Applying Doubly Labeled Transition Systems to the Refinement Paradox
Abstract
Possibilistic Security Properties are widely used in the development of high-assurance security models. However, while a model may possess a security property, an implementation of the model is not guaranteed to possess the property. The author argues that the choice of a framework, and its associated definition of refinement, is critical to ensure that an implementation maintains the security property. The author shows how to use the Doubly Labeled Transition Systems to reason about possibilistic security properties and refinement. He compares this framework to three other process algebra frameworks and shows how his framework and security model preserves the security of the largest class of systems. As a consequence of this framework, he shows how his security property links confidentiality to availability.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA439311
Entities
People
- David L. Bibighaus
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School