The Battle for Okinawa: A Direct Approach for Direct Defeat
Abstract
Throughout the fall of 1944 and early spring of 1945, the Japanese defenders of Okinawa prepared a defensive battle strategy that resulted in Japanese defeat and the most casualties for both forces in any single battle of the Pacific Campaign. Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, Commander of the Thirty-second Army defending Okinawa, formulated a direct approach strategy based on defensive positions strategically situated to confront head-on the brunt of the Allies' main attack. This approach aimed at prolonging each action to the utmost, while inflicting maximum casualties. The result would be the defeat of Allied forces through Japanese will power and Allied attrition. Applying Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart's theory of the Indirect Approach, this paper examines the Japanese defensive plan in terms of Lt. General Ushijima's failure to develop a scheme of battle based upon the enemy's strategy and disposition of forces. It will specifically examine the Thirty-second Army's plan for concentration of forces -- as well as the absence of maneuver and surprise -- in view of Hart's concepts of dispersion of forces, dissolution, and diminished resistance fighting. To systematically analyze each area, the author discusses a thesis (Hart's concept), antithesis (Japanese plan), and synthesis (Lt. General Ushijima's plan, using Hart's theory). Before examining Hart's theory, he will briefly discuss each force's strategic plan, and its place in the overall context of the war in the Pacific.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA440685
Entities
People
- Terry Robling
Organizations
- National War College