National Security Decision-Making and Electoral Politics: The Case of the 1992 Sale of F-16s to Taiwan
Abstract
This paper applies Graham Allison's bureaucratic paradigm to the Bush administration's 1992 sale of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan and, in so doing, attempts to illustrate the model's utility as well as its limitations in explaining the national security decision-making process. The National Security Council (NSC) staff, Defense Department, and State Department were split over the proposed sale -- a reflection of the differing policy preferences and organizational perspectives of the players from those agencies. But these interagency deliberations, on which the bureaucratic model focuses its analysis, had little impact on the President's decision. Instead, as this paper will argue, electoral considerations, specifically, the perceived political consequences of large-scale worker lay-offs at the F-16 production facility in Texas, a key state for George Bush's reelection campaign, were decisive in leading the President to approve the fighter sale. The F-16 sale, which was preceded by intense lobbying by the plane's manufacturer and members of Congress, demonstrates that the context of national security decision-making is broader than the executive branch bureaucracy, and that domestic political and economic factors often intervene in the process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA440774
Entities
People
- John J. Norris Jr.
Organizations
- National War College