The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dilemma: Are Nuclear Ambiguity and Crisis Stability Compatible

Abstract

Current U.S. non-proliferation policy In South Asia seeks to cap Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs short of open deployments and then, over time, roll back and eventually eliminate them. Given our temporary acquiescence to nuclear proliferation in the region, our immediate objective should be to help achieve a form of stable nuclear deterrence between the two countries. Thus, the chief challenge of this essay is to determine whether freezing in place the current state of nuclear ambiguity (i.e.. non-weaponized deterrence) is compatible with crisis stability. The essay argues that, absent additional steps to manage nuclear deterrence in South Asia, current U.S policy could actually increase. not decrease, the chances of nuclear war.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1996
Accession Number
ADA441119

Entities

People

  • Jerry Stacy

Organizations

  • National War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Aircrafts
  • Ambiguity
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Asia
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Command And Control
  • Command And Control Systems
  • Fissile Materials
  • Military Exercises
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Pakistan
  • South Asia
  • Training
  • Treaties
  • Warning Systems

Readers

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security
  • Strategic Security Studies