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ATTAINING REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE 21st CENTURY --
SECURITY THROUGH UNITED NATIONS MILITARY FORCE

The world was easy to understand in the eighties. They were over there and we were over here. Money was spent by both sides, all too easily, on weapons of both minimal and mass destruction. In retrospect, no one doubts that it was a more peaceable world, although certainly not more peaceful. More explicitly, the nations of the world, particularly those under communist influence, were more inclined to avoid internal conflict, albeit we still had an east-west confrontation that was anything but free of dissension. Today, without the "shelter" of Soviet authority, the lid has blown off all the pressure cookers. Bosnia is merely the beginning of civil unrest; small national conflicts on a large global scale seem to be our foreseeable future.

But what of the unforeseeable future? Boldly, what does the 21st century hold in store -- for intra-national conflict, for attaining and maintaining regional stability and for collective security?

This paper proposes a United Nations design for attaining regional stability and then offers in detail a United Nations military force, strongly supported by U.S. resolve, to compel

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that stability. Such a proposal is neither simplistic nor naive; regional stability can be achieved even in the most gruesome of territorial conflicts. Idealistic indeed, but why bother at all if world peace isn't our ultimate goal?

BACKGROUND

Global peace will be arduous to attain, but it is thinkable. "The interwoven ties of commerce, culture and shared values already bind the democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Established procedures insure that conflicts are resolved peacefully without recourse to violence."¹

And yet, every study, commission, think tank report or defense scenario shows conflicts and crises looming in the new world. "As the Middle East and Yugoslavia daily demonstrate, regional stability after the Cold War is largely shaped by essentially parochial concerns of an ethnic, religious, political, economic and social character."² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell adds, "Elimination of the threat of global conflict has not meant an end to conflict...The Cold War has given way to a new era of uncertainty and unrest."³

If this is true, the present-day approach to global peacekeeping is all wrong, in that it is too reactive to pending conflict. U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali realizes the after-the-fact performance of U.N. peacekeeping. In his presentation AGENDA FOR PEACE, he says; "United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established

after conflict has occurred."4 He discusses the United Nations network of early warning systems that has been developed to predict environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. He indicates a need, however, to strengthen these arrangements where a threat to peace exists. This is one approach, but it seems extremely timid in scope. The United Nations must focus on a long-term, all-encompassing attainment of regional stability. Once attained, then concern for maintaining this peace can follow.

Creating a plan for regional stability is useless unless there is global resolve to militarily back the plan and ensure its success. Conversely, having a standing United Nations military force without a long-term plan for regional stability is a gross misuse of resources without definite purpose.

ATTAINING REGIONAL STABILITY

The significance of the end of the cold war is now crystal clear. We have an opportunity to relieve pent-up pressures and allow long-term regional stability throughout the world. The United Nations should take their lead from the United States' "Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy".

"We can take advantage of the Cold War's end...to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges. With this focus we should work with our friends and allies to preclude the emergence of hostile, nondemocratic threats to our critical interests and to shape a more secure international environment."5

The operative concept for the U.N. is "preclude the emergence of hostile threats." President Clinton said it

clearly: "The key is to give the U.N. the tools to move in quickly to defuse tensions before they escalate".⁶ What are those tensions and what is the threat; what will cause one nation or people to make war against another? Today we see a resurgence of long-suppressed fights stemming from historical animosities, religious differences and ethnic rivalries. What will compel these nations or people to seek a different resolution, and not warfare?

As significant as religious, ethnic, or political differences may be, resolving disputed territorial boundaries seems paramount to future regional stability. Clausewitz said, "Modern wars are seldom fought without hatred between nations."⁷ But hatred comes from long disputed claims over who is the legitimate owner of a piece of land. Thus territory, or where nations or sovereign entities draw the lines, is the primary cause of legitimate war. One approach is an immediate United Nations referendum; a mandate to flush out, debate, and resolve territorial animosities.

THE MANDATE -- Borders 2000

It is time (and long overdue) to rethink the lines of national identity, particularly in previously Soviet dominated regions and those territories under colonial control during the past century.

Modern borders are a result of an evolution over the last 200 years, capped by the division of territory by the winning powers following World War II. Several agreements sanctioned

these borders, including the Yalta Treaty and the United Nations Charter. The borders of many now independent states of Sub-Saharan African were based on quite capricious lines drawn by their colonial "governments". These particular borders removed any common identity among religious, ethnic, or cultural groupings.⁸ Thus, globally we see random and arbitrary division of land and peoples, confined by unreasonable borders inconsistent with any historical or ethnic foundation. With recent world events allowing nations and peoples to question these borders as well as virtually the entire state system, Chester Crocker documents the result; "The short answer is that historic changes since 1989 have profoundly destabilized the previous existing order without replacing it with any recognizable or legitimate system. New vacuums are setting off new conflicts."⁹ What then can replace "the order"? Unequivocally, any endeavor will take a global mandate.

The nations of the earth must soon realize they cannot continue this escalation of regional conflicts, with only capricious international intervention. The United Nations must be pro-active in anticipating these conflicts by:

1. Convening a "Borders 2000" conference. Addressing border disputes through a near-term United Nations conference.
2. Having a systematic approach to geographically pre-determining potential border conflicts.
3. Using the International Court of Justice to coordinate research efforts on border disputes and then handle the actual adjudication.

4. Setting firm rules of engagement; negotiation only after weapons are put down. Incentivize peaceful settlement.
5. Specifying the end of this decade as the time limit for territorial petition. (This would also coincide with the United Nations Decade of International Law.)

It is absurd to conclude that with a "Borders 2000", any nation, any religious sect, any people locked in the territory of another nation, or anyone with any claim what-so-ever to any piece of property on the entire Earth could petition the United Nations for right of sovereignty to that property. And as Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, "if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace...would become ever more difficult to achieve."¹⁰ But the world community can't meekly sit and watch as nation after nation erupts with internal disorder.

Once the referendum is completed, new (and old) borders would get locked-in to preclude future regional conflicts. Therefore, any future border infringements would invite sanctioned U.N. forces to reestablish the new status quo.

In future years, any country desiring to change their border, or any "people" wanting to establish a separate nation, would need to petition the U.N. for sovereignty. Again, this could be easily facilitated through the International Court of Justice. If the world community concurs with the legitimacy of the request, negotiations would ensue peaceably.

This is not an end to regional conflicts. It doesn't even begin to address global problems like nuclear proliferation or environmental issues. It is a beginning to a rational, logical and methodical look at our world and makes a peaceful attempt at pre-emptive crisis resolution and border conflict or adjustment.

If nations refuse to accept the United Nations decree, military intervention will be required. Therefore, today's world needs an international police power to maintain stability, ensure security, and contain nationalistic tensions. (Three modern goals that are very similar to the original charter of the United Nations.)

It is clearly evident that no single nation wants to take-on (militarily, financially or politically), the responsibility of world policeman. Increasingly evident, and gaining political momentum, is the collective security concept of coalition forces. The United Nations has sanctioned military intervention in Iraq, Somalia, and now Bosnia, but has not actually led such forces. An obvious "one-step further" is a Global Peace Force under United Nations auspices.

UNITED NATIONS FORCES

HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

During the past 47 years, since the end of World War II, United Nations peacekeeping operations have taken place in virtually every region of the globe. The first was in 1956 when the U.N. established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to monitor the

disengagement of forces in the Suez War. In 1960, a coalition force was sent to the Belgian Congo to accomplish internal peace. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war saw U.N. peacekeepers in the Sinai and an observer force in the Golan Heights. During its first 42 years the United Nations established 13 separate peacekeeping operations. Many others have operated since 1987, and in fact, the U.N. has undertaken more missions in the last three years than in its first four decades. Additionally, the scope and variety of functions has grown, where "Peacekeeping today involves a complex mosaic of early warning and conflict control, mediation and forceful intervention, peacemaking and the traditional elements of peacekeeping (cease-fire, interposition, truce supervision, and monitoring through technical means)."11 A summary of current and proposed U.N. peacekeeping operations is at Table 1.

Historically, the U.S. has assigned military observers to several peacekeeping areas, while letting other (much smaller) nations send their soldiers to perform actual peacekeeping. With the vast increase in peace-involvement universally, those smaller nations are asking when will the U.S. send soldiers? United States involvement in Somalia definitely marks an incremental shift in U.S. commitment.

FUTURE COLLECTIVE SECURITY -- Ad Hoc, Standing By, or Permanent?

Future peace-engagement operations should not be jeopardized by the usual ad hoc approach of the past. "This ad hoc approach has often restricted the scope of U.N. peacekeeping missions, and sometimes delayed them to a point of near-disaster."¹²

STANDING BY FORCES

Internationally, there is wide and varied interest in some form of dedicated U.N. military force. In January 1992, at a Security Council meeting that included heads of state, French President Francois Mitterand concurred with increased U.N. involvement. His offer to make available on a two-day notice a contingent of one thousand troops for peacekeeping operations, could be doubled within a week. Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested considering a global defense system, using the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and Russian high technology. Also, his idea for Russia to participate in a pan-European collective security system was discussed heavily in meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Notably, China was opposed to U.N. interference in the internal affairs of other countries. But even with some disagreement, the "balance of opinion in the Security Council seems to be swinging toward greater preparedness to intervene in domestic conflicts, especially when they threaten the stability of neighboring states or involve gross human rights violations."¹³

In the United States, Senators Boren (D,Okla) and Biden (D,Del) favor a three-tier force. The first tier would have a

permanent U.N. command over a small ready-reaction force of a few pre-designated units. The second tier would be a rapid deployment force of ten to forty thousand troops that could be transferred from national militaries to a U.N. command on very short notice. The third tier would be the large-scale force under a unified U.N. command able to mount a major military action. President Clinton thinks "we should explore the possibility of creating a standby, voluntary United Nations rapid deployment force to deter aggression against small states and to protect humanitarian relief shipments."

PERMANENT STANDING FORCE

Where is all this heading? Devout supporters of multinational collective security see a permanent standing force under a United Nations flag. Ideas on manpower and structure differ widely. One idea has all nations training and equipping their soldiers as for any national military service, and the volunteer simply gets tasked to serve a tour with this global force. An alternative option lets countries pre-designate military units and then provides those units with any essential specialized training. These pre-designated forces could then be "packaged" per U.N. request. Another idea favors nation states sending fully trained and logistically supported troops to serve for the duration of their enlistment in a U.N. force. Still another plans for money and equipment going directly to the U.N. and they hire their own troops; U.N. specific bases would train, organize, and equip after the recruit shows for duty. This plan

also includes permanent bases designated as United Nations installations. (The U.N. could utilize closed-down military bases all over Europe, Russia or America.)

There is no doubt that collective security has finally come of age. But the leap from ad-hoc, coalition forces to a standing-by force, as presented by Boutros-Ghali or even further to a permanent standing force needs to come incrementally, after careful and serious debate. The end result could be a totally independent stand-alone fighting force that can go in when directed by the U.N. Security Council.

This concept of some sort of increased United Nations military efforts has produced valid arguments for and against. A non-prioritized list of PROS and CONS follows.

PROS:

1. A standing military force under United Nations control and direction will alleviate the concern by U.N. members of putting too much power in the hands of one country. The Gulf War, involving Chapter VII actions, was a successful application of multilateral intervention. But the U.S. predominant play in that military campaign has led U.N. members to oppose putting that much sanctioned power in the hands of such a major power.¹⁴
2. It should eliminate any negative stigma (both abroad and at home) of always sending in American troops.
3. It would enjoy international sanction; the world community could rally in support with sufficient troops and money.
4. Eventually, once this force was trained, organized and equipped, it would be able to enforce peace better than a

superpower acting unilaterally. The U.N. force won't need absolute reasons to intervene, such as presently required for superpower intervention.

5. "The notion of intervention by a multinational force under a U.N. flag and command is a politically attractive way of spreading the risk among several or more countries".¹⁵

6. This is a rapid response stabilizer. It would be a known quantity, with a renown capability.

7. Over time, United Nations military forces co-existing to serve world peace would develop common bonds and thus be an even greater "stabilizing" force. Interaction among nations leads to greater understanding which equals a greater propensity for peaceful conflict resolution.

8. The U.S. military could now exist solely to defend U.S. vital interests. Regional conflicts will demand response, and we will contribute money, manpower and technology to the U.N. global peace force. The U.S. military can be streamlined to only meet existing threats to vital interests.

9. This force will be all-volunteer, and openly recruited as such. The U.S. military's success in attaining its "quality force" is a direct result of an all-volunteer policy. Also, as pertains to allegiance, how can we ask American soldiers that have sworn to serve and protect their country, to now risk their lives protecting some other nation AND do so under the flag of an international force, not the American flag.

CONS:

1. Too much potential centralized power in the "out years" for

global domination. The difference with having America as a super power is we want global influence, not global domination.

Can a scenario exist where the U.N. standing force is the enemy of the U.S.?

2. Political chaos within the United Nations. "(Today in the U.N.) there is little agreement on whether the U.N. should get involved in nontraditional conflicts such as ethnic or religious strife or in civil wars, (and) there is even less consensus about the allowable limits of force that the international community may employ in pursuit of its stated objectives..."¹⁶

3. Will the United Nations be able to make decisions? The failure of the Security Council to agree on priorities is legend. And any peace enforcement operation would be subject to Chinese and Russian Security Council vetos.

4. It would attract too many third world soldiers, because they make more income from this job than back home. Any quality U.N. force starts with quality input; educated, experienced, literate.

5. There is a real difference in human rights tolerance by some less developed nations; even with U.S. allies, the "sensitivity" level may not equal that of the U.S. It may prove unacceptable to have these nations provide military leaders in charge of "our" soldiers and use a disturbing level of discipline.

6. Smaller countries may be extremely suspicious of this type of universal force and see it as a way for the U.S. to pry into their internal affairs.

7. United States forces would be "special targets because of fear and resentment of our superpower domination."¹⁷

8. The unwillingness of the United States to relinquish any perceived power or influence in world events.

CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

POLITICAL

Much has been said about increased military peace-enforcement actions infringing on state sovereignty; that the sanctity of each nation must be preserved, therefore the U.N. has no business getting involved. But what of the "humanitarian" reasons, or when a situation inside the borders of a failed state appear tragic and inhuman? Secretary General Boutros-Ghali favors the humanitarian position. He noted in his June 1991 report to the Security Council that, "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; its theory was never matched by reality." He also favored a "balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world."¹⁸

ECONOMIC

It is hard to determine just how high the costs of peace enforcement might go. The facts show a \$364 million budget in 1987, \$1.4 billion spent in 1992, and an expected bill of \$3.6 billion this year.¹⁹ A recent panel of financial experts commissioned to review the U.N. finances at the start of the post-cold war recommends that "governments charge their

peacekeeping dues to their national military budgets and the United Nations set up a unified peacekeeping budget financed by a single annual assessment on member governments, backed by a \$400 million revolving fund to pay start-up costs."20

A staggering comparison to previous peacekeeping budgets is seen in world-wide national defense, where expenditures at the end of the last decade had approached \$1 trillion a year, or \$2 million per minute. 21 As the financial panel reported, for every dollar the United States contributed to U.N. peacekeeping, it spent \$2,016 on its own national defense. Obviously with the projected increase expected in U.N. military involvement over the next few years, this limited financing must change. A promising start is the projected 1994 Defense Budget released by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on 26 March, 1993. For the first time a separate line-item of \$398 million is added specifically for U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.22

The percentage amount given for U.N. military actions could also be incrementally increased based on expected outcomes versus actual results. In other words, a certain going-in amount needs to be established. Then, based on how effective U.N. operations become, the percentage would be increased annually, and be a real incentive to the U.N. organization to get it right; fraud, waste and abuse being another global condemnation of the United Nation.

In the long run this could become less expensive for all countries who feel required to maintain large military forces. Britain, Germany, France, Russia, (China?); all could reduce their spending levels while contributing towards the standing

force, and stop these continual ad hoc coalition-type force expenditures that are certain to germinate over the next decade.

DIFFICULT ANALYSIS -- Issues and Tough Questions

The idea of a U.N. standing military force has been discussed and rejected before, most notably by the United States in the U.S. Disarmament Plan of 1962. 23 The issues and questions raised by this plan over thirty years ago are still valid and warrant consideration. For today's debate, the most relevant questions requiring attention are:

1. Who sets priorities? How does the Security Council determine when and where to intervene? (A clear-cut framework and criteria for intervention at the various levels of "peace-keeping" must be established. Paralleling this criteria would be a listing of the United Nations military capabilities. The decision to involve U.N. military forces could easily and unemotionally be made. At present, the Security Council determines "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." Any new framework would only be an extension of this practice).
2. Will the Military Staff Committee (MSC) control operations or merely interface with any U.N. military force? (Of all the areas considering an "incremental" involvement, this seems the most logical. Article 47 of the U.N. Charter already provides for establishment of the MSC, "to advise and assist the security Council on all questions of ... military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of

armaments, and possible disarmaments."24 The competence and capability of the MSC will not generate over-night; in the interim it will rely on leadership from NATO or the United States. Whether the Military Staff Committee ever totally runs an operation will result from proven, not potential leadership ability).

3. How should this force be commanded and controlled? (The question of actual pre-determined command and control is not as important as first developing common procedures, planning, training and doctrine, that would then become the basis for effective command and control. Avoid the temptation to use the Gulf War's command and control structure. Although highly successful, the variables -- location, make-up of coalition forces, political resolve, and likelihood of U.S. involvement and leadership -- are too unpredictable. Also, it is no secret that the United States has never placed its soldiers under the carte blanche command of other nations. This may be changing as the United States withdraws from Somalia, leaving up to 5,000 troops as part of a multinational force, commanded by a Turkish Army general).

4. With such a high number of potential contributors, does the issue of interoperability (personnel and equipment) become too limiting? (During the cold war, NATO troops routinely trained and exercised, ensuring highly standardized doctrine -- strategy and tactics. This routine has been broken; we aren't as involved as during the cold war, and without a clear mutual enemy precipitating joint military exchange, a decreased coalition in

strategy and tactics may result. United Nations forces, properly trained and exercised, could maintain standardized doctrine and actually increase interoperability).

5. What would be the force's political makeup; actual troop strength contributed by each nation? (The United Nations peacemaking force (UNPF) will give the U.N. credible standing military power to enforce world order. Actual troop strength would be pre-negotiated, as well as ground, air, naval, and general support components. The total number would vary, with approximately 20,000 a proposed strength).

6. Who would train, organize and equip such a force, and where would they be located? (Training for United Nations military observers, staff officers, logisticians and infantry is presently done by a handful of countries. The Nordic countries have the most highly coordinated system, with training programs and identified military units. Canada has a dedicated and trained standby brigade. Austria, Malaysia, Poland, and Switzerland also have national training programs.²⁵ Additionally, former President Bush suggested Fort Dix, N.J. as a potential site for multinational training and field exercises. As for equipment, member states would at first designate resources necessary to meet predetermined needs. Eventually, the United Nations force would maintain its own stockpiles of required supplies).

7. What weapons should the force have, and what mixture of sea, air, and ground forces? (We can't use past paradigms to gage what a U.N. force should possess. Determining weapons and force mix can only be accomplished after we determine the scope of

military operations. The United States has already pledged to work with the United Nations to best employ its vast lift, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to support peacekeeping operations).

8. Should it have nuclear weapons? (The general consensus is no, the United Nations would not own any nuclear weapons. But arrangements could be solidified to contract nuclear force from the United States, if necessary, to balance that threat).

9. What military law will regulate troop discipline? (The U.S. Code of Military Justice is the only military law acceptable to the United States. Since U.S. support is critical in creating any U.N. military force, this area seems closed to debate, although all countries will need to agree).

10. Once started, when will an operation be deemed too-tough for U.N. military forces to handle? (This is a critical question. Challenges such as those seen in Bosnia appear to hypnotize otherwise logical thinkers into a web of ever-escalating involvement. The Vietnam-syndrome remains a lesson. Valid military commitment criteria must be established using realistic U.N. capabilities).

As addressed by former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, "If the international community tries too many operations at once, all of them may fail for lack of adequate support." This is true, but none of these questions moves a U.N. standing military into the too-tough-to-do category. They are simply challenges for competent nations and effective leadership.

LEADERSHIP AND EFFECTIVENESS

The U.N. undersecretary general for peacekeeping activities, Marrack Goulding, remarks, "No one has advanced any widely acceptable ideas about how to move from traditional peacekeeping at one end of the scale and peace enforcement at the other."²⁶

Who then will take the lead? It seems as if the United States is waiting for an invitation to steer the course in formulating plans for peace enforcement. Why this hesitancy, when there is no other country with such a vast network and influence to pull it all together? Taking on this responsibility doesn't necessarily indicate total American approval. But how can the U.S. decide without first seeing the tactics, techniques and procedures, and addressing the issues and answering those questions previously posed.

The most obvious question -- will it work and can it be effective? Success with a military alliance in NATO says yes. Success with coalition forces in Kuwait says yes. Approached the correct way, and given the right incentives, every country will want to contribute. Why do the Eastern European countries want to join NATO and the European Community? Because they will get more than they give. The same argument can be made about the United Nations and a standing military force.

UNITED STATES RESPONSE

Former President Bush's vision described a New World Order:

"The New World Order does not mean surrendering our sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all,

to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment to a set of principles that undergird our relations - peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of peoples."27

Is it possible to be the world's only super power and at the same time NOT be the world's policeman? America has vital interests: defense of our nation, American welfare and prosperity, free-market world economy, maintenance of democratic ideals (both home and abroad). Regional conflicts may or may not pose a threat to those vital interests; and if not, U.S. military combat forces should not be used. However, it is still in America's interests to promote regional stability, therefore, supporting a U.N. peace force serves U.S. purposes extremely well. The U.S. would not have to play world policeman, yet regional conflicts would be alleviated. And as alluded to in the PRO argument, the U.S. military should never lose sight of its primary focus: defense of its vital interests.

As with any "threat-based" military, assessment of threats to our vital interests is paramount. Ideally, there can be a U.N. international force to go in and "police" tough neighborhoods. But what is the balance to that force gone awry? To put a global military force in the hands of a few persons is equal to Hitler winning. Therefore, this international force must be balanced by the United States: a universally recognized and undisputed effective power.

The U.S. has refined, tested and technologically advanced every spectrum of conflict from the lowest of low-intensity to cruise missiles, nuclear submarines and stealth fighters. U.S.

employment policy of study first, then act only with massive firepower with measurable and very attainable outcomes was the modus operandi of the American military. Who can argue with the success of a DESERT STORM? In that conflict, to use a Ross Perot axiom, "we measured it twice and then cut only once". Once was enough. All this is good advice for a future U.N. global peace force; don't start military actions with a loosing attitude and inferior odds.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The 90's seems to be a transition decade, full of opportunity for political endeavor and peacemaking experiment. But the question remains, who will take the lead? The United States would show true resolve with these actions:

1. Pay our debt to the United Nations.
2. For starters, increase our monetary input for a U.N. military peace force; we would still be well over the 2000:1 dollar ratio of national defense versus peacekeeping budget.
3. Increase our influence in the United Nations at a more regional "grass-roots" level. One approach -- use America's vast talents of leadership starting with the five ex-presidents of the United States. Each one could be appointed as a special ambassador to the U.N. for a specific region. Based on the five present or future regional hotspots in the world, President Richard Nixon would cover China and the Far

East; President Gerald Ford would cover the Americas; President Jimmy Carter would be assigned Africa; President Ronald Reagon would cover Russia; and President George Bush would be assigned all of Europe. Their actual involvement may be limited, but the stature of the name and residual influence each maintains would contribute greatly to getting things done.

4. Intervention, not isolation! Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney emphasized, "The world remains unpredictable and well-armed, causes for conflict persist, and we have not eliminated age-old temptations for nondemocratic powers to turn to force or intimidation to achieve their ends. We must not stand back and allow a new global threat to emerge or leave a vacuum in a region critical to our interests."28
5. Offer to host in 1994, a U.N. conference with overhaul of the entire U.N. military structure and proposals on a standing U.N. military force as its agenda; a "Global Forces '94". This would set in motion follow-up multi-national planning sessions to formulate specific details. Major players would be Canada and the Nordic Countries; nations with a long history of demonstrated capability in multinational military operations.
6. Standardize peace-engagement doctrine. Any debate about standing U.N. military forces must initially begin with a complete and universally agreed upon

"peace-engagement" doctrine. There is a virtual medley of peace-engagement designations and definitions, as is evident in published articles and conversation among military professionals. This hazy reference to many assortments of peace-whatever is confusing. The word peacekeeping itself has become blurred by "overexposure". "In addition to its institutionally accepted meaning, it is now being used loosely to describe military activities which lay beyond its strictly defined U.N. parameters."29

7. Support a "Borders 2000" approach to regional conflict resolution.

CONCLUSIONS

The nations of this earth cannot continue a poorly thought-out, reactive approach to the massive border disputes lurking just around the corner. In the years ahead, no one doubts the world situation will become more complex and less manageable, as powerful regional actors continue to alter the face of international politics. Tomorrow will bring dozens of additional conflicts about regional borders, most dating back centuries, and all having the deepest of nationalistic associations on each side of the dispute. The U.N. should react to regional conflicts before they become a threat and fill the role of international manager. The United States can be the senior partner in this international system, but not the world policeman.

America cannot afford to take an isolationist approach to this myriad of international crises. Peace at home and the urgency of rebuilding and strengthening our society also necessitates peace abroad and cooperation among all nations.³⁰ It is in U.S. interest to get involved; there is an obligation to effect any peace. There are definitive advantages to a standing United Nations peacekeeping/peacemaking force; a dedicated, trained, international force under U.N. security council control to mandate regional conflicts and have a globalist vision for future world peace well into the next century.

We must not get support for a U.N. standing force confused with decreased U.S. military capability. Quite the contrary. America must continue its superpower status and maintain the ability to compel an opponent with an early use of diplomatic and military options.³¹

This paper has delivered both sides of the debate. It covers a fascinating subject, as it should; these are fascinating and challenging times. The U.S. can creep into the peacemaking arena and merely respond to others' ideas, or it can boldly take the lead and ensure a solid foundation for a global peace force. With whatever type of United Nations military force that evolves -- peacekeeping-peacemaking-peace enforcing -- we still must attempt to "measure it twice".

UN Peacekeeping Operations

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TABLE 1

Responsibility
 B = military buffer
 E = election monitoring
 H = human rights monitoring
 O = observe cease-fire only
 P = civilian police guard force

Current Forces		
	Current (Projected Maximum) Strength	UN Estimate of 1992 Cost (million US \$)
UNTSO (Palestine) (O)	295	24
UNDOF (Israel/Syria) (B)	1,300	41
UNIFIL (Lebanon) (B)	5,800	151
UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan) (O)	36	4
UNFICYP (Cyprus) (B)	2,125	30
UNAVEM II (Angola) (B,E)	865	84
ONUSAL (El Salvador) (O,H)	635 (1,004)	53
UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait) (B)	1,440	121
MINURSO (Western Sahara) (B,E)	494 (2,900)	59
UNTAC (Cambodia) (B,E,H)	20,000 (28,000)	1,900
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia) (B,H)	14,896 (21,000)	700
UNOSOM (Somalia) (H,P)	550 (3,550)	250

Proposed Forces

	Likelihood UN Will Seriously Consider Sending Force During 1993	CIA Estimate of Proposed Strength
Bosnia (B)	High	20,000-50,000
Sri Lanka (O)	Low	500-1,000
Solomon Islands (O)	Moderate	10-20
Haiti (O,E)	Low	1,000-2,000
Sudan (B)	Moderate	5,000-10,000
Liberia (O)	Low	40-50
Eritrea (E)	High	200-300
Somalia (B)	Moderate	10,000
South Africa (E,O)	High	200-300
Mozambique (B,E,H,P)	High	2,500-3,000
Tajikistan (O)	Moderate	40-50
Moldova (O)	High	40-50
Georgia (Abkhazia) (O)	Moderate	10-20
Nagorno-Karabakh (B)	Low	5,000-10,000

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