Bureaucratic Political Decision Making: The Acquisition of Joint STARS
Abstract
This paper examines bureaucratic political decision making, defined by Graham T. Allison as different players bargaining along regularized circuits from which a particular course of action or result emerges that is distinct from what any of the players originally sought. The decisions examined were made during the acquisition of the Air force and Army's Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). As methodology, the paper will test three theses that correspond with critical phases of the system's life span, comparing the actions of the predominate players in the decision making process: Congress, the Air Force, and Grumman Corporation, the Joint STARS primary contractor. The first thesis tested is that the Air Force fully supported the Joint STARS program and fought to keep Congress from cutting funding between 1985 and 1990. The second is that the Air Force's decision to send the system to the Gulf War was an effort to save the program from future funding cuts. The third thesis is that once the system had proven itself in combat, funding for full production was virtually assured. Before discussing each thesis, however, the author provides information on the system's background. The examination shows that, individually, the decisions of each player -- Congress, the Air Force, and Grumman Corporation -- can be viewed in terms of Allison's Rational Actor and Organizational Process models. However, when the decision making process of each thesis is studied in the context of various players' bargaining and maneuvering along the same circuit, then Allison's model of bureaucratic politics emerges. In the end, the Joint STARS acquisition decisions produced a different result than any of the players originally sought.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 17, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA440993
Entities
People
- Lynn Wills
Organizations
- National War College