URGENT FURY: Rational Action or Bureaucratic Politics Run Amok?
Abstract
As Americans observe their nation's humanitarian intervention in Somalia and listen to an accelerating drumbeat for armed entry into the even uglier ethnic warfare of Bosnia, they naturally grope for sone sense of national interest in these evolving tragedies. As several recent lecturers at the National War College have commented, these sorts of ill-defined nasty little wars may well absorb the energies of the United . Nations, regional alliances such as NATO, and individual nations for the next several decades As the policy debate expands in coming weeks and months, it will prove useful to examine past United States' interventions to identify criteria for employment of armed force. While any number of armed excursions come to mind, the October 1983 invasion of Grenada offers a particularly useful set of starkly contrasting arguments about American projection of combat power into developing nations. Operation URGENT FURY came in the midst of the Reagan administration's massive military rebuilding and proved a clear test of the Reagan Doctrine that espoused a willingness to actively support reversal of communist revolutions, especially in the western hemisphere. URGENT FURY is also an appropriate case study because it occurred after passage of hotly contested War Powers Resolution and the equally controversial establishment of Congressional oversight of the intelligence community.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 18, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA440813
Entities
People
- Dan Challis
Organizations
- National War College