The TFX Decision: The Joint Canard

Abstract

In the early 1960's the United States needed replacement aircraft designs for both the Air Force and the Navy. The TFX (to become the F-111) was born and for some time struggled through a difficult development, testing and evaluation and combat periods before the Navy version of the aircraft was terminated and the total Air Force buy was considerably reduced. Why did a project with so much promise to provide a joint, reliable and cost-saving aircraft fail to achieve any of these three objectives? The answer lies in the understanding of the organizational paradigms and bureaucratic politics that influenced and guided the behavior of the competing organizations (Department of Defense, Contractor and Congress) that were ostensively working as a team to produce a product. This paper will show how the TFX aircraft was seriously impeded from any measure of success by conflicting organizational goals and political actions.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 18, 1992
Accession Number
ADA440831

Entities

People

  • Gerald L. Talbot Jr.

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircraft Design
  • Aircrafts
  • Assembly Lines
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Corporations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Fighter Aircraft
  • Governments
  • Judgment
  • National Security
  • New York
  • Organizational Structure
  • Systems Analysis
  • Tactical Air Support
  • United States

Readers

  • Life Cycle Cost Analysis
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Team-Based Human-Centered Cognitive Task Decision Making and Information Performance.