Marrying Force with Diplomacy in the Former Yugoslavia: What Went Wrong, Where to Next
Abstract
Central to the Clinton administration's efforts to grapple with the tragic and destabilizing consequences of Yugoslavia's disintegration has been the concept of marrying force with diplomacy. In contrast to the Bush administration's calculated "leave it to the Europeans" strategy, the Clinton administration undertook efforts to marshal Western military power toward three distinct aims: relieving suffering, containing the conflict, and promoting a negotiated settlement. The U.S. was doing so not just for humanitarian reasons, but because distinct U.S. interests were at stake. Just a year later, the marriage between force and diplomacy in U.S. Balkan policy had unraveled. Despite limited pressure from Serbian leader Milosevic on his Bosnian Serb proxies intended to ease international sanctions on Serbia, both Bosnian Serb militants and "Krajina" Serbs in Croatia continued to rebuff U.S.-proposed diplomatic settlements. Seen as a paper tiger, the United States had lost influence with foes and friends: U.S. fighters patrolling Bosnian skies proved incapable of deterring brazen violations of the no-fly zone; Bosnian Serb forces resumed periodic shelling of Sarajevo and other "safe zones"; Serbia shipped weapons to allies in Croatia and Bosnia, despite international monitoring of its borders; Bosnian President Izetbegovic strengthened ties to Iran to obtain arms; Croatian President Tudjman engaged in dangerous brinkmanship over renewal of the UN peacekeeping mandate in Croatia, backing down only under extreme pressure from the United States and Germany; despite the preventive deployment of U.S. peacekeepers to Macedonia, the threat of a Balkan spillover increased as ethnic tensions within Macedonia rose. What went wrong? Can the damage between diplomacy and force be saved? Should it be saved, and if so, on what terms? This paper examines these questions, considering how deficiencies in overall U.S. Balkan policy impeded the effective use of military force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 10, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA441039
Entities
People
- James W. Swigert
Organizations
- National War College