Anwar Sadat's Statecraft and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
Abstract
Now is an important time for the American people to sharpen their knowledge of national security strategy in order to make rational choices. Should the US commit armed forces to support humanitarian assistance operations in Bosnia - Hercegovina? Should US military forces be involved in counter-drug operations? Which presidential candidate has articulated the better foreign policy? A knowledge of national security strategy helps us to answer these important questions. So how do we recognize a good strategy or an exceptional statesman? History provides many examples of strategies and statesmen that have triumphed and failed. Unfortunately the strategies and tools that worked for one statesman did not work for another. History does not furnish a magic formula for successful statecraft; national security strategy is situational in nature and an art in practice. But history does provide excellent examples that illuminate certain characteristics common to successful strategies. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the characteristics of a successful national security strategy and to suggest implications for national security strategy in general and American security strategy in particular. The statecraft of Anwar Sadat surrounding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is an excellent case for study. Who won the 1973 war? American popular opinion would most certainly select Israel. On the other hand, Arab popular opinion would declare Egypt as the principle victor. An understanding of Sadat's strategy will provide insights into successful statecraft and the answer to who won the 1973 war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 18, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA440541
Entities
People
- John F. Kalb
Organizations
- National War College