Dien Bien Phu 1954, TET Offensive 1968, and Clausewitz: An Analysis

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive of 1968 by the author, a student at the National War College. The analysis is in response to a request by President Lyndon B. Johnson to get some clarification on any linkage between Dien Bien Phu and the TET Offensive, and the role of Carl von Clausewitz's theories in explaining the two battles. The result is a comparative analysis between the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the TET Offensive of 1968 in South Vietnam. On the tactical level of war the two operations could not be more dissimilar. The former was an outright tactical defeat of a French strong point by the Vietminh, while the latter was a defeat of a large number of South Vietnamese Communists by U.S. Forces. However, it is on the strategic level of war, in support of strategic national policy formulation and execution, that the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and TET 68 merge.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1995
Accession Number
ADA440684

Entities

People

  • John R. Combs

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Artillery
  • Center Of Gravity
  • Communists
  • Governments
  • Information Operations
  • Military Operations
  • Military Strategy
  • National Security
  • New York
  • North Vietnam
  • Security
  • South Vietnam
  • United States
  • Universities
  • Vietnam
  • War
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies