

R-11960

R-11960



K-11960

SICILY

ITALY

Instructors Reading this Document

Sign Below (File No. _____)

Date 20 Nov

W. E. Green

Com. It.

H. Russell

Sept 4

B. J. M. 41

Instructors Reading this Document

Date 20 Nov

W. H. L.
Cornell
H. H. Hall
B. G. Hall
J. H. Hall
J. H. Hall
M. H. Hall

Sept 48
7 March 49
2 Nov 48
2 Aug 51
15 March 72
10 Jan 75

JULY 9 1943
SEPT 13 1943
AN 22 1944

NOV 1945

82d Airborne Division

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.						
1. REPORT DATE NOV 1945		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 82d Airborne Division in Sicily and Italy				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
				5b. GRANT NUMBER		
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
				5e. TASK NUMBER		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Army Command & General Staff College, Combined Arms Research Library, 250 Gibbon Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027-2314				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited						
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
14. ABSTRACT This collection is one of a series describing campaigns in World War II by the 82d (All-American) Division. In the course of these operations the 82d Airborne Division became the first American Airborne Division to fight in two Theaters of Operations (the North African or Mediterranean, and the European Theaters). General Officers who served in the 82d Airborne Division became commanders of every American Airborne Division that saw action in World War II, and one became commander of the only American Airborne Corps formed during the war.
The 82d Infantry Division, a unit which spent more consecutive days under fire than any other American Division in World War I and which suffered a total of 1, 035 men killed and 6, 387 other casualties, became more than a fire card in the War Department on 25 March, 1942 when it was reactivated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. With the 77th and 90th Divisions, the 82d became one of the first three reserve divisions to be reactivated for service in World War II.						
15. SUBJECT TERMS						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:				17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 148	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified				

R-11960

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

IN

SICILY AND ITALY

PART I - PREFACE

PART I -- PREFACE

The 82d Infantry Division, a unit which spent more consecutive days under fire than any other American Division in World War I and which suffered a total of 1,035 men killed and 6,387 other casualties, became more than a file card in the War Department on 25 March 1942 when it was reactivated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. With the 77th and 90th Divisions, the 82d became one of the first three "reserve" divisions to be reactivated for service in World War II.

In World War I the 82d Division had participated in the Lorraine, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. Its officer ranks had included Major Jonathan M. Wainwright, in World War II a full general and the hero of Bataan; and Lieutenant Colonel John C. H. Lee, in World War II a Lieutenant General and commander of the Communications Zone in the European Theater. Its enlisted ranks included Sgt. Alvin C. York, winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor and blessed by General Pershing as the outstanding American soldier of World War I.

Reactivated as a triangular division, the 82d on 25 March included the Division Headquarters, Division Headquarters Company, 325th, 326th and 327th Infantry Regiments; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 82d Division Artillery; the 319th, 320th, 321st and 307th Field Artillery Battalions; and the 307th Engineer Battalion, 307th Medical Battalion, 407th Quartermaster Battalion, 82d Reconnaissance Troop, 82d Signal Company, and 82d Military Police Platoon.

Among officers assigned the 82d Infantry Division upon activation were Major General Omar N. Bradley, Commanding General, who later became a full General and, in succession, Commander of II Corps, First United States Army, and Twelfth United States Army Group; Brigadier General Matthew B. Ridgway, who succeeded General Bradley as Division Commander on 26 June 1942 and later Commanded XVIII Corps (Airborne) and was promoted to Lieutenant General; Brigadier General Joseph M. Swing, Division Artillery Commander and later commander of the 11th Airborne Division; Colonel George V. W. Pope, Chief of Staff and later Brigadier General and Assistant Division Commander of the 86th Infantry Division; Colonel Claudius S. Easley, Commander of the 325th Infantry, who later became a Brigadier General and was killed in action in the Pacific Theater; Colonel Stuart Cutler, Commander of the 326th Infantry, later promoted to Brigadier General and serving on the staff of the First Allied Airborne Army; Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Eaton, Adjutant General, later promoted to the rank of Brigadier General after service as Chief of Staff of both the Division and XVIII Corps (Airborne); and Lieutenant Colonel Francis A. March, 320th Field Artillery Battalion Commander and later commander of the 82d Airborne Division Artillery.

The Division, setting a new record for speed in its plan of classifying and assigning recruits to units, underwent training appropriate for the various arms of a normal infantry division during the first few months after activation. When General Ridgway succeeded General Bradley as Division Commander, Colonel Maxwell D. Taylor became Chief of Staff. Colonel Taylor later became a general officer, commanding first the 82d Airborne Division Artillery and later the 101st Airborne Division.

During the early summer word was received that the 82d was to become a motorized division and was to move in the fall to Camp Atterbury, Indiana. This plan however was cancelled and on 15 August 1942 the 82d Infantry Division became the 82d Airborne Division. The 82d Infantry Division of World War II held its first and only parade on that date.

The change to airborne saw the 82d split practically in half, one half becoming the 82d Airborne Division and the other half the 101st Airborne Division. In the process the 82d lost the 327th Infantry and two artillery battalions in

toto. The 325th and 326th regiments each contributed a battalion to form a new regiment for the 101st and most other units contributed approximately one-half of their strength to the 101st. (One of the "lost" battalions, the 2d Battalion, 401st was attached to the Division in early 1944 and eventually was incorporated permanently as the 3d Battalion, 325th).

Following the conversion, the 82d Airborne Division's order of battle included Division Headquarters, Division Headquarters Company, 325th and 326th Glider Infantry Regiments (each reduced to a two-battalion basis), 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment which had been activated only a few months earlier at Fort Benning, Georgia, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 82d Airborne Division Artillery, 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalions, the newly-activated 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion with two lettered glider companies and one lettered parachute company, the 307th Airborne Medical Company, 407th Airborne Quartermaster Company, 82d Airborne Signal Company, and 82d Airborne Military Police Platoon. The new Table of Organization did not provide for a Division reconnaissance element, but personnel remaining with the Division from the former 82d Reconnaissance Troop were formed into a provisional platoon.

The 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion was activated on 3 September 1942, and the 782d Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company was activated on 6 October 1942.

Ground training of the Division proceeded at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, until 1 October 1942, when the 82d moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for more advanced ground training in alternation with airborne training. A feature of the move saw both the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions send advance parties of approximately 250 men and officers each to Fort Bragg by air, the largest movement of American military personnel by air up to that time.

A further change in the organization of the Division was effected on 12 February, 1943, when the 326th Glider Infantry was withdrawn from the Division, and the 505th Parachute Infantry and 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion were assigned. To complete this change to two-thirds parachute combat strength, Company B of the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion was converted from a glider into a parachute unit.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Joseph M. Swing left his post as Division Artillery Commander to become Commanding General of the 11th Airborne Division. Colonel Maxwell D. Taylor was promoted to Brigadier General and became Division Artillery Commander. Brigadier General William M. Miley was relieved as Assistant Division Commander of the 82d and became Commanding General of the 17th Airborne Division. Colonel Charles L. Keerans, Jr., Chief of Staff of the 101st Airborne Division, was promoted to Brigadier General and became Assistant Division Commander of the 82d Airborne Division. (General Keerans later was listed as missing in action when his plane did not return from a flight to observe the 504th Parachute Combat Team's drop into Sicily.)

All parachute maintenance personnel were combined into a provisional Parachute Maintenance Company.

Alerted for overseas movement, the 82d Airborne Division began its departure from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 17 April 1943. The Division staged at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 April 1943 and departed for the New York Port of Embarkation. The 82d Airborne Division sailed from Staten Island early on the morning of 29 April 1943, thus becoming the first American Airborne Division to sail overseas.

The Division landed at Casablanca on 10 May, 1943, marshalled at Camp Don B.

Passage near that city, and began a move to the vicinity of Oudja, French Morocco and Marnia, Algiera, on 13 May 1943. Here the Division bivouacked as a combat team with the 325th Glider Combat Team, 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion stationed at Marnia and the remainder of the Division stationed near the Oudja airport.

A Division planning room was established in the gendarmerie building of Oudja (popularly known as the "Pentagon" building), and here plans were worked out for the Division's first combat mission, Operation "HUSKY" or the Invasion of Sicily (Code name: HORRIFIED).

In the Oudja area Division parades were given for Lieutenant General Mark Clark, Fifth Army Commander; Lieutenant General George Patton, Commander of I Armored Corps; and Major General Omar Bradley, Commander of II Infantry Corps. The Division's first airborne review, which included a ground parade, a battalion parachute drop and an exhibition glider landing, also was given for the Governor of Spanish Morocco.

Preceded by small advance parties, the Division on 24 June 1943, began movement by truck, train, plane and glider from its dusty camps amid the wheat fields of French Morocco, to the cactus-hedged areas of Tunisia in the vicinity of Kairouan. Troops were camped near their proposed takeoff airfields. As a result, regiments and other units were scattered, each regiment having headquarters approximately 25 miles from Division Headquarters and some regiments being some 50 road miles apart. Division Headquarters and Headquarters of the 52d Troop Carrier Wing were established in adjacent almond orchards. Ten takeoff fields were to be used.

* The Invasion of Sicily began on the windy night of 9 July 1943, when Colonel James M. Gavin, later to become assistant division commander and division commander, led his 505th Parachute Combat Team in its drop into Sicily.

Unit commanders and staff officers at this time were as follows:

Commanding General	Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Assistant Commanding General	Brigadier General CHARLES L. KEERANS, JR.
Division Artillery Commander	Brigadier General MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chief of Staff	Colonel RALPH P. EATON
G-1	Lieutenant Colonel FREDERICK M. SCHELLHAMMER
G-2	Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE E. LYNCH
G-3	Lieutenant Colonel RICHARD K. BOYD
G-4	Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT H. WIENECKE
Adjutant General	Lieutenant Colonel RAYMOND M. BRITTON
Chemical Officer	Lieutenant Colonel JOHN P. GEIGER
Chaplain	Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE L. RIDDLE
Finance Officer	Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM E. JOHNSON
Headquarters Commandant	Captain WILLIAM C. SHREVE
Inspector General	Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES BARRETT
Judge Advocate General	Lieutenant Colonel CASIMIR D. MOOS
Ordnance Officer	Lieutenant Colonel JOSHUA FINKEL
Provost Marshal	Major WILLIAM P. BOWDEN
Quartermaster	Lieutenant Colonel JOHN W. MOHRMAN
Signal Officer	Lieutenant Colonel FRANK W. MOORMAN
Surgeon	Lieutenant Colonel WOOLCOTT L. ETIENNE
Special Service Officer	Major FREDERICK G. MCCOLLUM
CO, 325th Glider Infantry	Colonel HARRY L. LEWIS
CO, 504th Parachute Infantry	Colonel REUBEN H. TUCKER
CO, 505th Parachute Infantry	Colonel JAMES M. GAVIN
Executive Officer, Division Artillery	Colonel FRANCIS A. MARCH

CO, 319th Glider FA Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM H. BERTSCH, JR.
CO, 320th Glider FA Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel PAUL E. WRIGHT
CO, 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel WHITEFIELD JACK (on DS with Div Hq as Asst G-3 Major RAYMOND E. SINGLETON (Acting))
CO, 376th Parachute FA Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel WILBUR M. GRIFFITH
CO, 456th Parachute FA Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel HARRISON HARDEN
CO, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion	Lieutenant Colonel ROBERT S. PALMER
CO, 82d Airborne Signal Company	Captain ROBERT E. FURMAN
CO, 307th Airborne Medical Company	Major WILLIAM H. HOUSTON
CO, 407th Airborne Quartermaster Company	Captain SAMUEL L. MAYS
CO, 782d Airborne Ordnance Company	Captain JEFF DAVIS, JR.
CO, 82d Parachute Maintenance Company (Prov)	Captain ALBERT C. MARIN
CO, Division Headquarters Company	Captain WILLIAM C. SHREVE
CO, Headquarters Battery Division Artillery	Captain TONY J. RAIBL
CO, 82d Airborne Military Police Platoon	Major WILLIAM P. BOWDEN
CO, Division Reconnaissance Platoon (Prov)	1st Lieutenant ROLAND M. HUDSON

begin

34

SECTION I -- DIVISION REPORT

~~(NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REFER TO
FOOTNOTES AT END OF NARRATIVE)~~

THE PLAN

The plan for the Invasion of SICILY provided for landings to be made on the southeastern extremity of the island, with British and Canadian forces on the east coast and American forces on the south coast. The American assault forces were to consist of the 3rd, 1st, and 45th Infantry Divisions, with attached units, which were to land in the LICATA, GELA, and SAMPIERE vicinities, respectively, and parachute troops from the 82d Airborne Division, which were to land inland from GELA. The remainder of the 82d Airborne Division and the 2nd Armored Division, in Army reserve, were to be brought in as quickly as possible.

The assaulting paratroopers were of the 505th Combat Team, Reinforced, commanded by Colonel James M. Gavin, and their mission was thus stated in Field Order #6 issued by the II Corps:

"~~(a)~~ Land during night D-1/D in area N and E of GELA, capture and secure high ground in that area. ~~(b)~~ Disrupt communications and movement of reserves during night. ~~(c)~~ Be attached to 1st Infantry Division effective H+1 hours on D-Day. ~~(d)~~ Assist 1st Infantry Division in capturing and securing landing field at PONTE OLIVO."

The elements to be employed as part of the 505th Combat Team, with their commanding officers, were as follows:

505th Pchtd. Inf. -----Col. James M. Gavin
3rd Bn., 504th Pchtd. Inf.-----Lt. Col. Charles Kouns
456th Pchtd. FA Bn.-----Lt. Col. Harrison Harden
Co. B., 307th Abn. Engr. Bn.-----Capt. William H. Johnson
Det. 82d Abn. Signal Co.-----2nd Lt. Edward Kacyainski
Det. 307th Abn. Medical Co.-----S/Sgt. Kenneth I. Knott
Air Support Party-----Capt. Jack M. Bartley
PWI Personnel-----1st Lt. Louis P. Testa

The 505th plan, as embodied in its first field order, directed that Regimental Headquarters, the 1st Battalion, and the 2nd Battalion, 505th, and Batteries A and B of the 456th, should drop just north of an important road junction about seven miles east of GELA, attack and overcome an enemy strong point commanding the junction, and defend the junction against attack. The 3rd Battalion, 505th, and Battery C, 456th, should drop south of the same junction, and occupy the high ground overlooking it. The 3rd Battalion, 504th, should drop south of NISCEMI and establish and defend road blocks on the road from NISCEMI to the south. Each of these elements was to be prepared to assist the 1st Infantry Division in seizing the PONTE OLIVO Airdrome. Three planes of troops, including the Demolition Section, were to drop about five miles further east and prepare the demolition of rail and road crossings of the AGATE River.

The mission assigned the Division less the 505th Combat Team was outlined in Field Order #1 of Force 343 (Seventh Army):

"(a) 82d Airborne Division (-Dets) concentrate rapidly by successive air lifts in SICILY, by D+7, in either or both the DIME (45th Infantry Division) or JOSS (3rd Infantry Division) areas, as directed.

"(b) 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, remain in NORTH AFRICA, in Force 343 reserve, available for drop missions as directed."

In compliance with this order, the Division devised a Movement Table (Annex 2 to Field Order #1), under which the 504th Combat Team, as a second lift, was alerted for movement the evening of D-Day; or, in the event of negative instructions at that time, the evening of D+1, or of any day thereafter. Division Headquarters was to constitute a third lift, ready for movement in gliders the evening of D+1, or thereafter. The 325th Combat Team and the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion, were to follow by planes and gliders in designated order.

The 504th Combat Team, under the command of Colonel Reuben H. Tucker, included the following units, under the command of the officers named:

504th Procht. Inf. (less 3rd Bn.) (2)-----Col. Reuben H. Tucker
 376th Procht. FA Bn.-----Lt. Col. Wilbur M. Griffith
 Co. C, 307th Abn. Engr. Bn.-----Capt. Thomas M. Wight

The Division Headquarters serial was to include members of the general and special staff sections and of the following units: Hq. and Hq. Btry., Div Arty.; Div. Hq. Co.; 82nd Abn. Signal Co.; 407th QM Co.; 307th Med. Co.; 782nd Ord. Maint. Co.; and the 307th Abn Engr. Bn., all under the command of Lt. Col. Robert Palmer, Division Engineer.

The Commanding General of the Division, Major General M. B. Ridgway, with a special command party, boarded the MONROVIA, Seventh Army Command Vessel, at ALGIERS, July 4, from which he and the party would land at GELA on D-Day. The Commanding General's party included Colonel R. P. Eaton, Chief of Staff; Lt. Col. G. E. Lynch, G-2; Lt. Col. R. K. Boyd, G-3; Lt. Col. R. H. Wienecke, G-4; Lt. Col. Frank Moorman, Signal Officer; Major E. S. Adams, Liaison Officer; Capt. Don C. Faith, aide-de-camp; and eleven enlisted men from the staff sections.

THE THREE LIFTS

D-1, the day of the first lift, was, as usual for the time of year in NORTH AFRICA, hot and clear. The men of the 505th Combat Team, stationed near KAIROUAN, TUNISIA, lounged in their bivouac area, made last preparations of arms and equipment, ate supper at 1600 hours, and went to the ten airdromes from which they were to take off. The 226 Army Transport planes, type C-47, in which they were flown, cleared the fields between 2010 and 2116 hours, July 9th.

The route was by way of JURIATE Island and MALTA, thence directly to the Sicilian Coast east of GELA and over the various drop zones; and the flight was expected to require, including time for air rendezvous, about three hours and twenty minutes.

Late in the afternoon the wind off the south coast of SICILY was of gale intensity. Although it diminished as the evening progressed, the weather continued sufficiently rough that an unusually large proportion of the men were ill in the planes, and much worse; that the plane formations were badly scattered. The difficulty in avoiding that consequence was, of course much enhanced by the darkness after 2130 hours, by the absence of inter-plane communication, and by the extremely low flying, dictated by tactical reasons. It is also testified (3) that there were some tracer fire on the planes, which, although not heavy, was the cause of the destruction of at least one plane which was seen to fall in flames. Many of the men stated they were standing, hooked up, for 30 to 50 minutes while their planes searched for the drop zone. In any event, the formations were broken, and not only were the drop zones missed by most of the planes, but also the Combat Team as a whole was badly scattered from the vicinity of GELA to points east of MODICA. (4)

Although eight planes failed to return, the parachutists had cleared them before they were lost. Three planes returned with full loads, including one officer and fifteen men of Company A, 505th, and 17 men of Batteries B and C, 456th. All

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

IN

SICILY AND ITALY

* * *

PART II ----- SICILY

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1	DIVISION REPORT
2	505TH PARACHUTE COMBAT TEAM REPORTS
3	504TH PARACHUTE COMBAT TEAM REPORTS
4	CASUALTIES

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

IN

SICILY AND ITALY

* * * *

PART I	-----	PREFACE
PART II	-----	SICILY
PART III	-----	ITALY
PART IV	-----	DISTRIBUTION
PART V	-----	WORLD WAR II CASUALTIES, DECORATIONS, CITATIONS

* * * *

This booklet is one of a series describing campaigns in World War II by the 82d (All-American) Division, others being those describing campaigns in NORMANDY, FRANCE, known as Operation "NEPTUNE", the NETHERLANDS, known as Operation "MARKET"; the ARDENNES, more popularly known as the BELGIAN BULGE; and CENTRAL EUROPE, the final action.

In the course of these operations the 82d Airborne Division became the first American Airborne Division in action and the only Airborne Division to fight in two Theaters of Operations (the North African or Mediterranean, and the European Theaters). General Officers who served in the 82d Airborne Division became commanders of every American Airborne Division which saw action in World War II, and one became commander of the only American Airborne Corps formed during the war.

* * * *

The contents herein are not to be considered as an official After-Action Report. This booklet, which completes a series of reports on operations of the Division, is published primarily for personnel who participated in the SICILIAN and ITALIAN Campaigns.

T. B. Kettererson

T. B. KETTERSON
Major, Cavalry
Division Historian

* * * *

these men, having been completely cleared of responsibility for the failure to drop were allowed to participate in the Second Lift.

The 504th Combat Team, alerted throughout D-Day for the Second Lift, at the fields and loaded in the planes, waited while a negative message from General Ridgway was delayed in delivery, but was finally released at 1840, when Colonel Clark of the 52d Wing decided that it was too late for the mission to be undertaken. The next day, D+1, at 1100 hours, orders were received that the Second Lift would be flown that evening.

This lift comprised 144 planes, and was to proceed to MALTA, thence to the southeastern coast of SICILY at SAMPIERE, thence along the coast to Lake BIVIERE southeast of GELA, thence inland to the FARELLO Airport.

The air was considerably quieter than two days before; the night was lighted by a quarter moon; and the drop zone was behind the 1st Division line. The highest hope for a safe crossing seemed justified. Nevertheless, full instructions were issued to the commanders of friendly troops and naval units relating to the flight, including the route, the time and the objective (5).

The hope was realized until the first planes neared the drop zone. How trouble began is best described in a statement made by Captain Willard E. Harrison, Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry:

"On the night of July 11-12, 1943, I flew in the leading plane of the first serial and reached the coast of SICILY near PUNTA SOCCA at approximately 2230 hours, thence flew in a northwesterly direction along the coast toward GELA. The left wing plane flew just over the water line, and the squadron of 9 planes continued perfect formation up to the coast at an altitude of approximately 900 feet. We encountered no fire of any kind until the lead plane reached the lake at H30-25 (Lake BIVIERE), when one .50 calibre machine gun, situated in the sand dunes several hundred yards from the shore, opened fire. As soon as this firing began, guns along the coast as far as we could see toward PUNTA SOCCA, opened fire and the naval craft lying off shore, both towards PUNTA SOCCA and toward GELA, began firing anti-aircraft guns."

The squadron mentioned by Captain Harrison was not hit, nor were any of his men fired on in the descent, but the anti-aircraft fire, particularly from naval units, grew more intense, and to it was added fire from machine gunners and riflemen on descending parachutists, and anti-aircraft units of the Army and Navy later declared that bombers had been overhead simultaneously with our own planes, one of which could not be distinguished from the other. In passing through this fire many planes were badly damaged and 23 of the 144 were destroyed. The entire formation was badly scattered. The pilot of one of the planes which did return told of his difficulties:

"A few minutes before reaching the drop point with the paratroopers, a shell smashed into the starboard side of the fuselage and knocked out a hole four by six feet while a fragment from the shell slit the aluminum and every rib from hole to rudder. Passing through the plane the fragment ripped off a door as a second ack-ack blast carried away a portion of the left stabilizer. The explosions also blew away a large piece of equipment, and the impact was so great that it felt like a motor crash in the pilot's cabin.

"The airplane spun at a right angle and nearly pulled the controls from my grasp. For a second I didn't realize what had happened, then finding myself out of formation I began a violent evasive action. I saw three planes burning on the ground and red tracers everywhere as machine gunners sprayed us as if potting a flight of ducks.

"Meanwhile I had cut into a less dangerous spot to give the parachutists

a fighting chance to reach ground. But I've got to hand it to those boys; one, who had been pretty badly hit by shrapnel, insisted on leaping with the others although he had been ordered to remain in the plane."

One of the more harrowing reports was that of 1st Lieutenant C. A. Drew, Company F, 504th. His statement shows that some men were lost because of warning of the flight had not been conveyed to the men of one unit, and others because each division then had its own password: (6)

"I was jump-master in Plane 531. This plane was leading a formation of 3 planes and was No. 7 in our Company. The pilot of my plane gave me the warning 20 minutes out from the DZ. After the red light came on he had to give me the green light in about 1 minute, due to the plane being on fire.

"We jumped into a steady stream of AA fire, and not knowing that they were friendly troops. There was 4 men killed and 4 wounded from my Platoon. Three of these men were hit coming down and one was killed on the ground because he had the wrong password. After landing we found out this had been changed to "Think"--"Quickly".

"The AA we jumped into was the 180th Infantry of the 45th Division. They also were not told we were coming. Later we found out that the 45th Division had been told we were coming but word never had got to the 180th Infantry of the 45th Division."

"We tried to reorganize but found we didn't have but 44 men including 3 officers. We searched all night for the rest of the men. After accounting for them we took care of the dead and wounded and started towards our objective. We arrived at the 504th CP at 2 o'clock July 12, 1943."

"About 75 yards from where I landed, Plane No. 915 was hit and burned. To my knowledge, only the pilot and three men got out. The pilot was thrown through the window."

"Another plane was shot down on the beach and another plane was down burning about 1,000 yards to my front. Altogether there were three planes I know of being shot down."

Of the 23 destroyed planes, fortunately only six were shot down before the parachutists had jumped. One of the six carried five officers and fifteen men of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 504th; one carried three officers and fifteen men of Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th; and four carried one officer and thirty-two men of Battery C, 376th; a total of 9 officers and 62 men. Miraculously, some of these survived. Lieutenant Colonel L. G. Freeman, Executive Officer, 504th; two other officers and twelve men survived--eleven of them wounded when their plane crash-landed. 1st Lieutenant M. C. Shelly, Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 504th, was thrown clear of his plane when it crashed, all other occupants being killed. One of the Battery C planes was shot down at sea, carrying all its nine parachutists down with it, but from the other three there were five men saved by their reserve chutes; two struggled out of their plane after it had been twice hit and was afire; three were actually blown clear as their planes were demolished by ack-ack.

One of the planes lost on its return flight, and of which no remains have been found, carried as an official observer Brigadier General Charles L. Keerans, Jr., Assistant Division Commander.

In the returning planes were four dead and six wounded parachutists, and eight full loads which had not been given an opportunity to jump. These included ten officers, two warrant officers and ninety-five men (7).

The dispersion was as great as that of the 505th, men being dropped practically as far east, and others being dropped west of GELA.

The following day, D+2, gliders were loaded and men of the Division Headquarters serial ready to embark, when an order was received from Force 141 (15th Army Group) cancelling all projected movements by air. (8). The possibility was left open of a movement by sea, but no decision was made known until Division Headquarters notified the 52d Wing at 1000 July 16, that the Third Lift would be carried to SICILY by plane and landed at PONTE OLIVO Airdrome, taking off at 1315 hours that same day. It cleared the fields on schedule, in a flight of 51 planes, escorted by fighters, and flew direct to SICILY by way of RANTELLARIA. All planes arrived safely, about 1515 hours.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

The scattered fashion in which Combat Team 505 was dropped made fully organized combat impossible. Of all its elements only "I" Company, less one plane, jumped on an assigned drop zone; but "I" Company is credited with having accomplished its mission, with reducing a blockhouse and several pillboxes and taking a great many prisoners.

Most of the men upon landing found themselves alone or near only one other or a few of their comrades. Those who were not already pinned down by fire immediately set out to find others; and during the remainder of the night, the great majority succeeded in grouping themselves into three or fours at least (although frequently members of such groups were from different units), and sometimes into groups of platoon size or larger. Indeed, the 2d Battalion Serial was almost entirely assembled within twelve hours of landing.

Thus the fighting was begun and continued by groups of all sizes and compositions, and against a variety of objectives. On one occasion on the 11th at BIAZZA Ridge between GELA and VITTORIA an important engagement was fought against a substantial force of the Hermann Goering Division by 200-300 paratroopers led by Colonel Gavin. At several points, groups of platoon size made planned attacks on strong points or ambushed enemy columns. On many more occasions, individuals or small groups, seeking at once to avoid capture, to find their units, and to do as much damage to the enemy as possible, chanced onto pillboxes, couriers, vehicles, and small garrisons, killed or captured the enemy, or fought him off and retired. Such action can be described only in its individual instances, as it occurred.

One case of two paratroopers isolated in enemy territory is so vividly told by a principal that it is here re-produced in his own words (9).

"We first received the order to stand up and hook up just off the coast. Just over the beach we ran into AA fire. Our plane kept diving and banking. The pilot passed the word down the line to jump on the red light. At the time the word reached Lieutenant Mills (10) the red light flashed on. We started out. Just as I got to the door our plane was hit. I was knocked back against the opposite side of the ship. I finally got out. Where we landed there were a couple of pillboxes burning from the bombing raid.

"We started to assemble in an orchard when the artillery opened up on us. That didn't last long. We assembled and found out that we had one man, Cpl. Len, had broken his leg. We wrapped him in a chute and hid him in a vine patch. We left him with 2 riggers.

"Lieutenant Mills got his bearings and told us what the score was. We had dropped 15 miles from the right DZ in enemy territory. We got our weapons and marched down the road. We heard somebody yelling and a whirring sound like an auto stuck in the mud. I don't know why but we marched right into them. We walked across a bridge. As we reached the end we heard some-

one yelled halt. It was the Hienies. Lieutenant Mills said, "Ground equipment and jump over the bridge." He no sooner said that than they opened fire on us. We ran into a vine patch and hid. They shot flares in the air and tried to pick us off. They tossed grenades and fired their guns into the patch. Pvts. Boggs, Wright and I were cut off from the rest. We started to run and were chased and fired on. We lost Wright somewhere. Boggs and I hid in a cane break for an hour or two.

"We got disgusted and decided to work our way back to the DZ about 3 miles away. We started and changed our minds again and headed due north the way we were ambushed. I had a compass and we started towards what we thought was GELA. About noon we seen a German patrol. Just 2 men. We were afraid to fire on them because the range was too great for a carbine. We ducked them and later came across a gun set upon a hill. We looked it over but couldn't make it out so we avoided it and started up the RR tracks.

"I seen someone on the skyline and started up the hill. I seen it was an American G.I. He had me covered with a .50 calibre so I started yelling. It was a 1st Division man. They took us to the assembly area."

In another case, two plane loads of Company "B", 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion, landed 15 miles northeast of the drop zone, and were joined by one plane load of Company "A", 505th. They spent the remainder of the night searching for the drop zones and cutting telegraph wires, and just before dawn, dug in at a road intersection. The rest of their story is told as follows:

"At 0530, a German motorcycle containing 3 passengers pulled up to the crossroads and stopped. The passengers were killed. Another motorcycle arrived 15 minutes later and likewise caught under fire and the occupants killed. The men were then assembled and moved out in the general direction of the DZ. Five of this group were separated when they went to pick up two equipment chutes which were spotted a half mile away. The remainder continued on and took up a position on ground commanding the two valleys. Here contact was made with elements of Company "G", and defensive positions were set up. During the afternoon, 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, 45th Division, arrived at the hill. The men attached themselves to it and remained with it for three nights and two days. During this period of time additional parachutist drifted in and became part of their organization."

One of the most substantial victories was accomplished by 1st Lieutenant F. E. Thomas, Company "I", 504th, without bloodshed. While with several men under his command being served a meal by friendly civilians, he was surprised and covered by the weapons of a small German force which had three disabled tanks in the vicinity, including one Mark VI. Lieutenant Thomas resorted to reason with his captor, pointing out the inevitability of Allied victory and the futility of his captors' efforts. It turned out that among the Germans there was one severely wounded man for whom the leader desired the excellent medical aid which he knew the Americans could afford. Consequently an understanding was reached. The Americans being released and given custody of the wounded man, promised to secure him immediate medical treatment. The Germans put their tanks out of commission, abandoned them, and departed in the opposite direction.

A vastly different sort of action involving a 1st Battalion group is narrated by Jack Thompson, Chicago Tribune correspondent who jumped with the First Lift:

"One group of the 1st Battalion, including Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Gorham, landed 4 miles south of NISCEMI, about 2 1/2 miles from the scheduled DZ. They were just east of a very sturdy, thick-walled farmhouse which had been converted into a military fort held by 60 men with 4 heavy machine guns and 6 lights. It was well wired in with trench defenses. Colonel Gorham ordered an assault on the house and it was organized and led by Captain Edwin Sayre (11) and 22 men. Their first attack was launched at 2 o'clock in the morning. They held up then until they attacked again just before dawn, with rifles, grenades, one 60mm mortar and a bazooka. They forced the Italians

back out of the trenches and into the house and attacked the house with grenades. Sayre led the assault, carrying one hand grenade in his teeth and another in his left hand, and with his carbine in his right hand. It wasn't until after they had taken the farmhouse that he discovered the man who was covering him was covering him with a trench knife and not a tommy gun as he had thought. A rifle grenade fired at about ten feet blew open the door, but the door swung shut again. Sayre walked up, threw open the door, and pitched a hand grenade inside. They found a total of 15 dead and took 45 prisoners, some of whom were Germans. Four paratroops were wounded, one of whom later died. The house soon came under fire from an 88 and Col. Gorham withdrew his men back to another hill and it wasn't until two days later that they were able to recapture the farmhouse."

This group later made contact with the 1st Division, and joined the 2nd Bn., 16th Inf., with which they fought two days until relieved. In resisting an enemy attack while with the 16th Inf., paratroopers succeeded with their rocket-launchers in stopping several tanks. It was in such an act at this time that Lt. Col. Arthur Gorham, C.O., 1st Bn., was killed. This episode is also related by Mr. Thompson:

"The position where Gorham's men were at that time acting as assault troops with the 16th Infantry, with whom they had made contact, came under heavy attack by Mark VI and Mark IV tanks and enemy artillery, as well as extremely heavy machine gun fire. Col. Gorham was killed by a shell from a Mark VI while firing a bazooka at the tanks on the nearby road. Captain Comstock (12), Medical Officer, ran to his aid and was wounded by the next shell burst. Lt. Dean McCandless (13), who was nearby, ran up to help the wounded doctor and called for Corporal Thomas Higgins (14) to get a jeep and evacuate him. Higgins ran a quarter of a mile through a concentration of machine gun fire until he found a jeep. The driver was reluctant to go into this fire so Higgins was joined by a paratroop cook, Private Bernard Williams (15). The two of them drove the jeep under fire back to the hill and with the aid of Lt. McCandless evacuated Captain Comstock and the body of Col. Gorham."

Another 1st Bn. group, dropped about 50 miles east of GELA, occupied and held the town of NOTO; and a third group, consisting of 12 men from the 1st Bn., participated in the capture of RAGUSA.

A group of about 40 men of the Headquarters Serial, including men from two platoons of Engineers, under the command of 1st Lieutenant H. H. Swingler, Headquarters Commandant, occupied early in the morning of the 10th an area of high ground commanding the road net leading inland from the 45th Division beaches, and is credited with greatly facilitating the landing of that Division. They destroyed one armored vehicle as it approached the beach, cut off advance elements seeking to retire before the 45th's attack, reduced several pillboxes, and themselves captured 5 officers and 96 men. This same group joined Colonel Gavin on the 11th in time to participate in the action at BLAZZA Ridge.

Although the 2d Battalion serial landed south of RAGUSA, 25 miles from its drop zone, and was attacked before reaching the ground, a large part of the Serial was assembled under its CO, Major Alexander, by noon the 10th. Even during that morning, it was engaged in attacking enemy positions near S. GROCE--CAMERINA, where it took 45 prisoners. Thence, it advanced on the town itself, occupied it after a short but hard fight, and captured 144 more prisoners and a great deal of equipment. After a third victorious skirmish east of the city, it bivouaked, reorganized the next day, and marched west on the 12th to join OT Headquarters.

Two and one-half miles southeast of NISCEMI a group of men from the 3d Battalion, 504th, under Lieutenant Willis J. Ferrill, Company "I", ambushed a force of 350 Germans from the Hermann Goering Division, who were retreating up the road.

The paratroopers, who by the end of the afternoon of D Day numbered 110,

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

had taken up a defensive position on a hill. They had already shot up a German patrol, and one small group had demolished an Italian patrol, killing 14. Eleven of these Italians were killed by two privates, Shelby R. Hord (16) and Thomas E. Lane (17). On the following day after Ferrill's force had begun to increase, it was in position on a hill at noon when an enemy column was observed coming up the road from the south. With the Germans were several American prisoners. Lieutenant Ferrill withheld fire until the Germans were almost opposite his position. Then at noon the Germans suddenly halted for a ten-minute break. The Americans waited until the Germans started to get up and put on their packs, and then fired on them with devastating effect. The battle lasted all afternoon. It was joined by two enemy tanks which shelled the Americans from the far-off hills. Late in the afternoon a German lieutenant came up the hill with a white flag to arrange a surrender, but when he saw the Americans were parachutists he refused to surrender and went down the hill again. Then the battle was resumed and lasted until dusk, when the Germans withdrew, leaving 50 dead. The cost to the Americans was 5 killed and 15 wounded. The hill from which the Americans fought was identified on the map as CASTLE NOCERA.

Of the 3d Battalion Serial, 505th, 45 men under 1st Lieutenant F. Willis, Battery C, 456th, joined forward elements of the 180th Infantry, and served with them as assault troops; and 60 others, with 3 guns of the 456th, were the first troops to enter VITTORIA. It was on this occasion that 1st Lieutenant William J. Harris, 3d Battalion Headquarters Company, taken prisoner by the Italians, persuaded the garrison commander of the futility of resistance, and induced him to surrender himself and his command of 80 men on the spot.

The largest part of the 3d Battalion, 180 men under Major Krause, were the backbone of the force which fought a battalion of the Hermann Goering Division at BIAZZA Ridge.

BIAZZA Ridge is a prominence about 12 miles west of VITTORIA on the GELA Highway. Colonel Gavin, approaching it the morning of the 11th from the direction of VITTORIA with the 3d Battalion force mentioned above, was warned of the presence of Germans. He succeeded in compelling them to retire from the ridge and in occupying the crest of it, but after an attempt to continue his advance, decided to organize the high ground and to be prepared to defend it against counter-attack. During the day three 75mm pack howitzers, two 57mm anti-tank guns from the 45th Division, and a few rocket launchers were assembled.

The expected enemy counter-attack with tanks--Mark IV's and Mark VI's was made shortly after noon, and surged within 50 yards of the detachment's CP. One tank was knocked out by a 75mm pack, and much aid was rendered by 155mm guns of the 45th Division and Navy 5 inchers. A last-ditch defense finally forced the enemy to withdraw for a reorganization.

In the meantime, about 1900, Lieutenant Swingler and his group arrived, and also 11 General Shermans, making possible an American attack at 2030 which completely routed the Germans and gave the detachment undisputed possession of the Ridge.

American losses in this action were 43 killed and 100 wounded. At least 50 enemy dead were left on the field, and 50 prisoners taken. Two German armored cars and one tank were knocked out; twelve 6-inch mortars, and many machine guns, small arms and vehicles taken. A caliber .50 crew of Battery D, 456th, was credited with the destruction of three Me 109's, which attacked the position.

After burying the dead the morning of the 12th, the force proceeded toward GELA. (18).

REORGANIZATION

The beach assault had begun at 0245, July 10th. At 0730 General Ridgway and Captain Faith went ashore to seek the drop zones and elements of the 505th, but succeeded in finding only Company "I", 505th, and in learning that Company "A" was in contact with the CP of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry. This CP, and also that of the 1st Division, was visited later in the day by Lieutenant Colonels Lynch and Boyd, who debarked at 1700, just after General Ridgway's return.

Contact with the 505th Command Post was not made on the 10th or 11th, nor was any substantial progress made in reassembly of the combat team on those days. At 0830 on the 11th an order was sent Division Rear that the 504th should be flown across that evening, and during the remainder of the day the MONROVIA party was occupied preparing for the arrival. A message was sent Seventh Army requesting notification of all friendly troops, and one to Division Rear to apprise the Wing of the great dispersion of the 505th. Arrangements were made for rations and water from the 1st Division, and immediate medical treatment at the drop zone by the 51st Medical Battalion. A Division CP was set up ashore at 1500 hours, about 3 miles southeast of GELA and one mile from the coast.

While General Ridgway and staff waited on the FARELLO landing field, the first elements of the 504th came down at 2250, July 11th, and by 0715 the next morning Colonel Tucker had arrived at the CP. In the meantime, word came indirectly that a number of members of the 505th were in the vicinity of RAGUSA. Nevertheless at 0755 on the 12th, General Ridgway was compelled to report to the Seventh Army:

"No formed element of Combat Team 505 under my control. Expect some today based on 1st Division reports. Elements of Combat Team 504 dribbling in. At present one battery 75 pack howitzer and equivalent of one infantry company available for use....Am concentrating all efforts on reorganization."

His expectations in regard to the 505th were not realized that day, however; and the 504th "dribbled in" only enough that the first G-1 Report to Seventh Army at 1730 could list present for the 504th 37 officers and 518 men.

Colonel Gavin reached the Division CP July 13 at 0900, and confirmed the location of 1200 troops under his command. Henceforth, reassembly proceeded more rapidly, so that at 1800 hours, Captain Alfred W. Ireland, S-1 of the 505th, could report a total strength of 1648. Information from other units, particularly 1st Division artillery and the 45th Division, facilitated the location of troops and a G-1 Report to the Seventh Army showed Division strength in SICILY as 3024 at midnight July 13. This figure grew to 3790 at midnight July 14, almost completing the reassembly of forward personnel which had not become casualties. With the acquisition of 426 officers and men of the Third Lift, the total Division strength in SICILY was only 4309 at 2400 July 17, and 4390 at 2400 July 27.

Thus, out of 5307 men in the first two lifts, 3024 represented the total strength July 13th, 3790 on July 14th. Out of 5733 in the three lifts, 4309 represented the total strength July 17th, and 4390 on July 27. Subtracting the 426 brought in the Third Lift from the strength for the 17th, there had been an increase in the strength of the two combat teams of only 93 men in three days from July 13th-17th.

As the reassembly progressed, preparations for action were being made. The 3d Battalion, 504th, rejoined the 504th Combat Team. The Division CP was moved on July 13th two miles north to a point near Highway 115, and the 504th and 505th assembly areas were maintained close at hand. A request was made July 15th for the movement of the Third Lift with fighter escort, which bore fruit the following day. The great problem of transportation for a Division which had been able to bring almost none of its own (19) was met by the procurement July 16 from Provisional

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corps of twenty-four 2 1/2 ton trucks and seven 1/4 ton trucks, which were retained throughout the following operations, and from the 39th Combat Team of eighty-three 2 1/2 and 3/4 ton trucks which were retained only for the movement from GELA to PALMA. (20) A basic load of ammunition, acquired before leaving the GELA area, sufficed for the entire campaign on which the Division was about to embark.

These preparations had proceeded under Seventh Army orders to reassemble and reorganize in Army reserve. At noon the 15th, a directive was received from Seventh Army, ordering the 82d Airborne Division to assemble with attached troops in the PALMA DI MONTECHIARO area, to relieve elements of the 3d Division in that area by dark, July 19th, and to be prepared to advance west. The projected zone of action of the Division was a coastal strip including Highway 115 and extending 5-10 miles inland, until, in the vicinity of the VERDURA River, west of RIBERA, the right boundary, shared with the 3d Division, turned north to PALERMO. The left boundary was the sea.

The movement west from the assembly area near GELA began by truck shuttle at 0600 July 17th and carried that evening to a new area about 5 miles west of PALMA, with the 504th Combat Team and most of Division Headquarters moving in the first serial, the 505th and the remainder of Division Headquarters in the second. On the 17th, at 1100 hours, Provisional Corps directed immediate relief of the 3d Division in the 82d Division zone, pursuant to which the 39th Combat Team was moved the evening of the 17th onto the high ground east of AGRIGENTO, from which it advanced at dawn the 18th through AGRIGENTO and PORTO EMPEDOCLE, where the 3d Division had been engaged the day before. Early in the morning of the 18th, elements of the 39th were astride Highway 115 at REALMONTE. This position they secured, occupying the high ground in that vicinity and patrolling to the CANNE River. Behind the 39th Combat Team, the Division CP was moved 2 miles west of PORTO EMPEDOCLE on the afternoon of the 18th and the 504th moved to an area near REALMONTE, immediately behind the line of the 39th, from which it could undertake an advance the next day.

Although the 3d Division had met some resistance and taken a great many prisoners in AGRIGENTO, not even the 39th Combat Team patrols ever gained contact with the enemy, and the 82d moved forward during the 17th and 18th entirely without molestation.

THE CAMPAIGN

The orders under which the 82d's campaign to the west were about to begin were the Provisional Corps Field Order #1, issued at 1500 July 18, directing the Division to advance by 0800 the 19th from the REALMONTE Line, and the Division Field Order #2 of the same day, directing Combat Team 504 to relieve Combat Team 39 by 0800 the 19th, secure crossings over the CANNE River by daylight and continue westward. Battery A of the 82d Armored Field Artillery Battalion and Battery A & B of the 83rd Chemical Battalion were attached to Combat Team 504 for this mission.

Prospects of resistance were assessed in the Intelligence Annex of the Division Field Order in these words: "At this time no known organized fighting forces are located to the immediate west on the route of advance of this Division."

Actually, some elements of Combat Team 504 were at REALMONTE by noon the 18th, before the formal orders were issued. The entire Combat Team, moving by marching and truck shuttle, assembled there during the day, and secured before dark the CANNE crossings and the high ground to the west. At 0300 the 19th, troops of the 2d Battalion, 504th, were in MONTALLEGRO; at 0900 at the FLATANI River; at 1015 at the MAGGAZIO River; and at 1200 had occupied RIBERA. Before 2100, they had reached and were stopped by the Corps phase line halfway between RIBERA and SCIACCA. Every phase of the advance, and of subsequent advances as well, was led

in person by General Ridgway, who kept himself in personal touch with the reconnaissance elements, the point, and the advance guard command.

This headlong progress had almost been retarded by enemy destruction the previous day of the highway bridge across the CANNE River, in what was reported by the Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry, as "the best job of demolition seen in a long time. Requires a major engineering job." But a by-pass for heavy vehicles around the demolished bridge was completed by a 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Palmer at 0400 the 19th, aided by a detachment of the 17th Engineer Battalion, Armored, of the 2d Armored Division.

Active enemy resistance during the entire day was extremely light. The only exceptions were brief machine gun fire just east of RIBERA and machine gun and light artillery fire at the VERDURA River, encountered by detachments of the Division Reconnaissance Platoon under 1st Lieutenant Roland Hudson, and of the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, operating on our front under Corps order. No casualties were suffered in either case, and in the former the enemy surrendered almost as soon as the fire was returned.

The latter resistance was somewhat more determined. It began about 1400 hours, when HE shells fell near the Reconnaissance vehicles. The vehicles deployed off the highway, the 75mm and four 37mm guns of the 82d Armored detachment undertaking counter-battery fire and the .50 calibre machine guns of the Division Platoon moving toward the railroad line to the south to engage machine gun emplacements. As accurate fire was brought to bear on them, the personnel of one enemy gun after another raised a white flag; and at the end of an hour all resistance had ceased. In the course of it, ten Italians had been killed and 250 captured, along with four 75mm and six 40mm guns, and a much larger number of machine guns.

The point of the 2d Battalion, 504th, came under light arms fire for a few minutes just west of RIBERA, but without being caused delay or casualties. The reconnaissance elements discovered a mine field just east of RIBERA in conjunction with a road block, and another just west of the town at a railroad crossing, all of which were removed without mishap. The only Division casualties during the day resulted from a general strafing of the entire column on three different occasions by 2 to 5 Me 110's. Five men of Company E, 505th, and two men of the 2d Battalion, 504th, were wounded.

At the end of the day, Combat Team 504 had secured the phase line halfway from RIBERA to SCIACCA. The artillery, all then under Division control, which had moved into the PLATANI VALLEY in the afternoon, was in position west of RIBERA and registered. Combat Team 505 was assembled just northeast of RIBERA; and Combat Team 39 at SICULIANA. (2) An advance of 25 miles had been made and 500 prisoners taken at a cost of 7 casualties.

Substantially, all the circumstances of the advance on the 19th, the promptness and rapidity of it, the token resistance and voluntary surrender of isolated enemy garrisons were repeated on the 20th, with a few minor variations.

At 0450 the 20th, the Division relayed to Combat Team 504 the Corps order to proceed at 0600 to the next phase line. The advance began on schedule, and leading elements entered SCIACCA at 0925, but the preparation of a difficult by-pass around a demolished bridge on the western outskirts of SCIACCA and the removal of mines in that vicinity so delayed the main body that it did not pass through the city until about noon. There the 2d Battalion, then leading, was turned north on the SAN MARGHERITA Road with TUMMINELLO as the night's objective, and Combat Team 504 (2d Battalion) continued west on Highway 115 toward MENFI, which was entered at 1800. By nightfall the 2d Battalion reached a point about 8 miles north of SCIACCA. Both sides were somewhat delayed during the afternoon by small minefields in road-beds, and the 1st Battalion, 504th, leading from SCIACCA to MENFI, was

fired on briefly by a battery of 75mm guns, which were quickly captured.

Combat Team 505 had spent the day securing the right flank and rear by patrolling the roads north from RIBERA. Batteries of the 376th, 34th and 62d Field Artillery (22) had been called into action briefly on enemy batteries, pillboxes, and personnel east of SCIACCA; and the 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion had prepared the by-pass at SCIACCA, and removed the mine-fields on three sides of the city.

The advance during the day was 15-20 miles; the number of prisoners taken approximately 1,000; and our own casualties, two. (23) North of SCIACCA was discovered an abandoned German bivouac area and anti-aircraft position, and a large Italian quartermaster dump.

The order of the day, July 21, was to proceed to and secure a line on the BELLICE River in the Division's zone, there to protect the right flank of the 2d Armored Division as it moved north along the west bank of the BELLICE to PALERMO.

The 2d Battalion, 504th, which had stopped about five miles short of TUMMINELLO the night before, resumed its advance the morning of the 21st and reached TUMMINELLO at 0800. The enemy, prepared at this point in a strong natural position, resisted with the fire of a battery of 75mm guns, two 90mm guns and small arms for a period of 15-30 minutes, killing 6 and wounding 8 men of Company F. But by 0830, as soon as a flanking party approached the position, it was captured with all its personnel and equipment. Two abandoned light Renault tanks, apparently in good condition, were discovered by the Division Reconnaissance Platoon north of TUMMINELLO.

The responsibility for continuing the advance from this point to the BELLICE had been assigned Combat Team 505. With the 2d Battalion leading, it had set out at 0300 from a bivouac area one mile east of SCIACCA, and it marched continuously that day without food or resupply of water until the objective was attained- a distance of 23 miles. The 2d Battalion passed through the 2d Battalion, 504th, at TUMMINELLO at 0930; occupied SAN MARGHERITA at 1140; and was organizing its positions on the BELLICE at 1500. Company I was diverted eastward at SAN MARGHERITA to occupy SAMBUCA, and one platoon of Company G, westward to occupy MONTEVAGO. In carrying out this last mission, the platoon came under very brief machine gun fire; but except for this and the engagement at TUMMINELLO no resistance was encountered by the Division throughout the day; nor was any contact whatsoever established north of SAN MARGHERITA. At 1350 the Combat Team 505 occupied the SCIACCA Airdrome about ten miles north of the city, where it captured 175 prisoners and took possession of 30 airplanes and several field pieces, most of which were badly damaged.

At the end of the day the 2d Battalion, 504th, was occupying SAMBUCA; the 2d and 3d Battalions, 505th, were protecting the highway bridges over the BELLICE near MONTEVAGO and north of SAN MARGHERITA, and securing the general area to the north and northwest; the 1st Battalion, 505th, was established just north of SAN MARGHERITA; and Combat Team 504 was being moved into the same area from MENFI. The Reconnaissance Platoon had entered SALAPARUTA and GIBELLINA without resistance, and the Division was prepared to move on an hour's notice either in support of the 2d Armored Division's PALERMO drive, or to the westward extremity of the island.

The day's advance had netted 15 miles at a cost of 14 casualties. 1515 prisoners had been taken and much stores and equipment in addition to that already mentioned.

The Division being in Corps reserve, the same positions were maintained throughout the 22nd, with no activity except uneventful patrolling to the north and east, (24) but all preparations were made for immediate resumption of the advance.

Corps orders were received at 0830 July 23 to "move without delay to seize

TRAPANI and the above-mentioned held portion of SICILY, (that west of line CASTELLAMARE--MAZZARA)," and for that purpose attaching to the Division, Task Force X, consisting of Combat Team 39, the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Reconnaissance Battalions.

Task Force X, which was scattered between CASTELVETRANO and MAZZARA, was ordered north along the coast road from MAZZARA to seize MARSALA, and north from there to a point about six miles south of TRAPANI. Combat Team 505, with the 376th and 34th Field Artillery Battalions and the 20th Engineer Battalion, was to be moved by truck to TRAPANI; and Combat Team 504, using the same vehicles, shuttled back from TRAPANI to SAN MARGHERITA, was to be moved to CASTELLAMARE and ALCAMO.

The 3d Battalion, 505th, departed MONTEVAGO at 1130, proceeded by way of PARTANNA, SANTA NINFA and SALEMI to Highway 113, and thence west toward TRAPANI. All along the route, which west of SANTA NINFA had been traversed by no other Allied troops, the local population competed with each other in their expressions of good will. In the towns the roads were lined with people who not only shouted their approval and showed in one place a prepared sign: "Welcome Liberators", but who also showered the vehicles with fruit, bread and chocolate, much of which had been pilfered from abandoned Italian military stores.

In spite of these popular greetings, at about 1600 hours when shortly east of TRAPANI, the Division encountered a strong position defense. On the outskirts of the city the reconnaissance vehicles found road blocks and mine fields and immediately thereafter were met with machine gun fire. By the time the advance guard had fanned out to return the fire effectively, the enemy here began an artillery barrage from the mountain north of the city and a hill southwest of it onto the highway, which he maintained almost constantly for 2-3 hours. (25) The 34th and 376th Field Artillery Battalions and the 89d Chemical (4.2 Mortar) Battalion returned the fire; and the 3d Battalion, 505th, advanced on the gun positions, which surrendered before dark. In spite of this impressive artillery duel, the only Division casualty of the afternoon was a bazooka operator who sustained a burn from his own weapon.

A treaty of surrender was immediately dictated by General Ridgway to Admiral Manfredi, Commander of the TRAPANI district, requiring cessation of resistance, preservation of stores, and the posting of a guard on all military and naval property. In addition to Admiral Manfredi, Brigadier General Antonio Sodero, who was to have succeeded the Admiral in the command of the district, and 2639 other prisoners were taken during the evening of the 23d and the day of the 24th, in and around the city of TRAPANI. An uncounted amount of guns and other military and naval material and stores were also taken.

During the afternoon of the 23d, Colonel Tucker and a reconnaissance party from Combat Team 504 entered CASTELLAMARE, and the main body followed the next day on the return of the transportation from TRAPANI. On the morning of the 24th Combat Team 504 proceeded to the occupation of ALCAMO; and Company A and the 2d Battalion, 505th, to that of SAN VITO; and 505th patrols contacted Task Force X patrols at PACECO; all without enemy resistance. Meanwhile Task Force X had occupied MARSALA (25a), and had taken 6856 prisoners in the CASTELVETRANO-MARSALA area.

Nothing remained but to police the occupied area and garrison it against the possibility of enemy counterattack, assemble captured stores, and gather in straggling prisoners; but this was to be the work of many days. Prisoners were still being picked up and drifting in from isolated outposts weeks later (26). Enemy barracks and stores, which were being looted even as the Division entered the area, were first put under guard and the food stores later appropriated to feed prisoners. Among the food stores taken were 28,000 hard rations from one warehouse, 700 pounds of beef, 2,000 pounds of sugar, 500 pounds coffee, and 400 gallons of tomato paste.

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

(27) Of the vehicles taken, 62 were in suitable condition to use (28). Weapons and ammunition were dumped, and passed through the proper ordnance channels.

The EGADI ISLANDS-FAVIGNANA, LEVANZO, and MARETTIMO situated 10-20 miles off TRAPANI, which had been out of communication with the mainland since the 23d, surrendered July 29th to Captain Richard Gerard of the G-3 Section and 1st Lieutenant Louis P. Testa, P.W.I., who approached FAVIGNANA in a scull boat and negotiated the surrender with Lieutenant Colonel Silvio Serralunga. The population of the Islands is about 6000; their garrison was nearly 1000.

In each of the two phases of its participation in the SICILIAN CAMPAIGN the Division had served effectively. In the first, it was prevented from achieving its specifically assigned mission; but at the cost of many casualties (29) it engaged elements of the Hermann Goering, 15th Panzer, 4th Livorno and 54th Napoli Divisions, and of the 206th Coastal Division. Major General J. M. Swing, Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division and airborne advisor to General Eisenhower, declared that the work of the airborne troops advanced the progress of the beach assault by two days.

In the second phase, both the opposition and the Division's own casualties were incomparably lighter. The only elements of divisional strength encountered were the 202d, 207th, and 208th Coastal Divisions, although there were a large number of supporting units. The Division lost one officer and six men killed, and sixteen men wounded. In five days of campaigning during the course of this phase, it advanced more than one hundred miles through enemy territory, and took prisoner or occupied the territory in which it later rounded up a total of 23,191 officers and men.

In recognition of this service General Ridgway received the following letter from Major General Geoffrey Keyes, commanding the Provisional Corps, of which the 82d Airborne Division had served as a part:

SEVENTH UNITED STATES ARMY
HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL CORPS
A.P.O. 758

24 July 1943

Major General M. B. Ridgway
Commanding 82d Airborne Division
A.P.O. 469.

My dear General Ridgway;

With the remarkably rapid and successful conclusion of the mission assigned the Provisional Corps of the Seventh Army in the operation to capture Palermo and the Western portion of the island of Sicily, I wish to express to you and your splendid division, together with the attached units, my admiration for feats accomplished.

The rapid assembly and organization of your force of mixed units, and their more rapid advance on each objective to include the important city and locality of Trapani, reflects great credit upon you, your staff and your men.

It is an honor for me to be privileged to command the Provisional Corps composed of such fine divisions and it is with extreme regret that I learn that the 82nd is to be withdrawn for other important missions.

R E S T R I C T E D

With best wishes to you and your command for continued success, I am,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Geoffrey Keyes
GEOFFREY KEYES

Major General, U.S.A.,
Commanding

FOOTNOTES

(1) Bn. C. O. 's of the 505th Pch. Inf. were: 1st Bn.--Lt. Col. Arthur Gorham; 2nd Bn.--Major Mark Alexander; 3rd Bn.--Major Edward C. Krause.

(2) Bn. C. O. 's were: 1st Bn.--Lt. Col. Warren Williams; 2nd Bn.--Lt. Col. William Yarborough.

(3) Lt. Louis Testa, PWI Officer.

(4) The difficulty of navigating and controlling the planes as a group was revealed by the fact that Gen. Taylor could get and send to Gen. Ridgway the following: "Incomplete information from Wing indicated all drops approximately on DZ except 2nd Bn 505 which is west of Gela..."

(5) At 110845 Seventh Army sent the following message to the II Corps and the 45th, 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Arm'd Divisions: "Notify all units especially AA that parachutists 82d Airborne Division will drop at about 2330 tonight July 11-12 on Farello Landing Field."

(6) 1st Lt. Z. C. Lutcavage, Co. F, 504th Pch. Inf., declared two of his men were killed when they gave the wrong password.

(7) The personnel in these 8 planes were from the following units: 2 planes--Hq. Co., 504th; 1 plane, Co. F, 504th; 2 planes, Btry C, 376th; 2 planes, Btry. D, 376th; 1 plane, Hq. Btry., Div Arty.

(8) Rec'd 121237. "TMX from Force 141 to Seventh Army, TCC, 82d Airborne Division. View of unfortunate incident last night no further repeat no further movement by air except assault will take place."

(9) Pvt. Keith K. Scott, 1st Bn. Hq. Co., 504th Pch. Inf., was a member of the Second Lift; but as the experiences of many of the members of the Second Lift were identical in nature to those of the First, they will be related here without discrimination.

(10) 1st Lt. Richard Mills, 1st Bn. Hq. Co., 504th.

(11) Co. A, 505th Pch. Inf.

(12) Capt. Carl R. Comstock, Med. Det., 505th Pch. Inf.

(13) 1st Lt. Dean McCandless, Hq. Co. 1st Bn., 505th Pch. Inf.

(14) Hq. Co. 1st Bn., 505th Pch. Inf.

(15) Hq. Co. 1st Bn., 505th Procht. Inf.

(16) Pfc Shelby R. Hord, Co. H, 504th Procht Inf.

(17) Pvt. Thomas E. Lane, Co. H, 504th Procht. Inf.

(18) The strength and casualties of each lift by units during the entire campaign is shown in a table printed at a later stage of this history. Casualties later in the campaign were so extremely light that figures in this table give a fair picture of lessons in the first so-called GUERRILLA WAREFARE.

(19) The Command Party brought on the MONROVIA one 3/4 ton Command and Reconnaissance Car, four 1/4 ton trucks and two 1/4 ton trailers; and the third lift brought in the planes with it twenty-two 1/4 ton trucks, all being a part of the Division's organic transportation.

(20) A note will be added here to complete a statement of the transportation available to the Division on its movement from Gela to Trapani. In addition to the Transportation brought by the Command Party and the Third Lift, the 505th CT, then situated west of Ribera, received on July 19th at Licata eighteen 1/4 ton trucks of its organic transportation. On July 19, Co. E, 47th QM Truck Bn., was attached to the Division, making available forty-six 2-1/2 ton trucks for transportation and supply. From time to time during the periods of their attachment, other transportation was obtained from the 62nd Armored, 34th and 77th FA Bns.

(21) CT 39 and 83rd Chem. Bn. had been attached to the Division July 17. The 34th FA Bn., the 62nd Armored FA Bn., the 1st Bn., 77th FA., and a detachment of the 56th Medical Bn. were attached July 18th.

(22) During the day CT 39, 1st Bn. 77th FA, the 62nd Armad FA Bn., and the 3rd Rn. Bn. were relieved from attachment to the Division. CT 39 followed CT 504 into Menfi, whence it advanced on Castelvetro the next day and occupied it at noon.

(23) 2nd Lt. Vernon P. Ellis, Co. C, 307th A/B Engr. Bn., was killed and Pvt. George C. Phillips of the same organization wounded while removing mines near Santa Ninfa.

(24) On the 21st and 22nd, Co. E, 47 QM Truck Bn. and the 20th Engr. Bn. were attached to the Division.

(25) A battery of four 75mm guns was found after the surrender at one of the firing positions with 155 empty shell cases nearby; a battery of six 90mm guns was found at another position with about 12 cases; and a 149mm btry. fired several salvos from the position southwest of the city. There is some dispute as to the reason for the inaccuracy of the enemy fire. It was without effect, except to force a halt and deployment, although his observation was perfect and his targets at short range.

(26) See the accompanying table for a day-by-day count on the registration of prisoners.

(27) Until the occupation of Trapani, the fare had been extremely limited in kind, and even that obtained only by the greatest effort--the morning's rations often not arriving until late in the evening.

Prior to the reorganization of the Division, members of the first two lifts had only one K and one D ration, plus what they could forage, or what was given some individuals by members of other units. At Gela, fortunately, C rations were

R E S T R I C T E D

obtained, and C and K Rations constituted the sole fare from there to Trapani. Thereafter, U Rations were obtained, and supplemented by captured supplies.

(28) See the accompanying table for a list of vehicles captured and their assignment to units.

(29) See table below.

LIST OF PRISONERS

The number of prisoners, officers and men, taken day by day during the western campaign and rounded up from the Trapani and nearby garrisons during the three successive days were as follows:

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. PRISONERS</u>
July	19	848
	20	745
	21	1515
	22	19
	23	898
	24	1741
	25	3268
	26	2231
Total - -		11,265

The number rounded up during the period July 27--August 15, in the course of a general reconnaissance of western Sicily, were 83 officers and 4127 enlisted men, or a total of 4210. Adding this to the sum of the figures above, it is shown that a grand total of 15,475 prisoners were taken during the campaign, by organic elements of the Division alone.

CAPTURED VEHICLES

List of captured motor vehicles, and their distribution to units:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>M/C</u>	<u>1/4--3/4</u>	<u>1--1 1/2</u>	<u>2--3</u>	<u>Amb.</u>	<u>Total</u>
307 Engra	3	2		7		12
Hq. Co.			2			2
MP Plat.	1	1				2
782d Ord	1	3		1		5
505 CT	6	3	3	3	2	17
504 CT	<u>15</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	26	12	9	12	3	62

begin

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 2: 505th Parachute Infantry Reports

HEADQUARTERS 505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
A. P. O. #469, U. S. ARMY,

IN FIELD
August 14, 1943

SUBJECT: AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS.

TO: Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division.

GENERAL:

~~1.~~ All units departed from take-off airdromes in North Africa in accordance with plans scheduled.

~~2.~~ The Headquarters and Command Serial dropped approximately ten miles South of VITTORIA, 30 miles from its assigned Drop Zone. Small groups of fighters were organized during the night, and at daylight, enemy strong-points and pill-boxes were attacked wherever found. Some small groups worked South to the beaches and rendered direct assistance in the landing of the 45th Division. One group consisting of the Combat Team Commander, Colonel GAVIN; the S-3, Major VANDERVOORT; the Adjutant, Captain IRELAND, and three enlisted men captured one prisoner who later escaped. They then moved west, and after a brief engagement in which one parachutist was killed, and four casualties inflicted on the enemy, succeeded in joining the 45th Division at 0240, D plus one, at which time the reorganization of the Combat Team was initiated by the Combat Team Commander. A group of approximately forty men of the Headquarters Serial, under the command of Headquarters Commandant (Lt. H. H. SWIGLER), occupied high key terrain commanding the main road not leading inland from the 45th Division. This group destroyed one armored vehicle which was attempting to move to the beach and prevented the retirement of the enemy forces inland from the beach after the assault had been begun by the 45th Division. They captured five officers and ninety-six men who were attempting to retire inland from the beach defense. Also, it reduced several pill-boxes and captured a large amount of enemy materiel, including machine guns. Three parachute enlisted men were killed in the action of this group. This group rejoined the Combat Team on D plus one (11 July), in time to participate in the attack on enemy positions on BIAZZO RIDGE.

~~3.~~ The First Battalion Serial landed approximately four miles South of NISCEMI, and was immediately engaged by the enemy. Captain SAYRE and forty-five men attacked and captured an Italian garrison, taking twenty-two prisoners. During this attack four parachutists were killed. An advance was continued until the FIRST DIVISION was joined. Upon joining the Second Battalion, 16TH INFANTRY, the attack was resumed with them. The enemy counter-attacked with tanks at 1130, causing a withdrawal of some of the troops participating. The parachute troops held their ground and succeeded in knocking out several of the attacking tanks. Lt. Colonel ARTHUR F. GORDON personally manned an anti-tank launcher in this defense and knocked out a tank before he was killed. The attack was later resumed and the First Battalion continued to fight with the 16TH INFANTRY until relieved to join its own Combat Team. A portion of the First Battalion Serial landed approximately fifty miles East of GELA, occupied and held the town of NOTO. A detachment of twelve men assisted in the capture of RAGUSA. Further estimate of their combat activities is not known at present. Major WINTON, The Battalion Executive Officer, was outstanding in

[REDACTED]

assisting the organization of the Battalion while under fire, refusing to be evacuated despite a wrenched knee received on landing.

4. The Second Battalion Serial landed South of RAGUSA, approximately forty kilometers from the scheduled Drop Zone. At the time of the jump the entire serial was being harrassed by small arms fire, several men being killed in their chutes. Immediately upon landing, reorganization was started. With the aid of patrols searching for small isolated groups the complete Serial was intact by 1200 hour, D day. At 0900 on D day, the Battalion began to clean up the strong-point and the area near S. CROCE-CAMERINA. During this action, two officers and six enlisted men were killed. Forty-five Italians, a quantity of small arms and ammunition were captured. As soon as this strong concentration had been completely wiped out, the Battalion worked toward the South and set up a defensive position on the outskirts of S. CROCE-CAMERINA overlooking the sea. "E" Company, acting as an advance guard in this action, encountered fire from the city. They immediately went into an organized attack. The city was taken after a short but hard fight. The company captured 144 Italians, one 47mm anti-tank gun, 13,600 rounds of machine gun ammunition, 330 grenades and enough rifles and carbines and equipment to equip an Italian Battalion. This Battalion also captured a strongly held point East of S. CROCE-CAMERINA. The Battalion was under the command of Major ALEXANDER. July 11 was spent in more complete reorganization, and contact was made with Regimental Headquarters. The evening of the 11th they left the area, marched through CAMERINA PASS, and came in contact with men of the 45th Division, outside of the town along the coast. They passed through VITTORIA and moved into bivouac about 1500 hour on the 12th, joining the rest of the 505th Combat Team.

5. The Third Battalion Serial, upon approaching the coast to turn inland over its Drop Zone, was turned by the Air Corps out to sea again, less "I" Company. "I" Company, less one plane, landed on its Drop Zone and fully accomplished its mission in addition to reducing pill-boxes and a blockhouse, and taking prisoners. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion Serial, on its second pass was dropped at 0025, well scattered in an area about 3 1/2 miles Southeast of ACATE RIVER. Eighty-five men of "G" Company were assembled within an hour, under their Company Commander, and with little resistance reached a point of high ground where the coastal highway crosses the ACATE RIVER. Forty-five men of the Serial under Lt. WILLIS joined forward elements of the 180TH INFANTRY and were employed as assault troops, and succeeded in reducing strong enemy positions in front of the 45th Division. Lt. WILLIS and two men were killed. Sixty men of the Serial with the aid of three guns, "C" Battery, 456th Field Artillery, were the first troops into VITTORIA. They reduced an Italian garrison, approximately eight prisoners were taken besides numerous vehicles, small arms, and other stores. In this action Lt. HARRIS was captured and held prisoner in the Italian curatel for a period of several hours. During this time he succeeded in convincing the defenders of the ineffectiveness of their defense and their inability to cope with the advancing troops of the 45th Division. As a result of this, the Italian Commanding Officer raised the white flag and surrendered approximately eighty men and numerous small arms and other stores. After local night fighting and patrolling the remainder of the 3rd Battalion Serial was assembled and reorganized and equipment gathered during the hours of daylight on D day. Efforts to make contact with the rest of the 505th Combat Team were made to no avail. At 1900 hour, D day, the Serial Commander with 180 men and officers, set out toward VITTORIA for the purpose of orientation. Upon reaching the GELA-VITTORIA highway, about five miles Northeast of VITTORIA, the unit was halted. Colonel GAVIN appeared in the area about 0600, D plus one, and ordered the unit to move toward GELA. They then participated in the action on BLAZZO RIDGE.

6. Company "B", 307th Engineer Battalion:

a. The first planeload, first platoon, Company "B", 307th Engineers,

D

was forced down in North Africa, and took off alone later on. They jumped at 0022, July 10, and landed six kilometers South of COMISO. There they assembled and started in a southerly direction at 0400. They traveled three kilometers and encountered shell fire from the sea and dug in. They met a group from the 3rd Battalion, going North, and joined them and travelled until 1400. They left the 3rd Battalion and headed West where they met the 180TH INFANTRY and dug in for the night along highway 115 at a point about five miles Northwest of VITTORIA. The Combat Team Commander moved the men from that point at 0600, July 11, and they were joined by "G" Company, 505th Parachute Infantry. They started fighting under Major HAGAN at 1030, in which engagement Lt. WEXLER and several enlisted men were wounded. They remained under the 3rd Battalion until rejoining the Engineer Company at 1930, July 11. The second and third planeloads, first platoon, Company "B", 307th Engineers, landed at 0025, July 10, fifteen miles Northeast of Drop Zone. Assembling on the ground, one plane load from Company "A", 505th Parachute Infantry, was met and forces joined. From time of assembly until 0430, a search was made for the assigned Drop Zone and accomplishment of their mission. During the search, telegraph and telephone wires were cut, but they were unable to locate themselves in relation to the Drop Zone. It was decided to dig in at a crossroad and wait for morning. At 0530, a German motorcycle containing three passengers pulled up to the crossroads and stopped. The passengers were killed. Another motorcycle arrived 15 minutes later and was likewise caught under fire and the occupants killed. The men were then assembled and moved out in the general direction of the Drop Zone. Five of this group were separated when they went to pick up two equipment chutes which were spotted a half mile away. The remainder continued on and took up a position on ground commanding the two valleys. Here contact was made with elements of "G" Company, 505th Parachute Infantry, and defensive positions were set up. During the afternoon, 2nd Battalion, 180TH INFANTRY, 45th Division arrived at the hill. The men from "B" Company, 307th Engineers, and men from "A" Company, 505th Parachute Infantry attached themselves to 2nd Battalion, 180TH INFANTRY, and remained with them for three nights and two days. During this period of time additional parachutists drifted in and became part of their organization. On the 13th, contact was made through patrols with the 505th Combat Team Headquarters and a march was made to that position, where they again came under control of their Company Commander.

1. The second and third platoons jumped at 0026 on July 10, approximately five kilometers South of COMISO. Platoons were ordered to assemble and move toward objective. The Company Commander and one sergeant left Drop Zone immediately and proceeded Northwest, assembling all men encountered. They joined Lt. SWINGLER and a group of Headquarters personnel at dawn, about four miles Northwest of the Drop Zone. Leaving the bulk of the men at a farmhouse, Captain JOHNSON and eight men went on patrol, where they encountered opposition consisting of three pill-boxes at a crossroads. During the encounter with the pill-boxes they wrecked a German personnel carrier, towing a tank. One German was killed and three were captured. After also killing a German motorcyclist and a dispatch carrier, the eight men were forced to retire by three tanks. One man was wounded during the encounter. They withdrew to a position in a field and gathered the remainder of their forces which had been left under Lt. SWINGLER. The group set up a position on top of two small hills, with an all around defense. It was planned to move the entire force to the beach that night. At about 1530 one battery of the 288th Italian Field Artillery Battalion approached the hill on which the defensive position was located. The entire battery was captured, consisting of four officers and approximately one hundred enlisted men. They then set up prisoner of war straggler posts. They sent out patrols to locate a radio with which to contact all their forces at their Drop Zone and did so at 2000, July 10, turning their prisoners over to the 45th Division. They bivouacked at the Drop Zone until 1700, on July 11. They joined the 3rd

[REDACTED]

Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, for an attack on enemy Northwest of VITTORIA. Lt. RIFFLE and three enlisted men were killed and several enlisted men were wounded in this encounter.

7. The Action at BIAZZO RIDGE:

A prolonged engagement took place on the BIAZZO RIDGE on the VITTORIA-GELA highway about two miles East of the ACATE RIVER on D plus one. This affair, judging by the intensity of the fighting and the results accomplished, appears to be the only engagement of magnitude participated in by the Combat Team during the landings.

a. At 0600 the morning of D plus one the Combat Team Commander and S-3 proceeded West on the GELA road from VITTORIA to obtain control of any parachute troops that might be found, determine what, if any, enemy troops were between VITTORIA and GELA, and move all available parachute troops West to join the 1st Division as per plan. About two hundred men of the 3rd Battalion under the command of Major KRAUS were located near the road about eight to ten miles West of VITTORIA. About two miles West of their bivouac a group of forty men of "L" Company, 180TH INFANTRY and twenty parachutists were found. At this point individual soldiers stopped the Combat Team Commander and informed him that enemy troops were to the West and astride the road. Continued questioning of those who professed to know the enemy situation failed to disclose any specific information of his location, strength or dispositions.

b. The Commanding Officer and S-3 continued West to the railroad station about one mile East of BIAZZO RIDGE where a point reconnaissance was made. At this point a German Officer and private suddenly came around the corner in a motorcycle and were captured. They made no effort to resist capture and appeared to be quite disgusted with the lack of resistance being offered by the Italian troops, but refused to give any information regarding their own troops. The twenty nearby parachutists under the command of Lt. WEXLAR were ordered forward at once and the Combat Team S-3 was sent to the rear to bring Major KRAUS and his men and to go to the 45th Division Command Post. Here he was to send a message to the 1st Division and the 82d Division informing them of the Combat Team plan to advance West along the GELA highway.

c. The twenty parachutists under the command of Lt. WEXLAR arrived promptly and after being given the situation were moved in the direction of BIAZZO RIDGE. They were ordered to proceed West to the ACATE RIVER and were accompanied by the Combat Team Commanding Officer. Several hundred yards short of the Ridge they came under small arms fire coming from the Ridge. They continued to advance driving the enemy to the West. Upon reaching the top of the Ridge they met intense small arms and mortar fire that stopped their advance. Here they were ordered to dig in and hold until the arrival of the Battalion.

d. At approximately 1000 the 3rd Battalion group, consisting of about 200 men, arrived at the railroad station under the command of Major HAGAN. The Combat Team Commanding Officer outlined the situation to Major HAGAN and directed him to proceed West along the GELA Road to the ACATE RIVER, here to reorganize and move forward on Combat Team order. Rolls were dropped, orders issued, and the battalion moved out. By this time it was established through contact with the 180TH INFANTRY that the regiment was held up on a line generally parallel to the GELA highway and South of that road. They had been unable to advance. Upon the departure of the battalion a small combat team reserve of about three squads was made up. Later in the day the forty men from "L" Company, 180TH INFANTRY, joined this unit.

e. The attack of the 3d Battalion continued west with some losses from small arms fire until about noon. At this time it had advanced about one mile. Only German troops were encountered and a number were wounded, killed and captured early in the fight. From there it was determined that the enemy force consisted of one battalion of the Herman Goering Division. It was evidently within supporting distance of another battalion and a large number of tanks. About noon the Germans counterattacked with tanks inflicting heavy losses on our attacking infantry. Major Hagan was wounded and evacuated and Major Krause who had arrived took command of the battalion. Orders were issued by the Combat Team Commanding Officer to the reserve to dig in on BIAZZO RIDGE. It appeared evident that the Ridge dominated the area between the ACATE River and VITTORIA and its loss would seriously jeopardize the landings of the 45th Division. It was decided to hold the Ridge at all cost and if the tanks entered the defense to destroy the infantry accompanying them. Because of the loss of equipment during the drop there were few rocket launchers present. By noon one 75mm howitzer had arrived, about an hour later another arrived and by the end of the day there were three present.

f. Shortly after noon Captain Ireland of the Combat Team Staff was sent up as liaison party for a 155mm Battalion and a Navy 5 inch liaison party. They did splendid work and about three o'clock were firing upon the known German assembly areas and positions. By this time all of the launchers except three had been destroyed and the tanks were within 50 yards of the Combat Team Command Post. The 45th Division also sent up two 57mm anti-tank guns. One 75mm gun from the 456th Field Artillery Battalion engaged and destroyed one of the attacking tanks. The attacking forces withdrew and appeared to be regrouping and reorganizing about 1000 yards to a mile in front of the ridge.

g. Information was received at 1800 that Regimental Headquarters Company, 505th Parachute Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Swingler, with some Engineers of "B" Company, had been located and would arrive by 2000. At about the same time a company of tanks (11) arrived. Orders were then issued for a counter-attack to be made at 8:30 (2030) employing Regimental Headquarters Company, the available engineers and the tank company supported by all available artillery fire. The mission given the attacking force was to attack and destroy all enemy to the front, advancing far enough to permit evacuation of our dead and wounded, and then to organize a further defense around BIAZZA RIDGE.

h. The attack jumped off at about 8:45. Very heavy mortar and artillery fire was brought to bear on the attacking troops and on the Ridge. The attack was continued through the enemy position, inflicting heavy losses in men and equipment upon him. Twenty-two dead bodies and many wounded were recovered. The Germans withdrew in apparent confusion, leaving many dead and wounded and considerable equipment of all types. Four tanks were believed to have been knocked out, although all but one were recovered by the Germans during the night.

i. The following day, the dead were buried and those not yet found removed from the battlefield. All abandoned enemy equipment was taken up. Our losses were forty-three killed and 100 wounded. No equipment was lost. Enemy losses abandoned on the battlefield amounted to about fifty killed. Fifty prisoners were taken, all German. Two armored cars were knocked out, twelve six-inch Russian mortars captured, besides many machine guns, small arms, vehicles and ammunition dumps. A calibre .50 gun crew of Battery "D", 456th Field Artillery, is credited with knocking down three ME 109's which strafed and bombed our positions on the Ridge. The Battalion Commanding Officer confirms the fact that one was shot down.

j. One section of Battery "C", 456th Field Artillery, under command of Lieutenant Loren and Sergeant Thomas, particularly distinguished themselves

~~SECRET~~

by taking positions in the open at the top of BIAZZO RIDGE and engaging openly tanks in range. Despite small arms fire of all types and four rounds of direct fire from an 88mm cannon on a Mark VI tank which the gun disabled, this crew held their gun in position even after members of the crew were knocked down by shell concussion. They succeeded in delaying the tanks in the attack until sufficient reinforcements arrived to permit continuation of the attack.

~~SECRET~~
X. Third Battalion Medical Section under Captain McElroy, and elements of the Regimental Aid Station under the Regimental Surgeon, Captain Smith, and the Assistant Regimental Surgeon, Lieutenant Suer, were outstanding in their intense and devoted performance of their first aid tasks under fire of all types. Wounded were removed from the battlefield promptly at all times, allowing the maximum number of combat troops to be kept in the engagement.

/s/t/ JAMES M. GAVIN,
Colonel, Infantry,
Commanding.

begin
begin 38
505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
41 AFTER ACTION REPORT

* * * * *

THE PLAN

~~SECRET~~
The planning for this unit's part of the "HUSKY" Operation began in the middle of May, 1943 while it was stationed at OUJDA, FRENCH MOROCCO. The 82d Airborne Division was given the mission of securing the amphibious landing of the 1st Division in SICILY by establishing an airborne bridgehead. The 1st Division was to land between GELA and SCOGLINTI at 0255 hours on July 10th, 1943. The greatest threat to the success of this landing was a German Panzer Division concentrated near CALTAGIRONE, a small town about 15 miles inland.

It was determined that the best method of accomplishing this mission was to drop a parachute combat team to seize and hold the road net and surrounding terrain running from CALTAGIRONE to the sea. The object was to prevent the enemy from intercepting the landing of the 1st Infantry Division. The center of this defense was to be the intersection where the minor road running south from CALTAGIRONE met the main coast road running between GELA and VITTORIA.

S The combat team was made up to include the 505th Parachute Infantry, the 3d Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry, the 456th Field Artillery, and Company "B" of the 307th Airborne Engineers. The time set for the drop was 2346 hours on July 9th, 1943.

With the mission assigned, a training program was drawn up for specialized work to be done during the period prior to the jump to better prepare us for the fight to come. This schedule provided for both day and night training in all necessary basic subjects such as bayonet fighting, scouting and patrolling, and hand to hand fighting. As the period progressed, small unit tactics were reviewed with emphasis placed on setting up defensive positions at night. Ranges were made available for final zeroing of all weapons.

The regimental plans and training section developed a standard plane loading plan for both equipment and personnel which was tried and accepted.

[REDACTED]

Battalion combat teams were organized and began training as such. Each one executed a practice parachute jump with their full combat loads, stressing the method of assembly and the tactics of defense. The entire combat team participated in a dry run of the actual operation during the latter part of June. In this problem only jumpmasters jumped working from jump patterns already on the ground. Sand table replicas of the operational terrain were made and studied in conjunction with aerial photographs.

The training area was in the wind swept, dusty valley eight miles north of OUJDA. The terrain was generally flat and rocky with little or no vegetation. There was some hilly ground to the west and this was utilized as much as possible. The temperature was the greatest training obstacle, often reaching 120 degrees.

The first days of July, the combat team moved by plane to the vicinity of KAIROUAN, TUNISIA. Here each battalion combat team was bivouacked near the airfield where its planes were based. The week just prior to the actual operation was spent clearing up supply and administrative details. The operation was gone over in more detail with the help of better aerial photographs and maps. Equipment and weapons were given the final touches. The Air Corps provided training in the use of their rubber life rafts and other safety devices.

The morning of the 9th of July was spent in loading the equipment bundles in the para-racks and the drop testing of them. During the afternoon the men rested and dressed for combat. After the evening meal the Company Commanders gathered their men around them and gave them final instructions and the pass word. Everyone, less the rear echelon, then moved by truck to their planes. Last minute conferences were held between jumpmasters and pilots and the take off started at 2020 hours.

THE AIR CORPS ANGLE

The combat team was flown in the planes of the 52d Wing, which was broken down into five serials. The Third Battalion Serial was flown by the 314th Group, the 504th Battalion Serial by the 64th Group, the First Battalion Serial by the 313th Group, the Headquarters Serial by the 316th Group and the Second Battalion Serial by the 61st Group. Each serial was to fly as an individual unit on a definite planned time schedule. The flight plan consisted of a rendezvous over TUNISIA, then east to the Island of MALTA, then northwest to SICILY and along its southern coast to the point east of GELA where each group turned north over the LAGO DI BIVARRE to their drop zones. Here the parachutists were to jump when the pilots turned on the green jump light.

This drop plan however did not materialize for several reasons. A strong west wind developed ranging between 20 and 30 miles per hour and literally blew the planes off their course whereupon the pilots lost their direction. Strong anti-aircraft fire was encountered along the coast and at the cross roads in the drop area which also drove the planes off the course. As the result the Combat Team was spread over an area sixty five miles wide.

Stone fences, rock piles, and olive trees covered the area in which most men landed. A large number consequently were seriously injured on the jump. Leg and ankle injuries were the most common, however one soldier broke his back on landing. The rugged nature of the terrain also made the assembly plan more difficult.

THE FIRST FIVE DAYS

End

The First Battalion Serial which was supposed to be dropped just northwest of the crossroads above GELA was well scattered. A group of three hundred and twenty were dropped three miles northwest of the city of AVOLA on the eastern

[REDACTED]

coast of the Island. Small groups were organized, found their equipment, and became involved in several small skirmishes with the Italians. The individual groups were assembled at daylight and attacked the town of AVOLA. After some short skirmishes with the enemy, contact was made with the British. This group then moved to the outskirts of the city and set up a defensive position. The next day was spent in reorganization and the evacuation of the wounded. On July 12th this group started marching toward GELA in an effort to rejoin the Combat Team. Upon their arrival in NOTO they received word that the British were ordered by Allied Force Headquarters to evacuate all parachutists in that area that had been cut off from their unit. This was done from embarkation points south of AVOLA. While enroute the parachutists acted as guards for Prisoners of War who were also being evacuated. Debarkation of this group was made at SOUSSE, TUNISIA, and they were then sent overland to KAIROUAN. Another group of this same serial was dropped about two miles northeast of their actual drop zone and landed in a well fortified area. Several skirmishes developed immediately and before the group could become oriented they were pinned down by fire. The next night parts of this group started moving south. On July 11th, the main body was attacked by several German tanks. A stiff fight developed and the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gorham, was killed. Parts of the 16th Infantry joined this group at this time and took up the fight with anti-tank weapons. On the 13th the Battalion Executive Officer, Major Winton, assembled the group and awaited the arrival of the Combat Team on the 14th. One plane of this serial searched for their drop zone and finally returned without dropping for lack of gasoline. Another plane dropped their parachutists near MARINA DI RAGUSA.

The Third Battalion Serial was dropped at 0030 hours in between SCOGLITTI and VITTORIA. The men assembled in small groups and due to the unfamiliar terrain were unable to orient themselves. The early hours of the morning were spent in searching for equipment bundles. A provisional battalion command post was set up about two miles north of SCOGLITTI at 0345 hours. Patrols were sent out in an effort to contact the other battalions. A defensive position was organized and the salvage of equipment began. At 1900 hours a group of one hundred and sixty men started marching toward VITTORIA leaving a salvage crew of twenty men behind. After marching two miles the Battalion Commander, Major Krause, contacted the Regimental Executive Officer who directed the Battalion to bivouac for the night about four miles west of VITTORIA on the GELA Road. Another group of this same Battalion consisting of about sixty men moved west during the first night and set up a defense on a hill eleven miles west of VITTORIA. Here they remained until they joined the combat team on July 13th. Several other small groups contacted the enemy along the road to VITTORIA from SCOGLITTI but only small skirmishes developed. Eventually these men found their way to Hill 125 where the Combat Team assembled.

THE BIAZZI RIDGE BATTLE

At 0615 hours on July 11th, the Combat Team Commander ordered the Third Battalion group and all others that had assembled to march west on the GELA-VITTORIA COAST Road in an effort to reach the assigned defensive area. About 0830 hours at a position approximately eight miles west of VITTORIA the point of the column was fired upon. Under command of the Third Battalion Executive Officer the Battalion deployed and moved on to Hill 125 on their right. Already on the hill were about twenty parachutists from the airborne engineers. The Battalion machine gun platoon was brought forward and a section placed on each flank. An attack was made immediately and by 0915 hours the enemy had been driven out of the valley to the west. The 81mm mortar observation post then moved forward, and, with a 536 radio, the mortar platoon leader directed effective fire on enemy positions in buildings 400 yards to the northwest. One mortar shell lit on top of what was thought to be a pillbox and turned out to be a tank (Mark VI). This tank then pulled out and started down the road to the enemy's rear. In a few minutes it returned with three other tanks which

~~SECRET~~

worked their way forward into our positions in the vineyard. Bazookas were sent forward but were unable to place effective fire. Both tanks and ground guns then laid down heavy machine gun fire which covered our entire position. At this time the assistant mortar platoon leader was killed, the executive officer seriously wounded. Casualties were increasing. The tanks advanced to the base of Hill 125 under cover of the enemy machine gun fire but our lines held on the crest. The bazookas held their fire until the tanks were within seventy five yards and scored two hits. This apparently caused the enemy to be uncertain of our strength and to withdraw. As one tank turned a direct hit was made on the rear of the tank which caused it to catch fire.

One and one half sections of the parachute artillery (75mm howitzer) Battalion then moved into position behind Hill 125 and delivered fire on the enemy positions. One gun was moved to the crest of the hill and then ensued a duel of heavy caliber fire in which two enemy tanks were knocked out. Fire was requested from the 45th Division Artillery and an observer was brought forward.

After adjustment by radio, effective fire was placed on enemy positions. Tank support was requested and it arrived at 1745 hours along with seventy five more members of the combat team. An attack was made around sundown in an effort to recover our dead and wounded. Company L of the 180th Infantry supported the attack from the right flank.

A request was made through a Navy Liaison Officer for supporting Naval fire. The coordinates were radioed in and within three minutes, fire was placed on the target without adjustment. It appeared as though the enemy was attempting an attack at the same time. 120mm mortar fire covered the hill we held and many casualties were inflicted. This was the most harassing fire yet received.

The tanks completed their mission which was a circuit through the valley to our front. Two enemy tanks were knocked out. Our tanks returned to the rear in their original position. This attack drove the enemy completely from the valley. The wounded were taken to the aid station and equipment lost in the valley during the morning was recovered. The position on the hill was then consolidated and outposts placed for the night, and so ended the 11th of July, 1943.

The Second Battalion Serial was dropped in an area about six miles northwest of the small town of MARINA DI RAGUSA. Complete assembly was not achieved until the noon of the 10th. In the mean time small skirmishes were fought with pillboxes and machine gun nests and several casualties resulted. At 1400 hours, the battalion moved out toward the beach. Scattered sniper fire was encountered during the march from behind the many stone walls which covered the countryside. The Battalion was held up at one point enroute and a Company was sent around the right to flank the enemy position. This Company ran into an Italian Garrison located about a mile north of MARINA DI RAGUSA. The garrison was composed of two barracks and six pillboxes which were all taken after a short fire fight. In this instance no casualties were sustained. Information was gained as the whereabouts of the Combat Team and the Battalion proceeded to march in that direction through the ST. CROCE CAMERINA and VITTORIA. The unit reached the crossroads six miles west of VITTORIA by the morning of the twelfth and rejoined the Combat Team.

The Headquarters Serial (less the demolition section) was dropped between ST. CROCE CAMERINA and VITTORIA. The main body of this serial worked their way in small groups toward VITTORIA and eventually to Hill 125. Several skirmishes developed involving pillboxes and roadblocks along the way. The group which was supposed to be dropped near the railroad bridge three miles east of GELA was dropped sixty five miles away, just south of SYRACUSA on the eastern coast of the Island. They set up a defensive position around a highway bridge which the British later took over. On July 20th, this demolition section was evacuated to SOUSSE, TUNISIA, from SYRACUSA.

[REDACTED]

omit { The Third Battalion of the 504th was scattered from their assigned drop zone north and west to NISCEMI. A large number were taken prisoner by the Germans in this area. Small groups formed and slowly fought their way back to their assigned drop zone and dug in awaiting their regiment.

Company I was dropped on their assigned drop zone at 2349 hours and proceeded to accomplish their missions. A part of the Company set up a defensive position adjacent to their drop zone but no enemy was encountered. One platoon of the Company proceeded to the beach to contact the 16th Infantry but met stiff resistance from an Italian garrison. A patrol reached the west end of the LAGO DI BIVARRE and lit the beacon fire to guide the 16th Infantry on their landing. With these missions accomplished the parts of the Company withdrew to the defensive position and awaited the arrival of the combat team. One plane of the Company dropped their load near NISCEMI and was then shot down by anti-aircraft fire. This group rejoined the Company on July 13th.

end ~~end~~ # July 12th and 13th were spent in the burial of the dead and salvaging of enemy and our own equipment and reorganization.

THE ROAD TO TRAPANI

On July 14th, the Combat Team, after collecting of remnants, moved to a bivouac area five miles east of GELA. The next three days were spent in the care, cleaning, and inspection of Equipment. On July 18th, the Combat Team started moving as part of the Division through LICATA to AGRIGENTO, SCIACCA, MENFI, and SAN MARGHERITA.

On July 23d, the Third Battalion Commander received orders to alert his command for a movement as advance guard for the Regimental Combat Team. At 1000 hour, orders came to move by truck on Highway 113 via PARTANIA, SANTA NINFA, SALEMI, and CALTAFIMI into the province and city of TRAPANI, a distance of 45 miles. The Battalion entrucked and with attachments crossed IP at 1130 hour. Order of march: "H" Company, "G" Company "Headquarters" Company, Company "B" 83d Chemical Mortar Battalion, "I" Company, and Battery "C" 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion. Nine demolitionists from Regimental Headquarters Company were attached to Headquarters Company. The third Platoon of Company "B", 307th Airborne Engineers, was attached to the point for the purpose of detecting and reducing mine fields and demolitions, thus securing the uninterrupted advance of the main body.

Mined roads were encountered at two points north and northwest of SANTA NINFA. Engineer crews quickly cleared these hazards during short halts. Thence the advance was without incident to a point 10 km east of TRAPANI. Here a group was dispatched to capture some Italian soldiers who were seen taking cover in a nearby railroad tunnel. After the preparations for an attack were made, the enemy surrendered. As the column advanced, a party was left to take control of the prisoners and to investigate a radio station which was situated several hundred yards to the north of the highway at this point. Investigation showed the station to be abandoned and the equipment destroyed. After a further advance of about 3 km, the point was fired upon by small arms and machine gun fire originating from trenches and small pillboxes on the right and left of the road, the heaviest portion of fire came from the stronger points on the right. The resistance appeared reluctant to carry the fight and the forward elements of the advance party rapidly closed in. Seizure was made without casualties and 110 Italian officers and men were taken prisoners. As the Advance Guard proceeded, the point was halted by artillery fire about 3 km. east of the city of TRAPANI at about 1500 hours. The artillery fire appeared to be coming from the high ground approximately 1,000 yards north of the road. The point displaced forward to feel out and reconnoiter the enemy positions and strength. After determining the enemy to be emplaced in strong fortified positions on the road and high ground to the right, orders were issued to detruck, deploy and move forward to

ready positions in preparation for a coordinated attack against the enemy positions. This movement continued rapidly with the point displacing forward.

At approximately 1545 the Company Commanders were given their missions with imperative instructions that the advance be rapid and all covered approaches be utilized. The disposition of the Battalion Combat Team was as follows: "H" Company to move forward on the left of the road with the road as a right boundary; "I" Company on the right; Headquarters Company in support of "G" Company in reserve. The plan was to seize and destroy enemy installations on the high ground and thereafter to move forward on TRAPANI. Line of departure was a north-east-southwest line through the hangars at MILO AIRPORT. Jump off was immediate and advance was swift. Supporting fires were called for from 105's, 75's, and chemical mortars which were received after some delay. Enemy artillery from positions mentioned above increased and was joined by heavy caliber, flat trajectory explosive fire which seemed to originate at a point southwest of the airport.

The advance of the assault companies was swift and well controlled and essentially aided by the dominating accurate fire laid down by the light machine gun platoon, harassing the enemy to the extent that this return fire was ineffective. Actions of the LMG Platoon in this operation was superior. Good alternate gun positions were used.

Friendly counter-battery fire could be heard from the 75mm and Chemical Mortar positions in an orchard about 1 km. to the rear. First supporting fires were registered by the 456th Field Artillery Battalion and continued throughout the assault. Though necessarily in close proximity throughout to our forward elements, the fire fell with great accuracy on enemy targets.

At 1605, the Company Commander of Headquarters Company was summoned by the Battalion Commander, then at an observation post, to be given the mission for the 81mm Mortar Platoon. As the forward movement continued rapidly, it assumed a northwesterly direction toward the gun emplacements on the high ground to the north of the road. A group moving west on the highway encountered a roadblock and pillbox manned by twenty of the enemy. The group fired several rounds and the enemy surrendered. Fire was immediately placed from the captured guns against the positions on the hill. This fire was maintained until it was masked a short time later by "I" Company closing with the enemy.

The attack continued, "I" Company gaining their objective. Enemy resistance then ceased and the Battalion quickly reorganized. Company "I" was assigned the mission of mopping up enemy installations and securing garrisons and stores on the hill. This mission yielded 525 prisoners including one Naval garrison containing large stores of naval explosives, torpedoes, etc. (partly wrecked by the enemy); 12-90mm field pieces, ammunition, small arms, etc.

No enemy inflicted casualties were sustained by this unit due to the inability of the enemy artillery to follow its rapid covered approach. Throughout the movement artillery fire fell in and near the rear elements.

The approach march formation continued its movement on Highway 113 into TRAPANI; order of march: "H", Headquarters and "G" Companies. After advancing about 1 km. into the city, the Division Commanding Officer halted the column and the Division G-2 went forward and received the official surrender of the city.

At 2000 the Battalion Combat Team was ordered to a bivouac area 2 km. east of the city on Highway 113. One platoon given the mission of outpostting the entrance to the city, was left to maintain order in compliance with the terms of the surrender.

After the capture of TRAPANI, the Combat Team patrolled the city and surround-

[REDACTED]

ding areas. Training was conducted whenever it could be done in conjunction with the guard work. A Battalion problem was held on the terrain to the east and proved profitable. On August 20th the Combat Team moved back by plane to AFRICA and so ended the Campaign in SICILY.

SECTION III

3

begin

504TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY REPORTS

HEADQUARTERS 504TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
A. P. O. #469, U. S. Army

August 21, 1943

SUBJECT: AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS - 9-14 July 1943.

TO : Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division.

Miscellaneous

GENERAL

~~1.~~ This is an informal report on the activities of the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, participating with Combat Team 505 in the initial airborne assault operations in SICILY during the period 9-14 July 1943.

~~2.~~ The first plane-loads of elements of the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, operating with Combat Team 505, were dropped in SICILY about 1130 on the night of 9 July 1943, scattered over an area approximately 60 miles wide, southeast and east of MISCEMI to PACHINO in the southeast tip of the island. Six plane-loads were not accounted for, and from another 10 planes, only 1 to 5 men were located during initial operations. Groups assembled and organized as best they could, and attempted to contact other groups and move toward scheduled drop zones or reach the Battalion Command Post.

~~3.~~ Many isolated elements, scattered in the British area of operations, attached themselves to Canadian forces, worked and fought with them, and some were evacuated by the British to the coast and picked up by Major Beall on 10 and 11 July. In the American sector, isolated men and groups attached themselves to Seventh Army Units and fought with them until able to contact the Battalion. The size of groups assembled, ranged from 6 to 107 men, the latter number being reached after several days of action.

~~4.~~ Generally, it appeared that the TC planes had become widely dispersed, either as the result of poor navigation or by separation from formations in the face of heavy Ack-Ack. Plane-loads were dropped everywhere. Some were engaged while landing, most within an hour or so later as the men located or were located by the enemy. Very little decisive fighting occurred during darkness of night 9-10 July, but early on the 10th, as officers were able to assemble men, each group did what it could, endeavoring to reach Battalion objectives or the Command Post, knocking out whatever enemy resistance was found enroute, or consolidating with other groups for offensive action at vital points.

~~5.~~ It is noteworthy that operations of the many Battalion groups were conducted in spite of the severe loss of key personnel during the night landings. It was later determined that initial losses included all Company Commanders, all 1st Sergeants, except one, all the Battalion Staff except Major Beall, all communication except four runners and one 511 operator, and all supply section NCO's except one artificer. Many of these missing men may have been evacuated and may possibly turn up later.

~~SECRET~~
ACTION VICINITY NISCEMI

Lieutenant James C. Ott: The group with Lieutenant Ott landed nearest of all to scheduled Drop Zone, approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles away from it, falling near an orchard. After landing, he managed to assemble approximately 15 men, some injured, and set out with them to accomplish his mission, that of covering right flank of the Battalion, which he thought was in position as scheduled. He moved north toward a house, found that occupants were friendly, and left 4 injured troopers there. Lieutenant Ott then oriented himself in relation to NISCEMI by questioning the Italians. From about 0200 of 10 July, he patrolled the area to the east and got exact bearings for road to NISCEMI.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Kouns: About $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from east-west secondary road to NISCEMI and some 3 miles southeast of NISCEMI, Lieutenant Colonel Kouns, with 9 men, was in position on a hill. Early on the morning of 10 July, Lieutenant Ott working east, joined his group to that of Lieutenant Colonel Kouns. In position, they saw a column of German Infantry, estimated as one regiment of the Hermann Goering Division, moving along the road toward NISCEMI and turning left on the by-pass toward GELA. Lieutenant Colonel Kouns asked Lieutenant Ott to go to the road and observe. Lieutenant Ott, with 9 enlisted men, including a rocket-launcher team, proceeded toward the road, a distance of 500-700 yards, covered by the rifles of Lieutenant Colonel Kouns and the remaining men. This was accomplished without observation by the enemy, although they had machine guns in position dominating the zone. Lieutenant Ott reached a cactus hedge and through an opening observed that the enemy was taking a break and their men were somewhat scattered.

Lieutenant Ott was seen by a German officer, so he shot him and took a rocket-launcher from one of his men and blew a German car to bits, killing three officers and the driver. German trucks and riflemen opened fire. Colonel Kouns and his men directed a covering fire against the enemy as Lieutenant Ott's group withdrew by taking quick cover in bamboo and running or crawling back through a vineyard, getting to a house with three of his men.

Lieutenant Willis J. Ferrill: Landing approximately six miles southeast of NISCEMI, Lieutenant Ferrill and two men marched north and, by 0900, 10 July, had assembled 24 enlisted men. A strong defensive position was set up on the high ground at CASTLE NOCERA, 3 miles southeast of NISCEMI. A patrol sent out to contact the rest of the Battalion encountered a company of German anti-aircraft. In the engagement two Germans were killed and two captured, but the patrol was forced to withdraw to the defensive position. About 1400, 10 July, about 20 Italians attacked the position and were repulsed, losing 14 of their force killed and 2 captured. In this engagement Private S. R. Hord killed 7 Italians while attacking hostile machine gun positions, enabling his men to use captured machine gun fire on rest of enemy. At the same time Private Lane killed four Italian riflemen who were protecting the machine guns. This engagement lasted approximately four hours, then the remaining Italians fled, leaving behind machine guns, rifles, pistols, ammunition, and transportation. During the night, hostile patrols were driven off with a few shots by the listening posts which had been established by Lieutenant Ferrill. During the morning of the 11th there was no action. At 1300 Lieutenant Watts contacted Lieutenant Willis J. Ferrill and that afternoon Lieutenant Watt's group joined Lieutenant Ferrill.

Lieutenant George J. Watts: About $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles southeast of NISCEMI, 1st Lieutenant George J. Watts had assembled another group of about 15 men by 0830, and had moved to a strategic hill and set up all round defensive positions which were maintained July 10-11. About 1300 on Sunday, 11 July, this group contacted Lieutenant Ferrill's group by radio and moved over to join them. About 1330, 11 July, the group fired on a column of German Infantry moving northeast toward NISCEMI with 2 tanks. A fierce fight ensued with the paratroopers repulsing the Germans, killing about 75 and losing 5 of their own men.

[REDACTED]

In this engagement, maps were captured which proved of great value to the 16th Infantry, as well as mortars and other equipment. Private Lane, under exposure of heavy enemy machine gun and rifle fire, carried water to 103 of his companions. The group had mined roads surrounding their position (HAWKINS mines) and fought with 3 machine guns, 2 mortars, rifles and 2 rocket-launchers, plus machine guns which Lieutenant Terrill's men had captured, and had plenty of ammunition. On 14 July, Lieutenant Watt's group contacted a motorized patrol of the 16th Infantry who asked that he hold the position to protect the right flank. Wounded and enemy prisoners were turned over to the 16th Infantry. On 14 July, he located the Battalion Command Post and reported there with remaining 104 men. Captured materiel included German recon cars, valuable medical supplies, three 240mm Russian mortars, eight German machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition.

5. Lieutenant Fred E. Thomas: About 5 miles southeast of NISCEMI, 1st Lieutenant Fred E. Thomas landed, and at 0200 on the 10 July, he and five enlisted men advanced towards NISCEMI reaching the outskirts of the city about 0330. No troops were located there and the group worked their way west looking for the rest of the Battalion. About 1000, 10 July, they encountered a strong force of Germans which was under fire. Lieutenant Thomas and his group attacked the left rear of the Germans, killing seven Germans, losing two dead and one wounded of this group. The unidentified friendly force which had been firing on the Germans had withdrawn, and Lieutenant Thomas was forced to withdraw with his two remaining men. Later that day eight men from "H" Company, under command of Private Ferrari, joined Lieutenant Thomas. The group of eleven worked its way to the southeast, several times being subjected to the fire of artillery and automatic weapons. On the 14th July, Lieutenant Thomas came upon a large winery, about 10 miles east of GELA, in which were two seriously injured and three uninjured men of the 16th Infantry. While treating the injured, three German tank-men entered the winery and were captured. However, the winery was covered by two Mark VI Tanks. The Germans also had a wounded man, and an agreement was reached whereby neither force would take prisoners, but would attempt to procure a doctor to treat the wounded. An American Medical Officer reached the group and attended the injured. Because their two Mark VI Tanks were too slow to evade the advancing Americans, the Germans burned them and about 30 in number withdrew on foot towards VITTORIA. Lieutenant Thomas and his group joined the 504th Combat Team in the GELA area about 1700 on 14 July.

III. ACTION NORTHWEST OF BISCARI - (Lieutenant Peter J. Eaton)

1. Approximately 2 miles northwest of BISCARI, at 2355 on 9 July, 1st Lieutenant Peter J. Eaton, "Headquarters Company", 3d Battalion Mortar Platoon, took charge of 3 planeloads that landed intact. On the morning of 10 July, he rounded up all equipment and men he could find and proceeded west toward NISCEMI.

2. At 1200, 10 July, scouts encountered 2 Italian cars towing 47mm anti-tank guns. They killed the occupants and took the guns. With this added equipment, positions were set up, mined, and manned, with guns covering roads toward BISCARI. Sergeant Suggs of Headquarters Company, and 7 other men of that Company manned these guns of which they had no knowledge. Fore-sighting them, they fired them like veterans.

3. About 1230, a column of Italian motorized infantry, with an 11-ton Italian tankette in lead (estimated at a battalion because it occupied about 2200 yards on Highway NISCEMI-BISCARI). Sergeant Suggs and his men knocked out the tankette with their Italian 47mm anti-tank guns and so disorganized the foe with their fire, backed by their own 81mm mortars, that they retreated in confusion.

4. Lieutenant Eaton, believing that the enemy force after reorganization, would be too large and possess too much fire power for his own weapons, which were carbines, destroyed the enemy equipment and withdrew to the south.

[REDACTED]

7. On 11 July, Lieutenant Eaton's group contacted a Battalion of 180th Infantry and continued to fight with this force to 12 July, when he learned location of the Battalion Command Post and joined it in the vicinity of GETA. It is noteworthy that through all this fighting, Lieutenant Eaton displayed superior leadership and utilization of his men and firepower, and that he brought his group out without loss of a man killed or wounded. On one occasion the fight was so hot that he destroyed his 81mm mortars and withdrew. Worked with 180th Infantry for 2 days.

IV. ACTION VICINITY EACCHINO -- (Major William R. Beall)

1. Major Beall found himself with one (1) Medical Officer (Captain) William W. Kitchin) after jumping beside an Italian garrison. Surrounded by enemy, who were hunting them in the dark, they withdrew to a vineyard to figure their location and attempt to round up more men. About 0200, 10 July, they heard machine gun fire about 200 yards away and carbine return fire intermittently for 1 hour, and knew other troopers were in the vicinity. About 0730, 10 July, an advance patrol of Canadians came up. They gave Major Beall their positions, he asked help to attack garrison, but was not able to secure it, because Canadians had another mission, that of establishing and protecting beach-heads in another zone. He worked back to the beach and got assistance. The garrison was taken with Canadian assistance a little later. One Italian Officer and 20 enlisted men were captured, and six paratroopers were released, having been imprisoned by Italians. The results were one United States and one Canadian killed and buried, and one United States Officer and one United States enlisted man evacuated to Canadian Hospital. Major Beall continued his search for more men, and with what he rounded up, went back to the beach on the night of 10 July, staying there all night.

~~2.~~ On the morning of 11 July, went out to 1st Canadian Division Headquarters on boat, met General Simmons, who promised transportation by boat to enable Americans to rejoin unit.

~~3.~~ July 12, Tuesday, Major Beall, Captain Kitchin, and 18 enlisted men left by RAF crash boat to rejoin unit, and stopped enroute at coast towns to pick up United States paratroopers, landed at SOGLITTI on 13 July, and reported to bivouac area west of VITTORIA (505th Combat Team CP) with Captain Kitchin, one other officer, and 48 enlisted men from various organizations. At VITTORIA, Major Beall was told that Battalion Commanding Officer had been captured and he was in command. He proceeded to organize the remainder of the Battalion preparatory to continuing operations. Assembled a total of 4 officers and 90 enlisted men. There reorganization was affected and Battalion continued its mission with Combat Team 504.

V. AUTHENTICATION:

1. It is indicated that this report does not cover in full detail every action in which sections of the 3d Battalion were engaged. It does, however, present a general picture, which will be supplemented by such further data as will become available.

Amc

[REDACTED]

EXCERPT FROM 504TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY HISTORY BOOK
"THE DEVILS IN BAGGY PANTS"

* * * * *

SICILY HISTORY

The African sun, like a bloody curious eye, hung on the rim of the world as hundreds of airplane engines coughed into life, spewing miniature dust storms across the flat wastes of a desert airfield.

Thin aluminum skins of C-47s vibrated like drawn snare drums and as paratroopers heaved themselves up into the planes and sought their predesignated seats, they wrinkled their noses at the smell of gasoline and lacquer that flooded the planes' interiors.

Spearheading the airborne invasion of Sicily, the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, crossed the North African coast as the sun flared briefly, then plummeted into the Mediterranean. Flak rose thinly into the dusky sky ahead--probably Malta, the paratroopers grimly thought.

Detached from the regiment for tactical requirements, the 3d Battalion crossed over the Sicilian coast on schedule and jumped on its assigned drop zone, July 9, 1943.

For two days the men of the 3d Battalion fought an enemy superior in numbers and equipment. By D+3 it had achieved its initial mission and was returned to regimental control.

The remainder of the regiment, lead by Colonel R. H. Tucker, loaded planes and took off from the dusty airstrips around Mairouan, Tunisia, on July 11, 1943. As the planes cruised over the churning sea, all was quiet; some closed their eyes and prayed that it would remain quiet, while others anxiously craned their necks to peer ahead or to look down at the whitecapped waves which tossed fifteen feet below the planes.

Nearing the Sicilian coast, the formation of C-47s was fired upon by a naval vessel. Immediately, as though upon a prearranged signal, other vessels fired. Planes dropped out of formation and crashed into the sea. Others, like clumsy whales, wheeled and attempted to get beyond the flak, which rose in fountains of fire, lighting the stricken faces of men as they stared through the windows.

More planes dived into the sea and those that escaped broke formation and raced like a covey of quail for what they thought was the protection of the beach. But they were wrong. Over the beach they were hit again--this time by American ground units, who, having seen the naval barrage, believed the planes to be German. More planes fell and from some of them, men jumped and escaped alive; the less fortunate were riddled by flak before reaching the ground.

Fired upon by our own Navy and shore troops, in one of the greatest tragedies of World War II, the 504th Parachute Infantry, less the 3d Battalion, was scattered like chaff in the wind over the length and breadth of Sicily Island. Colonel Tucker's plane, after twice flying the length of the Sicilian coast and with over 2000 flak holes through the fuselage, reached the DZ near GELA; however, few others were as fortunate and by morning, only 400 of the regiment's 1600 men (excluding the 3d Battalion) had reached the regimental area.

[REDACTED]

Other plane loads of 504 men dropped in isolated groups on all parts of the island, and although unable to join the regiment, carried out demolitions, cut lines of communications, established inland road-blocks, ambushed German and Italian motorized columns, and caused confusion over such extensive areas behind the enemy lines that initial German radio reports estimated the number of American parachutists dropped to be over ten times the number actually participating!

On the 13th of July, with the 3d Battalion returned to regimental control and with about half of the remainder of the regiment assembled in the vicinity of AGRIGENTO, the 504 moved out in the attack, spearheading the coastal drive of the 82d Airborne Division. With Italian light tanks, motorcycles, horses, bicycles, mules, trucks, and even wheelbarrows for transportation, the regiment pressed forward; a cocky, spirited bunch of "mechanized" paratroopers heading into battle.

Resistance, for the most part, was light; the Germans had withdrawn to the north and east, leaving behind garrisons of Italian soldiers who would fire a few shots, and then "saving face" (and other portions of their respective anatomies) would raise the white flag of surrender. The gruelling Mediterranean sun, however, told on the foot-weary paratroopers; it was march, march, march, day and night--they prayed for the enemy to make a stand so that they could stop and fight--and rest. For five days and nights this continued, and in an outstanding tribute to the physical stamina of parachute troops, men of the 504 walked and fought their way from AGRIGENTO to ST. MARGHERITA--a distance of 150 miles.

Having reached ST. MARGHERITA, the regiment again parted from Division and turned north toward ALCAMO and CASTELLAMARE DEL GOLFO. These towns were taken successfully and at CASTELLAMARE the regiment assumed the duties of a policing force, which activity they continued for ten days. On the tenth day, the 504 was shuttled by plane back to its base at KAIROUAN, NORTH AFRICA.

Although the Sicilian operation was costly, both in lives and equipment, valuable experience was gained by those who survived, untold damage was inflicted behind enemy lines, many prisoners were captured (the 82d Division was credited with 22,000), and Nazi and Fascist forces were given their first dose of a medicine that proved to be fatal--and one that they understandably feared. It was with this experience that the now-veteran 504 returned to AFRICA to prepare for the invasion of the Italian mainland.

SECTION IV

CASUALTIES IN SICILIAN CAMPAIGN
(CORRECTED THROUGH 5 MAY 1945)

ENTIRE DIVISION

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
Killed in Action	25	165	190
Died of Wounds		6	6
Prisoners of War	8	164	172
Missing in Action	5	43	48
Missing in Action to Return to Duty	2	71	73
Wounded	16	121	137
Wounded to Duty	<u>24</u>	<u>314</u>	<u>438</u>
	80	884	964

CASUALTIES
BY
TYPE AND UNIT

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Division Headquarters</u>			
Missing in Action	<u>1</u>	-	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	1	-	1
<u>504th Parachute Infantry Regiment</u>			
Killed in Action	11	69	80
Died of Wounds	-	1	1
Prisoners of War	6	104	110
Missing in Action	4	29	33
Missing in Action to Return to Duty	-	6	6
Wounded	7	50	57
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>2</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>101</u>
TOTAL	33	355	388
<u>505th Parachute Infantry Regiment</u>			
Killed in Action	8	56	64
Died of Wounds	-	4	4
Prisoners of War	2	56	58
Missing in Action	-	5	5
Missing in Action to Return to Duty	2	57	59
Wounded	7	57	64
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>14</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>170</u>
TOTAL	33	391	424
<u>307th Airborne Engineer Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	2	5	7
Prisoners of War	-	3	3
Missing in Action	-	1	1
Missing in Action to Returned to Duty	-	3	3
Wounded	1	5	6
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>
TOTAL	5	34	39

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>376th Parachute Field Artillery</u>			
<u>Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	2	26	28
Prisoners of War	-	-	-
Missing in Action	-	7	7
Missing in Action to Returned to Duty-	-	1	1
Wounded	-	5	5
Wounded to Returned to Duty	-	16	16
TOTAL	2	55	57
<u>456th Parachute Field Artillery</u>			
<u>Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	2	9	11
Died of Wounds	-	1	1
Prisoners of War	-	1	1
Missing in Action	-	1	1
Missing in Action to Returned to Duty -	-	4	4
Wounded	1	4	5
Wounded to Returned to Duty	3	29	32
TOTAL	6	49	55
<u>TOTAL DIVISION CASUALTIES</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>884</u>	<u>964</u>

THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

IN

SICILY AND ITALY

PART III --- ITALY

<u>Section</u>	<u>Title</u>
1	"Contact Imminent"
2	Description of Operation from Planning Phase to Execution
3	Mission to Rome
4	Excerpt from "No Spaghetti for Breakfast"
5	Division After-Action Report.
6	Unit Reports
	a. The 325th Glider Combat Team
	b. The 504th Parachute Infantry Combat Team.
	c. The 505th Parachute Combat Team
	(1) 2d Battalion.
	(2) 1st Battalion.
	(3) 3d Battalion.
7	Casualties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECTION I

"CONTACT IMMINENT"

(A narrative of pre-campaign activities of the
82d Airborne Division, July - September 1943.)

FOREWORD

The combat operations of the 82d Airborne Division in the Italian Campaign are recorded elsewhere. The following account is concerned only with the remarkable series of orders, counter orders, plans, changes in plans, marches and counter-marches; missions and remissions, by air, water and land, endured by the Division prior to entry in combat. This record might be termed, "A Saga of Change". It is a monument to the spirit and mental flexibility of the men and officers of the Division.

THE STORY

On July 29, 1943, the parachute elements of the 82d Airborne Division, together with a minimum of Headquarters and Special Troops, some 5,000 officers and men in all, were disposed in and around TRAPANI, CASTELVETRANO, MARSALA, MAZARA, CASTELLAMARE and ALCAMO, SICILY.

These troops had just completed a whirlwind conquest of Western Sicily; commencing on July 9 when the first parachutist dropped and ending with the assault and reduction of the fortified city of TRAPANI on July 23, 1943. Now, without rest from the arduous campaign, they were fully occupied with the impressive task of evacuating some 28,000 prisoners of war, restoring order, and assisting in rehabilitating the country. The complexity of this work was tremendously increased by the fact that, the spread throughout the western third of the Island, the Division had only 52 jeeps and 48--2½ ton trucks.

Air Corps supplies, personal clothing and equipment, in fact all items of issue, were sadly depleted. Personnel had parachuted or airlanded with one combat uniform and in most instances without blankets or tentage. However, the troops were in fine condition and in excellent morale.

The remainder of the Division restively awaited combat orders at their departure airfields in the vicinity of KAIROUAN, TUNISIA, some 275 miles across the MEDITERRANEAN.

It was under these circumstances that the Division Commander, on July 29, 1943, received his initial instructions for the participation of the Division in the coming Italian campaign. Profiting from the lessons learned in SICILY, he repeatedly and vigorously urged a minimum of three weeks combined air-ground training with the Troop Carrier Command. He urgently recommended that the 82d Airborne Division be immediately concentrated in the KAIROUAN Area for the purpose of reorganization, reequipping and training.

On August 2, a portion of the Division staff reported to Fifth Army Headquarters at ALGIERS, where plans were formulated for the employment of the Division, worked out in detail, and then changed many times. The Fifth Army ground force assault plan was definitely fixed from the beginning. In substance it was to land on the SALERNO beaches, fight northwest, capture NAPLES, push on to ROME and eventually overrun all of northern ITALY. How best to exploit the Airborne Division was a problem of considerable concern and much speculation.

By now it had become apparent that higher headquarters would move the Troop Carrier Command from the KAIROUAN AREA to SICILY a few days prior to the Italian campaign. This at once presented a serious obstacle to combined training. Further, it was impossible to obtain a release so that the troops in

SICILY could return to KAIROUAN. Permission for the return was withheld until other forces became available in SICILY to replace the 82d Airborne Division.

While the Division proper, both in SICILY and in NORTH AFRICA, went about its training and its duties, operational projects for the Airborne invasion of ITALY were born, matured and died, one after another, at Fifth Army Headquarters, ALGIERS.

The original of six missions for the 82d Airborne Division, all planned in detail, called for the seizure by an airborne task force of the towns of NOCERA and SARNO at the exits to the passes leading northwest from SALERNO. Every available transport plane and every available glider, 318 of each, were earmarked for the operation. The early capture of these passes, on the night of D-1 Day, was held to be vital to the debouchment of the 10 British Corps onto the Plain of NAPLES. A small seaborne task force from the Division was designated to land in the AMALFI-MAIORI Area. Plans were developed to the last detail. Excellent aerial photographs were obtained, drop zones and landing fields carefully selected and minutely located. The air approach to the drop zones and landing fields presented many difficulties. One approach would carry the transport planes over intense enemy flak. The other approach required passage over the high mountains of the SORRENTINE Peninsula. The most suitable drop zones were far from satisfactory. The most suitable glider landing zones consisted of widely scattered small fields. In order for parachutists to drop in force from a suitable altitude, the flight would have been in from the sea and across the coast northwest of CASTELLAMARE. The only suitable glider release point was some 4,500-6,000 feet above the SORRENTINE Mountains, with a resultant glide of several miles. After a great deal of study and planning, the NOCERA-SARNO operation was rejected.

It was now August 12, only twenty-seven days before D-Day, September 9th. One-half of the Division was still scattered over the western end of SICILY, not yet re-clothed or reequipped. There had been no combined air-ground training. There was no plan for the employment of the Division, other than the very definite understanding that the Division would be employed somehow somewhere. All of this despite the continued efforts of the Division Commander to concentrate, reorganize and train the Division in the KAIROUAN Area, from which the Troop Carrier Command had not as yet moved.

It was on August 18 that the Division Commander received his first intimation of a brand new plan for the employment of the Division. On that date he was told that a decision had been made to conduct an airborne operation on the VOLTURNO River, northwest of NAPLES and some 40 miles from the nearest Allied beach landings in the vicinity of SALERNO. Relief of the airborne troops by ground elements of the Fifth Army could not be expected for many days. Re-supply by air became a critical item. Again the airborne machinery shifted into high gear. Now, only nineteen days remained before D-Day.

Gone was the expectation for any substantial air-ground training with the Troop Carrier Command. It was too late. Every effort had to be concentrated on getting the troops back from SICILY and reequipping them. It was imperative that the planning stage be cut to a minimum in order that the Division might have an opportunity to acquaint itself with its mission. Better than a thousand replacements must be absorbed into the two parachute combat teams.

The junior officers and the enlisted men of the Division did not know,

[REDACTED]

but they sensed a coming operation. The Division Commander flew almost in circles, again and again, from his Division Command Post at TRAPANI, 600 odd miles to his planning staff at Fifth Army Headquarters, ALGIERS, thence over 400 miles to his Division Command Post at KAIROUAN, thence almost 300 miles to his Division Command Post at TRAPANI. He and his staff labored ceaselessly with the concurrent problems of the coming operations and those of reassembly and re-equipping the Division. Unit commanders were practically helpless, in so far as preparations were concerned, because of the absence of definite plans. No supplies or replacements could be shipped into SICILY in the time available; that would have to be done upon return to NORTH AFRICA. The long distances separating the various headquarters greatly hampered communications when time was of the essence.

After many requests to have the Division relieved from the Sicilian Army of Occupation and returned to its base in KAIROUAN, orders were received to send staff representatives to Seventh Army Headquarters in PALERMO to formulate plans to move the Division by truck to PALERMO, thence by sea to BIZERTE and thence by truck to KAIROUAN. The G-3 and asst. G-3 departed from TRAPANI on August 17 on this mission. The Division Commander was in ALGIERS when these orders were received.

At 1500 August 18 a radio from the Division Commander at ALGIERS was received at TRAPANI directing the Chief of Staff and the two parachute combat team commanders to meet him at 1600 on CASTELVETRANO airfield. At CASTELVETRANO the Division Commander informed these officers that all arrangements had been made and that, commencing the next morning, the troops in SICILY would be prepared for air movement back to KAIROUAN.

During the night units scattered over the western end of SICILY were alerted by radio, telephone and courier. The Division had only 24 trucks to move personnel and equipment to the airfields, which were as much as 45 miles away. All jeeps were accounted for and impounded. At 0200 hours the orders were confirmed and the troops moved out. On that day, August 19, and until dark on August 20, C-47 planes droned singly and in groups in and out of BORIZZO and CASTELVETRANO airfields, loading airborne troops and equipment. Thus better than half of the strength of the Division, with all but the heaviest of equipment, was air-transported by shuttle to the KAIROUAN Area on August 19 and 20. Speed was essential, and it is well indeed that the movement was executed by air without red tape and complicated "coordination". The troops and equipment simply loaded up and took off for NORTH AFRICA. The Staff officers who had been in Army Headquarters at PALERMO, formulating the move by sea to AFRICA arrived with approved but complicated plans for a rail-water-rail journey just in time to board the last transport plane for AFRICA. The official confirmatory orders for the truck and sea movement arrived three days later after the Division closed in the KAIROUAN Area. Only sixteen days until D Day.

The now red hot operational plan for the VOLTURNO mission involved simultaneous airborne and seaborne landings by the Division. It was planned that the seaborne task force would take in essential ammunition and supplies for the airborne task force, with which it was to make contact within 24 hours after landing. Again, all available airplanes and gliders were to participate. That portion of the Division not involved in the air assault was to land on the beaches at the mouth of the VOLTURNO during the night of D-1 Day. This mission was denominated as the GIANT operation. It underwent several changes within the few days immediately following August 18. Finally, it was broadened to include the destruction of all crossings over the VOLTURNO from TRIFLISCO (northeast of CAPUA) to the sea.

Not one individual in the entire Division, officer or man, had ever had any experience or instruction in amphibious operations. Yet, a fullfledged beach

[REDACTED]

assault was scheduled to be undertaken within two weeks. A limited number of officers was selected and rushed off to PORTE POULE, N. A., for amphibious training.

On August 20 the composition of the seaborne task force could not be settled, because the number and composition of the assault boats was not definite. Plans were made for amphibious training of the troops at BIZERTE, but there were no craft yet available at the port. Shuttle of the troops to BIZERTE was nevertheless commenced. They began to arrive at BIZERTE on August 25. There were no craft available for training. Only eleven days remained before embarkation. The number of assault craft to be made available was suddenly increased and more units were sent to BIZERTE. The assault craft finally arrived and intensive training was immediately commenced. Training efforts were pointed to the elements being loaded and prepared for the invasion by midnight September 5.

The amphibious operation had been planned on the sketchiest of beach studies. While the amphibious training was in progress at BIZERTE, it became doubtful that the beaches at the mouth of the VOLTURNO River were suitable for landing. Nevertheless, the amphibious training continued apace with the beach study. As the beach study progressed, it became increasingly obvious that there would be great difficulty attendant upon a landing.

Then, in the midst of frantic efforts to pass on a minimum of training to all units, orders were received on September 1 directing that loading must be completed by September 3. Water-proofing of the vehicles was conducted concurrently with amphibious training, and, by 1600 on September 3, all troops, vehicles, supplies, ammunition and equipment were loaded on the assault craft and ready to sail.

Turn now to Army Headquarters at ALGIERS. There, unknown to the Seaborne Task Force Commander, the beach assault, because of the reefs and shoals, was successively reduced, first to one battalion of infantry, then to one company of infantry, and finally to a naval bombardment without troop landings. This left approximately half of the combat strength of the Division stranded at BIZERTE without a mission. It now became imperative that the airborne task force in the VOLTURNO River be resupplied by air and plans therefore were fully developed with the greatest possible haste.

The Troop Carrier Command was ordered to permanent change of station in SICILY, on nine separate departure airfields, stretching more than 100 miles across the island. The 82d Division obviously had to make the same change of station. This in the midst of assault plans that changed almost daily. Unimaginable communications difficulties arose. The dispersion of the Division at KAIROUAN itself was over an area of approximately 600 square miles.

Gone was the opportunity for any real air-ground training. It was impossible to parachute, rescue parachutes and repack them in time for the impending operation. However, because of its vital necessity, a week of such training was scheduled and some four days of same executed to a fairly satisfactory degree. The Division was only able to place the jumpmaster in each plane and have the "sticks" of parachutists represented by a few replacements who had not had a night jump. Whether the units at BIZERTE would participate in the Italian campaign at all, and, if so, when and how, was now an important question. Army Headquarters solved this by directing that to the extent that shipping became available the units at BIZERTE would be embarked as a floating reserve.

All of this time, the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, was attached to the Division. About August 23, orders were received to the effect that it

[REDACTED]

was contemplated using the 509th for a drop mission on call in any of the areas around NOCERA, SARNO, MINTURNO, BATTAPAGLIA, etc. Studies and plans for such a call had to be at once instituted and carried to a practical degree of conclusion.

Concurrently, arrangements were being hastily made with the Air Forces and with the Navy for the routing of the air columns, placing of ships with radio and lights to mark points along the route, etc.

Alternative plans and studies were undertaken for the use of the divisional units to be embarked at BIZERTE in floating Army Reserve. For re-supply of the airborne task force scheduled to drop in the VOLTURNO Valley, a daily automatic 90-plane re-supply program was worked out.

It was agreed with the Troop Carrier Command that upon termination of the one week's joint air-ground training on August 31, the Troop Carrier Command would move to SICILY, get itself settled, and then return to the KAIROUAN Area to pick up the airborne assault troops who were to be already combat-loaded. The airborne assault troops would then be landed at the proper fields in SICILY, from which they would take off for combat a few days later.

It should be borne in mind that all of these plans and changes, orders and counter-orders, were issued from and communicated to widely separated Command Posts. Fifth Army Main Headquarters were at MOSTAGANEM, 680 miles by air from KAIROUAN. Army Advance Headquarters were at ALGIERS, 600 miles from SICILY and over 400 miles from Division Headquarters at KAIROUAN. Troop Carrier Command was at SOUSSE, 30 miles from KAIROUAN, until it moved over 200 miles, into SICILY.

Re-supply by air for the VOLTURNO River air assault force was, of course, utterly essential. Hindsight shows that re-supply by ground forces could not have been effected for several weeks. Beach landings could not be made. So, when the Air Forces determined on August 26 that re-supply by air was deemed impracticable, the VOLTURNO River mission had to be drastically altered. The Commander-in-Chief directed a new plan reducing the size of the airborne task force to a parachute regimental combat team, less one infantry battalion, carrying enough supplies and ammunition to last four or five days. At the time of these instructions it was apparently thought by higher headquarters that ground relief would be effected within that period. Notice of this major change was dispatched by officer courier from ALGIERS, and the next day, September 1, began all of the multitudinous cancellations and revisions down to smaller units. Only seven days remained.

The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander, Chief of Staff, G-2, 3 and 4 remained in KAIROUAN assisting the regimental combat team commander affect his plans and checking the air movement of the combat team and the remainder of Division (less amphibious force) to departure fields in SICILY. They were to sail with the amphibious force on September 3. They planned to leave KAIROUAN at 1300 September 2, baggage and personnel was to be loaded on ships by 1600 that day. At 1130 a message was received that the Commanding General, North African Air Forces, desired to see the Division Commander at his headquarters in LAMARSA. When the Division Commander and his staff arrived at LAMARSA they were informed that an airborne operation was contemplated in the ROME Area. The Division Commander was to report to the Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group, at SYRACUSA, SICILY, without delay. The importance of the mission overweighed any objections as to lack of time to properly brief troops of any other serious defect that might arise. The Division Commander and his staff departed for SYRACUSA by air and arrived at dusk on September 2 and immediately went into conference.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The ROME operation became known as GIANT II. It called for the placing of the strongest airborne task force which available aircraft would carry, on and near three airfields immediately east and northeast of ROME on the night of D-1 Day, September 8, 1943, with the mission of defending that city in conjunction with Italian forces in the area.

Turn back now to KAIROUAN. There the Division continued its preparations for the VOLTURNO and for the seaborne floating reserve, wholly unaware of the fast-developing radical change. The ROME mission had not become definite enough and plans had not reached a sufficiently advanced stage to justify changing the course of preparation in which the Division was already engaged.

At SYRACUSA conversations with the Italian Army representatives continued over the next 36-hour period. It finally developed that the Italian Army representatives could make no guarantee that their forces could silence the coastal anti-aircraft over which the troop transport planes would have to fly to arrive at ROME, nor to guarantee that airfields necessary for air landing would be controlled by them. To have attempted the mission under these circumstances would have been disastrous. Meanwhile, time ticked on.

But American troops had to land in ROME. The Armistice had been signed, sealed and delivered with that understanding. Only the most unlooked for complications could justify the non-performance of an airborne mission to ROME. It was determined to jump and air-land a small airborne task force of one parachute regimental combat team, less one infantry battalion, with air-landed reinforcements, and an advance echelon of Division Headquarters, at two airfields, FURBIRA and CERVETERI, some 25 miles northwest of ROME. Then, if everything went well, it was planned to jump and air-land other elements of the Division on successive nights.

The Troop Carrier Command was busily engaged in moving to SICILY. Upon completion of that move the airborne troops at KAIROUAN had to be transported to SICILY and immediately thereafter troops would have to take off from the Sicilian departure airfields for ROME, or whatever other mission might be determined upon.

With the ROME mission definitely ordered, the Division Commander released his staff planning group on September 3. They returned by air to KAIROUAN and BIZERTE and late that evening the Division troops at BIZERTE received their first notice of this most recent change. Only four full days remained. Two of these would have to be used for air movement from KAIROUAN and BIZERTE to SICILY.

Meanwhile, on that same day, September 3, at about 1300 the Commanding Officer of the amphibious task force, Colonel Lewis, received radio instructions to meet the Fifth Army Commander personally at BIZERTE Airfield at 1400. There, Colonel Lewis was instructed that this amphibious mission had been cancelled, that all of the assault craft were urgently needed for another mission involving other troops, and that all of his troops, supplies, vehicles, etc., now being loaded must be cleared off the craft not later than 1900 that afternoon. Back to the amphibious loading area went Colonel Lewis as fast as his jeep would take him. It was a bitter disappointment to all of the officers and men, but in the best traditions of the Division all hands turned to and unloaded and cleared all craft in record time. By 1730 that evening every craft had been released. Waterproofing on vehicles was removed. Units, vehicles, etc., returned to bivouac on the beach ten miles from BIZERTE. Further instructions were awaited.

An interesting sidelight on the cancellation of the amphibious task force orders was the fact that so close was the time element that it was necessary for the Army Commander at SYRACUSA to take the message to Colonel Lewis personally. When the Army Commander made the decision, his was the only plane available and the order could only be transported by plane in time to reach Colonel Lewis be-

[REDACTED]

fore his forces would have sailed.

Late on the afternoon of September 3, Colonel Lewis received instructions from the Division Commander to prepare for movement to SICILY by plane at once. The designated departure field was at MATEUR, a 2½-hour truck trip from the bivouac. Such trucks as could be procured were immediately put into operation and shuttling of troops, equipment, and supplies was commenced.

The next morning, September 4, the Division Commander returned by air to BIZERTE to disseminate the GIANT II plan and speed both planning and movement. On September 5 the Division Commander and his staff at BIZERTE continued to supervise planning for those elements which the day before had been aboard assault craft and were now scheduled for commitment to action by air landing in the ROME Area. A complicated juggling of available aircraft was worked out whereby the troops at BIZERTE could be flown to SICILY and then on successive days to reinforce the troops which would have already dropped on D-1 in the ROME Area.

On the night of September 4 representatives of the Division Staff and the Troop Carrier Command worked until late in the night planning the troop movement by air from KAIROUAN and BIZERTE to Sicilian departure airfields. The next morning, September 5, troop movement by air from Kairouan was commenced. Two days were required for the shuttling of the troops at KAIROUAN and BIZERTE into SICILY.

Meanwhile, at BIZERTE the Division Commander and his staff were preparing to leave for SICILY. At about 0800 that day, September 5, radio instructions were received to the effect that shipping would be made available that day for a small seaborne task force of one artillery battalion, three anti-aircraft batteries and a company of infantry. Also, the same radio instruction attached three platoons of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion to the Division and directed that these three platoons would be included in the newly set up seaborne task force. The mission of this seaborne task force was to support the ROME operation.

The Division Commander designated the 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, plus the anti-aircraft batteries of the 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion and one company of the 504th Parachute Infantry, together with the tank destroyer elements. Lt. Col. Bertsch was placed in command of this sea expedition. The Division Commander and his staff left by plane for SICILY. Colonel Lewis assumed full responsibility for the water-borne project.

No one knew the whereabouts of the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion. None of the port authorities had received any orders at all concerning the existence of any such amphibious force as had been directed. The 319th Field Artillery Battalion and the 80th Anti-aircraft Battalion were diverted from movement by air just in time. Late that night the Tank Destroyer Battalion was located some 40 miles from BIZERTE. All units commenced movement into the dock area. Vehicles and weapons were again waterproofed.

Actually, it was not until the next morning, September 6, that Colonel Bertsch received definite orders and it was ascertained that two LCTs and two LCIs were available for the sea expedition. Additional vessels had been assigned but their whereabouts were not known. These additional vessels were British and it was finally determined that they might not be available at all. In this emergency the American admiral in the harbor came to the rescue and provided additional craft. Loading commenced on September 7. No one knew when the expedition would up-anchor and away. Many changes had been made in vessel assignments, so that the final composition of the little armada was three LCTs and only one LST. However, all of the above troops were crowded aboard.

[REDACTED]

Under secret orders the three LCIs sailed September 8. The LST sailed September 9.

When the little flotilla pulled away from the BIZERTE docks, its commander knew only that his destination was "FF", and that if no one met him at "FF" he was to sail on to "GG". He strongly suspected that both "FF" and "GG" were in the ROME Area. (Later information disclosed that the point "FF" was on the beach just north of the mouth of the TIBER River and that the point "GG" was up the TIBER River halfway from its mouth to the City of ROME.

Colonel Bertsch, on the LST, knew not where his three LCIs were and could only depend on fate and fortune for a rendezvous. Nor would the naval officers in command of the vessels know any more than he did.

Once at sea, radio instructions were received directing that the sea-borne force report to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, aboard U.S. AMCON, in the Gulf of SALERNO, for orders. Fortunately, these rendezvous instructions were received by all of the craft and on September 10 Colonel Bertsch reported to the Fifth Army Commander aboard the U.S. ANCON. The Fifth Army Commander directed that the sea-borne force land on the beaches at MAIORI, where they would go into action as a part of the Ranger Force operating through the passes across the SORRENTINE Peninsula.

With destination and mission changed, the flotilla landed on the beaches of MAIORI on September 11 and joined the Ranger Force.

As soon as the sea-borne task force had been set up at BIZERTE, Colonel Lewis proceeded with the movement of the remainder of his force, principally the 325th Glider Infantry and the 3rd Bn., 504th Parachute Infantry, on to departure fields in SICILY.

Meanwhile, in SICILY, every member of both the Division and the Troop Carrier Command worked day and night making final preparations for the ROME mission. Twenty-four hours prior to take-off time, Brigadier General Taylor, Division Artillery Commander, was moved secretly by Italian Army authorities into the City of ROME. He was accompanied by a representative of the Troop Carrier Command.

It was not until 1400 on D-1 Day, when Brigadier General Lemmitzer, Fifteenth Army Group, arrived at the Division Command Post at LICATA by plane, that the Division Commander first knew of the possibility of the ROME mission being called off.

The Italian Armistice had been signed. It was to be announced by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in a radio broadcast scheduled for approximately 1730 on D-1 (September 8). Marshal Badoglio, broadcasting from Radio ROME, was scheduled to follow the Commander-in-Chief on the air. By the use of a code word inserted into his speech, Badoglio was to signify whether or not the Italian authorities were still prepared to support the 82d Airborne Assault.

The Division Commander and several members of his staff drove to Troop Carrier Command Headquarters, LICATA, late on the afternoon of September 8 to listen in on a special receiving set. This set failed to function at the appointed time. Had the Armistice been announced or not? Fortunately, the Division Chief of Staff discovered a small portable commercial set in time to hear the concluding remarks of the Commander-in-Chief, which included an announcement of the Armistice. For some unknown reason Marshal Badoglio did not immediately follow General Eisenhower. In fact his radio address came on the air about 1900.

[REDACTED]

The Division Commander and his staff immediately returned to the Division Command Post, believing that the mission would be flown as prepared. Meanwhile, General Taylor had returned from ROME with the strong recommendation that the mission be cancelled because the Germans had full knowledge of the plan and the Italians would be unable to support the assault. Based on this recommendation, the Commander-in-Chief directed the postponement of the mission for twenty-four hours. His instructions were received by the Division Commander through Air Force channels only five minutes before the scheduled departure of the first planes, which were loaded with personnel and the motors being warmed up.

The next afternoon, as take-off time neared, all was in readiness again. Ready were men and equipment that the units on one field got into their planes, started the motors, and would have taken off had it not been for the arrival there of the Division Chief of Staff. That evening the ROME mission was definitely cancelled and abandoned.

The next instructions for employment of the Division were to be prepared to move as many troops as possible by nine LCI's from LICATA, SICILY, into the Italians operations.

Less vehicles and heavy weapons, the 325th Glider Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 504th Parachute Infantry were assembled by plane at LICATA, SICILY, on September 13. At 2000 that night it sailed from the harbor and landed near SALERNO, ITALY, late on the night of September 15. The 3rd Battalion of the 504th was sent to join its regiment near ALBANELLA. The 325th was moved shortly thereafter into the operations on the SORENTINE Peninsula.

On the afternoon of September 13th, at about 1330 hours, a tired, begrimed pilot landed in an A36 at LICATA Field having just flown down from the SALERNO front. He had an urgent message for the Division Commander and refused to give it to anyone else. In the meantime, the Division Commander, G-2 and G-4, had taken off from LICATA for TERMINI to report to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, in ITALY. The Chief of Staff of the Division had the LICATA Field Control tower call the Division Commander's plane and bring him back. The message brought by the pilot was a personal letter from the Commanding General, Fifth Army, containing an appeal for immediate help, and requesting specifically that one parachute RCT be dropped on the beach south of the SELLE River to reinforce the VI Corps that same night. The Army Commander also directed that the 509th Parachute Battalion drop on the mountain village of AVELLINO, far behind the German lines, on the night of September 14.

Reallocation of departure fields, re-shuffling of troops, air routes, coordination with friendly anti-aircraft fire, etc., were arranged within eight hours.

On the night of September 13, the 504th Parachute Infantry, with Co. "C", 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion attached, dropped on the SELLE River beaches. The drop zone was well lighted and from its reflection the paratroops could be seen for miles by both friend and foe. A dramatic meeting ensued. The reinforcements had been badly needed. The enemy was dangerously near a breakthrough to the beaches, which would have separated the VI and X Corps. The VI Corps had suffered heavy casualties. With his troops assembled in the dark less than an hour after landing, Col. Tucker, commanding, reported to the Army Commander. The Army Commander directed: "As soon as assembled you are to be placed in the front lines." Col. Tucker replied, "Sir, we are assembled and ready now." The 504th RCT moved, within a matter of minutes, into a front line position and shouldered its battle responsibility.

The AVELLINO drop was made as planned on the night of September 14. The

drop zone was high in a mountain valley. Navigational obstacles were tremendous. While only a portion of the troops were dropped on the proper drop zones, the operation was successful in delaying and harassing enemy concentrations in the vicinity of AVELLINO. Many of these troops were not contacted by ground elements for a period of three weeks.

On the same night, September 14, CT 505, likewise parachute, repeated the drop on the SELLE River beaches and also went into action.

There is little doubt but that these most timely air reinforcements turned the tide of battle in the VI Corps sector.

On September 14, both the Division and Troop Carrier Command moved gliders into position on departure fields, prepared air movement tables, and set up glider RCTs to follow into the SELLE River beaches. This called for an enormous amount of troop shifting, movement of gliders, etc.

On 15 September gliders on departure fields were loaded and the troops stood in readiness to climb in. However, reconnaissance in the SELLE River Area failed to disclose suitable glider landing areas and on 16 September further glider operations were suspended.

On the afternoon of 17 September orders were received at LICATA to move the remainder of the combat troops by motor vehicle to TERMINI for sea movement to ITALY on the 19th. By jeep, truck and air the movement was commenced immediately. An advance party was dispatched by plane to TERMINI. No sooner had the motor movement to TERMINI been commenced than instructions were received to air-land 50 planeloads of Division Headquarters and Special Troops in the PESTUM Area, ITALY, on September 18, 25 planes to depart at 1000 and 25 planes to depart at 1300. The troops to be moved by air included detachments of the Quartermaster and Ordnance Companies, who were scheduled for 1000 departure. These detachments had already left by motor vehicle for TERMINI. Both jeeps and cub planes were dispatched to overtake them. They were not overtaken until they were entering the outskirts of TERMINI. They immediately turned back and reached the departure field at LICATA the next morning at 0950 and by 0958 disappeared into 047s. At 0600 a garbled radio was received stating it most imperative 3,000 rounds of M2 artillery ammunition be transported to ITALY. This ammunition displaced seven planeloads of personnel and equipment and caused a hasty reallocation of planes.

These serials landed on a newly constructed landing strip at PAESTUM RUINS. The runway was so short and rough that ten planes crashed on landing. Fortunately only one person was slightly injured.

The remainder of the Division, less the 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion and certain base echelon personnel poured into TERMINI on organic and borrowed vehicles to meet the embarkation deadline. But there were no craft to be boarded. A last minute priority change allocated all available shipping to other units. For many days the troops were at TERMINI. Finally shipping was made available and they were landed on the SALERNO beaches.

In such fashion did the airborne, seaborne, truckborne, railborne, All American 82d Division go to the war in ITALY.

SECTION 2:

A. DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION FROM PLANNING PHASE TO EXECUTION

1. On about July 28, 1943, Brigadier General Taylor, Division Artillery Commander, reported at Fifth Army Headquarters as planning representative for the Division Commander. On August 7 three Division Staff Officers joined General Taylor and remained with him until approximately August 15, 1943. Thereafter the Division was represented by General Taylor alone.

2. Between July 28 and September 13, a total of six missions were prepared in detail. They are briefly described as follows:

- a. NOCERA and SAIRO Passes.
- b. VOLTURNO River (subsequently known as Giant I).
- c. ROME (subsequently known as Giant II).
- d. AVELLINO (subsequently known as Giant III).
- e. Area northeast of NAPLES and vicinity of CAPUA.
- f. Reinforcement of VI Corps on beaches south of SELE River.

3. The development, changes, and details of the several planned operations is best followed chronologically, as shown below.

4. When planning commenced at Headquarters, Fifth Army, the combat elements of the Division were in SICILY. The remainder of the Division and the 2d Bn 509th Pzcht Infantry, then attached, were in North Africa.

5. D-Day for the Italian Campaign having been tentatively set for September 9, the Division Commander strongly urged the necessity of at least three weeks combined training to include a detailed dress rehearsal, in compliance with Paragraph 4, Training Memorandum No. 43, Allied Force Headquarters, 2 August 1943. Because of considerable depletion both in personnel and material, the Division Commander likewise urgently and repeatedly recommended that the Division be immediately moved to North Africa for reorganization.

6. The original mission assigned the Division was to seize the towns of NOCERA and SAIRO, situated at the exits to passes leading northwest from SALERNO, and cover the debouchment of 10 Corps (Br.) onto the plains of NAPLES. At that time it was considered vital that these passes be seized on D-1 Day and held at all cost. Due to enemy flak, necessity for dropping paratroopers and releasing gliders at high altitudes, and further due to the lack of suitable glider landing zones, this mission presented considerable difficulties. Air coverage was secured and DZs and LZs selected. It was tentatively planned to drop paratroopers from height of from 1,500 to 2,000 feet and to release gliders along the SORRENTO Ridge at altitudes of from 4,500 to 6,000 feet. This was to be a night operation with the benefit of moonlight.

7. On about August 12 the NOCERA-SAIRO mission was abandoned and the VOLTURNO River mission (later known as Giant I) was assigned. The VOLTURNO River mission called for simultaneous air and sea landings on D-1 Day. Specifically, the mission as originally approved was as follows:

"To land from sea and air under the cover of darkness on the night of D-1/D Day south of the VOLTURNO River, seize, organize and defend Hill Mass 3 (just outside of CAPUA) and prevent movement of hostile forces south across the

[REDACTED]

VOLTURNO towards the NAPLES Area, in order to assist the Fifth Army's attack of the NAPLES Area from the Southeast."

8. Meanwhile, on August 19-21, the Division closed in the KAIROUAN Area.

9. On August 22 the mission was changed to "seize, organize and defend a bridghead to include the CANCELLO Area". (One precht bn with attached engineers to demolish the river crossings near CAPUA.)

10. The original combined air and sea assault in the VOLTURNO Area contemplated the employment of four (4) LSTs and twenty (20) LCILs and 310 planes and 130 gliders. The Airborne force consisted of two precht RCTs, Reinforced, and one glider FA bn. The seaborne force consisted of one glider infantry RCT.

11. On August 23 the VOLTURNO mission was broadened to include the destruction of the crossings over the VOLTURNO from CAPUA to the sea. At the same time it was ascertained that the beaches in the vicinity of the mouth of the VOLTURNO were not suitable for landings. The seaborne effort was thereupon reduced to one bn of infantry, to one company of infantry, and then limited solely to a naval bombardment.

12. The Division Commander was informed on August 24 that these elements of the Division not to be employed in the air assault would be embarked and used as a floating reserve for the Army Commander.

13. About August 24 the Division Commander was informed that it was contemplated using the 2nd Bn 509th Precht Inf, in army reserve for drop missions on call. Studies were made for the employment of this bn in the NOCERA, SARNO, MINTURNO, and BATTIPAGLIA Areas. Resupply by air for the VOLTURNO mission was to be daily, automatic, ninety planes per day, until relieved by 10 Corps.

14. Meanwhile, all arrangements were made with the Navy for route, visual lights from ships to be stationed along the route, radio directional beams, etc. As planned, the air assault would have the benefit of sufficient moonlight, both in and out, insofar as the transport planes were concerned.

15. The allocation of craft to the seaborne portion of the Division remained the same. On August 27, Fifth Army directed that loading be completed at BIZERTE by D-5.

16. One week of joint training with TCC was scheduled. However, due to a number of factors, including (a) TCC's movement to new bases in SICILY, (b) lack of facilities for return of gliders after landings, necessity for overhaul of planes and equipment prior to departure mission, etc., the training was neither particularly realistic nor satisfactory. The main accomplishment was the demonstration of the value of the pathfinder radio homing device.

17. Complete and detailed air support, commencing on D-3 Day, was arranged for jointly with the Troop Carrier Command.

18. Plans for coordination with respect to routes, timings, navigational aids, naval, and ground forces, use of pathfinder aircraft, establishment of airborne corridors, altitude for flight, use of downward recognition lights etc.,

19. On September 1 the size of the force for the VOLTURNO mission was reduced to two precht inf bns, a company of precht Engineers, and a battery of glider AT guns. The mission was restricted to the destruction of the crossings at CAPUA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20. On September 2 the Division Commander was orally informed that the VOLTURNO mission was cancelled and that, instead, the Division would air land in the ROME Area (known as Operation Giant III), commencing on D-1 Day. The waterborne force, which had meantime substantially completed loading at BIZERTE, was ordered to disembark. The air operation in the ROME Area was ordered for parachute and air landings on successive nights, on airfields adjacent to the city.

21. On September 5, Fifth Army directed that the 2nd Battalion, 509th, be prepared for drop missions on call at EBOLI, AVELLINO or BENEVENTO.

22. On September 6 one LST and three LCI's were assigned to the Division for loading at BIZERTE. A Bn of FA, one company of infantry, three Anti-Aircraft batteries, a detachment of Engineers, and four TD guns were loaded. These troops, along with three LCI's loaded with ammunition, sailing from separate points, were to join the air assault at the mouth of the TIBER River. The air route, navigational aids, etc., were rapidly readjusted with the Navy to fit the new mission.

23. On September 6 the Division CP opened at LICATA, SICILY, and on September 8 all air combat elements of the Division closed in SICILY. Take-off ROME was set for 1745 September 8.

24. On September 8, at 1650, orders were received postponing the ROME mission.

25. On September 9 the ROME mission was cancelled and orders issued to be prepared for Giant I, or a similiar operation, on short notice.

26. Meanwhile, the one LST and the three LCI's had sailed from BIZERTE, On Army Group order they were diverted to the SORRENTO Peninsula.

27. The Division passed to Fifth Army control on September 9. On September 12 orders were received directing that 2nd Battalion, 509th, drop in the AVELLINO Area and that Giant I be executed in the area northeast of NAPLES, both missions to be executed on the night of September 12/13. To this, reply was made that the AVELLINO mission could be executed on the night of September 15/16 and the Giant I mission in the CAPUA Area on September 14/15, there being no suitable DZ's northeast of NAPLES.

28. On September 13 the Division Commander was directed to execute Giant I in the CAPUA Area on call on or after September 14/15, and to drop one precht RCT near the beach south of the SELE River in the zone of the VI Corps on the night of the 13th.

29. On September 13 the 325th Glider Infantry, with one bn, 504th Prcht Inf, less transportation, cleared LICATA in nine LCI's, destination SORRENTO Peninsula.

30. On September 13 Army directed the execution of the AVELLINO drop on the night of September 14/15.

31. On the night of September 13 the 504th Prcht Inf less one bn, with one company of prcht engineers attached, dropped near the beaches approximately six miles south of the SELE River in support of the VI Corps.

32. At 1400 on September 14 orders were received that the AVELLINO mission (Giant III) and a repeat of the SELE River mission would be executed on that night.

33. On the night of September 14 the 2nd Bn, 509th, dropped on AVELLINO in forty planes and the 505th Prcht Inf, with one company of Prcht Engineers attached, dropped near the beach six miles south of the SELE River as reinforcement to the VI Corps.

34. For these missions, routes, timing use of pathfinder aircraft, establishment of airborne corridors, altitudes, use of downward recognition lights etc., were planned as set forth subsequently, in the report.

35. In all three of the last-mentioned drops, routes, timings, coordination with ground troops, navy, etc., were quickly and effectively arranged on short notice.

36. On September 15 plans were set up for a movement of glider troops and Division Headquarters and Division Special Troops into the SELE River area. Gliders were spotted and loaded. However, on September 16 orders were received suspending all glider operations. On September 17 orders were received directing that substantially all of the remaining combat troops be moved to TERMINI for sea movement to ITALY. The movement to TERMINI was commenced.

37. On September 18 Division Headquarters and detachments of Division Special Troops air landed in the PAESTUM Area, ITALY. There were no further air movements. The remainder of the Division, less 456th Precht Fa, have been brought by sea to ITALY.

B. SPECIFIC MEASURES TAKEN TO COORDINATE WITH AIR, NAVAL AND GROUND FORCES

As set forth in Annex No. 1, measures for coordination with air, naval and ground forces for the VOLTURNO River mission were prescribed by NAAF. However the provision of this plan were inapplicable to the SELE River mission, and since time was of the essence, Lt Gen Clark summoned Admiral Hewitt, Naval Commander and Maj. Gen Lucas, VI Corps Commander and personally informed them that troop carrying planes would fly a prescribed course at a certain time and directed that from 2100 until contrary orders were given by him, all anti aircraft guns on the SALERNO would be silenced, and barrage balloons taken down.

Lt Gen Clark directed Maj Geyer TCC and Lt Col Yarborough, then Fifth Army to make a spot check to determine whether crews of AA guns on the SALERNO beach-head had been informed of the bar on firing. Every gun crew checked by these officers had received order to suspend firing until further orders.

C. ESTABLISHMENT OF AIRBORNE CORRIDORS AND USE OF GUIDE SHIPS

There was no airborne corridor prescribed for this operation and no guide ships were used to mark the route.

In planning the VOLTURNO River mission, airborne corridors were set forth and guide ships were to be stationed to mark the lane. These plans are set forth in detail in ANNEX No. 1. While the VOLTURNO mission was still pending, a rehearsal was held in which a lane was marked as set forth in ANNEX No. 1 and flown by TCC units. The test run was highly successful.

D. MEANS EMPLOYED TO GUIDE AIRCRAFT TO DZ

This phase of the operation was greatly facilitated by the fact that the drop was made behind friendly lines.

The letter from Lt Gen Clark which was delivered to Gen Ridgway directing the jumps to be made set forth that the DZ would be marked with a white T. A penciled-note indicated how it would be done. The marking was actually accomplished by formation of a T, each leg 1/2 mile long, and of issue gas cans, cut in half and filled with sand permeated with gasoline. These gas cans were laid out during daylight and one man stood by each. At a prearranged signal all flares were lit, and upon completion of the drop they were extinguished by dousing.

[REDACTED]

In addition to those smudge pots, Very signals were fired for the benefit of planes at the tail of the formations. These were of material assistance to some pilots.

E. USE OF DOWNWARD RECOGNITION LIGHTS

For downward recognition, amber lights on belly and wing tips of each flight loaders' plane have been employed by TCC since midsummer. They were employed while flying over water on this mission.

F. ALTITUDES DURING FLIGHTS

Troop Carrier crews were briefed to fly below 1000 ft to DZ. Departure from these orders was necessary because of low cloud formations encountered enroute and due to hill masses just south of DZs. Aircraft returned to bases at altitudes of not less than 6,000 ft.

[REDACTED]

SECTION III

9 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. C. of S., G-3,
Allied Force Headquarters.

SUBJECT : Mission to ROME.

1. In compliance with verbal orders from AFHQ and the Fifteen Army Group, Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor and Colonel W.T. Gardener, A.C., left Palermo for Rome at 0200 September 7 for the purpose of completing arrangements in Italy for the execution of Operation GIANT TWO. Transportation was by a British P.T. boat to Ustica Island where the party was transferred to a waiting Italian corvette. Rear Admiral Maugeri, Chief of Naval Intelligence received the American officers on board and remained with them until their arrival in Rome. The corvette put into GAETA at 1950 where the party was quickly put in a Navy sedan, taken to the outskirts of town and transferred to a Red Cross ambulance. The trip up the Appian Way to Rome was uneventful. Few German troops were seen and the visible defenses along the route were unimpressive. The party entered Rome just at nightfall and was taken to the Palazzo Caprara opposite the War Office (intersection of V. Firenze and V. 20 Settembre) where accommodations had been prepared.

2. Colonel Salbi, Chief of Staff to General Carboni, the General's Aide, Lt. Lanza and Major Marchesi received the officers. No conferences had been scheduled for that evening but, at the insistence of the Americans, interviews were hastily arranged with General Carboni, Commanding the Army Corps about Rome (concurrently Chief of Intelligence since August 20) and General Rossi, Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff. For reasons shown subsequently the interview with Rossi did not take place.

3. Interview with General Carboni.

General Carboni arrived at 2130. He immediately launched upon an expose of his views of the military situation in the Rome area. Since the fall of Mussolini (he said), the Germans had been bringing in men and supplies thru the Brenner Pass and also thru Rosia and Tarvisio, with the result that their forces near Rome had greatly increased. There were now 12,000 Germans principally parachutists in the valley of the Tiber who have heavy equipment including 100 pieces of artillery, principally 88mm. The Panzer Grenadier Division had been raised to an effective strength of 24,000 men with 50 light and 150 heavy tanks. In the meantime the Germans had ceased to supply the Italians with gas and munitions so that their divisions were virtually immobilized and had only enough ammunition for a few hours of combat. General Carboni's estimate of the situation was as follows:

If the Italians declare an armistice, the Germans will occupy Rome, and the Italians can do little to prevent it. The simultaneous arrival of U.S. airborne troops would only provoke the Germans to more drastic action. Furthermore the Italians would be unable to secure the airfields, cover the assembly and provide the desired logistical aid to the airborne troops. If it must be assumed that an Allied seaborne landing is impossible North of Rome, then the only hope of saving the capital is to avoid overt acts against the Germans and await the effect of the Allied attacks in the South. He stated that he knew that the Allied landings would be at Salerno, which was too far away to aid directly in the defence of Rome. He stated that General Roatta shared his views.

4. It was apparent to the American officers that regardless of the soundness of General Carboni's information and views, he displayed an alarming pessimism certain to affect his conduct of operations in connection with GIANT TWO. General Taylor proposed that they request an immediate interview with

[REDACTED]

Marshal Badoglio to permit General Carboni to present his recommendations and receive the decision of the Head of the State. The interview was requested and granted.

5. The delegation reached Marshal Badoglio's private villa at about midnight, where the household was awake as the result of an air alarm. General Carboni was received at once by the Marshal while the American officers waited in the antichamber. After about fifteen minutes they were admitted and greeted cordially by the Marshal. Throughout the ensuing interview he made frequent expressions of his friendship for the Allies and his desire to enter into effective cooperation.

6. Interview with Marshal Badoglio.

General Taylor explained the late visit, saying that General Carboni had raised questions so grave that the immediate decision of the Head of the State was required. Was Marshal Badoglio in accord with General Carboni in considering an immediate armistice and the reception of airborne troops impossible of execution? The Marshal replied that he agreed with Carboni and repeated much the same arguments. General Taylor asked if he realized how deeply his government was committed by the agreements entered into by the Castellano mission. He replied that the situation had changed and that General Castellano had not known all the facts. The only result of an immediate armistice would be a German supported Fascist government in Rome. He was asked if he feared the possible occupation of Rome by the Germans more than the renewed attacks of the Allied Air Forces which would certainly come if he rejected the armistice. He answered with considerable emotion that he hoped the Allies would not attack their friends who were only awaiting the right moment to join forces. If any bombing is to be done let it be on the Northern rail centers serving the German troops.

In reply to the question as to how he expected the Allied Chiefs to react to these charges he expressed the hope that General Taylor would return and explain the situation. The latter declined to accept any responsibility for the Italian interpretation of the situation but offered to act as a messenger if so instructed by the Allied authorities. The urgent business was to send to Algiers a definite statement of the Italian views over Badoglio's own signature.

7. The Marshal accepted this proposal and drafted the message which is appended as Inclosure 1. General Taylor prepared another message at the same time (Inclosure 2) recommending the cancellation of GIANT TWO and requesting instructions for himself and Colonel Gardiner. The visitors withdrew and returned to the Palazzo Caprara where the two messages were turned over to General Carboni for transmission. At 0800 the next morning, word was received of their reception in Algiers.

8. In order to present a clearer picture of the local situation, General Taylor with the concurrence of General Carboni and Colonel Gardiner sent off the message attached as Inclosure 3. At 1135, as no acknowledgment of the message recommending the cancellation of GIANT TWO had been received, the code phrase "Situation Innocuous" (Inclosure 4) was sent off. This had not been sent initially as its use had been reserved for the case of an Italian refusal to transmit a request for cancellation. It was used in this instance to save time as the encoding of longer messages was taking as much as three hours.

9. The Italians showed great concern over the possible reaction of the Allied Chiefs to their reversal of position on the armistice. The American officers reinforced their apprehension by emphasizing the gravity of the situation in which the Badoglio government found itself. The Italians repeatedly urged the American officers to return and plead their case whereas the latter declined to be anything other than messengers. It was then decided that some senior officer should return with the Americans. The name

[REDACTED]

of General Roatta was first proposed then withdrawn as he was considered indispensable in dealing with the Germans. (He had been military attache to Germany.) General Rossi, Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff, was eventually selected and message No. 4 (Inclosure 5) was dispatched.

10. The American officers expressed a desire to see General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff who was reported to be out of the city. This interview was arranged eventually for 1830 but never took place as the officers were ordered back to Tunis by a message arriving about 1500. Although no authorization for their visit had been received, General Rossi and Lt. Tagliavia (interpreter) joined the American officers who were again put in an ambulance and driven to the Centocelle airfield. The party took off at 1705 in a tri-motor Savoia-Marchetti bomber which flew straight to El Aouina, Tunis, arriving at 1905. The officers were driven from here to "Fairfield" where the Americans reported to the Commander in Chief.

11. Conclusion.

While the Castellano mission was committing the Badoglio government to active military cooperation, the Germans were building up their strength in the Rome area and throttling the flow of munitions and gasoline to the Italian troops. Although their fear of the Germans was mounting daily, the Italian leaders allowed themselves to become deeply committed to the Allies in the belief (so they said) that the major landings would be near Rome. By the time General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner arrived, this illusion was dispelled and the Italians knew for certain that AVALANCHE would strike in the Salerno area. While this produced a profound pessimism and a realization of their over commitments, they were allowing matters to drag without redefining clearly their position to the Allies. The arrival of the American officers, their insistence on the imminence of events and the importance of action brought matters to a head and stopped an operation (GIANT TWO) which was near being launched into a situation which invited disaster.

/s/t/ MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General,
U.S. Army.

/s/t/ W.T. GARDINER,
Colonel, Army Air Forces.

Inclosure 1

Message of Marshal Badoglio to Allied Commander in Chief

Dati lutamenti di situazione determinatesi in dislocazioni et entita' forze Germaniche zona Roma non e' piu possibile accettazione immediata armistizio poiche' essa prevocherebbe occupazione capitale ed assunzione violenta governo per parte tedesca. Operazione Giant Two non piu possibile perche mancano forze per garantire campi anazione. Il generale Taylor e disponibile per rientrare in Sicilia per presentare vedute del governo ed attende ordini.

Badoglio.

Translation

Due to changes in the situation brought about by the disposition and strength of the German forces in the Rome area, it is no longer possible to accept an immediate armistice as this could provoke the occupation of the

[REDACTED]

capital and the violent assumption of the government by the Germans. Operation GIANT TWO is no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee the airfields. General Taylor is available to return to Sicily to present the views of the government and await orders.

Inclosure 2

Message No. 1

8 September

In view of the statement of Marshal Badoglio as to inability to declare armistice and to guarantee fields GIANT TWO is impossible. Reasons given for change are irreplaceable lack of gasoline and munitions and new German dispositions. Badoglio requests Taylor return to present government views. Taylor and Gardiner awaiting instructions. Acknowledge.

Taylor Time signed 0121

Inclosure 3

Message No. 2

8 September

Summary of situation as stated by Italian authorities. Germans have 12,000 troops in Tiber Valley. Panzer Grenadier Division increased by attachments to 24,000. Germans have stopped supply gasoline and munitions so that Italian Divisions virtually immobilized and have munitions only for a few hours of combat. Shortages make impossible the successful defense of Rome and the provision of logistical aid promised airborne troops. Latter not wanted to present as their arrival would bring an immediate attack on Rome. Source of these views Marshal Badoglio and General Carboni.

Taylor Time signed 0820

Inclosure 4

Message No. 3

8 September

Situation innocuous.

Taylor Time signed 1135

Inclosure 5

In case Taylor is ordered to return to Sicily, authorities at Rome desire to send with him the Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff, General Rossi, to clarify issues. Is this visit authorized?

Taylor Time signed 1140

[REDACTED]

SECTION IV

EXCERPTS FROM "NO SPAGHETTI FOR BREAKFAST"

(Book by Alfred Wagg and David Brown, published in 1943 by Nicholson & Watson, 26 Manchester Square, London, W. I.)

AMERICANS IN ROME
By David Brown

Chapter 18

That fateful message of September 8th, on the very eve of the attack, was one of the last links in a series of episodes which are certainly among the most amazing and romantic of the entire war.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill lifted a corner of the curtain on these events in the course of the brilliant review of the war he gave to the House of Commons on September 21st.

"We offered and prepared to land an American airborne division in Rome at the same time as the Armistice was declared," the Prime Minister told the House, "in order to fight off the two armoured divisions which were massed outside it to help the Italians, but owing to the German investment of the Rome airfields which took place in the last day or two before the announcement of the Armistice, of which investment the Italian Government warned us, it was not possible to carry out this part of the plan, which was, I think, a pretty daring plan --(cheers)-- to cast this powerful force there in Rome in conditions which no one could measure, which might have led to its complete destruction, but we were quite ready to do it. But at the last moment the warning came, 'The airfields are not in our control.'" "

The story of that projected airborne invasion dates back to the final stages of the Armistice negotiations. Castellano had stated on behalf of the Italian Government that with the considerable forces of Germans then in Italy the Italian Government could not consider itself a free agency. The capital was almost certain to be invested by German troops when the Allied attack began, the seat of power would fall into German hands and the Government would be rounded up. However, said the Italians, if the Allies could land airborne troops at Rome they felt that, with the divisions they had available in the Rome area, sufficient combined strength could be mustered to take immediate control of the Italian capital.

After considerable discussion and examination of the strategic situation, the Allies agreed to make the attempt. An airborne operation was already in preparation which would have dropped American paratroops, on the night of the first assault, in the valley of the Volturno River, above Naples - a natural defensive barrier which the 5th Army finally crossed successfully in mid-October in their push North from Naples to Rome.

Brigadier-General Maxwell Taylor, Second in Command of all American Airborne Divisions, was one of several airborne troop officers hastily summoned to Sicily four days before "D-day", the day of the attack. That was on Sunday, September 5th. The Italians had remained at Cassibile since signing the Armistice two days before, and on reaching Advanced Headquarters, Taylor and the others were called into consultation with them and with the Allied commanders. They were presented with a completely new airborne plan. The airborne effort was to be diverted from the Volturno valley to the airfields in the Rome area. It looked and was an extremely hazardous and ambitious undertaking.

Working out the details of such an operation ordinarily takes between three and four weeks. The decision to undertake it was made at an all-night session

[REDACTED]

at Cassibile with the Italians and Allied commanders, the plan was approved by General Alexander, and the airborne commanders were asked to do it in forty-eight hours. It was already the morning of the 6th, and there was to be no putting-off of the general attack which was to occur on the night of the 8th.

Briefly, the plan called for parachute drops on several aerodromes north of Rome, from which the paratroopers would move rapidly to the outskirts of the city where at specified points the Italians were to have piled necessary supplies of munitions, guns and other supplies, and to have waiting lorries and extra stores of petrol. With the assistance of the Italian battalions in the area it was figured out that by the following evening the parachute troops would have held control of three more airfields contiguous to Rome, and by the third evening they would have completed the capture of all the airfields in the Rome area and assembled with their Italian allies inside the city and on its outskirts in sufficient strength and with sufficiently good defensive dispositions to hold it against any German counter-attacks.

Neither Taylor nor his superior officers were wholly satisfied, however, that the help they were to get from the Italians was of a responsible sort, to be fully depended on. They were planning to risk an entire division of specially selected men, the best and most carefully trained soldiers in the American Army. Without absolute certainty of support when they had made their drops, the plan would fail. And the slightest false move by the Italians in making their preparations for assistance would, naturally, have betrayed the scheme to the Germans, and the division would fall into a trap where they would probably be annihilated.

Taking stock of the project after the all-night discussions, it was felt that someone should go to Rome to look the situation over and make absolutely certain of the arrangements there. General Taylor himself was selected to go, and to accompany him the choice fell on Colonel William Tudor Gardiner, of the U.S. Army Air Force. The airborne operation, however, was already definitely scheduled to occur, and General Alexander would not permit the two officers to start off on their mission until twenty-four hours before it was to become operative. The reason for his strange-seeming prohibition was a simple one. Taylor and Gardiner were going to run enormous risks. If they were captured too long before the zero hour, the plan might become revealed to the Germans in time for them to take quick, effective counter-measures and an entire division might be lost. By limiting the time of their exposure to capture within Italy, this risk was cut down to a minimum which would still allow the airborne operation a chance to succeed.

Taylor and Gardiner set off from Cassibile that same morning, September 6th, but they went only as far as Palermo, where they stayed overnight in the villa of the Allied Naval Commander. Meantime, the Italians back at Cassibile were working the suitcase-set radio channel for all it was worth making arrangements for their secret reception in Rome.

Taylor and Gardiner had known each other only slightly before they set off on their great adventure together. But they took an instant liking to each other and worked together well. Taylor, a brigadier-general at 42, is the perfect type of the young, alert, aggressive, professional military man. Slim, tanned and handsome in the jumperlike uniform of the American parachute soldier falling over the tops of his high-laced boots, he personifies the corps d'elite that comprises the parachute divisions of the U.S. Army. He received his appointment to West Point from Kansas City, Missouri, his home. His rise as a professional soldier of courage and judgment has been rapid. Just before the start of the war he was a captain, serving in the Far East.

Colonel Gardiner was 53, eleven years Taylor's senior. A product of Harvard,

[REDACTED]

veteran of the last war, and a lawyer-sportsman, he had served for a term as Governor of his native State of Maine, where his home town -Gardiner, Maine- had been named after his family. Gardiner's law practice after he left the Governorship was in New York City, and he had learned to fly an aeroplane at the age of 48, so he could travel quickly between Maine and New York.

The two officers got as much rest as they could at Palermo; Taylor had been up all the night before, and both of them were to be awakened at 2 a.m. on the morning of the 7th to set out for Rome.

In the pitch blackness of four o'clock in the morning, they went aboard a British P.T. boat which was to take them on the first stage of their journey. Lines were cast off and the boat moved slowly at first, gaining speed as it left the harbor and finally moving with its engines roaring at full speed as it headed through the night for the tiny island of Ustica, forty miles above the north-western corner of Sicily.

They reached Ustica at daybreak. A rendezvous had been arranged for them there with an Italian corvette, and she appeared right on the dot. Aboard her was Admiral Maugeri, one of the top-ranking officers of the Italian Navy, who had come to see them safely on their way and played host to them during the long day's voyage across the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Italian mainland.

The two officers were going into what was to all intents and purposes a hostile country. No word had been breathed of the signing of the Armistice Terms. The Germans in Italy were expecting things to happen and had been fully alerted. In Rome, their destination, especially would they be putting their necks in the lion's mouth. They had discussed at length the question of concealment and had decided finally to wear their uniforms. This would render them technically safe from shooting as spies if they were caught.

"But we weren't under any illusions about the kind of treatment we'd get if the Germans did nab us," General Taylor told me later. "It had been arranged that if any questions were asked when we were first taken ashore we were to be described as American aviators who had been shot down in the Mediterranean, and picked up by the corvette as prisoners."

The question of arms had also been discussed and both officers had decided to carry them. Gardiner had a regular Service Pistol, a Colt .45. General Taylor carried a small Italian Beretti pistol he had picked up from an Italian prisoner in Sicily, and which he preferred to the heavier weapon. The arms, with their uniforms, improved their legitimacy of their status as combatant soldiers as opposed to spies, and were comforting to feel bouncing lightly against their hips.

"We were the first Allied Armed Forces to enter Rome," Taylor smilingly said afterwards.

The day passed pleasantly enough aboard the corvette. Admiral Maugeri extended himself to make their 200-mile trip comfortable. Food and wine were plentiful, and good. The weather was perfect and the sea calm. They spent most of the time on deck talking. Late in the afternoon the Italian coast came into sight and about 6:30 in the evening they pulled into their port and tied up at a naval dock. This was at Gaeta, north along the west coast of Italy from Naples, and about seventy-five miles below Rome.

The two Americans came down the gangplank on to Italian soil under the close watch of an Italian guard placed over them to carry out the pretence that they were captured aviators. They had jammed their caps out of sight into their pockets. Their hair was dishevelled, their neckties awry, their coats unbuttoned, and altogether they gave a very good representation of prisoners of war who had been re-

ceiving none too gentle handling. The Italians standing around the dockside may have remarked that the American prisoners were getting a taste of real Italian toughness.

The car sped quickly away from the docks and drove without stopping about two miles outside the town of Gaeta, where it turned into a small side road. A little way up this road, hidden from the main highway, was waiting a small vehicle, about the size and appearance of the delivery trucks used by florists or grocers, with frosted-glass windows letting light into the interior and permitting the occupants to look out. Taylor and Gardiner hopped out of their car and scrambled quickly into the back of the truck.

The truck turned out of the side road and started up the Appian Way towards Rome. The two officers reflected on the perfection of the arrangements and the excellence of the timing displayed by the Italians in the bit of intrigue they were now in the midst of. If the Italian army had only been able to show such excellent organization and performance, what might it not have accomplished.

They watched interestedly through the glass as they sped on towards Rome. They noted that between Gaeta and the Italian capital no extensive defensive precautions had been taken. They counted only six road-blocks over the seventy-five mile stretch. They kept their eyes peeled for German troops but spotted only four uniformed German soldiers in the whole journey. However, along both sides of the Appian Way there were neatly lettered signs in German pointing to German military units concentrated at points off the main highway, up the side roads. Civilian traffic on the Appian Way was surprisingly heavy; apparently petrol restrictions were not too severe.

Just at nightfall they entered Rome. Their little truck drove through the wide streets to the Palazzo Caprara and stopped outside a handsome stone building just opposite the Italian War Office. It was used as an adjunct to the War Office and housed the offices of some of the Italian Army's senior headquarter's staffs. It was to be Taylor's and Gardiner's hide-out.

They dropped out of the back of the truck and scuttled across the sidewalk into the building, holding their trench coats closed and with their collars pulled up to conceal as much as they could of their American uniforms. Inside, they found that every effort had been made to provide them with comfortable quarters. The combination of the fine old Italian mansion and the ingenuity of the Italian officers charged with looking after them had, indeed, provided them with magnificence which contrasted startlingly with the field tent or rude billets they had been inhabiting in Sicily. Two huge offices on the second floor had been converted into bedrooms for them. They were magnificent rooms, beautifully panelled in dark wood, with fine old Italian carvings. Adjoining were great bathrooms, with mirrors, silver and marble fittings, luxurious rugs. They gasped at the suddenness of the contrast. A day before they had been sleeping on canvas cots in dusty, mosquito-infested fields, shaving and bathing with cold water out of an old five-gallon petrol tin.

Every precaution had been taken to guard their secrecy. The shutters of their rooms had been tightly closed. Armed Italian sentries on guard at the far end of the corridor not only protected their rooms, but blocked off the whole wing of the building in which they were located.

Taylor and Gardiner were received by the Chief of Staff and aide to General Carboni, who commanded all Italian troops in the Rome area. They had arranged a lavish dinner for the American guests. Tables were laid in their apartments with gleaming white linen, shining silverware and flowers. Soup, filet mignon, fresh vegetables, dessert, fruit and an assortment of fine wines were brought out for

[REDACTED]

the hungry Americans who had seen nothing except Army field rations for weeks.

"They certainly showed no signs of having a food shortage in Rome". Taylor said.

The two Italian officers were completely unaware, as were all the other Italians with whom they came into contact, of the imminence of the Allied military operation. They wanted to make an occasion of the dinner, and sit around afterwards and be hosts to the Americans for a social evening. No arrangements had been made for conferences with senior military officers. Tomorrow would be soon enough to get down to business, the Italians said. Meantime, have some more wine.

Gardiner and Taylor were appalled at this lack of preparation. It was already Tuesday night. The Armistice was to be proclaimed to the world on Wednesday evening, less than twenty-four hours later, and the Allies were to land at Salerno in the early hours of Thursday morning. The Airborne operation with which they were specifically concerned was to take place some six hours earlier than the landings. Only thirty hours away their paratroops would be dropping on the Rome airfields, and instead of talks with the Italian commander they were being offered more wine.

They insisted on seeing the Italian General immediately. They could not reveal the reason for their pressing haste, but their urgency was apparent enough, and after a few more attempts to dissuade them and settle down to a pleasant evening of relaxation, the Italians sent word to General Carboni. He arrived after a short delay, and the Americans plunged at once into the question of the airborne landing.

Immediately they got their first rude shock. General Carboni took a most pessimistic view of the whole situation. Numbers of fresh German troops had been moved into the Rome area since the Armistice negotiations had got under way, and the problem looked far more difficult if not impossible. He thought that any announcement of the Armistice just then would be highly undesirable and would result in the immediate occupation of Rome by the Germans. The airborne operation, he said flatly, would be disastrous.

Taylor and Gardiner pressed him for reasons. Why did he feel the operation couldn't succeed? Carboni said the new German units had taken control of the airfields which were to be their objectives.

His Rome troops, which were to have been counted on for help, were in an almost defenseless condition. The Germans had been keeping a close grip on supplies of ammunition and fuel in the area and doling it out to the Italian Army in the smallest possible rations. His soldiers had only enough ammunition for a few hours of combat. They had almost no petrol to ensure their mobility. They could not put their hands on the supplies needed to provide hidden stockpiles for the American parachute division. The Germans were alert, suspicious. They would come in and slaughter both his Italian soldiers and the Americans dropping from the skies.

The two Americans were alarmed by Carboni's pessimistic point of view. Their responsibility was a heavy one. Knowing how he felt, they believed that his cooperation in the agreed plan- if they insisted on carrying it through- would be highly doubtful. The evening was passing fast and every minute was vital if they were eventually to stop the airborne operation. The only way to settle the matter finally, they decided, was to see the head of the Italian Government. They asked to be taken to Marshal Badoglio at once.

The Italians demurred. It was late. The Marshal was an old man, and could

[REDACTED]

not be disturbed. The ride through the streets was long and risky. Tomorrow would do just as well; put off the meeting until the morning, and they would be taken to see Badoglio.

But the Americans insisted. They could picture the airborne soldiers preparing to hop off the next afternoon, perhaps to drop into certain death. This was no time for inaction or the finer courtesies. They refused to be put off until the next day, and under their insistent demands Carboni finally agreed to take them to Badoglio's home.

They came down into the darkened street and climbed with Carboni into his private limousine. They had put their trench coats on over their uniforms and sat well back in the darkness of the teneau. Several times they were stopped by sentries, but their danger on this ride seemed less because of the blackout and the presence of Carboni. When their car was halted by a sentry they remained sitting back as far as they could in the darkness while General Carboni leaned forward into the pool of light cast by the sentry's torch and with a word got the car cleared past the barrier. Several times the sentries were German. Carboni's uniform and Italian officer's cap would come into view at the car window and the sentry, noting the insignia of his high rank, would refrain from flashing his torch inside the car.

Neither Taylor nor Gardiner felt any real chill of fear. They knew they were running a great risk, but it was only the reaction of the Italians about them while they were in Rome that brought home to them fully the danger of their position. The Italians were terrified of the Germans generally, and those whose job it was to help the two American officers along were afraid for their skins. They knew it would be all up with them if they were caught in the company of the two American officers. Having no real personal knowledge of how tight the German grip was in Rome, Gardiner and Taylor basked in the valour of ignorance. Their only measure of the perilousness of their situation they obtained in the reflection of the behavior of those around them.

There was an air-raid alert on as they moved through the darkened streets. Military targets in Rome had already been subjected to two raids by the Allied Air Forces, and the inhabitants were jittery. The ride lasted for about twenty minutes, and the car pulled up before Marshal Badoglio's impressive villa. It was already after midnight but the whole household was up in pyjamas and dressing-gowns owing to the alert.

Leaving them seated in the car, Carboni rang and was admitted to the darkened house. He spent fifteen minutes inside talking with Badoglio. Then he came out and invited Gardiner and Taylor to enter and join Marshal Badoglio in his study.

BADOGLIO HESITATES

By David Brown

Chapter 19

The great entrance hall of Badoglio's impressive modern villa was brilliantly lighted behind its blackout curtains, and the Americans blinked a little until their eyes became accustomed to the light. They had a few moments to glance around before they were ushered in. There were great halls of white marble, deep, soft, luxurious rugs, marble nymphs and other statuary advantageously placed in the halls and staircase, lovely paintings, and the most modern type of private elevators leading to the upper floors. The furniture was modern and costly. Badoglio's expensive new villa had been the subject of much comment in Rome, political and otherwise, when it had been built shortly after his return from the Ethiopian war.

~~SECRET~~

The Marshal was waiting for them in his study. Like the rest of the household, he had been awakened by the air-raid alarm, and was wearing pyjamas and lounging robe. He greeted them cordially and made some reference to the alert, indicating his costume.

"I thought there were to be no more bombings of Rome," he said to them, reproachfully.

They took seats in the study, lined with pictures and mementoes of Badoglio's long military career. Both the American officers knew French, though their Italian was not good enough for conversational use. So Badoglio and Taylor talked in French, while Colonel Gardiner took notes as the discussion proceeded. It turned out to be a very tense, short interview.

Brigadier-General Taylor was the spokesman for the Americans, and plunged right into the heart of the matter. He told the Marshal how alarmed they were that Carboni felt the Armistice couldn't be declared, and that the use of the airborne plan was undesirable.

Badoglio replied that he agreed perfectly with General Carboni.

The two Americans had meanwhile been sizing up the aged Marshal. The first and most striking impression they received was one of feebleness. They saw him as an old man, already growing weak. Irresistibly they found themselves comparing him mentally with Marshal Petain. They looked at the walls of the study, hung with reminders of a brilliant military career covering fifty-five years. Badoglio had already been a soldier for thirteen years before General Taylor was born. Badoglio had the wisdom and experience of years, but they wondered if he still retained his attributes of strength and decision.

He gave them his estimate of the situation, which was in large measure a reiteration of General Carboni's arguments. He pointed out that because of the new German dispositions he lacked sufficient forces to guarantee holding the airfields. The Germans had, fortunately, not become aware of the negotiations that had been going on, but following Mussolini's downfall they had feared what course Italy might take, and had been sending heavy reinforcements into the country. There were already nineteen German divisions in Italy.

Parenthetically, one of Germany's worst blunders had been the shifting of her diplomatic staff within Italy after the collapse of Fascism. She had sensed, of course, that something was going to happen, but didn't know what or when. She had taken steps other than military ones. She had made wholesale changes and replacements to break up what she feared might be harmful Italo-German friendships, and in order, as she thought, to increase the toughness and alertness of her diplomatic and intelligence staffs within Italy. She didn't want long usage, carelessness, or long-standing friendships to interfere with their keenness and alertness in a crisis. But by so doing she had broken many long-developed channels of information through which she might have been able to get a hint of the negotiations at Lisbon. Germany's own manner of keeping up her hostile pressure against her Ally had cost her the possibility of getting advance warning of the surrender.

Badoglio made it plain that he not only thought the airborne plan couldn't succeed, but that he wanted the announcement of the Armistice put off.

Taylor quickly pointed out to him the situation in which Italy found herself- a British Army advancing up from the south, her railroads and lines of communication devastated by allied air raids, which were increasing daily in power and would continue to increase as long as the Germans remained in Italy

[REDACTED]

and the Italians failed to come in on the Allied side. Which was the more to be feared by Italy, the Germans or the Allied Air Force, backed up by one army already landed on the mainland and another one coming? Taylor pointed out the likely effect on Italy if she repudiated the agreements entered into by her accredited representatives in Lisbon and solemnly signed in Sicily only three days before. He did not think that Italy desired to, or could, repudiate those undertakings.

Almost with tears in his eyes the old Marshal renewed his protestations of friendship for the Allies. All he wanted, he said, was a delay. He couldn't believe that the Allies would turn against friends who were only waiting for a "propitious moment" to join hands. Unaware, like all the other Italians, that the assault at Salerno was scheduled for the following night, and that the invasion fleet was already on the Mediterranean, he asked Taylor to return to General Eisenhower and explain the situation as he saw it, stressing his (Badoglio's) complete desire to cooperate, but stressing, also, the unsuitability of conditions at that moment for putting their plans into effect.

Badoglio, like the rest, was obsessed with all-prevailing fear of German retaliation. Rome was the crux of that fear. They could not contemplate the Germans coming in and damaging, perhaps destroying it. It was the center of their world. It was the seat of their fortunes, their homes, of all their vested interests and the source of all their political and military power. Through the long centuries of its ancient glory it had come to mean more to the Italians than Italy itself. They could more calmly contemplate the loss of hundreds or thousands more Italian soldiers fighting in the Naples area or in Southern Italy, through their failure to fulfill their agreement, than the damaging of one building in Rome by revengeful Germans. They were all fearful and pessimistic, and their fears made them all see the future through dark glasses.

Badoglio's attitude epitomized the terror they all felt. "I'll declare the Armistice if you insist, but the Germans will be in here and cut my throat by tomorrow night," he said at one point.

The youthful looking Taylor found himself in an unenviable spot. He had come on his mission to do a concrete military job. Suddenly he found resting on his shoulders the weight of the whole Armistice, and possibly the whole future of the Italian campaign.

Actually, of course, it was a pretty clear-cut proposition. Within a few moments of starting their talks with Carboni, both Taylor and Gardiner had felt that the whole project was hopeless. Even earlier, when they had arrived and found that no staff conferences had been arranged, nothing done to further their military mission, they had begun to feel definite misgivings. Despite the fact that he was the first harbinger of bad news, they looked upon Carboni as a strong and effective figure. He was reassuringly anti-German. His mother was an American. The Germans mistrusted him and had him constantly under surveillance. Taylor regarded him as the most decisive and commanding figure they met in Italy, and one who would prove of the greatest help to the Allies if he managed to escape from German occupied territory. He sat back now and listened to their talk with Badoglio.

With the shortness of the time remaining constantly in his mind and guiding his decisions, Taylor slid over Badoglio's suggestions that he return and lay the problem before General Eisenhower. Instead, he urged the Marshal to place his own full statement of the case before Eisenhower at once by wireless. Badoglio agreed, and sat down to draft his message. He wrote out at the same time a full statement in long hand for General Taylor to take back in person.

The essence of his position which he incorporated in his telegram was what he wanted:

- 1) To delay the armistice announcement; and
- 2) To withhold the planned airborne operation

Badoglio had already won his second point without a struggle, for the Allies depended on his cooperation for the airborne operation, and if he couldn't cooperate they couldn't go ahead with it. It was the first point that became the all important one.

Badoglio drafted his telegram to Eisenhower twice, each time shrewdly inserting a phrase that would indicate that General Taylor agreed with him. He made use of such phrases as "as General Taylor knows," and "as is understood by General Taylor." Each time Taylor, no less acute, looked the message over and handed it back to Badoglio for revision. On the third try Badoglio's message stood on its own feet, and Taylor sat down at the Marshal's desk and wrote down his own brief recommendation to General Eisenhower that the airborne operation be cancelled. He put both messages in his pocket to be handed over later for transmission.

During the whole of the interview only French had been spoken. But now, as the American officers got up to leave, Marshal Badoglio spoke in Italian. He took Taylor by the hand and swore by his honor, as a soldier of fifty-five years service, that he was sincere in his dealings with the Allies. He was quite emotional in his protestations of friendship and good faith.

"You cannot doubt my honesty," he said. "It is my only desire to please and assist the Allies."

He ushered them to the door, shook their hands again, and bade them good-night. The two officers drove back to their quarters in the Palazzo Caprera. It was a quiet, uneventful return trip. They were stopped by sentries as before, but Carboni got them through without difficulties. When they reached their rooms they looked through the messages again for a final check-up on their contents, and handed them over to General Carboni for transmission over the secret "suitcase" set. This was hidden somewhere in the offices of the Italian Supreme Command. Taylor signed his message at 01.21. They got to bed about 2 a.m. It was already September 8th, the day on which the Armistice was to be announced.

Taylor was to learn later that atmospheric conditions, which had been raising havoc continually with their message transmission during the entire three weeks' period, were especially bad that night. The message he filed at 01.21 did not reach Algiers until six o'clock on the morning of the 8th. And it was hours later before its vital contents reached Advanced Headquarters, where it had to be -and was- acted upon with celerity by General Eisenhower and his staff. It reached them none too soon.

With the thoroughness and foresight that had provided General Bedell Smith and Brigadier Strong with prepared armistice terms and with the "B" radio set before they set out for Lisbon, Allied Headquarters had also provided for something going wrong with the airborne plan. In their discussions at Cassibile, the possibility had been envisaged of the Italians not going through with the scheme, and a code word had been agreed upon to indicate that the operation was to be cancelled. That code word was the word "innocuous." The Allied Command understood that if they got any message from Taylor containing that word they were to flash a message at once to the assembly point of the airborne division halting their preparations.

When Gardiner and Taylor awoke they were informed of the difficulties with

[REDACTED]

the wireless transmission. As an extra precaution, Taylor sent a two word message about 11 o'clock that morning. "Situation innocuous" that message read. It, too, was delayed, and was relayed through to Advanced Headquarters late in the afternoon. Taylor's first recommendation had just been received, and orders hastily flashed through to the airborne troops. They did not reach the airborne commander until 4:30 in the afternoon. The transport planes were already lined up to take his men to Italy, and the parachute soldiers, finely trained, tense and eager to start their operation, were already preparing their packs and parachutes. In a very short time they were to be stepping aboard the planes, the order to stop the operation came as a blow to them, and they grumbled some as they stowed their kit back in their tents. "Why couldn't So-and-So Generals make up their minds?" they wondered, as they tramped disconsolately away from the assembly area. They could not know they had just been saved from dropping into what at the moment looked like the jaws of certain death.

At the Palazzo Caprera nothing remained for Gardiner and Taylor to do except wait for orders from Allied Headquarters. They roamed about their rooms nervously. Taylor peeked out through the closed shutters and got a sudden warm thrill of recognition. He was looking down slantwise- the shutters prevented a full view- on a sight he knew! He had never been in Rome before, but below him was a lovely little fountain, and he knew it at once.

"It was the fountain of Saint Barnardo, that used to be on the cover of my high school art text book," he said. "I would have recognized it anywhere. It gave me a queer and pleasant thrill."

Air-raid sirens and then the sound of bombing penetrated to their closed rooms. It was the destructive allied raid on the German military Headquarters in the suburb of Frascati, a few miles away. The Americans knew it was the Flying Fortresses in action, though they did not know what the target was. "It sounded as though the target were getting quite a pasting," Taylor remarked.

In the limited travelling about Rome, most of it at night, they had seen no evidence of bombed damage to the city itself. On their entry they had to make detours where bombs had in one area damaged railroad crossings during the first raid on Rome, but all they saw supported the Airforce's claim that the bombing had been well controlled and had hit only military targets. Rome had seemed to them very quiet. They had expected to find chaotic conditions in the city. Instead they had, in their limited observation, seen everything to be normal and calm, the people seemingly rejoicing over having got rid of Mussolini and enjoying their new found freedom from Fascist control. Traffic through the street they had observed to be of the usual wartime nature, with a great preponderance of military vehicles, but they had seen numerous private cars as well, and the Appian Way had been liberally dotted with private automobiles. Their food was excellent. The Italians who had been in charge, at least laughed, at the talk of food shortages. "We could have had filet mignons at every meal, and there was always wine", they observed.

General Carboni came in to see them about 11 o'clock and told them that orders had just been received from Allied Headquarters for them to return. It was part of their plan to take an Italian General back to North Africa with them, to join Castellano and his now increasing staff. At first the Italians had decided to send General Roatta, the Army Chief of Staff. The Allied Generals felt a little leery of this choice, because Roatta had been military attache in Berlin, and had always been very close with the Germans. But they politely refrained from saying so. Possibly the Italians remembered this, too, and decided that Roatta would be a useful man to have around when the Germans heard the sad news of the Armistice. At any rate, their nominee was changed, and Lieutenant-General Francesco Rossi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was picked to go along with

them. They were also taking back an interpreter, whose name was Taglivavia.

Taylor and Gardiner had no preparations to make for their departure: They had brought no baggage. They had an excellent lunch with the Italian officers, and rested and lounged in their rooms until half-past four. Then their little truck drove up under the porte-cochere of the building, so they might be shielded from the gaze of any stray passers-by. The Americans had already said their good-byes to Carboni and the other Italian officers. The four passengers climbed in—General Rossi, Tagliavia, General Taylor and Colonel Gardiner. Driving out of the town to Centoselle Airfield they again had to make detours, for their road crossed the railroad lines which had been heavily bombed.

As they drove on to the airfield they had their closest brush with danger of the entire trip. Their vehicle had to halt to allow the passage of a detachment of marching troops. Peering through the little frosted windows the American officers saw with a sudden chill that they were German soldiers. They marched up close beside the truck. Taylor and Gardner, crouching in the back, could have reached out their hands and touch them. Were they going to halt and search the truck? The Americans sighed with relief as the truck got its engines started up again and drove far out on the field, away from the administration buildings and any curious loungers on the edge of the parking areas.

Waiting for them on the far side of the field was a three-motored Savoia-Marchetti, with a crew of four. Its engine was warmed up, the propellers whirling. They hopped out of the back of the truck and climbed aboard the plane as fast as they could. The door was slammed shut, and without loss of time the Savoia taxied out to the runway and took off. The interior of the plane was comfortable fitted with tables, chairs, charts and piles of memoranda, and had evidently been used to take Italian officers about the country.

They took off from Centoselle at 5 o'clock. It was a beautiful, sunny afternoon. As they climbed the Americans had their first real look at Rome, spread out in panorama beneath them. The dome of Saint Peter's rose in the distance and was quickly left behind as they headed straight for the coast, between Sardinia and Corsica. Once over the sea they turned South and made for Tunis.

Allied aircraft patrolling the North African Coast had been warned the Savoia was coming, and instructed not to molest it. None came near them until just as they were crossing the Tunisian coast. Then an American fighter plane spotted the Savoia with its Italian markings and came over to investigate; it circled the Savoia for a while and gave the Italian and American occupants some moments of real anguish. Then, apparently satisfied, and aware of the "don't molest" instructions, it flew off.

The flight from Rome took about two hours. When they put in at El Aouina Airfield, a few miles outside Tunis, it was just after 7 o'clock. General Eisenhower had gone on the air and announced the Italian Armistice to the World at 6:30. Almost simultaneously the British Broadcasting Corporation from London and the American Radio networks had started to spread the news around the globe. The airfield personnel were in a ferment of excitement.

But before they left the Airfield, Taylor, Gardiner and their two Italian companions had their own surprise. Radios had been kept tuned in and had picked up the news of Badoglio's announcement. He had gone on the air one hour after General Eisenhower, and had made his proclamation to the Italian people and the armed forces of Italy. Here is what he said:

[REDACTED]

"The Italian Government, recognizing the impossibility of continuing the unequal struggle against the overwhelming power of the enemy with the object of avoiding further and more grievous harm to the nation, has requested an armistice from General Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American Allied Forces. This request has been granted.

"The Italian Forces will, therefore, cease all acts of hostility, against the Anglo-American Forces wherever they may be met. They will, however, oppose attacks from any other quarter."

Marshal Badoglio had retreated from the position he had taken the evening before, and had made the announcement as he had originally agreed. The die was cast. Italy was now in it with the Allies.

Taylor and Gardiner looked curiously at General Rossi when he heard the news. Rossi turned grey under his skin. His feelings had been the same as that of Badoglio and the other Italian leaders. He had wanted more time to take preparatory measures against the Germans who were now swarming in Italy. Like them, his only thought was, what would happen to Rome?

The two American officers had completed their mission, and everything had worked out satisfactorily. Though the Italians didn't yet know it, the invasion fleet was at that moment heading in toward the beaches at Salerno. The airborne operation had been called off by the narrowest of margins.

"We believe that the whole value of our mission was that it stopped an operation which in our judgment would, under the circumstances, have been disastrous," General Taylor summed it up for me.

SECTION 5

DIVISION AFTER ACTION REPORT, SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 1943.

1. Preparatory to the operations undertaken by the Division and its component units during the month of September, 1943, six different missions were prepared in detail by the Division Staff, only two of which were destined to be put in execution. These two were a jump by the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion in the vicinity of AVELLINO on the night of September 14 and jumps by the 504th and 505th Combat Teams on the nights of September 13 and 14 on the beaches south of the SELE River as reinforcement for the VI Corps. Although the Division Staff participated in the planning of these operations, the combat teams undertaking them passed to Army or VI Corps control on their take-off and the history of their subsequent maneuvers is therefore the history of the units themselves and of the Army or Corps of which they were at that time a part. Likewise the 325th Combat Team (including 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry), which cleared LICATA, SICILY September 13 for a seaborne movement to AVALANCHE began its Italian operations under control other than that of the 82d Airborne Division Command.

2. Division Headquarters and detachments of Division Special Troops air-landed in the PAESTUM Area September 18 and the 504th and 505th Combat Teams were brought under Division control after they were withdrawn from actual combat operations in the vicinity of AIBANELLI and ALTAVILLA, ITALY. Thereafter, for several days the Division Command, through these two combat teams, undertook patrol activities in the vicinity of ROCCADASPIDE and CASTEL-CIVITA, while the 325th Combat Team was being actively engaged on the SORRENTO Peninsula as an element of the Ranger Force.

3. Movement of the main body of the Division from the vicinity of CASTELCIVITA to the SORRENTO Peninsula was begun September 26 and the Division CP opened at LIORI on that date and immediately took command of a task force on the peninsula, consisting principally of what had been the Ranger Force already operating there and the divisional parachute elements newly brought from CASTELCIVITA. Lt. Col. Darby was placed in command of the East Force under the Division Commander, with headquarters at LIORI, and Col. James H. Gavin, in command of the West Force, in the AGEROLA Area. The Division CP was moved to MALFI September 27. That night a general advance was begun, with the main effort through CHIUNZI Pass in the East, and a supporting effort through the AGEROLA--GRAGNANO tunnel in the West. The advance was lightly opposed and entirely successful, the first troops debouching into the SARNO Plain early the following morning. From the 28th to the 30th the entire force converged on CASTELLARE and concentrated in that vicinity. On the 30th the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, led the advance along the main highway routes as far as TORRE ANNUNZIATA, and the entire division preceded into the city of NAPLES the following day.

4. Leading elements of the 82d Airborne Division, with the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, serving as advance guard, entered the city of NAPLES about noon October 1, 1943, on the main highways leading into the city from the South. The Division was preceded as far as the southern extremity of the city suburbs by reconnaissance elements of the 23rd Armored Brigade (British), which at that point diverged to the Northeast and by-passed the city itself. The entire city was occupied and put under patrol before nightfall.

5. Except for elements of the Division detached from it to serve under other commands, the Division remained throughout the month in the City of NAPLES, charged with the responsibility for maintaining order, and saw no further combat service, sailing for North Ireland on 19 November 1943.

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A. P. O. #464, U. S. Army

In the field,
1 October 1943.

SUBJECT: Division of Responsibility between CG, 82d Airborne Division
and CG, Fifth Army Base Section.

TO : CG, 82d Airborne Division
CG, Fifth Army Base Section
CG, 10th Corps (Br)
CG, VI Corps (U.S.)

1. The CG, 82nd Airborne Division, utilizing Allied troops under his command, is charged with the maintenance of peace and good order in the City of Naples and the guarding of all military installations, public works and other public property. He will act directly under the Commanding General, Fifth Army, pursuant to Operation Instruction No. 3, 22 September 1943. He will also utilize the services of the Carabinieri and other Italian civilian police which he will control through Allied Military Government channels. He will also be responsible for local defense, and the disciplinary control of all Allied Military personnel within the city.

2. The CG, Fifth Army Base Section (Brig. Gen. Ponce) will be charged with the general administrative control of Naples, except for the function allotted to CG, 82nd Airborne Division under Par. 1. Among his functions will be:

a. Control of Allied Military Government within the area, except for its policing functions. This will include supervision of the provision of food and medical supplies for the civilian population.

b. Maintenance of utilities of all sorts to the extent necessary for military purposes.

c. Establishment of supply dumps in coordination with chiefs of section, Fifth Army.

d. Reconstruction and operations of the port area.

e. Acquisition of real estate and matters of quartering, billeting and similar activities, as prescribed in Administrative Instruction No. 11.

f. Signal communications within the Fifth Army Base Section.

g. Transportation insofar as it pertains to base section activities.

h. PAD, fire fighting, traffic control and sanitation.

By command of Lieutenant General CLARK:

/s/t/ M. F. GRANT
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

SECTION 6

THE 325TH GLIDER INFANTRY

On September first, 1943, the 325th Combat Team, consisting of the 325th Glider Infantry, with an attached parachute infantry battalion, field and coast artillery, combat, and shore engineers, and medical personnel, was undergoing intensive training near Bizerte, Tunisia, for the shore landing operation known as "Avalanche." On September 3rd, while the Combat Team was engaged in loading its heavy equipment on LST's, the mission was cancelled.

Planning was commenced on September 4th to move the Combat Team to Sicily by plane, and on the 5th, the 1st Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, Company "A", 307th Airborne Engineers, and the advance party of the Combat Team moved to Airport No. 2, Mateur, Tunisia. The advance detail boarded planes at 1700 and landed at Licata, Sicily, at 1915 on September 6th. On the same date the 2d Battalion of the 325th moved to Airport No. 2, Mateur. Both the 1st and 2d Battalions boarded planes on the 7th. The 1st Battalion landed at Gela West, Sicily. The battalion headquarters and part of Company "F" of 2d Battalion landed at the Trapani-Mico airfield, Sicily, and the rest of 2d Battalion landed at Comiso, Sicily. On the same date the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, attached, moved by plane from Africa to Comiso. Also on September 7th, the 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion and the 2d Platoon of the 307th Airborne Engineer Company attached left by water for Maiori, Italy, from which point the 319th was used in support of the Ranger Task Force. The Engineer platoon was also used in action north of Maiori.

Regimental Headquarters Company, Service Company and the Regimental Medical Detachment of the 325th, together with Battery "A" of the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion and Company "A", 307th Airborne Engineers less the 2d Platoon, moved by plane to Castelvetro, Sicily, on September 8th. The advance echelon of the Combat Team had already moved from Licata to Castelvetro by truck on September 7th. The dispersion of the 325th Combat Team, less detachments, among various Sicilian airfields was dictated by the possibility of a mission involving air landings in the vicinity of Rome.

The next few days were spent standing by in case the airborne mission materialized. On the 9th, reconnaissance was made for a possible bivouac area to be used in case of concentration of the Combat Team near the Trapani-Milo airport. On September 10th, the Regimental Personnel Section arrived at Castelvetro from Bizerte by plane.

The Combat Team, less the elements previously sent on a separate mission on the 8th, and less the two antitank platoons of Regimental Headquarters Company, moved by plane to Licata on September 13th and was loaded on LCI's, which left the port at 2000 the same date. At 1430 the following day, the LCI's arrived at Palermo, Sicily. The troops remained aboard overnight, and at 0500 on the 15th, the LCI's left for a destination near Salerno, Italy. At 2300 that night the Combat Team landed on the beach 18 kilometers south of Salerno and remained there until morning.

On the 16th, the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, left on an unknown mission. The 2d Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, less Company "G", which was attached to Headquarters, Fifth Army, departed by LCI's to work with the Rangers on a beach head north of Salerno. For the next five days the 2d Battalion held positions on Mt. San Angelo di Cava against enemy action which culminated in an eight-hour attack on September 20th. The Battalion held its ground.

The remainder of the Combat Team marched five miles to a bivouac area near Staz di Cappuccio, Italy. At 0700 on September 17th, Company "G", 325th Glider Infantry, left by LCI's to occupy the Island of Ischia, southwest of the harbor of Naples. The 3rd Battalion of the 504th was relieved from attached

[REDACTED]

at 0001 the same date, and the rest of the Combat Team was alerted to go to the front at 2130.

At 0300 the following morning, the 1st Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, moved out and took up positions northeast of Albanella, Italy, in support of the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry. Regimental Headquarters Company, Service Company, and the Regimental Medical Detachment, 325th, with Company Headquarters of Company "A" of the 307th Airborne Engineers, moved to a bivouac area about one mile southeast of Albanella. The Regimental CP was also established at this point. At 0630 on the same date (September 18th), the 1st Platoon of Company "A", 307th Engineers, joined the 1st Battalion.

The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, of Regimental Headquarters Company, 325th Glider Infantry, established an observation post northeast of Albanella during the morning of the 18th. During the afternoon there was more or less shelling from German 88's, and during the night there was some artillery fire. At 1622 on the 18th, Company "C" of the 1st Battalion furnished a 30 man reconnaissance detail to a Tank Destroyer unit. During the 19th, the 1st Battalion remained in a defensive position. At 0935 a patrol from Company "C" reported that it was west of Altavilla and that there was no enemy opposition. At 1700 it was reported that the 30 man detail with the tank destroyer unit was at Altavilla.

On September 20th, the Combat Team was withdrawn from its positions and moved by truck to Beach No. 1 near Paestum, Italy, remaining there overnight. At 1500 on the 21st the Combat Team personnel moved by LCI and LST to Maiori, Italy. Equipment was sent overland by truck. The Combat Team arrived at Maiori at 1830 and was attached to the Ranger Force. The 1st Battalion, 325th, moved up to positions at Mt. San Angelo di Cava to relieve the 2d Battalion, which moved back and took up positions behind the 1st Battalion. The 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, less Company "H", was again attached to the 325th Glider Infantry and took up positions on Mt. di Chiunzi. The 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from attached and was attached to the 1st Ranger Battalion. The Regimental CP was temporarily established at Maiori, and Major Zinn, Regimental S-3, with Captain Berkut, Regimental S-2, went forward to the front to give the field order for the following day's operations.

On the 23rd, the 1st Platoon, 307th Airborne Engineers moved up to work with the 1st Battalion of the 325th. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of Regimental Headquarters Company was also sent to the front, where it was extensively used in patrol work. Lt. Col. Sitler, Regimental Executive Officer, and Major Zinn, S-3, established a forward CP on the road to Chiunzi Pass. A report was received that the 1st Battalion was in position by 1500. Meanwhile, the general attack, in which the 325th's mission was a defensive one, had started at 0330 on the 23rd. Allied naval vessels shelled the mountains north of Maiori during the day.

The Regimental CP was moved from Maiori into the mountains on the Chiunzi Pass road on the morning of the 24th, and the forward CP personnel moved to the Regimental CP location at 1200. At 2000 Colonel Lewis, Commanding Officer of the 325th Glider Infantry, directed a machine gun platoon of 1st Battalion with rifle protection to occupy high ground at Fornace and strafe the road toward Camerelle. By 0900 the following day, however, those troops were forced to withdraw, having suffered several casualties.

On the 25th the 1st Battalion positions were the same as on the preceding day, strong enemy opposition being reported in front of Company "B" from 0530 to 0600. On this day, information was relayed back from the Regiment's observation post which enabled British artillery and naval guns to shell an enemy truck column south of Camerelle, destroying 17 trucks.

Major General Ridgway, Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, was placed in command of all the area west of Salerno on September 26th. The

[REDACTED]

area was divided into east and west sectors, Lt. Col. Darby of the Rangers remaining in command of the east sector, in which the 325th was operating. The 26th was a day of patrol activity, the British being reported out of contact with the enemy. The 1st Battalion of the 325th sent patrols toward Caremelle, the 2d Battalion, toward Nocera. The 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, patrolled toward Paganì, and other units, to the south of Sala. On this date the 3rd Battalion of the 504th reverted to regimental control, and the 325th returned to Division control at 2400.

On orders from the Commanding Officer of Force Headquarters, the 1st Battalion, 325th, attacked the road southwest of highway 18 to establish contact with the 46th Division on the right. This operation was part of the Force plan to seize positions in the valley in the east sector. On the 28th of September this operation was successfully completed as far as units of the 325th Combat Team were concerned, and units held the positions established on the previous day.

On September 29th, the 325th Combat Team moved to San Egidio and bivouacked there overnight. On September 30th, the Combat Team moved to an assembly area east of Castellammare, where the two antitank platoons of Regimental Headquarters Company rejoined the Regiment, having arrived by boat from Termini, Sicily. On this day the officers of the Combat Team were informed of plans for the occupation of Naples by the 82d Airborne Division to restore order and prevent rioting.

HEADQUARTERS 325th GLIDER INFANTRY
APO #469, U. S. Army

October 20, 1943

ANNEX #1:

To "The 325th Glider Infantry in Action", dated October 19, 1943.

The 1st Battalion, 325th, in execution of orders to attack the road southeast of their position and establish contact with the British 46th Division, sent Company "B", with one platoon of Company "A", against enemy strong point at 1330 on September 27th. After a four hour fight, in the course of which Lieutenant Gibson, commanding Company "B", was wounded and Captain Bishop of Company "A" took over the direction of the attack, the strong point was captured, together with four prisoners, a German radio and considerable other enemy material. Our losses were eight wounded against thirty Germans killed. This strong point had been protecting an artillery observation post, and had been holding up the advance of the British 15th Armored Brigade and the British 46th Division.

b. THE 504th PARACHUTE INFANTRY
(EXCERPTS FROM "DEVILS WITH BAGGY PANTS")

Most men of the 504 were reluctant to leave their new-found home in Sicily; grapes were ripe for one thing, the language was much easier than the thousand and one Arab dialects encountered in Africa, and then the Sicilians, who were firmly convinced that their homeland was now an "American Island", were quite willing to show their new bosses a good time.

An order from Fifth Army headquarters, however, returned the regiment to Kairouan, North Africa, where it became immediately evident that another parachute mission was in the wind. Replacements were absorbed by the companies, training was resumed, and the 3rd Battalion was once again detached from the regiment--this time they were sent to Bizerte for special beach assault training with the Rangers and the 325th Glider Infantry.

[REDACTED]

Orders soon came for the 504 to return to Sicily; a more suitable jumping-off place for the invasion of Italy. They again boarded planes in Africa and flew, this time undisturbed by enemy and friendly flak, to Comiso, and Trapani, Sicily.

Weeks of preparation for a jump at Capua, briefings, tiny scale models of the proposed drop zone expertly carved by former German toy makers-were forgotten. The mission to Capua had been cancelled; the enemy had been warned and was waiting on the DZ.

Then there was the mission where men of the regiment were to jump on Rome and with the help of Italian partisans, occupy the city. That, too, had been cancelled-and only three minutes before the scheduled take off. 504 men were disgusted at the time, but subsequently felt differently when they learned the full story of General Taylor's negotiations with Marshal Badoglio in Rome, and of his resultant decision to stop the 504 from jumping into what his eleventh hour information disclosed to be a trap.

The 3rd Battalion then moved to Licata and rejoined the 325th and the Rangers. Here they boarded LCI's and set out to sea; they knew they were going to Italy, but other than that, information was vague. H Company's boats left the convoy, and on September 9, with a group of Rangers, made the initial landings on the Italian coast at Paicri. Opposition on the beach was slight, and the parachutists quickly advanced into the mountains overlooking the coast where they captured the now famous Chiunzi Pass and a vital railroad tunnel.

G, Headquarters, and I Companies, with the remainder of the 325th Combat Team, swerved south and on September 11, landed on the bloody Salerno beach. The Luftwaffe and the American and British Air Forces provided an overhead show that ran 24 hours a day. That the military situation at Salerno was not as it should have been became more evident with each passing hour; German tanks and strong infantry forces were pressing relentlessly toward the beach, and the word was passed around that it would be fight or swim. No paratrooper on that beach was in the mood for a twelve-mile swim, and with the prospects of a last-ditch stand staring them in the face, men of the 3rd Battalion settled down and awaited developments.

The remainder of the 504 was restlessly waiting at airfields in Comiso, and Trapani, Sicily, for the parachute mission that they had been told to expect. On September 13, they were again alerted. "Another dry run", was the cynical comment of most men. Nevertheless, each man gave his equipment a last minute check-just in case. Early chow was eaten and immediately afterward the troops fell in at their bivouac areas in the appointed plane loading formations; then marched to the battered and roofless hangers where they picked up their chutes.

It was not until the men were seated in the planes that the mission was disclosed. In probably the briefest briefing of any comparable operation of the war, men of the 504 were informed that the Fifth Army beachhead in Italy was in grave danger of being breached; that the 504 was to jump behind friendly lines in the vicinity of the threatened breakthrough in order to stem the German advance. A pathfinder group was going in ahead with special equipment to guide the planes onto the DZ, the center of which the Fifth Army was to indicate with a large flaming "T". That was all; no one knew specifically what was to be required of him-nothing more than the fact that the Fifth Army was endangered and that the 504 was needed badly. Each man felt an inward surge of pride in his importance. Morale climbed.

As the planes sped down the air strip and lifted into the night sky, these men felt that they had a big assignment ahead of them; the rescuing of the Fifth Army. Though some may have had misgivings about what the morrow would bring, they were confident in their strength and happy to be on the way.

[REDACTED]

Shortly after midnight the planes, flying in a column of battalions, passed over the clearly marked DZ and unloaded their human cargoes. With the exception of eight planes which failed to navigate properly to the DZ, but whose planeloads were subsequently accounted for, there was little difficulty of confusion experienced in completing the operation. Assembly was made in the designated areas with a minimum loss of time and a later check revealed that only 75 men had suffered injuries as a result of the jump. This mission is still regarded as history's greatest example of the mobility of airborne troops--in exactly eight hours the 504 had been notified of its mission, briefed, loaded onto planes, jumped on its assigned drop zone, and committed against the enemy.

On the DZ, situated a few hundred yards from the beach and two miles South of Paestum, the boom of cannon and the flash of gunfire were distinctly evident a short distance to the North. Assembled, organized, and entrucked, the regiment was within the hour moving slowly along the road that led in the direction from whence the sounds of battle came.

By dawn the regiment, less the 3rd Battalion, was firmly emplaced in a defensive sector three miles from Paestum and Southwest of Albanella. The days of the 14th and 15th of September, were spent in anticipation of a tank attack that threatened from the Calore River region to the North. The 2nd Battalion assisted in the repulsing of one tank attack across the Solo River while E Company, on a reconnaissance in force of the same area, encountered scattered and small elements of the enemy. The regimental recon platoon patrolled the area several miles to the front and battalions also sent out reconnaissance and combat patrols of their own with particular emphasis on the Altavilla sector.

Hostile artillery fire was spasmodic and largely interdictory in character. Air activity was confined principally to friendly craft, though the enemy in groups of two and three would occasionally make an appearance over 504 positions only to be driven off by intense fire from supporting anti-aircraft units.

On the morning of the 16th, the regiment marched four miles to occupy the town of Albanella, where at noon, Colonel Tucker issued to the battalion commanders the order to seize and hold the high ground surmounting Altavilla.

The days following were, in the words of Gen. Mark W. Clark, commander of the Fifth Army, "responsible for saving the Salerno beachhead". Men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced across the flat valley floor, were subjected to intense enemy artillery and small arms fire; contact between the battalions and the OP group were lost, but all units pressed relentlessly forward and in spite of overwhelming enemy superiority in numbers, took their assigned objectives. The enemy counter-attacked stubbornly, and on the night of the 17th, it became evident that help had to be secured if the 504, now completely cut off from friendly forces, was to hold these key positions so necessary for the security of the beachhead.

General Dawley, commander of the Sixth Corps, was contacted by radio, and suggested that the regiment withdraw and attempt to establish a line nearer to the beach. It was then that Col. Tucker uttered the statement that epitomized the saga of Altavilla--"Retreat, Hell! --Send me my other battalion." The 3rd Battalion was then sent to rejoin the regiment. They moved into position on Hill 344, the 1st and 2nd Battalions repulsed strong enemy counter-attacks, contact between the units was made, and the Salerno beachhead was saved. The next day the 504 was relieved by elements of the 36th Division.

This, the first contact with the enemy for men of the 504 since Sicily and the first time that the regiment had been committed as a unit in any single tactical operation, was a battle that turned the tide of the German onslaught on the Salerno beachhead and frustrated their attempts to contain

[REDACTED]

the Fifth Army within the confines of the coastal plain reaching as far as Altavilla. With its flanks secured, the Fifth Army was at liberty to extend itself northward in the direction of Salerno, and ultimately to Naples.

The area in the region of Altavilla for several years had been a firing range for a German artillery school; consequently there was no problem of range, deflection, or prepared concentrations that the enemy had not solved long before the advent of the Americans. Needless to say, hostile artillery and mortar fire was extremely accurate and capable of pin-pointing with lethal concentrations such vital features as wells, trails, and draws. During the three days that the 504th occupied the several hills behind Altavilla, approximately 30 paratroopers died, 150 were wounded, and one man was missing in action.

The majority of these casualties were caused by the enemy's artillery fire. Enemy casualties were, judging from the number of dead left on the field of battle and from information divulged by prisoners, several times those of the regiment. Four separate and distinct attacks by the enemy launched from the north, east, and west of 504th positions were driven back with heavy casualties resulting for the Germans.

On the morning of September 20, the 504th, less the 3d Battalion, moved back into a reserve position. The 3d Battalion moved directly from Hill 344 to Blue Beach in the vicinity of Paestum where they boarded LCI's and headed toward Maiori to join "H" Company, still holding out with the Rangers at Chiunzi Pass.

For the remainder of the regiment, the period 20-25 September, was for the most part one of rest and resupply. However, road patrols were maintained by the regiment recon platoon which at the same time kept in constant touch with the British Eighth Army on the right flank. The enemy had apparently withdrawn to the north, and the report of the villagers was always the same--that the Germans had passed through in trucks a day or two before headed north.

Before noon on the 25th, the regiment was ordered to join the 3d Battalion and boarded LCI's at Red Beach where they skirted the coast to Maiori.

Terrain in this sector was precipitous and hilly with plenty of concealment provided by underbrush and trees. All evidence of the enemy was confined to the valley which stretched like a vast carpet below--the valley of Naples. Even in the valley there was little, aside from an occasional truck movement or a gun flash, to be seen of the Germans. Positions were occasionally shelled, particularly that portion of the road that wound around the mountain and came out in full view of the German guns located at the base of Mount Vesuvius some ten miles to the front. This outlet was known as Chiunzi Pass--but because of trigger happy German artillerymen, was promptly renamed "88" Pass by 504 men.

On September 28, the regiment contacted the British 10th Corps, and moved out in the attack, spearheading the drive for the great port of Naples. British tanks skirted around the base of Mount Vesuvius to the east, bypassing the city, while 504 men turned west, captured Castellamare. The 504th entered Naples on October 1st.

[REDACTED]

The city was a scene of ruin, starvation, and general wretchedness. Bombed buildings were to be seen everywhere and the streets were littered with an accumulation of rubble piled by months of bombing. The public utilities--water, gas, and electricity--had each been carefully and systematically destroyed by the enemy on the eve of his departure from the city. Business was at a standstill, with the exception of an occasional barber who did, needless to say, a great trade.

Looting was common, riots were in constant occurrence, and everywhere the American soldier was called upon by civilians to arbitrate and judge their street differences. For most Americans this was a difficult and most irksome task, inasmuch as the language was foreign and the simultaneous pleadings and cajolings of the conflicting parties for a judgment would increase in intensity and dramatic quality until the confused soldier in his inability to understand the accusations, or even have the faintest idea of the bone of contention, would throw up his hands in dismay to wash himself of the whole affair. Then the Italians would smile gently and mutter with a little nod in the direction of the American, "No capisco".

These were happy days; duty was light, wine, women, and song were the order of the day, and with each passing week Naples could be seen to progress another degree toward business and life as usual. Shops and cafes opened gradually in spite of the scars of war. Then came inflation--everything doubled, then tripled, in price; champagne, wine, and cognac disappeared in favor of a new and more deadly beverage--"Ten-minute" cognac. Pure medicinal alcohol, with sugar and water added, and primed with a few drops of the essence of cognac, was bottled, labeled, aged, and sold on the streets within a matter of minutes.

Naples and its dubious pleasures had begun to pall on most men and it was with a certain amount of enthusiasm that the news of a forthcoming mission was received. Advance information indicated that the mission involved the assaulting of precipitous mountain positions. A group of thirty men was dispatched to the Fifth Army Mountain Climbing School near Naples to receive specialized training in cliff scaling and mountain climbing.

On October 27, 1943, the 504 Combat Team moved by truck to a bivouac area in the vicinity of Castello d'Alife. It became apparent at that time that the objective would not be the assault of any particular mountain position, but instead to make a general advance toward Isernia, about 25 miles due North from Alife. Two days later, the 504 launched an epic attack through the mountains of central Italy that was to carry them 22 miles ahead of the Fifth Army on their left and the Eighth Army on their right. Driving North toward Gallo, in a battle that proved for the most part to be one of physical stamina interspersed with sharp patrol engagements, the 504 crossed the Volturno, entered the rail and road center of Isernia, cleared Colli, Macchia, Fornelli, Cerro, and Rochetta, and 15 men from H and I Companies doggedly fought their way through mine fields to reach the summit of Hill 1017--the Fifth Army objective and key point of the entire sector.

All supplies in this advance were of necessity carried by men and mules, since jeepable roads were non-existent. Communication was extremely difficult to maintain because the front was wide, the distance between the regimental CP and the battalions great, and inclusive of rough and rocky mountains. Because of the constant forward movement and redispotion of the unit's elements, it was necessary for the wire team to work night and day in their efforts to provide even the barest minimum of communication required for the efficient functioning of the Combat Team.

Probably the most valuable asset possessed by the 504 in this phase of the Italian campaign was dogged stamina and the initiative and will to overcome or circumvent all obstacles in their pursuance of the part they were ordered to play in this operation.

[REDACTED]

On this mission, almost without exception, combat was restricted to small local engagements between patrols over a broad front. The terrain was such that no distinct front line, either enemy or friendly, could be designated. German patrols operated behind our "lines" and the same thing was true of the American patrols to an even greater extent. It is in this type of warfare that the 504 proved itself to be the unequivocal master of the enemy; there were few encounters, even when the Germans had the advantage of numerical superiority, that the enemy didn't come out second best. Trained to fight in small independent groups, in the technique of scouting and stealth, and for stamina and perseverance, the paratroopers proved the value of their specialized preparation for combat.

With the enemy falling back for a stand along a line running from Cardito to Alfedena, the 504 Combat Team was warned to stand by for a displacement forward to Scapoli. However, before any such movement began, the CT was ordered into Corps reserve, its positions to be exchanged with the 133rd Infantry.

The 3rd Battalion moved to the rear on November 23, followed by the remainder of the Combat Team on successive days thereafter. At Ciorlano, Thanksgiving was celebrated with a sumptuous repast transported in special containers to the regiment from Naples, and arrived in such quantities that mess kits were foregone in favor of the greater volume of tin helmets.

After a dull and somewhat uncomfortable two weeks spent in bivouac in a reserve position near Ciorlano, the Combat Team received orders to move forward for an assault on Mt. Samuero and the adjacent hills beyond Venafr-- positions that dominated the gateway to the German stronghold of Cassino.

On the rainy cold evening of December 10, 1943, the regimental CP was established at Venafrò, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions closed in on their respective bivouac areas at the base of the high ground overlooking the Volturno Valley and Venafrò. Companies G and I of the 3rd Battalion moved immediately forward to relieve elements of the 3rd Ranger Battalion who were in position on Hill 950. While advancing to relieve the Rangers, I Company became subjected to enemy small arms fire and in the midst of a German counter-attack, managed to take up their assigned positions. The next twelve hours found the Germans counter-attacking seven times in force, and although I Company had suffered 46 casualties by noon of the following day, they still held the position.

The following morning the 2nd Battalion completed the difficult climb up Mt. Samuero (1205) to take up positions formerly occupied by the 143rd Infantry. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion joined G and I Companies and continued to repel repeated enemy counter-attacks. 307th Airborne Engineers laid a mine field in the draw between Hills 1205 and 950. Enemy artillery increased in intensity to a degree unprecedented in the Italian campaign-- it became quite evident that the Germans were determined to regain these heights at all costs.

The 1st Battalion, supposedly in reserve, was used for litter-bearing details, and to carry food, water, and ammunition up the rocky, heavily-shelled trails to the troops clinging stubbornly to positions on the heights.

During the succeeding several days the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on the enemy-held Hill 687, but was repulsed and withdrew to a defensive position in front of hill 1205. The 1st Battalion moved out of reserve and, with the exception of B Company which occupied Hill 710, moved up to Hill 1205 in support of the 2nd Battalion's attack. The 3rd Battalion sent out patrols toward the enemy lines, and although meeting little resistance, discovered extensive mine fields and defensive positions that had recently been vacated.

[REDACTED]

By this time the 376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion was well emplaced and giving direct support to the 504 Combat Team that was of exceptional accuracy and efficiency. The wire section established and maintained communications with the various units of the CT--an endless and fatiguing job frequently necessitating work under artillery fire, which usually knocked out the wire as fast as it could be replaced.

By December 20, the 504 CT was holding Hills 1205, 950, 954, 710, and 687, with patrols operating on Hills 877 and 610. The fighting of this operation consisted of the assaulting of one hill after another. It was an uphill fight all the way characterized by rock and tree, bare, 45 degree slopes, and unusually stubborn resistance by the enemy. Supply and evacuation of the wounded was a matter of back-breaking work. The medic's task, at best a difficult one, was increased ten-fold on the high, craggy, windswept, and shelterless hill tops. Medical supplies were short when they were needed most and there was no quick way of obtaining more. Casualties had to be carried on stretchers down to the road--a painful six hour journey. Mule trains were able to carry supplies to a certain point, after which it became necessary because of the increased angle of ascent, for all supplies and ammunition to be transported up to the summits by carrying parties of men. This work was carried out over heavily-shelled trails, with supplies always reaching the units engaged just in time.

During the 19 days that the 504 was in action near Venafro they suffered a total of 54 dead, 226 wounded, and two men missing in action. These figures are exclusive of the 376 FA Battalion and Company C, 307 Engineers, each of whom suffered dead and wounded. Most of the casualties were the result of enemy artillery fire, which was, as has been mentioned, intense.

However high the number of these casualties may seem, compared to those of the enemy they must be considered light. Only the very roughest of estimates can be made of the enemy casualties, however information revealed by prisoners (51 were taken) indicated German dead and wounded to be at least five times greater than those suffered by the 504. On December 27, the regiment was relieved of duty in the Venafro sector and was moved to new bivouac areas in the vicinity of Pignaturo.

Small, much-bombed Pignaturo, located in the heart of the lower Volturno Valley in the shadow of Hill 620, which five months before had been designated as the objective for the 504 on their much-briefed Capua mission, had now become a scene of rest for men of the regiment. A belated Christmas was celebrated, New Year's Day dinner eaten under the hungry gaze of the town's population, and finally the long-awaited Christmas packages were received and opened. The regiment was paid and for the next several days the Italian courtyards of Pignaturo echoed with the almost forgotten sound of rippling dice, and the strident coaxing of "Whup, seven--do it!"

Shower baths were made available, movies were shown nightly in a tiny renovated picture house, orange trees groaned under the weight of fresh fruit (all off limits), and "tough guy" Humphrey Bogart, wife, and company put on a few skits for the regiment from the back of a six-by-six parked in a nearby soccer field.

Still, these were simple pleasures and the paratroopers longed for Naples' gaiety and relaxation of another sort, so it was with cheery hearts that the Combat Team moved again on January 4, 1944, to the suburbs of Naples.

"Officially", Naples was off limits to the 504, but then who were they--the victors of Altavilla, the assaulters of Mt. Sammucro, and the participants of a hundred other engagements--to suddenly become impotent at the flicker of a PBS directive; besides hadn't they taken the town four months before? Naples was retaken by mass infiltration.

[REDACTED]

The city had changed; in some ways for the better and in others for the worse. The lights had come on, water ran in the toilets, the opera and the movies were playing to packed houses, the streets were cleared of the wreckage of bombed buildings, stores were well stocked with everything but good "vino", and the enlisted men's Red Cross Club was a structure of grandeur that topped anything from the United States to the UK.

Naples had assumed the cosmopolitan and multi-colored atmosphere of Casablanca, Algiers, and Cairo. The streets were iridescent with the uniforms of sailors and soldiers of half a dozen different nationalities. In a manner of speaking, Naples had become the property of the world. There were those who said with a nostalgic sigh, "I liked it better before", but then such statements are merely human and not necessarily to be taken seriously, for Naples, though it had changed, was still the mother of fun and Maria was still as friendly as ever, even though her ideas had changed too.

However, all was not play. There was training, inspections, re-equipping, and it soon became evident that the rumors of, "We're going home", or "England is next", were doomed to go the way of all rumors; another mission was forthcoming--this time a parachute mission.

Sand tables were constructed, recognition crews sent out to nearby units and finally came the briefing--on January 20, the 504 was ready to take off. The operation was called "Shingle" and involved a vertical envelopment of the enemy in a sector behind the coastal town of Anzio, 28 miles South of Rome. The S-2's estimate of the enemy's capabilities did not appear encouraging, to say nothing of the fact that in spite of all efforts to maintain secrecy of the impending operation, it seemed that every Italian Joe in Naples and vicinity had a least a vague idea of what was going on. Consequently, there was a certain amount of "sweating" on the part of the paratroopers, for most felt certain that the Germans, aware of the plans, would be waiting on the DL with upturned bayonets--a situation, that to say the least, would have been embarrassing. However, subsequent events on the beachhead proved that their fears were unfounded, for that particular sector of the Italian coast was lightly defended and the jump would probably have gone off without a hitch.

Nevertheless, on the morning of January 20, orders were received from the Fifth Army to the effect that the 504 would not jump in the "Shingle" operation, but would go in on the beach assault in LCI's. Movement orders and boat loading lists were issued to all elements of the Combat Team and the following morning found the 504 loading on boats at the tiny fishing port of Pozzuoli, North of Naples.

That afternoon the regiment's small convoy of LCI's swung out from the port to become part of the huge northbound invasion fleet that stretched in both directions as far as the eye could see. The afternoon was quiet and as the sun submerged into the sea, men became impressed with the magnitude of the operation--an endless string of ships moving on their predesignated course like the hand of fate across the sea.

Dawn of the 22nd found the 504 standing out from the beach upon which they were to later debark. There was an LST sinking off the port bow of the lead 504 craft, but aside from this there seemed to be amazingly little evidence of the enemy that had been expected--everything seemed quiet; too quiet.

Reports had been received that five waves had been landed when through the loudspeaker of a neighboring boat, Col. Tucker was ordered to land the Combat Team on Red Beach. Immediately the 13 LCI's that contained the members of the regiment commenced to move toward the shore. There was no confusion; everything was proceeding with the regularity and order of clockwork. The lead boats were grinding into the sand. Already the ramps had slammed down into the water and men were splashing their way toward the shore. It was perfect. The operation couldn't have gone more smoothly. The only thing that was lacking to make this a perfect movie operation was the enemy.

[REDACTED]

At that precise moment the tense stillness was shattered by a whining roar that left no doubt in anyone's mind as to its source. Straight out of the sun the enemy planes came--their machine guns blasting. For a few brief seconds the world became one great kaleidoscope of raging sound, then the planes were gone and in the water where they had passed over lay several boiling circles where bombs had struck. One LCI, its nose disgorging men, settled in the shallow water. Its after-section was a mass of twisted metal and oily black smoke. Men could be seen hanging from the bits of twisted steel. That had been LCI number 20--G Company's craft.

The landing craft continued to come, unload their personnel, and back out into the water, while the German dive bombers returned again and again. The paratroopers ran down the ramps and jumped into the surf. Some went in to their knees, some to their waists, and some went in over their heads and swam for the shore. And all the while the German planes continued to roar in from the sun to bomb and strafe. The ship borne anti-aircraft units sent up a terrific barrage, but nobody in the 504 was watching for hits--they were too busy getting ashore and seeking cover.

Two days later, the regiment was ordered to the right flank of the beachhead where German elements had forced the withdrawal of Third Division reconnaissance units in the vicinity of bridges number Two and number Five over the Mussolini Canal.

Near bridge number Five, Lt. Col. W. R. Williams, commanding the 1st Battalion, ordered B Company to attack the Germans in the vicinity. After an unsuccessful attempt to take the bridge, a platoon of A Company was committed along with a platoon of tanks. Four hours later, with the aid of tanks and 57mm guns manned by the 376, the enemy was pushed across the canal and bridge number Five was secured.

In the vicinity of bridge number Two, Lt. Col. L. G. Freeman, commanding the 3rd Battalion, committed I Company to clear the sector. The company was ambushed, however, and forced to take up defensive positions. At dawn of the 24th, I Company, now reinforced by a platoon of tanks and naval gunfire from the sea, counter-attacked frontally while G and H Companies brought the enemy under cross fire from the flanks. Two hours later the enemy, after suffering 69 killed, 25 wounded, 33 prisoners, two halftracks knocked out and one captured, was driven back to the other side of the canal. 504 casualties were two men killed, three wounded, and none missing.

Following days found the regiment patrolling actively and consolidating its line along the Mussolini Canal. It was then decided to attack the town of Borgo Piave, an important road center that came to be known as the "spider" because of the five main roads that joined in the city.

At 1330 on January 25, all three battalions moved out in the attack. The 1st Battalion attacked Sessano, the 3rd Battalion Borgo Sabatino, and the 2nd Battalion made the main drive for Borgo Piave. The 3rd Battalion attained its objective and pushed strong combat patrols to the North and East supported by naval gunfire. The 1st Battalion encountered stiff opposition and heavy enemy artillery fire; nevertheless, a small group of C Company men did reach the objective--Sessano. The 2nd Battalion, supported by a rolling barrage, reached Borgo Piave and D Company pushed 200 yards East of the town. However, the enemy counter-attacked with an armored force of about five tanks and eight flak wagons and isolated D Company from the remainder of the battalion. Upon order from the Third Division, the 2nd Battalion withdrew to the Mussolini Canal leaving behind a strong combat outpost and several tank-hunting teams. D Company, after suffering heavy losses, subsequently infiltrated through the enemy's encirclement and regained their own lines.

As a result of these operations, the regiment had gained outpost positions on the other side of the canal, but generally speaking, had not ad-

vanced any appreciable distance--the MIR still remaining along the Mussolini Canal.

After a week of holding and attacking along a front extending from bridge number Five south to the sea, the 504 was relieved in this sector by the 179th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion was attached to the First Armored Division and sent to the northern (British) flank of the beachhead, while the remainder of the Combat Team was sent North of bridge number Five to participate in an attack scheduled to take place in the Third Division sector.

The 3rd Battalion, after several days in reserve with the First Armored Division, was committed with the British First (Guards) Division in the Carroceto sector. German artillery fire in this area was unusually intense and it was here that the enemy launched his main drive to push the beachhead into the sea. After one of the heaviest artillery barrages ever experienced by 504 men, the Germans began their attack in the early hours of February 5, 1944. On successive days British units were cut off from the 3rd Battalion, which was forced to withdraw to the famous "factory" in Mussolini's wonder-town of Aprilia. Enemy railroad guns and dive bombers then concentrated their efforts on the 3rd Battalion garrison. The paratroopers suffered severe casualties, and by the time enemy infantry moved in, the companies had been reduced in strength to between 20 and 30 men.

Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which the paratroopers by sheer determination and courage, were able to repel repeated German onslaughts. Rather than remain in the exposed positions in which they now found themselves, they withdrew to a railroad underpass several hundred yards behind the "factory" and established defensive positions. H Company was ordered to attack and attempt the rescue of a British general who had been captured. After bloody fighting, they recaptured the general, only to find themselves cut off from friendly forces. I Company was then ordered to attack and make contact with H Company. The 16 men remaining in the company carried out this mission successfully and a semblance of order was restored to this sector--the backbone of the German attack had been broken. It was for this outstanding performance in the period 8-12 February, that the 3rd Battalion was given one of the first Presidential Citations in the European Theater of Operations.

The remainder of the Combat Team, meanwhile, had been engaged in heavy fighting in the Third Division sector. On the January 30, the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off in an attack that was to take them to the Cisterna River. The 1st Battalion led the way and encountered only light resistance as they passed through the German outpost line. Soon after, however, as they neared their first bridge objective over the Mussolini Canal, they were engaged by strong enemy forces. The reserve company was committed and the enemy driven back across the stream, first blowing the bridge behind him and thus saving the paratroopers the trouble.

While the 1st Battalion was consolidating its gains, the 2nd Battalion advanced along the left flank of the 1st Battalion and under similar circumstances, were engaged by the enemy in the vicinity of a bridge farther upstream. Here again, the enemy was forced to retreat across the canal after blowing the bridge behind them. The 2nd Battalion continued to attack to the north on the heels of the retreating Germans, who proceeded to blow another bridge--this time it was the bridge crossing the Cisterna River. The loss of this bridge denied the paratroopers any further support from friendly tanks, a factor which caused the 2nd Battalion to halt its advance and dig in on the far side of the river.

Much enemy material in the form of halftracks, 75mm howitzers, small arms, and vehicles was either captured or destroyed in this attack. Eighty prisoners were taken with very heavy casualties inflicted upon the enemy. 504 losses were comparatively light.

For the remainder of their eight-week stay on the Anzio beachhead 504 men found themselves confronted with a defensive situation, rather than offensive for which they had been trained. With the exception of the first week of fighting on the beachhead, no appreciable advance was made by our forces. It was strictly trench-type warfare characteristic of the First World War. For the first time, 504 men were digging dugouts and living in them for weeks at a time; barbed wire entanglements and mine fields in unusual depth covered all areas where the enemy might conceivably tread; alternate positions were prepared for any eventuality, and there were times when such an eventuality did not seem too remote. All in all, this was not the type of combat for which the 504 was psychologically suited. In fact, it was absolutely contrary to the way that paratroopers had always been taught to fight, and so it was with something more than the usual enthusiasm that the men of the 504 received the order to embark from Anzio on March 23, for the trip to Naples.

As the LST's loaded with paratroopers got under way, the Germans were dropping shells into the harbor, as though in some final frantic gesture to keep the 504 from leaving; like a murderer's last stab at his executioner. This had been a costly campaign for the 504--but ten times as costly for the enemy. During the eight-week period, 120 paratroopers were killed, 410 wounded, and 60 missing in action. Many lessons had been learned at Anzio, and many men had been lost. It was a good place to bid farewell.

After one uneventful night on the water, the small convoy turned in toward the coast and before long the port of Pozzuoli, from which the regiment had sailed on the mission to Anzio, hove into sight. The big LST's nudged their noses up to the beach, dropped their ramps, and the already entrucked troops rolled out onto land again.

Bagnoli, the bivouac area, was but fifteen minutes from the heart of Naples by way of the local railway system and was the site of the projected Italian World's Fair. Many fine buildings, statues, and other architectural features typical of this type of exhibition were in evidence. The 504 was quartered in the modern, and only recently constructed Italian University for the education of Ethiopian students. The buildings of the university were spacious and an excellent example of modern Italian designing.

Once firmly ensconced in their quarters at the university, the regiment fell into a daily routine which for the most part, consisted of very light training, turning in equipment, and taking off for Naples at every opportunity. General Clark reviewed the regiment at a ceremony held in honor of the 3rd Battalion and presented Col. Freeman, the battalion commander, with a Presidential Unit Citation for the battalion's outstanding performance at Carrocote.

It had been generally assumed that the 504 would leave Italy and sail to England to rejoin the 82nd Airborne Division; however, up until the last moment the hopeful rumor that the regiment was on the way back to the States could still be heard. On April 10, 1944, the Combat Team moved by train into Naples where they alighted at Garibaldi Station, marched down the Via Umberto to the water front, and boarded the Capetown Castle--a large British ship of streamlined appearance.

The following morning 504 men awoke to feel the throb of the ship's engines beneath them and with the knowledge that Italy now obscured by a mist that hung against the horizon its battles, its moments of sorrow and happiness, had become another chapter in the history of courage of the 504th Parachute Infantry.

c. THE 505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY

1. After many various plans had been made to jump the Combat Team, first near the VOLTURNO River, then on ROME, a final mission was received 141500B Sept., 1943. This mission as planned and executed involved jumping on the night of Sept. 14 and 15 behind the lines of friendly troops, the VI Corps, then engaged to the North and East of PAESTUM, Italy. In describing this operation in succeeding paragraphs the following points will be discussed:

- A. Plans and operation of 505 Combat Team
- B.
 - a. Organization of a Pathfinder Group
 - b. Equipment of Pathfinder Group
 - c. Plans for employment of personnel and equipment
 - d. Actual execution of plan
 - e. Results achieved

2. Plans and operation of 505 Combat Team:

Fortunately the Combat Team had been on air alert status for a seven (7) day period and all the physical labor that remained to be done prior to taking off was to load equipment bundles, which were already packed, and draw personnel chutes. Plane assignments and take off airdromes had previously been designated, however, a time schedule remained to be worked out. It was decided to take off and jump according to the following plan:

UNIT	AIRPLANES	DEPARTURE AIRDROME	DEPARTURE
Pathfinder Group	3	AGRIGENTO	2100
3rd Bn	36	CASTELVETRANO	2130
Hq Co 505 CT	9	CASTELVETRANO	2145
Co "B", 307 Engr Bn	9	BARIZZO	2130
2nd Bn	36	COISO	2145
1st Bn	36	BARIZZO	2200

Drop times were in general to follow same sequence as units are listed above. It was realized at the time that considerable difficulty would arise in regrouping planes following the jump of the 504th CT the night before.

Bn. and separate unit commanders were assembled at 1600 hr., given the situation and plan to be executed. The DZ located just N of the SOLOFRONE River (S 785699) was to be marked by a "T" of white lights. The horizontal line was to represent the "Go" line.

Units were to assemble as follows:

Pathfinder Group	Center of Lights
3rd Bn	N edge of DZ on red flare
Hq Co	NW edge of DZ
2nd Bn	S edge of DZ on green flare
Engineers	S edge of DZ
1st Bn	SW edge of DZ on white flash-light

RESULTS OF THE OPERATION:

UNIT	DEPARTURE TIME	DROP TIME	PLANES MISSING
Pathfinder Group	2100	2338	0
3rd Bn	2240	0110	4
Hq Co	2240	0120	1
Co "B", 307 Engr Bn	2330	0140	0

Cont.

RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DEPARTURE TIME</u>	<u>DROP TIME</u>	<u>PLANES MISSING</u>
2nd Bn	2320	0130	0
1st Bn	0100	0255	2
<u>Jumping Altitude:</u> 600 - 900 feet			
<u>Moonlight</u> : 3/4 Moon			
<u>Course</u> : Just inside N coast of Sicily, passed immediately N of MT ETNA, then NE to coast of Italy, then N along coastline to point opposite SOLO-FRONE River, then E to DZ.			

As a unit the CT loaded and jumped without incident. The Bn. jump patterns were extremely small and with exceptions as noted, all personnel and equipment were assembled in a remarkably short period of time (No Bn. taking more than 60 minutes to assemble). Jump casualties were extremely light. Of the seven (7) missing planes four (4) had turned back due to faulty navigation, two (2) never got off the ground, and one (1) dropped its load near EBOLI. This plane load later joined the CT in M. PLES on Oct 1.

The use of radar equipment was definitely proven as most successful. A more detailed description follows:

The marking of the DZ was satisfactory from the standpoint of results achieved and the situation of jumping behind our own lines. It is believed, however, that under normal circumstances Krypton Lights or Aldis Lamps would be more practical from the security viewpoint. Smoke Pots as used consisted of gasoline and sand, and throw off a considerable flame.

Plane recognition was accomplished with Amber Lights on the underside of the wings. The lights were easily visible from the ground. Plane formations flew directly over friendly ships in harbor at PAESTUM, and also over shore installations. Previous instructions to shore and naval gun crews had been given - not to fire on transport aircraft. These instructions with the additional aid of Amber Recognition Lights were most necessary and no doubt helped prevent a recurrence of the disaster, which met the 2nd Lift in the SICILIAN Operation two (2) months previous.

The use of flares by the 2nd and 3rd Bn's. for assembling off the DZ was most instrumental in the rapid assembly of their personnel, however, it is believed that ten (10) to twelve (12) flares are excessive and should be reduced to two (2) at a maximum. Furthermore, if plane loads are sufficiently close to DZ, a complete assembly by use of flash light is preferred. We later found that our ground signals were easily visible to enemy observation fifteen (15) to twenty (20) miles away where enemy gun installations were reported in position at the time.

3. B. a. Organization of a Pathfinder Group

- (1) When and Where Organized: One week prior to combat jump at AGRIGENTO, Sicily.
- (2) Personnel: Lt. Col. Billingslea and two (2) radar teams. (See para c below for Organization)
- (3) Training:
 - (a) Large proportion of personnel i.e., same Radar Operators had made a previous test of equipment in a practice operation (302100B Aug., '43) at ENFIDAVILLE, N Africa (Known as "SNOWBALL"). In this operation the two (2) sets of radar were both ready for operation within five (5) min. after drop time.

- [REDACTED]
- (b) One (1) week at AGRIGENTO was spent with further familiarizing teams with equipment: nomenclature, operation and method of wearing same. Men actually became proficient at setting up equipment blindfolded in a few minutes.
- (c) Lt. Col. Billingslea accompanied 50th C^T for their jump the night previous.

b. EQUIPMENT OF PATHFINDER GROUP

- (1) 2 sets of radar equipment, each consisted of four (4) parts:
- (a) Btry 12 Volt, wet cell
 - (b) Power Converter
 - (c) Receiver and transmitter group with detonator device.
 - (d) Aerial

Each set weighed about 51 lbs fitted into a compact container known as a leg pack, jumped on one man. Two (2) men were required to work each set; one (1) to jump with equipment, and the other to assist in setting up and provide a safety factor for operation. Both men knew how to operate the equipment well.

(2) One (1) beacon or radio compass device was packed in an A-5 Container together with one (1) Aldis Lamp. The original idea was to check the beacon and the radar, one against the other, and test the usefulness of the lights. At the last minute the above container and contents were left behind since the 509th Pch^t Bn. was executing a combat jump the same night using a beacon and interference was probable.

- (3) Twelve (12) Flash Lights, Government Issue.

c. PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

Planes to be loaded as follows:

First Plane: Piloted by Lt. Col. Crouch - Jump Master Col. Gavin -

Lt Kenar, with one (1) radar set to be put into operation immediately

Lt. Col. Billingslea, with one (1) SCR 536 to notify plane No. 2 in case of accident.

Cpl Houston, to assist Lt Kenar

Cpl Fitzgerald, with team of two (2) men equipped with flash lights to augment DZ markings if necessary

Two (2) rifle men from 307 Engr Bn to provide security

Second Plane: Pilot unknown - Jump master, Major Malachy with SCR 536 to provide communication with plane No. 1

Cpl Huth, with one (1) radar set to be ready for operation pending mishap to team in plane No. 1

Cpl Girodo, to assist Cpl Huth

Same light and security teams as Plane No. 1

Third Plane: Piloted by Maj Brown - Jump master Captain Norton Capt Wight

Lt Cooperider, in charge of light crews

(Crews to assemble on center of DZ or center of "T" of lights)

Same light and security teams as plane No. 1.

d. ACTUAL EXECUTION OF PLANS.

This Pathfinder group landed at AGRIGENTO, Sicily at 2100 hr. after a brief conference concerning the DZ location and a final review of each mans job. It was evident at the time that the navigation of the lead plane would largely govern the results of the Pathfinder work. Our planes flew in a close "V" formation at an altitude from 6000 to 7000 ft. from AGRIGENTO along a prescribed course until a few miles off the coast of Italy. We crossed the coastline at about 1000 ft. and jumped at 700 ft. There wasn't any wind. The chutes came straight down near the center of the DZ. Groups assembled as planned without difficulty and without casualty. In three (3) minutes Lt Konar's radar set was in operation. Cpl Huth (standing by) had his set ready for operation. The flash lights were not needed as the gasoline and fire signals were operating in good order.

e. RESULTS ACHIEVED:

From observation from the DZ and from later conversation with pilots and men, the radar was the chief reason for such a successful jump, and without a doubt it was the most successful jump the 505 CT has ever made. In numerous cases Squadrons and groups approached from varied directions further indicating that the radar was instrumental in their locating the DZ. In almost every instance, however, the formation of planes split the DZ and dropped their loads within 500 yds. of its center.

I would further like to emphasize that only the ability of the lead pilot of the Pathfinder Planes to hit the DZ plus the efficient operation of radar made possible such a successful jump.

/s/t/ JOHN NORTON
Captain, Infantry
S-3

[REDACTED]

PART III ITALY

Section 6, Unit Reports.

505th Parachute Infantry Report

2ND BN, 505 INF. COMBAT REPORT

October 4, 1943

The 2nd Battalion was alerted at 0650 hour on October 4, 1943, and at 0930 hour all of the details were received from higher headquarters. The movement order was issued at 0845 hour and at 1000 hour the battalion moved north from its present bivouac area. At a point opposite the Naples Airport the battalion entrucked on 30 British lorries at 1130 hour. At 1315 hour the battalion detrucked 1000 yards west of GIUGLIANO IN CAMPANIA and moved by foot $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west into a forward assembly area. D Company mounted British tanks and the balance of the battalion moved out on foot at 1450 hour.

The battalion continued the march toward Villa Liturno until 2030 hour when a CP was set up in farm house on south edge of Villa Liturno. F Company sent one platoon at 2045 hour to secure bridge at the canal, and also a road block to the east and west of the village. These patrols made first contact with the enemy at 2116 hour in village square, but after firing several thousand rounds of automatic small arms fire the enemy withdrew to the north and F Company continued on mission. E Company bypassed the village and moved into defensive position on north edge. Harrassing enemy small arms fire continued through most of the night. During the night D Company returned to battalion control.

October 5, 1943

At 0530 battalion continued attack; D, E, and F were $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile North of VILLA LATERNO; D Company made contact. They continued attack but were held up after 300 yards by strong enemy forces to the left of Street. E Company was committed on left flank, cleaned up situation and suffered light casualties from numerous booby traps placed in open fields and around buildings, and advance continued to bridge which was reached at 0830 hour. One section of a three section bridge was blown in spite of stubborn resistance from the platoon of F Company which had the previous night been given the mission to seize the bridge. The platoon did prevent the enemy from completely destroying the remaining two sections of the bridge.

With E on the right, D on the left, and F in reserve the battalion pushed aggressively forward never losing contact with the enemy and at 1000 hour, the canal was reached where orders from higher command stopped our advance; Battalion moved into defensive position.

At 1830 hour platoons from D, E, and F companies were sent on patrol to reconnoiter routes to the river, possible river crossings and any enemy information. Patrols reported to Battalion CP.

East patrol reported route passable, river approximately 25 yards wide, depth unknown and easy to bridge. They encountered small groups of enemy.

Center patrol was unable to reach river due to enemy activity.

[REDACTED]

West patrol reported route passable, river approximately 60 yards wide, depth unknown, and difficult to bridge. They also encountered small groups of the enemy.

October 6, 1943

At 0230 hour another platoon patrol from F Company was sent out to capture prisoners but returned at 0530 hour after being unable to contact enemy.

At 0900 hour a platoon from F Company was sent into Arnone to seize and secure the village and with the exception of artillery fire they encountered no enemy resistance.

At 1130 hour the balance of F Company plus the 81mm mortar platoon was ordered into the village.

At 1430 hour the 1st platoon of E Company was committed north along railroad to protect F Company's left flank.

At 1530 hour a very heavy enemy artillery concentration began to fall on ARNONE and at 1540 hour F Company reported the enemy counter-attacking. Prisoners later volunteered information that one company was to attack the village from the west and they were to be reinforced by a battalion which was to cross the river.

The balance of E Company was committed north along railroad at 1540 hour. At 1600 hour the 1st platoon of E Company hit the enemy's right flank along the railroad tracks in the vicinity of the railway station and at the same time the platoon of F Company covering the company's withdrawal struck back at the enemy crossing the river. Our artillery opened up all along the river and the enemy was stopped in his tracks. By 1700 hour E and F Companies had withdrawn to road running east and west 1000 yards south of ARNONE and a defensive position established.

At 1847 hour A Company of the 1st battalion moved into E Company's former position on the canal.

Outposts were placed and with the exception of harassing enemy artillery fire the night was quiet.

October 7, 1943

At 0957 hour E Company reported an enemy patrol crossing the river on the remains of the railroad bridge but our artillery stopped any further action on the enemy's part. During the day our patrols were active to the river and no enemy were encountered.

At 2130 hour the battalion was relieved by the 46th British Division and the battalion moved into bivouac 3/4 of a mile to the east of Villa Liturno. The night was quiet.

October 8, 1943

At 0630 hour the battalion entrucked on British lorries and returned to the City of Naples. The convoy arrived at 0930 hour. The balance of the day was spent cleaning equipment.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION
505th PARACHUTE INFANTRY
APO 469 % POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

11 October 1943

Subject: Combat Action First Battalion October 4-9, 1943 Inclusive.

To : S-3, 505 Parachute Infantry.

1. Following are the accounts of activities of 1st Bn. during the above mentioned period.

At 0900 hour the Bn. moved by foot to Capuccini Airdrome in preparation for movement by motor to the vicinity of Villa Litterno where the 2nd Bn. had relieved a Bn. of the 143rd Inf. The effort was toward the Volturno River along the Villa Litterno-Arnone highway and the 1st Bn. was in regimental reserve.

At 0600 Oct. 5 the Bn. moved out and at 0630 reached Villa Litterno set up the Bn. CP in the eastern outskirts of town and set up a defense straddling the road north just out of town about 200 yards. All day the Bn. received artillery fire, three casualties resulted, none fatal.

At 1700 hour Bn. moved forward again and set up a defense to cover rear and flanks of the 2nd Bn. Center of the defense was RJ 049706, right flank 067700, left flank 032691. Bn. CP in a farmhouse 054704. On the way to this position two casualties resulted from trip wires.

Oct. 6-0800 hour Capt. Sayer was seriously wounded by an "S" mine.

"C" Co. patrols, composed of one platoon, left early to reconnoiter the coast road south of Castle Volturno, the town itself and the area between the Villa Litterno-Arnone road and the coast road. No enemy was contacted except for a few snipers in Castle Volturno. Both bridges over canal immediately south of Castle Volturno were blown. At 2000 hour "A" Co. attached to 2nd Bn. and moved out to join them at approximately 043717.

Oct. 7-Two patrols were sent to reconnoiter as follows- one to reconnoiter Grazzanise and the main roads between our own positions and Grazzanise. The other to reconnoiter Castle Volturno and the area between our own positions and Castle Volturno. Patrol that went to Grazzanise reported on air field with wrecked planes at 075745. In Grazzanise British Recon units were contacted. A German patrol was encountered at La Socia. A short fire fight ensued, two Germans killed. The other patrol reported heavy shelling of Castle Volturno but no other enemy activities. Civilians report North bank of Volturno River heavily mined.

Continuous patrolling by "B" Co. during the night protected both flanks of the 2nd Bn. on Sept. 7-8. Sept. 8 the Bn. was relieved at 2030 hours by British. Bn. marched to Villa Litterno, bivouacked East South East of there about 600 yards until 0630 hours when the Bn. departed in trucks for Naples. Arrived in Naples approximately 1000 hours.

/s/t/ DALE A. ROYSDON
Capt. 505 INF.
S-3

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
A.P.O. 469

31 October 1943

BATTALION HISTORICAL RECORD
OCTOBER 1943

On October 1st, 1943 the Third Battalion left forward assembly area at Torre-Del Annunziata at 0730 hour aboard British motor lorries and moved North toward Naples, on highway No. 18, behind the 7th Armored Corps, reconnaissance units. At a temporary assembly area at Portici this battalion (less "I" Company) was given the mission at 1200 hour of escorting the Fifth Army Commander into the city of Naples. The battalion was employed as follows: One (1) platoon of "G" Company assigned as Army Commander's personal guard, balance of battalion to follow in convoy to the first stopping point, Piazzì Garibaldi, and deploy immediately around perimeter of square as a civilian mob control cordon.

The above mission was expedited on schedule and elicited the Army Commander's commendation.

The battalion C. P. was established on Northwest Island of Piazzì Garibaldi. The battalion (less "I" Company attached to the Scottish Grays of the 10th Armored Corps in the vicinity of SanGiorgio, Southeast of Naples) was then dispatched to patrol previously assigned area of responsibility, this being accomplished by 1600 hour. "I" Company was relieved of assignment and closed the battalion area at 0330 hour 2 October 1943.

One platoon of "H" Company and one (1) section of 81mm mortar platoon was with-held from patrols and assigned a mission by the Battalion Commander; S-3 report concerning this mission quoted herewith: (other than stated herein no contact was made with the enemy).

(1) Following is the account of the action of Third Platoon Company "H", on an assigned mission to secure a reservoir that supplied the water for the city of Napoli.

At 1400 hours October 1st. Major Krause ordered Lt. Ziegler to take a platoon of men and accompany him on a mission to secure a water reservoir that was alleged to be in German hands. The platoon with the Mortar platoon of Headquarters Company attached, moved from the Railway station at 1400 hours. With the aid of a civilian guide they arrived on trucks at 213509. The men detrucked and Major Krause gave Lt. Ziegler the order to take his men to 212515 and determine if there were any Germans in the area. It was found that the Germans had left after blowing up the reservoir.

An investigation by Major Krause disclosed another important reservoir in the nearby vicinity that was also alleged to be in German hands. Major Krause then ordered Lt. Ziegler to take his platoon and investigate reservoir and prevent its destruction if it were possible. The platoon moved out at 1525 hours. They arrived at 193518 at 1630 hours. Lt. Ziegler took a six man patrol and moved to 197518. The reservoir was found to be intact and civilians stated the Germans had left a few hours earlier. The reservoir was left guarded and the remainder of the platoon was assembled at 193518. At 1800 hours a civilian reported that the Ger-

[REDACTED]

mans had prepared a bridge for demolitions, and were returning to blow it that night. Lt. Ziegler took four men and with the civilian as a guide went to investigate the Bridge. Upon arrival there he found the charges. He arranged for a guard at the Bridge all night, and returned to his platoon O. P. At 020800 the 7th Armored Force arrived and the demolition charges were removed. Lt. Ziegler with two men as scouts moved out ahead of the British Reconnaissance unit and at 196531 came in contact with a German Mark IV tank. The tank fired a few bursts with its Machine Guns and departed. Neither scouts or the officer were harmed by the shots. Lt. Ziegler stayed with the Reconnaissance unit until he returned to his company area at 021400.

SECTION 7

CASUALTIES IN ITALY
(Corrected to 5 May 1945)

DIVISION TOTAL

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Killed in Action	30	230	260
Died of Wounds	4	47	51
Prisoners of War	1	18	19
Missing in action	-	71	71
Missing in action to Return to Duty	2	62	64
Wounded	24	316	340
Wounded to Duty	61	739	800
TOTALS	122	1483	1605

UNIT TOTALS

504th Parachute Infantry Regiment

Killed in Action	19	160	179
Died of Wounds	1	33	34
Prisoners of War	1	13	14
Missing in action	-	61	61
Missing in action to Returned to Duty	-	10	10
Wounded	13	223	236
Wounded to Duty	51	521	572
TOTALS	85	1021	1106

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

Killed in Action	4	8	12
Died of Wounds	-	4	4
Missing in action	-	1	1
Missing to Returned to Duty	1	22	23
Wounded	3	21	24
Wounded to Returned to Duty	3	108	111
TOTALS	11	164	175

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

Killed in Action	1	15	16
Died of Wounds	1	3	4
Prisoners of War	-	5	5
Missing in action	-	4	4
Missing in action to Returned to Duty	-	1	1
Wounded	1	18	19
Wounded to Returned to Duty	1	25	26
TOTALS	4	71	75

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>307th Airborne Engineer Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	1	30	31
Died of Wounds	-	1	1
Missing in Action	-	5	5
Missing in Action to Returned to Duty	1	29	30
Wounded	1	17	18
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>4</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>43</u>
TOTALS	7	121	128

<u>376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	2	8	10
Died of Wounds	1	5	6
Wounded	5	16	21
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>
TOTALS	8	58	66

<u>456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	2	-	2
Died of Wounds	1	1	2
Wounded	1	7	8
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	4	9	13

<u>319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	1	3	4
Wounded	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>7</u>
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>
TOTALS	3	18	21

<u>320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	<u>-</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	-	6	6

<u>80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion</u>			
Killed in Action	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Wounded to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	-	2	2

<u>407th Airborne Quartermaster Company</u>			
Wounded	-	6	6
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTALS	-	9	9

<u>Headquarters Company 82d Airborne Division</u>			
Killed in Action	-	1	1
Wounded to Returned to Duty	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTALS	-	2	2



	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>307th Airborne Medical Company</u>			
Wounded - - - - -	-	1	1
<u>82d Airborne Military Police Platoon</u>			
Wounded to Returned to Duty - - - - -	-	1	1
Total Division Casualties	122	1483	1605

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

IN

SICILY AND ITALY

PART IV - DISTRIBUTION

<u>Airborne Headquarters</u>		<u>Offices Within Division</u>	
FAA	2	CG	1
11th Abn Div	2	Asst. CG	1
13th Abn Div	2	C/S	1
101st Abn Div	2	G-1	1
Precht School	2	G-2	1
Abn Board	2	G-3	1
508th Precht Inf	2	G-4	1
		G-5	1
<u>Higher Headquarters</u>		AG File	1
AC of S, G-2 OPD,		IG	1
War Dept. Gen. Staff	11	Sig O	1
War Dept.	3	Chem O	1
		Fin O	1
		JA	1
<u>Courtesy Copies</u>		Div Surg	1
Gen. Marshall	1	Ord O	1
Gen. Eisenhower	1	QM	1
Gen. Bradley	1	SSO	1
Gen. Patton	1	Engr	1
Gen. Ridgway	1	PRO	2
Gen. Koyes	1	Div Assn	2
Gen. Gavin	5	Div Hist	2
Gen. Taylor	1	Hq Comdt	1
Gen. Eaton	1	1 ea Field O with Div	
Gen. March	1	at time (Est)	60
Col. Tucker	1		
Col. Ekman	1		
Col. Wienecke	1		
Col. Billingslea	1		
Col. Griffith	1		
<u>Units Within Division</u>			
325th Gli Inf	50		
504th Precht Inf	50		
505th Precht Inf	50		
Hq & Hq Btry, Div			
Arty	10		
319th Gli FA Bn	15		
320th Gli FA Bn	15		
376th Precht FA Bn	15		
456th Precht FA Bn	15		
307th Abn Engr Bn	15		
80th Abn AA Bn	15		
407th Abn QM Co	5		
782d Abn Ord. Maint			
Co	5		
307th Abn Med Co	5		
82d Abn Sig Co	5		
82d Precht Maint Co	5		
Hq Sp Trs	2		
82d Abn Ren Plat	2		
82d Abn MP Plat	2		

PART V

WORLD WAR II CASUALTIES
DECORATIONS, CITATIONS

(Also miscellaneous information)

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
1	DAYS IN COMBAT
2	CASUALTIES
3	AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
4	CITATIONS
	<u>a.</u> NETHERLANDS CITATION
	<u>b.</u> BELGIUM CITATION
5	COMMAND AND STAFF
6	ASSIGNMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS
7	COMMAND POST LOCATIONS

SECTION I

SUMMARY OF DAYS IN COMBAT AREAS

(Note: The term "front line positions" is used below as any period of time in which a regimental combat team or larger group of the Division, whether or not detached from the Division, was in direct contact with enemy troops.)

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>FRONT LINE POSITIONS</u>	<u>CORPS RESERVE</u>	<u>ARMY RESERVE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>SICILY (HUSKY)</u>				41
(1) 10-14 July '43	5			
15-16 July '43		2		
17-24 July '43	8			
(a) 25 July - 19 Aug. '43			26	
Sub-Totals	(13)	(2)	(26)	(41)

<u>ITALY</u>				163
Naples-Foggie (Avalanche) (Giant)				
Rome-Arno (Shingle)				
(2) 14-18 Sept. '43	5			
(3) 16-25 Sept. '43	10			
(4) 18-24 Sept. '43	7			
(5) 25 Sept. - 2 Oct. '43	7			
(6) 4-7 Oct. '43	4			
(7) 27 Oct. - 25 Nov. '43	30			
(8) 6 Dec. '43 - 1 Jan. '44	27			
(9) 22 Jan. - 23 March '44	62			
(10) (b) 3 Oct. - 19 Nov. '43 (net)			21	
Net Sub-Totals	(142)		(21)	(163)

<u>NORMANDY (NEPTUNE)</u>				38
6 June - 8 July '44	33			
9-11 July '44		3	2	
12-13 July '44				
Sub-Totals	(33)	(3)	(2)	(38)

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>FRONT LINE POSITIONS</u>	<u>CORPS RESERVE</u>	<u>ARMY RESERVE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>HOLLAND (MARKET)</u> (Rhineland) 17 Sept. - 13 Nov. '44	58			58
<u>ARDENNES</u> 18 Dec. '44 - 11 Jan '45 12-27 Jan. '45 28 Jan. - 4 Feb. '45 5 Feb. '45 6-18 Feb. '45 Sub-Totals	25 8 13 (46)	16 1 (17)		63 (63)
<u>CENTRAL EUROPE</u> 4-16 April '45 (c) 17-25 April '45 26-27 April '45 28 April - 8 May '45 (d) 9 May - 1 June '45 Sub-Totals	13 11 (24)	9 24 (33)	2 (2)	59 (59)
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>	316	55	51	422

TOTAL DAYS IN COMBAT AREA - BY YEAR:

1943 --- 141
1944 --- 173
1945 --- 108

TOTAL 422

TOTAL DAYS IN COMBAT AREA AS A RESULT OF

AIRBORNE DEPLOYMENT

SICILY 41
ITALY 20
NORMANDY 38
HOLLAND 58
TOTAL 157

GROUND DEPLOYMENT

ITALY 143
ARDENNES 63
CENTRAL 59
EUROPE 59
TOTAL 265

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTES

- (1) -- 505, 504 Precht RCTs
- (2) -- 504, 505 Precht RCTs
- (3) -- 325 Gli RCT
- (4) -- Div on right flank of Fifth Army
- (5) -- Div on Sorrento Ridge and Naples Plain
- (6) -- 505 Precht RCT on Volturno River.
- (7) -- 504 Precht RCT in Isernia Sector.
- (8) -- 504 Precht RCT in Vemfro Sector.
- (9) -- 504 Precht RCT on Anzio Beachhead.
- (10) -- Net, does not include periods 4-7 Oct '43 or 27 Oct. - 25 Nov. '43
 - (a) -- Also occupational duty in Western Sicily.
 - (b) -- Also occupational duty in Naples. Does not include periods 504 Precht RCT was in Corps or Army reserve after Div proper left Italy.
 - (c) -- Also occupational duty in Cologne, Germany, area.
 - (d) -- Also occupational duty in Ludwigslust, Germany, area.

* * *

"On the first day of the year of final victory in Europe, the Battalion was relieved of the attachment to VII Corps, 3d Armored Division, and attached to XVIII Corps (Airborne), 82d Airborne Division. These were truly fighting men. A squad of the 82d Airborne Division will take on a company of the German Army, an 82d Airborne Division Company will take on a German Battalion, and to assign any unit of the 82d Airborne Division an objective is to know that the objective will be taken and held." (Excerpt from "Victory TD", the unit history of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion)

* * *

SECTION 2

CASUALTIES

a. Average casualty rate: The 82d Airborne Division occupied front line positions for a total of 316 days and suffered a total of 19,586 casualties of all types, an average of 61.98 casualties for each day, on the basis of computations made 28 May 1945.

- (1) An average of 4.85 men were missing in action, each day.
- (2) An average of 39.88 men were wounded each day.
- (3) An average of 8.8 men were injured each day.
- (4) An average of 8.43 men were killed in action or died of wounds each day.

* * *

b. Casualties by campaign: Figures available as of 25 October 1945 show that only 106 individuals of the 82d Airborne Division are still listed as "Missing in Action", all others listed earlier as "Missing" having been liberated from prison camps or legally declared dead. A tabulation of casualties on this basis, however, would not present a true picture of the Division's status during the particular campaign, and two sets of computations therefore are given below.

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>MISSING IN ACTION</u>	<u>WOUNDED IN ACTION</u>		<u>INJURED IN ACTION</u>		<u>KILLED IN ACTION DIED OF WOUNDS</u>
		<u>Not Rtd</u>	<u>Rtd</u>	<u>Not Rtd</u>	<u>Rtd</u>	
* SICILY	48	474	336	x	x	197
* ITALY	73	1140	799	x	x	309
* NORMANDY	661	2373	1554	704	502	1142
* HOLLAND	622	1796	821	327	196	535
**ARDENNES & RHINELAND	101	2073	1036	609	364	440
**CENTRAL EUROPE	30	168	34	49	31	42
TOTALS	1535	8024	4580	1689	1093	2665
		12,604		2,782		

* -- Corrected to 12 December 1944

** -- Corrected to 28 May 1945

x -- Figures not kept for these campaigns

Not Rtd -- Did not return to Division

Rtd -- Returned to Division

[REDACTED]

Computations corrected on the basis of official reports received to 25 October 1945:

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>MISSING IN ACTION</u>	<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u> <u>OR</u> <u>DIED OF WOUNDS</u>
SICILY	12	206
ITALY	2	327
NORMANDY	0	1,282
HOLLAND	80	658
ARDENNES & RHINELAND	7	670
CENTRAL EUROPE	5	75
TOTALS	106	3,228

* * *

On the last day of its last campaign the 82d Airborne Division liberated five of its soldiers who had been captured in Sicily and later had been "hired out" to German farmers as farm hands.

* * *

c. Casualties by unit (corrected to 28 May 1945):

UNIT	MIA	WOUNDED		INJURED		KIA or DOW
		Not Rtd	Rtd	Not Rtd	Rtd	
Div Hq	4	11	11	9	4	4
Div Hq Co	1	15	10	9	7	17
82 Abn MP Plat	5	4	2			1
325 Gli Inf	190	1256	731	291	181	380
504 Prcht Inf	208	1850	1122	125	85	522
505 Prcht Inf	146	1760	1081	357	263	465
507 Prcht Inf	337	526	270	96	56	251
508 Prcht Inf	312	1280	665	466	284	551
2 Bn 401 Gli Inf	165	630	274	109	56	141
Hq & Hq Btry Div Arty		15	9	2	2	1
319 Gli FA Bn	44	75	45	51	37	36
320 Gli FA Bn	49	48	30	37	24	33
376 Prcht FA Bn	7	97	56	12	6	62
456 Prcht FA Bn	1	104	65	16	8	44
80 Abn AA Bn	17	91	57	46	40	42
307 Abn Engr Bn	34	235	140	21	14	94
407 Abn QM Co		9	3			
307 Abn Med Co	1	12	6	13	7	7
82 Abn Sig Co	9	5	2	22	16	11
782 Abn Ord Maint Co		1	1	1	1	
82 Abn Ren Plat	5			6	2	3
TOTALS	1535	8024	4580	1689	1093	2665

NOTES: The 507th Parachute Infantry was attached for the NORMANDY Campaign.

The 508th Parachute Infantry was attached for the NORMANDY, HOLLAND, ARDENNES & RHINELAND Campaigns.

The 2d Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, was attached to the 325th Glider Infantry (to give the 325th a total of three battalions) in the NORMANDY, HOLLAND, ARDENNES & RHINELAND Campaigns and was absorbed by the 325th on 1 March 1945.

Figures for the 82d Parachute Maintenance Company (Prov) are included in those for other Parachute units.

SECTION III

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

A. INDIVIDUAL DECORATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR

PRIVATE JOHN R. TOWLE 504TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
(Posthumously. Gallantry in Action in Holland)

1ST SERGEANT LEONARD A. FUNK 508TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY
(Gallantry in Action in the Ardennes)

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

*--Denotes Oak Leaf Cluster also awarded

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Atcheson, Robert B.	Major	504th Parachute Infantry
Baldwin, Lewis N.	Cpl.	456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion
Bednarz, Walter J.	Cpl.	508th Parachute Infantry
*Billingslea, Charles E.	Col.	325th Glider Infantry
Clarke, James F.	2d Lt.	507th Parachute Infantry
Cook, Julian A.	Lt. Col.	504th Parachute Infantry
Cymerys, Charles F.	Cpl.	505th Parachute Infantry
Del Grippo, Daniel T.	Pfc.	504th Parachute Infantry
Doerfler, Eugene A.	1st Lt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Dunham, Don B.	Major	504th Parachute Infantry
Dustin, Shelton W.	Sgt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Fessler, John H.	S/Sgt.	507th Parachute Infantry
Foley, John P.	1st Lt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Funk, Leonard A.	1st Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
*Gavin, James M.	Major Gen.	505th Parachute Infantry
Gilbert, Emmil P.	T/5	507th Parachute Infantry
Gordon, Oscar L.	2d Lt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Gorham, Arthur F.	Lt. Col.	505th Parachute Infantry
Grenado, John	Cpl.	504th Parachute Infantry
Gushue, Charles A.	Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Hanna, Roy M.	1st Lt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Harper, Lee W.	Pvt.	456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion
Harris, Wesley O.	Capt.	307th Airborne Engineer Batta Battalion
Harrison, Willard	Major	504th Parachute Infantry
Henderson, Alvin H.	S/Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Holstoi, Raymond S.	Pfc.	504th Parachute Infantry
Hord, Shelby R.	Pvt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Huempfer, Milo C.	Pfc.	Division Headquarters Company
Hughes, John A.	1st Lt.	507th Parachute Infantry
Jusek, Joseph J.	Cpl.	504th Parachute Infantry
Kaiser, James L.	Lt. Col.	505th Parachute Infantry
Karnap, Bernard E.	2d Lt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Kelley, Charles B.	Pvt.	507th Parachute Infantry
Kellogg, William M.	Capt.	307th Airborne Engineer Battalion

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>UNIT</u>
Kero, William E.	Sgt.	307th Airborne Engineer Battalion
Kiernan, James R.	1st Lt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Kinsey, Paul S.	1st Lt.	325th Glider Infantry
Kirby, Yarsel	T/5	507th Parachute Infantry
Koss, Joseph M.	Pfc.	504th Parachute Infantry
Krause, Edward C.	Lt. Col.	505th Parachute Infantry
Kumler, Lyle K.	Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Larnin, George D.	1st Lt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Lanseadel, William G.	Pfc.	504th Parachute Infantry
Lockwood, John A.	Pvt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Madlock, Hy F.	Pvt.	507th Parachute Infantry
Megellas, James	1st Lt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Mendez, Louis G.	Lt. Col.	508th Parachute Infantry
Myers, Joseph F.	1st Lt.	325th Glider Infantry
Muzynski, Walter J.	Pfc.	504th Parachute Infantry
Nau, Charles E.	Cpl.	504th Parachute Infantry
Ostberg, E.J.	Lt. Col.	507th Parachute Infantry
Parris, Harold L.	Pfc.	508th Parachute Infantry
Polette, Lloyd L.	1st Lt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Prager, Clarence	S/Sgt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Prager, Leonard A.	1st Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
*Ridgway, Matthew B.	Major Gen.	Division Headquarters
Roberts, Ernest T.	Cpl.	508th Parachute Infantry
Rutledge, James A.	T/Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
*Sanford, Teddy A.	Lt. Col.	325th Glider Infantry
Sayre, Edwin M.	Capt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Shanley, Thomas J.	Lt. Col.	508th Parachute Infantry
Sirovica, Frank L.	S/Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Sprinkle, John I.	1st Lt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Stevens, Stanley E.	S/Sgt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Swenson, John H.	Lt. Col.	325th Glider Infantry
Taylor, Stokes M.	Cpl.	80th Airborne Anti-aircraft Battalion
Terry, Dewitt S.	Sgt.	325th Glider Infantry
*Tucker, Reuben H.	Col.	504th Parachute Infantry
*Vandervoort, Benjamin H.	Lt. Col.	505th Parachute Infantry
Walsh, William P.	S/Sgt.	504th Parachute Infantry
Wason, Donald B.	2d Lt.	325th Glider Infantry
Wertich, Jake L.	1st Lt.	508th Parachute Infantry
Ziegler, Harvey	1st Lt.	505th Parachute Infantry
Zwingman, Otto K.	Pvt.	508th Parachute Infantry

B. SUMMARY OF DECORATIONS OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY CAMPAIGN

NOTE: Compilations listed below include decorations awarded through 12 October 1945. Approximately 140 recommendations for decorations were being processed at that time.

CAMPAIGN		DECORATIONS				
		MofH	DSC	LofM	SS	BS
SICILY	9 July 43 - 19 Aug 43		10	9	102	5
ITALY	12 Sept 43 - 19 Nov 43 *22 Mar 44		4	2	58	59
NORMANDY	6 Jun 44 - 12 Jul 44		32	11	271	925
HOLLAND	17 Sept 44 - 13 Nov 44	1	200	3	209	709
BELGIUM	18 Dec 44 - 17 Feb 45		11	5	169	396
GERMANY	2 Apr 45 -	1	2	2	85	384
TOTAL		2	79	32	894	2478

*504th Parachute Infantry

BY UNIT

UNIT	MofH	DSC	LofM	Silver Star	Bronze Star
Hq 82d Abn Div		4	12	11	108
MP Platoon			1	1	5
Prcht Maint Co			1		4
307th Abn Med Co			1	9	53
82d Abn Sig Co			3	1	9
407th Abn QM Co					5
782d Abn Ord Maint Co			2		17
Recon Platoon				4	9
307th Abn Engr Bn		3	2	20	100
325th Gli Inf		10	2	95	266
80th Abn AA Bn		1		4	45
319th Gli FA Bn				8	45
Hq Div Arty			1	5	22

UNIT	MofH	DSC	LofM	Silver Star	Bronze Star
320th Gli FA Bn				10	54
456th Prcht FA Bn		2		24	25
376th Prcht FA Bn				7	44
504th Prcht Inf	1	20	2	200	428
505th Prcht Inf		12	4	275	596
Other	1	26	1	220	641
TOTAL	2	78	32	894	2478

C. SUMMARY OF DECORATIONS OF
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

AWARD

NUMBER PRESENTED

FRENCH

Croix De Guerre A L'Ordre De L'Armee (Army Level).....	7
Croix De Guerre L' Ordre De La Division (Division Level).....	3
Croix De Guerre A L'Ordre Du Regiment (Regimental Level).....	16
Croix De Guerre Certificates.....	27
	<u>53</u>

BRITISH

Military Cross.....	6
Military Medal.....	11
Distinguished Service Order.....	2
Distinguished Conduct Medal.....	23
	<u>42</u>

RUSSIAN

Order of Alexander Nevsky.....	1
Order of the Peoples War, 1st Degree.....	2
Order of the Peoples War, 2nd Degree.....	4
Medal For Valor.....	4
Medal For Combat Service.....	3
	<u>14</u>

HOLLAND

ORANGE NASSAU IN	
Degree of Grand Officer.....	1
Degree of Commander.....	1
Degree of Officer.....	5
Military Willems Order.....	10
Bronze Lion.....	42
Bronze Cross.....	14
	<u>73</u>

SECTION 4

CITATIONS

CITATIONS OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION AS A WHOLE

THE NETHERLANDS -- MILITAIRE WILLEMS ORDE, DEGREE OF KNIGHT OF THE FOURTH CLASS. Awarded for gallantry in action in the NETHERLANDS during the period 17 September 1944 -- 4 October 1944. (See Annex 4a)

BELGIUM -- THE FOURRAGERE 1940. Awarded for gallantry in action in BELGIUM in December 1944 and January and February 1945 in the ARDENNES, the 82d Airborne Division having been cited twice in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army. (See Annex 4b)

FRANCE -- CITATION. For gallantry in action in NORMANDY.

PRESIDENTIAL CITATIONS OF UNITS OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN</u>
Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company	Normandy
325th Glider Infantry	Normandy
1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry (Less Company A)	Ardennes
Company A, 504th Parachute Infantry	Central Europe
3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry	Rome-Arno (Anzio)
505th Parachute Infantry	Normandy
507th Parachute Infantry (Attached)	Normandy
508th Parachute Infantry (Attached)	Normandy
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 82d Airborne Division Artillery	Normandy
319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion	Normandy
320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion	Normandy
82d Airborne Signal Company	Normandy
307th Airborne Medical Company	Normandy
Headquarters and Batteries A, B, and C, 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion	Normandy
Companies A and B, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion	Normandy

MERITORIOUS SERVICE PLAQUES AWARDED UNITS

407th Airborne Quartermaster Company
307th Airborne Medical Company
782d Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company
82d Parachute Maintenance Company
666th Quartermaster Truck Company (Attached)

PRISONERS OF WAR
CAPTURED BY THE
82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

<u>CAMPAIGN</u>	<u>NO. OF PW'S</u>
SICILY	23,191
ITALY	74
NORMANDY	2,159
HOLLAND	2,995
ARDENNES	4,529
CENTRAL EUROPE	<u>148,152*</u>
TOTAL	181,100

NOTES: Figures include only prisoners of war processed through the Division Prisoner of War Cage and do not include any prisoners captured by units of the Division while such units were detached from the Division. The above figures thus do not include prisoners taken by the 505th Parachute RCT in the early days of SICILY, the 325th, 504th and 505th RCTs on the SALERNO BEACHHEAD or much of the CHIUNZI PASS sector, the 505th RCT on the VOLTURNO, or the 504th RCT in the ISERNIA, VENAFRO or ANZIO sectors.

*The figure of 148,152 prisoners captured in the CENTRAL EUROPE Campaign includes an estimated 144,000 captured when the German Twenty-First Army surrendered to the 82d Airborne Division at LUDWIGSLUST, GERMANY

HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

APO 469 U. S. Army
12 October 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 125)

SECTION

NETHERLANDS DECREE, DATED 8 OCT 1945, AWARD OF THE "MILITAIRE
WILLEMS ORDE" ----- I
MINISTERIAL DECREE, NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT, 8 OCT 1945,
WEARING OF THE ORANGE LANYARD, ROYAL NETHERLAND ARMY ----- II

I --- NETHERLANDS DECREE:

Announcement is made of the Netherlands award of the "Militaire Willems Orde", degree of Knight of the fourth class, to the 82d Airborne Division. The Netherlands Decree, dated 8 October 1945, is hereby quoted:

"WE WILHELMINA, by the Grace of God, Queen of the Netherlands, Princess of Orange-Nassau, etc., etc., etc.

On the recommendation of Our Ministers of War and for Foreign Affairs, dated October 3, 1945, Secret Nr.Y.22;

In accordance with the provisions of the amended Act of April 30, 1815, Nr.5 (Statue-Book Nr.33);

In view of the clause 18 of the Regulations of administration and discipline for the "Militaire Willems Orde", as laid down in the Royal Decree of June 25, 1815, Nr.10;

Considering that the 82d Airborne Division of the United States Army, during the airborne operations and the ensuing fighting actions in the central part of the Netherlands in the period from September 17 to October 4, 1944, excelled in performing the tasks, allotted to it, with tact, coupled with superior gallantry, self-sacrifice and loyalty;

Considering also, that the actions, fought by the aforesaid Division, took place in the area of NIJMEGEN;

HAVE APPROVED AND ORDERED:

1. To decree, that the Divisional Colours of the 82d Airborne Division of the United States Army shall be decorated with the "Militaire Willems Orde", degree of Knight of the fourth class;
2. To authorize the Division to carry in its Divisional Colours the name of the town of

NIJMEGEN 1944

Our Ministers of War and for Foreign Affairs are, each for his own part, in charge of the execution of this Decree, copy of which shall be sent to the Chancellor of the Netherlands Orders of Knighthood.

THE HAGUE, October 8, 1945
(sgd.) WILHELMINA

THE MINISTER OF WAR
(sgd.) J. MEIJNEN
THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
(sgd.) VAN KLEFFENS

Conformable to the original,
the Director of the Cabinet of the Queen,
(sgd.) VAN TETS VAN GOUDRIAAN.
For true translation,
The acting Chancellor of the Netherlands Orders
of Knighthood,
(sgd.) KOFFLER."

II -- MINISTERIAL DECREE, NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT:

Ministerial Decree of the Netherlands Minister of War, dated 8 October 1945, granting the personnel of the 82d Airborne Division, who participated in operations during the period of 17 September to 4 October 1944, authority to wear the ORANGE LANYARD of the Royal Netherlands Army is quoted:

"MINISTERIAL DECREE OF THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER OF WAR, dated October 8, 1945, Section III A, Secret No-X 25.

The Minister of War considering, that the outstanding performance of duty of the 82d Airborne Division, United States Army, during the airborne operations and the ensuing fighting actions in the central part of the NETHERLANDS in the period from September 17 to October 4, 1944, have induced HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN to decorate its Divisional Colours with the "MILITAIRE WILLEMS-ORDE" degree of Knight of the fourth class; CONSIDERING also, that it is desirable for each member of the Division, who took part in the afore-said operations, to possess a lasting memento of this glorious struggle;

DECREES: that each member of the personnel of the 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY, who took part in the operations in the area of NIJMEGEN in the period from September 17 to October 4, 1944, is allowed to wear the ORANGE LANYARD, as laid down in article 123g of the Clothing Regulations/1944, of the Royal Netherlands Army.


THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 8, 1945,
THE MINISTER OF WAR--"

(Minister van Oorlog)

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL GAVIN:

R. H. WIENECKE
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:


JOHN D. GRAY
Major, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" & "C" plus 3 to TAG (Attn: Decorations & Awards Branch,
Munitions Bldg., Wash. 25, D. C.)
2 to CG, USFET (Roar) (Attn: Awards & Decorations
Branch, AG Mil Pers Div))
1 to CG, US Hq Berlin District
2 to CO, 45th MRU (Mobile) APO 755

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
Office of the Division Commander

APO 469, U.S. Army
8 October 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 123))

BELGIUM CITATION

Pursuant to authority contained in the Belgium Ministry of National Defense Decree Number 1034, dated 4 October 1945, announcement is made of the award of the fourragere 1940 to the 82d Airborne Division and the 508 Parachute Infantry Regiment. Appropriate portions from the Decree are hereby quoted:

"At the proposal of the Minister of National Defense, we have decreed and we order:

Article 1: The 82d Airborne Division with the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attached is cited twice in the Order of the Day of the Belgian Army and is herewith given the fourragere 1940, for:

1. This elite Division which has gone with great elan through the campaigns of Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, Holland and France, has distinguished itself particularly in the Battle of the Ardennes from December 17 to December 31, 1944. Called upon as a reinforcement by the Allied High Command in the evening of the 17 December, at a time when the division was in the vicinity of Reims, the Division was able to take up combat positions in the region of Werbomont only 24 hours later and this under very severe climatic conditions. Progressing towards Ambleve and the Salm, the Division opened and maintained a corridor for the elements of four American Divisions which were surrounded in the vicinity of St. Vith, thus giving new courage to the engaged units. The Division had prevented the enemy from piercing the north flank of the pocket created by the offensive of Von Rundstedt and thusly succeeded in saving the city of Liege and its surroundings from a second occupation by the Germans.

2. After having excelled in defensive warfare at the banks of the Salm and the Ambleve and after having repelled successfully the repeated attacks of the best German shocktroops, the 82d Airborne Division with the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attached, in spite of extreme cold and excessively deep snow, went on the offensive themselves and advanced to the German border, capturing 2500 German prisoners, including 5 battalion commanders. This fighting was extremely valorous as the organic composition of the Division handicapped the unit considerably, not having at their disposal, as any other Infantry Division would have, heavy weapons to support their attack. During 23 days, under most painful and adverse conditions, the veterans of the 82d Airborne Division did not cease to give a wonderful example of courage and heroism, exemplifying their fighting spirit by several remarkably brilliant actions. By its valor, the Division wrote another page in heroic annals of Allied Airborne troops and rendered an important service to Belgium and to the Allied cause by establishing the necessary basis for the new pursuit of the enemy towards the Rhine River.

Article 2: The Minister of National Defense is herewith ordered to execute the decree.

GO No 123 Hq 82d Abn Div APO 469 US Army dtd 8 Oct 45 contd.

For the Regent:


The Minister of National Defense,

signed: "L. Mundeloor."

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL GAVIN:

R. H. WIENECKE
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:


JOHN D. GRAY
Major, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"A" & "C" plus 3 to TAG (Attn: Decorations & Awards Branch,
Munitions Bldg., Wash. 25, D.C.)
2 to CG, USFET (Rear) (Attn: Awards & Decorations
Branch, AG Military Pers Div)
1 to CG, US Hq Berlin District
25 to CO, 508th Pzcht Inf

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECTION 5

COMMAND AND STAFF

82D INFANTRY DIVISION

AND

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

25 MARCH, 1942 -- 25 OCTOBER, 1945

NOTE: Dates shown for promotion are dates of rank unless shown with an asterisk (*). If shown with an asterisk the dates are dates of acceptance of promotion.

COMMANDING GENERALS

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Major Gen. Omar N. Bradley	25 March '42	25 June '42
Brig. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	26 June '42	5 August '42
Major Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	7 August '42	27 August '44
Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin	28 August '44	19 October '44
Major Gen. James M. Gavin	20 October '44	To Date

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDERS

Brig. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	25 March '42	25 June '42
Col. Don F. Pratt	3 July '42	15 August '42
Brig. Gen. William M. Miloy	18 August '42	15 January '43
Col. Charles L. Keorans, Jr.	17 January '43	6 February '43
Brig. Gen. Charles L. Keorans, Jr.	7 February '43(MIA)	11 July '43
Col. James M. Gavin	4 October '43	6 October '43
Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin	*7 October '43	27 August '44
Col. Ira P. Swift	13 December '44	19 March '45
Brig. Gen. Ira P. Swift	20 March '45	2 September '45

COMMANDING GENERALS, DIVISION ARTILLERY

Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Swing	25 March '42	11 December '42
Brig. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	*12 December '42	5 October '43
Col. Francis A. March	6 October '43	6 February '44
Brig. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	7 February '44	21 February '44
Col. Francis A. March	22 February '44	7 May '44
Col. Lemuel Mathewson	8 May '44	21 May '44
Col. Francis A. March	22 May '44	15 November '44
Brig. Gen. Francis A. March	16 November '44	To Date

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Col. George Van W. Pope	25 March '42	5 July '42
Col. Maxwell D. Taylor	6 July '42	11 December '42
Lt. Col. Ralph P. Eaton	12 December '42	4 January '43
Col. Ralph P. Eaton	5 January '43	27 August '45
Lt. Col. Robert H. Wioncke	28 August '44	28 October '44
Col. Robert H. Wioncke	29 October '44	To Date

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1

FROM

TO

Lt. Col. Ralph P. Eaton (Acting)	25 March '42	2 May '42
Major Ralph C. Cooper	3 May '42	21 June '42
Capt. Frederick M. Schellhammer	22 June '42	13 August '42
Major Frederick M. Schellhammer	14 August '42	17 December '42
Capt. Thomas B. Kotterson (Acting)	9 September '42	16 December '42
Capt. Thomas B. Kotterson	17 December '42	29 January '43
Major Thomas B. Kotterson	30 January '43	27 March '43
Major Frederick M. Schellhammer	28 March '43	11 April '43
Lt. Col. Frederick M. Schellhammer	12 April '43	27 August '44
Major Alfred W. Ireland	28 August '44	5 November '44
Lt. Col. Alfred W. Ireland	6 November '44	To Date

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

Major George E. Lynch	25 March '42	3 April '42
Lt. Col. George E. Lynch	*4 April '42	26 September '43
Lt. Col. Whitfield Jack	2 October '43	27 August '44
Lt. Col. Walter W. Winton, Jr.	28 August '44	20 June '45
Major Michael K. Berkut (Acting)	1 July '45	18 July '45
Major Paul E. Vaupel	19 July '45	To Date

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

Major Willis S. Matthews	25 March '42	3 April '42
Lt. Col. Willis S. Matthews	*4 April '42	5 July '42
Major Richard K. Boyd	6 July '42	7 October '42
Lt. Col. Richard K. Boyd	8 October '42	19 August '43
Lt. Col. Whitfield Jack	20 August '43	1 October '43
Lt. Col. Paul L. Turner, Jr.	2 October '43	16 February '44
Lt. Col. Robert H. Wienecke	17 February '44	27 August '44
Major John Norton	28 August '44	25 October '44
Lt. Col. John Norton	26 October '44	To Date

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4

Lt. Col. Truman C. Thorson	25 March '42	18 August '42
Major Robert H. Wienecke	19 August '42	31 January '43
Lt. Col. Robert H. Wienecke	1 February '43	16 February '44
Major Bennie A. Zinn	17 February '44	31 May '44
Lt. Col. Bennie A. Zinn	1 June '44	16 June '44
Lt. Col. Frank W. Moorman (Acting)	7 June '44	16 July '44
Lt. Col. Frank W. Moorman	17 July '44	27 August '44
Major Albert G. Marin	28 August '44	10 November '44
Lt. Col. Albert G. Marin	11 November '44	To Date

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-5 (See also Military Government Officer)

Major Arthur W. Seward, Jr.	13 August '45	17 October '45
-----------------------------	---------------	----------------

ADJUTANT GENERAL

Lt. Col. Ralph P. Eaton	25 March '42	11 December '42
Captain Raymond M. Britton	12 December '42	29 January '43
Major Raymond M. Britton	30 January '43	16 February '43
Major John Poole	17 February '43	12 March '43
Major Raymond M. Britton	13 March '43	31 January '44

[REDACTED]

ADJUTANT GENERAL

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Lt. Col. Raymond M. Britton	1 February '44	21 February '45
Major Maurice E. Stuart (Acting)	2 February '45	21 February '45
Major Maurice E. Stuart	22 February '45	15 May '45
Lt. Col. Maurice E. Stuart	16 May '45	30 June '45
Major John D. Gray	1 July '45	To Date

CHAPLAIN

1st Lt. Garner D. Noland	25 March '42	29 March '42
Major Charles W. Lovin	30 March '42	8 February '43
Capt. George L. Riddle	9 February '43	1 March '43
Major George L. Riddle	1 March '43	3 January '44
Lt. Col. George L. Riddle	1 February '44	12 November '44
Captain George B. Wood	13 November '44	21 January '45
Major George B. Wood	22 January '45	To Date

CHEMICAL OFFICER

Major John P. Geiger	25 March '42	7 April '42
Lt. Col. John P. Geiger	*8 April '42	To Date

FINANCE OFFICER

Major William E. Johnson	25 March '42	2 August '42
Lt. Col. William E. Johnson	3 August '42	To Date

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

Capt. Jean G. Callahan	25 March '42	7 April '42
Major Jean G. Callahan	*8 April '42	13 August '42
Capt. John H. Swenson	14 August '42	13 September '42
Major John H. Swenson	14 September '42	20 February '43
Capt. William C. Shreve	21 February '43	2 August '43
Capt. Walter H. Chandler, Jr.	21 August '43	17 January '44
Capt. Don C. Faith, Jr.	18 January '44	9 May '44
Major Don C. Faith, Jr.	10 May '44	23 August '44
Capt. William H. Johnson	24 August '44	6 October '44
Major William H. Johnson	7 October '44	28 February '45
Capt. George J. Claussen	1 March '45	30 June '45
Major Lawrence L. Lynch	1 July '45	To Date

INSPECTOR GENERAL

Lt. Col. Willard S. Madelton	25 March '42	8 September '42
Lt. Col. Charles F. Barrett, Jr.	9 September '42	27 August '44
Lt. Col. Frank P. Dunnington	28 August '44	16 March '45
Capt. William F. Jones	17 March '45	30 June '45
Lt. Col. Edward S. Nelson, Jr.	1 July '45	To Date

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Major Eugene G. Cushing	25 March '42	8 July '42
Lt. Col. Eugene G. Cushing	9 July '42	14 August '42
Capt. Casimir D. Moss	15 August '42	6 September '42
Major Casimir D. Moss	7 September '42	2 April '43
Lt. Col. Casimir D. Moss	3 April '43	27 August '44
Major Nicholas E. Allen	28 August '44	6 December '44

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

Lt. Col. Nicholas E. Allen
Major Robert F. H. Pollock

FROM

7 December '44
17 October '45

TO

16 October '45
To Date

ORDNANCE OFFICER

Capt. Joshua A. Finkel
Major Joshua A. Finkel
Lt. Col. Joshua A. Finkel
Major Mayo S. Silvey
Lt. Col. Mayo S. Silvey
Lt. Col. Raymond W. Smith

25 March '42
4 April '42
30 November '42
13 December '44
20 March '45
1 July '45

3 April '42
29 November '42
12 December '44
19 March '45
30 June '45
To Date

PROVOST MARSHAL

Major Joan C. Callahan
Capt. John H. Swenson
Major John H. Swenson
Capt. William P. Bowden
Major William P. Bowden
Major Frederick G. McCollum
Major Paul E. Vaupel
Capt. Robert B. Patterson

25 March '42
14 August '42
14 September '42
20 October '42
30 January '43
7 January '44
23 May '45
19 July '45

13 August '42
13 September '42
19 October '42
29 January '43
6 January '44
22 May '45
18 July '45
To Date

QUARTERMASTER

Lt. Col. Samuel H. Baker
Major Erle H. Landers
Lt. Col. Erle H. Landers
1st Lt. Harvey M. Lifset
Major John W. Mohrman
Lt. Col. John W. Mohrman
Lt. Col. Raymond H. Tiffany
Major Samuel M. Mays

25 March '42
15 August '42
30 November '42
19 March '43
24 March '43
19 November '43
1 July '45
21 September '45

14 August '42
29 November '42
16 March '43
23 March '43
18 November '43
30 June '45
20 September '45
To Date

SIGNAL OFFICER

Capt. Frank W. Moorman
Major Frank W. Moorman
Lt. Col. Frank W. Moorman
Capt. Robert E. Furman
Major Robert E. Furman
Lt. Col. Robert E. Furman
Lt. Col. Joseph P. Ahern

25 March '42
*4 April '42
8 October '42
17 July '44
8 September '44
1 March '45
1 July '45

3 April '42
7 October '42
16 July '44
7 September '44
28 February '45
30 June '45
To Date

SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICER

1st Lt. Harold A. Shebeck
Capt. Harold A. Shebeck
1st Lt. Shirley H. Dix
Capt. Frederick G. McCollum
Major Frederick G. McCollum
Capt. Rudrick R. Otto
Major Rudrick R. Otto
Major Samuel H. Mays
Capt. John T. Elliott

25 March '42
4 August '42
21 December '42
3 March '43
19 Sept. '43
7 January '44
1 September '44
1 July '45
21 September '45

3 August '42
20 December '42
2 March '43
18 September '43
6 January '44
31 August '44
30 June '45
20 September '45
To Date

~~RESTRICTED~~

SURGEON

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Lt. Col. Clifford Best	25 March '42	21 January '43
Major Woolcott L. Etienne	30 January '43	2 March '43
Lt. Col. Woolcott L. Etienne	3 March '43	27 August '44
Major William C. Lindstrom	28 August '44	7 September '44
Lt. Col. William C. Lindstrom	8 September '44	To Date

MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER (See also G-5)

Capt. Peter Sheuvaloff	22 May '44	26 December '44
Capt. Arthur Soward, Jr. (Acting)	16 December '44	25 December '44
Capt. Arthur Soward, Jr.	26 December '44	11 February '45
Major Arthur Soward, Jr.	11 February '45	12 August '45

PARACHUTE MAINTENANCE OFFICER (Authorized 1 March '45)

Capt. James E. Griffin	1 March '45	30 April '45
Major James E. Griffin	1 May '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 325TH INFANTRY (Redesignated 325th Glider Infantry on 15 August 1942.)

Col. Claudius M. Easley	25 March '42	27 July '42
Lt. Col. Jean D. Scott	28 July '42	13 August '42
Lt. Col. Harry L. Lewis	14 August '42	21 August '44
Lt. Col. Charles E. Billingslea	22 August '44	28 October '44
Col. Charles E. Billingslea	29 October '44	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 326TH INFANTRY (REDESIGNATED 326TH GLIDER INFANTRY ON 15 AUGUST, 1942). TRANSFERRED FROM DIVISION ON 10 FEBRUARY 1945

Col. Stuart Cutler	25 March '42	10 February '45
--------------------	--------------	-----------------

COMMANDING OFFICER, 327TH INFANTRY (TRANSFERRED FROM DIVISION ON 15 AUGUST, 1942.)

Col. George S. Wear	25 March '42	15 August '42
---------------------	--------------	---------------

COMMANDING OFFICER, 504TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY (ASSIGNED TO DIVISION ON 15 AUGUST, 1942.)

Col. Theodor L. Dunn	15 August '42	16 December '42
	(Date Regt asgd to Div)	
Lt Col Reuben H. Tucker (Acting)	1 December '42	15 December '42
Lt. Col. Reuben H. Tucker	16 December '42	28 May '43
Col. Reuben H. Tucker	29 May '43	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 505TH PARACHUTE INFANTRY (ASSIGNED TO DIVISION ON 10 FEBRUARY '43.)

Col. James M. Gavin	6 July '42	4 October '43
Lt. Col. Herbert F. Batchelor	3 October '43	21 March '44
Lt. Col. William E. Ekman	22 March '44	21 July '44
Col. William E. Ekman	22 July '44	To Date

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, DIVISION ARTILLERY

FROM

TO

Col. Sidney F. Dunn	25 March '42	5 January '43
Lt. Col. Francis A. March	6 January '43	15 January '43
Col. Francis A. March	16 January '43	5 October '43
Lt. Col. William H. Bortsch	6 October '43	6 February '44
Col. Francis A. March	7 February '43	21 February '44
Lt. Col. William H. Bortsch	21 February '44	9 June '44
Col. William H. Bortsch	10 June '44	24 September '44
Lt. Col. Wilbur M. Griffith	25 September '44	15 February '45
Col. Wilbur M. Griffith	16 February '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 319TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (REDESIGNATED 319TH GLIDER

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION ON 15 AUGUST, 1942)

Lt. Col. William H. Bortsch	25 March '42	5 October '43
Major James C. Todd	6 October '43	6 February '44
Major James C. Todd	21 February '44	29 June '44
Lt. Col. James C. Todd	30 June '44	30 June '45
Lt. Col. Joseph W. Keating	1 July '45	16 October '45
Major Dantes A. York	17 October '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 320TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (REDESIGNATED 320TH GLIDER

FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION ON 15 AUGUST, 1942.)

Lt. Col. Francis A. March	25 March '42	5 January '43
Major Paul E. Wright	6 January '43	9 April '43
Lt. Col. Paul E. Wright	10 April '43	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 321ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (TRANSFERRED FROM DIVISION
ON 15 AUGUST, 1945).

Lt. Col. John W. Works	25 March '42	15 August '42
------------------------	--------------	---------------

COMMANDING OFFICER, 907TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (TRANSFERRED FROM DIVISION
ON 15 AUGUST, 1942)

Lt. Col. John E. Ray	25 March '42	19 June '42
Major Ephraim H. McLemore	20 June '42	14 July '42
Lt. Col. Ephraim H. McLemore	15 July '42	15 August '42

COMMANDING OFFICER, 376TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (ACTIVATED AND
ASSIGNED TO DIVISION, 15 AUGUST '42).

Capt. Paul E. Wright	16 August '42	17 August '42
Major Paul E. Wright	18 August '42	20 October '42
Capt. Robert H. Neptune (Acting)	21 October '42	3 January '43
Major Wilbur M. Griffith	4 January '43	8 March '43
Lt. Col. Wilbur M. Griffith	9 March '43	24 September '44
Major Robert W. Neptune	25 September '44	10 November '44
Lt. Col. Robert W. Neptune	11 November '44	30 June '45
Major Herbert H. Champlin	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 456TH PARACHUTE FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (ASSIGNED TO

DIVISION ON 10-FEBRUARY '43).

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Lt. Col. Harrison B. Harden, Jr.	10 February '43	2 August '43
Major Hugh A. Neal	3 August '43	27 February '44
Major Wagner J. D'Allessio	23 February '44	29 June '44
Lt. Col. Wagner J. D'Allessio	30 June '44	30 June '45
Major Frederick J. Silvey	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 80TH AIRBORNE ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTALION (ACTIVATED AND

ASSIGNED TO DIVISION 3 SEPTEMBER '42).

Major Whitfield Jack	5 September '42	29 November '42
Lt. Col. Whitfield Jack	30 November '42	19 August '43
Major Raymond E. Singleton (Acting)	1 July '43	19 August '43
Major Raymond E. Singleton	20 August '43	31 January '44
Lt. Col. Raymond E. Singleton	1 February '44	30 June '45
Lt. Col. John V. Paddock	1 July '45	15 October '45
Major Choice R. Rucker	16 October '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 307TH ENGINEER BATTALION (REDESIGNATED 307TH AIRBORNE

ENGINEER BATTALION ON 15 AUGUST 1942).

Lt. Col. Peter E. Bormel	25 March '42	13 July '42
Major Robert S. Palmer	14 July '42	29 November '42
Lt. Col. Robert S. Palmer	30 November '42	6 June '44
Major Edwin A. Bedell	7 June '44	26 November '44
Lt. Col. Edwin A. Bedell	27 November '44	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 307TH MEDICAL BATTALION (REDESIGNATED 307TH AIRBORNE

MEDICAL COMPANY ON 15 AUGUST, 1942).

Major Clifford Best	25 March '42	3 April '42
Lt. Col. Clifford Best	4 April '42	20 May '42
Major William E. Williams	21 May '42	6 July '42
Lt. Col. William E. Williams	7 July '42	14 August '42
Maj. Melcett L. Etienne	15 August '42	29 January '43
Capt. William H. Houston	30 January '43	2 March '43
Major William H. Houston	3 March '43	6 June '44 (KIA)
Capt. Jerry J. Belden	7 June '44	30 June '44
Major Jerry J. Belden	1 July '44	30 June '45
Capt. Hubert C. Stewart	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 407TH QUARTERMASTER BATTALION (REDESIGNATED 407TH AIRBORNE

QUARTERMASTER COMPANY ON 15 AUGUST, 1942).

Capt. Harold E. Rose	15 August '42	25 November '42
1st Lt. Samuel H. Mayes	26 November '42	24 March '43
Capt. Samuel H. Mayes	25 March '43	28 February '45
Capt. Edgar F. Brooks	1 March '45	23 June '45
Capt. Harold O. Karberly	24 June '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 762D AIRBORNE ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY (ACTIVATED ON

6 OCTOBER '42).

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
1st Lt. Lee B. Gatlin	6 October '42	31 October '42
1st Lt. Howard W. Crusey	1 November '42	22 November '42
1st Lt. William B. McGuire	22 November '42	20 January '43
Capt. William B. McGuire	21 January '43	8 May '43
1st Lt. Jeff Davis, Jr.	9 May '43	21 June '43
Capt. Jeff Davis, Jr.	22 June '43	16 April '45
1st Lt. John D. Leonard	17 April '45	30 June '45
1st Lt. Robert L. Feinsod	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D RECONNAISSANCE TROOP (INACTIVATED ON 15 AUGUST 1942)

Capt. John H. Swenson	25 March '42	14 August '42
-----------------------	--------------	---------------

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON (PROVISIONAL).

1st Lt. William C. Shreve	15 August '42	21 December '42
Capt. William C. Shreve	22 December '42	20 February '42
1st Lt. Roland M. Hudson	21 February '42	8 August '43
2d Lt. Joseph V. DeMasi	25 August '43	21 November '43
1st Lt. Joseph V. DeMasi	22 November '43	28 February '45

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON (ACTIVATED ON 1 MARCH 1945

1st Lt. Joseph V. DeMasi	1 March '45	30 June '45
1st Lt. Kenneth M. Palmer	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D SIGNAL COMPANY (REDESIGNATED 82D AIRBORNE SIGNAL COM-
PANY ON 15 AUGUST 1942).

1st Lt. Lester H. Clark	25 March '42	9 April '42
Capt. Lester H. Clark	10 April '42	5 August '42
1st Lt. Robert E. Furman	6 August '42	12 April '43
Capt. Robert E. Furman	13 April '43	16 July '44
1st Lt. Richard E. Nerf	17 July '44	16 October '44
Capt. Richard E. Nerf	17 October '44	30 June '45
1st Lt. Theodore M. Shema	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 82D DIVISION (REDESIGNATED HEADQUARTERS
COMPANY, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, ON 15 AUGUST, 1942)

Capt. Jean G. Callahan	25 March '42	7 April '42
Major Jean G. Callahan	8 April '42	13 August '42
Capt. John H. Swenson	14 August '42	13 September '42
Major John H. Swenson	14 September '42	20 February '43
Capt. William C. Shreve	21 February '43	2 August '43
Capt. Walter H. Chandler, Jr.	21 August '43	17 January '44
1st Lt. George J. Claussen	18 January '44	31 May '44
Capt. George J. Claussen	1 June '44	28 February '45
Capt. Robert B. Patterson	1 March '45	18 July '45
1st Lt. William L. Stanley	19 July '45	20 August '45
1st Lt. George C. Roberts	21 August '45	To Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMANDING OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 82D DIVISION ARTILLERY
(REDESIGNATED HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTERY, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

<u>ARTILLERY ON 15 AUGUST, 1942)</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Capt. John W. Smiley	25 March '42	6 June '42
1st Lt. Tony J. Raibl	7 June '42	6 July '42
Capt. Tony J. Raibl	7 July '42	30 June '45
Capt. James L. Lewis	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D MILITARY POLICE PLATOON (PART OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

COMPANY UNTIL ACTIVATED AS MILITARY POLICE PLATOON, 82D INFANTRY DIVISION ON

24 MAY '42. DISBANDED 15 AUGUST '42. ACTIVATED AS MILITARY POLICE PLATOON,

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION ON 8 SEPTEMBER '42).

Capt. William P. Bowden	25 March '42	20 October '42
1st Lt. Harold M. McLeod (Acting)	16 September '42	10 December '42
1st Lt. George E. Bankston	21 October '42	20 May '43
2d Lt. Jacob H. Sneiderman	21 May '43	16 November '43
1st Lt. Jacob H. Sneiderman	17 November '43	20 July '44
2d Lt. John J. McGillivary	21 July '44	10 November '44
1st Lt. John J. McGillivary	11 November '44	30 June '45
1st Lt. James P. Logan	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, PARACHUTE MAINTENANCE COMPANY (PROVISIONAL)

Capt. Albert G. Marin	1 November '43	1 June '44
Capt. James E. Griffin	2 June '44	28 February '45

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D PARACHUTE MAINTENANCE COMPANY (ACTIVATED 1 MARCH '45).

Capt. Wylie Cooper	1 March '45	To Date
--------------------	-------------	---------

COMMANDING OFFICER, SPECIAL TROOPS, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION (ACTIVATED 1 MARCH '45)

Major William H. Johnson	1 March '45	30 June '45
Lt. Col. Robert W. Johnson	1 July '45	To Date

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D INFANTRY DIVISION INFANTRY BAND (ACTIVATED 27 APRIL '42,

REDESIGNATED 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION INFANTRY BAND 15 AUGUST '42, REDESIGNATED 504TH

PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT BAND 6 JANUARY '43, INACTIVATED 1 MARCH '45).

WO (JG) Carl A. Moldenhauer	26 August '42	25 February '43
CWO Carl A. Moldenhauer	26 February '43	28 February '45

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY BAND (ACTIVATED 27 APRIL '42,

REDESIGNATED 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION ARTILLERY BAND 15 AUGUST '42, INACTIVATED 1

MARCH '45).

S/Sgt Ricardo Sodero	27 April '42	20 October '42
WO (JG) Wilbur H. Hall	21 October '42	19 March '44
CWO Wilbur H. Hall	20 March '44	28 February '45

COMMANDING OFFICER, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION BAND (ACTIVATED 1 MARCH '45)

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
CWO Carl A. Moldenhauer	1 March '45	30 June '45
CWO John T. Venettozzi	1 July '45	To Date

* * * * *

The Division Medical Supply Officer, 1st Lt. Arthur R. McAlpine, was supervising the storage of medical supplies at OUDJA, FRENCH MORROCCO, when he noticed a box that did not seem to belong with his supplies. Prying off the top, Lieutenant McAlpine discovered \$1,000,000 worth of 1,000-franc notes issued by a French bank in DAKAR. Several months later another box containing \$1,000,000 in francs was found among reserve Division supplies in BIZERTE, TUNISIA.

The two boxes were part of a huge shipment of new banknotes that were being shipped by an American banknote company to the French bank. Somehow a total of 19 of the boxes became mixed with American military supplies being shipped to CASABLANCA. All were ultimately recovered.

- - - - -

* * * * *

SECTION 6

ASSIGNMENTS, ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS

A. ASSIGNMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS OF DIVISION
OR UNITS TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

* * *

THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA)

European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA)

* * *

ARMY GROUPS

<u>ARMY GROUP</u>	<u>CAMPAIGNS</u>
12th Army Group (U.S.)	Ardennes and Central Europe
15th Army Group (U.S. & Br.)	Sicily, Italy (Naples-Foggia and Rome-Arno)
21st Army Group	Normandy, Holland, Ardennes Central Europe

* * *

ARMIES

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION</u>
First (U.S.)	Normandy, Ardennes
First Allied Airborne	England, France
First (Canadian)	Holland
Second (U.S.)	U.S.A.
Second (Br.)	Holland, Central Europe
Third (U.S.)	U.S.A.
Fifth (U.S.)	North Africa, Italy
Seventh (U.S.)	Sicily
Ninth (U.S.)	England, Central Europe (For Administration)
Fifteenth (U.S.)	Rhineland

CORPS

<u>CORPS</u>	<u>CAMPAIGN OR LOCATION</u>
I Armored Corps (U.S.)	North Africa
1st Airborne Corps (Br.)	Holland
II Corps (U.S.)	Sicily
Provisional Corps	Sicily
2d Corps (Canadian)	Holland
III Corps	Rhineland
IV Corps	U.S.A.
V Corps	Ardennes and Rhineland
VI Corps	Italy
VII Corps	Normandy
VIII Corps	Normandy, Ardennes
10th Corps (Br.)	Italy
12th Corps (Br.)	Central Europe
XV Corps (U.S.)	North Ireland
XVI Corps (U.S.)	France
XVIII Corps (Airborne) (U.S.)	Ardennes, Central Europe
XIX Corps (U.S.)	North Ireland
XXII Corps (U.S.)	Rhineland
30th Corps (Br.)	Holland

* * *

B. UNITS OF DIVISION ATTACHED TO OTHER HEADQUARTERS

SICILY 505th Parachute RCT to 1st Infantry Division (U.S.)

ITALY 325th Glider RCT, 504th and 505th Parachute RCTs to 36th Infantry Division (U.S.) on Salerno Beach-head.

325th Glider RCT, 504th Parachute RCT, 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion, and Batteries D, E, and F, 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion, to Ranger Task Force in Chiunzi Pass Sector.


505th Parachute RCT to 23d Armored Brigade (Br.)
South of Naples.

505th Parachute RCT to 23d Armored Brigade (Br.)
in Volturno River Sector.

504th Parachute RCT to 34th Infantry Division
(U.S.) and II Corps (U.S.) in Isernia and Venafro
Sectors.

504th Parachute RCT to 3d Infantry Division (U.S.)
on Anzio Beachhead.

HOLLAND 508th Parachute RCT to 30th Corps (Br.) north of
Waal River.

BELGIUM 505th Parachute RCT to V Corps in Hurtgen area.

C. UNITS ATTACHED TO THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

NORTH AFRICA

(Complete records of attachments in North Africa
are not currently available)

2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry

Engineer Co. (Cam)

334th Quartermaster Company (Depot)

SICILY

(Complete records of attachments in Sicily
are not currently available)

39th Regimental Combat Team

26th Field Artillery Battalion

34th Field Artillery Battalion

62d Field Artillery Battalion

77th Field Artillery Battalion

20th Engineer Battalion (C)

83d Chemical Battalion (4.2" Mortar)

ITALY

(Complete records of attachments in Italy
are not currently available)

3d Ranger Battalion (to 504th Parachute RCT)

Ghurka Battalion, British (to 504th Parachute RCT)

ENGLAND

Quartermaster Truck Company

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Airborne Brigade
(From 20 January 1944 to 27 August 1944)

507th Parachute Infantry (From 20 January 1944 to 27 August 1944)

508th Parachute Infantry (From 20 January 1944 to 30 March 1945)

NORMANDY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Troop B, 4th Cav Rcn Sqdn	1 June 1944	23 June 1944
87th Armd FA Bn	1 June 1944 14 June 1944	8 June 1944 8 July 1944
Co C, 746th Tk Bn	1 June 1944	11 June 1944
Co A, 746th Tk Bn	13 June 1944	21 June 1944
Co A, 712th Tk Bn	1 July 1944	8 July 1944
188th FA Bn	12 June 1944	8 July 1944
172d FA Bn	16 June 1944	19 June 1944
Co C, 899th TD Bn	1 June 1944	19 June 1944
Co A, 607th TD Bn	19 June 1944	4 July 1944
801 TD Bn	30 June 1944	1 July 1944
803 TD Bn	1 July 1944	8 July 1944
Co B, 87th Chem Mortar Bn	15 June 1944	21 June 1944
Co D, 86th Chem Mortar Bn	1 July 1944	4 July 1944
3809 QM Trk Co		
3810 QM Trk Co		
1st Plat 603d QM GR Co		
1 Plat, 464th Amb Co, 31st Med Gp.		
493d Collecting Co, 179th Med Bn.		
374th Collecting Co, 50th Med Bn.		
429th Litter Bearing Platoon		
591st Collecting Co		

HOLLAND


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Unit A, 50th Field Hosp	17 September 1944	
666th QM Trk Co	19 September 1944	
1st Coldstream Gds Armd Bn (Br.)	19 September 1944	22 September 1944
5th Coldstream Gds Inf Bn (Br.)	19 September 1944	22 September 1944
2d Irish Gds Bn (Br.)	19 September 1944	22 September 1944
Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry (Br.)	19 September 1944	10 October 1944
Royals Recce Bn (Br.)	19 September 1944	9 October 1944
Polish Precht Brigade	25 September 1944	30 September 1944
231st Brigade (Br.)	30 September 1944	1 October 1944
3d Gds Brigade (Br.)	30 September 1944	1 October 1944
5th Coldstream Gds Inf Bn (Br.)	30 September 1944	10 October 1944
79th FA Regt (Br.)	30 September 1944	2 October 1944
304th AT Btry (Br.)	30 September 1944	3 October 1944
506th Precht Inf	1 October 1944	3 October 1944
502d Precht Inf	3 October 1944	4 October 1944
130th Inf Brigade (Br.)	5 October 1944	6 October 1944
2d Gren Gds Bn (Br.)	6 October 1944	7 October 1944
13/18 Hussars	10 October 1944	10 November 1944

ARDENNES

Unit A, 50th Field Hosp.

666th QM Trk Co

Co C, 563d AAA AW Bn	18 December 1944	25 December 1944
CC "B", 9th Armd Div	23 December 1944	24 December 1944
Co B, 86th Cml Bn	25 December 1944	11 January 1945
254th FA Bn	20 December 1944	18 February 1945
551st Precht Inf Bn	25 December 1944	12 January 1945
703d TD Bn	20 December 1944	1 January 1945
591st FA Bn	20 December 1944	11 January 1945
740th Tk Bn	29 December 1944 27 January 1945	11 January 1945 5 February 1945



<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
628th TD Bn	1 January 1945	11 January 1945
517th Pzcht Inf	1 January 1945 1 February 1945	11 January 1945 4 February 1945
634th AAA Bn	5 February 1945	18 February 1945
887th Abn Engr Co	25 December 1944	12 January 1945
Co A, 87th Cml Bn	25 January 1945	5 February 1945
643d TD Bn	25 January 1945	31 January 1945
400th Armd FA Bn	25 January 1945	18 February 1945
32d Cav Ren Sqdn	28 January 1945	5 February 1945
629th TD Bn	31 January 1945	18 February 1945

CENTRAL EUROPE

341st Inf	4 April 1945	4 April 1945
417th FA Gp	4 April 1945	25 April 1945
746th FA Bn	4 April 1945	25 April 1945
672d FA Bn	4 April 1945	14 April 1945
541st FA Bn	4 April 1945	25 April 1945
805th FA Bn	4 April 1945	16 April 1945
546th FA Bn	11 April 1945	16 April 1945
790th FA Bn	10 April 1945	14 April 1945
74th Cml Gen Co	4 April 1945	21 April 1945
74th FA Bn	18 April 1945	25 April 1945
12th TD Gp (Hq only)	18 April 1945	25 April 1945
661st FA Bn	18 April 1945	25 April 1945
942d FA Bn	18 April 1945	25 April 1945
3d Co, 22d Belgian Fus Bn	21 April 1945	25 April 1945
294th FA Obs Bn	25 April 1945	25 April 1945
1130th Engr C Bn	25 April 1945	26 April 1945
280th FA Bn	27 April 1945	17 May 1945
580th AAA AW Bn	26 April 1945 23 May 1945	2 May 1945 5 June 1945
13th Infantry	28 April 1945	1 May 1945

[REDACTED]

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
43d FA Bn	28 April 1945	1 May 1945
604th TD Bn	28 April 1945	15 May 1945
Sqdn A, 4th Royals (Br.)	29 April 1945	2 May 1945
740th Tk Bn	29 April 1945	1 May 1945
644th TD Bn	29 April 1945	1 May 1945
Co A, 89th Cml Bn	29 April 1945	9 May 1945
121st Inf	30 April 1945	1 May 1945
56th FA Bn	30 April 1945	1 May 1945
Co C, 89th Cml Bn	30 April 1945	1 May 1945
CC "B", 7th Armd Div	1 May 1945	4 May 1945
205th FA Gp	3 May 1945	17 May 1945
207th FA Bn	3 May 1945	17 May 1945
768th FA Bn	3 May 1945	17 May 1945

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TEAMS ATTACHED
IN ETUSA

82D Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Interrogator Prisoner of War Team No. 40
Interrogator Prisoner of War Team No. 43
Interrogator Prisoner of War Team No. 45
Interrogator Prisoner of War Team No. 47
Military Intelligence Interpreter Team No. 412
Order of Battle Team No. 16
Photo Interpretation Team No. 3
Photo Interpretation Team No. 11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECTION 7
COMMAND POST LOCATIONS
OF THE
82D AIRBORNE DIVISION

<u>Date CP Opened</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Country</u>
25 March '42	Camp Claiborne, Louisiana	United States
02 October '42	Fort Bragg, North Carolina	United States
20 April '43	Camp Edwards, Massachusetts	United States
28 April '43	U.S. Transport George Washington, Staten Island, New York	United States
29 April '43	U. S. Transport George Washington	At Sea
<u>NORTH AFRICA</u>		
10 May '43	Camp Don B. Passage, Casablanca	French Morocco
12 May '43	Oudja	French Morocco (Part of Division camped in Algeria)
25 June '43	Kairouan	Tunisia
<u>SICILY</u>		
6 July '43	(Fwd) Aboard S.S. Monrovia	
10 July '43	(Fwd) Gela	Sicily
17 July '43	(Fwd) East of Agrigento	Sicily
18 July '43	(Fwd) Near Port Empedocle	Sicily
19 July '43	(Fwd) West of Montellegro	Sicily
19 July '43	(Fwd) West of Ribera	Sicily
20 July '43	(Fwd) Northeast of Sciacca	Sicily
21 July '43	(Fwd) S. Margherita	Sicily
23 July '43	(Fwd) Trapani	Sicily
19 August '43	Kairouan	Tunisia
(During period Forward CP was in Sicily the rear CP remained at Kairouan)		

ITALY

<u>Date CP Opened</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Country</u>
02 September '43	Bizerte	Tunisia
05 September '43	(Fwd) Licata	Sicily
18 September '43	(Fwd) Paestum	Italy
	(Rear) Termini	Sicily
	(Base) Comiso	Sicily
	(Rear Base No. 1) Bizerte	Tunisia
	(Rear Base No. 2) Kairouan	Tunisia
22 September '43	(Fwd) West of Castelcivita	Italy
26 September '43	Amalfi	Italy
27 September '43	(Fwd) Chiunzi Pass	Italy
29 September '43	Castellammare	Italy
1 October '43	Naples	Italy
19 November '43	U.S. Transport Funston	At Sea

UNITED KINGDOM

9 December '43	Castle Dawson	North Ireland
14 February '44	Braunstone Park, Leicester	England
6 June '44	(Fwd) West of Ste. Mere	
	Eglise	France
	(Base) Leicester	England

NORMANDY

14 June '44	(Fwd) Near Picaudville	France
15 June '44	(Fwd) North of Etienville	France
	(Rear) West of Etienville	France
17 June '44	(Fwd) East of St. Sauveur	
	Le Vicomte	France
	(Rear) West of Etienville	France
20 June '44	(Fwd & Rear) South of Etienville	France
2 July '44	(Fwd) Southwest of Etienville	
	(Rear) South of Etienville	France
5 July '44	(Fwd) Auvrairie	France
12 July '44	(Fwd & Rear) South of Etienville	France
13 July '44	Braunstone Park, Leicester	England

~~SECRET~~

<u>Date CP Opened</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Country</u>
---------------------------	--------------	----------------

HOLLAND

17 September '44	(Fwd) West of Groesbeek	Netherlands
24 September '44	(Fwd) South of Nijmegen	Netherlands
14 November '44	(Fwd & Base) Camp Sissonne	France

ARDENNES

18 December '44	(Fwd) Werbomont	Belgium
19 December '44	(Fwd) Habiemont (Rear) Werbomont	Belgium Belgium
21 December '44	(Fwd) Lierneux	Belgium
22 December '44	(Fwd & Rear) Bra	Belgium
24 December '44	(Fwd) Habiemont (Rear) Chateau de Ville	Belgium Belgium
27 December '44	(Rear) Chevron	Belgium
29 December '44	(Fwd & Rear) Chevron	Belgium
3 January '45	(Fwd) Bassebodeux	Belgium
5 January '45	(Fwd) Abrefontaine	Belgium
10 January '45	(Rear) Nonceveux	Belgium
11 January '45	(Fwd & Rear) Nonceveux	Belgium
25 January '45	(Fwd & Rear) Nonceveux (Main) Stavelot	Belgium Belgium
26 January '45	(Fwd) Hunnage	Belgium
28 January '45	(Fwd) Medell	Belgium
29 January '45	(Fwd) Wereth (Rear Fwd) Medell (Rear & Main) Stavelot	Belgium Belgium Belgium
30 January '45	(Fwd) Holzheim	Belgium
5 February '45	(Fwd) Vielsalm (Rear & Main) Stavelot	Belgium Belgium
8 February '45	(Fwd & Rear) Rott (Main) Stavelot	Germany Belgium
10 February '45	(Fwd) Hurtgen (Rear) Rott (Main) Stavelot (Base) Sissonne	Germany Germany Belgium France

<u>Date CP Opened</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Country</u>
18 February '45	(Fwd & Rear) Rott	Germany
19 February '45	(All CPs) Sissonne	France
<u>CENTRAL EUROPE</u>		
2 April '45	(Fwd) Weiden	Germany
27 April '45	(Fwd) Hohenzethen	Germany
	(Main) Weiden	Germany
29 April '45	(Fwd) Bleckede	Germany
30 April '45	(Advance) Wendischthun	Germany
	(Fwd & Rear) Bleckede	Germany
1 May '45	(Fwd) Nouhaus	Germany
	(Rear) Bleckede	Germany
2 May '45	(Advance) Ludwigslust	Germany
	(Fwd) Nouhaus	Germany
	(Rear) Bleckede	Germany
	(Main) Weiden	Germany
	(Base) Sissonne	France
3 May '45	(Fwd) Ludwigslust	Germany
	(Main) Weiden	Germany
15 May '45	(Fwd & Main) Ludwigslust	Germany
<u>POST - HOSTILITIES</u>		
1 June '45	Sissonne	France
15 June '45	Epinal	France
1 August '45	Berlin	Germany

* * * * *

At one time after the Italian campaign started troops of the 82d Airborne Division were fighting or camped at 17 different points in Italy, Sicily and North Africa. As late as 25 September 1943, troops of the Division were fighting or camped in the Calore River Valley and on Sele Beach, Sorrento Peninsula and the Isle D' Ischia in Italy; Termini and Comiso in Sicily, and Bizerte and Kairouan in North Africa.

* * * * *

ERRATA:

On page 108 the Medal of Honor listed for the GERMANY Campaign should be listed under the BELGIUM campaign.

On page 128 the 508th Parachute Infantry should be listed as attached to the 7th Armored Division in the St. Vith area.