A Game-Theoretic Formulation of Multi-Agent Resource Allocation
Abstract
This paper considers resource allocation in a network with mobile agents competing for computational priority. We formulate this problem as a multi-agent game with the players being agents purchasing service from a common server. We show that there exists a computable Nash equilibrium when agents have perfect information into the future. We simulate a network of hosts and agents using our strategy to show that our resource-allocation mechanism effectively prioritize agents according to their endowments.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2005
- Accession Number
- ADA440183
Entities
People
- Cagri Imer
- Daniela L. Rus
- David Kotz
- Jonathan Bredin
- Rajiv T. Maheswaran
- Tamer Başar
Organizations
- Dartmouth College