The ABM Treaty and TMD: Scylla and Charybdis of US Defense Policy
Abstract
Misapplication of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has presented the United States with the predicament of having to choose between accepting continued defenselessness against theater missile threats on the one hand, and jeopardizing the START reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals on the other. This analysis focuses on the issues in addressing regional and theater threats, which are very likely to confront the United States and its interests, versus addressing strategic threats, which are less probable but which jeopardize U S. national existence if manifested. The analysis also treats the concept of arms control as an instrument of defense strategy and its tradeoffs with direct active military defense programs. The current state of play is examined and a prescription is offered for reconciling the competing interests. The author suggests that, instead of rushing to raise theoretical and legal debates in Geneva to protect the letter of the obsolete ABM Treaty, the United States should proceed quietly with the business of acquiring theater defenses. The ABM Treaty does not merit fixing for its own sake and U.S. programs do it no violence in any case. As a symbol, it is a helpful means to the ends of START, but as a symbol it is hurt more than helped by legalistic diplomatic wrangling. Rather than indulge in theoretical debate over hypothetical circumventions that can never be satisfactorily responded to, the United States should pursue concrete actions toward compliant programs and be prepared to answer such legitimate inquiries or objections as may arise.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA441053
Entities
People
- Carol C. Morehouse
Organizations
- National War College