The Case for Strategic Attack
Abstract
Since its very inception, the concept of strategic aerial attack has been exceedingly contentious. Strategic attack-or strategic bombardment, as it was known in earlier days--was originally conceived by early air power theorists as an independent, war-winning means of destroying an enemy's will to fight. Later, more refined concepts advocated decisive aerial destruction of the enemy's industrial base, or capability to resist. Today, most contemporary theories emphasize the "paralyzation" or coercion of enemy leadership2, while "strategic attack" is defined officially as: Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systemic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. (Joint Pub 1-02)3 Regardless of the particular theory, on the surface they all seemed to offer a relatively "quick and easy" means to victory. Unfortunately, at least until the Gulf War, performance generally failed to match promise. While air power played an "occasionally spectacular, increasingly important"4 role in war, in no case did it provide the swift and certain victory promised. Applied strategically, air power appeared to be a far more blunt instrument than its advocates hoped, the will of target populations and the resilience of enemy industries much stronger than predicted.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA441100
Entities
People
- Richard P. King
Organizations
- National War College