects from the threat or use of force, the underlying premise is "that a sovereign state is accorded the right to shape its cultural, social,

²⁸⁵ VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 418-421 (discussing the attempts to control radio communications so that they "avoid interference with the communications services of all contracting governments or agencies authorized by them.").

²⁸⁶ MARK W. JANIS, *AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW* 122 (1988) ("A sovereign state is one that is free to independently govern its own population in its own territory and set its own foreign policy."); LEVI, *supra* note 278, at 91 ("Respect for a state's sovereignty requires that other states do not interfere in its internal affairs, including the internal aspects of foreign policymaking.").

²⁸⁷ The Charter provides that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" U.N. CHARTER, *supra* note 8, art. 2, ¶ 4, reprinted in DA PAM. 27-24, *supra* note 8, at 3-2.

economic, and political life as it wishes, ..." ²⁸⁸

Despite this, nations have attempted for a variety of reasons to protect their own interests or the interests of others within the borders of other sovereign states. ²⁸⁹

The problem is that there is some flexibility in the concept of sovereignty. As treaties proliferate and the practice of states establish customary norms of behavior in international law, precisely what matters are solely within the internal purview of the state may change. ²⁹⁰ For example, the advent of human rights law has begun a fairly major movement, of which the U.S. has been a part, to intervene in the affairs of other states for humanitarian reasons. ²⁹¹ As the world becomes more interconnected and American capability to communicate and interact between nations becomes more and more broad based, what states consider "internal" will almost assuredly shrink. Can a nation legally intervene electronically, through PSYOP, in a communist regime to promote democracy because it feels democracy is better for the people? Can a nation legally jam and superimpose its news over state-sponsored news in

²⁸⁸ ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1972).

²⁸⁹ See LEVI, *supra* note 278, at 91-93.

²⁹⁰ See *id.* at 91.

²⁹¹ See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 cmt. e & reporter's note 8 (Discussing several theories that are increasingly accepted as authorizing humanitarian intervention.).

another nation because that nation's portrayal of the first state is inaccurate or biased? Without discussing the relative merit of such intervention, it seems clear that these actions violate a strict interpretation of sovereignty, at least defined as I have as territorial integrity and independence of action within that territory. The use of sovereignty as a legal concept against the U.S. in international law will surely increase as it increases its information capability and use.²⁹² This cry of foul will most likely come from those who do not have similar capabilities. It is precisely this type of political usefulness that the concept of sovereignty has been jealously guarded for, despite its diminished power.²⁹³

In a moral sense, America may justify ideological interference in other nations and may view sovereignty as an antiquated concept that needs to be pushed aside for the greater good of international society and the global marketplace. The government should consider, however, that the U.S. is probably the most vulnerable nation on earth to media-based propaganda.²⁹⁴ In fact, other governments most

²⁹² Technology has always engendered changes in the international law surrounding sovereignty. For example, sovereignty over airspace was a result of the airplane and the many telecommunications conventions have been the result of radio and television communications. See VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 405 & 418.

²⁹³ See LEVI, *supra* note 278, at 99 ("The evidence is clear that states find the survival of sovereignty most useful as a political and legal tool. in full awareness of its drawbacks . . .").

²⁹⁴ Cf., TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 147-151 (discussing the vulnerability of U.S. "knowledge" assets); *Id.* at 208-09 (discussing the power of the (Continued on Next Page)

often do not need their own assets, they can simply use America's open media against it.²⁹⁵ Because of this, U.S. leaders need to rethink and recommit to an enhanced concept of sovereignty. Because of America's vulnerability, strengthening sovereignty as a legal concept between nations helps the U.S. to seek international remedies, short of using elements of its own national power, if another nation attempts to undermine U.S. internal affairs. Still, protecting U.S. interests may require attempts to influence perceptions in other states. Doing so, however, may subject the nation to legal and political repercussions within the community of nations. Balancing national security interests against the potential ramifications in the international community requires the decision of the highest officials in the U.S. government. This is particularly true when U.S. actions may be viewed as aggression.

b. Defining Aggression

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, nations began attempting to limit war, prompted by the advent of mass armies and the continual growth in the efficiency of weapon

(Continued)

media in this country); and Eliot A. Cohen, *A Revolution in Warfare*, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 37 (discussing the vulnerability of the United States, as an information-based society, to information-based attack).

²⁹⁵ Cf. TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 175 ("But win, lose, or draw, the media . . . will be a prime weapon for Third Wave combatants in both the wars and anti-wars of the future, a key component of knowledge strategy.").

systems.²⁹⁶ The focus quickly became renouncing not all war, but aggressive war. The culmination of this effort was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.²⁹⁷ The difficulty was creating a mechanism to enforce this renunciation. Following World War II and the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations became that mechanism and incorporated and expanded on many ideas about limiting war within its Charter.²⁹⁸ This remains the situation today. Thus, there are now two types of force -- defensive and aggressive.²⁹⁹ The first is permissible, the other has been asserted since the War Crimes tribunals at Nuremberg to be illegal.³⁰⁰ The focus, then, in conflict is the concept of aggression.

The difficulties with this concept are several. The first and most fundamental is that no one really agrees on

²⁹⁶ VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 670.

²⁹⁷ *Id.* at 671. It should be noted that Kellogg -Briand "was not intended to abolish the institution of war as such, for under its terms, resort to war was still allowed in legally permissible self-defense and as an instrument of collective action to restrain an aggressor." *Id.*

²⁹⁸ *Id.* at 674.

²⁹⁹ *Id.* at 675.

³⁰⁰ *Id.*, quoting *International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences*, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1949) ("To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."). Specifically, the Nuremberg Tribunal's charter defined "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression" a crime against peace. CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546.

what the term means,³⁰¹ at least in the sense of enforceably prohibiting certain conduct. Second, the UN charter provision preserving the right of self-defense³⁰² is interpreted by many nations (including the United States) as allowing anticipatory self-defense.³⁰³ Other nations view this type of anticipatory attack as aggression. Finally, the United Nations Charter *authorizes* the use of force by the security council to "restore international peace and security"³⁰⁴ if the Council determines "the existence of . . . [an] act of aggression" Thus, the meaning of aggression is critical.

To assist in the Security Council's efforts, the UN General Assembly adopted a definition of aggression.³⁰⁵ It defines aggression generally as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or

³⁰¹ *Id.* at 676 ("Until now, the present writer believes, no generally binding definition of what is meant by aggression has come into being, despite the General Assembly's approval of its Special Committees definition . . .").

³⁰² UN CHARTER, *supra* note 8, art. 51.

³⁰³ Anticipatory self-defense is a concept "[u]nder existing customary international law, [whereby] states do not always have to wait until after an attack has been absorbed to undertake self-defense. Rather, where the threat is sufficiently imminent in point of time, they can choose to strike first, providing, of course, that the strike is within the parameters of discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity." Louis Rene Beres, *The Legal meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander*, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-13 (1995).

³⁰⁴ UN CHARTER, *supra* note 8, art. 42.

³⁰⁵ *Definition of Aggression*, U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (1975), reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1975).

political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition."³⁰⁶ The resolution goes on to list a number of acts that serve as *prima facie* evidence of aggression including such things as invasion, bombardment, and blockade.³⁰⁷ Article 4 quickly goes on to add, however, that this list is not exhaustive.³⁰⁸ Further, Article 6 states that the definition should not be construed "as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful."³⁰⁹ This preserves the concept of self-defense, including the controversy over anticipatory self-defense. Still another problem with this definition, is that it does not address the situation where the use of force is not conducted by a state. Most important when considering this definition, however, is that it is merely guidance.³¹⁰ It is not a binding rule, but was essentially put forward to help the Security Council in its role of

³⁰⁶ *Id.* at art. 1, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 481.

³⁰⁷ *Id.* at art. 3, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 482.

³⁰⁸ *Id.* at art. 4, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 482 ("The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.").

³⁰⁹ *Id.* at art. 6, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 483.

³¹⁰ The resolution "recommends that [the Security Council] should, as appropriate, take account of that Definition as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression." *Id.* at item 4, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 480 (emphasis added).

determining the existence of an act of aggression pursuant to the Charter.³¹¹

c. *Information as Aggression*

The coming wave of information is sure to change this conception of aggression. The UN definition at least reflects the consensus of nations as to the type of things that can constitute aggression. One of these is the use of armed force against the political independence of another state.³¹² Surely, it will not be long before the use of information assets will be considered the use of information weapons, particularly when used to influence the political posture of another nation. In fact, considering the use of information has been found to be an integral part of waging a war of aggression.

³¹¹ Professor von Glahn asserts that the definition is not binding and states that "[i]t should be kept in mind that General Assembly resolutions do not create obligatory rules of international law." VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 676-78. Others, however, disagree, since the definition "is the most recent and most widely (albeit not universally) accepted." DINSTEIN, *supra* note 15, at 120-21. As such, it is at least arguably customary international law. In fact, "[a]t least one paragraph of the definition, namely, Article 3(g) . . . , has been held by the International Court of Justice, in the *Nicaragua* case of 1986, to mirror customary international law." *Id.* at 121, citing *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua* (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103. Article 3(g) is part of the listed acts of aggression in the UN Definition. It prohibits the "sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State" *Definition of Aggression*, *supra* note 305, art. 3(g), 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 482.

³¹² *Definition of Aggression*, *supra* note 305, art. 1, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. at 481.

In the trials at Nuremberg, it was seen that the Nazi propaganda machine was one of the most powerful weapons in the German arsenal. It was this "weapon" that promoted the actions of the Nazis. Consequently, the use of propaganda was considered part of the conspiracy to plan, prepare and conduct a war of aggression.³¹³

Additionally, during the debate leading up to the UN Definition of Aggression, a concept surfaced that extends aggression to include information acts. This concept was labeled "ideological aggression." While there was insufficient support to include this idea in the UN definition,³¹⁴ there is at least a good faith basis for

³¹³ See I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 30-31, 293-294 (1947) (discussing propaganda as one of the "opportunistic methods" used by the Nazi conspirators and the indictment of Rosenberg as the party "ideologist"). Additionally, the advocating of the so-called "final solution" was considered part and parcel of "crimes against humanity" when considering the crimes of Streicher. See *id.* at 302. In some instances, it appears that the tribunal did not consider propaganda alone to be enough for conviction. See *id.* at 336-38 (acquitting Herr Fritzsche, finding that although he "made strong statements of a propagandistic nature in his broadcasts[,] the Tribunal is not prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities . . .").

³¹⁴ See VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 677 ("[N]o agreement was achieved on whether any definition of aggression ought not to include what might be termed *indirect aggression*, such as conspiracies organized abroad or ideological propaganda."); JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 59-60 (discussing the disagreements over ideological aggression during some of the earlier discussion in the 1950s and 1960's that led eventually to the UN definition.).

including it in a charge of a violation of international law based on precedent before international organizations.³¹⁵

There is no generally accepted definition of ideological aggression. However, those who do define it tend to define it in terms of the means by which you obtain its generally accepted object, that is "the actual or intended imposition of an ideology."³¹⁶ Given the definition of ideology discussed previously and the influence of perception on it, the methods considered aggressive in this concept are those that are "adapted to the molding of the thought processes of the people of a state so as to maintain the condition of things in the state intact or to effect a change in the condition of things in that state so as to accord with the aggressor's wishes."³¹⁷ Ideological aggression then "is the spreading of ideas intentionally and deliberately so as to manipulate by symbols controversial attitudes and positions."³¹⁸ A review of the definition of PSYOP and its capabilities discussed above should evidence remarkable similarities to the reader.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ See THOMAS & THOMAS, *supra* note 288, at 85-88 (Discussing a number of complaints made to a variety of international organizations based upon hostile propaganda.).

³¹⁶ *Id.* at 83.

³¹⁷ *Id.* at 83-84.

³¹⁸ *Id.* at 84.

³¹⁹ See *supra* notes 110-11 and accompanying text discussing the definition of PSYOP and *supra* notes 127-33 and accompanying text discussing the capabilities of PSYOP.

The discussion of this concept goes on to discuss it in terms of propaganda. In this classical sense of ideological aggression, there were considered three types of propaganda that fell within the definition. The first is war-mongering propaganda which essentially was urging the other state to be the first to commit an act of war by declaration, invasion, blockade, etc.³²⁰ The second is subversive propaganda which is the advocating of civil strife or war within the other state.³²¹ The third is defamatory propaganda which is "directed against the leaders of the government of the state."³²² Again these actions seem remarkably similar to many of the goals and objectives of PSYOP discussed above.³²³

The effects of the Third Wave can only serve to expand this definition. As the disparity of knowledge grows between the Third Wave societies and those that remain in the First and Second Waves, the Third Wave societies will be increasingly able to powerfully influence actions in the First and Second wave societies without using "armed force"

³²⁰ THOMAS & THOMAS, *supra* note 288, at 84.

³²¹ *Id.*

³²² *Id.* at 85. The authors assert that "[d]efamatory propaganda violates customary international law." *Id.* citing J. WHITTON & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS A DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS 56 (1963).

³²³ See *supra* notes 110-11 and accompanying text discussing the definition of PSYOP; *supra* notes 127-33 and accompanying text discussing the capabilities of PSYOP; and *supra* notes 135-43 and accompanying text discussing the objectives of PSYOP.

in the classical sense. This will cause an outcry among the societies being influenced. Consequently, the concept of ideological aggression is likely to expand and become generally accepted as a necessary means for the international establishment to try to make fact their goal of sovereign equality among nations, even though this equality does not really exist today.³²⁴

The implications are that a nation must take information actions advisedly. Technological capabilities will allow Third Wave societies, like the U.S., to influence things in other nations more readily than ever before. Regardless of motive, the recipient of these acts could consider them aggressive. Characterizing actions as aggression could give rise to problems in the legal and political realms of the international community ranging from condemnation to conflict. Consequently, the U.S. must have

³²⁴ The principle of sovereign equality is viewed from different perspectives. Common sense dictates that "in the face of inequalities among states, equality could only mean equality before the law or equal application of the law, . . ." LEVI, *supra* note 278, at 89. Despite this, many states, lawyers, and commentators believe that it should mean something more. Some insist that it includes "equality in law, i.e. equal rights and duties of states." *Id.* at 89-90. Of course, in practice this type of equality is belied by such things as the veto power the permanent members of the veto power, funding of the UN by ability to pay, and weighted voting procedures in other international organizations. *Id.* at 90. Still other states take a more expansive view of equality. These states, usually less developed, react to the actual gaps in standard of living by calling for redistribution of wealth from developed to developing countries. JANIS, *supra* note 286, at 63-64. These calls for equality in fact can only be exacerbated as the Third Wave creates even larger gaps between First Wave and Third Wave societies and new gaps between Second Wave and Third Wave societies.

the correct people making the decision to act with full knowledge of the potential consequences.

2. Domestic Legal Issues

The fundamental legal issue for domestic use of national power is which portion of America's Constitutional government needs to order the action and whether any other branch has to approve. While I recommend executive control, I also recommend a statute so that the President's authority is backed up by a congressional enactment. I then recommend an executive order to consolidate policies that address both domestic and international legal issues.

a. The Constitution, War Powers, and Presidential Authority

The Constitution expressly gives the power to declare war to the Congress.³²⁵ Of course, the Congress has not done so since World War II. As veterans of the myriad conflicts that have occurred since then can attest, and as the silent markers of their fallen comrades emphasize, this does not mean that America has not fought. The Constitution further gives the Congress the express power to raise and support armies and to make laws governing the conduct of those armies.³²⁶ Despite this seemingly extensive power to influence and impact the armed forces, consulting the

³²⁵ U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 11.

³²⁶ *Id.*, cl. 12 - 14.

Congress has been an afterthought in the actual use of force in recent times.³²⁷

The real decision-maker behind the employment of the military has been the President, whose unilateral use of the armed forces is based upon two express powers granted to him. The first is his position as commander in chief of the armed forces.³²⁸ With the advent of the standing army, presidents have viewed this power expansively and used those armies for the purposes they see fit. With regard to using those armed forces in foreign lands, the President relies upon his constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.³²⁹

Dispute exists on both fronts for a similar reason -- the Framers of the Constitution chose to split both powers between the executive and legislative branches to prevent abuses. The Constitution, in a variety of places gives both branches a role in the warmaking power.³³⁰ Similarly, while

³²⁷ In recent operations, like the Gulf War and Haiti, the President has sought congressional resolutions supporting his actions. However, this does not usually come until the President has at least spoken publicly and put the power and prestige of the United States on the line. More often, troops have already been committed and the Congress ratifies the action more as support for the nation's soldiers than as approval of the use of the forces.

³²⁸ U.S. CONST., art. 2, §2, cl. 1.

³²⁹ *Id.*, art. 2, §2, cl. 2.

³³⁰ Mark T. Uyeda, *Presidential Prerogative Under The Constitution To Deploy U.S. Military Forces In Low-Intensity Conflict*, 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 790 (1995).

the President conducts foreign affairs, the Constitution contemplates a congressional role in that area.³³¹ This balance has been expressed by one Supreme Court jurist as creating a range of legitimacy for the President's actions.³³² One commentator summarizes this framework as one where

presidential powers "fluctuate" depending on the actions taken by Congress . . . First, when the President acts pursuant to express or implied congressional authorization, his power is "at its maximum." Second, when the President acts in an area of coextensive power shared with Congress but in the absence of any legislative action, he acts in a "zone of twilight" that may invite the exercise of "independent presidential responsibility." Third, if the President acts in contravention of expressed or implied congressional will, then his power is "at its lowest ebb," and the President may rely only on his Article II authority independent of Congress.³³³

The best position then for executive authority is when the executive acts in concert with the Congress.

This does not mean that the President cannot act unilaterally. Actual practice since World War II has seen

³³¹ *Id.* at n. 66. (Discussing the President's power as Commander in Chief (U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1) and to receive ambassadors (*id.* at § 3) as compared to Congress's power to regulate foreign trade (*id.* at art. I, § 8, cls. 3-4) and powers related to the military (*id.* at cls. 1, 11-16).).

³³² *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

³³³ Uyeda, *supra* note 330, at 792, citing *Youngstown Steel*, 343 U.S. at 635-38.

such action to pursue a variety of foreign policy and national security objectives.³³⁴ The Congress has fought over the last couple of decades to reclaim a role in this process. The so-called War Powers Resolution³³⁵ has been the major effort. While this statute has not had the impact the Congress sought, it has caused Presidents to seek out the Congress and work for congressional support.³³⁶

The bottom line to this brief discussion of the internal political structure of the U.S. is that, despite the recent increases in congressional influence, the president still has unilateral authority to use the armed forces in pursuit of national security. Thus, it is the president who bears the responsibility to effectively

³³⁴ Uyeda, *supra* note 330, at 777-78 ("The President has often used military forces for missions that cannot be clearly labeled as war; under such circumstances, military forces have been deployed due to some intrinsic or unique capability, availability, or convenience in order to further U.S. foreign policy."). Mr. Uyeda lists a number of instances since 1987. *Id.* at n.4. Most notable among these were the recent actions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.

³³⁵ 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1995).

³³⁶ For example, in Operation DESERT SHIELD, President Bush moved naval forces into the region "within one hour of the start of the attack." GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 19. Troops on the ground began deploying on 7 August 1990. *Id.* at 371. The President did not wait for Congressional approval, although he did seek and receive it. Cf. Raymond Seitz, *America's Foreign Policy: From the jaws of victory*, THE ECONOMIST, May 27, 1995, at 21 ("Both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue have been tugging on the rope of the War Powers Act for 20 years, and the renewed Republican assault on the president's role as commander-in-chief suggests that the contest is a long way from over. In the half-century of hot war and cold war, the White House usually had the upper hand; but, with national security no longer paramount in Washington, the authority of the presidency is slipping.").

utilize the information assets provided to him, including PSYOP forces to attain those goals. However, obtaining Congressional approval maximizes his authority to act.

b. Are We at War?

The interplay of this system of presidential control with the concept of ideological aggression makes this analysis slightly more problematic. If the U.S. uses its military assets as strategic information assets, and the acts are found to be "aggression" under international law, has the President committed us to a war without the required Congressional declaration?

The realities of the modern world obviate this debate. The United States has been involved in many actions that looked an awful lot like war, but that were still considered (with some dissent of course) to be within the president's authority.³³⁷ This is because "Congress, consisting of 535 members assisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive, and flexible action in the employment of armed force, the conduct of foreign policy, and the control of intelligence operations."³³⁸ Consequently, it is, and

³³⁷ See Uyeda, *supra* note 330, at 799-805 (Discussing the constitutional argument for unilateral presidential action and a number of historical cases, court opinions, and commentaries supporting the action.).

³³⁸ W Michael Reisman, *Comment: Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics*, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203, 212, quoting Robert Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH x (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989). Professor Reisman asserts that the President must have unilateral authority. He argues that the (Continued on Next Page)

should remain, the president's decision when the U.S. should commit to a course of action that may be considered ideological aggression. Congress still has a role to play in clarifying and determining policy. However, when action is needed, Congress' "fundamental function . . . is to support the executive in ways that send a clear message of national resolve, so unequivocal and unmistakable that international pillagers and those who advise them can have no doubts."³³⁹

Maintaining this power and authority in the executive is particularly important as the U.S. continues to become a Third Wave society. Technology has made the interactions of Third Wave societies extremely quick and time-sensitive.³⁴⁰ The president will not always have time to utilize the deliberative process to seek a solution. If he did, the conditions that make information effective may be gone by the time the decision is reached.³⁴¹ While this does place substantial unchecked discretion in the executive branch, it is a worthwhile risk. The use of information to resolve foreign policy issues can result in savings measured in

(Continued)

world situation, which could not have been anticipated by the Framers of the Constitution, dictates this power.

³³⁹ Reisman, *supra* note 338, 209.

³⁴⁰ TOFFLER, *supra* note 9, at 63 & 79-80 (Discussing accelerated transactions in both economics and warfare.)

³⁴¹ See *supra* notes 204 & 217-20 and accompanying text.

lives and blood. The value of these types of savings outweighs the danger of abuse by the President. Moreover, the President can strengthen his position for acting by seeking a generalized statutory mandate to conduct these types of operations in advance.

c. A Proposed Statute

U.S. citizens will most likely have two primary concerns regarding the routine use of military PSYOP in a national information strategy. First, they will want assurance of protection of Americans and their governmental processes from propaganda.³⁴² Second, they will want to ensure that the independent media is not surreptitiously used in the conduct of these operations.³⁴³ The best method to address these concerns is through the people's representatives in the Congress. A proposed statute to accomplish this is at Appendix A. This solution does several things.

First, it eases the minds of U.S. citizens whose support is critical to success.³⁴⁴ The current "policy"

³⁴² See *supra* notes 2 & 109 for quotes regarding concerns about PSYOP.

³⁴³ Cf. TOFFLER, *supra* note 9 at 165 ("After the Gulf War a fiery dispute broke out between the American media and the Pentagon over its attempts to manage the news and its deliberate effort to keep reporters away from ground combat.). The Tofflers quote one commentator who theorizes that technology may "'transform reporters from dispassionate observers to unwitting, even unwilling, but nonetheless direct participants' in a war." *Id.* at 172.

³⁴⁴ See *supra* notes 55-60 and accompanying text.

approach gives little comfort when the very branch of government that seeks to use and control this power controls the policy, its interpretation, and enforcement. The comfort is actually less when the policy is not clear. This is the case with the current limitation on domestic use of PSYOP.³⁴⁵ The policy is not only unclear and not comprehensive, but it is also not truly explicit. The statute solves these problems because it sets forth precise limitations and protections and is made by the people's representatives to reflect their concerns.

Second, the statutory approach helps to eliminate any potential misuse of the domestic media by the government. This fear has caused consistent tension between the press and the government. For example, following the Persian Gulf War, the media complained that they were manipulated to support the military operation.³⁴⁶ This allegation is particularly striking since the media appeared to have excellent access and rapport during the operation.³⁴⁷ The statute will help address this concern.

Of course, the expansion of information flow will make it more difficult to prevent PSYOP messages from being both picked up by the media and broadcast to the U.S. citizenry. The benefit to the statutory prohibition is that it forces

³⁴⁵ See *supra* notes 223-25 and accompanying text.

³⁴⁶ See *supra* note 343.

³⁴⁷ See GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 651-55.

planners to design the messages for direction at a foreign target audience diminishing their efficacy in America, even if they are unintentionally encountered.³⁴⁸ The statute also explicitly prohibits certain types of messages that are most dangerous to America -- those aimed at political processes, labor groups, etc. Finally, the statute addresses the best balance between national security and the first amendment role of the media. It prohibits the *intentional* misuse of the media, while not hamstringing U.S. officials charged by the Constitution with maintaining national security. These officials should not be held accountable for something they cannot reasonably control.

Finally, the statute provides another important benefit. By expressly authorizing Presidential use of information for foreign policy, the Congress strengthens his hand when the President unilaterally acts to use information assets.³⁴⁹ Not only does this give the executive more legitimacy domestically, it demonstrates resolve and support to the nation's adversaries. Consequently, it maximizes the Presidents position when he decides to use information power.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ At least one commentator has commented that Americans (soldiers at least) are somewhat impervious to propaganda. See Sandler, *supra* note 235, at 25 ("Interestingly, the American serviceman has proved, through the years, to be almost uniquely impervious to the persuasion of his enemies.").

³⁴⁹ See *supra* notes 330-33 and accompanying text.

³⁵⁰ See *supra* notes 325-36 and accompanying text.

Statutes are often seen as a limitation and as a drag on efficient and effective use of power. In this case, however, the statute serves to legitimize and empower the use of military information assets. Taking this action is critical to continued success as a nation as the U.S. begins to ride the Third Wave.

d. *The Need for a Consolidated Presidential Policy*

It is impractical to address every piece of guidance about the employment of PSYOP in a statute. Still, the President needs to control other aspects of this powerful tool. The growing importance of information requires that the President himself take a personal role in formulating limits and guidance about this employment of PSYOP assets.

First, the President and his advisors must ensure that the National Security Strategy incorporates the use of information. They must affirmatively include military PSYOP as a means to obtain the goals the strategy sets out.³⁵¹ In the future, "information warfare might not always be a supporting function; in some future campaigns, it might take the leading role."³⁵² In fact, there are many goals in the current National Security Strategy where information power is the most appropriate tool to use.³⁵³ Ignoring PSYOP as a

³⁵¹ See *supra* notes 244-60 and accompanying text.

³⁵² Kraus, *supra* note 220, at 44.

³⁵³ See *supra* notes 249-60 and accompanying text.

powerful strategic tool, limiting its applicability to certain types of operations, or failing to use all of the information assets at America's disposal will become a bigger and bigger mistake as the Third Wave continues to impact society.

Second, all guidance should be included in one executive order. The order should be compulsory and provide comprehensive guidance to the operators in the field. If it is necessary to classify portions of the document, it should be released in both a classified and unclassified version.³⁵⁴

Examples of areas this document should cover are:

- Themes that support the National Security Strategy
- Media acceptable for use and the circumstances for its employment
- Approval authority and Approval process for each type of media
- Roles and responsibilities of the agencies of the executive branch

Additionally, it should give guidance on specific types of information operations that could have international legal implications.

³⁵⁴ This is done for many documents, including the National Security Strategy. Many times, the information that requires classification is minimal. Releasing both versions will get maximum guidance to the field while still maintaining security.

3. *International Legal Issues*

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive study of the international treaties, conventions, court decisions, and international organization opinions that might be implicated by the strategic use of military PSYOP. However, the following provides a starting point for research and as examples of the broad range of situations that should be covered in the President's Executive Order.

a. *UN Charter*

As previously mentioned, the Charter specifically seeks to protect the sovereignty of nations, both territorially and politically. American use of information in a way that could involve ideological aggression, must be made in anticipation of difficulties at the UN. While formal actions against U.S. use of information could be blocked by its veto power in the Security Council,³⁵⁵ political fallout could result that might impact alliances and other agreements or goals. The president should address these concerns in his order and consider what types of information acts would be considered aggressive. He should then construct appropriate guidelines for employment.

³⁵⁵ See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., *The Security Council's First Fifty Years*, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1995) (Discussing the formation of the Security Council and its operations over the first 50 years of its existence.).

b. OAS Charter

The United Nations is not the only organization whose reactions the U.S. might consider. The charters and agreements of many organizations that the U.S. belongs to limit state behavior. The Organization of American States is one example.³⁵⁶

c. Telecommunications Agreements

Since the advent of radio, the international community has sought to regulate the use of electronic signals crossing international boundaries.³⁵⁷ There is currently an international telecommunications commission. Additionally, the United States is party to numerous treaties and conventions that address telecommunications.³⁵⁸ American use of information assets will clearly implicate many of these agreements. Guidance should thus be given regarding the particular types of media that might fall under these agreements, the circumstances for its use, and any limitations that might be appropriate.

³⁵⁶ The OAS Charter limits the use of force in stronger language than the UN Charter. It provides that states may not "intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements." OAS CHARTER, art. 18.

³⁵⁷ VON GLAHN, *supra* note 281, at 418.

³⁵⁸ See *id.* at 418-21 discussing the conventions and treaties and State practice under them.

d. *Space Treaties*

Telecommunications is not the only type of hardware that is subject to international controls. Satellites are subject to the provisions of several treaties.³⁵⁹ The principal treaty is the so-called Outer Space Treaty which in general terms requires the peaceful use of space.³⁶⁰ Use of information in pursuit of national security goals might be considered a non-peaceful use. Thus, specific guidelines would have to be formulated to address this area. This is an example of where military PSYOP provides an option. Broadcasting from a fixed location might require satellite relay. Military assets, like Commando Solo, may be able to get into range for information operations without the need for space assets.

e. *Law of the Sea*

Space is not the only environment governed by special limitations. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea³⁶¹ also addresses use of structures on the high seas. One of the specific limitations placed on the use of these

³⁵⁹ See Anderson, *supra* note 6 and Richard A. Morgan, *Military Use of Commercial Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and Peaceful Purposes*, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237 (1994) which discuss many of the treaties applicable to the military use of space assets.

³⁶⁰ Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967).

³⁶¹ United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea, *opened for signature* Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261.

type of assets is the broadcast of propaganda into another country from these off-shore platforms.³⁶² This would have to be addressed to fully use the Navy's PSYOP capabilities.

These are but a few examples of the international legal concerns that would need to be addressed in any executive order. The broad range and complex nature of the issues involved in preparing this order are indicative of the use of information assets in general. Consequently, utilizing information power and controlling it effectively will require full time supervision from a leader in the executive branch. This leader will need to integrate agency capabilities and functions, law, policies, and national security interests into a coherent information strategy that uses the variety of information capabilities controlled by the executive branch.

³⁶² *Id.* at art. 109, 21 I.L.M. at 1289 ("All States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas. . . . For the purposes of this Convention, "unauthorized broadcasting" means the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international regulations, but excluding the transmission of distress calls."). The convention includes authority to prosecute violators. *Id.* ("Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted before the court of: (a) the flag State of the ship; (b) the State of registry of the installation; (c) the State of which the person is a national; (d) any State where the transmissions can be received; or (e) any State where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.").

B. *The Need for a National Leader to Conduct a National Coordinated Strategy*

America's increased capability to effectively use information is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it is a highly effective tool to achieve national policy objectives. On the other, the implication of various legal and political ramifications cautions us to use it wisely. Military PSYOP has tremendous potential to increase U.S. strategic information capability. But, involving a military unit can exacerbate the legal and political concerns just discussed. Such decisions need to be made at the highest levels of the government.

Complicating any proposal to use military PSYOP is the fact that there are more players than the defense department in the strategic information game. The Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and the State Department also have roles.³⁶³ Lack of coordination among these players can complicate the strategic use of PSYOP at best and destroy its effectiveness through conflicting messages at worst.³⁶⁴

On a broader scale, this principle applies to all of the elements of national power. Maximizing effectiveness requires "the integrated and synergistic use of the various

³⁶³ See Kreisel, *supra* note 232, at 56-63 (Laying out all of the players involved in persuasive communication.).

³⁶⁴ See *id.* at 58-59; FM 33-1, *supra* note 115 at 3-1.

instruments of power."³⁶⁵ The current method to achieve this synergistic use is the interagency process.

As conceived under the current administration, this process begins with a Presidential Review Directive from the National Security Advisor which "defines the scope of the process, identifies interested agencies, and appoints an executive agent or lead agency."³⁶⁶ The lead agency is critical because it not only "establishes the coordination process, sets the agenda, drafts policy recommendations, and conducts meetings[,]" but it "also implements decisions unless that responsibility is passed to another organization."³⁶⁷ In the midst of the process are Interagency Working Groups made up of action officers who sift information, analyze it, and pass options and recommendations to the Deputies Committee. This committee "includes relatively senior officials from various departments and agencies" that "can usually make some decisions and . . . agree to proposals affecting their agency or department."³⁶⁸ Important decisions are deferred to the principals of the agencies.

³⁶⁵ Raach & Kass, *supra* note 239, at 9. See also Jones, *supra* note 232, at 50.

³⁶⁶ Raach & Kass, *supra* note 239, at 10.

³⁶⁷ *Id.*

³⁶⁸ *Id.*

Several problems are evident from the description of this process. First, "membership in the interagency process . . . varies from crisis to crisis."³⁶⁹ Thus, expertise and relationships are not developed. This is exacerbated by the second problem, which is the vulnerability of the process to personalities and organizational agendas.³⁷⁰ Knowing and trusting the critical players in a department can make the difference between success and failure. Moreover, personality problems and differing agendas can distract from the real issues in the crisis. Third, the lead agency may or may not have the expertise to actually perform or oversee the mission, but it has that responsibility decided beforehand.³⁷¹

These procedural weaknesses could cripple a nation in the Third Wave. Everything is time-sensitive and accelerated.³⁷² Issues are complex, can depend on cultural, language, and political sensitivities in the area of crisis, and have to be resolved quickly. In the opinion of some, "the interagency process is clearly broken."³⁷³ Trusting control of critical information power to this system as it is currently structured is inadvisable.

³⁶⁹ *Id.*

³⁷⁰ *See Id.* at 10-11.

³⁷¹ *Id.* at 11.

³⁷² *See supra* note 340.

³⁷³ Raach & Kass, *supra* note 239, at 13.

The brokenness of this process applies equally to PSYOP. There are at least two committees that seek to coordinate PSYOP. One is the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.³⁷⁴ This commission is a group of experts appointed by the president who advise the President, the USIA and Secretary of State about public diplomacy.³⁷⁵ This committee meets regularly, and recently included a military PSYOP adviser in its agenda.³⁷⁶ However, this committee is advisory in nature and does not have the access or clout to energize agencies across the executive branch. Moreover, it does not include the defense department in its charter. Thus, its ability to integrate *all* information assets is limited. There is also a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Committee, but in the words of one commentator, this committee needs to be "revitalized."³⁷⁷ The interagency process is broken. With regard to an overall view of information strategy, it is arguably nonexistent. Revitalizing this area will require the attention of a

³⁷⁴ 22 U.S.C. § 1469 (1995).

³⁷⁵ *Id.*

³⁷⁶ See, e.g., U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 6294 (1996) (Announcing a meeting on Feb. 21, 1996); U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 3525 (1996) (Announcing a meeting on Jan. 31, 1996); U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Meeting, 61 Fed. Reg. 2579 (1996) (Announcing a meeting on Jan. 25, 1996 to be attended by "Col. Daniel C. Deflin, Chief of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, The Joint Staff.")

³⁷⁷ Jones, *supra* note 232, at 49.

single office to coordinate and integrate all information assets of the Executive Branch.

The need for high level approval of PSYOP programs argues for a single office as well. The process should be efficient enough to use in any operation. This eliminates confusion because the process is always the same, regardless of the "state of the environment." In fact, a single process eliminates the need for artificial distinctions, at least for PSYOP purposes, like the "states of the environment" in current doctrine. More importantly, a single approval process allows for expertise to develop and efficiency to be worked in. The result is a process that provides better control with more efficient execution. It is the type of process needed in a Third Wave society.

The best suited official to revitalize the interagency process with regard to information and establish and operate a single, effective approval system in the current U.S. Executive Branch structure is the National Security Advisor. He is unique in the executive branch because of his broad perspective on national security, clout with the President, and bureaucratic neutrality.

C. The National Security Advisor as Information Adviser to the President

The National Security Advisor (NSA) is the President's "senior advisor in the national security field who . . . is

answerable to him [the President] alone."³⁷⁸ He also runs the National Security Council (NSC)³⁷⁹ staff. The NSA's position is uniquely fitted to considering national strategy from an interagency point of view for several reasons. First, his staff has expertise in the broad range of disciplines that fall under national security. Second, he is bureaucratically neutral. Third, he has clout with the President. Fourth, he reflects the institutional perspective of the president. These characteristics also suit him to the role of controlling the neglected element of power, information.

1. *Staff Expertise*

The NSA has a variety of disciplines represented on the National Security Council Staff. Included are personnel with expertise in the military, intelligence, economics, and

³⁷⁸ Carnes Lord, *Strategy and Organization at the National Level*, in *GRAND STRATEGY AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS* 141, 156 (J. Gaston ed., 1992).

³⁷⁹ The National Security Council is composed of "(1) the President; (2) the Vice President; (3) the Secretary of State; (4) the Secretary of Defense; (5) the Director for Mutual Security; (6) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and (7) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure." 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1995). "The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." *Id.*

diplomacy.³⁸⁰ It is the most wide ranging staff in the Executive Branch, and it views all of these areas from the perspective of one objective -- the security of the nation. No other office in the executive branch cuts such a wide swath across the disciplines and capabilities of the national establishment. Nor is any other agency so specifically focused on national security.

This broad expertise is critical for control of information power. First, the use of this power is technical in nature requiring some expertise. Second, use of this power must be coordinated with other disciplines to maximize effectiveness.³⁸¹ Third, the power spans a number of agencies whose disciplines are represented on the staff.³⁸² Thus, obstacles, difficulties, and limitations can be anticipated instead of being reacted to during interagency coordination.

2. *Bureaucratic Neutrality*

Another major advantage that the NSA has is his independence from the various agencies that control information assets.³⁸³ He does not have any institutional

³⁸⁰ See Lord, *supra* note 378, at 144.

³⁸¹ See *supra* note 364.

³⁸² See *supra* note 380.

³⁸³ The NSA does not control any information assets. All of the assets are controlled by other agencies within the executive branch. See *supra* note 363.

biases that might cause him to promote a given course of action simply because it will "glorify" his agency.³⁸⁴ In making decisions regarding the strategic uses of information, and particularly PSYOP, the President "must be presented with options that reflect genuine strategic choices rather than options refracted through institutional preferences of the national security agencies."³⁸⁵ This allows the President to view the situation as a whole and utilize the various instruments of national power that he has at his disposal effectively to address the situation. The independence of the NSA and his broad interagency perspective make him best suited to advise the President regarding these choices.

This is not to say that other agencies should not participate. On the contrary, the other agencies control the assets needed to perform the mission. However, the NSA should form the strategy and assign operations to the particular agency best suited to handle that mission. The agency would then be tasked to prepare the operational plan to actually implement the strategy. This planning could be done using an interagency committee or some other format the NSA may prefer. The critical element is that the strategy will be formulated based on what is best for the nation, not what is best for some particular agency.

³⁸⁴ See Lord, *supra* note 378, at 144-45.

³⁸⁵ *Id.* at 145.

3. *Clout*

The NSA has clout with the commander in chief. As an advisor personally appointed by and accountable to the President, the NSA is normally in the President's inner circle.³⁸⁶ This gives him the ability to directly access the President and obtain decisions and backing when needed. Access to the President is critical because proper conduct of information campaigns will involve multiple agencies of the executive. The NSA's direct relationship with the President enables him to compel agencies to participate in accordance with the decisions made by the President, even when it requires downplaying or sacrificing the role or prestige of one agency in favor of another.

4. *The Institutional Perspective of the Presidency*

A national strategy must reflect "the institutional perspective of the presidency rather than that of any specific executive agency."³⁸⁷ This perspective is by necessity broad, interdisciplinary, and interagency because it reflects the enormous responsibilities of the highest office in the United States. It also reflects the unique position of the United States as a leader in the free world because it is the President that must represent the nation

³⁸⁶ See *id.* at 144-45.

³⁸⁷ *Id.* at 145.

in that role.³⁸⁸ No single agency has this perspective. They are beholden to the president for a particular area of his responsibility. The NSA can look from the broad perspective of the president and determine which assets and which agency can best serve the particular national security needs of the time. This allows not only interagency coordination of information, but allows information to support the uses of other elements of power that might be occurring simultaneously.

The NSA already provides this broad, national security perspective to a number of committees, including some that affect the distribution and use of information. For example, he is a member of the telecommunications oversight committee and works with the interagency committee that is looking at computers and their use and protection.³⁸⁹ The NSA's perspective is needed to lead in the use of information entering the Third Wave. Expansion of his role in controlling the power of U.S. information assets is a logical choice.

³⁸⁸ See Uyeda, *supra* note 330, at 800-01 ("The notion of the President as the principal agent of the country in foreign relations finds support in several Supreme Court opinions."). Mr. Uyeda goes on to discuss several opinions including *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) and *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

³⁸⁹ See, e.g., National Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning and Execution, 47 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1995) (Assigning various responsibilities to the NSA for the development of policy plans and programs regarding the use of the "Nation's telecommunications resources" in wartime and non-wartime emergencies.).

Making the true strategic use of PSYOP acceptable to the American people raises issues of control. These issues can be effectively addressed through legislative and executive action to formalize rules and policies. The assets can then be effectively integrated and controlled through the oversight of the National Security Advisor. True utility, however, requires an additional step. The Army must make force structure changes so that the needed forces are available, ready, and properly positioned for quick response to national security needs.

VI. The Utility of Persuasion: The Need for Decentralized Execution

PSYOP units possess unique capabilities to facilitate the use of information at the strategic level. However, the current force structure makes the feasibility of additional missions for active component forces doubtful. Additionally, the placement of the forces within the Army's organizational structure limits their utility. In this section, I propose restructuring PSYOP forces both internally and in their location within the Army's structure. Doing so will not only enable the strategic use of these forces, but will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their control.

A. *Formation of Regional PSYOP "Groups"*

The Army should form an active component PSYOP "group" to support each Regional CINC. In these days of drawdown,

this type of suggestion is probably met with a great deal of skepticism. However, the actual increase in force structure is very modest, especially compared with the capability gained. Additionally, concomitant reductions in the reserve component could be made, if necessary, in order to simply change the mix of PSYOP forces as opposed to increasing them.³⁹⁰ Either way, the need as the U.S. continues to ride the Third Wave is for a PSYOP force that is totally focused on a particular region, fully capable of supporting PSYOP missions at all levels, including strategic, and consistently available to the CINCs. Formation of these regionalized "groups" is the first step toward accomplishing this goal.

The term "group" is in quotations intentionally. I recommend a new structure for these regionalized groups. While the Group I envision would have similar capabilities to the single active component Group the Army currently has,³⁹¹ it would have a reduced number of personnel for each function. It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose specific numbers of personnel and military occupation specialty breakdowns. However, I will address the approximate sizes and functions to be performed.

³⁹⁰ Rethinking the mix of active and reserve component forces was recommended by DOD in 1992. GULF WAR REPORT, *supra* note 92, at 538.

³⁹¹ See *supra* notes 145-82 and accompanying text.

I maintain the "group" terminology, despite the smaller size, to remain consistent with other special operations organizations. Additionally, this label emphasizes a critical point -- the grade of commander must be commensurate with the label, rather than the size of the forces. The PSYOP Group Commander must be a critical player on the CINC's staff. As such, he must be of sufficient rank to warrant the CINC's confidence. The component commanders are all of flag rank as are the primary staff.³⁹² Therefore, an O6 commander is essential to maintain credibility and position on the staff.

The current PSYOP group structure has approximately 1100 people.³⁹³ The group I envision would have approximately half that number or about 550 personnel. Thus, the Army can provide the capability to conduct PSYOP directly to the CINCs with about two and one-half times the number of personnel in the current structure.

This new group structure would be broken down into 4 sub-units. The first would be a headquarters element of about 50 people. This would include the command and staff structure as well as administrative and support personnel and equipment. The other three sub-units would be called "battalions." This label is used for similar reasons to those justifying the use of "group" for the overall unit.

³⁹² JOINT GUIDE, *supra* note 192, at 2-27- 2-36.

³⁹³ See *supra* notes 146-48 and accompanying text.

Each battalion would have an O5 commander. These battalions would mirror the capabilities of the current PSYOP group.³⁹⁴

The first battalion would be a Regional Support Battalion. This unit would contain civilian analysts to study the CINC's region and Product Development Cells to conduct PSYOP planning and product development.³⁹⁵ This unit would consist of approximately 100 personnel. The second battalion would be a Tactical Support Battalion consisting of a number of operational detachments to conduct Tactical PSYOP in support of the CINC's missions.³⁹⁶ This unit would also have about 100 personnel. The final battalion would be the PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB). This unit would have signal, broadcast, and print capabilities similar to the current PDB.³⁹⁷ It would consist of about 250 personnel and requisite equipment. This unit gives the CINC organic capability to produce his own PSYOP products.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁴ See *supra* notes 149-58 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁵ See *supra* notes 149-52 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁶ See *supra* notes 156-58 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁷ See *supra* notes 154-55 & 172-78 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁸ As a cost-saving measure, it may be necessary to only provide this unit with "light" print capability. See *supra* note 172 and accompanying text. The most feasible solution may be to maintain the 4th PSYOP Group's media production center as a joint asset under CINC, USSOCOM for production of major quantities of print material. The CINCs would still have their organic "light" capability to produce sufficient quantities to conduct at least limited operations until the "heavy" support is provided.

The result of this restructuring would be a manifest improvement in the integration, availability, and execution of PSYOP. Additionally, it would make the strategic use of these assets feasible. The final critical links, however, are to collocate the units with the Regional CINCs and to give the Regional CINC Operational Control (OPCON)³⁹⁹ over these forces.

B. Give OPCON to the Regional CINCs

The current method for supporting regional CINCs is discussed above.⁴⁰⁰ This system relies on the PSYOP staff officers assigned to the CINC's command and the forward detachments that the 4th PSYOP Group has sacrificed from its own ranks to provide. Despite these efforts, implementation of any PSYOP Campaign plans require forces beyond the CINCs control. These forces are within the command of CINC, USSOCOM, a separate 4-star CINC, with additional flag officer layers of command below him.⁴⁰¹ While CINC, USSOCOM is committed by doctrine to support the Regional CINC, it is his decision, not the Regional CINC's, as to who gets

³⁹⁹ Operational control (OPCON) is defined as "Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. . . . [It] includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command." DOD DICTIONARY, *supra* note 203, at 274.

⁴⁰⁰ See *supra* notes 195-204 and accompanying text.

⁴⁰¹ See *supra* notes 159-62 and accompanying text. See also *supra* Figure 2.

priority for PSYOP assets. This tends to devalue the PSYOP forces in the eyes of the Regional CINC who will prefer options that utilize forces he has combatant command over. There are certain advantages to the centralized command of CINC, USSOCOM that dictate the maintenance of that relationship. However, the need for effective execution dictates operational control of units where they will actually operate.

1. *Maintain Centralized Command in CINC, USSOCOM*

CINC, USSOCOM, by statute, performs many functions that other CINCs do not. He is responsible for special operations strategy, doctrine and tactics; funding of special operations specific equipment and supplies; formal courses of instruction for training special operations forces (including officers and noncommissioned officers schools); and monitoring promotions of special operations force officers.⁴⁰² Because of these far-reaching responsibilities, CINC, USSOCOM has a broad range of expertise in his headquarters specifically focused on the unique needs of special operations forces, including PSYOP. It would not make sense to attempt to duplicate this role in

⁴⁰² 10 U.S.C. § 167(e)(2). In conventional forces, most of these activities are conducted by other agencies within the service department. For example, in the Army, formal school training is normally the responsibility of the Training and Doctrine Command, not the combat units.

five different Regional CINC headquarters, and statutorily it belongs to CINC, USSOCOM anyway.

CINC, USSOCOM also has access to specialized funding programs that other CINCs do not have. For example, special operations training funds allow the training of foreign nation forces for the primary benefit of U.S. forces practicing their skills as trainers.⁴⁰³ It makes sense to maintain access to these opportunities for greatest flexibility in options for conducting the PSYOP mission.

Perhaps most important, a detached relationship is specifically contemplated in the code section establishing the combatant command of CINC, USSOCOM. The CINC is specifically tasked to "monitor[] the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of special operations forces *assigned to unified combatant commands other than the special operations command.*"⁴⁰⁴ Thus, it is envisioned that CINC, USSOCOM will have a role that takes advantage of his unique expertise, while having forces located and under control of the Regional CINCs. Establishing this relationship is critical to utilizing military PSYOP at the strategic level.

2. OPCON to CINCs

Giving OPCON to the CINC puts military PSYOP on his team. It provides a number of advantages, all of which

⁴⁰³ 10 U.S.C. § 2011 (Supp. 1995).

⁴⁰⁴ 10 U.S.C. § 167(e)(3)(B) (Supp. 1995).

equate to a powerful asset that the CINC can rely on to accomplish his mission. Creating this relationship with a group under the revised structure, collocated with the CINC will improve integration of PSYOP at the military level. More importantly, it will place an asset with the CINC that will enable the NSA to task strategic information missions to him when they fall within the CINC's region of responsibility.

a. *Simplify Flow of Approval*

First, and foremost, the new OPCON relationship simplifies the flow of the approval process. As currently structured, the process involves two chains of command.⁴⁰⁵ While the CINC under the current system is responsible for the approval of the campaign called for under his plans, the executing unit will be coming from an entirely different chain of command. Thus the utilization of resources, the flow of the products, the type of products, the resources committed, and the flow of the approval and limitations travel in at least two paths, rather than one. The dangers of this duplicity are those inherent in any communication -- the more people the message flows through, the greater the chance of error.

The new system would simplify and shorten the path for approval and communication of limitations. The proposed

⁴⁰⁵ See *supra* notes 205-19 and accompanying text.

plan would flow directly from the Regional CINC's PSYOP Group Commander (the same commander who would be executing the plan), through the CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council.⁴⁰⁶ The NSA would then shepherd the proposal through any interagency coordination required.⁴⁰⁷ The proposal would return by the same route, directly to the executing unit. One process should apply to ALL actions, regardless of which "state of the environment" exists. By establishing a single, simpler process, those involved will gain experience and can work efficiencies into the system. At least in the long term, this process should help to ensure that processing of plans is consistently expeditious and that concerns or limitations placed by the National Command Authority are accurately passed to the executing CINC and PSYOP Commander.

⁴⁰⁶ The plan is set forth in general terms. Exactly which staff officer handles the matter would be worked out by each agency. However, I recommend that no more than one person handle the matter in each agency. Additionally, the same person should handle it each time so as to develop familiarity and expertise. Finally, the staff member who handles the matter should be on the principal staff of the agency, not an assistant staff member. This will ensure that the matter gets the attention it deserves.

⁴⁰⁷ As the President's information advisor, the NSA would know what coordination, if any, would need to be done because he would be familiar with all of the national security operations occurring in the region, including information operations. See section V *supra*.

b. Ensure That PSYOP Fit into Regional and National Strategies

A dedicated PSYOP commander in the CINC's area of operations provides him an invaluable tool to incorporating information power into his regional strategy.⁴⁰⁸ This provides a local check to ensure that the PSYOP plan fits the CINC's overall strategy. Additionally, another valuable check is provided by employing the NSA as the information advisor. His involvement provides a "big picture" check which ensures that the activity fits into the overall national security strategy of the nation for that region. Moreover, regional presence of military PSYOP gives the NSA another asset that he can readily use to conduct information operations in support of strategic objectives. The fact that the Regional CINC has PSYOP assets directly at his disposal would allow the NSA to assign that CINC strategic information missions through the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These assets would already be focused on the region, aware of regional vulnerabilities, and have assets on the ground ready to perform the mission in a manner that meets the compressed time constraints of the Third Wave. Moreover, it would cost less to utilize these assets because of the shorter logistic lines to the regional mission location.

⁴⁰⁸ Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones, former commander of the 4th PSYOP Group has advocated such incorporation for a number of years. See Jones, *supra* note 232.

c. *Supports the Increased Power to CINCs*

Finally, these changes are in fitting with the trend, both in Congress and in commentary, calling for increasing the power of the Regional CINCs. The Goldwater-Nichols reorganization in 1986 focused on this as a means to ensure joint, efficient defense.⁴⁰⁹ Commentators and the CINCs themselves have called for increased authority.⁴¹⁰ Some commentators have also called upon CINCs to use innovative methods to make U.S. influence felt in their regions.⁴¹¹ Collocating PSYOP assets supports all of these goals while it strengthens America's position as an information power.

These benefits underscore the improvements in both execution and control that would derive from regionalized PSYOP Groups, collocated with the Regional CINC's, and under their operational control.⁴¹² These changes enhance

⁴⁰⁹ See *supra* note 188 and accompanying text.

⁴¹⁰ See, e.g., Joyce Endoso, *Commanders-In-Chief Need A Voice In It Plans, Study Says*; Defense Science Board Report, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Jan. 23, 1995, at 50; *CINCs Suggest New Responsibilities for Unified Commands*, DEF. DAILY, Sep. 19, 1994, at 55; *Ashy Wants "Space" For Warfighters*; Gen. Joseph Ashy Comments At Senate Confirmation Hearing; *Theater Commander Control Over Space Assets*, DEF. & AEROSPACE ELECTRONICS, July 25, 1994, at 4.

⁴¹¹ See, e.g., Tanya Bielski, *Commission: CINCs Should Test New Approaches For Presence*, DEF. DAILY, May 25, 1995, at 285.

⁴¹² One potential objection to these changes is that this type of relationship does not fit the current model for support by other types of Special Operations Forces. This is not an issue regarding my proposals, however, because PSYOP is handled differently now.

Each regional CINC has been assigned a Special Operations Command (SOCOM) which is now commanded by a flag officer. Support is arranged through this regional SOCOM, with the regional SOCOM commander generally commanding any support forces provided to the CINC. PSYOP forces'

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execution and control by making strategic use of military PSYOP both feasible and acceptable.

VII. Conclusion

The Third Wave is pushing our society into the information age. This change is revolutionizing America and its military. It also presents tremendous opportunities to the nation. The ideological nature of conflict and the power of perception to impact ideology underscore the benefits that will accrue to those nations who harness the power of information. To enhance this capability in the United States, America must truly see information as an element of its national power and utilize all of the assets that it has to conduct information operations at the strategic level. This includes military PSYOP.

To utilize military PSYOP strategically requires changes in its control and execution. Effective and

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"requirement to be fully integrated with interagency activities, . . . as well as with conventional forces, command and control warfare, and information warfare" dictate a separate command structure. Letter from Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones, Joint Staff, Department of Defense, to Editor, *Joint Force Quarterly*, reprinted in *Letters . . .*, JOINT FORCE Q., Autumn 1995, at 7. Thus, planning is currently conducted by Regional CINC J3s supported by their PSYOP staff officer. *Id.* In crisis, a Joint Force PSYOP Component Command (JFPOCC) is formed to control PSYOP support. *Id.* My proposal simply creates what is in essence a standing JFPOCC and transfers all planning and control functions to him.

Additionally, collocating the forces is similar to the forward presence provided in several of the Special Forces Groups. These forces have Battalions forward-deployed in at least SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM. Consequently, forward-deploying PSYOP forces is really not a change to the way special operations support is given.

efficient control requires two major changes. First, policies and limitations must be clarified and formalized in statute and in policy directives from the executive. This will ensure clear guidance to the operators in the field and enhance the confidence of our citizenry in the routine use of PSYOP. Second, control must be centralized under a single department of the executive. I recommend the National Security Advisor because of his staff's broad expertise, his clout with the President, his bureaucratic independence, and his broad institutional perspective. This centralization will make for effective integration of military PSYOP into the overall strategy pursuing U.S. national security objectives. It will also serve to present the President true strategic alternatives for the use of information power.

Military PSYOP already have the expertise to execute PSYOP strategically. However, the limited assets available make these additional missions unfeasible. The Army should make two force structure changes to address this issue. First, form an active component regional PSYOP "group" for each Regional CINC. These "groups" would be about half the size of the current active component group, but maintain a similar array of capabilities. These groups should be collocated with the CINC.

Second, the groups should remain under the centralized command of CINC, USSOCOM, but should be under the operational control (OPCON) of the CINCs. These changes

simplify command lines and the flow of approval processes and policy limitations between the National Command Authority and the executing PSYOP unit. Additionally, they will place military PSYOP in position to be effectively utilized to pursue national security objectives, with or without an underlying military operation to support.

The speed and complexity of the Third Wave requires that nations anticipate problems, identify solutions, and implement them quickly. The changes I propose do just that. The protection of American national security interests in the future will rely heavily on leveraging information. We cannot afford to ignore one of the nation's most versatile and powerful information assets. Consequently, the nation must move now to complete the revitalization of military PSYOP it began in the 1980s. America must enact the truly strategic vision of military PSYOP in a way that is acceptable to its citizens and feasible for its forces. Doing so will place this great nation well on the path toward information superiority. In the trisected world that will exist after the Third Wave crashes, information superiority will be the only means of assuring that we remain a secure superpower.

APPENDIX A

Suggested PSYOP Statute

10 U.S.C. § 167a The Conduct of Psychological Operations

(a) DEFINITIONS:

(1) "Psychological Operations", as used in this section, means planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to particular audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of organizations, groups, and individuals within that audience.

(2) "Disaster Relief", has the same meaning as it does in Title 42 of this code.

(3) "Foreign Audience", as used in this section, means an individual or group, selected as a target audience for psychological operations, who is not --

(A) affiliated with any local, state, or national governmental entity of the United States; OR

(B) the governing body of any labor organization, professional association, lobby organization, or other organization that represents the interests of United States Citizens before any local, state, or national governmental entity of the United States; OR

(C) a political party of the United States or subdivision thereof; OR

(D) a "United States Person."

(4) "Domestic Audience", as used in this section, means an individual or group, selected as a target audience for psychological operations, who is --

(A) not a "foreign audience" as defined in this section; OR

(B) is a "United States Person."

(5) "United States Person,"⁺ as used in this section means:

(A) A United States citizen;

(B) An alien known by the agency conducting the psychological operations to be a permanent resident alien;

(C) An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens;

(D) A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. A corporate or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States, is not a United States person.

A person or organization outside the United States shall be presumed not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained. An alien in the United States shall be presumed not to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is obtained.

(b) FOREIGN AUDIENCES:

(1) Under regulations and policies prescribed by the President, agencies of the executive branch, to include assets of the Department of Defense, may carry out psychological operations directed toward foreign audiences if the President --

(A) believes that the operations will promote the national security interests of the United States; AND

(B) the psychological operations will be conducted outside the United States and its territories.

(2) Psychological Operations carried out under this section shall complement, and may not duplicate, any other form of information operation conducted in support of the national security of the United States.

(3) The President shall appoint a member of his personal staff to coordinate all information activities conducted under this section.

(4) The President shall submit to Congress, no later than 1 December of each year, a report detailing all of the information activities conducted under this section during the prior fiscal year.

(c) DOMESTIC AUDIENCES:

(1) Psychological operations shall not be conducted against domestic audiences under any circumstances.

(2) Agencies, including the Department of Defense, that are capable of conducting psychological operations may only provide information to domestic audiences in the following circumstances:

(A) Domestic Disaster relief is requested under Title 42, Chapter 68 of this code; AND

(B) The governor of the state or territory specifically requests media assets to disseminate information; AND

(C) The agencies involved disseminate information as dictated by disaster relief officials without any effort to influence the message or the audience in any fashion.

(d) MEDIA: Under no circumstances will information or actions that are part of a psychological operation be intentionally or knowingly distributed through the open media sources of the United States.

(e) PENALTIES: Violation of this statute shall be punished criminally with a maximum punishment of confinement for one year and a fine not to exceed \$5,000. Additionally, individuals who knowingly order, approve, or conduct operations by subsection (b) above shall be acting outside the scope of their employment and will be subject to individual civil liability.

(f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to preclude:

(1) the conduct of information dissemination missions directed toward foreign audiences; OR

(2) the conduct of notional psychological operations at training centers within the United States and its territories for the purpose of readiness.

(g) This section does not apply to the unintentional receipt of a psychological operations product or message by a member of a domestic audience through international media such as the INTERNET.

⁺ This definition is taken virtually verbatim from DEP'T OF ARMY,
ARMY REGULATION 381-10, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES A-4 - A-4 (1
July 1984).